{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_77338/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_77338","id":"gutenberg_77338","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/77338","summary":null,"tags":["Philosophy, English -- 17th century"],"text":"------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note:\n\nThis version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.\nItalics are delimited with the \u2018_\u2019 character as _italic_.\n\nFootnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are\nreferenced.\n\nMinor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please\nsee the transcriber\u2019s note at the end of this text for details regarding\nthe handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.\n\n THE\n\n ENGLISH WORKS\n\n OF\n\n THOMAS HOBBES\n\n OF MALMESBURY;\n\n NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED\n\n BY\n\n SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.\n\n -------\n\n VOL. VI.\n\n -------\n\n\n\n\n LONDON:\n JOHN BOHN,\n HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.\n\n --\n\n MDCCCXL.\n\n\n\n\n LONDON:\n C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN\u2019S LANE.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n CONTENTS.\n\n A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws\n of England 1\n\n\n Behemoth: the History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England 161\n\n\n The Whole Art of Rhetoric 419\n\n\n The Art of Rhetoric, plainly set forth with pertinent examples\n for the more easy understanding of the same 511\n\n\n The Art of Sophistry 529\n\n\n\n\n A\n\n DIALOGUE\n\n BETWEEN\n\n A PHILOSOPHER & A STUDENT\n\n OF\n\n THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND.\n\n\n\n\n A DIALOGUE\n\n OF\n\n THE COMMON LAW.\n\n ==========\n\n[Sidenote: Of the law of reason.]\n\n_Lawyer._ What makes you say, that the study of the law is less rational\nthan the study of the mathematics?\n\n_Philosopher._ I say not that; for all study is rational, or nothing\nworth: but I say, that the great masters of the _mathematics_ do not so\noften err as the great professors of the law.\n\n_L._ If you had applied your reason to the law, perhaps you would have\nbeen of another mind.\n\n_P._ In whatsoever study, I examine whether my inference be rational:\nand have looked over the titles of the statutes from Magna Charta\ndownward to this present time. I left not one unread, which I thought\nmight concern myself; which was enough for me, that meant not to plead\nfor any but myself. But I did not much examine which of them was more or\nless rational; because I read them not to dispute, but to obey them, and\nsaw in all of them sufficient reason for my obedience, and that the same\nreason, though the Statutes themselves were changed, remained constant.\nI have also diligently read over Littleton\u2019s book of _Tenures_, with the\ncommentaries thereupon of the renowned lawyer Sir Edward Coke; in which\nI confess I found great subtilty, not of the law, but of inference from\nlaw, and especially from the law of human nature, which is the law of\nreason: and I confess that it is truth which he says in the epilogue to\nhis book, that by arguments and reason in the law, a man shall sooner\ncome to the certainty and knowledge of the law: and I agree with Sir\nEdward Coke, who upon that text farther says, that reason is the soul of\nthe law; and upon section 138, _nihil, quod est contra rationem, est\nlicitum_; that is to say, nothing is law that is against reason; and\nthat reason is the life of the law, nay the common law itself is nothing\nelse but reason; and upon section 21, _\u00e6quitas est perfecta qu\u00e6dam\nratio, qu\u00e6 jus scriptum interpretatur et emendat, nulla scriptura\ncomprehensa, sed solum in vera ratione consistens_; _i. e._ Equity is a\ncertain perfect reason, that interpreteth and amendeth the law written,\nitself being unwritten, and consisting in nothing else but right reason.\nWhen I consider this, and find it to be true, and so evident as not to\nbe denied by any man of right sense, I find my own reason at a stand;\nfor it frustrates all the laws in the world. For upon this ground any\nman, of any law whatsoever, may say it is against reason, and thereupon\nmake a pretence for his disobedience. I pray you clear this passage,\nthat we may proceed.\n\n_L._ I clear it thus, out of Sir Edward Coke (I. Inst. sect. 138), that\nthis is to be understood of an artificial perfection of reason, gotten\nby long study, observation, and experience, and not of every man\u2019s\nnatural reason; for _nemo nascitur artifex_. This legal reason is _summa\nratio_; and therefore if all the reason that is dispersed into so many\nseveral heads, were united into one, yet could he not make such a law as\nthe law of England is; because by so many successions of ages it hath\nbeen fined and refined by an infinite number of grave and learned men.\n\n_P._ This does not clear the place, as being partly obscure, and partly\nuntrue. That the reason which is the life of the law, should be not\nnatural, but artificial, I cannot conceive. I understand well enough,\nthat the knowledge of the law is gotten by much study, as all other\nsciences are, which when they are studied and obtained, it is still done\nby natural, and not by artificial reason. I grant you, that the\nknowledge of the law is an art; but not that any art of one man, or of\nmany, how wise soever they be, or the work of one or more artificers,\nhow perfect soever it be, is law. It is not wisdom, but authority that\nmakes a law. Obscure also are the words _legal reason_. There is no\nreason in earthly creatures, but human reason. But I suppose that he\nmeans, that the reason of a judge, or of all the judges together without\nthe King, is that _summa ratio_, and the very law: which I deny, because\nnone can make a law but he that hath the legislative power. That the law\nhath been fined by grave and learned men, meaning the professors of the\nlaw, is manifestly untrue; for all the laws of England have been made by\nthe kings of England, consulting with the nobility and commons in\nparliament, of which not one of twenty was a learned lawyer.\n\n_L._ You speak of the statute law, and I speak of the common law.\n\n_P._ I speak generally of law.\n\n_L._ Thus far I agree with you, that statute law taken away, there would\nnot be left, either here, or any where, any law at all that would\nconduce to the peace of a nation; yet equity and reason, (laws Divine\nand eternal, which oblige all men at all times, and in all places),\nwould still remain, but be obeyed by few: and though the breach of them\nbe not punished in this world, yet they will be punished sufficiently in\nthe world to come. Sir Edward Coke, for drawing to the men of his own\nprofession as much authority as lawfully he might, is not to be\nreprehended; but to the gravity and learning of the judges they ought to\nhave added in the making of laws, the authority of the King, which hath\nthe sovereignty: for of these laws of reason, every subject that is in\nhis wits, is bound to take notice at his peril, because reason is part\nof his nature, which he continually carries about with him, and may read\nit, if he will.\n\n_P._ It is very true; and upon this ground, if I pretend within a month\nor two to make myself able to perform the office of a judge, you are not\nto think it arrogance; for you are to allow to me, as well as to other\nmen, my pretence to reason, which is the common law, (remember this,\nthat I may not need again to put you in mind, that reason is the common\nlaw): and for statute law, seeing it is printed, and that there be\nindexes to point me to every matter contained in them, I think a man may\nprofit in them very much in two months.\n\n_L._ But you will be but an ill pleader.\n\n_P._ A pleader commonly thinks he ought to say all he can for the\nbenefit of his client, and therefore has need of a faculty to wrest the\nsense of words from their true meaning, and the faculty of _rhetoric_ to\nseduce the jury, and sometimes the judge also, and many other arts which\nI neither have, nor intend to study.\n\n_L._ But let the judge, how good soever he thinks his reasoning, take\nheed that he depart not too much from the letter of the statute: for it\nis not without danger.\n\n_P._ He may without danger recede from the letter, if he do not from the\nmeaning and sense of the law; which may be by a learned man, (such as\njudges commonly are,) easily found out by the preamble, the time when it\nwas made, and the incommodities for which it was made. But I pray tell\nme, to what end were statute laws ordained, seeing the law of reason\nought to be applied to every controversy that can arise.\n\n_L._ You are not ignorant of the force of an irregular appetite to\nriches, to power, and to sensual pleasures, how it masters the strongest\nreason, and is the root of disobedience, slaughter, fraud, hypocrisy,\nand all manner of evil habits; and that the laws of man, though they can\npunish the fruits of them, which are evil actions, yet they cannot pluck\nup the roots that are in the heart. How can a man be indicted of\navarice, envy, hypocrisy, or other vicious habit, till it be declared by\nsome action which a witness may take notice of? The root remaining, new\nfruit will come forth, till you be weary of punishing, and at last\ndestroy all power that shall oppose it.\n\n_P._ What hope then is there of a constant peace in any nation, or\nbetween one nation and another?\n\n_L._ You are not to expect such a peace between two nations; because\nthere is no common power in this world to punish their injustice. Mutual\nfear may keep them quiet for a time; but upon every visible advantage\nthey will invade one another; and the most visible advantage is then,\nwhen the one nation is obedient to their king, and the other not. But\npeace at home may then be expected durable, when the common people shall\nbe made to see the benefit they shall receive by their obedience and\nadhesion to their own sovereign, and the harm they must suffer by taking\npart with them, who by promises of reformation, or change of government,\ndeceive them. And this is properly to be done by divines, and from\narguments not only from reason, but also from the Holy Scripture.\n\n_P._ This that you say is true, but not very much to that I aim at by\nyour conversation, which is to inform myself concerning the laws of\nEngland. Therefore I ask you again, what is the end of statute-laws?\n\n[Sidenote: Of sovereign power.]\n\n_L._ I say then that the scope of all human law is peace, and justice in\nevery nation amongst themselves, and defence against foreign enemies.\n\n_P._ But what is justice?\n\n_L._ Justice is giving to every man his own.\n\n_P._ The definition is good, and yet it is Aristotle\u2019s. What is the\ndefinition agreed upon as a principle in the science of the common law?\n\n_L._ The same with that of Aristotle.\n\n_P._ See, you lawyers, how much you are beholden to the philosopher; and\nit is but reason; for the more general and noble science and law of all\nthe world, is true philosophy, of which the common law of England is a\nvery little part.\n\n_L._ It is so, if you mean by philosophy nothing but the study of\nreason; as I think you do.\n\n_P._ When you say that justice gives to every man his own, what mean you\nby his own? How can that be given me, which is my own already? Or, if it\nbe not my own, how can justice make it mine?\n\n_L._ Without law, every thing is in such sort every man\u2019s, as he may\ntake, possess, and enjoy, without wrong to any man; every thing, lands,\nbeasts, fruits, and even the bodies of other men, if his reason tell him\nhe cannot otherwise live securely. For the dictates of reason are little\nworth, if they tended not to the preservation and improvement of men\u2019s\nlives. Seeing then without human law all things would be common, and\nthis community a cause of encroachment, envy, slaughter, and continual\nwar of one upon another, the same law of reason dictates to mankind, for\ntheir own preservation, a distribution of lands and goods, that each man\nmay know what is proper to him, so as none other might pretend a right\nthereunto, or disturb him in the use of the same. This distribution is\njustice, and this properly is the same which we say is one\u2019s own; by\nwhich you may see the great necessity there was of statute laws, for\npreservation of all mankind. It is also a dictate of the law of reason,\nthat statute laws are a necessary means of the safety and well-being of\nman in the present world, and are to be obeyed by all subjects, as the\nlaw of reason ought to be obeyed, both by King and subjects, because it\nis the law of God.\n\n_P._ All this is very rational; but how can any laws secure one man from\nanother, when the greatest part of men are so unreasonable, and so\npartial to themselves as they are, and the laws of themselves are but a\ndead letter, which of itself is not able to compel a man to do otherwise\nthan himself pleaseth, nor punish or hurt him when he hath done a\nmischief?\n\n_L._ By the laws, I mean laws living and armed. For you must suppose,\nthat a nation that is subdued by war to an absolute submission to a\nconqueror, may, by the same arm that compelled it to submission, be\ncompelled to obey his laws. Also, if a nation choose a man, or an\nassembly of men, to govern them by laws, it must furnish him also with\narmed men and money, and all things necessary to his office; or else his\nlaws will be of no force, and the nation remains, as before it was, in\nconfusion. It is not therefore the word of the law, but the power of a\nman that has the strength of a nation, that make the laws effectual. It\nwas not Solon that made Athenian laws, though he devised them, but the\nsupreme court of the people; nor, the lawyers of Rome that made the\nimperial law in Justinian\u2019s time, but Justinian himself.\n\n_P._ We agree then in this, that in England it is the King that makes\nthe laws, whosoever pens them; and in this, that the King cannot make\nhis laws effectual, nor defend his people against their enemies, without\na power to levy soldiers; and consequently, that he may lawfully, as oft\nas he shall really think it necessary to raise an army, (which in some\noccasions be very great) I say, raise it, and money to maintain it. I\ndoubt not but you will allow this to be according to the law, at least\nof reason.\n\n_L._ For my part I allow it. But you have heard how, in and before the\nlate troubles the people were of another mind. Shall the King, said\nthey, take from us what he pleases, upon pretence of a necessity whereof\nhe makes himself the judge? What worse condition can we be in from an\nenemy? What can they take from us more than what they list?\n\n_P._ The people reason ill. They do not know in what condition we were,\nin the time of the Conqueror, when it was a shame to be an Englishman;\nwho, if he grumbled at the base offices he was put to by his Norman\nmasters, received no other answer than this, _thou art but an\nEnglishman_. Nor can the people, nor any man that humours their\ndisobedience, produce any example of a King that ever raised any\nexcessive sums, either by himself or by the consent of his Parliament,\nbut when they had great need thereof; nor can show any reason that might\nmove any of them so to do. The greatest complaint by them made against\nthe unthriftiness of their Kings, was for the enriching now and then a\nfavourite, which to the wealth of the kingdom was inconsiderable, and\nthe complaint but envy. But in this point of raising soldiers, what is,\nI pray you, the statute law?\n\n_L._ The last statute concerning it, is 13 _Car._ II. cap. 6, by which\nthe supreme government, command, and disposing of the militia of\nEngland, is delivered to be, and always to have been, the ancient right\nof the Kings of England. But there is also in the same act a proviso,\nthat this shall not be construed for a declaration, that the King may\ntransport his subjects, or compel them to march out of the kingdom; nor\nis it, on the contrary, declared to be unlawful.\n\n_P._ Why is not that also determined?\n\n_L._ I can imagine cause enough for it, though I may be deceived. We\nlove to have our King amongst us, and not to be governed by deputies,\neither of our own or another nation. But this I verily believe, that if\na foreign enemy should either invade us, or put himself into a readiness\nto invade either England, Ireland, or Scotland, no Parliament then\nsitting, and the King send English soldiers thither, the Parliament\nwould give him thanks for it. The subjects of those Kings who affect the\nglory, and imitate the actions, of Alexander the Great, have not always\nthe most comfortable lives, nor do such Kings usually very long enjoy\ntheir conquests. They march to and fro perpetually, as upon a plank\nsustained only in the midst; and when one end rises, down goes the\nother.\n\n_P._ It is well. But where soldiers, in the judgment of the King\u2019s\nconscience, are indeed necessary, as in an insurrection, or rebellion at\nhome; how shall the kingdom be preserved without a considerable army\nready and in pay? How shall money be raised for this army, especially\nwhen the want of public treasure inviteth neighbour Kings to encroach,\nand unruly subjects to rebel?\n\n_L._ I cannot tell. It is matter of polity, not of law. But I know, that\nthere be statutes express, whereby the King hath obliged himself never\nto levy money upon his subjects without the consent of his Parliament.\nOne of which statutes is 25 _Edw._ I. c. 6, in these words: _We have\ngranted for us, and our heirs, as well to archbishops, bishops, abbots,\npriors, and other folk of holy Church, as also to earls, barons, and to\nall the commonalty of the land, that for no business from henceforth, we\nshall take such aids, tasks, or prizes, but by the common consent of the\nrealm_. There is also another statute of _Edward_ I. (34 _Edw._ I. stat.\n4) in these words: _No tallage, or aid shall be taken or levied by us or\nour heirs in our realm, without the good will and assent of the\narchbishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other\nfreemen of the land_; which statutes have been since that time confirmed\nby divers other Kings, and lastly by the King that now reigneth.\n\n_P._ All this I know, and am not satisfied. I am one of the common\npeople, and one of that almost infinite number of men, for whose welfare\nKings and other sovereigns were by God ordained: for God made Kings for\nthe people, and not people for Kings. How shall I be defended from the\ndomineering of proud and insolent strangers that speak another language,\nthat scorn us, that seek to make us slaves, or how shall I avoid the\ndestruction that may arise from the cruelty of factions in a civil war,\nunless the King, to whom alone, you say, belongeth the right of levying\nand disposing of the militia by which only it can be prevented, have\nready money, upon all occasions, to arm and pay as many soldiers, as for\nthe present defence, or the peace of the people, shall be necessary?\nShall not I, and you, and every man be undone? Tell me not of a\nParliament, when there is no Parliament sitting, or perhaps none in\nbeing, which may often happen. And when there is a Parliament, if the\nspeaking and leading men should have a design to put down monarchy, as\nthey had in the Parliament which began to sit the third of November,\n1640, shall the King, who is to answer to God Almighty for the safety of\nthe people, and to that end is intrusted with the power to levy and\ndispose of the soldiery, be disabled to perform his office, by virtue of\nthese acts of Parliament which you have cited? If this be reason, it is\nreason also that the people be abandoned, or left at liberty to kill one\nanother, even to the last man; if it be not reason, then you have\ngranted it is not law.\n\n_L._ It is true, if you mean _recta ratio_; but _recta ratio_, which I\ngrant to be law, as Sir Edward Coke says, (1 _Inst._ sect. 138), is an\nartificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and\nexperience, and not every man\u2019s natural reason; for _nemo nascitur\nartifex_. This legal reason is _summa ratio_; and therefore, if all the\nreason that is dispersed into so many several heads, were united into\none, yet could he not make such a law as the law of England is, because\nby many successions of ages it hath been fined and refined by an\ninfinite number of grave and learned men. And this is it, he calls the\ncommon law.\n\n_P._ Do you think this to be good doctrine? Though it be true, that no\nman is born with the use of reason, yet all men may grow up to it as\nwell as lawyers; and when they have applied their reason to the laws,\n(which were laws before they studied them, or else it was not law they\nstudied), may be as fit for and capable of judicature, as Sir Edward\nCoke himself, who whether he had more or less use of reason, was not\nthereby a judge, but because the King made him so. And whereas he says,\nthat a man who should have as much reason as is dispersed in so many\nseveral heads, could not make such a law as this law of England is; if\none should ask him who made the law of England, would he say a\nsuccession of English lawyers or judges made it, or rather a succession\nof kings? And that upon their own reason, either solely, or with the\nadvice of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, without the judges or\nother professors of the law? You see therefore that the King\u2019s reason,\nbe it more or less, is that _anima legis_, that _summa lex_, whereof Sir\nEdward Coke speaketh, and not the reason, learning, or wisdom of the\njudges. But you may see, that quite through his _Institutes of Law_, he\noften takes occasion to magnify the learning of the lawyers, whom he\nperpetually termeth the sages of the Parliament, or of the King\u2019s\ncouncil. Therefore unless you say otherwise, I say, that the King\u2019s\nreason, when it is publicly upon advice and deliberation declared, is\nthat _anima legis_; and that _summa ratio_ and that equity, which all\nagree to be the law of reason, is all that is or ever was law in\nEngland, since it became Christian, besides the Bible.\n\n_L._ Are not the Canons of the Church part of the law of England, as\nalso the imperial law used in the Admiralty, and the customs of\nparticular places, and the by-laws of corporations and courts of\njudicature?\n\n_P._ Why not? For they were all constituted by the Kings of England; and\nthough the civil law used in the Admiralty were at first the statutes of\nthe Roman empire, yet because they are in force by no other authority\nthan that of the King, they are now the King\u2019s laws, and the King\u2019s\nstatutes. The same we may say of the Canons; such of them as we have\nretained, made by the Church of Rome, have been no law, nor of any force\nin England, since the beginning of Queen Elizabeth\u2019s reign, but by\nvirtue of the great seal of England.\n\n_L._ In the said statutes that restrain the levying of money without\nconsent of Parliament, is there any thing you can take exceptions to?\n\n_P._ No. I am satisfied that the kings that grant such liberties, are\nbound to make them good, so far as it may be done without sin: but if a\nKing find that by such a grant he be disabled to protect his subjects,\nif he maintain his grant, he sins; and therefore may, and ought to take\nno notice of the said grant. For such grants, as by error or false\nsuggestion are gotten from him, are, as the lawyers do confess, void and\nof no effect, and ought to be recalled. Also the King, as is on all\nhands confessed, hath the charge lying upon him to protect his people\nagainst foreign enemies, and to keep the peace betwixt them within the\nkingdom: if he do not his utmost endeavour to discharge himself thereof,\nhe committeth a sin, which neither King nor Parliament can lawfully\ncommit.\n\n_L._ No man, I think, will deny this. For if levying of money be\nnecessary, it is a sin in the Parliament to refuse; if unnecessary, it\nis a sin both in King and Parliament to levy. But for all that, it may\nbe, and I think it is, a sin in any one that hath the sovereign power,\nbe he one man or one assembly, being intrusted with the safety of a\nwhole nation, if rashly, and relying upon his own natural sufficiency,\nhe make war or peace, without consulting with such, as by their\nexperience and employment abroad, and intelligence by letters, or other\nmeans, have gotten the knowledge in some measure of the strength,\nadvantages, and designs of the enemy, and the manner and the degree of\nthe danger that may from thence arise. In like manner, in case of\nrebellion at home, if he consult not with those of military condition;\nwhich if he do, then I think he may lawfully proceed to subdue all such\nenemies and rebels; and that the soldiers ought to go on without\ninquiring whether they be within the country, or without. For who shall\nsuppress rebellion, but he that hath right to levy, command, and dispose\nof the militia? The last Long Parliament denied this. But why? Because\nby the major part of their votes the rebellion was raised with the\ndesign to put down monarchy, and to that end maintained.\n\n_P._ Nor do I hereby lay any aspersion upon such grants of the King and\nhis ancestors. Those statutes are in themselves very good for the King\nand the people, as creating some kind of difficulty for such Kings as,\nfor the glory of conquest, might spend one part of their subjects' lives\nand estates in molesting other nations, and leave the rest to destroy\nthemselves at home by factions. That which I here find fault with, is\nthe wresting of those, and other such statutes, to the binding of our\nKings from the use of their armies in the necessary defence of\nthemselves and their people. The late Long Parliament, that in 1648\nmurdered their King, (a King that sought no greater glory upon earth,\nbut to be indulgent to his people, and a pious defender of the Church of\nEngland,) no sooner took upon them the sovereign power, than they levied\nmoney upon the people at their own discretion. Did any of their subjects\ndispute their power? Did they not send soldiers over the sea to subdue\nIreland, and others to fight against the Dutch at sea; or made they any\ndoubt but to be obeyed in all that they commanded, as a right absolutely\ndue to the sovereign power in whomsoever it resides? I say not this as\nallowing their actions, but as a testimony from the mouths of those very\nmen that denied the same power to him whom they acknowledged to have\nbeen their sovereign immediately before; which is a sufficient proof,\nthat the people of England never doubted of the King\u2019s right to levy\nmoney for the maintenance of his armies, till they were abused in it by\nseditious teachers, and other prating men, on purpose to turn the State\nand Church into popular government, where the most ignorant and boldest\ntalkers do commonly obtain the best preferments. Again, when their new\nrepublic returned into monarchy by Oliver, who durst deny him money upon\nany pretence of _Magna Charta_, or of these other acts of Parliament\nwhich you have cited? You may therefore think it good law, for all your\nbooks, that the King of England may at all times, that he thinks in his\nconscience it will be necessary for the defence of his people, levy as\nmany soldiers and as much money as he please, and that himself is judge\nof the necessity.\n\n_L._ Is there nobody hearkening at the door?\n\n_P._ What are you afraid of?\n\n_L._ I mean to say the same that you say: but there be very many yet,\nthat hold their former principles, whom neither the calamities of the\ncivil wars, nor their former pardon, have thoroughly cured of their\nmadness.\n\n_P._ The common people never take notice of what they hear of this\nnature, but when they are set on by such as they think wise; that is, by\nsome sorts of preachers, or some that seem to be learned in the laws,\nand withal speak evil of the governors. But what if the King, upon the\nsight or apprehension of any great danger to his people, (as when their\nneighbours are borne down by the current of a conquering enemy), should\nthink his own people might be involved in the same misery; may he not\nlevy, pay, and transport soldiers to help those weak neighbours, by way\nof prevention to save his own people and himself from servitude? Is that\na sin?\n\n_L._ First, if the war upon our neighbour be just, it may be questioned\nwhether it be equity or no to assist them against the right.\n\n_P._ For my part, I make no question of that at all, unless the invader\nwill, and can, put me in security, that neither he nor his successors\nshall make any advantage of the conquest of my neighbour, to do the same\nto me in time to come. But there is no common power to bind them to the\npeace.\n\n_L._ Secondly, when such a thing shall happen, the Parliament will not\nrefuse to contribute freely to the safety of themselves and the whole\nnation.\n\n_P._ It may be so, and it may be not; for if a Parliament then sit not,\nit must be called; that requires six weeks' time; debating and\ncollecting what is given requires as much, and in this time the\nopportunity perhaps is lost. Besides, how many wretched souls have we\nheard to say in the late troubles; what matter is it who gets the\nvictory? We can pay but what they please to demand, and so much we pay\nnow. And this they will murmur, as they have ever done, whosoever shall\nreign over them, as long as their covetousness and ignorance hold\ntogether; which will be till doomsday, if better order be not taken for\ntheir instruction in their duty, both from reason and religion.\n\n_L._ For all this I find it somewhat hard, that a King should have right\nto take from his subjects, upon the pretence of necessity, what he\npleaseth.\n\n_P._ I know what it is that troubles your conscience in this point. All\nmen are troubled at the crossing of their wishes; but it is our own\nfault. First, we wish impossibilities; we would have our security\nagainst all the world upon right of property, without paying for it;\nthis is impossible. We may as well expect that fish and fowl should\nboil, roast, and dish themselves, and come to the table, and that grapes\nshould squeeze themselves into our mouths, and have all other the\ncontentments and ease which some pleasant men have related of the land\nof Cocagne. Secondly, there is no nation in the world where he or they\nthat have the sovereignty, do not take what money they please for the\ndefence of those respective nations, when they think it necessary for\ntheir safety. The late Long Parliament denied this; but why? Because\nthere was a design amongst them to depose the King. Thirdly, there is no\nexample of any King of England that I have read of, that ever pretended\nany such necessity for levying money against his conscience. The\ngreatest sums that ever were levied, comparing the value of money, as it\nwas at that time, with what it is now, were levied by King Edward III\nand King Henry V; kings in whom we glory now, and think their actions\ngreat ornaments to the English history. Lastly, as to the enriching now\nand then a favourite, it is neither sensible to the kingdom, nor is any\ntreasure thereby conveyed out of the realm, but so spent as it falls\ndown again upon the common people. To think that our condition being\nhuman should be subject to no incommodity, were injuriously to quarrel\nwith God Almighty for our own faults.\n\n_L._ I know not what to say.\n\n_P._ If you allow this that I have said, then say, that the people never\nwere, shall be, or ought to be, free from being taxed at the will of one\nor other; that if civil war come, they must levy all they have, and that\ndearly, from the one or from the other, or from both sides. Say, that\nadhering to the King, their victory is an end of their trouble; that\nadhering to his enemies there is no end; for the war will continue by a\nperpetual subdivision, and when it ends, they will be in the same estate\nthey were before. That they are often abused by men who to them seem\nwise, when then their wisdom is nothing else but envy of those that are\nin grace and in profitable employments; and that those men do but abuse\nthe common people to their own ends, that set up a private man\u2019s\npropriety against the public safety. But say withal, that the King is\nsubject to the laws of God, both written and unwritten, and to no other;\nand so was William the Conqueror, whose right is all descended to our\npresent King.\n\n_L._ As to the law of reason, which is equity, it is sure enough there\nis but one legislator, which is God.\n\n_P._ It followeth, then, that which you call the common law, distinct\nfrom statute law, is nothing else but the law of God.\n\n_L._ In some sense it is; but it is not Gospel, but natural reason, and\nnatural equity.\n\n_P._ Would you have every man to every other man allege for law his own\nparticular reason? There is not amongst men a universal reason agreed\nupon in any nation, besides the reason of him that hath the sovereign\npower. Yet though his reason be but the reason of one man, yet it is set\nup to supply the place of that universal reason, which is expounded to\nus by our Saviour in the Gospel; and consequently our King is to us the\nlegislator both of statute-law, and of common-law.\n\n_L._ Yes, I know that the laws spiritual, which have been law in this\nkingdom since the abolishing of popery, are the King\u2019s laws, and those\nalso that were made before. For the Canons of the Church of Rome were no\nlaws, neither here, nor anywhere else without the Pope\u2019s temporal\ndominions, farther than kings and states in their several dominions\nrespectively did make them so.\n\n_P._ I grant that. But you must grant also, that those spiritual laws\nwere made by the legislators of the spiritual law. And yet not all kings\nand states make laws by consent of the Lords and Commons; but our King\nhere is so far bound to their assents, as he shall judge conducing to\nthe good and safety of his people. For example, if the Lords and Commons\nshould advise him to restore those laws spiritual, which in Queen Mary\u2019s\ntime were in force, I think the King were by the law of reason obliged,\nwithout the help of any other law of God, to neglect such advice.\n\n_L._ I grant you that the King is sole legislator; but with this\nrestriction, that if he will not consult with the Lords of Parliament,\nand hear the complaints and informations of the Commons, that are best\nacquainted with their own wants, he sinneth against God, though he\ncannot be compelled to any thing by his subjects by arms and force.\n\n_P._ We are agreed upon that already. Since therefore the King is sole\nlegislator, I think it also reason he should be sole supreme judge.\n\n[Sidenote: The King is the supreme judge.]\n\n_L._ There is no doubt of that; for otherwise there would be no\ncongruity of judgments with the laws. I grant also that he is the\nsupreme judge over all persons, and in all causes civil and\necclesiastical within his own dominions; not only by act of Parliament\nat this time, but that he has ever been so by the common law. For the\njudges of both the Benches have their offices by the King\u2019s\nletters-patent; and so as to judicature have the bishops. Also the Lord\nChancellor hath his office by receiving from the King the Great Seal of\nEngland. And, to say all at once, there is no magistrate, or\ncommissioner for public business, neither of judicature nor execution,\nin State or Church, in peace or war, but he is made so by authority from\nthe King.\n\n_P._ It is true; but perhaps you may think otherwise, when you read such\nacts of parliament, as say, that the King shall have power and authority\nto do this or that by virtue of that act, as _Elizabeth_ c. I. \u201cthat\nyour highness, your heirs, and successors, Kings, or Queens of this\nrealm, shall have full power and authority, by virtue of this act, by\nletters-patent under the great seal of England, to assign, &c.\u201d Was it\nnot this Parliament that gave this authority to the Queen?\n\n_L._ No. For the statute in this clause is no more than, as Sir Edward\nCoke useth to speak, an affirmance of the common-law. For she being head\nof the Church of England, might make commissioners for the deciding of\nmatters ecclesiastical, as freely as if she had been Pope, who did, you\nknow, pretend his right from the law of God.\n\n_P._ We have hitherto spoken of laws without considering anything of the\nnature and essence of a law; and now unless we define the word _law_, we\ncan go no farther without ambiguity and fallacy, which will be but loss\nof time; whereas, on the contrary, the agreement upon our words will\nenlighten all we have to say hereafter.\n\n_L._ I do not remember the definition of _law_ in any statute.\n\n_P._ I think so: for the statutes were made by authority, and not drawn\nfrom any other principles than the care of the safety of the people.\nStatutes are not philosophy, as is the common-law, and other disputable\narts, but are commands or prohibitions, which ought to be obeyed,\nbecause assented to by submission made to the Conqueror here in England,\nand to whosoever had the sovereign power in other commonwealths; so that\nthe positive laws of all places are statutes. The definition of law was\ntherefore unnecessary for the makers of statutes, though very necessary\nto them whose work it is to teach the sense of the law.\n\n_L._ There is an accurate definition of a law in Bracton, cited by Sir\nEdward Coke: _Lex est sanctio justa, jubens honesta, et prohibens\ncontraria_.\n\n_P._ That is to say, law is a just statute, commanding those things\nwhich are honest, and forbidding the contrary. From whence it followeth,\nthat in all cases it must be the honesty or dishonesty that makes the\ncommand a law; whereas you know that but for the law we could not, as\nsaith St. Paul, have known what is sin. Therefore this definition is no\nground at all for any farther discourse of law. Besides, you know the\nrule of honest and dishonest refers to honour, and that it is justice\nonly, and injustice, that the law respecteth. But that which I most\nexcept against in this definition, is, that it supposes that a statute\nmade by the sovereign power of a nation may be unjust. There may indeed\nin a statute-law, made by men, be found iniquity, but not injustice.\n\n_L._ This is somewhat subtile. I pray deal plainly. What is the\ndifference between injustice and iniquity?\n\n_P._ I pray you tell me first, what is the difference between a court of\njustice, and a court of equity?\n\n_L._ A court of justice is that which hath cognizance of such causes as\nare to be ended by the positive laws of the land; and a court of equity\nis that, to which belong such causes as are to be determined by equity;\nthat is to say, by the law of reason.\n\n_P._ You see then that the difference between injustice and iniquity is\nthis; that injustice is the transgression of a statute-law, and iniquity\nthe transgression of the law of reason. But perhaps you mean by\ncommon-law, not the law itself, but the manner of proceeding in the law,\nas to matter of fact, by twelve men, freeholders; though those twelve\nmen are no court of equity, nor of justice, because they determine not\nwhat is just or unjust, but only whether it be done or not done; and\ntheir judgment is nothing else but a confirmation of that which is\nproperly the judgment of the witnesses. For to speak exactly, there\ncannot possibly be any judge of fact besides the witnesses.\n\n_L._ How would you have a law defined?\n\n_P._ Thus; a law is the command of him or them that have the sovereign\npower, given to those that be his or their subjects, declaring publicly\nand plainly what every of them may do, and what they must forbear to do.\n\n_L._ Seeing all judges in all courts ought to judge according to equity,\nwhich is the law of reason, a distinct court of equity seemeth to me to\nbe unnecessary, and but a burthen to the people, since common-law and\nequity are the same law.\n\n_P._ It were so indeed, if judges could not err; but since they may err,\nand that the King is not bound to any other law but that of equity, it\nbelongs to him alone to give remedy to them that, by the ignorance or\ncorruption of a judge, shall suffer damage.\n\n_L._ By your definition of a law, the King\u2019s proclamation under the\nGreat Seal of England is a law; for it is a command, and public, and of\nthe sovereign to his subjects.\n\n_P._ Why not, if he think it necessary for the good of his subjects? For\nthis is a maxim at the common-law alleged by Sir Edward Coke himself, (I\nInst. sect. 306), _Quando lex aliquid concedit, concedere videtur et id\nper quod devenitur ad illud_. And you know out of the same author, that\ndivers Kings of England have often, to the petitions in Parliament which\nthey granted, annexed such exceptions as these, _unless there be\nnecessity, saving our regality_; which I think should be always\nunderstood, though they be not expressed; and are understood so by\ncommon lawyers, who agree that the King may recall any grant wherein he\nwas deceived.\n\n_L._ Again, whereas you make it of the essence of a law to be publicly\nand plainly declared to the people, I see no necessity for that. Are not\nall subjects bound to take notice of all acts of Parliament, when no act\ncan pass without their consent?\n\n_P._ If you had said that no act could pass without their knowledge,\nthen indeed they had been bound to take notice of them; but none can\nhave knowledge of them but the members of the houses of Parliament;\ntherefore the rest of the people are excused. Or else the knights of the\nshire should be bound to furnish people with a sufficient number of\ncopies, at the people\u2019s charge, of the acts of Parliament, at their\nreturn into the country; that every man may resort to them, and by\nthemselves, or friends, take notice of what they are obliged to. For\notherwise it were impossible they should be obeyed: and that no man is\nbound to do a thing impossible, is one of Sir Edward Coke\u2019s maxims at\nthe common-law. I know that most of the statutes are printed; but it\ndoes not appear that every man is bound to buy the book of statutes, nor\nto search for them at Westminster or at the Tower, nor to understand the\nlanguage wherein they are for the most part written.\n\n_L._ I grant it proceeds from their own faults; but no man can be\nexcused by ignorance of the law of reason, that is to say, by ignorance\nof the common-law, except children, madmen, and idiots. But you exact\nsuch a notice of the statute-law, as is almost impossible. Is it not\nenough that they in all places have a sufficient number of the penal\nstatutes?\n\n_P._ Yes; if they have those penal statutes near them. But what reason\ncan you give me why there should not be as many copies abroad of the\nstatutes, as there be of the Bible?\n\n_L._ I think it were well that every man that can read, had a\nstatute-book; for certainly no knowledge of those laws, by which men\u2019s\nlives and fortunes can be brought into danger, can be too much. I find a\ngreat fault in your definition of law; which is, that every law either\nforbiddeth or commandeth something. It is true that the moral law is\nalways a command or a prohibition, or at least implieth it. But in the\nLevitical law, where it is said that he that stealeth a sheep shall\nrestore fourfold, what command or prohibition lieth in these words?\n\n_P._ Such sentences as that are not in themselves general, but\njudgments; nevertheless, there is in those words implied a commandment\nto the judge, to cause to be made a fourfold restitution.\n\n_L._ That is right.\n\n_P._ Now define what justice is, and what actions and men are to be\ncalled just.\n\n_L._ Justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own; that\nis to say, of giving to every man that which is his right, in such\nmanner as to exclude the right of all men else to the same thing. A just\naction is that which is not against the law. A just man is he that hath\na constant will to live justly; if you require more, I doubt there will\nno man living be comprehended within the definition.\n\n_P._ Seeing then that a just action, according to your definition, is\nthat which is not against the law; it is manifest that before there was\na law, there could be no injustice; and therefore laws are in their\nnature antecedent to justice and injustice. And you cannot deny but\nthere must be law-makers, before there were any laws, and consequently\nbefore there was any justice, (I speak of human justice); and that\nlaw-makers were before that which you call _own_, or property of goods\nor lands, distinguished by _meum_, _tuum_, _alienum_.\n\n_L._ That must be granted; for without statute-laws, all men have right\nto all things; and we have had experience, when our laws were silenced\nby civil war, there was not a man, that of any goods could say assuredly\nthey were his own.\n\n_P._ You see then that no private man can claim a propriety in any\nlands, or other goods, from any title from any man but the King, or them\nthat have the sovereign power; because it is in virtue of the\nsovereignty, that every man may not enter into and possess what he\npleaseth; and consequently to deny the sovereign anything necessary to\nthe sustaining of his sovereign power, is to destroy the propriety he\npretends to. The next thing I will ask you is, how you distinguish\nbetween law and right, or _lex_ and _jus_.\n\n_L._ Sir Edward Coke in divers places makes _lex_ and _jus_ to be the\nsame, and so _lex communis_ and _jus communis_, to be all one; nor do I\nfind that he does in any place distinguish them.\n\n_P._ Then will I distinguish them, and make you judge whether my\ndistinction be not necessary to be known by every author of the\ncommon-law. For law obligeth me to do, or forbear the doing of\nsomething; and therefore it lays upon me an obligation. But my right is\na liberty left me by the law to do any thing which the law forbids me\nnot, and to leave undone any thing which the law commands me not. Did\nSir Edward Coke see no difference between being bound and being free?\n\n_L._ I know not what he saw, but he has not mentioned it. Though a man\nmay dispense with his own liberty, he cannot do so with the law.\n\n_P._ But what are you better for your right, if a rebellious company at\nhome, or an enemy from abroad, take away the goods, or dispossess you of\nthe lands you have a right to? Can you be defended or repaired, but by\nthe strength and authority of the King? What reason therefore can be\ngiven by a man that endeavours to preserve his propriety, why he should\ndeny or malignly contribute to the strength that should defend him or\nrepair him? Let us see now what your books say to this point, and other\npoints of the right of sovereignty. Bracton, the most authentic author\nof the common law, (fol. 55), saith thus: _Ipse Dominus Rex habet omnia\njura in manu sua, sicut Dei vicarius; habet etiam ea qu\u00e6 sunt pacis;\nhabet etiam coercionem, ut delinquentes puniat; item habet in potestate\nsua leges. Nihil enim prodest jura condere, nisi sit qui jura tueatur._\nThat is to say: Our Lord the King hath all right in his own hands; is\nGod\u2019s vicar; he has all that concerns the peace; he has the power to\npunish delinquents; all the laws are in his power: to make laws is to no\npurpose, unless there be somebody to make them obeyed. If Bracton\u2019s law\nbe reason, as I and you think it is, what temporal power is there which\nthe King hath not? Seeing that at this day all the power spiritual,\nwhich Bracton allows the Pope, is restored to the crown; what is there\nthat the King cannot do, excepting sin against the law of God? The same\nBracton, (_lib._ ii. _c._ 8, fol. 5), saith thus: _Si autem a Rege\npetatur, cum breve non currat contra ipsum, locus erit supplicationi\nquod factum suum corrigat et emendet; quod quidem si non fecerit, satis\nsufficit ei ad p\u0153nam, quod Dominum expectet ultorem: nemo quidem de\nfactis suis pr\u00e6sumat disputare, multo fortius contra factum suum\nvenire_. That is to say: If any thing be demanded of the King, seeing a\nwrit lieth not against him, he is put to his petition, praying him to\ncorrect and amend his own fact; which if he will not do, it is a\nsufficient penalty for him, that he is to expect a punishment from the\nLord: no man may presume to dispute of what he does, much less to resist\nhim. You see by this, that this doctrine concerning the rights of\nsovereignty, so much cried down by the Long Parliament, is the ancient\ncommon-law, and that the only bridle of the Kings of England, ought to\nbe the fear of God. And again, Bracton, (_lib._ ii. _c._ 24, fol. 55),\nsays, that the rights of the Crown cannot be granted away: _Ea vero qu\u00e6\njurisdictionis sunt et pacis, et ea qu\u00e6 sunt justiti\u00e6 et paci annexa, ad\nnullum pertinent nisi ad coronam et dignitatem Regiam, nec a corona\nseparari poterunt, nec a privata persona possideri_. This is to say:\nthose things which belong to jurisdiction and peace, and those things\nthat are annexed to justice and peace, appertain to none but to the\ncrown and dignity of the King, nor can be separated from the crown, nor\nbe possessed by a private person. Again, you will find in Fleta, a\nlaw-book written in the time of Edward II, that liberties, though\ngranted by the King, if they tend to the hinderance of justice, or\nsubversion of the regal power, were not to be used, nor allowed; for in\nthat book, (_lib._ i. c. 20, \u00a754) concerning articles of the crown,\nwhich the justices itinerant are to enquire of, the 54th article is\nthis: You shall inquire, _de libertatibus concessis qu\u00e6 impediunt\ncommunem justitiam, et Regiam potestatem subvertunt_. Now what is a\ngreater hinderance to common justice, or a greater subversion of the\nregal power, than a liberty in subjects to hinder the King from raising\nmoney necessary to suppress or prevent rebellions, which doth destroy\njustice, and subvert the power of the sovereignty? Moreover, when a\ncharter is granted by the King in these words: \u201c_Dedita etc. ... coram\netc. ... pro me et h\u00e6redibus meis_:\u201d the grantor by the common-law, as\nSir Edward Coke says in his Commentaries on Littleton, is to warrant his\ngift; and I think it reason, especially if the gift be upon\nconsideration of a price paid. Suppose a foreign state should lay claim\nto this kingdom, (it is no matter as to the question I am putting,\nwhether the claim be unjust), how would you have the King to warrant to\nevery freeholder in England the lands they hold of him by such a\ncharter? If he cannot levy money, their estates are lost, and so is the\nKing\u2019s estate; and if the King\u2019s estate be gone, how can he repair the\nvalue due upon the warranty? I know that the King\u2019s charters are not so\nmerely grants, as that they are not also laws; but they are such laws as\nspeak not to all the King\u2019s subjects in general, but only to his\nofficers; implicitly forbidding them to judge or execute any thing\ncontrary to the said grants. There be many men that are able judges of\nwhat is right reason, and what not; when any of these shall know that a\nman has no superior nor peer in the kingdom, he will hardly be persuaded\nhe can be bound by any law of the kingdom, or that he who is subject to\nnone but God, can make a law upon himself, which he cannot also as\neasily abrogate as he made it. The main argument, and that which so much\ntaketh with the throng of people, proceedeth from a needless fear put\ninto their minds by such men as mean to make use of their hands to their\nown ends. For if, say they, the King may notwithstanding the law do what\nhe please, and nothing to restrain him but the fear of punishment in the\nworld to come, then, in case there come a king that fears no such\npunishment, he may take away from us, not only our lands, goods, and\nliberties, but our lives also if he will. And they say true; but they\nhave no reason to think he will, unless it be for his own profit; which\ncannot be, for he loves his own power; and what becomes of his power\nwhen his subjects are destroyed or weakened, by whose multitude and\nstrength he enjoys his power, and every one of his subjects his fortune?\nAnd lastly, whereas they sometimes say the King is bound, not only to\ncause his laws to be observed, but also to observe them himself; I think\nthe King causing them to be observed is the same thing as observing them\nhimself. For I never heard it taken for good law, that the King may be\nindicted, or appealed, or served with a writ, till the Long Parliament\npractised the contrary upon the good King Charles; for which divers of\nthem were executed, and the rest by this our present King pardoned.\n\n_L._ Pardoned by the King and Parliament.\n\n_P._ By the King in Parliament if you will, but not by the King and\nParliament. You cannot deny, but that the pardoning of injury belongs to\nthe person that is injured; treason, and other offences against the\npeace and against the right of the sovereign, are injuries done to the\nKing; and therefore whosoever is pardoned any such offence, ought to\nacknowledge he owes his pardon to the King alone: but as to such\nmurders, felonies, and other injuries as are done to any subject how\nmean soever, I think it great reason that the parties endamaged ought to\nhave satisfaction before such pardon be allowed. And in the death of a\nman, where restitution of life is impossible, what can any friend, heir,\nor other party that may appeal, require more than reasonable\nsatisfaction some other way? Perhaps he will be content with nothing but\nlife for life; but that is revenge, and belongs to God, and under God to\nthe King, and none else; therefore if there be reasonable satisfaction\ntendered, the King without sin, I think, may pardon him. I am sure, if\nthe pardoning him be a sin, that neither King, nor Parliament, nor any\nearthly power can do it.\n\n_L._ You see by this your own argument, that the Act of _Oblivion_,\nwithout a Parliament, could not have passed; because, not only the King,\nbut also most of the Lords, and abundance of common people had received\ninjuries; which not being pardonable but by their own assent, it was\nabsolutely necessary that it should be done in Parliament, and by the\nassent of the Lords and Commons.\n\n_P._ I grant it; but I pray you tell me now what is the difference\nbetween a general pardon, and an act of _oblivion_?\n\n_L._ The word Act of _Oblivion_ was never in our books before; but I\nbelieve it is in yours.\n\n_P._ In the state of Athens long ago, for the abolishing of the civil\nwar, there was an act agreed on; that from that time forward, no man\nshould be molested for anything before that act done, whatsoever,\nwithout exception; which act the makers of it called an act of\n_oblivion_; not that all injuries should be forgotten (for then we could\nnever have had the story), but that they should not rise up in judgment\nagainst any man. And in imitation of this act, the like was propounded,\nthough it took no effect, upon the death of Julius C\u00e6sar, in the senate\nof Rome. By such an act you may easily conceive that all accusations for\noffences past were absolutely dead and buried; and yet we have no great\nreason to think, that the objecting one to another of the injuries\npardoned, was any violation of those acts, except the same were so\nexpressed in the act itself.\n\n_L._ It seems then that the act of _oblivion_ was here no more, nor of\nother nature, than a general pardon.\n\n[Sidenote: Of Courts.]\n\n_P._ Since you acknowledge that in all controversies, the judicature\noriginally belongeth to the King, and seeing that no man is able in his\nown person to execute an office of so much business: what order is taken\nfor deciding of so many and so various controversies?\n\n_L._ There be divers sorts of controversies, some of which are\nconcerning men\u2019s titles to lands and goods; and some goods are\ncorporeal, as lands, money, cattle, corn, and the like, which may be\nhandled or seen; and some incorporeal, as privileges, liberties,\ndignities, offices, and many other good things, mere creatures of the\nlaw, and cannot be handled or seen; and both of these kinds are\nconcerning _meum_ and _tuum_. Others there are concerning crimes\npunishable divers ways: and amongst some of these, part of the\npunishment is some fine or forfeiture to the King; and then it is called\na plea of the Crown, in case the King sue the party; otherwise it is but\na private plea, which they call an appeal. And though upon judgment in\nan appeal the King shall have his forfeiture, yet it cannot be called a\nplea of the Crown, but when the Crown pleadeth for it. There be also\nother controversies concerning the government of the Church, in order to\nreligion and virtuous life. The offences both against the Crown and\nagainst the laws of the Church, are crimes: but the offences of one\nsubject against another, if they be not against the Crown, the King\npretendeth nothing in those pleas but the reparation of his subjects\ninjured.\n\n_P._ A crime is an offence of any kind whatsoever, for which a penalty\nis ordained by the law of the land: but you must understand that damages\nawarded to the party injured, has nothing common with the nature of a\npenalty, but is merely a restitution or satisfaction, due to the party\ngrieved by the law of reason, and consequently is no more a punishment\nthan is the paying of a debt.\n\n_L._ It seems by this definition of a crime, you make no difference\nbetween a crime and a sin.\n\n_P._ All crimes are indeed sins, but not all sins crimes. A sin may be\nin the thought or secret purpose of a man, of which neither a judge, nor\na witness, nor any man can take notice; but a crime is such a sin as\nconsists in an action against the law, of which action he can be\naccused, and tried by a judge, and be convinced or cleared by witnesses.\nFarther; that which is no sin in itself, but indifferent, may be made\nsin by a positive law: as when the statute was in force that no man\nshould wear silk in his hat, after the statute such wearing of silk was\na sin, which was not so before. Nay, sometimes an action that is good in\nitself, by the statute law may be made a sin; as if a statute should be\nmade to forbid the giving of alms to a strong and sturdy beggar, such\nalms, after that law, would be a sin, but not before; for then it was\ncharity, the object whereof is not the strength or other quality of the\npoor man, but his poverty. Again, he that should have said in Queen\nMary\u2019s time, that the Pope had no authority in England, should have been\nburnt at a stake; but for saying the same in the time of Queen\nElizabeth, should have been commended. You see by this, that many things\nare made crimes, and no crime, which are not so in their own nature, but\nby diversity of law, made upon diversity of opinion or of interest by\nthem which have authority: and yet those things, whether good or evil,\nwill pass so with the vulgar, if they hear them often with odious terms\nrecited, for heinous crimes in themselves, as many of those opinions,\nwhich are in themselves pious and lawful, were heretofore, by the Pope\u2019s\ninterest therein, called detestable heresy. Again, some controversies\nare of things done upon the sea, others of things done upon the land.\nThere need be many courts to the deciding of so many kinds of\ncontroversies. What order is there taken for their distribution?\n\n_L._ There be an extraordinary great number of courts in England. First,\nthere be the King\u2019s courts, both for law and equity, in matters\ntemporal; which are the Chancery, the King\u2019s Bench, the Court of Common\nPleas; and, for the King\u2019s revenue, the Court of the Exchequer: and\nthere be subjects' courts by privilege, as the Courts in London and\nother privileged places. And there be other courts of subjects, as the\nCourt of Landlords, called the Court of Barons, and the Courts of\nSheriffs. Also the Spiritual Courts are the King\u2019s courts at this day,\nthough heretofore they were the Pope\u2019s courts. And in the King\u2019s courts,\nsome have their judicature by office, and some by commission; and some\nauthority to hear and determine, and some only to inquire, and to\ncertify into other courts. Now for the distribution of what pleas every\ncourt may hold, it is commonly held, that all the pleas of the Crown,\nand of all offences contrary to the peace, are to be holden in the\nKing\u2019s Bench, or by commissioners. For Bracton saith: _Sciendum est,\nquod si actiones sunt criminales, in Curia Domini Regis debent\ndeterminari; cum sit ibi p\u0153na corporalis infligenda, et hoc coram ipso\nrege, si tangat personam suam, sicut crimen l\u00e6s\u00e6 majestatis, vel coram\njustitiariis ad hoc specialiter assignatis_: that is to say, that if the\nplea be criminal, it ought to be determined in the Court of our Lord the\nKing, because there they have power to inflict corporal punishment; and\nif the crime be against his person, as the crime of treason, it ought to\nbe determined before the King himself; or if it be against a private\nperson, it ought to be determined by justices assigned, that is to say,\nbefore commissioners. It seems by this, that heretofore Kings did hear\nand determine pleas of treason against themselves, by their own persons;\nbut it has been otherwise a long time, and is now; for it is now the\noffice of the Lord Steward of England, in the trial of a peer, to hold\nthat plea by a commission especially for the same. In causes concerning\n_meum_ and _tuum_, the King may sue, either in the King\u2019s Bench, or in\nthe Court of Common Pleas; as it appears by Fitzherbert in his Natura Brevium_, at the writ of escheat.\n\n_P._ A king perhaps will not sit to determine of causes of treason\nagainst his person, lest he should seem to make himself judge in his own\ncause; but that it shall be judged by judges of his own making can never\nbe avoided, which is all one as if he were judge himself.\n\n_L._ To the King\u2019s Bench also, I think, belongeth the hearing and\ndetermining of all manner of breaches of the peace whatsoever, saving\nalways to the King that he may do the same, when he pleaseth, by\ncommissioners. In the time of Henry III and Edward I (when Bracton\nwrote) the King did usually send down every seven years into the\ncountry, commissioners called justices itinerant, to hear and determine\ngenerally all causes temporal, both criminal and civil; whose places\nhave been now a long time supplied by the justices of assize, with\ncommissions of the peace of _oyer_ and _terminer_, and of gaol-delivery.\n\n_P._ But why may the King only sue in the King\u2019s Bench or Court of\nCommon Pleas, which he will, and no other person may do the same?\n\n_L._ There is no statute to the contrary, but it seemeth to be the\ncommon-law. For Sir Edward Coke (IV_th Instit._), setteth down the\njurisdiction of the King\u2019s Bench; which, he says, has: first,\njurisdiction in all pleas of the Crown. Secondly, the correcting of all\nmanner of errors of other justices and judges, both of judgments and\nprocess, except of the Court of Exchequer, which, he says, is to this\ncourt _proprium quarto modo_. Thirdly, that it has power to correct all\nmisdemeanours _extrajudicial_, tending to the breach of the peace, or\noppression of the subjects, or raising of factions, controversies,\ndebates, or any other manner of misgovernment. Fourthly, it may hold\nplea by writ out of the Chancery of all trespasses done _vi et armis_.\nFifthly, it hath power to hold plea by bill for debt, detenue, covenant,\npromise, and all other personal actions. But of the jurisdiction of the\nKing\u2019s Bench in actions real he says nothing; save, that if a writ in a\nreal action be abated by judgment in the Court of Common Pleas, and that\nthe judgment be by a writ of error reversed in the King\u2019s Bench, then\nthe King\u2019s Bench may proceed upon the writ.\n\n_P._ But how is the practice?\n\n_L._ Real actions are commonly decided, as well in the King\u2019s Bench, as\nin the Court of Common Pleas.\n\n_P._ When the King by authority in writing maketh a Lord Chief Justice\nof the King\u2019s Bench; does he not set down what he makes him for?\n\n_L._ Sir Edward Coke sets down the letters-patent, whereby of ancient\ntime the Lord Chief Justice was constituted, wherein is expressed to\nwhat end he hath his office; _viz. pro conservatione nostra et\ntranquillitatis regni nostri, et ad justitiam universis et singulis de\nregno nostro exhibendam, constituimus dilectum et fidelem nostrum_ P.B.\n_Justitiarium Angli\u00e6, quamdiu nobis placuerit, Capitalem, etc._: that is\nto say, for the preservation of ourself, and of the peace of our realm,\nand for the doing of justice to all and singular our subjects, we have\nconstituted our beloved and faithful P. B. during our pleasure, Chief\nJustice of England, &c.\n\n_P._ Methinks it is very plain by these letters-patent, that all causes\ntemporal within the kingdom, except the pleas that belong to the\nExchequer, should be decidable by this Lord Chief Justice. For as for\ncauses criminal, and that concern the peace, it is granted him in these\nwords, \u201cfor the conservation of our self, and peace of the kingdom,\u201d\nwherein are contained all pleas criminal; and, in the doing of justice\nto all and singular the King\u2019s subjects are comprehended all pleas\ncivil. And as to the Court of Common Pleas, it is manifest it may hold\nall manner of civil pleas, except those of the Exchequer, by _Magna\nCharta_, cap. ii. So that all original writs concerning civil pleas are\nreturnable into either of the said courts. But how is the Lord Chief\nJustice made now?\n\n_L._ By these words in their letters-patent: _Constituimus vos\nJustitiarium nostrum Capitalem ad placita coram nobis tenenda, durante\nbeneplacito nostro_: that is to say, we have made you our Chief Justice,\nto hold pleas before ourself, during our pleasure. But this writ, though\nit be shorter, does not at all abridge the power they had by the former.\nAnd for the letters-patent for the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas,\nthey go thus: _Constituimus dilectum et fidelem, etc., Capitalem\nJustitiarium de Communi Banco, habendum, etc., quamdiu nobis placuerit,\ncum vadiis et f\u0153dis ab antiquo debitis et consuetis. Id est_, We have\nconstituted our beloved and faithful, &c., Chief Justice of the Common\nBench, to have, &c., during our pleasure, with the ways and fees\nthereunto heretofore due, and usual.\n\n_P._ I find in history, that there have been in England always a\nChancellor and a Chief Justice of England, but of a Court of Common\nPleas there is no mention before _Magna Charta_. Common pleas there were\never both here, and, I think, in all nations; for common pleas and civil\npleas I take to be the same.\n\n_L._ Before the statute of _Magna Charta_, common pleas, as Sir Edward\nCoke granteth, (2 _Inst._ p. 21), might have been holden in the King\u2019s\nBench; and that court being removeable at the King\u2019s will, the returns\nof writs were _Coram nobis ubicunque fuerimus in Anglia_; whereby great\ntrouble of jurors ensued, and great charges of the parties, and delay of\njustice; and for these causes it was ordained, that the common pleas\nshould not follow the King, but be held in a place certain.\n\n_P._ Here Sir Edward Coke declares his opinion, that no common plea can\nbe holden in the King\u2019s Bench, in that he says they might have been\nholden then. And yet this doth not amount to any probable proof, that\nthere was any Court of Common Pleas in England before _Magna Charta_.\nFor this statute being to ease the jurors, and lessen the charges of\nparties, and for the expedition of justice, had been in vain, if there\nhad been a Court of Common Pleas then standing; for such a court was not\nnecessarily to follow the King, as was the Chancery and the King\u2019s\nBench. Besides, unless the King\u2019s Bench, wheresoever it was, held plea\nof civil causes, the subject had not at all been eased by this statute.\nFor supposing the King at York, had not the King\u2019s subjects about\nLondon, jurors and parties, as much trouble and charge to go to York, as\nthe people about York had before to go to London? Therefore I can by no\nmeans believe otherwise, than that the erection of the Court of Common\nPleas was the effect of that statute of _Magna Charta_, cap. 11; and\nbefore that time not existent, though I think that for the multiplicity\nof suits in a great kingdom there was need of it.\n\n_L._ Perhaps there was not so much need of it as you think. For in those\ntimes the laws, for the most part, were in settling, rather than\nsettled; and the old Saxon laws concerning inheritances were then\npractised, by which laws speedy justice was executed by the King\u2019s\nwrits, in the courts of Barons, which were landlords to the rest of the\nfreeholders; and suits of barons in County courts; and but few suits in\nthe King\u2019s courts, but when justice could not be had in those inferior\ncourts. But at this day there be more suits in the King\u2019s courts, than\nany one court can despatch.\n\n_P._ Why should there be more suits now, than formerly? For I believe\nthis kingdom was as well peopled then as now.\n\n_L._ Sir Edward Coke (4 _Inst._ p. 76) assigneth for it six causes: 1.\nPeace. 2. Plenty. 3. The dissolution of religious houses, and dispersing\nof their lands among so many several persons. 4. The multitude of\ninformers. 5. The number of concealers. 6. The multitude of attorneys.\n\n_P._ I see Sir Edward Coke has no mind to lay any fault upon the men of\nhis own profession, and that he assigns for causes of the mischiefs,\nsuch things as would be mischief and wickedness to amend. For if peace\nand plenty be the cause of this evil, it cannot be removed but by war\nand beggary; and the quarrels arising about the lands of religious\npersons cannot arise from the lands, but from the doubtfulness of the\nlaws. And for informers, they were authorized by statutes; to the\nexecution of which statutes they are so necessary, as that their number\ncannot be too great; and if it be too great, the fault is in the law\nitself. The number of concealers are indeed a number of cozeners, which\nthe law may easily correct. And lastly, for the multitude of attorneys,\nit is the fault of them that have the power to admit or refuse them. For\nmy part, I believe that men at this day have better learned the art of\ncavilling against the words of a statute, than heretofore they had, and\nthereby encourage themselves and others to undertake suits upon little\nreason. Also the variety and repugnancy of judgments of common-law, do\noftentimes put men to hope for victory in causes whereof in reason they\nhad no ground at all: also the ignorance of what is equity in their own\ncauses, which equity not one man in a thousand ever studied. And the\nlawyers themselves seek not for their judgments in their own breasts,\nbut in the precedents of former judges: as the ancient judges sought the\nsame, not in their own reason, but in the laws of the empire. Another,\nand perhaps the greatest cause of multitude of suits, is this, that for\nwant of registering of conveyances of land, which might easily be done\nin the townships where the lands lay, a purchase cannot easily be had\nwhich will not be litigious. Lastly, I believe the covetousness of\nlawyers was not so great in ancient time, which was full of trouble, as\nthey have been since in time of peace; wherein men have leisure to study\nfraud, and get employment from such men as can encourage to contention.\nAnd how ample a field they have to exercise this mystery in, is manifest\nfrom this, that they have a power to scan and construe every word in a\nstatute, charter, feoffment, lease, or other deed, evidence, or\ntestimony. But to return to the jurisdiction of this Court of the King\u2019s\nBench, where, as you say, it hath power to correct and amend the errors\nof all other judges, both in process and in judgments; cannot the judges\nof the Common Pleas correct error in process in their own courts,\nwithout a writ of error from another court?\n\n_L._ Yes; and there be many statutes which command them so to do.\n\n_P._ When a writ of error is brought out of the King\u2019s Bench, be it\neither error in process or in law, at whose charge is it to be done?\n\n_L._ At the charge of the client.\n\n_P._ I see no reason for that; for the client is not in fault, who never\nbegins a suit but by the advice of his counsel, learned in the law, whom\nhe pays for his counsel given. Is not this the fault of his counsellor?\nNor when a judge in the Common Pleas hath given an erroneous sentence,\nis it always likely that the judge of the King\u2019s Bench will reverse the\njudgment, (though there be no question, but as you may find in Bracton\nand other learned men, he has power to do it); because being professors\nof the same common-law, they are persuaded, for the most part, to give\nthe same judgments. For example: if Sir Edward Coke, in the last term\nthat he sat as Lord Chief Justice in the Court of Common Pleas, had\ngiven an erroneous judgment, is it likely that when he was removed, and\nmade Lord Chief Justice of the King\u2019s Bench, he would therefore have\nreversed the said judgment? It is possible he might, but not very\nlikely. And therefore I do believe there is some other power, by the\nKing constituted, to reverse erroneous judgments, both in the King\u2019s\nBench and in the Court of Common Pleas.\n\n_L._ I think not; for there is a statute to the contrary, made 4 _Henry\nIV_, cap. 23, in these words: Whereas, as well in plea real, as in plea\npersonal, after judgment in the court of our Lord the King, the parties\nbe made to come upon grievous pain sometimes before the King himself,\nsometimes before the King\u2019s council, and sometimes to the Parliament, to\nanswer thereof anew, to the great impoverishing of the parties\naforesaid, and to the subversion of the common-law of the land, it is\nordained and established, that after judgment given in the court of our\nLord the King, the parties and their heirs shall be there in peace,\nuntil the judgment be undone by attaint, or by error, if there be error,\nas hath been used by the laws in the times of the King\u2019s progenitors.\n\n_P._ This statute is so far from being repugnant to that I say, as it\nseemeth to me to have been made expressly to confirm the same. For the\nsubstance of the statute is, that there shall be no suit made by either\nof the parties for anything adjudged, either in the King\u2019s Bench, or\nCourt of Common Pleas, before the judgment be undone by error, or\ncorruption proved; and that this was the common-law before the making of\nthis statute, which could not be, except there were before this statute\nsome courts authorized to examine and correct such errors as by the\nplaintiff should be assigned. The inconvenience which by this statute\nwas to be remedied was this, that often judgment given in the King\u2019s\ncourts, by which are meant in this place the King\u2019s Bench and Court of\nCommon Pleas, the party against whom the judgment was given, did begin a\nnew suit, and cause his adversary to come before the King himself. Here,\nby the King himself must be understood the King in person: for though in\na writ by the words _coram nobis_ is understood the King\u2019s Bench, yet in\na statute it is never so; nor is it strange, seeing in those days the\nKing did usually sit in court with his council to hear causes, as\nsometimes King James. And sometimes the same parties commenced their\nsuit before the Privy Council, though the King were absent, and\nsometimes before the Parliament, the former judgment yet standing. For\nremedy whereof, it was ordained by this statute, that no man should\nrenew his suit till the former judgment was undone by attaint or error;\nwhich reversing of a judgment had been impossible, if there had been no\ncourt besides the aforesaid two courts, wherein the errors might be\nassigned, examined, and judged; for no court can be esteemed, in law or\nreason, a competent judge of its own errors. There was therefore before\nthis statute, some other court existent for the hearing of errors, and\nreversing of erroneous judgments. What court this was, I inquire not\nyet; but I am sure it could not be either the Parliament or the Privy\nCouncil, or the court wherein the erroneous judgment was given.\n\n_L._ The _Doctor and Student_ discourses of this statute (cap. 18 et\nseq.) much otherwise than you do. For the author of that book saith,\nthat against an erroneous judgment all remedy is by this statute taken\naway. And though neither reason, nor the office of a King, nor any law\npositive, can prohibit the remedying of any injury, much less of an\nunjust sentence; yet he shows many statutes, wherein a man\u2019s conscience\nought to prevail above the law.\n\n_P._ Upon what ground can he pretend, that all remedy in this case is by\nthis statute prohibited?\n\n_L._ He says it is thereby enacted, that judgment given by the King\u2019s\nCourts shall not be examined in the Chancery, Parliament, nor elsewhere.\n\n_P._ Is there any mention of Chancery in this act? It cannot be examined\nbefore the King and his council, nor before the Parliament; but you see\nthat before the statute it was examined somewhere, and that this statute\nwill have it examined there again. And seeing the Chancery was\naltogether the highest office of judicature in the kingdom for matter of\nequity, and that the Chancery is not here forbidden to examine the\njudgments of all other courts, at least it is not taken from it by this\nstatute. But what cases are there in this chapter of the Doctor and\nStudent, by which it can be made probable, that when law and conscience,\nor law and equity, seem to oppugn one another, the written law should be\npreferred?\n\n_L._ If the defendant wage his law in an action of debt brought upon a\ntrue debt, the plaintiff hath no means to come to his debt by way of\ncompulsion, neither by _subp\u0153na_, nor otherwise; and yet the defendant\nis bound in conscience to pay him.\n\n_P._ Here is no preferring, that I see, of the law above conscience or\nequity. For the plaintiff in this case loseth not his debt for want\neither of law, or equity, but for want of proof; for neither law nor\nequity can give a man his right, unless he prove it.\n\n_L._ Also if the grand jury in attaint affirm a false verdict given by\nthe petty jury, there is no further remedy, but the conscience of the\nparty.\n\n_P._ Here again the want of proof is the want of remedy. For if he can\nprove that the verdict given was false, the King can give him remedy\nsuch way as himself shall think best, and ought to do it, in case the\nparty shall find surety, if the same verdict be again affirmed, to\nsatisfy his adversary for the damage and vexation he puts him to.\n\n_L._ But there is a statute made since, _viz._ 27 _Eliz._ c. 8, by which\nthat statute of 4 _Hen. IV._ 23, is in part taken away. For by that\nstatute, erroneous judgments given in the King\u2019s Bench, are by a writ of\nerror to be examined in the Exchequer-chamber, before the justices of\nthe Common Bench and the Barons of the Exchequer; and by the preamble of\nthis act it appears, that erroneous judgments are only to be reformed by\nthe High Court of Parliament.\n\n_P._ But here is no mention, that the judgments given in the Court of\nCommon Pleas should be brought in to be examined in the\nExchequer-chamber. Why therefore may not the Court of Chancery examine a\njudgment given in the Court of Common Pleas?\n\n_L._ You deny not but, by the ancient law of England, the King\u2019s Bench\nmay examine the judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas.\n\n_P._ It is true. But why may not also the Court of Chancery do the same,\nespecially if the fault of the judgment be against equity, and not\nagainst the letter of the law?\n\n_L._ There is no necessity of that; for the same court may examine both\nthe letter and the equity of the statute.\n\n_P._ You see by this, that the jurisdiction of courts cannot easily be\ndistinguished, but by the King himself in his Parliament. The lawyers\nthemselves cannot do it; for you see what contention there is between\ncourts, as well as between particular men. And whereas you say, that law\nof 4 _Hen. IV._ 23, is by that of 27 _Eliz._ c. 8, taken away, I do not\nfind it so. I find indeed a diversity of opinion between the makers of\nthe former and the latter statute, in the preamble of the latter and\nconclusion of the former. The preamble of the latter is, forasmuch as\nerroneous judgments given in the Court called the King\u2019s Bench, are only\nto be reformed in the High Court of Parliament; and the conclusion of\nthe former is, that the contrary was law in the times of the King\u2019s\nprogenitors. These are no parts of those laws, but opinions only\nconcerning the ancient custom in that case, arising from the different\nopinions of the lawyers in those different times, neither commanding nor\nforbidding anything; though of the statutes themselves, the one forbids\nthat such pleas be brought before the Parliament, the other forbids it\nnot. But yet, if after the act of _Hen. IV._ such a plea had been\nbrought before the Parliament, the Parliament might have heard and\ndetermined it. For the statute forbids not that; nor can any law have\nthe force to hinder the Parliament of any jurisdiction whatsoever they\nplease to take upon them, seeing it is a court of the King and of all\nthe people together, both Lords and Commons.\n\n_L._ Though it be, yet seeing the King (as Sir Edward Coke affirms, 4\n_Inst._ p. 71) hath committed all his power judicial, some to one court,\nand some to another, so as if any man would render himself to the\njudgment of the King, in such case where the King hath committed all his\npower judicial to others, such a render should be to no effect. And p.\n73, he saith farther: that in this court, the Kings of this realm have\nsitten on the high bench, and the judges of that court on the lower\nbench, at his feet; but judicature belongeth only to the judges of that\ncourt, and in his presence they answer all motions.\n\n_P._ I cannot believe that Sir Edward Coke, how much soever he desired\nto advance the authority of himself and other justices of the\ncommon-law, could mean that the King in the King\u2019s Bench sat as a\nspectator only, and might not have answered all motions, which his\njudges answered, if he had seen cause for it. For he knew that the King\nwas supreme judge then in all causes temporal, and is now in all causes\nboth temporal and ecclesiastical; and that there is an exceeding great\npenalty ordained by the laws for them that shall deny it. But Sir Edward\nCoke, as he had (you see) in many places before, hath put a fallacy upon\nhimself, by not distinguishing between committing and transferring. He\nthat transferreth his power, hath deprived himself of it: but he that\ncommitteth it to another to be exercised in his name and under him, is\nstill in the possession of the same power. And therefore, if a man\nrender himself, that is to say, appealeth to the King from any judge\nwhatsoever, the King may receive his appeal; and it shall be effectual.\n\n_L._ Besides these two courts, the King\u2019s Bench for Pleas of the Crown,\nand the Court of Common Pleas for causes civil, according to the\ncommon-law of England, there is another court of justice, that hath\njurisdiction in causes both civil and criminal, and is as ancient a\ncourt at least as the Court of Common Pleas, and this is the Court of\nthe Lord Admiral; but the proceedings therein are according to the laws\nof the Roman empire, and the causes to be determined there are such as\narise upon the marine sea: for so it is ordained by divers statutes, and\nconfirmed by many precedents.\n\n_P._ As for the statutes, they are always law, and reason also; for they\nare made by the assent of all the kingdom; but precedents are judgments,\none contrary to another; I mean divers men in divers ages, upon the same\ncase give divers judgments. Therefore I will ask your opinion once more\nconcerning any judgments besides those of the King, as to their validity\nin law. But what is the difference between the proceedings of the Court\nof Admiralty, and the Court of Common-law?\n\n_L._ One is, that the Court of Admiralty proceeded by two witnesses,\nwithout any either grand-jury to indict, or petty to convict; and the\njudge giveth sentence according to the laws imperial, which of old time\nwere in force in all this part of Europe, and now are laws, not by the\nwill of any other Emperor or foreign power, but by the will of the Kings\nof England that have given them force in their own dominions; the reason\nwhereof seems to be, that the causes that arise at sea are very often\nbetween us, and people of other nations, such as are governed for the\nmost part by the self-same laws imperial.\n\n_P._ How can it precisely enough be determined at sea, especially near\nthe mouth of a very great river, whether it be upon the sea, or within\nthe land? For the rivers also are, as well as their banks, within or a\npart of one country or other.\n\n_L._ Truly the question is difficult; and there have been many suits\nabout it, wherein the question has been, whose jurisdiction it is in.\n\n_P._ Nor do I see how it can be decided but by the King himself, in case\nit be not declared in the Lord Admiral\u2019s letters-patent.\n\n_L._ But though there be in the letters-patent a power given to hold\nplea in some certain cases, not contrary to any of the statutes\nconcerning the Admiralty, the justices of the common-law may send a\nprohibition to that court, to proceed in the plea, though it be with a\n_non-obstante_ of any statute.\n\n_P._ Methinks that that should be against the right of the Crown, which\ncannot be taken from it by any subject. For that argument of Sir Edward\nCoke\u2019s, that the King has given away all his judicial power, is worth\nnothing: because, as I have said before, he cannot give away the\nessential rights of his Crown, and because by a _non-obstante_ he\ndeclares he is not deceived in his grant.\n\n_L._ But you may see by the precedents alleged by Sir Edward Coke, the\ncontrary has been perpetually practised.\n\n_P._ I see not that perpetually. For who can tell but there may have\nbeen given other judgments, in such cases, which have either been not\npreserved in the records, or else by Sir Edward Coke, because they were\nagainst his opinion, not alleged? For this is possible, though you will\nnot grant it to be very likely. Therefore I insist only upon this, that\nno record of a judgment is a law, save only to the party pleading until\nhe can by law reverse the former judgment. And as to the proceeding\nwithout juries, by two sufficient witnesses, I do not see what harm can\nproceed from it to the commonwealth, nor consequently any just quarrel\nthat the justice of the common-law can have against their proceedings in\nthe Admiralty. For the proof of the fact in both courts lieth merely on\nthe witnesses; and the difference is no more, but that in the imperial\nlaw, the judge of the court judgeth of the testimony of the witnesses,\nand the jury doth it in a court of common-law. Besides, if a court of\ncommon-law should chance to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the\nAdmiral, may not he send a prohibition to the court of common-law to\nforbid their proceeding? I pray you tell me what reason there is for the\none, more than for the other?\n\n_L._ I know none but long custom, for I think it was never done. The\nhighest ordinary court in England is the Court of Chancery, wherein the\nLord Chancellor, or otherwise Keeper of the Great Seal, is the only\njudge. This court is very ancient, as appears by Sir Edward Coke, 4\n_Inst._ p. 78, where he nameth the Chancellors of King Edgar, King\nEtheldred, King Edmund, and King Edward the Confessor. His office is\ngiven to him, without letters-patent, by the King\u2019s delivery to him of\nthe Great Seal of England; and whosoever hath the keeping of the Great\nSeal of England, hath the same, and the whole jurisdiction that the Lord\nChancellor ever had by the statute of 5 _Eliz._ _c._ 18, wherein it is\ndeclared, that such is, and always has been the common-law. And Sir\nEdward Coke says, he has his name of Chancellor from the highest point\nof his jurisdiction, viz. a _cancellando_; that is, from cancelling the\nKing\u2019s letters-patent, by drawing strokes through it like a lattice.\n\n_P._ Very pretty. It is well enough known that _Cancellarius_ was a\ngreat officer under the Roman empire, whereof this island was once a\nmember, and that the office came into this kingdom, either with, or in\nimitation of the Roman government. Also, it was long after the time of\nthe twelve C\u00e6sars, that this officer was created in the state of Rome.\nFor till after Septimius Severus his time, the emperors did diligently\nenough take cognizance of all causes and complaints for judgments given\nin the Courts of the Pr\u00e6tors, which were in Rome the same that the\njudges of the common-law are here. But by the continual civil wars in\nafter times for the choosing of Emperors, that diligence by little and\nlittle ceased. And afterwards, as I have read in a very good author of\nthe Roman civil law, the number of complaints being much increased, and\nbeing more than the Emperor could dispatch, he appointed an officer as\nhis clerk, to receive all such petitions; and that this clerk caused a\npartition to be made in a room convenient, in which partition-wall, at\nthe heighth of a man\u2019s reach, he placed at convenient distances certain\nbars; so that when a suitor came to deliver his petition to the clerk,\nwho was sometimes absent, he had no more to do but to throw in his\npetition between those bars, which in Latin are called properly\n_cancelli_; not that any certain form of those bars, or any bars at all\nwere necessary, for they might have been thrown over, though the whole\nspace had been left open; but because they were _cancelli_, the clerk\nattendant, and keeping his office there, was called _Cancellarius_. And\nany court bar may properly enough be called _cancelli_, which does not\nsignify a lattice; for that is but a mere conjecture grounded upon no\nhistory nor grammar, but taken up at first, as is likely, by some boy\nthat could find no other word in the dictionary for a lattice, but\n_cancelli_. The office of this Chancellor was at first but to breviate\nthe matter of the petitions, for the easing of the Emperor; but\ncomplaints increasing daily, they were too many, considering other\nbusinesses more necessary for the Emperor to determine; and this caused\nthe Emperor to commit the determination of them to the Chancellor again.\nWhat reason doth Sir Edward Coke allege to prove, that the highest point\nof the Chancellor\u2019s jurisdiction is to cancel his master\u2019s\nletters-patent, after they were sealed with his master\u2019s seal; unless he\nhold plea concerning the validity of them, or of his master\u2019s meaning in\nthem, or of the surreptitious getting of them, or of the abusing of\nthem, which are all causes of equity? Also, seeing the Chancellor hath\nhis office only by the delivery of the Great Seal, without any\ninstruction, or limitation of the process of his court to be used; it is\nmanifest, that in all causes whereof he has the hearing, he may proceed\nby such manner of hearing and examining of witnesses, with jury or\nwithout jury, as he shall think fittest for the exactness, expedition,\nand equity of the decrees. And therefore, if he think the custom of\nproceeding by jury, according to the custom of England in Courts of\ncommon-law, tend more to equity, which is the scope of all the judges in\nthe world, or ought to be, he ought to use that method; or if he think\nbetter of another proceeding, he may use it, if it be not forbidden by a\nstatute.\n\n_L._ As for this reasoning of yours, I think it well enough. But there\nought to be had also a reverend respect to customs not unreasonable; and\ntherefore, I think, Sir Edward Coke says not amiss, that in such cases\nwhere the Chancellor will proceed by the rule of the common-law, he\nought to deliver the record in the King\u2019s Bench; and also it is\nnecessary for the Lord Chancellor to take care of not exceeding as it is\nlimited by statutes.\n\n_P._ What are the statutes by which his jurisdiction is limited? I know\nthat by the 27 _Eliz._ _c._ 8, he cannot reverse a judgment given in the\nKing\u2019s Bench for debt, detinue, &c.; nor before the statute could he\never, by virtue of his office, reverse a judgment in pleas of the Crown,\ngiven by the King\u2019s Bench, that hath the cognizance of such pleas. Nor\nneed he; for the judges themselves, when they think there is need to\nrelieve a man oppressed by ill witnesses, or power of great men\nprevailing on the jury, or by error of the jury, though it be in case of\nfelony, may stay the execution and inform the King, who will in equity\nrelieve him. As to the regard we ought to have to custom, we will\nconsider of it afterwards.\n\n_L._ First, in a Parliament holden the 13th of Richard II, the Commons\npetitioned the King, that neither the Chancellor, nor other Chancellor,\ndo make any order against the common-law, nor that any judgment be given\nwithout due process of law.\n\n_P._ This is no unreasonable petition; for the common-law is nothing\nelse but equity: and by this statute it appears, that the Chancellors,\nbefore that statute, made bolder with the Courts of common-law than they\ndid afterward; but it does not appear that common-law in this statute\nsignifies any thing else but generally the law temporal of the realm,\nnor was this statute ever printed, that such as I might take notice of\nit. But whether it be a statute or not, I know not, till you tell me\nwhat the Parliament answered to this petition.\n\n_L._ The King\u2019s answer was, the usages heretofore shall stand, so as the\nKing\u2019s royalty be saved.\n\n_P._ This is flatly against Sir Edward Coke, concerning the Chancery.\n\n_L._ In another Parliament, 17 _Rich. II_, it is enacted, at the\npetition of the Commons, that forasmuch as people were compelled to come\nbefore the King\u2019s Council, or in Chancery, by writs grounded upon untrue\nsuggestions, the Chancellor for the time being, presently after such\nsuggestions be duly found and proved untrue, shall have power to ordain\nand award damages according to his discretion, to him which is so\ntravelled unduly as is aforesaid.\n\n_P._ By this statute it appears, that when a complaint is made in\nChancery upon undue suggestions, the Chancellor shall have the\nexamination of the said suggestions, and as he may award damages when\nthe suggestions are untrue, so he may also proceed by process to the\ndetermining of the cause, whether it be real or personal, so it be not\ncriminal.\n\n_L._ Also the Commons petitioned in a Parliament of 2 _Hen. IV_, (not\nprinted) that no writs, nor privy seals, be sued out of Chancery,\nExchequer, or other places, to any man to appear at a day upon a pain,\neither before the King and his Council, or in any other place, contrary\nto the ordinary course of common-law.\n\n_P._ What answer was given to this petition by the King?\n\n_L._ That such writs should not be granted without necessity.\n\n_P._ Here again, you see, the King may deny or grant any petitions in\nParliament, either as he thinks it necessary, as in this place, or as he\nthinks it prejudicial or not prejudicial to his royalty; as in the\nanswer of the former petition, which is a sufficient proof that no part\nof his legislative power, or any other essential part of royalty, can be\ntaken from him by a statute. Now seeing it is granted that equity is the\nsame thing with the law of reason, and seeing Sir Edward Coke (1 _Inst._\nsec. xxi.), defines equity to be a certain reason comprehended in no\nwriting, but consisting only in right reason, which interpreteth and\namendeth the written law; I would fain know to what end there should be\nany other Court of Equity at all, either before the Chancellor or any\nother person, besides the Judges of the Civil or Common Pleas? Nay, I am\nsure you can allege none but this, that there was a necessity for a\nhigher Court of Equity than the Courts of common-law, to remedy the\nerrors in judgment given by the justices of inferior courts; and the\nerrors in Chancery were irrevocable, except by Parliament, or by special\ncommission appointed thereunto by the King.\n\n_L._ But Sir Edward Coke says, that seeing matters of fact by the\ncommon-law are triable by a jury of twelve men, this court should not\ndraw the matter _ad aliud examen_, that is, to another kind of\nexamination, _viz._ deposition of witnesses, which should be but\nevidence to a jury.\n\n_P._ Is the deposition of witnesses any more or less, than evidence to\nthe Lord Chancellor? It is not therefore another kind of examination;\nnor is a jury more capable of duly examining witnesses than a Lord\nChancellor. Besides, seeing all courts are bound to judge according to\nequity, and that all judges in a case of equity may sometimes be\ndeceived, what harm is there to any man, or to the state, if there be a\nsubordination of judges in equity, as well as of judges in common-law?\nSeeing it is provided by an Act of Parliament, to avoid vexation, that\n_subp\u0153nas_ shall not be granted till surety be found to satisfy the\nparty so grieved and vexed for his damages and expenses, if so be the\nmatter may not be made good which is contained in the bill.\n\n_L._ There is another statute of 31 _Hen. VI._ c. 2, wherein there is a\nproviso cited by Sir Edward Coke in these words: \u201c_Provided that no\nmatter determinable by the laws of the realm, shall be by the said Act\ndetermined in other form, than after the course of the same law in the\nKing\u2019s Courts, having the determination of the same law_.\u201d\n\n_P._ This law was made but for seven years, and never continued by any\nother Parliament, and the motive of this law was the great riots,\nextortions, oppressions, &c. used during the time of the insurrection of\nJohn Cade, and the indictments and condemnations wrongfully had by this\nusurped authority. And thereupon the Parliament ordained, that for seven\nyears following no man should disobey any of the King\u2019s writs under the\nGreat Seal, or should refuse to appear upon proclamation before the\nKing\u2019s Council, or in the Chancery, to answer to riots, extortions, &c.;\nfor the first time he should lose, &c. Wherein there is nothing at all\nconcerning the jurisdiction of the Chancery or any other court, but an\nextraordinary power given to the Chancery, and to the King\u2019s Privy\nCouncil, to determine of those crimes, which were not before that time\ntriable but only by the King\u2019s Bench or special commission. For the Act\nwas made expressly for the punishment of a great multitude of crimes\ncommitted by those who had acted under the said Cade\u2019s authority; to\nwhich Act the proviso was added which is here mentioned, that the\nproceedings in those Courts of Chancery, and of the King\u2019s Council,\nshould be such as should be used in the courts, to which the said\ncauses, before this Act was made, do belong: that is to say, such causes\nas were criminal, should be after the order of the King\u2019s Bench; and\nsuch causes as were not criminal, but only against equity, should be\ntried after the manner of the Chancery, or in some cases according to\nthe proceedings in the Exchequer. I wonder why Sir Edward Coke should\ncite a statute, as this is, above two hundred years before expired, and\nother two petitions, as if they were statutes, when they were not passed\nby the King; unless he did it on purpose to diminish, as he endeavours\nto do throughout his Institutes, the King\u2019s authority, or to insinuate\nhis own opinions among the people for the law of the land; for that also\nhe endeavours by inserting Latin sentences, both in his text and in the\nmargin, as if they were principles of the law of reason, without any\nauthority of ancient lawyers, or any certainty of reason in themselves,\nto make men believe they are the very grounds of the law of England. Now\nas to the authority you ascribe to custom, I deny that any custom of its\nown nature can amount to the authority of a law. For if the custom be\nunreasonable, you must, with all other lawyers, confess that it is no\nlaw, but ought to abolished; and if the custom be reasonable, it is not\nthe custom, but the equity that makes it law. For what need is there to\nmake reason law by any custom how long soever, when the law of reason is\neternal? Besides, you cannot find it in any statute, though _lex et\nconsuetudo_ be often mentioned as things to be followed by the judges in\ntheir judgments, that _consuetudines_, that is to say, customs or\nusages, did imply any long continuance of former time; but that it\nsignified such use and custom of proceeding, as was then immediately in\nbeing before the making of such statute. Nor shall you find in any\nstatute the word common-law, which may not be there well interpreted for\nany of the laws of England temporal; for it is not the singularity of\nprocess used in any court that can distinguish it, so as to make it a\ndifferent law from the law of the whole nation.\n\n_L._ If all the courts were, as you think, courts of equity, would it\nnot be incommodious to the commonwealth?\n\n_P._ I think not; unless perhaps you may say, that seeing the judges,\nwhether they have many or few causes to be heard before them, have but\nthe same wages from the King, they may be too much inclined to put off\nthe causes they use to hear, for the easing of themselves, to some other\ncourt, to the delay of justice, and damage of the parties suing.\n\n_L._ You are very much deceived in that; for on the contrary, the\ncontention between the courts for jurisdiction is, of who shall have\nmost causes brought before them.\n\n_P._ I cry you mercy, I smelt not that.\n\n_L._ Seeing also all judges ought to give their sentence according to\nequity, if it should chance that a written law should be against the law\nof reason, which is equity, I cannot imagine in that case how any\njudgment can be righteous.\n\n_P._ It cannot be that a written law should be against reason; for\nnothing is more reasonable than that every man should obey the law which\nhe hath himself assented to. But that is not always the law, which is\nsignified by _grammatical_ construction of the letter, but that which\nthe legislature thereby intended should be in force; which intention, I\nconfess, is a very hard matter many times to pick out of the words of\nthe statute, and requires great ability of understanding, and greater\nmeditations and consideration of such conjuncture of occasions and\nincommodities, as needed a new law for a remedy. For there is scarce\nanything so clearly written, that when the cause thereof is forgotten,\nmay not be wrested by an ignorant grammarian, or a cavilling logician,\nto the injury, oppression, or perhaps destruction of an honest man. And\nfor this reason the Judges deserve that honour and profit they enjoy.\nSince the determination of what particular causes every particular court\nshould have cognizance, is a thing not yet sufficiently explained, and\nis in itself so difficult, as that the sages of the law themselves, (the\nreason Sir Edward Coke will leave to law itself), are not yet agreed\nupon it; how is it possible for a man who is no professed or no profound\nlawyer, to take notice in what court he may lawfully begin his suit, or\ngive counsel in it to his client?\n\n_L._ I confess that no man can be bound to take notice of the\njurisdiction of courts, till all the courts be agreed upon it amongst\nthemselves; but what rule to give judgment by, a judge can have, so as\nnever to contradict the law written, nor displease his legislator, I\nunderstand not.\n\n_P._ I think he may avoid both, if he take care by his sentence that he\nneither punish an innocent man, nor deprive him of his damages due from\none that maliciously sueth him without reasonable cause, which to the\nmost of rational men and unbiassed, is not, in my opinion, very\ndifficult. And though a judge should, as all men may do, err in his\njudgment, yet there is always such power in the laws of England, as may\ncontent the parties, either in the Chancery, or by commissioners of\ntheir own choosing, authorized by the King; for every man is bound to\nacquiesce in the sentence of the judges he chooseth.\n\n_L._ In what cases can the true construction of the letter be contrary\nto the meaning of the lawmaker?\n\n_P._ Very many, whereof Sir Edward Coke nameth three: fraud, accident,\nand breach of confidence. But there be many more; for there be a very\ngreat many reasonable exceptions almost to every general rule, which the\nmakers of the rule could not foresee; and very many words in every\nstatute, especially long ones, that are, as to _grammar_, of ambiguous\nsignification, and yet to them that know well to what end the statute\nwas made, perspicuous enough; and many connexions of doubtful reference,\nwhich by a _grammarian_ may be cavilled at, though the intention of the\nlawmaker be never so perspicuous. And these are the difficulties which\nthe judges ought to master, and can do it in respect of their ability\nfor which they are chosen, as well as can be hoped for; and yet there\nare other men can do the same, or else the judges' places could not be\nfrom time to time supplied. The bishops commonly are the most able and\nrational men, and obliged by their profession to study equity, because\nit is the law of God; and are therefore capable of being judges in a\ncourt of equity. They are the men that teach the people what is sin;\nthat is to say, they are the doctors in cases of conscience. What reason\nthen can you show me, why it is unfit and hurtful to the commonwealth\nthat a bishop should be a Chancellor; as they were most often before the\ntime of Henry VIII, and since that time once in the reign of King James?\n\n_L._ But Sir Edward says, that soon after that a Chancellor was made\nwhich was no professor of the law, he finds in the rolls of the\nParliament a grievous complaint by the whole body of the realm, and a\npetition that the most wise and able men within the realm might be\nchosen Chancellors.\n\n_P._ That petition was reasonable; but it does not say which are the\nabler men, the judges of the common-law, or the bishops.\n\n_L._ That is not the great question as to the ability of a judge; both\nof one and the other, there are able men in their own way. But when a\njudge of equity has need, almost in every case, to consider as well the\nstatute-law, as the law of reason, he cannot perform his office\nperfectly, unless he be also ready in the statutes.\n\n_P._ I see no great need he has to be ready in the statutes. In the\nhearing of a cause, do the judges of the common-law inform the counsel\nat the bar what the statute is, or the counsel the judges?\n\n_L._ The counsel inform the judges.\n\n_P._ Why may they not as well inform the Chancellor? Unless you will\nsay, that a bishop understands not as well as a lawyer what is sense,\nwhen he hears it read in English. No, no; both the one and the other are\nable enough: but to be able enough is not enough, when not the\ndifficulty of the case only, but also the passion of the judge is to be\nconquered. I forgot to tell you of the statute of 36 _Edw.III_, c. 9,\nthat if any person thinking himself grieved contrary to any of the\narticles above-written, or others contained in divers statutes, will\ncome to the Chancery, or any for him, and thereof make his complaint, he\nshall presently there have remedy by force of the said articles and\nstatutes, without elsewhere pursuing to have remedy. By the words of\nthis statute it is very apparent, in my opinion, that the Chancery may\nhold plea upon the complaint of the party grieved, in any case triable\nat the common-law; because the party shall have present remedy in that\ncourt, by force of this Act, without pursuing for remedy elsewhere.\n\n_L._ Yes; but Sir Edward Coke (4 _Inst._ p. 82) answers this objection\nin this manner. These words, says he, _he shall have remedy_, signify no\nmore but that he shall have presently there a remedial writ grounded\nupon those statutes, to give him remedy at the common-law.\n\n_P._ Very like Sir Edward Coke thought, as soon as the party had his\nwrit, he had his remedy, though he kept the writ in his pocket without\npursuing his complaint elsewhere: or else he thought, that the\nCommon-bench was not elsewhere than in the Chancery.\n\n_L._ Then there is the Court of\u2014\u2014\n\n_P._ Let us stop here; for this which you have said satisfies me, that\nseek no more than to distinguish between justice and equity; and from it\nI conclude, that justice fulfils the law, and equity interprets the law,\nand amends the judgments given upon the same law. Wherein I depart not\nmuch from the definition of equity cited in Sir Edward Coke (1 _Inst._\nsec. xxi.); _viz._ equity is a certain perfect reason, that interpreteth\nand amendeth the law written; though I construe it a little otherwise\nthan he would have done; for no one can mend a law but he that can make\nit, and therefore I say it amends not the law, but the judgments only\nwhen they are erroneous. And now let us consider of crimes in\nparticular, the pleas whereof are commonly called the Pleas of the\nCrown, and of the punishments belonging to them. And first of the\nhighest crime of all, which is high-treason. Tell me, what is\nhigh-treason?\n\n[Sidenote: Of crimes capital.]\n\n_L._ The first statute that declareth what is high-treason, is the\nstatute of the 25 _Edw. III_, in these words: \u201cWhereas divers opinions\nhave been before this time, in what case treason shall be said, and in\nwhat not; the King, at the request of the Lords and of the Commons, hath\nmade declaration in the manner as hereafter follows: that is to say,\nwhen a man doth compass or imagine the death of our Lord the King, of\nour Lady the Queen, or of their eldest son and heir; or if a man doth\nviolate the King\u2019s companion, or the King\u2019s eldest daughter unmarried,\nor the wife of the King\u2019s eldest son and heir; or if a man do levy war\nagainst our Lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King\u2019s\nenemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm or\nelsewhere; and thereof be provably attainted by open deed by people of\ntheir condition: and if a man counterfeit the King\u2019s Great or Privy\nSeal, or his money: and if a man bring false money into this realm\ncounterfeit to the money of England, as the money called Lushburgh, or\nother like to the said money of England, knowing the money to be false,\nto merchandize, and make payment in deceit of our said Lord the King,\nand of his people: and if a man slay the Chancellor, Treasurer, or the\nKing\u2019s Justices of one Bench or the other, Justices in Eyre, or Justices\nof Assizes, and all other justices assigned to hear and determine, being\nin their places and doing their offices. And is to be understood in the\ncases above rehearsed, that that ought to be adjudged treason, which\nextends to our royal Lord the King, and his royal Majesty; and of such\ntreason the forfeiture of the escheats pertains to our Lord the King, as\nwell the lands and tenements holden of others, as himself. And moreover\nthere is another manner of treason; that is to say, when a servant\nslayeth his master, or a wife her husband; or when a man, secular or\nreligious, slayeth his prelate, to whom he oweth faith and obedience;\nand of such treason the escheats ought to pertain to every Lord of his\nown fee. And because many other like cases of treason may happen in time\nto come, which a man cannot think nor declare at this present time, it\nis accorded, that if any case supposed treason, which is not above\nspecified, doth happen before any justices, the justices shall tarry\nwithout giving any judgment of the treason, till the cause be showed and\ndeclared before the King and his Parliament, whether it ought to be\nadjudged treason or other felony.\u201d\n\n_P._ I desired to understand what treason is, wherein no enumeration of\nfacts can give me satisfaction. Treason is a crime of itself, _malum in\nse_, and therefore a crime at the common-law; and high-treason the\nhighest crime at the common-law that can be. And therefore not the\nstatute only, but reason without a statute makes it a crime. And this\nappears by the preamble, where it is intimated, that all men, though of\ndivers opinions, did condemn it by the name of treason, though they knew\nnot what treason meant, but were forced to request the King to determine\nit. That which I desire to know is, how treason might have been defined\nwithout the statute, by a man that has no other faculty to make the\ndefinition of it, than by mere natural reason.\n\n_L._ When none of the lawyers have done it, you are not to expect that I\nshould undertake it on such a sudden.\n\n_P._ You know that _salus populi_ is _suprema lex_, that is to say, the\nsafety of the people is the highest law; and that the safety of the\npeople of a kingdom consisteth in the safety of the King, and of the\nstrength necessary to defend his people, both against foreign enemies\nand rebellious subjects. And from this I infer, that to compass, that\nis, to design, the death of the then present King, was high treason\nbefore the making of this statute, as being a designing of a civil war\nand the destruction of the people. 2. That the design to kill the King\u2019s\nwife, or to violate her chastity, as also to violate the chastity of the\nKing\u2019s heir-apparent, or of his eldest daughter unmarried, as tending to\nthe destruction of the certainty of the King\u2019s issue, and by consequence\nto the raising of contentions about the Crown, and destruction of the\npeople in succeeding time by civil war, was therefore high-treason\nbefore this statute. 3. That to levy war against the King within the\nrealm, and aiding the King\u2019s enemies, either within or without the\nrealm, are tending to the King\u2019s destruction or disherison, and was\nhigh-treason, before this statute, by the common-law. 4. That\ncounterfeiting the principal seals of the kingdom, by which the King\ngoverneth his people, tendeth to the confusion of government, and\nconsequently to the destruction of the people, and was therefore treason\nbefore the statute. 5. If a soldier design the killing of his general or\nother officer in time of battle, or a captain hover doubtfully with his\ntroops, with intention to gain the favour of him that shall chance to\nget the victory, it tendeth to the destruction both of King and people,\nwhether the King be present or absent, and was high-treason before the\nstatute. 6. If any man had imprisoned the King\u2019s person, he had made him\nincapable of defending his people, and it was therefore high-treason\nbefore the statute. 7. If any man had, with design to raise rebellion\nagainst the King, by words written or advisedly uttered, denied the King\nregnant to be their lawful King, he that wrote, preached, or spoke such\nwords, living then under the protection of the King\u2019s laws, it had been\nhigh-treason before the statute, for the reasons aforesaid. And perhaps\nthere may be some other cases upon this statute, which I cannot\npresently think upon. But the killing of a justice or other officer, as\nis determined by the statute, is not otherwise high-treason, but by the\nstatute. And to distinguish that which is treason by the common-law from\nall other inferior crimes, we are to consider, that if such high-treason\nshould take effect, it would destroy all laws at once; and being done by\na subject, it is a return to hostility by treachery; and consequently,\nsuch as are traitors may, by the law of reason, be dealt withal as\nignoble and treacherous enemies: but the greatest of other crimes, for\nthe most part, are breaches of one only, or at least of very few laws.\n\n_L._ Whether this you say be true or false, the law is now\nunquestionable, by a statute made in the 1st and 2nd years of _Queen\nMary_, whereby there is nothing to be esteemed treason, besides those\nfew offences specially mentioned in the act of 25 _Edward III_.\n\n_P._ Amongst these great crimes the greatest is that which is committed\nby one that has been trusted and loved by him whose death he so\ndesigneth: for a man cannot well take heed of those whom he thinks he\nhath obliged, whereas an open enemy gives a man warning before he\nacteth. And this it is for which the statute hath declared, that it is\nanother kind of treason, when a servant killeth his master or mistress,\nor a wife killeth her husband, or a clerk killeth his prelate. And I\nshould think it petty treason also, though it be not within the words of\nthe statute, when a tenant in fee, that holdeth by homage and fealty,\nshall kill the lord of his fee; for fealty is an oath of allegiance to\nthe lord of the fee; saving he may not keep his oath in any thing sworn\nto, if it be against the King. For homage, as it is expressed in a\nstatute of 17 _Edw. II_, is the greatest submission that is possible to\nbe made to one man by another. For the tenant shall hold his hands\ntogether between the hands of his landlord, and shall say thus; I become\nyour man from this day forth for life, for member, and for worldly\nhonour, and shall owe that my faith for the lands that I shall hold of\nyou, saving the faith that I owe unto our Sovereign Lord the King, and\nto many other lords. Which homage, if made to the King, is equivalent to\na promise of simple obedience, and if made to another lord, there is\nnothing excepted but the allegiance to the King; and that which is\ncalled fealty, is but the same confirmed by an oath.\n\n_L._ But Sir Edward Coke, (4 _Inst._ p. 11), denies that a traitor is in\nlegal understanding the King\u2019s enemy. For enemies, saith he, be those\nthat be out of the allegiance of the King. And his reason is, because,\nif a subject join with a foreign enemy, and come into England with him,\nand be taken prisoner here, he shall not be ransomed, or proceeded with\nas an enemy shall, but he shall be taken as a traitor to the King.\nWhereas an enemy coming in open hostility, and taken, shall either be\nexecuted by martial law, or ransomed; for he cannot be indicted of\ntreason, for that he never was in the protection and ligeance of the\nKing; and the indictment of the treason saith, _contra ligeantiam suam\ndebitam_.\n\n_P._ This is not an argument worthy of the meanest lawyer. Did Sir\nEdward Coke think it impossible for a King lawfully to kill a man, by\nwhat death soever, without an indictment, when it is manifestly proved\nhe was his open enemy? Indictment is a form of accusation peculiar to\nEngland, by the command of some King of England, and retained still, and\ntherefore a law to this country of England. But if it were not lawful to\nput a man to death otherwise than by an indictment, no enemy could be\nput to death at all in other nations, because they proceed not, as we\ndo, by indictment. Again, when an open enemy is taken and put to death\nby judgment of martial-law; it is not the law of the general or council\nof war, that an enemy shall be thus proceeded with, but the law of the\nKing contained in their commissions; such as from time to time the Kings\nhave thought fit, in whose will it always resteth, whether an open\nenemy, when he is taken, shall be put to death, or no, and by what\ndeath; and whether he shall be ransomed, or no, and at what price. Then\nfor the nature of treason by rebellion; is it not a return to hostility?\nWhat else does rebellion signify? William the Conqueror subdued this\nkingdom; some he killed; some upon promise of future obedience he took\nto mercy, and they became his subjects, and swore allegiance to him. If\ntherefore they renew the war against him, are they not again open\nenemies? Or if any of them lurking under his laws, seek occasion thereby\nto kill him secretly, and come to be known, may he not be proceeded\nagainst as an enemy, who, though he had not committed what he designed,\nyet had certainly a hostile design? Did not the Long Parliament declare\nall those for enemies to the state, that opposed their proceedings\nagainst the late King? But Sir Edward Coke does seldom well distinguish,\nwhen there are two divers names for one and the same thing: though one\ncontain the other, he makes them always different; as if it could not be\nthat one and the same man should be both an enemy and a traitor. But now\nlet us come to his comment upon this statute. The statute says (as it is\nprinted in English) when a man doth compass, or imagine, the death of\nour Lord the King, &c. What is the meaning of the word compassing, or\nimagining?\n\n_L._ On this place Sir Edward Coke says, that before the making of this\nact, _voluntas reputabatur pro facto_, the will was taken for the deed.\nAnd so saith Bracton; _spectatur voluntas, et non exitus; et nihil\ninterest utrum quis occidat, aut causam pr\u00e6beat_, that is to say, the\ncause of the killing. Now Sir Edward Coke says, this was the law before\nthe statute; and that to be a cause of the killing, is to declare the\nsame by some open deed tending to the execution of his intent, or which\nmight be cause of death.\n\n_P._ Is there any Englishman can understand, that to cause the death of\na man, and to declare the same, is all one thing? And if this were so,\nand that such was the common-law before the statute, by what words in\nthe statute is it taken away?\n\n_L._ It is not taken away, but the manner how it must be proved is thus\ndetermined, that it must be proved by some open deed, as providing of\nweapons, powder, poison, assaying of armour, sending of letters, &c.\n\n_P._ But what is the crime itself, which this statute maketh treason?\nFor as I understand the words, to compass or imagine the King\u2019s death,\n&c. the compassing (as it is in the English) is the only thing which is\nmade high-treason. So that not only the killing, but the design, is made\nhigh-treason; or, as it is in the French record, _fait compasser_, that\nis to say, the causing of others to compass or design the King\u2019s death\nis high-treason; and the words _par overt fait_, are not added as a\nspecification of any treason, or other crime, but only of the proof that\nis required by the law. Seeing then the crime is the design and purpose\nto kill the King, or cause him to be killed, and lieth hidden in the\nbreast of him that is accused; what other proof can there be had of it\nthan words spoken or written? And therefore, if there be sufficient\nwitness that he by words declared that he had such a design, there can\nbe no question, but that he is comprehended within the statute. Sir\nEdward Coke doth not deny, but, that if he confess this design, either\nby word or writing, he is within the statute. As for that common saying,\nthat bare words may make a heretic but not a traitor, which Sir Edward\nCoke on this occasion maketh use of, they are to little purpose; seeing\nthat this statute maketh not the words high-treason, but the intention,\nwhereof the words are but a testimony: and that common saying is false\nas it is generally pronounced. For there were divers statutes made\nafterwards, though now expired, which made bare words to be treason\nwithout any other deed; as, 1 _Eliz. c. 6_, and 13 _Eliz. c. 1_, if a\nman should publicly preach that the King were an usurper, or that the\nright of the crown belonged to any other than the King that reigned,\nthere is no doubt but it were treason, not only within this statute of\nEdward III, but also within the statute of 1 _Edw. VI, c. 12_, which are\nboth still in force.\n\n_L._ Not only so; but if a subject should counsel any other man to kill\nthe King, Queen, or heir-apparent to the Crown, it would at this day be\nadjudged high-treason; and yet it is no more than bare words. In the\nthird year of King James, Henry Garnet, a Jesuit priest, to whom some of\nthe gunpowder traitors had revealed their design by way of confession,\ngave them absolution without any caution taken for their desisting from\ntheir purpose, or other provision against the danger, and was therefore\ncondemned and executed as a traitor, though such absolution was nothing\nelse but bare words. Also I find in the reports of Sir John Davis,\nAttorney-General for Ireland, that in the time of King Henry VI, a man\nwas condemned of treason for saying the King was a natural fool, and\nunfit to govern. But yet this clause in the statute of _Edw. III_, viz.\nthat the compassing there mentioned ought to be proved by some _overt\nact_, was by the framers of the statute not without great wisdom and\nprovidence inserted; for as Sir Edward Coke very well observeth, when\nwitnesses are examined concerning words only, they never, or very\nrarely, agree precisely about the words they swear to.\n\n_P._ I deny not but that it was wisely enough done. But the question is\nnot here of the treason, which is either fact or design, but of the\nproof, which when it is doubtful, is to be judged by a jury of twelve\nlawful men. Now whether think you is it a better proof of a man\u2019s\nintention to kill, that he declare the same with his own mouth, so as it\nmay be witnessed, or that he provide weapons, powder, poison, or assay\narms? If he utter his design by words, the jury has no more to do than\nto consider the legality of the witnesses, the harmony of their\ntestimonies, or whether the words were spoken advisedly. For they might\nhave been uttered in a disputation, for exercise only; or when he that\nspake them, had not the use of reason, nor perhaps any design or wish at\nall, towards the execution of what he talked of. But how a jury, from\nproviding or buying of armour, or buying of gunpowder, or from any other\novert act, not treason in itself, can infer a design of murdering the\nKing, unless there appear some words also signifying to what end he made\nsuch provision, I cannot easily conceive. Therefore, as the jury on the\nwhole matter, words and deeds, shall ground their judgment concerning\ndesign or not design, so, in reason, they ought to give verdict. But to\ncome to the treason of counterfeiting the great or privy-seal, seeing\nthere are so many ways for a cheating fellow to make use of these seals,\nto the cozening of the King and his people; why are not all such abuses\nhigh-treason, as well as the making of a false seal?\n\n_L._ So they are; for Sir Edward Coke produceth a record of one that was\ndrawn and hanged for taking the great seal from an expired patent, and\nfastening it to a counterfeit commission to gather money. But he\napproveth not the judgment, because it is the judgment for petty\ntreason: also, because the jury did not find him guilty of the offence\nlaid in the indictment, which was, the counterfeiting of the great seal,\nbut found the special matter, for which the offender was drawn and\nhanged.\n\n_P._ Seeing this crime of taking the great seal from one writing, and\nfastening it to another, was not found high-treason by the jury, nor\ncould be found upon special matter to be the other kind of treason\nmentioned in the same statute; what ground had either the jury to find\nit treason, or the judge to pronounce sentence upon it?\n\n_L._ I cannot tell. Sir Edward Coke seems to think it a false record;\nfor hereupon he saith, by way of admonition to the reader, that hereby\nit appeareth how dangerous it is to report a case by the ear.\n\n_P._ True; but he does not make it apparent that this case was untruly\nreported; but on the contrary, confesseth that he had perused the same\nrecord; and a man may, if it may be done without proof of the falsity,\nmake the same objection to any record whatsoever. For my part, seeing\nthis crime produced the same mischief that ariseth from counterfeiting,\nI think it reason to understand it as within the statute; and for the\ndifference between the punishments, which are both of them capital, I\nthink it is not worthy to be stood upon; seeing death, which is _ultimum\nsupplicium_, is a satisfaction to the law, as Sir Edward Coke himself\nhath in another place affirmed. But let us now proceed to other crimes.\n\n_L._ Appendant to this is another crime, called misprision of treason;\nwhich is the concealing of it by any man that knows it; and is called\nmisprision from the French _mespriser_, which signifies to contemn or\nundervalue. For it is no small crime in any subject, so little to take\nto heart a known danger to the King\u2019s person, and consequently to the\nwhole kingdom, as not to discover not only what he knows, but also what\nhe suspecteth of the same, that the truth therefore may be examined. But\nfor such discovery, though the thing prove false, the discoverer shall\nnot, as I think, be taken for a false accuser; if for what he directly\naffirms, he produce a reasonable proof, and some probability for his\nsuspicion. For else the concealment will seem justifiable by the\ninterest, which is to every man allowed, in the preservation of himself\nfrom pain and damage.\n\n_P._ This I consent to.\n\n_L._ All other crimes merely temporal, are comprehended under felony or\ntrespass.\n\n_P._ What is the meaning of the word felony? Does it signify anything\nthat is in its own nature a crime, or that only which is made a crime by\nsome statute? For I remember some statutes that make it felony to\ntransport horses, and some other things, out of the kingdom; which\ntransportation, before such statutes were made, and after the repealing\nof the same, was no greater crime than any other usual traffic of a\nmerchant.\n\n_L._ Sir Edward Coke derives the word felony from the Latin word _fel_,\nthe gall of a living creature; and accordingly defines felony to be an\nact done _animo felleo_; that is to say, a bitter, a cruel act.\n\n_P._ Etymologies are no definitions, and yet when they are true, they\ngive much light towards the finding out of a definition. But this of Sir\nEdward Coke\u2019s carries with it very little of probability; for there be\nmany things made felony by the statute law, that proceed not from any\nbitterness of mind at all, and many that proceed from the contrary.\n\n_L._ This is matter for a critic, to be picked out of the knowledge of\nhistory and foreign languages, and you may perhaps know more of it than\nI do.\n\n_P._ All that I, or I think any other, can say in this matter, will\namount to no more than a reasonable conjecture, insufficient to sustain\nany point of controversy in law. The word is not to be found in any of\nthe old Saxon laws, set forth by Mr. Lambard, nor in any statute printed\nbefore that of Magna Charta; there it is found. Now Magna Charta was\nmade in the time of Henry III, grandchild to Henry II, Duke of Anjou, a\nFrenchman born, and bred in the heart of France, whose language might\nvery well retain many words of his ancestors the German Franks, as ours\ndoth of the German Saxons; as also many words of the language of the\nGauls, as the Gauls did retain many words of the Greek colony planted at\nMarseilles. But certain it is, the French lawyers at this day use the\nword felon, just as our lawyers use the same; whereas the common people\nof France use the word _filou_ in the same sense. But _filou_\nsignifieth, not the man that hath committed such an act as they call\nfelony, but the man that maketh it his trade to maintain himself by the\nbreaking and contemning of all laws generally; and comprehendeth all\nthose unruly people called cheaters, cutpurses, picklocks, catchcloaks,\ncoiners of false money, forgers, thieves, robbers, murderers, and\nwhosoever make use of iniquity on land or sea as a trade or living. The\nGreeks upon the coast of Asia, where Homer lived, were they that planted\nthe colony of Marseilles. They had a word that signified the same with\nfelon, which was \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, _filetes_; and this _filetes_ of Homer\nsignifies properly the same that a felon signifies with us. And\ntherefore Homer makes Apollo to call Mercury \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd, _fileteen_, and\n\u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. I insist not upon the truth of this etymology, but it is\ncertainly more rational than the _animus felleus_ of Sir Edward Coke.\nAnd for the matter itself, it is manifest enough, that which we now call\nmurder, robbery, theft, and other practices of felons, are the same that\nwe call felony, and crimes in their own nature without the help of\nstatute. Nor is it the manner of punishment, that distinguisheth the\nnature of one crime from another; but the mind of the offender and the\nmischief he intendeth, considered together with the circumstances of\nperson, time, and place.\n\n_L._ Of felonies, the greatest crime is murder.\n\n_P._ And what is murder?\n\n_L._ Murder is the killing of a man upon malice forethought, as by a\nweapon, or by poison, or any way, if it be done upon antecedent\nmeditation; or thus, murder is the killing of a man in cold blood.\n\n_P._ I think there is a good definition of murder set down by statute,\n52 _Henry III, c. 25_, in these words: Murder, from henceforth, shall\nnot be judged before our justices, where it is found misfortune only,\nbut it shall take place in such as are slain by felony, and not\notherwise. And Sir Edward Coke interpreting this statute, 2 _Inst._ p.\n148, saith, that the mischief before this statute was, that he that\nkilled a man by misfortune, as by doing any act that was not against\nlaw, and yet against his intent the death of a man ensued, this was\nadjudged murder. But I find no proof of that he allegeth, nor find I any\nsuch law among the laws of the Saxons set forth by Mr. Lambard. For the\nword, it is, as Sir Edward Coke noteth, old Saxon, and amongst them it\nsignified no more than a man slain in the field or other place, the\nauthor of his death not known. And according hereunto, Bracton, who\nlived in the time of Magna Charta, defineth it, fol. 134, thus: Murder\nis the secret killing of a man, when none besides the killer and his\ncompanions saw or knew it; so that it was not known who did it, nor\nfresh suit could be made after the doer. Therefore, every such killing\nwas called murder, before it could be known whether it could be by\nfelony or not; for a man may be found dead that kills himself, or was\nlawfully killed by another. This name of murder came to be the more\nhorrid, when it was secretly done, for that it made every man to\nconsider of their own danger, and him that saw the dead body, to boggle\nat it, as a horse will do at a dead horse. And to prevent the same, they\nhad laws in force, to amerce the hundred where it was done, in a sum\ndefined by law to be the price of his life. For in those days, the lives\nof all sorts of men were valued by money, and the value set down in\ntheir written laws. And therefore Sir Edward Coke was mistaken, in that\nhe thought that killing a man by misfortune before the statute of\nMarlebridge, was adjudged murder. And those secret murders were\nabominated by the people, for that they were liable to so great a\npecuniary punishment for suffering the malefactor to escape. But this\ngrievance was by Canutus, when he reigned, soon eased. For he made a\nlaw, that the county in this case should not be charged, unless he were\nan Englishman that was so slain; but if he were a Frenchman, (under\nwhich name were comprehended all foreigners, and especially the\nNormans,) though the slayer escaped, the county was not to be amerced.\nAnd this law, though it were very hard and chargeable, when an\nEnglishman was so slain, for his friend to prove he was an Englishman,\nand also unreasonable to deny the justice to a stranger, yet was it not\nrepealed till the 14th _Edw. III_. By this you see that murder is\ndistinguished from homicide by the statute laws, and not by any\ncommon-law without the statute; and that it is comprehended under the\ngeneral name of felony.\n\n_L._ And so also is petit treason: and I think so is high-treason also.\nFor in the abovesaid statute in the 25th _Edw. III_, concerning\ntreasons, there is this clause: And because that many other like cases\nof treason may happen in time to come, which a man cannot think or\ndeclare at the present time; it is accorded, that if any other case,\nsupposed treason, which is not above specified, doth happen before any\nof the justices, the justices shall tarry without any going to judgment\nof the treason, till the cause be shewed and declared before the King\nand his Parliament, whether it be treason or other felony. Which thereby\nshews that the King and Parliament thought that treason was one of the\nsorts of felony.\n\n_P._ And so think I.\n\n_L._ But Sir Edward Coke denies it to be so at this day. For (_1 Inst.\nsec. 745_) at the word felony, he saith, that in ancient time this word\n_felony_ was of so large an extent, as that it included high-treason;\nbut afterwards it was resolved, that in the King\u2019s pardon or charter,\nthis word _felony_ should extend only to common felonies; and at this\nday, under the word felony, by law is included petite treason, murder,\nhomicide, burning of houses, burglary, robbery, rape, &c. chance medley,\n_se defendendo_, and petite larceny.\n\n_P._ He says it was resolved: but by whom?\n\n_L._ By the justices of assize in the time of Henry IV, as it seems in\nthe margin.\n\n_P._ Have justices of assize any power by their commission to alter the\nlanguage of the land and the received sense of words? Or in the question\nin what case felony shall be said, is it referred to the judges to\ndetermine; as in the question in what case treason shall be said, it is\nreferred by the statute of Edward III to the Parliament? I think not;\nand yet perhaps they may be obliged to disallow a pardon of treason,\nwhen mentioning all felonies it nameth not treason, nor specifies it by\nany description of the fact.\n\n_L._ Another kind of homicide there is, simply called so, or by the name\nof manslaughter, and is not murder: and that is, when a man kills\nanother man upon sudden quarrel, during the heat of blood.\n\n_P._ If two meeting in the street chance to strive who shall go nearest\nto the wall, and thereupon fighting, one of them kills the other, I\nbelieve verily he that first drew his sword, did it of malice\nforethought, though not long forethought; but whether it be felony or\nno, it may be doubted. It is true, that the harm done is the same as if\nit had been done by felony; but the wickedness of the intention was\nnothing near so great. And supposing it had been done by felony, then it\nis manifest, by the statute of Marlebridge, that it was very murder. And\nwhen a man for a word or a trifle shall draw his sword and kill another\nman, can any man imagine that there was not some precedent malice?\n\n_L._ It is very likely there was malice, more or less: and therefore the\nlaw hath ordained for it a punishment equal to that of murder, saving\nthat the offender shall have the benefit of his clergy.\n\n_P._ The benefit of clergy comes in upon another account, and importeth\nnot any extenuation of the crime. For it is but a relic of the old\nusurped papal privilege, which is now by many statutes so pared off, as\nto spread but to few offences, and is become a legal kind of conveying\nmercy, not only to the clergy, but also to the laity.\n\n_L._ The work of a judge, you see, is very difficult, and requires a man\nthat hath a faculty of well distinguishing of dissimilitudes in such\ncases as common judgments think to be the same. A small circumstance may\nmake a great alteration; wherefore a man that cannot well discern, ought\nnot to take upon him the office of a judge.\n\n_P._ You say very well; for if judges were to follow one another\u2019s\njudgments in precedent cases, all the justice in the world would at\nlength depend upon the sentence of a few learned, or unlearned, ignorant\nmen, and have nothing at all to do with the study of reason.\n\n_L._ A third kind of homicide is when a man kills another, either by\nmisfortune, or in the necessary defence of himself, or of the King, or\nof his laws; for such killing is neither felony nor crime, saving, as\nSir Edward Coke says (_3 Inst. p. 56_), that if the act that a man is\ndoing, when he kills another man, be unlawful, then it is murder. As, if\nA meaning to steal a deer in the park of B, shooteth at the deer, and by\nthe glance of the arrow killeth a boy that is hidden in a bush, this is\nmurder, for that the act was unlawful; but if the owner of the park had\ndone the like, shooting at his own deer, it had been by misadventure,\nand no felony.\n\n_P._ This is not so distinguished by any statute, but is the\n_common-law_ only of Sir Edward Coke. I believe not a word of it. If a\nboy be robbing an appletree, and falleth thence upon a man that stands\nunder it and breaks his neck, but by the same chance saveth his own\nlife, Sir Edward Coke, it seems, will have him hanged for it, as if he\nhad fallen of prepensed malice. All that can be called crime in this\nbusiness is but a simple trespass, to the damage perhaps of sixpence or\na shilling. I confess the trespass was an offence against the law, but\nthe falling was none, nor was it by the trespass but by the falling that\nthe man was slain; and as he ought to be quit of the killing, so he\nought to make restitution for the trespass. But I believe the cause of\nSir Edward Coke\u2019s mistake was his not well understanding of Bracton,\nwhom he cites in the margin. For, fol. 120 b. lib. iii. cap. 4, he saith\nthus: _Sed hic erit distinguendum, utrum quis dederit operam rei licit\u00e6,\nvel illicit\u00e6; si illicit\u00e6, ut si lapidem projiciebat quis versus locum\nper quem consueverunt homines transitum facere, vel dum insequitur quis\nequum vel bovem, et aliquis a bove vel equo percussus fuerit, et\nhujusmodi, hoc imputatur ei_. That is: But here we are to distinguish\nwhether a man be upon a lawful or unlawful business; if an unlawful, as\nhe that throws a stone into a place where men use to pass; or if he\nchase a horse or an ox, and thereby the man be stricken by the horse or\nthe ox; this shall be imputed to him. And it is most reasonable; for the\ndoing of such an unlawful act as is here meant, is a sufficient argument\nof a felonious purpose, or at least a hope to kill somebody or other,\nand he cared not whom, which is worse than to design the death of a\ncertain adversary, which nevertheless is murder. Also, on the contrary,\nthough the business a man is doing be lawful, and it chanceth sometimes\nthat a man be slain thereby, yet may such killing be felony. For if a\ncarman drive his cart through Cheapside in a throng of people, and\nthereby he kill a man, though he bare him no malice, yet because he saw\nthere was very great danger, it may reasonably be inferred, that he\nmeant to adventure the killing of somebody or other, though not of him\nthat was killed.\n\n_L._ He is a felon also that killeth himself voluntarily, and is called,\nnot only by common lawyers, but also in divers statute laws, _felo de\nse_.\n\n_P._ And it is well so; for names imposed by statutes are equivalent to\ndefinitions. But I conceive not how any man can bear _animum felleum_,\nor so much malice towards himself, as to hurt himself voluntarily, much\nless to kill himself. For naturally and necessarily the intention of\nevery man aimeth at somewhat which is good to himself, and tendeth to\nhis preservation. And therefore, methinks, if he kill himself, it is to\nbe presumed that he is not _compos mentis_, but by some inward torment\nor apprehension of somewhat worse than death, distracted.\n\n_L._ Nay, unless he be _compos mentis_, he is not _felo de se_, as Sir\nEdward Coke saith, _3 Inst. p. 54_; and therefore he cannot be judged a\n_felo de se_, unless it be first proved he was _compos mentis_.\n\n_P._ How can that be proved of a man dead; especially if it cannot be\nproved by any witness, that a little before his death he spake as other\nmen used to do? This is a hard place; and before you take it for\ncommon-law, it had need to be cleared.\n\n_L._ I will think on it. There is a statute of _3 Hen. VII, c. 14_,\nwhich makes it felony in any of the King\u2019s household servants, under the\ndegree of a Lord, to compass the death of any of the King\u2019s Privy\nCouncil. The words are these: That from henceforth the steward,\ntreasurer, and comptroller of the King\u2019s house for the time being, or\none of them, have full authority and power, to inquire by twelve staid\nmen and discreet persons of the chequer-roll of the King\u2019s honourable\nhousehold, if any servant, admitted to be his servant sworn, and his\nname put into the chequer-roll, whatsoever he be, serving in any manner,\noffice, or room, reputed, had, or taken under the estate of a Lord, make\nany confederacies, compassings, conspiracies, or imaginations with any\nperson, to destroy or murder the King, or any Lord of this realm, or any\nother person sworn of the King\u2019s council, steward, treasurer, or\ncomptroller of the King\u2019s house. And if such misdoers shall be found\nguilty by confession, or otherwise, that the said offence shall be\njudged felony.\n\n_P._ It appears by this statute, that not only the compassing the death,\nas you say, of a privy-councillor, but also of any Lord of this realm,\nis felony; if it be done by any of the King\u2019s household servants, that\nis not a Lord.\n\n_L._ No; Sir Edward Coke upon these words, _any Lord of this realm, or\nother person sworn of the King\u2019s council_, infers (_3 Inst. p. 38_),\nthat it is to be understood of such a Lord only as is a\nprivy-councillor.\n\n_P._ For barring of the Lords of Parliament from this privilege, he\nstrains this statute a little farther, in my opinion, than it reacheth\nof itself. But how are such felonies to be tried?\n\n_L._ The indictment is to be found before the steward, treasurer, and\ncomptroller of the King\u2019s house, or one of them, by twelve of the King\u2019s\nhousehold servants. The petit jury for the trial must be twelve other of\nthe King\u2019s servants. And the judges are again the steward, treasurer,\nand comptroller of the King\u2019s house, or two of them; and yet I see that\nthese men are not usually great students of the law.\n\n_P._ You may hereby be assured, that either the King and Parliament were\nvery much overseen in choosing such officers perpetually for the time\nbeing to be judges in a trial at the common-law, or else that Sir Edward\nCoke presumes too much to appropriate all the judicature, both in law\nand equity, to the common lawyers; as if neither lay persons, men of\nhonour, nor any of the Lords spiritual who are the most versed in the\nexamination of equity and cases of conscience, when they hear the\nstatutes read and pleaded, were fit to judge of the intention and\nmeaning of the same. I know that neither such great persons, nor\nbishops, have ordinarily so much spare time from their ordinary\nemployment, as to be so skilful as to plead causes at the bar; but\ncertainly they are, especially the bishops, the best able to judge of\nmatters of reason, that is to say (by Sir Edward Coke\u2019s confession) of\nmatters, except of blood, at the common-law.\n\n_L._ Another sort of felony, though without manslaughter, is robbery;\nand by Sir Edward Coke (_3 Inst. p. 68_), defined thus: Robbery by the\ncommon-law is a felony committed by a violent assault upon the person of\nanother, by putting him in fear, and taking away from him his money, or\nother goods of any value whatsoever.\n\n_P._ Robbery is not distinguished from theft by any statute.\n_Latrocinium_ comprehendeth them both, and both are felony, and both\npunished with death. And therefore to distinguish them aright is the\nwork of reason only. And the first difference, which is obvious to all\nmen, is that robbery is committed by force or terror, of which neither\nis in theft. For theft is a secret act, and that which is taken by\nviolence or terror, either from his person, or in his presence, is still\nrobbery. But if it be taken secretly, whether it be by day or night,\nfrom his person, or from his fold, or from his pasture, then it is\ncalled theft. It is force and fraud only, that distinguisheth between\ntheft and robbery; both which are, by the pravity only of the intention,\nfelony in their nature. But there be so many evasions of the law found\nout by evil men, that I know not, in this predicament of felony, how to\nplace them. For suppose I go secretly, by day or night, into another\nman\u2019s field of wheat, ripe and standing, and loading my cart with it I\ncarry it away: is it theft or robbery?\n\n_L._ Neither, it is but trespass. But if you first lay down the wheat\nyou have cut, and then throw it into your cart, and carry it away, then\nit is felony.\n\n_P._ Why so?\n\n_L._ Sir Edward Coke tells you the reason of it (_3 Inst. p. 107_). For\nhe defineth theft to be, by the common-law, a felonious and fraudulent\ntaking and carrying away, by any man or woman, of the mere personal\ngoods of another, not from the person, nor by night in the house of the\nowner. From this definition, he argues thus, p. 109: Any kind of corn or\ngrain, growing upon the ground, is a personal chattel, and the executors\nof the owner shall have them, though they be not severed; but yet no\nlarceny can be committed of them, because they are annexed to the\nrealty; so it is of grass standing on the ground, or of apples, or of\nany fruit upon the trees, &c.; so it is of a box or chest of charters,\nno larceny can be committed of them, because the charters concern the\nrealty, and the box or chest though it be of great value, yet shall it\nbe of the same nature the charters are of; _et omne magis dignum trahit\nad se minus_.\n\n_P._ Is this definition drawn out of any statute, or is it in Bracton or\nLittleton, or any other writer upon the science of the laws?\n\n_L._ No, it is his own: and you may observe by the logic sentences\ndispersed through his works, that he was a logician sufficient enough to\nmake a definition.\n\n_P._ But if his definitions must be the rule of law, what is there that\nhe may not make felony or not felony, at his pleasure? But seeing it is\nnot statute law that he says, it must be very perfect reason, or else no\nlaw at all; and to me it seems so far from reason, as I think it\nridiculous. But let us examine it. There can, says he, be no larceny of\ncorn, grass, or fruits that are growing, that is to say, they cannot be\nstolen. But why? Because they concern the realty; that is, because they\nconcern the land. It is true, that the land cannot be stolen, nor the\nright of a man\u2019s tenure; but corn, and trees, and fruit, though growing,\nmay be cut down, and carried away secretly and feloniously, in contempt\nand despite of the law. And are they not then stolen? And is there any\nact which is feloniously committed, that is not more than trespass? Can\nany man doubt of it, that understands the English tongue? It is true,\nthat if a man pretend a right to the land, and on that pretence take the\nfruits thereof by way of taking possession of his own, it is no more\nthan a trespass, unless he conceal the taking of them. For in that one\ncase, he but puts the man that was in possession before, to exhibit his\ncomplaint, which purpose is not felonious, but lawful; for nothing makes\na distinction between felony and not felony, but the purpose. I have\nheard, that if a man slander another with stealing of a tree standing,\nthere lies no action for it. And that upon this ground: to steal a\nstanding tree is impossible; and that the cause of the impossibility is,\nthat a man\u2019s freehold cannot be stolen; which is a very obvious fallacy.\nFor freehold signifieth, not only the tenement, but also the tenure; and\nthough it be true that a tenure cannot be stolen, yet every man sees\nthat the standing trees and corn may easily be stolen. And so far forth\nas trees, &c. are part of the freehold, so far forth also, they are\npersonal goods. For whatsoever is freehold is inheritance, and descended\nto the heir, and nothing can descend to the executors but what is merely\npersonal. And though a box or case of evidences are to descend to the\nheir, yet unless you can shew me positive law to the contrary, they\nshall be taken into the executors' hands to be delivered to the heir.\nBesides, how unconscionable a thing is it, that he that steals a\nshilling\u2019s worth of wood, which the wind hath blown down, or which lieth\nrotting on the ground, should be hanged for it, and he that takes a\ntree, worth twenty or forty shillings, should answer only for the\ndamage!\n\n_L._ It is somewhat hard, but it has been so practised time out of mind.\nThen follows sodomy, and rape, both of them felonies.\n\n_P._ I know that, and that of the former he justly says it is\ndetestable, being in a manner an apostacy from human nature: but in\nneither of them is there anything of _animus felleus_. The statutes\nwhich make them felony, are exposed to all men\u2019s reading. But because\nSir Edward Coke\u2019s commentaries upon them are more diligent and accurate\nthan to be free from all uncleanness, let us leap over them both;\nobserving only by the way, that he leaves an evasion for an impotent\noffender, though his design be the same, and pursued to the utmost of\nhis power.\n\n_L._ Two other great felonies are, breaking and burning of houses;\nneither of which are defined by any statute. The former of them is by\nSir Edward Coke (_3 Inst. p. 63_), defined thus:\u2014Burglary is by the\ncommon-law, the breaking and entering into the mansion-house of another,\nin the night, with intent to kill some reasonable creature, or to commit\nsome other felony within the same, whether his intent be executed or\nnot. And he defineth night to be then, when one man cannot know\nanother\u2019s face by daylight. And for the parts of a mansion-house, he\nreckoneth all houses that belong to house-keeping, as barns, stables,\ndairyhouses, buttery, kitchen, chambers, &c. But breaking of a house by\nday, though felony, and punished as burglary, is not within the statute.\n\n_P._ I have nothing to say against his interpretations here; but I like\nnot that any private man should presume to determine, whether such or\nsuch a fact done be within the words of a statute or not, where it\nbelongs only to a jury of twelve men to declare in their verdict,\nwhether the fact laid open before them, be burglary, robbery, theft, or\nother felony. For this is to give a leading judgment to the jury, who\nought not to consider any private lawyer\u2019s institutes, but the statutes\nthemselves pleaded before them for directions.\n\n_L._ Burning, as he defines it (ibid. p. 66), is a felony at the\ncommon-law, committed by any that maliciously and voluntarily, in the\nnight or day, burneth the house of an other. And he hereupon infers, if\na man set fire to the house, and it takes not, that then it is not\nwithin the statute.\n\n_P._ If a man should secretly and maliciously lay a quantity of\ngunpowder under another man\u2019s house, sufficient to blow it up, and set a\ntrain of powder in it, and set fire to the train, and some accident\nhinder the effect, is not this burning? Or what is it? What crime? It is\nneither treason, nor murder, nor burglary, nor robbery, nor theft, nor\n(no damage being made) any trespass, nor contrary to any statute. And\nyet, seeing the common-law is the law of reason, it is a sin, and such a\nsin as a man may be accused of, and convicted; and consequently a crime\ncommitted of malice prepensed. Shall he not then be punished for the\nattempt? I grant you that a judge has no warrant from any statute-law,\ncommon-law, or commission, to appoint the punishment; but surely the\nKing has power to punish him, on this side of life or member, as he\nplease; and with the assent of Parliament, if not without, to make the\ncrime for the future capital.\n\n_L._ I know not. Besides these crimes, there is conjuration, witchcraft,\nsorcery and enchantment; which are capital by the statute _1 James, c.\n12_.\n\n_P._ But I desire not to discourse of that subject. For though without\ndoubt there is some great wickedness signified by those crimes; yet I\nhave ever found myself too dull to conceive the nature of them, or how\nthe devil hath power to do many things which witches have been accused\nof. Let us now come to crimes not capital.\n\n_L._ Shall we pass over the crime of heresy, which Sir Edward Coke\nranketh before murder? But the consideration of it will be somewhat\nlong.\n\n_P._ Let us defer it till the afternoon.\n\n[Sidenote: Of heresy.]\n\n_L._ Concerning heresy, Sir Edward Coke (3 _Inst._ p. 39) says, that\nfive things fall into consideration. 1. Who be the judges of heresy. 2.\nWhat shall be judged heresy. 3. What is the judgment upon a man\nconvicted of heresy. 4. What the law alloweth him to save his life. 5.\nWhat he shall forfeit by judgment against him.\n\n_P._ The principal thing to be considered, which is the heresy itself,\nhe leaveth out, viz. what it is; in what fact or words it consisteth;\nwhat law it violateth, statute-law or the law of reason. The cause why\nhe omitteth it, may perhaps be this; that it was not only out of his\nprofession, but also out of his other learning. Murder, robbery, theft,\n&c. every man knoweth to be evil, and are crimes defined by the\nstatute-law, so that any man may avoid them, if he will. But who can be\nsure to avoid heresy, (if he but dare to give an account of his faith),\nunless he know beforehand what it is?\n\n_L._ In the preamble of the statute of _2 Hen. IV, c. 15_, heresy is\nlaid down, as a preaching or writing of such doctrine as is contrary to\nthe determination of Holy Church.\n\n_P._ Then it is heresy at this day to preach or write against\nworshipping of Saints, or the infallibility of the Church of Rome, or\nany other determination of the same Church. For Holy Church, at that\ntime, was understood to be the Church of Rome, and now with us the Holy\nChurch I understand to be the Church of England; and the opinions in\nthat statute are now, and were then, the true Christian faith. Also the\nsame statute of _Hen. IV_ declareth, by the same preamble, that the\nChurch of England had never been troubled with heresy.\n\n_L._ But that statute is repealed.\n\n_P._ Then also is that declaration or definition of heresy repealed.\n\n_L._ What, say you, is heresy?\n\n_P._ I say, heresy is a singularity of doctrine or opinion contrary to\nthe doctrine of another man, or men; and the word properly signifies the\ndoctrine of a sect, which doctrine is taken upon trust of some man of\nreputation for wisdom, that was the first author of the same. If you\nwill understand the truth hereof, you are to read the histories and\nother writings of the ancient Greeks, whose word it is; which writings\nare extant in these days, and easy to be had. Wherein you will find,\nthat in and a little before the time of Alexander the Great, there lived\nin Greece many excellent wits, that employed their time in search of the\ntruth in all manner of sciences worthy of their labour, and which to\ntheir great honour and applause published their writings; some\nconcerning justice, laws, and government, some concerning good and evil\nmanners, some concerning the causes of things natural and of events\ndiscernible by sense, and some of all these subjects. And of the authors\nof these, the principal were Pythagoras, Plato, Zeno, Epicurus and\nAristotle, men of deep and laborious meditation, and such as did not get\ntheir bread by their philosophy, but were able to live of their own, and\nwere in honour with princes and other great personages. But these men,\nthough above the rest in wisdom, yet their doctrine in many points did\ndisagree; whereby it came to pass, that such men as studied their\nwritings, inclined some to Pythagoras, some to Plato, some to Aristotle,\nsome to Zeno, and some to Epicurus. But philosophy itself was then so\nmuch in fashion, as that every rich man endeavoured to have his children\neducated in the doctrine of some or other of these philosophers, which\nwere for their wisdom so much renowned. Now those that followed\nPythagoras, were called _Pythagoreans_; those that followed Plato,\n_Academics_; those that followed Zeno, _Stoics_; those that followed\nEpicurus, _Epicureans_; and those that followed Aristotle,\n_Peripatetics_; which are the names of heresy in Greek, which signifies\nno more but taking of an opinion; and the said _Pythagoreans_,\n_Academics_, _Stoics_, _Peripatetics_, _&c._ were termed by the names of\nso many several heresies. All men, you know, are subject to error, and\nthe ways of error very different; and therefore it is no wonder if these\nwise and diligent searchers of the truth did, notwithstanding their\nexcellent parts, differ in many points amongst themselves. But this\nlaudable custom of great wealthy persons to have their children at any\nprice to learn philosophy, suggested to many idle and needy fellows an\neasy and compendious way of maintenance; which was to teach the\nphilosophy, some of Plato, some of Aristotle, &c: whose books to that\nend they read over, but without capacity or much endeavour to examine\nthe reasons of their doctrines, taking only the conclusions, as they\nlay. And setting up with this, they soon professed themselves\nphilosophers, and got to be the school-masters to the youth of Greece.\nBut by competition for such employment, they hated and reviled one\nanother with all the bitter terms they could invent; and very often,\nwhen upon occasion they were in civil company, fell first to\ndisputation, and then to blows, to the great trouble of the company and\ntheir own shame. Yet amongst all their reproachful words, the name of\n_heretic_ came never in, because they were all equally heretics, their\ndoctrine not being theirs, but taken upon trust from the aforesaid\nauthors. So that though we find heresy often mentioned in Lucian and\nother heathen authors, yet we shall not find in any of them _h\u00e6reticus_\nfor a heretic. And this disorder among the philosophers continued a long\ntime in Greece, and infecting also the Romans, was at the greatest in\nthe times of the apostles and in the primitive Church, till the time of\nthe Nicene Council, and somewhat after. But at last the authority of the\nStoics and Epicureans was not much esteemed, only Plato\u2019s and\nAristotle\u2019s philosophy were much in credit; Plato\u2019s with the better\nsort, that founded their doctrine upon the conceptions and ideas of\nthings, and Aristotle\u2019s with those that reasoned only from the names of\nthings, according to the scale of the _categories_. Nevertheless, there\nwere always, though not new sects of philosophy, yet new opinions\ncontinually arising.\n\n_L._ But how came the word heretic to be a reproach?\n\n_P._ Stay a little. After the death of our Saviour, his apostles and his\ndisciples, as you know, dispersed themselves into several parts of the\nworld to preach the Gospel, and converted much people, especially in\nAsia the Less, in Greece, and Italy, where they constituted many\nchurches; and as they travelled from place to place, left bishops to\nteach and direct those their converts, and to appoint presbyters under\nthem to assist them therein, and to confirm them by setting forth the\nlife and miracles of our Saviour, as they had received them from the\nwritings of the apostles and evangelists; whereby, and not by the\nauthority of Plato, or Aristotle, or any other philosopher, they were to\nbe instructed. Now you cannot doubt but that among so many heathens\nconverted in the time of the apostles, there were men of all professions\nand dispositions, and some that had never thought of philosophy at all,\nbut were intent upon their fortunes or their pleasures; and some that\nhad a greater, some a less use of reason; and some that had studied\nphilosophy, but professed it not, which were commonly the men of the\nbetter rank; and some had professed it only for their better abstinence,\nand had it not farther than readily to talk and wrangle; and some were\nChristians in good earnest, and others but counterfeit, intending to\nmake use of the charity of those that were sincere Christians, which in\nthose times was very great. Tell me now, of these sorts of Christians,\nwhich was the most likely to afford the fittest men to propagate the\nfaith by preaching and writing, or public or private disputation; that\nis to say, who were fittest to be made presbyters and bishops.\n\n_L._ Certainly those who, _c\u00e6teris paribus_, could make the best use of\nAristotle\u2019s rhetoric and logic.\n\n_P._ And who were the most prone to innovation?\n\n_L._ They that were most confident of Aristotle\u2019s and Plato\u2019s (their\nformer masters) natural philosophy. For they would be the aptest to\nwrest the writings of the apostles and all Scriptures to the doctrines\nin which their reputation was engaged.\n\n_P._ And from such bishops and priests and other sectaries it was, that\nheresy, amongst the Christians, first came to be a reproach. For no\nsooner had one of them preached or published any doctrine that\ndispleased either the most, or the most leading men of the rest, but it\nbecame such a quarrel as not to be decided but by a Council of the\nbishops in the province where they lived; wherein he that would not\nsubmit to the general decree, was called a heretic, as one that would\nnot relinquish the philosophy of his sect. The rest of the Council gave\nthemselves the name of Catholics, and to their Church the name of\nCatholic Church. And thus came up the opposite terms of catholic and\nheretic.\n\n_L._ I understand how it came to be a reproach, but not how it follows\nthat every opinion condemned by a Church that is, or calls itself\ncatholic, must needs be an error or a sin. The Church of England denies\nthat consequence, and that such doctrine as they hold cannot be proved\nto be erroneous but by the Scripture, which cannot err; but the Church,\nbeing but men, may both err and sin.\n\n_P._ In this case we must consider also that error, in its own nature,\nis no sin. For it is impossible for a man to err on purpose; he cannot\nhave an intention to err; and nothing is sin unless there be a sinful\nintention: much less are such errors sins, as neither hurt the\ncommonwealth nor any private man, nor are against any law positive or\nnatural; such errors as were those for which men were burnt, in the time\nwhen the Pope had the government of this Church.\n\n_L._ Since you have told me how heresy came to be a name, tell me also\nhow it came to be a crime; and what were the heresies that first were\nmade crimes.\n\n_P._ Since the Christian Church could declare, and none else, what\ndoctrines were heresies, but had no power to make statutes for the\npunishment of heretics before they had a Christian King, it is manifest\nthat heresy could not be made a crime before the first Christian\nEmperor, which was Constantine the Great. In his time, one Arius, a\npriest of Alexandria, in dispute with his bishop publicly denied the\ndivinity of Christ, and maintained it afterwards in the pulpit, which\nwas the cause of a sedition and much bloodshed both of citizens and\nsoldiers in that city. For the preventing of the like for the time to\ncome, the Emperor called a general Council of bishops to the city of\nNice; who being met, he exhorted them to agree upon a confession of the\nChristian faith, promising that whatsoever they agreed on he would cause\nto be observed.\n\n_L._ By the way, the Emperor, I think, was here a little too\nindifferent.\n\n_P._ In this Council was established so much of the creed we now use and\ncall the Nicene creed, as reacheth to the words, _I believe in the Holy\nGhost_. The rest was established by the three general Councils next\nsucceeding. By the words of which creed almost all the heresies then in\nbeing, and especially the doctrine of Arius, were condemned; so that now\nall doctrines published by writing or by word, and repugnant to this\nconfession of the first four general Councils, and contained in the\nNicene creed, were, by the imperial law forbidding them, made crimes;\nsuch as are that of Arius, denying the divinity of Christ; that of\nEutiches, denying the two natures of Christ; that of the Nestorians,\ndenying the divinity of the Holy Ghost; that of the Anthropomorphites,\nthat of the Manichees, that of the Anabaptists, and many other.\n\n_L._ What punishment had Arius?\n\n_P._ At the first, for refusing to subscribe, he was deprived and\nbanished; but afterwards having satisfied the Emperor concerning his\nfuture obedience (for the Emperor caused this confession to be made, not\nfor the regard of truth of doctrine, but for the preserving of the\npeace, especially among his Christian soldiers, by whose valour he had\ngotten the empire, and by the same was to preserve it), he was received\nagain into grace, but died before he could repossess his benefice. But\nafter the time of those Councils, the imperial law made the punishment\nfor heresy to be capital, though the manner of the death was left to the\nprefects in their several jurisdictions; and thus it continued till\nsomewhat after the time of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. But the\npapacy having gotten the upper hand of the Emperor, brought in the use\nof burning both heretics and apostates; and the Popes from time to time\nmade heresies of many other points of doctrine (as they saw it conduce\nto the setting up of the chair above the throne), besides those\ndetermined in the Nicene creed, and brought in the use of burning; and\naccording to this papal law, there was an apostate burnt at Oxford, in\nthe time of William the Conqueror, for turning Jew. But of a heretic\nburnt in England, there is no mention made till after the statute of 2\n_Hen. IV_, whereby some followers of Wicliff, called Lollards, were\nafterwards burned; and that for such doctrines as by the Church of\nEngland, ever since the first year of Queen Elizabeth, have been\napproved for godly doctrines, and no doubt were godly then. And so you\nsee how many have been burnt for godliness.\n\n_L._ It was not well done. But it is no wonder we read of no heretics\nbefore the time of Henry IV: for in the preamble to that statute it is\nintimated, that before those Lollards there never was any heresy in\nEngland.\n\n_P._ I think so too; for we have been the tamest nation to the Pope of\nall the world. But what statutes concerning heresy have there been made\nsince?\n\n_L._ The statute of 2 _Hen. V_, _c._ 7, which adds to the burning the\nforfeiture of lands and goods; and then no more till the 25 _Hen. VIII_,\n_c._ 14, which confirms the two former, and giveth some new rules\nconcerning how they shall be proceeded with. But by the statute of 1\n_Edw. VI_, _c._ 12, all acts of Parliament formerly made to punish any\nmanner of doctrine concerning religion, are repealed. For therein it is\nordained, after divers Acts specified, that all and every other Act or\nActs of Parliament concerning doctrine or matters of religion, and all\nand every branch, article, sentence, and matter, pains and forfeitures\ncontained, mentioned, or anywise declared in the same Acts of Parliament\nor statutes, shall be from henceforth repealed, utterly void, and of\nnone effect. So that in the time of King Edward VI, not only all\npunishments of heresy were taken away, but also the nature of it was\nchanged to what originally it was, a private opinion. Again, in 2 _Phil.\n& M._ those former statutes of 2 _Hen. IV_, _c._ 15, 2 _Hen. V_, _c._\n17, 25 _Hen. VIII_, _c._ 14, are revived; and the branch of 1 _Edw. VI_,\n_c._ 12, touching doctrine, though not specially named, seemeth to be\nthis, that the same statute confirmeth the statute of 25 _Edw. III_,\nconcerning treasons. Lastly, in the first year of Queen Elizabeth, _c.\n1_, the aforesaid statutes of Queen Mary are taken away, and thereby the\nstatute of 1 _Edw. VI_, _c._ 12, revived; so as there was no statute\nleft for the punishment of heretics. But Queen Elizabeth by the advice\nof her Parliament gave a commission, which was called the High\nCommission, to certain persons, amongst whom were very many of the\nbishops, to declare what should be heresy for the future, but with a\nrestraint that they should judge nothing to be heresy, but what had been\nso declared in the first four general Councils.\n\n_P._ From this which you have showed me, I think we may proceed to the\nexamination of the learned Sir Edward Coke concerning heresy. In his\nchapter of heresy, 3 _Inst._ p. 40, he himself confesseth that no\nstatute against heresy stood then in force, when in the 9th year of King\nJames, Bartholomew Legat was burnt for Arianism; and that from the\nauthority of the act of 2 _Hen. IV_, _c._ 15, and other acts cited in\nthe margin, it may be gathered that the diocesan hath the jurisdiction\nof heresy. This I say is not true: for as to acts of Parliament, it is\nmanifest, that from acts repealed, that is to say, from things that have\nno being, there can be gathered nothing. And as to the other authorities\nin the margin, Fitzherbert and the Doctor and Student, they say no more\nthan what was law in the time when they writ; that is, when the Pope\u2019s\nusurped authority was here obeyed. But if they had written this in the\ntime of King Edward VI or Queen Elizabeth, Sir Edward Coke might as well\nhave cited his own authority, as theirs; for their opinions had no more\nthe force of laws than his. Then he cites this precedent of Legat, and\nanother of Hammond in the time of Queen Elizabeth; but precedents prove\nonly what was done, and not what was well done. What jurisdiction could\nthe diocesan then have of heresy, when by the statute of _Edw. VI_, _c._\n12, then in force, there was no heresy, and all punishment for opinions\nwas forbidden? For heresy is a doctrine contrary to the determination of\nthe Church; but then the Church had not determined any thing at all\nconcerning heresy.\n\n_L._ But seeing the high-commissioners had power to correct and amend\nheresies, they must have power to cite such as were accused of heresy to\nappear before them; or else they could not execute their commission.\n\n_P._ If they had first made and published a declaration of what articles\nthey made heresy, that when one man heard another speak against their\ndeclaration, he might thereof inform the commissioners, then indeed they\nhad had power to cite and imprison the person accused. But before they\ncan know what should be heresy, how was it possible that one man should\naccuse another? And before he be accused, how can he be cited?\n\n_L._ Perhaps it was taken for granted, that whatsoever was contrary to\nany of the four first general Councils, was to be judged heresy.\n\n_P._ That granted, yet I see not how one man might accuse another any\nthe better for those Councils. For not one man of ten thousand had ever\nread them, nor were they ever published in English, that a man might\navoid offending against them; nor perhaps are they extant. Nor if those\nthat we have printed in Latin, are the very acts of the Councils, which\nis yet much disputed amongst divines, do I think it fit they were put in\nthe vulgar tongues. But it is not likely that the makers of the statutes\nhad any purpose to make heresy of whatsoever was repugnant to those four\ngeneral Councils. For if they had, I believe the Anabaptists, of which\nthere was great plenty in those times, would one time or other have been\nquestioned upon this article of the Nicene Creed, _I believe one baptism\nfor the remission of sins_. Nor was the commission itself for a long\ntime after registered, that men might in such uncertainty take heed and\nabstain, for their better safety, from speaking of religion anything at\nall. But by what law was this heretic Legat burnt? I grant he was an\nArian, and his heresy contrary to the determination of the Church of\nEngland, in the highest points of Christianity. But seeing there was no\nstatute-law to burn him, and no penalty forbidding, by what law, by what\nauthority was he burnt?\n\n_L._ That this Legat was accused of heresy, was no fault of the\nhigh-commissioners; but when he was accused, it had been a fault in them\nnot to have examined him, or having examined him and found him an Arian,\nnot to have judged him so, or not to have certified him so. All this\nthey did, and this was all that belonged unto them; they meddled not\nwith his burning, but left him to the secular power to do with him what\nthey pleased.\n\n_P._ Your justification of the commissioners is nothing to the question.\nThe question is by what law was he burnt? The spiritual-law gives no\nsentence of temporal punishment; and Sir Edward Coke confesseth that he\ncould not be burned; and burning being forbidden by statute-law, by what\nlaw then was he burned?\n\n_L._ By the common-law.\n\n_P._ What is that? It is not custom. For before the time of Henry IV,\nthere was no such custom in England; for if there had, yet those laws\nthat came after were but confirmations of the custom, and therefore the\nrepealing of those laws was a repealing of the custom. For when King\nEdward VI and Queen Elizabeth abolished those statutes, they abolished\nall pains, and consequently burning, or else they had abolished nothing.\nAnd if you will say he was burnt by the law of reason, you must tell me\nhow there can be proportion between doctrine and burning; there can be\nno equality, nor majority, nor minority assigned between them. The\nproportion that is between them, is the proportion of the mischief which\nthe doctrine maketh, to the mischief to be inflicted on the doctor; and\nthis is to be measured only by him that hath the charge of governing the\npeople; and consequently the punishing of offences can be determined by\nnone but by the King, and that, if it extend to life or member, with the\nassent of Parliament.\n\n_L._ He does not draw any argument for it from reason, but allegeth for\nit this judgment executed upon Legat, and a story out of Holinshed and\nStow. But I know that neither history nor precedent will pass with you\nfor law. And though there be a writ _de h\u00e6retico comburendo_ in the\nregister, as you may read in Fitzherbert, grounded upon the statutes of\n2 _Hen. IV_, _c._ 15, and 2 _Hen. V_, _c._ 7; yet seeing those statutes\nare void, you will say the writ is also void.\n\n_P._ Yes, indeed will I. Besides this, I understand not how that it is\ntrue that he saith, that the diocesan hath jurisdiction of heresy, and\nthat so it was put in use in all Queen Elizabeth\u2019s reign; whereas by the\nstatute it is manifest, that all jurisdiction spiritual was given under\nthe Queen to the high-commissioners. How then could any one diocesan\nhave any part thereof without deputation from them, which by their\nletters-patent they could not grant? Nor was it reasonable they should;\nfor the trust was not committed to the bishops only, but also to divers\nlay persons, who might have an eye upon their proceedings, lest they\nshould encroach upon the power temporal. But at this day there is\nneither statute nor any law to punish doctrine, but the ordinary power\necclesiastical, and that according to the canons of the Church of\nEngland, only authorized by the King, the high-commission being long\nsince abolished. Therefore let us come now to such causes criminal as\nare not capital.\n\n[Sidenote: Of premunire.]\n\n_L._ The greatest offence not capital, is that which is done against the\nstatute of provisors.\n\n_P._ You have need to expound this.\n\n_L._ This crime is not unlike to that for which a man is outlawed, when\nhe will not come in and submit himself to the law; saving that in\noutlawries there is a long process to precede it, and he that is\noutlawed is put out of the protection of the law. But for the offence\nagainst the statute of provisors (which is called _pr\u00e6munire facias_,\nfrom the words in the original writ), if the offender submit not himself\nto the law within the space of two months after notice, he is presently\nan outlaw. And this punishment, if not capital, is equivalent to\ncapital. For he lives secretly at the mercy of those that know where he\nis, and cannot, without the like peril to themselves, but discover him.\nAnd it has been much disputed, before the time of Queen Elizabeth,\nwhether he might not be lawfully killed by any man that would, as one\nmight kill a wolf. It is like the punishment amongst the old Romans, of\nbeing barred the use of fire and water; and like the great\nexcommunication in the papacy, when a man might not eat nor drink with\nthe offender without incurring the like penalty.\n\n_P._ Certainly the offence for which this punishment was first ordained\nwas some abominable crime, or extraordinary mischief.\n\n_L._ So it was. For the Pope, you know, from long before the Conquest,\nencroached every day upon the power temporal. Whatsoever could be made\nto seem to be _in ordine ad spiritualia_, was in every commonwealth\nclaimed and haled to the jurisdiction of the Pope; and for that end, in\nevery country he had his court ecclesiastical, and there was scarce any\ncause temporal which he could not, by one shift or other, hook into his\njurisdiction, in such sort as to have it tried in his own courts at\nRome, or in France, or in England itself. By which means the King\u2019s laws\nwere not regarded, judgments given in the King\u2019s courts were avoided,\nand presentations to bishoprics, abbeys, and other benefices, founded\nand endowed by the Kings and nobility of England, were bestowed by the\nPope upon strangers, or such as with money in their purses could travel\nto Rome to provide themselves of such benefices. And suitably hereunto,\nwhen there was a question about a tithe, or a will, though the point\nwere merely temporal, yet the Pope\u2019s court here would fetch them in, or\nelse one of the parties would appeal to Rome. Against these injuries of\nthe Roman Church, and to maintain the right and dignity of the Crown of\nEngland, Edward III made a statute concerning provisors, that is, such\nas provide themselves with benefices here from Rome. For in the\ntwenty-fifth year of his reign he ordained, in a full Parliament, that\nthe right of election of bishops, and right of advowsons and\npresentations, belonged to himself, and to the nobility that were the\nfounders of such bishoprics, abbeys, and other benefices. And he enacted\nfurther, that if any clerk which he or any of his subjects should\npresent, should be disturbed by any such provisor, that such provisor or\ndisturber should be attached by his body, and if convicted, lie in\nprison till he were ransomed at the King\u2019s will, and had satisfied the\nparty grieved, renounced his title, and found sureties not to sue for it\nany further; and that if they could not be found, then exigents should\ngo forth to outlawry, and the profits of the benefice in the mean time\nbe taken into the King\u2019s hands. And the same statute is confirmed in the\ntwenty-seventh year of King Edward III; which statute alloweth to these\nprovisors two months to appear: but if they appear before they be\noutlawed, they shall be received to make answer; but if they render not\nthemselves, they shall forfeit all their lands, goods, and chattels,\nbesides that they stand outlawed. The same law is confirmed again by 16\n_Rich. II_, _c._ 5; in which is added, because these provisors obtained\nsometimes from the Pope, that such English bishops, as according to the\nlaw were instituted and inducted by the King\u2019s presentees, should be\nexcommunicated, that for this also both they, and the receivers and\npublishers of such papal process, and the procurers, should have the\nsame punishment.\n\n_P._ Let me see the statute itself of 27 _Edw. III_.\n\n_L._ It lies there before you, set down _verbatim_ by Sir Edward Coke\nhimself, both in English and French.\n\n_P._ It is well. We are now to consider what it means, and whether it be\nwell or ill interpreted by Sir Edward Coke. And first it appeareth by\nthe preamble, which Sir Edward Coke acknowledgeth to be the best\ninterpreter of the statute, that this statute was made against the\nencroachments only of the Church of Rome upon the right of the King, and\nother patrons, to collate bishoprics and other benefices within the\nrealm of England, and against the power of the courts spiritual to hold\nplea of controversies determinable in any of the courts of the King, or\nto reverse any judgment there given, as being things that tend to the\ndisherison of the King and destruction of the common-law of the realm\nalways used. Put the case now, that a man had procured the Pope to\nreverse a decree in chancery. Had he been within the danger of\npr\u00e6munire?\n\n_L._ Yes, certainly. Or if the judgment had been given in the Court of\nthe Lord Admiral, or in any other King\u2019s court whatsoever, either of law\nor equity. For courts of equity are most properly courts of the\ncommon-law of England, because equity and common-law, as Sir Edward Coke\nsays, are all one.\n\n_P._ Then the word common-law is not in this preamble restrained to such\ncourts only where the trial is by juries, but comprehends all the King\u2019s\ntemporal courts, if not also the courts of those subjects that are lords\nof great manors.\n\n_L._ It is very likely, yet I think it will not by every man be granted.\n\n_P._ The statute also says, that they who draw men out of the realm in\nplea, whereof the cognizance pertaineth to the King\u2019s court, or of\nthings whereof judgment is given in the King\u2019s court, are within the\ncases of pr\u00e6munire. But what if one man draw another to Lambeth in plea,\nwhereof judgment is already given at Westminster. Is he by this clause\ninvolved in a pr\u00e6munire?\n\n_L._ Yes. For though it be not out of the realm, yet it is within the\nmeaning of the statute; because the Pope\u2019s court, not the King\u2019s court,\nwas then perhaps at Lambeth.\n\n_P._ But in Sir Edward Coke\u2019s time the King\u2019s court was at Lambeth, and\nnot the Pope\u2019s.\n\n_L._ You know well enough that the spiritual Court has no power to hold\npleas of common-law.\n\n_P._ I do so; but I know not for what cause any simple man, that\nmistakes his right court, should be out of the King\u2019s protection, lose\nhis inheritance and all his goods, personal and real, and if taken, be\nkept in prison all his life. This statute cannot be by Sir Edward Coke\u2019s\ntorture made to say it. Besides, such men are ignorant in what courts\nthey are to seek their remedy; and it is a custom confirmed by perpetual\nusage, that such ignorant men should be guided by their counsel at law.\nIt is manifest, therefore, that the makers of the statute intended not\nto prohibit men from suing for their right, neither in the Chancery, nor\nin the Admiralty, nor in any other court, except the Ecclesiastical\ncourts, which had their jurisdiction from the Church of Rome. Again,\nwhere the statute says, \u201cwhich do sue in any other court, or defeat a\njudgment in the King\u2019s court\u201d: what is the meaning of another court?\nAnother court than what? Is it here meant the King\u2019s Bench, or Court of\nCommon Pleas? Does a pr\u00e6munire lie for every man that sues in Chancery\nfor that which might be remedied in the Court of Common Pleas? Or can a\npr\u00e6munire lie by this statute against the Lord Chancellor? The statute\nlays it only on the party that sueth, not upon the judge which holdeth\nthe plea. Nor could it be laid, either by this statute or by the statute\nof 16 _Rich. II_, upon the judges, which were then punishable only by\nthe Pope\u2019s authority. Seeing then the party suing has a just excuse upon\nthe counsel of his lawyer, and the temporal judge and the lawyer both\nare out of the statute, the punishment of the pr\u00e6munire can light upon\nnobody.\n\n_L._ But Sir Edward Coke in this same chapter bringeth two precedents to\nprove, that though the spiritual courts in England be now the King\u2019s\ncourts, yet whosoever sueth in them for any thing triable by the\ncommon-law, shall fall into a pr\u00e6munire. One is, that whereas in the\ntwenty-second year of _Hen. VIII_ all the clergy of England in a\nconvocation by public instrument acknowledged the King to be supreme\nhead of the Church of England; yet after this, viz. 24 _Hen. VIII_, this\nstatute was in force.\n\n_P._ Why not? A convocation of the clergy could not alter the right of\nsupremacy; their courts were still the Pope\u2019s courts. The other\nprecedent, in the twenty-fifth year of _Hen. VIII_, of the Bishop of\nNorwich, may have the same answer. For the King was not declared head of\nthe Church by Act of Parliament till the twenty-sixth year of his reign.\nIf he had not mistrusted his own law, he would not have laid hold on so\nweak a proof as these precedents. And as to the sentence of pr\u00e6munire\nupon the Bishop of Norwich, neither doth this statute nor that other of\nRichard II warrant it. He was sentenced for threatening to excommunicate\na man which had sued another before the mayor. But this statute forbids\nnot that, but forbids the bringing in or publishing of excommunications,\nor other process from Rome, or any other place. Before the twenty-sixth\nyear of Henry VIII, there is no question but that for a suit in the\nspiritual court here in a temporal cause there lay a pr\u00e6munire. And if\nperhaps some judge or other hath since that time judged otherwise, his\njudgment was erroneous.\n\n_L._ Nay, but by the statute of 16 _Rich. II._ _c._ 5, it appeareth to\nthe contrary, as Sir Edward Coke here will show you. The effect, saith\nhe, of the statute of Richard II is, that if any pursue, or cause to be\npursued, in the Court of Rome or elsewhere, anything which toucheth the\nKing, against him, his crown, or regality, or his realm, they, their\nnotaries, &c. shall be out of the King\u2019s protection.\n\n_P._ I pray you let me know the very words of the statute as they lie.\n\n_L._ Presently. The words are, _If any man purchase or pursue, or cause\nto be purchased or pursued, in the Court of Rome or elsewhere, any such\ntranslations, processes and sentences of excommunication, bulls,\ninstruments, or any other things whatsoever, which touch the King,\nagainst him, his crown, and his regality, or his realm, as is aforesaid,\n&c._\n\n_P._ If a man bring a plea of common-law into the spiritual court, which\nis now the King\u2019s court, and the judge of this spiritual court hold plea\nthereof: by what construction can you draw it within the compass of the\nwords you have now read? To sue for my right in the King\u2019s court, is no\npursuing of translations of bishoprics, made or procured in the Court of\nRome, or any place else, but only in the court of the King; nor is this\nthe suit against the King, nor his crown, nor his regality, nor his\nrealm, but the contrary. Why then is it a pr\u00e6munire? No. He that brings\nin or setteth out a writing in any place whatsoever, wherein is\ncontained, that the King hath so given away his jurisdiction, as that if\na subject be condemned falsely, his submission to the King\u2019s judgment is\nof none effect; or that the King upon no necessity whatsoever can out of\nParliament-time raise money for the defence of the kingdom, is, in my\nopinion, much more within the statute of provisors, than they which\nbegin suit for a temporal matter in a court spiritual. But what argument\nhas he for this law of his, since the statute-law fails him, from the\nlaw of reason?\n\n_L._ He says, _they are called other courts, either because they proceed\nby the rules of other laws, as by the canon or civil law, or by other\ntrials than the common-law doth warrant. For the trial warranted by the\nlaw of England for matter of fact, is by verdict of twelve men before\nthe judges of the common-law, in matters pertaining to the common-law,\nand not upon examination of witnesses, as in the Court of Equity. So\nthat alia curia is either that which is governed per aliam legem, or\nwhich draweth the party ad aliud examen. For if_\u2014\n\n_P._ Stop there. Let us consider of this you have read: _for the trial\nwarranted by the law of England is by verdict of twelve men_. What means\nhe here by the law of England? Does it not warrant the trials in\nChancery, and in the Court of Admiralty, by witnesses?\n\n_L._ By the law of England he means the law used in the King\u2019s Bench;\nthat is to say, the common-law.\n\n_P._ This is just as if he had said, that two courts did warrant their\nown way of trial; but other courts not so, but were warranted by the\nKing: only the courts of common-law were warrants to themselves. You see\nthat _alia curia_ is this way ill expounded. In the courts of common-law\nall trials are by twelve men, who are judges of the fact; and the fact\nknown and proved, the judges are to pronounce the law; but in the\nspiritual court, the Admiralty, and in all the courts of Equity, there\nis but one judge, both of fact and of law; this is all the difference.\nIf this difference be intended by the statute by _alia curia_, there\nwould be a pr\u00e6munire for suing in a court, being not the King\u2019s Court.\nThe King\u2019s Bench and Court of Common Pleas may also be different kinds\nof courts, because the process is different. But it is plain that this\nstatute doth not distinguish courts otherwise than into the courts of\nthe King, and into the courts of the foreign states and princes. And\nseeing you stand upon the name of a jury for the distinguishing of\ncourts, what difference do you find between the trials at the\ncommon-law, and the trials in other courts? You know that in trials of\nfact naturally, and through all the world, the witnesses are judges, and\nit is impossible to be otherwise. What then in England can a jury judge\nof, except it be of the sufficiency of the testimony? The justices have\nnothing to judge of or do, but after the fact is proved, to declare the\nlaw; which is not judgment, but jurisdiction. Again, though the trial be\nin Chancery, or in the Court of civil law, the witnesses are still\njudges of the fact, and he that hath the commission to hear the cause,\nhath both the parts, that is to say, of a jury to judge of the\ntestimony, and of a justice to declare the law. In this, I say, lies all\nthe difference: which is indeed enough to make a dispute (as the world\ngoes) about jurisdiction! But seeing it tends neither to the disherison\nof the King, nor of the people, nor to the subversion of the law of\nreason, that is of common-law, nor to the subversion of justice, nor to\nany harm of the realm, without some of which these statutes are not\nbroken; it cannot be a pr\u00e6munire.\n\n_L._ Let me read on. _For if the freehold, inheritances, goods and\nchattels, debts and duties, wherein the King and subject have right and\nproperty by the common-law, should be judged per aliam legem, or be\ndrawn ad aliud examen, the three mischiefs afore expressed would follow;\nviz. the destruction of the King and his crown, the disherison of his\npeople, and the undoing and destruction of the common-law always used._\n\n_P._ That is to say, of the law of reason. From hence it follows, that\nwhere there are no juries, and where there are different laws from ours,\nthat is to say, in all the world besides, neither King nor people have\nany inheritance, nor goods, nor any law of reason. I will examine his\ndoctrine concerning cases criminal no further. He nowhere defineth a\ncrime, that we may know what it is: an odious name sufficeth him to make\na crime of any thing. He hath put heresy among the most odious crimes,\nnot knowing what it signifies; and upon no other cause, but because the\nChurch of Rome, to make their usurped power the more terrible, had made\nit, by long preaching against it, and cruelty shown towards many godly\nand learned men of this and other reformed Churches, appear to common\npeople a thing detestable. He puts it in as a plea of the crown in the\ntime of Queen Elizabeth; whereas in her time there was no doctrine\nheresy. But Justice Stamford leaves it out, because, when heresy was a\ncrime, it was a plea of the _mitre_. I see also in this catalogue of\ncauses criminal, he inserteth costly feeding, costly apparel, and costly\nbuilding, though they were contrary to no statute. It is true, that by\nevil circumstances they become sins; but these sins belong to the\njudgment of the pastors spiritual. A justice of the temporal law (seeing\nthe intention only makes them sins) cannot judge whether they be sins or\nno, unless he have power to take confessions. Also he makes flattery of\nthe King to be a crime. How could he know when one man had flattered\nanother? He meant therefore that it was a crime to please the King: and\naccordingly he citeth divers calamities of such as had been in times\npast in great favour of the Kings they served; as the favourites of\nHenry III, Edward II, Richard II, Henry VI; which favourites were some\nimprisoned, some banished, and some put to death by the same rebels that\nimprisoned, banished, and put to death the same King, upon no better\nground than the Earl of Strafford, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and\nKing Charles the First, by the rebels of that time. Empson and Dudley\nwere no favourites of Henry the seventh, but spunges, which King Henry\nthe eighth did well squeeze. Cardinal Wolsey was indeed for divers years\na favourite of Henry the eighth, but fell into disgrace, not for\nflattering the King, but for not flattering him in the business of\ndivorce from Queen Katherine. You see his reasoning here; see also his\npassion in the words following: we will for some causes descend no\nlower: _Qui eorum vestigiis insistunt, eorum exitus perhorrescant._ This\nis put in for the favourite, that then was, of King James. But let us\ngive over this, and speak of the legal punishments to these crimes\nbelonging.\n\n[Sidenote: Of punishments.]\n\nAnd in the first place I desire to know who it is that hath the power,\nfor an offence committed, to define and appoint the special manner of\npunishment. For I suppose you are not of the opinion of the Stoics in\nold time, that all faults are equal, and that there ought to be the same\npunishment for killing a man, and for killing a hen.\n\n_L._ The manner of punishment in all crimes whatsoever, is to be\ndetermined by the common-law. That is to say, if it be a statute that\ndetermines it, then the judgment must be according to the statute; if it\nbe not specified by the statute, then the custom in such cases is to be\nfollowed: but if the case be new, I know not why the judge may not\ndetermine it according to reason.\n\n_P._ But according to whose reason? If you mean the natural reason of\nthis or that judge authorized by the King to have cognizance of the\ncause, there being as many several reasons, as there are several men,\nthe punishment of all crimes will be uncertain, and none of them ever\ngrow up to make a custom. Therefore a punishment certain can never be\nassigned, if it have its beginning from the natural reasons of deputed\njudges; no, nor from the natural reason of the supreme judge. For if the\nlaw of reason did determine punishments, then for the same offences\nthere should be, through all the world and in all times, the same\npunishments; because the law of reason is immutable and eternal.\n\n_L._ If the natural reason neither of the King, nor of any else, be able\nto prescribe a punishment, how can there be any lawful punishment at\nall?\n\n_P._ Why not? For I think that in this very difference between the\nrational faculties of particular men, lieth the true and perfect reason\nthat maketh every punishment certain. For, but give the authority of\ndefining punishments to any man whatsoever, and let that man define\nthem, and right reason has defined them, suppose the definition be both\nmade, and made known before the offence committed. For such authority is\nto trump in card playing, save that in matter of government, when\nnothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps. Therefore seeing every man\nknoweth by his own reason what actions are against the law of reason,\nand knoweth what punishments are by this authority for every evil action\nordained; it is manifest reason, that for breaking the known laws he\nshould suffer the known punishments. Now the person to whom this\nauthority of defining punishments is given, can be no other, in any\nplace of the world, but the same person that hath the sovereign power,\nbe it one man or one assembly of men. For it were in vain to give it to\nany person that had not the power of the militia to cause it to be\nexecuted; for no less power can do it, when many offenders be united and\ncombined to defend one another. There was a case put to King David by\nNathan, of a rich man that had many sheep, and of a poor man that had\nbut one, which was a tame lamb: the rich man had a stranger in his\nhouse, for whose entertainment, to spare his own sheep he took away the\npoor man\u2019s lamb. Upon this case the King gave judgment, \u201cSurely the man\nthat hath done this shall die.\u201d What think you of this? Was it a royal,\nor tyrannical judgment?\n\n_L._ I will not contradict the canons of the Church of England, which\nacknowledge the King of England within his own dominions hath the same\nrights, which the good Kings of Israel had in theirs; nor deny King\nDavid to have been one of those good Kings. But to punish with death\nwithout a precedent law, will seem but a harsh proceeding with us, who\nunwillingly hear of arbitrary laws, much less of arbitrary punishments,\nunless we were sure that all our Kings would be as good as David. I will\nonly ask you, by what authority the clergy may take upon them to\ndetermine or make a canon concerning the power of their own King, or to\ndistinguish between the right of a good and an evil King.\n\n_P._ It is not the clergy that make their canons to be law, but it is\nthe King that doth it by the great seal of England; and it is the King\nthat giveth them power to teach their doctrines, in that, that he\nauthorized them publicly to teach and preach the doctrine of Christ and\nhis apostles, according to the Scriptures, wherein this doctrine is\nperspicuously contained. But if they had derogated from the royal power\nin any of their doctrines published, then certainly they had been to\nblame; nay, I believe that they had been more within the statute of\npr\u00e6munire of 16 _Rich. II_, _c._ 5, than any judge of a Court of Equity\nfor holding pleas of common-law. I cite not this precedent of King\nDavid, as approving the breach of the great charter, or justifying the\npunishment with loss of life or member, of every man that shall offend\nthe King; but to show you that before the charter was granted, in all\ncases where the punishments were not prescribed, it was the King only\nthat could prescribe them; and that no deputed judge could punish an\noffender but by force of some statute, or by the words of some\ncommission, and not _ex officio_. They might for a contempt of their\ncourts, because it is a contempt of the King, imprison a man during the\nKing\u2019s pleasure, or fine him to the King according to the greatness of\nthe offence: but all this amounteth to no more, than to leave him to the\nKing\u2019s judgment. As for cutting off of ears, and for the pillory, and\nthe like corporal punishments usually inflicted heretofore in the\nStar-chamber, they were warranted by the statute of _Hen. VII_, that\ngiveth them power to punish sometimes by discretion. And generally it is\na rule of reason, that every judge of crimes, in case the positive law\nappoint no punishment, and he have no other command from the King, then\ndo consult the King before he pronounce sentence of any irreparable\ndamage on the offender: for otherwise he doth not pronounce the law,\nwhich is his office to do, but makes the law, which is the office of the\nKing. And from this you may collect, that the custom of punishing such\nand such a crime, in such and such a manner, hath not the force of law\nin itself, but from an assured presumption that the original of the\ncustom was the judgment of some former King. And for this cause the\njudges ought not to run up, for the customs by which they are warranted,\nto the time of the Saxon Kings, nor to the time of the Conquest. For the\nmost immediate antecedent precedents are the fairest warrants of their\njudgments; as the most recent laws have commonly the greatest vigour, as\nbeing fresh in the memory of all men, and tacitly confirmed, because not\ndisapproved, by the sovereign legislator. What can be said against this?\n\n_L._ Sir Edward Coke, (3 _Inst._ _p._ 210), in the chapter of judgments\nand executions, saith, that of judgments some are by the common-law,\nsome by statute-law, and some by custom; wherein he distinguisheth\ncommon-law both from statute-law and from custom.\n\n_P._ But you know, that in other places he makes the common-law, and the\nlaw of reason, to be all one; as indeed they are, when by it is meant\nthe King\u2019s reason. And then his meaning in this distinction must be,\nthat there be judgments by reason without statute-law, and judgments\nneither by statute-law nor by reason, but by custom without reason. For\nif a custom be reasonable, then, both he and other learned lawyers say,\nit is common-law; and if unreasonable, no law at all.\n\n_L._ I believe Sir Edward Coke\u2019s meaning was no other than yours in this\npoint, but that he inserted the word _custom_, because there be not many\nthat can distinguish between customs reasonable and unreasonable.\n\n_P._ But custom, so far forth as it hath the force of a law, hath more\nof the nature of a statute, than of the law of reason, especially where\nthe question is not of lands and goods, but of punishments, which are to\nbe defined only by authority. Now to come to particulars, what\npunishment is due by law for high-treason?\n\n_L._ To be drawn upon a hurdle from the prison to the gallows, and there\nto be hanged by the neck, and laid upon the ground alive, and have his\nbowels taken out and burnt whilst he is yet living; to have his head cut\noff, his body to be divided into four parts, and his head and quarters\nto be placed as the King shall assign.\n\n_P._ Seeing a judge ought to give judgment according to the law, and\nthat this judgment is not appointed by any statute, how does Sir Edward\nCoke warrant it by reason, or how by custom?\n\n_L._ Only thus: reason it is, that his body, lands, goods, posterity,\n&c. should be torn, pulled asunder, and destroyed, that intended to\ndestroy the majesty of government.\n\n_P._ See how he avoids the saying the majesty of the King. But does not\nthis reason make as much for punishing a traitor, as Mettius Fuffetius\nin old time was executed by Tullus Hostilius, King of Rome, or as\nRavaillac, not many years ago in France, who were torn in pieces by four\nhorses, as it does for drawing, hanging, and quartering?\n\n_L._ I think it does. But he confirms it also in the same chapter, by\nholy Scripture. Thus Joab for treason (1 _Kings_ ii. 28), was drawn from\nthe horns of the altar; that is proof for drawing upon a hurdle: _Esth._\nii. 22; Bigthan for treason was hanged; there is proof for hanging:\n_Acts_ i. 18; Judas hanged himself and his bowels were poured out; there\nis for hanging and embowelling alive: 2 _Sam._ xviii. 14; Joab pierced\nAbsalom\u2019s heart; that is proof for pulling out a traitor\u2019s heart: _Sam._\nxx. 22; Sheba the son of Bichri had his head cut off; which is proof\nthat a traitor\u2019s head ought to be cut off: 2 _Sam._ iv. 12; they slew\nBaanah and Rechab, and hung up their heads over the pool of Hebron; this\nis for setting up of quarters: and lastly for forfeiture of lands, and\ngoods, _Psalms_ cix. 9-15: _Let their children be driven out, and beg,\nand other men make spoil of their labours, and let their memory be\nblotted out of the land._\n\n_P._ Learnedly said; and no record is to be kept of the judgment. Also\nthe punishments divided between those traitors, must be joined in one\njudgment for a traitor here.\n\n_L._ He meant none of this, but intended (his hand being in) to show his\nreading, or his chaplain\u2019s, in the Bible.\n\n_P._ Seeing then for the specifying of the punishment in case of\ntreason, he brings no argument from natural reason, that is to say, from\nthe common-law; and that it is manifest that it is not the general\ncustom of the land, the same being rarely or never executed upon any\npeer of the realm, and that the King may remit the whole penalty, if he\nwill: it follows, that the specifying of the punishment depends merely\nupon the authority of the King. But this is certain, that no judge ought\nto give other judgment, than has been usually given and approved either\nby a statute, or by consent express or implied of the sovereign power.\nFor otherwise it is not the judgment of the law, but of a man subject to\nthe law.\n\n_L._ In petit treason the judgment is, to be drawn to the place of\nexecution, and hanged by the neck; or if it be a woman, to be drawn and\nburnt.\n\n_P._ Can you imagine that this so nice a distinction can have any other\nfoundation than the wit of a private man?\n\n_L._ Sir Edward Coke upon this place says, that she ought not to be\nbeheaded or hanged.\n\n_P._ No, not by the judge, who ought to give no other judgment than the\nstatute or the King appoints; nor the sheriff to make other execution\nthan the judge pronounceth; unless he have a special warrant from the\nKing. And this I should have thought he had meant, had he not said\nbefore, that the King had given away all his right of judicature to his\ncourts of justice.\n\n_L._ The judgment for felony is\u2014\n\n_P._ Heresy is before felony in the catalogue of the pleas of the Crown.\n\n_L._ He has omitted the judgment against a heretic, because, I think, no\njury can find heresy, nor no judge temporal did ever pronounce judgment\nupon it. For the statute of 2 _Hen. V_, _c._ 7, was, that the bishop\nhaving convicted any man of heresy, should deliver him to the sheriff,\nand that the sheriff should believe the bishop. The sheriff therefore\nwas bound by the statute of 2 _Hen. IV_, after he was delivered to him,\nto burn him; but that statute being repealed, the sheriff could not burn\nhim, without a writ _de heretico comburendo_, and therefore the sheriff\nburnt Legat (9 King James) by that writ, which was granted by the judges\nof the common-law at that time, and in that writ the judgment is\nexpressed.\n\n_P._ This is strange reasoning. When Sir Edward Coke knew and confessed,\nthat the statutes upon which the writ _de h\u00e6retico comburendo_ was\ngrounded, were all repealed, how could he think the writ itself could be\nin force? Or that the statute, which repealeth the statutes for burning\nheretics, was not made with an intent to forbid such burning? It is\nmanifest he understood not his books of common-law. For in the time of\nHenry IV and Henry V, the word of the bishop was the sheriff\u2019s warrant,\nand there was need of no such writ; nor could be till the 25 _Hen.\nVIII_, when those statutes were repealed, and a writ made for that\npurpose and put into the register, which writ Fitzherbert cites in the\nend of his Natura Brevium_. Again, in the latter end of\nthe reign of Queen Elizabeth, was published a correct register of\noriginal and judicial writs, and the writ _de h\u00e6retico comburendo_ left\nout; because that statute of 25 _Hen. VIII_, and all statutes against\nheretics, were repealed, and burning forbidden. And whereas he citeth\nfor the granting of this writ, in the ninth year of James I, the Lord\nChief Justice, the Lord Chief Baron, and two Justices of the\nCommon-Pleas, it is, as to all but the Lord Chief Justice, against the\nlaw. For neither the judges of Common-Pleas, nor of the Exchequer, can\nhold pleas of the Crown without special commission; and if they cannot\nhold plea, they cannot condemn.\n\n_L._ The punishment for felony is, that the felon be hanged by the neck\ntill he be dead. And to prove that it ought to be so, he cites a\nsentence, from whence I know not, _Quod non licet felonem pro felonia\ndecollare._.\n\n_P._ It is not indeed lawful for the sheriff of his own head to do it,\nor to do otherwise than is commanded in the judgment, nor for the judge\nto give any other judgment than according to statute-law, or the usage\nconsented to by the King; but this hinders not the King from altering\nhis law concerning judgments, if he see good cause.\n\n_L._ The King may do so, if he please: and Sir Edward Coke tells you how\nhe altered particular judgments in case of felony, and showeth that\njudgment being given upon a lord in Parliament, that he should be\nhanged, he was nevertheless beheaded; and that another lord had the like\njudgment for another felony, and was not hanged but beheaded: and withal\nhe shows you the inconveniency of such proceeding, because, saith he, if\nhanging might be altered to beheading, by the same reason it might be\naltered to burning, stoning to death, &c.\n\n_P._ Perhaps there might be inconveniency in it; but it is more than I\nsee, or he shows, nor did there happen any inconveniency from the\nexecution he citeth: besides he granteth, that death, being _ultimum\nsupplicium_, is a satisfaction to the law. But what is all this to the\npurpose, when it belongeth not to consider such inconveniences of\ngovernment but to the King and Parliament? Or who, from the authority of\na deputed judge, can derive a power to censure the actions of a King\nthat hath deputed him?\n\n_L._ For the death of a man by misfortune, there is, he saith, no\nexpress judgment, nor for killing a man in one\u2019s own defence; but he\nsaith, that the law hath in both cases given judgment that he, that so\nkilleth a man, shall forfeit all his goods and chattels, debts and\nduties.\n\n_P._ If we consider what Sir Edward Coke saith (1 _Inst._ _sec._ 745),\nat the word _felony_, these judgments are very favourable; for there he\nsaith, that killing a man by _chance medley_, or _se defendendo_, is\n_felony_. His words are: \u201cwherefore by the law at this day, under the\nword _felony_ in commissions, &c. is included petite treason, murder,\nhomicide, burning of houses, burglary, robbery, rape, &c.\n_chance-medley_, and _se defendendo_.\u201d But if we consider only the\nintent of him that killeth a man by misfortune or in his own defence,\nthe same judgments will be thought both cruel and sinful judgments. And\nhow they can be _felony_, at this day cannot be understood, unless there\nbe a statute to make them so. For the statute of 25 _Hen. III_, _c._ 25,\nthe words whereof, \u201cmurder from henceforth shall not be judged before\nour justices, where it is found misfortune only, but it shall take place\nin such as are slain by felony, and not otherwise,\u201d make it manifest, if\nthey be felonies, they must also be murders, unless they have been made\nfelonies by some later statute.\n\n_L._ There is no such later statute, nor is it to say in commission; nor\ncan a commission, or anything but another statute, make a thing felony\nthat was not so before.\n\n_P._ See what it is for a man to distinguish _felony_ into several\nsorts, before he understands the general name of felony, what it\nmeaneth. But that a man, for killing another man by misfortune only,\nwithout any evil purpose, should forfeit all his goods and chattels,\ndebts and duties, is a very hard judgment, unless perhaps they were to\nbe given to the kindred of the man slain, by way of amends for damage.\nBut the law is not that. Is it the common-law, which is the law of\nreason, that justifies this judgment, or the statute-law? It cannot be\ncalled the law of reason, if the case be mere misfortune. If a man be\nupon his appletree to gather his apples, and by ill-fortune fall down,\nand lighting on the head of another man, kill him, and by good fortune\nsave himself; shall he for this mischance be punished with the\nforfeiture of his goods to the King? Does the law of reason warrant\nthis? He should, you will say, have looked to his feet; that is true;\nbut so should he, that was under, have looked up to the tree. Therefore\nin this case the law of reason, as I think, dictates that they ought\neach of them to bear his own misfortune.\n\n_L._ In this case I agree with you.\n\n_P._ But this case is the true case of mere misfortune, and a sufficient\nreprehension of the opinion of Sir Edward Coke.\n\n_L._ But what if this had happened to be done by one, that had been\nstealing apples upon the tree of another man? Then, as Sir Edward Coke\nsays (3 _Inst._ _p._ 56), it had been murder.\n\n_P._ There is indeed great need of good distinction in a case of killing\nby misfortune. But in this case the unlawfulness of stealing apples\ncannot make it murder, unless the falling itself be unlawful. It must be\na voluntary unlawful act that causeth the death, or else it is no murder\nby the law of reason. Now the death of the man that was under the tree,\nproceeded not from that, that the apples were not his that fell, but\nfrom the fall. But if a man shoot with a bow or a gun at another man\u2019s\ndeer, and by misfortune kill a man, such shooting being both voluntary\nand unlawful, and also the immediate cause of the man\u2019s death, may be\ndrawn, perhaps well enough sometimes, to murder by a judge of the\ncommon-law. So likewise if a man shoot an arrow over a house, and by\nchance kill a man in the street, there is no doubt but by the law of\nreason it is murder: for though he meant no malice to the man slain, yet\nit is manifest that he cared not whom he slew. In this difficulty of\nfinding out what it is that the law of reason dictates, who is it that\nmust decide the question?\n\n_L._ In the case of misfortune, I think it belongs to the jury; for it\nis matter of fact only. But when it is doubtful whether the action from\nwhich the misfortune came, were lawful or unlawful, it is to be judged\nby the judge.\n\n_P._ But if the unlawfulness of the action, as the stealing of the\napples, did not cause the death of the man; then the stealing, be it\ntrespass or felony, ought to be punished alone, as the law requireth.\n\n_L._ But for the killing of a man _se defendendo_, the jury, as Sir\nEdward Coke here says, shall not in their verdict say it was _se\ndefendendo_, but shall declare the manner of the fact in special, and\nclear it to the judge to consider how it is to be called, whether _se\ndefendendo_, manslaughter, or murder.\n\n_P._ One would think so; for it is not often within the capacity of a\njury, to distinguish the signification of the different hard names which\nare given by lawyers to the killing of a man: as murder and felony,\nwhich neither the laws, nor the makers of the laws, have yet defined.\nThe witnesses say, that thus and thus the person did, but not that it\nwas murder or felony; no more can the jury say, who ought to say nothing\nbut what they hear from the witnesses or from the prisoner. Nor ought\nthe judge to ground his sentence upon anything else besides the special\nmatter found, which, according as it is contrary or not contrary to the\nstatute, ought to be pronounced.\n\n_L._ But I have told you, that when the jury has found misfortune or _se\ndefendendo_, there is no judgment at all to be given, and the party is\nto be pardoned of course, saving that he shall forfeit his goods and\nchattels, debts and duties, to the King.\n\n_P._ But I understand not how there can be a crime for which there is no\njudgment, nor how any punishment can be inflicted without a precedent\njudgment, nor upon what ground the sheriff can seize the goods of any\nman, till it be judged that they be forfeited. I know that Sir Edward\nCoke saith, that in the judgment of hanging, the judgment of forfeiture\nis implied, which I understand not; though I understand well enough,\nthat the sheriff by his office may seize the goods of a felon convicted;\nmuch less do I conceive how the forfeiture of goods can be implied in a\nno-judgment; nor do I conceive, that when the jury has found the special\nmanner of the fact to be such as is really no other than _se\ndefendendo_, and consequently no fault at all, why he should have any\npunishment at all. Can you show me any reason for it?\n\n_L._ The reason lies in the custom.\n\n_P._ You know that unreasonable customs are not law, but ought to be\nabolished; and what custom is there more unreasonable, than that a man\nshould be punished without a fault?\n\n_L._ Then see the statute of 24 _Hen. VIII_, _c._ 5.\n\n_P._ I find here, that at the making of this statute there was a\nquestion amongst the lawyers, in case one man should kill another, that\nattempted feloniously to rob or murder him in or near any common\nhighway, courtway, horseway, or footway, or in his mansion, messuage, or\ndwelling place; whether for the death of such a man one shall forfeit\nhis goods and chattels, as a man should do for killing another by chance\nmedley or in his own defence. This is the preamble, and penned as well\nas Sir Edward Coke could have wished. But this statute does not\ndetermine that a man should forfeit his goods for killing a man _se\ndefendendo_, or for killing him by misfortune; but supposeth it only\nupon the opinion of the lawyers that then were. The body of the statute\nis, that if a man be indicted or appealed for the death of such person\nso attempting as aforesaid, and the same by verdict be so found and\ntried, he shall not forfeit anything, but shall be discharged as if he\nhad been found not guilty. You see the statute; now consider thereby, in\nthe case of killing _se defendendo_. First, if a man kill another in his\nown defence, it is manifest that the man slain did either attempt to\nrob, or to kill, or to wound him; for else it were not done in his own\ndefence. If then it were done in the street, or near the street, as in a\ntavern, he forfeits nothing, because the street is a highway. So\nlikewise it is to be said of all other common-ways. In what place\ntherefore can a man kill another in his own defence, but that this\nstatute will discharge him of the forfeiture?\n\n_L._ But the statute says the attempt must be felonious.\n\n_P._ When a man assaults me with a knife, sword, club, or other mortal\nweapon, does any law forbid me to defend myself, or command me to stay\nso long as to know whether he have a felonious intent, or no? Therefore\nby this statute, in case it be found _se defendendo_, the forfeiture is\ndischarged; if it be found otherwise, it is capital. If we read the\nstatute of _Glocester_, _cap._ 9, I think it will take away the\ndifficulty. For by that statute, in case it be found by the country that\nhe did it in his own defence or by misfortune, then by the report of the\njustices to the King, the King shall take him to his grace, if it please\nhim. From whence it followeth, first, that it was then thought law, that\nthe jury may give the general verdict of _se defendendo_; which Sir\nEdward Coke denies. Secondly, that the judge ought to report especial\nmatter to the King. Thirdly, that the King may take him to his grace, if\nhe please; and consequently, that his goods are not to be seized, till\nthe King, after the report of the judge heard, give the sheriff command\nto do it. Fourthly, that the general verdict of the King hinders not the\nKing but that he may judge of it upon the special matter; for it often\nhappens that an ill-disposed person provokes a man with words or\notherwise, on purpose to make him draw his sword, that he may kill him,\nand pretend it done in his own defence; which appearing, the King may,\nwithout any offence to God, punish him, as the cause shall require.\nLastly, contrary to the doctrine of Sir Edward Coke, he may in his own\nperson be judge in the case, and annul the verdict of the jury; which a\ndeputed judge cannot do.\n\n_L._ There be some cases wherein a man, though by the jury he be found\nnot guilty, shall nevertheless forfeit his goods and chattels to the\nKing. For example; a man is slain, and one A, hating B, giveth out that\nit was B that slew him; B hearing thereof, fearing if he be tried for\nit, that through the great power of A, and others that seek his hurt, he\nshould be condemned, flieth, and afterwards is taken and tried; and upon\nsufficient evidence is by the jury found not guilty; yet because he\nfled, he shall forfeit his goods and chattels, notwithstanding there be\nno such judgment given by the judge, nor appointed by any statute; but\nthe law itself authoriseth the sheriff to seize them to the use of the\nKing.\n\n_P._ I see no reason (which is common-law) for it, and am sure it is\ngrounded upon no statute.\n\n_L._ See Sir Edward Coke, 1 _Inst._ _s._ 709, and read.\n\n_P._ \u201cIf a man that is innocent be accused of felony, and for fear\nflieth for the same; albeit that he be judicially acquitted of the\nfelony, yet if it be found that he fled for the same, he shall,\nnotwithstanding his innocence, forfeit all his goods and chattels, debts\nand duties.\u201d O unchristian and abominable doctrine! which also he in his\nown words following contradicteth: \u201cfor,\u201d saith he, \u201cas to the\nforfeiture of them, the law will admit no proof against the presumption\nof the law grounded upon his flight, and so it is in many other cases:\nbut that the general rule is, _Quod stabitur pr\u00e6sumptioni, donec\nprobetur in contrarium_; but you see it hath many exceptions.\u201d This\ngeneral rule contradicts what he said before; for there can be no\nexceptions to a general rule in law, that is not expressly made an\nexception by some statute, and to a general rule of equity there can be\nno exception at all.\n\n[Sidenote: Of pardoning.]\n\nFrom the power of punishing, let us proceed to the power of pardoning.\n\n_L._ Touching the power of pardoning, Sir Edward Coke says, (3 _Inst._\n_p._ 236), that no man shall obtain charter of pardon out of Parliament;\nand cites for it the statute of 2 _Edw. III_, _c._ 2; and says further,\nthat accordingly in a Parliament roll it is said, that for the peace of\nthe land it would help that no pardon were granted but by Parliament.\n\n_P._ What lawful power would he have left to the King, that thus\ndisableth him to practise mercy? In the statute which he citeth, to\nprove that the King ought not to grant charters of pardon but in\nParliament, there are no such words, as any man may see; for that\nstatute is in print; and that which he says is in the Parliament roll,\nis but a wish of he tells not whom, and not a law; and it is strange\nthat a private wish should be enrolled among acts of Parliament. If a\nman do you an injury, to whom, think you, belongeth the right of\npardoning it?\n\n_L._ Doubtless to me alone, if to me alone be done that injury; and to\nthe King alone, if to him alone be done the injury; and to both\ntogether, if the injury be done to both.\n\n_P._ What part then has any man in the granting of a pardon, but the\nKing and the party wronged. If you offend no member of either House, why\nshould you ask their pardon? It is possible that a man may deserve a\npardon; or he may be such a one sometimes as the defence of the kingdom\nhath need of. May not the King pardon him, though there be no Parliament\nthen sitting? Sir Edward Coke\u2019s law is too general in this point; and I\nbelieve, if he had thought on it, he would have excepted some persons,\nif not all the King\u2019s children and his heir-apparent; and yet they are\nall his subjects, and subject to the law as other men.\n\n_L._ But if the King shall grant pardons of murder and felony of his own\nhead, there would be very little safety for any man, either out of his\nhouse or in it, either by night or by day. And for that very cause there\nhave been many good statutes provided, which forbid the justices to\nallow of such pardons as do not specially name the crime.\n\n_P._ Those statutes, I confess, are reasonable, and very profitable,\nwhich forbid the judge to pardon murders. But what statute is there that\nforbids the King to do it? There is a statute of 13 _Rich. II_, _c._ 1,\nwherein the King promiseth not to pardon murder; but there is in it a\nclause for the saving of the King\u2019s regality. From which may be inferred\nthat the King did not grant away that power, when he thought good to use\nit for the commonwealth. Such statutes are not laws to the King, but to\nhis judges, and though the judges be commanded by the King not to allow\npardons in many cases, yet if the King by writing command the judges to\nallow them, they ought to do it. I think, if the King think in his\nconscience it be for the good of the commonwealth, he sinneth not in it:\nbut I hold not that the King may pardon him without sin, if any other\nman be damnified by the crime committed, unless he cause reparation to\nbe made as far as the party offending can do it. And howsoever, be it\nsin or not sin, there is no power in England that may resist him or\nspeak evil of him lawfully.\n\n_L._ Sir Edward Coke denies not that; and upon that ground it is that\nthe King, he says, may pardon high-treason; for there can be no\nhigh-treason but against the King.\n\n_P._ That is well; therefore he confesseth, that whatsoever the offence\nbe, the King may pardon so much of it as is an injury to himself, and\nthat by his own right, without breach of any law positive or natural, or\nof any grant, if his conscience tell him that it be not to the damage of\nthe commonwealth; and you know that to judge of what is good or evil to\nthe commonwealth, belongeth to the King only. Now tell me, what it is\nwhich is said to be pardoned?\n\n_L._ What can it be, but only the offence? If a man hath done a murder,\nand be pardoned for the same, is it not the murder that is pardoned?\n\n_P._ Nay, by your favour, if a man be pardoned for murder or any other\noffence, it is the man that is pardoned; the murder still remains\nmurder. But what is pardon?\n\n_L._ Pardon, as Sir Edward Coke says, (3 _Inst._ _p._ 233), is derived\nof _per_ and _dono_, and signifies thoroughly to remit.\n\n_P._ If the King remit the murder, and pardon not the man that did it,\nwhat does the remission serve for?\n\n_L._ You know well enough that when we say a murder, or any thing else,\nis pardoned, all Englishmen understand thereby, that the punishment due\nto the offence is the thing remitted.\n\n_P._ But for our understanding of one another, you ought to have said so\nat first. I understand now, that to pardon murder or felony is\nthoroughly to save the offender from all the punishment due unto him by\nthe law for his offence.\n\n_L._ Not so; for Sir Edward Coke in the same chapter, p. 238, saith\nthus: \u201ca man commits felony, and is attainted thereof, or is abjured;\nthe King pardoneth the felony without any mention of the attainder or\nabjuration: the pardon is void.\u201d\n\n_P._ What is it to be attainted?\n\n_L._ To be attainted is, that his blood be held in law as stained and\ncorrupted; so that no inheritance can descend from him to his children,\nor to any that make claim by him.\n\n_P._ Is this attaint a part of the crime or of the punishment?\n\n_L._ It cannot be a part of the crime, because it is none of his own\nact; it is therefore a part of the punishment, viz. a disherison of the\noffender.\n\n_P._ If it be a part of the punishment due, and yet not pardoned\ntogether with the rest, then a pardon is not a thorough remitting of the\npunishment, as Sir Edward Coke says it is. And what is abjuration?\n\n_L._ When a clerk heretofore was convicted of felony, he might have\nsaved his life by abjuring the realm; that is, by departing the realm\nwithin a certain time appointed, and taking an oath never to return. But\nat this day all statutes for abjuration are repealed.\n\n_P._ That also is a punishment, and by a pardon of the felony pardoned,\nunless a statute be in force to the contrary. There is also somewhat in\nthe statute of 13 _Rich. II_, _c._ 1, concerning the allowance of\ncharters of pardons, which I understand not well. The words are these:\n\u201cNo charter of pardon for henceforth shall be allowed before our\njustices for murder, or for the death of a man by await, or malice\nprepensed, treason, or rape of a woman, unless the same be specified in\nthe same charter.\u201d For I think it follows thence, that if the King say\nin his charter that he pardoneth the murder, then he breaketh not the\nstatute, because he specifies the offence: or if he saith he pardoneth\nthe killing by await or of malice prepensed, he breaketh not the\nstatute, he specifies the offence. Also if he say so much as that the\njudge cannot doubt of the King\u2019s meaning to pardon him, I think the\njudge ought to allow it, because the statute saveth the King\u2019s liberty\nand regality in that point; that is to say, the power to pardon him,\nsuch as are these words, \u201cnotwithstanding any statute to the contrary,\u201d\nare sufficient to cause the charter to be allowed; for these words make\nit manifest that the charter was not granted upon surprise, but to\nmaintain and claim the King\u2019s liberty and power to show mercy when he\nseeth cause. The like meaning have these words, _perdonavimus omnimodam\ninterfectionem_; that is to say, we have pardoned the killing, in what\nmanner soever it was done. But here we must remember that the King\ncannot pardon, without sin, any damage thereby done to another man,\nunless he causes satisfaction to be made as far as the offender possibly\ncan; but he is not bound to satisfy men\u2019s thirst of revenge; for all\nrevenge ought to proceed from God, and under God from the King. Now,\nbesides in charters, how are these offences specified?\n\n_L._ They are specified by their names, as treason, petite treason,\nmurder, rape, felony, and the like.\n\n_P._ Petite treason is felony, murder is felony; so is rape, robbery,\nand theft; and, as Sir Edward Coke says, petite larceny is felony. Now\nif in a Parliament-pardon, or in a Coronation-pardon, all felonies be\npardoned, whether is petite larceny pardoned, or not?\n\n_L._ Yes, certainly, it is pardoned.\n\n_P._ And yet you see it is not specified; and yet it is a crime that\nhath less in it of the nature of felony, than there is in robbery. Do\nnot therefore rape, robbery, theft, pass under the pardon of all\nfelonies?\n\n_L._ I think they are all pardoned by the words of the statute, but\nthose that are by the same statute excepted; so that specification is\nneedful only in charters of pardon, but in general pardons not so. For\nthe statute 13 _Rich. II_, _c._ 1, forbids not the allowance of\nParliament-pardons, or Coronation-pardons; and therefore the offences\npardoned need not be specified, but may pass under the general word of\n_all felonies_. Nor is it likely that the members of the Parliament, who\ndrew up their own pardons, did not mean to make them as comprehensive as\nthey could. And yet Sir Edward Coke (1 _Inst._ _sec._ 745), at the word\n_felony_, seemeth to be of another mind. For piracy is one species of\nfelony; and yet when certain Englishmen had committed piracy in the last\nyear of Queen Elizabeth, and came home into England in the beginning of\nthe reign of King James, trusting to his coronation-pardon of all\nfelonies, they were indicted (Sir Edward Coke was then Attorney-general)\nof the piracy before commissioners, according to the statute of 28 _Hen.\nVIII_, and being found guilty were hanged. The reason he allegeth for it\nis, that it ought to have been specified by the name of _piracy_ in the\npardon, and therefore the pardon was not to be allowed.\n\n_P._ Why ought it to have been specified more than any other felony? He\nshould therefore have drawn his argument from the law of reason.\n\n_L._ Also he does that; for the trial, he says, was by the common-law,\nand before commissioners, not in the Court of the Lord Admiral, by the\ncivil law; therefore, he says, it was an offence whereof the common-law\ncould not take any notice, because it could not be tried by twelve men.\n\n_P._ If the common-law could not, or ought not, to take notice of such\noffences, how could the offenders be tried by twelve men, and found\nguilty, and hanged as they were? If the common-law take no notice of\npiracy, what other offence was it for which they were hanged? Is piracy\ntwo felonies, for one of which a man shall be hanged by the civil-law,\nand for the other by the common-law? Truly I never read weaker reasoning\nin any author of the law of England, than in Sir Edward Coke\u2019s\nInstitutes, how well soever he could plead.\n\n_L._ Though I have heard him much reprehended by others as well as by\nyou, yet there be many excellent things, both for subtilty and for\ntruth, in these his Institutes.\n\n_P._ No better things than other lawyers have, that write of the law as\nof a science. His citing of Aristotle, and of Homer, and of other books\nwhich are commonly read by gownmen, do, in my opinion, but weaken his\nauthority; for any man may do it by a servant. But seeing the whole\nscene of that time is gone and past, let us proceed to somewhat else.\nWherein doth an _Act of Oblivion_ differ from a Parliament-pardon?\n\n_L._ This word _Act of Oblivion_ was never in our law-books before the\n12 _Car. II._ _c._ 11, and I wish it may never come again; but from\nwhence it came, you may better know perhaps than I.\n\n_P._ The first and only Act of Oblivion that ever passed into a law, in\nany state that I have read of, was that _amnestia_ or _oblivion_ of all\nquarrels between any of the citizens of Athens, at any time before that\nact, without all exception of crime or person. The occasion whereof was\nthis. The Laced\u00e6monians having totally subdued the Athenians, entered\ninto the city of Athens, and ordained that the people should choose\nthirty people of their own city to have the sovereign power over them.\nThese being chosen, behaved themselves so outrageously, as caused a\nsedition, in which the citizens on both sides were daily slain. There\nwas then a discreet person that propounded to each of the parties this\nproposition, that every man should return to his own and forget all that\nwas past; which proposition was made, by consent on both sides, into a\npublic act, which for that cause was called an _oblivion_. Upon the like\ndisorder happening in Rome by the murder of Julius C\u00e6sar, the like act\nwas propounded by Cicero, and indeed passed, but was within a few days\nafter broken again by Marcus Antonius. In imitation of this act was made\nthe act of 12 _Car. II._ _c._ 11.\n\n_L._ By this it seems, that the Act of Oblivion made by King Charles was\nno other than a Parliament-pardon, because it containeth a great number\nof exceptions, as the other Parliament-pardons do, and the act of Athens\ndid not.\n\n_P._ But yet there is a difference between the late Act of Oblivion made\nhere, and an ordinary Parliament-pardon. For concerning a fault pardoned\nin Parliament by a general word, a suit in law may arise about this,\nwhether the offender be signified by the word or not, as whether the\npardon of all felonies be a pardon of piracy or not. For you see by Sir\nEdward Coke\u2019s reports, that notwithstanding a pardon of felony, a\nsea-felony, when he was Attorney-General, was not pardoned. But by the\nlate Act of Oblivion, which pardoned all manner of offences committed in\nthe late civil war, no question could arise concerning crimes excepted.\nFirst, because no man can by law accuse another man of a fact, which by\nlaw is to be forgotten. Secondly, because all crimes may be alleged as\nproceeding from the licentiousness of the time, and from the silence of\nthe law occasioned by the civil war, and consequently (unless the\noffender\u2019s person also were excepted, or unless the crime were committed\nbefore the war began) are within the pardon.\n\n_L._ Truly I think you say right. For if nothing had been pardoned but\nwhat was done by the occasion of the war, the raising of the war itself\nhad not been pardoned.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the laws of _meum_ and _tuum_.]\n\n_P._ I have done with crimes and punishments; let us come now the laws\nof _meum_ and _tuum_.\n\n_L._ We must then examine the statutes.\n\n_P._ We must so, what they command and forbid; but not dispute of their\njustice. For the law of reason commands that every one observe the law\nwhich he hath assented to, and obey the person to whom he hath promised\nobedience and fidelity. Then let us consider next the commentaries of\nSir Edward Coke upon Magna Charta and other statutes. For the\nunderstanding of Magna Charta it will be very necessary to run up into\nancient times, as far as history will give us leave, and consider not\nonly the customs of our ancestors the Saxons, but also the law of\nnature, the most ancient of all laws, concerning the original of\ngovernment and acquisition of property, and concerning courts of\njudicature. And first, it is evident that dominion, government, and\nlaws, are far more ancient than history or any other writing, and that\nthe beginning of all dominion amongst men was in families. In which,\nfirst, the father of the family by the law of nature was absolute lord\nof his wife and children: secondly, made what laws amongst them he\npleased: thirdly, was judge of all their controversies: fourthly, was\nnot obliged by any law of man to follow any counsel but his own:\nfifthly, what land soever the lord sat down upon and made use of for his\nown and his family\u2019s benefit, was his propriety by the law of first\npossession, in case it was void of inhabitants before, or by the law of\nwar, in case they conquered it. In this conquest what enemies they took\nand saved, were their servants. Also such men as wanting possessions of\nlands, but furnished with arts necessary for man\u2019s life, came to dwell\nin the family for protection, became their subjects, and submitted\nthemselves to the laws of the family. And all this is consonant, not\nonly to the law of nature, but also to the practice of mankind set forth\nin history, sacred and profane.\n\n_L._ Do you think it lawful for a lord, that is the sovereign ruler of\nhis family, to make war upon another like sovereign lord, and dispossess\nhim of his lands?\n\n_P._ It is lawful or not lawful, according to the intention of him that\ndoes it. For, first, being a sovereign ruler, he is not subject to any\nlaw of man; and as to the law of God, where the intention is\njustifiable, the action is so also. The intention may be lawful in\ndivers cases by the right of nature; one of those cases is, when he is\nconstrained to it by the necessity of subsisting. So the children of\nIsrael, besides that their leaders, Moses and Joshua, had an immediate\ncommand from God to dispossess the Canaanites, had also a just pretence\nto do what they did, from the right of nature which they had to preserve\ntheir lives, being unable otherwise to subsist. And as their\npreservation, so also is their security a just pretence of invading\nthose whom they have just cause to fear, unless sufficient caution be\ngiven to take away their fear: which caution, for anything I can yet\nconceive, is utterly impossible. Necessity and security are the\nprincipal justifications before God, of beginning war. Injuries received\njustify a war defensive; but for reparable injuries, if reparation be\ntendered, all invasion upon that title is iniquity. If you need\nexamples, either from Scripture or other history, concerning this right\nof nature in making war, you are able enough of your own reading to find\nthem out at your leisure.\n\n_L._ Whereas you say, that the lands so won by the sovereign lord of a\nfamily, are his in propriety, you deny, methinks, all property to the\nsubjects, how much soever any of them have contributed to the victory.\n\n_P._ I do so; nor do I see any reason to the contrary. For the subjects,\nwhen they come into the family, have no title at all to demand any part\nof the land, or anything else but security: to which also they are bound\nto contribute their whole strength, and, if need be, their whole\nfortunes. For it cannot be supposed that any one man can protect all the\nrest with his own single strength; and for the practice, it is manifest,\nin all conquests the land of the vanquished is in the sole power of the\nvictor, and at his disposal. Did not Joshua and the High-priest divide\nthe land of Canaan in such sort among the tribes of Israel as they\npleased? Did not the Roman and Grecian princes and states, according to\ntheir own discretion, send out the colonies to inhabit such provinces as\nthey had conquered? Is there at this day among the Turks, any inheritor\nof land besides the Sultan? And was not all the land in England once in\nthe hands of William the Conqueror? Sir Edward Coke himself confesses\nit. Therefore it is an universal truth, that all conquered lands,\npresently after victory, are the lands of him that conquered them.\n\n_L._ But you know that all sovereigns are said to have a double\ncapacity, viz. a natural capacity, as he is a man; and a politic\ncapacity, as a king. In his politic capacity, I grant you, that King\nWilliam the Conqueror was the proper and only owner once of all the land\nin England; but not in his natural capacity.\n\n_P._ If he had them in his politic capacity, then they were so his own,\nas not to dispose of any part thereof but only to the benefit of his\npeople; and that must be either by his own, or by the people\u2019s\ndiscretion, that is, by Act of Parliament. But where do you find that\nthe Conqueror disposed of his lands (as he did some to Englishmen, some\nto Frenchmen, and some to Normans, to be holden by divers tenures, as\nknight-service, soccage, &c.) by Act of Parliament? Or that he ever\ncalled a Parliament, to have the assent of the Lords and Commons of\nEngland in disposing of those lands he had taken from them? Or for\nretaining of such and such lands in his own hands, by the name of\nforrests, for his own recreation or magnificence? You have heard perhaps\nthat some lawyers, or other men reputed wise and good patriots, have\ngiven out that all the lands which the Kings of England have possessed,\nhave been given them by the people, to the end that they should\ntherewith defray the charges of their wars, and pay the wages of their\nministers; and that those lands were gained by the people\u2019s money. For\nthat was pretended in the late civil war, when they took from the King\nhis town of Kingston-upon-Hull. But I know you do not think that the\npretence was just. It cannot therefore be denied but that the lands,\nwhich King William the Conqueror gave away to Englishmen and others, and\nwhich they now hold by his letters-patent and other conveyances, were\nproperly and really his own, or else the titles of them that now hold\nthem, must be invalid.\n\n_L._ I assent. As you have showed me the beginning of monarchies, so let\nme hear your opinion concerning their growth.\n\n_P._ Great monarchies have proceeded from small families. First, by war,\nwherein the victor not only enlarged his territory, but also the number\nand riches of his subjects. As for the other forms of commonwealths,\nthey have been enlarged other ways. First, by a voluntary conjunction of\nmany lords of families into one great aristocracy. Secondly, from\nrebellion proceeded first anarchy, and from anarchy proceeded any form\nthat the calamities of them that lived therein did prompt them to;\nwhether it were, that they chose an hereditary King, or an elective King\nfor life; or that they agreed upon a council of certain persons, which\nis _aristocracy_; or a council of the whole people to have the sovereign\npower, which is _democracy_. After the first manner, which is by war,\ngrew up all the greatest kingdoms in the world, viz. the Egyptian,\nAssyrian, Persian, and the Macedonian monarchy; and so did the great\nkingdoms of England, France, and Spain. The second manner, was the\noriginal of the Venetian Aristocracy. By the the third way, which is\nrebellion, grew up divers great monarchies, perpetually changing from\none form to another: as in Rome, rebellion against Kings produced\ndemocracy, upon which the senate usurped under Sylla, and the people\nagain upon the senate under Marius, and the Emperor usurped upon the\npeople under C\u00e6sar and his successors.\n\n_L._ Do you think the distinction between natural and politic capacity\nis insignificant?\n\n_P._ No. If the sovereign power be in an assembly of men, that assembly,\nwhether it be _aristocratical_ or _democratical_, may possess lands; but\nit is in their politic capacity: because no natural man has any right to\nthose lands, or any part of them. In the same manner, they can command\nan act by plurality of commands; but the command of any one of them is\nof no effect. But when the sovereign power is in one man, the natural\nand politic capacity are in the same person, and as to possession of\nlands, undistinguishable. But as to the acts and commands, they may be\nwell distinguished in this manner. Whatsoever a monarch does command or\ndo, by consent of the people of his kingdom, may properly be said to be\ndone in his politic capacity; and whatsoever he commands by word of\nmouth only, or by letters signed with his hand, or sealed with any of\nhis private seals, is done in his natural capacity. Nevertheless, his\npublic commands, though they be made in his politic capacity, have their\noriginal from his natural capacity. For in the making of laws, which\nnecessarily requires his assent, his assent is natural. Also those acts\nwhich are done by the King previously to the passing of them under the\nGreat Seal of England, either by word of mouth, or warrant under his\nsignet or private seal, are done in his natural capacity; but when they\nhave passed the Seal of England, they are to be taken as done in his\npolitic capacity.\n\n_L._ I think verily your distinction is good. For natural capacity and\npolitic capacity signify no more than private and public right.\nTherefore, leaving this argument, let us consider in the next place, as\nfar as history will permit, what were the laws and customs of our\nancestors.\n\n_P._ The Saxons, as also all the rest of Germany not conquered by the\nRoman Emperors nor compelled to use the imperial laws, were a savage and\nheathen people, living only by war and rapine, and as some men learned\nin the Roman antiquities affirm, had their name of Germans from that\ntheir ancient trade of life, as if _Germans_ and _hommes de guerre_ were\nall one. Their rule over their family, servants, and subjects, was\nabsolute; their laws, no other than natural equity; written law they had\nlittle or none; and very few there were in the time of the Caesars that\ncould write or read. The right to the government was either paternal, or\nby conquest, or by marriages. Their succession to lands was determined\nby the pleasure of the master of the family, by gift or deed in his\nlifetime; and what land they disposed not of in their lifetime,\ndescended after their death to their heirs. The heir was the eldest son.\nThe issue of the eldest son failing, they descended to the younger sons\nin their order; and, for want of sons, to the daughters jointly as to\none heir, or to be divided amongst them, and so to descend to their\nheirs in the same manner. And children failing, the uncle by the\nfather\u2019s or mother\u2019s side, according as the lands had been the father\u2019s\nor the mother\u2019s, succeeded to the inheritance, and so continually to the\nnext of blood. And this was a natural descent, because naturally the\nnearer in blood the nearer in kindness, and was held for the law of\nnature, not only amongst the Germans, but also in most nations before\nthey had a written law. The right of government, which is called _jus\nregni_, descended in the same manner, except only that after the sons it\ncame to the eldest daughter first, and her heirs; the reason whereof\nwas, that government is indivisible. And this law continues still in\nEngland.\n\n_L._ Seeing all the land, which any sovereign lord possessed, was his\nown in propriety, how came a subject to have a propriety in their lands?\n\n_P._ There be two sorts of propriety. One is, when a man holds his land\nfrom the gift of God only, which lands civilians call _allodial_; which\nin a kingdom, no man can have but the King. The other is, when a man\nholds his land from another man, as given him in respect of service and\nobedience to that man, as a fee. The first kind of propriety is\nabsolute; the other is in a manner conditional, because given for some\nservice to be done unto the giver. The first kind of propriety excludes\nthe right of all others; the second excludes the right of all other\nsubjects to the same land, but not the right of the sovereign, when the\ncommon good of the people shall require the use thereof.\n\n_L._ When those kings had thus parted with their lands, what was left\nthem for the maintenance of their wars, either offensive or defensive;\nor for the maintenance of the royal family in such manner as not only\nbecomes the dignity of a sovereign king, but is also necessary to keep\nhis person and people from contempt?\n\n_P._ They have means enough; and besides what they gave their subjects,\nhad much land remaining in their own hands, afforrested for their\nrecreation. For you know very well that a great part of the land of\nEngland was given for military service to the great men of the realm,\nwho were for the most part of the King\u2019s kindred or great favourites;\nmuch more land than they had need of for their own maintenance; but so\ncharged with one or many soldiers, according to the quantity of land\ngiven, as there could be no want of soldiers at all times ready to\nresist an invading enemy: which soldiers those lords were bound to\nfurnish, for a time certain, at their own charges. You know also, that\nthe whole land was divided into hundreds, and those again into\ndecennaries; in which decennaries all men, even to children of twelve\nyears of age, were bound to take the oath of allegiance. And you are to\nbelieve, that those men that hold their land by the service of\nhusbandry, were all bound with their bodies and fortunes to defend the\nkingdom against invaders, by the law of nature. And so also such as they\ncalled villains, and as held their land by baser drudgery, were obliged\nto defend the kingdom to the utmost of their power. Nay, women and\nchildren, in such a necessity, are bound to do such service as they can,\nthat is to say, to bring weapons and victuals to them that fight, and to\ndig. But those that hold their land by service military, have lying upon\nthem a greater obligation. For read and observe the form of doing\nhomage, according as it is set down in the statute of 17 _Edw. II_,\nwhich you doubt not was in use before that time, and before the\nConquest.\n\n_L._ _I become your man for life, for member, and for worldly honour,\nand shall owe you my faith for the lands that I hold of you._\n\n_P._ I pray you expound it.\n\n_L._ I think it is as much as if you should say, I promise you to be at\nyour command, to perform with the hazard of my life, limbs, and all my\nfortune, as I have charged myself in the reception of the lands you have\ngiven me, and to be ever faithful to you. This is the form of homage\ndone to the King immediately. But when one subject holdeth land of\nanother by the like military service, then there is an exception added,\nviz. _saving the faith I owe to the King_.\n\n_P._ Did he not also take an oath?\n\n_L._ Yes, which is called the oath of fealty: _I shall be to you both\nfaithful, and lawfully shall do such customs and services, as my duty is\nto you at the terms assigned, so help me God and all his Saints_. But\nboth these services, and the services of husbandry, were quickly after\nturned into rents, payable either in money, as in England, or in corn or\nother victuals, as in Scotland and France. When the service was\nmilitary, the tenant was for the most part bound to serve the King in\nhis wars, with one or more persons, according to the yearly value of the\nland he held.\n\n_P._ Were they bound to find horsemen, or footmen?\n\n_L._ I do not find any law that requires any man, in respect of his\ntenancy, to serve on horseback.\n\n_P._ Was the tenant bound, in case he were called, to serve in person?\n\n_L._ I think he was so in the beginning. For when lands were given for\nservice military, and the tenant dying left his son and heir, the lord\nhad the custody both of body and lands till the heir was twenty-one\nyears old. And the reason thereof was, that the heir, till that age of\ntwenty-one years, was presumed to be unable to serve the King in his\nwars; which reason had been insufficient, if the heir had not been bound\nto go to the wars in person. Which, methinks, should ever hold for law,\nunless by some other law it come to be altered. These services, together\nwith other rights, as wardships, first possession of his tenants'\ninheritance, licenses for alienation, felons' goods, felons' lands (if\nthey were holden of the King), and the first year\u2019s profit of the lands,\nof whomsoever they were holden, forfeitures, amercements, and many other\naids, could not but amount to a very great yearly revenue. Add to this\nall that which the King might reasonably have imposed upon artificers\nand tradesmen; for all men, whom the King protecteth, ought to\ncontribute towards their own protection; and consider then whether the\nKings of those times had not means enough, and to spare (if God were not\ntheir enemy), to defend their people against foreign enemies, and also\nto compel them to keep the peace amongst themselves.\n\n_P._ And so had had the succeeding Kings, if they had never given their\nrights away, and their subjects always kept their oaths and promises. In\nwhat manner proceeded those ancient Saxons, and other nations of\nGermany, especially the northern parts, to the making of their laws?\n\n_L._ Sir Edward Coke, out of divers Saxon laws, gathered and published\nin Saxon and Latin by Mr. Lambard, inferreth that the Saxon Kings, for\nthe making of their laws, called together the Lords and Commons, in such\nmanner as is used at this day in England. But by those laws of the\nSaxons published by Mr. Lambard, it appeareth, that the Kings called\ntogether the bishops, and a great part of the wisest and discreetest men\nof the realm, and made laws by their advice.\n\n_P._ I think so. For there is no King in the world, being of ripe years\nand sound mind, that made any law otherwise. For it concerns them in\ntheir own interest to make such laws as the people can endure, and may\nkeep them without impatience, and live in strength and courage to defend\ntheir King and country, against their potent neighbours. But how was it\ndiscerned, and by whom was it determined, who were those wisest and\ndiscreetest men? It is a hard matter to know who is wisest in our times.\nWe know well enough who chooseth a knight of the shire, and what towns\nare to send burgesses to the Parliament. Therefore if it were determined\nalso in those days, who those wise men should be, then I confess that\nthe Parliaments of the old Saxons, and the Parliaments of England since,\nare the same thing, and Sir Edward Coke is in the right. Tell me\ntherefore, if you can, when those towns, which now send burgesses to the\nParliament, began to do so, and upon what cause one town had this\nprivilege, and another town, though much more populous, had not.\n\n_L._ At what time began this custom I cannot tell; but I am sure it is\nmore ancient than the city of Salisbury. Because there come two\nburgesses to Parliament for a place near to it, called Old Sarum, which,\nas I rid in sight of it, if I should tell a stranger that knew not what\nthe word burgess meant, he would think it were a couple of rabbits; the\nplace looketh so like a long cony-borough. And yet a good argument may\nbe drawn from thence, that the townsmen of every town were the electors\nof their own burgesses, and judges of their discretion; and that the\nlaw, whether they be discreet or not, will suppose them to be discreet,\ntill the contrary be apparent. Therefore where it is said, that the King\ncalled together the more discreet men of his realm; it must be\nunderstood of such elections as are now in use. By which it is manifest,\nthat those great and general moots assembled by the old Saxon Kings,\nwere of the same nature with the Parliaments assembled since the\nConquest.\n\n_P._ I think your reason is good. For I cannot conceive, how the King,\nor any other but the inhabitants of the boroughs themselves, can take\nnotice of the discretion or sufficiency of those they were to send to\nthe Parliament. And for the antiquity of the burgess-towns, since it is\nnot mentioned in any history or certain record now extant, it is free\nfor any man to propound his conjecture. You know that this land was\ninvaded by the Saxons at several times, and conquered by pieces in\nseveral wars; so that there were in England many Kings at once, and\nevery of them had his Parliament. And therefore according as there were\nmore, or fewer walled towns within each King\u2019s dominion, his Parliament\nhad the more or fewer burgesses. But when all these lesser kingdoms were\njoined into one, then to that one Parliament came burgesses from all the\nboroughs of England. And this perhaps may be the reason, why there be so\nmany more such boroughs in the west, than in any other part of the\nkingdom; the west being more populous, and also more obnoxious to\ninvaders, and for that cause having greater store of towns fortified.\nThis I think may be the original of that privilege which some towns\nhave, to send burgesses to the Parliament, and others have not.\n\n_L._ The conjecture is not improbable, and for want of greater\ncertainty, may be allowed. But seeing it is commonly received, that for\nthe making of a law, there ought to be had the assent of the Lords\nspiritual and temporal; whom do you account in the Parliaments of the\nold Saxons for Lords temporal, and whom for Lords spiritual? For the\nbook called _The mode of holding Parliaments_, agreeth punctually with\nthe manner of holding them at this day, and was written, as Sir Edward\nCoke says, in the time of the Saxons, and before the Conquest.\n\n_P._ Mr. Selden, a greater antiquary than Sir Edward Coke, in the last\nedition of his book of _Titles of Honour_, says, that that book called\n_The mode of holding Parliaments_, was not written till about the time\nof Richard II, and seems to me to prove it. But howsoever that be, it is\napparent by the Saxon laws set forth by Mr. Lambard, that there were\nalways called to the Parliament certain great persons called Aldermen,\n_alias_ Earls. And so you have a House of Lords, and a House of Commons.\nAlso you will find in the same place, that after the Saxons had received\nthe faith of Christ, those bishops that were amongst them, were always\nat the great moots in which they made their laws. Thus you have a\nperfect English Parliament, saving that the name of Barons was not\namongst them, as being a French title, which came in with the Conqueror.\n\n\n\n\n BEHEMOTH:\n\n THE HISTORY OF THE CAUSES\n\n OF\n\n THE CIVIL WARS OF ENGLAND,\n\n AND OF THE COUNSELS AND ARTIFICES BY WHICH\n\n THEY WERE CARRIED ON FROM THE\n\n YEAR 1640 TO THE YEAR 1660.\n\n ---\n\n \u201cBella per Angliacos plusquam civilia campos,\n Jusque datum sceleri loquimur.\u2014\u2014\u201d\n\n\n\n\n THE BOOKSELLER TO THE READER.\n\n\nMy duty, as well to the public as to the memory of Mr. Hobbes, has\nobliged me to procure with my utmost diligence, that these tracts should\ncome forth with the most correct exactness.[A]\n\nI am compelled by the force of truth to declare, how much both the world\nand the memory of Mr. Hobbes have been abused by the several spurious\neditions of the _History of the Civil Wars_; wherein, by various and\nunskilful transcriptions, are committed above a thousand faults, and in\nabove a hundred places whole lines left out, as I can make appear.\n\nI must confess Mr. Hobbes, upon some considerations, was averse to the\npublishing thereof; but since it is impossible to suppress it, no book\nbeing more commonly sold by all booksellers, I hope I need not fear the\noffence of any man by doing right to the world and this work, which I\nnow publish from the original manuscript, done by his own amanuensis,\nand given me by himself above twelve years since.\n\nTo this I have joined the treatise against Archbishop Bramhall, to\nprevent the like prejudice, which must certainly have fallen on it,\nthere being so many false copies abroad, if not thus prevented; as also\nthe Discourse of Heresy from a more correct copy; and have likewise\nannexed his Physical Problems, as they were translated by himself and\npresented to his Majesty, with the epistle prefixed, in the year 1662,\nat the same time they came forth in Latin.\n\nThese things premised, there remains nothing but to wish for myself good\nsale, to the buyer much pleasure and satisfaction.\n\n Your humble servant,\n WILLIAM CROOKE.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nFootnote A:\n\n This preface is prefixed to the edition of 1682, in which the\n _Behemoth_ is printed along with the _Answer to Archbishop Bramhall_,\n the _Discourse of Heresy_, and the _Physical Problems_.\n\n\n\n\n BEHEMOTH,\n\n OR THE EPITOME OF\n\n THE CIVIL WARS OF ENGLAND.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n_A._ If in time, as in place, there were degrees of high and low, I\nverily believe that the highest of time would be that which passed\nbetween 1640 and 1660. For he that thence, as from the Devil\u2019s Mountain,\nshould have looked upon the world and observed the actions of men,\nespecially in England, might have had a prospect of all kinds of\ninjustice, and of all kinds of folly, that the world could afford, and\nhow they were produced by their hypocrisy and self-conceit, whereof the\none is double iniquity, and the other double folly.\n\n_B._ I should be glad to behold that prospect. You that have lived in\nthat time and in that part of your age, wherein men used to see best\ninto good and evil, I pray you set me, that could not see so well, upon\nthe same mountain, by the relation of the actions you then saw, and of\ntheir causes, pretensions, justice, order, artifice, and event.\n\n_A._ In the year 1640, the government of England was monarchical; and\nthe King that reigned, Charles, the first of that name, holding the\nsovereignty, by right of a descent continued above six hundred years,\nand from a much longer descent King of Scotland, and from the time of\nhis ancestor Henry II, King of Ireland; a man that wanted no virtue,\neither of body or mind, nor endeavoured anything more than to discharge\nhis duty towards God, in the well governing of his subjects.\n\n_B._ How could he then miscarry, having in every county so many trained\nsoldiers, as would, put together, have made an army of 60,000 men, and\ndivers magazines of ammunition in places fortified?\n\n_A._ If those soldiers had been, as they and all other of his subjects\nought to have been, at his Majesty\u2019s command, the peace and happiness of\nthe three kingdoms had continued as it was left by King James. But the\npeople were corrupted generally, and disobedient persons esteemed the\nbest patriots.\n\n_B._ But sure there were men enough, besides those that were\nill-affected, to have made an army sufficient to have kept the people\nfrom uniting into a body able to oppose him.\n\n_A._ Truly, I think, if the King had had money, he might have had\nsoldiers enough in England. For there were very few of the common people\nthat cared much for either of the causes, but would have taken any side\nfor pay or plunder. But the King\u2019s treasury was very low, and his\nenemies, that pretended the people\u2019s ease from taxes, and other specious\nthings, had the command of the purses of the city of London, and of most\ncities and corporate towns in England, and of many particular persons\nbesides.\n\n_B._ But how came the people to be so corrupted? And what kind of people\nwere they that did so seduce them?\n\n_A._ The seducers were of divers sorts. One sort were ministers;\nministers, as they called themselves, of Christ; and sometimes, in their\nsermons to the people, God\u2019s ambassadors; pretending to have a right\nfrom God to govern every one his parish, and their assembly the whole\nnation.\n\nSecondly, there were a very great number, though not comparable to the\nother, which notwithstanding that the Pope\u2019s power in England, both\ntemporal and ecclesiastical, had been by Act of Parliament abolished,\ndid still retain a belief that we ought to be governed by the Pope, whom\nthey pretended to be the vicar of Christ, and, in the right of Christ,\nto be the governor of all Christian people. And these were known by the\nname of Papists; as the ministers I mentioned before, were commonly\ncalled Presbyterians.\n\nThirdly, there were not a few, who in the beginning of the troubles were\nnot discovered, but shortly after declared themselves for a liberty in\nreligion, and those of different opinions one from another. Some of\nthem, because they would have all congregations free and independent\nupon one another, were called Independents. Others that held baptism to\ninfants, and such as understood not into what they are baptized, to be\nineffectual, were called therefore Anabaptists. Others that held that\nChrist\u2019s kingdom was at this time to begin upon the earth, were called\nFifth-monarchy-men; besides divers other sects, as Quakers, Adamites,\n&c., whose names and peculiar doctrines I do not well remember. And\nthese were the enemies which arose against his Majesty from the private\ninterpretation of the Scripture, exposed to every man\u2019s scanning in his\nmother-tongue.\n\nFourthly, there were an exceeding great number of men of the better\nsort, that had been so educated, as that in their youth having read the\nbooks written by famous men of the ancient Grecian and Roman\ncommonwealths concerning their polity and great actions; in which books\nthe popular government was extolled by that glorious name of liberty,\nand monarchy disgraced by the name of tyranny; they became thereby in\nlove with their forms of government. And out of these men were chosen\nthe greatest part of the House of Commons, or if they were not the\ngreatest part, yet by advantage of their eloquence, were always able to\nsway the rest.\n\nFifthly, the city of London and other great towns of trade, having in\nadmiration the prosperity of the Low Countries after they had revolted\nfrom their monarch, the King of Spain, were inclined to think that the\nlike change of government here, would to them produce the like\nprosperity.\n\nSixthly, there were a very great number that had either wasted their\nfortunes, or thought them too mean for the good parts they thought were\nin themselves; and more there were, that had able bodies, but saw no\nmeans how honestly to get their bread. These longed for a war, and hoped\nto maintain themselves hereafter by the lucky choosing of a party to\nside with, and consequently did for the most part serve under them that\nhad greatest plenty of money.\n\nLastly, the people in general were so ignorant of their duty, as that\nnot one perhaps of ten thousand knew what right any man had to command\nhim, or what necessity there was of King or Commonwealth, for which he\nwas to part with his money against his will; but thought himself to be\nso much master of whatsoever he possessed, that it could not be taken\nfrom him upon any pretence of common safety without his own consent.\nKing, they thought, was but a title of the highest honour, which\ngentleman, knight, baron, earl, duke, were but steps to ascend to, with\nthe help of riches; they had no rule of equity, but precedents and\ncustom; and he was thought wisest and fittest to be chosen for a\nParliament, that was most averse to the granting of subsidies or other\npublic payments.\n\n_B._ In such a constitution of people, methinks, the King is already\nousted of his government, so as they need not have taken arms for it.\nFor I cannot imagine how the King should come by any means to resist\nthem.\n\n_A._ There was indeed very great difficulty in the business. But of that\npoint you will be better informed in the pursuit of this narration.\n\n_B._ But I desire to know first, the several grounds of the pretences,\nboth of the Pope and of the Presbyterians, by which they claim a right\nto govern us, as they do, in chief: and after that, from whence and when\ncrept in the pretences of that Long Parliament, for a democracy.\n\n_A._ As for the Papists, they challenge this right from a text in\n_Deut._ xvii. 12, and other like texts, according to the old Latin\ntranslation in these words: _And he that out of pride shall refuse to\nobey the commandment of that priest, which shall at that time minister\nbefore the Lord thy God, that man shall by the sentence of the judge be\nput to death_. And because, as the Jews were the people of God then, so\nis all Christendom the people of God now, they infer from thence, that\nthe Pope, whom they pretend to be the high-priest of all Christian\npeople, ought also to be obeyed in all his decrees by all Christians,\nupon pain of death. Again, whereas in the New Testament (Matth. xxviii.\n18-20) Christ saith: _All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth;\ngo therefore and teach all nations, and baptize them in the name of the\nFather, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and teach them to observe\nall these things which I have commanded you_: from thence they infer,\nthat the command of the apostles was to be obeyed, and by consequence\nthe nations were bound to be governed by them, and especially by the\nprince of the apostles, St. Peter, and by his successors the Popes of\nRome.\n\n_B._ For the text in the Old Testament, I do not see how the commandment\nof God to the Jews, to obey their priests, can be interpreted to have\nthe like force in the case of other nations Christian, more than upon\nnations unchristian (for all the world are God\u2019s people); unless we also\ngrant, that a king cannot of an infidel be made Christian, without\nmaking himself subject to the laws of that apostle, or priest, or\nminister, that shall convert him. The Jews were a peculiar people of\nGod, a sacerdotal kingdom, and bound to no other law but what first\nMoses, and afterwards every high-priest, did go and receive immediately\nfrom the mouth of God in Mount Sinai, in the tabernacle of the ark, and\nin the _sanctum sanctorum_ of the temple. And for the text in St.\nMatthew, I know the words in the Gospel are not _go teach_, but _go and\nmake disciples_; and that there is a great difference between a subject\nand a disciple, and between teaching and commanding. And if such texts\nas these must be so interpreted, why do not Christian kings lay down\ntheir titles of majesty and sovereignty, and call themselves the Pope\u2019s\nlieutenants? But the doctors of the Romish Church seem to decline that\ntitle of absolute power, in their distinction of power spiritual and\ntemporal; but this distinction I do not very well understand.\n\n_A._ By spiritual power they mean the power to determine points of\nfaith, and to be judges in the inner court of conscience of moral\nduties, and a power to punish those men, that obey not their precepts,\nby ecclesiastical censure, that is, by excommunication. And this power,\nthey say, the Pope hath immediately from Christ, without dependence upon\nany king or sovereign assembly, whose subjects they be that stand\nexcommunicate. But for the power temporal, which consists in judging and\npunishing those actions that are done against the civil laws, they say,\nthey do not pretend to it directly, but only indirectly, that is to say,\nso far forth as such actions tend to the hindrance or advancement of\nreligion and good manners, which they mean when they say _in ordine ad\nspiritualia_.\n\n_B._ What power then is left to Kings and other civil sovereigns, which\nthe Pope may not pretend to be his _in ordine ad spiritualia_?\n\n_A._ None, or very little. And this power not only the Pope pretends to\nin all Christendom; but some of his bishops also, in their several\ndioceses, _jure divino_, that is, immediately from Christ, without\nderiving it from the Pope.\n\n_B._ But what if a man refuse obedience to this pretended power of the\nPope and his bishops? What harm can excommunication do him, especially\nif he be the subject of another sovereign?\n\n_A._ Very great harm. For by the Pope\u2019s or bishop\u2019s signification of it\nto the civil power, he shall be punished sufficiently.\n\n_B._ He were in an ill case then, that adventured to write or speak in\ndefence of the civil power, that must be punished by him whose rights he\ndefended, like Uzza, that was slain because he would needs, unbidden,\nput forth his hand to keep the ark from falling. But if a whole nation\nshould revolt from the Pope at once, what effect could excommunication\nhave upon the nation?\n\n_A._ Why, they should have no more mass said, at least by any of the\nPope\u2019s priests. Besides, the Pope would have no more to do with them,\nbut cast them off, and so they would be in the same case as if a nation\nshould be cast off by their king, and left to be governed by themselves,\nor whom they would.\n\n_B._ This would not be taken so much for a punishment to the people, as\nto the King; and therefore when a Pope excommunicates a whole nation,\nmethinks he rather excommunicates himself than them. But I pray you tell\nme, what were the rights that the Pope pretended to in the kingdoms of\nother princes?\n\n_A._ First, an exemption of all priests, friars, and monks, in criminal\ncauses, from the cognizance of civil judges. Secondly, collation of\nbenefices on whom he pleased, native or stranger, and exaction of\ntenths, first fruits, and other payments. Thirdly, appeals to Rome in\nall causes where the Church could pretend to be concerned. Fourthly, to\nbe the supreme judge concerning lawfulness of marriage, that is\nconcerning the hereditary succession of Kings, and to have the\ncognizance of all causes concerning adultery and fornication.\n\n_B._ Good! A monopoly of women.\n\n_A._ Fifthly, a power of absolving subjects of their duties, and of\ntheir oaths of fidelity to their lawful sovereigns, when the Pope should\nthink fit for the extirpation of heresy.\n\n_B._ This power of absolving subjects of their obedience, as also that\nother of being judge of manners and doctrine, is as absolute a\nsovereignty as is possible to be; and consequently there must be two\nkingdoms in one and the same nation, and no man be able to know which of\nhis masters he must obey.\n\n_A._ For my part, I should rather obey that master that had the right of\nmaking laws and of inflicting punishments, than him that pretendeth only\nto a right of making canons, that is to say, rules, and no right of\nco-action, or otherwise punishing, but by excommunication.\n\n_B._ But the Pope pretends also that his canons are laws; and for\npunishing, can there be greater than excommunication; supposing it true,\nas the Pope saith it is, that he that dies excommunicate is damned?\nWhich supposition, it seems, you believe not; else you would rather have\nchosen to obey the Pope, that would cast your body and soul into hell,\nthan the King, that can only kill the body.\n\n_A._ You say true. For it were very uncharitable in me to believe that\nall Englishmen, except a few Papists, that have been born and called\nheretics ever since the Reformation of Religion in England, should be\ndamned.\n\n_B._ But for those that die excommunicate in the Church of England at\nthis day, do you not think them also damned?\n\n_A._ Doubtless, he that dies in sin without repentance is damned, and he\nthat is excommunicate for disobedience to the King\u2019s laws, either\nspiritual or temporal, is excommunicate for sin; and therefore, if he\ndie excommunicate and without desire of reconciliation, he dies\nimpenitent. You see what follows. But to die in disobedience to the\nprecepts and doctrines of those men that have no authority or\njurisdiction over us, is quite another case, and bringeth no such danger\nwith it.\n\n_B._ But what is this heresy, which the Church of Rome so cruelly\npersecutes, as to depose Kings that do not, when they are bidden, turn\nall heretics out of their dominions?\n\n_A._ Heresy is a word which, when it is used without passion, signifies\na private opinion. So the different sects of the old philosophers,\nAcademians, Peripatetics, Epicureans, Stoics, &c., were called heresies.\nBut in the Christian Church, there was in the signification of that\nword, comprehended a sinful opposition to him, that was chief judge of\ndoctrines in order to the salvation of men\u2019s souls; and consequently\nheresy may be said to bear the same relation to the power spiritual,\nthat rebellion doth to the power temporal, and is suitable to be\npersecuted by him that will preserve a power spiritual and dominion over\nmen\u2019s consciences.\n\n_B._ It would be very well, (because we are all of us permitted to read\nthe Holy Scriptures, and bound to make them the rule of our actions,\nboth public and private), that heresy were by some law defined, and the\nparticular opinions set forth, for which a man were to be condemned and\npunished as a heretic; for else, not only men of mean capacity, but even\nthe wisest and devoutest Christian, may fall into heresy without any\nwill to oppose the Church; for the Scriptures are hard, and the\ninterpretations different of different men.\n\n_A._ The meaning of the word heresy, is by law declared in an Act of\nParliament in the first year of Queen Elizabeth; wherein it is ordained,\nthat the persons who had by the Queen\u2019s letters-patent the authority\nspiritual, meaning the High Commission, shall not have authority to\nadjudge any matter or cause to be heresy, but only such as heretofore\nhave been adjudged to be heresy by the authority of the canonical\nScriptures, or by the first four general Councils, or by any other\ngeneral Council, where the same was declared heresy by the express and\nplain words of the said canonical Scriptures, or such as hereafter shall\nbe adjudged heresy by the high court of Parliament of this realm, with\nthe assent of the clergy in their convocation.\n\n_B._ It seems therefore, if there arise any new error that hath not yet\nbeen declared heresy, (and many such may arise), it cannot be judged\nheresy without a Parliament. For how foul soever the error be, it cannot\nhave been declared heresy neither in the Scriptures nor in the Councils;\nbecause it was never before heard of. And consequently there can be no\nerror, unless it fall within the compass of blasphemy against God or\ntreason against the King, for which a man can in equity be punished.\nBesides, who can tell what is declared by the Scripture, which every man\nis allowed to read and interpret to himself? Nay more, what Protestant,\neither of the laity or clergy, if every general Council can be a\ncompetent judge of heresy, is not already condemned? For divers Councils\nhave declared a great many of our doctrines to be heresy, and that, as\nthey pretend, upon the authority of the Scriptures.\n\n_A._ What are those points, that the first four general Councils have\ndeclared heresy?\n\n_B._ The first general Council, held at Nic\u00e6a, declared all to be heresy\nwhich was contrary to the Nicene Creed, upon occasion of the heresy of\nArius, which was the denying the divinity of Christ. The second general\nCouncil, held at Constantinople, declared heresy the doctrine of\nMacedonius; which was that the Holy Ghost was created. The third\nCouncil, assembled at Ephesus, condemned the doctrine of Nestorius, that\nthere were two persons in Christ. The fourth, held at Chalcedon,\ncondemned the error of Eutyches, that there was but one nature in\nChrist. I know of no other points condemned in these four Councils, but\nsuch as concern church-government, or the same doctrines taught by other\nmen in other words. And these Councils were all called by the Emperors,\nand by them their decrees confirmed at the petition of the Councils\nthemselves.\n\n_A._ I see by this, that both the calling of the Council, and the\nconfirmation of their doctrine and church-government, had no obligatory\nforce but from the authority of the Emperor. How comes it then to pass,\nthat they take upon them now a legislative power, and say their canons\nare laws? That text, _all power is given to me in heaven and earth_, had\nthe same force then as it hath now, and conferred a legislative power on\nthe Councils, not only over Christian men, but over all nations in the\nworld.\n\n_B._ They say no; for the power they pretend to is derived from this,\nthat when a king was converted from Gentilism to Christianity, he did by\nthat very submission to the bishop that converted him, submit to the\nbishop\u2019s government and became one of his sheep; which right therefore\nhe could not have over any nation that was not Christian.\n\n_A._ Did Sylvester, which was Pope of Rome in the time of Constantine\nthe Great, converted by him, tell the Emperor, his new disciple,\nbeforehand, that if he became a Christian he must be the Pope\u2019s subject?\n\n_B._ I believe not. For it is likely enough, if he had told him so\nplainly, or but made him suspect it, he would either have been no\nChristian at all, or but a counterfeit one.\n\n_A._ But if he did not tell him so, and that plainly, it was foul play,\nnot only in a priest, but in any Christian. And for this derivation of\ntheir right from the Emperor\u2019s consent, it proceeds only from this, that\nthey dare not challenge a legislative power, nor call their canons laws\nin any kingdom in Christendom, further than the kings make them so. But\nin Peru, when Atabalipa was King, the friar told him, that Christ being\nKing of all the world, had given the disposing of all the kingdoms\ntherein to the Pope, and that the Pope had given Peru to the Roman\nEmperor Charles the Fifth, and required Atabalipa to resign it; and for\nrefusing it, seized upon his person by the Spanish army there present,\nand murdered him. You see by this how much they claim, when they have\npower to make it good.\n\n_B._ When began the Popes to take this authority upon them first?\n\n_A._ After the inundation of the northern people had overflowed the\nwestern parts of the empire, and possessed themselves of Italy, the\npeople of the city of Rome submitted themselves, as well in temporals as\nspirituals, to their bishop; and then first was the Pope a temporal\nprince, and stood no more in so great fear of the Emperors, which lived\nfar off at Constantinople. In this time it was that the Pope began, by\npretence of his power spiritual, to encroach upon the temporal rights of\nall other princes of the west; and so continued gaining upon them, till\nhis power was at the highest in that three hundred years, or thereabout,\nwhich passed between the eighth and eleventh century, that is, between\nPope Leo the Third and Pope Innocent the Third. For in this time Pope\nZachary the First deposed Chilperic, then King of France, and gave the\nkingdom to one of his subjects, Pepin; and Pepin took from the Lombards\na great part of their territory and gave it to the Church. Shortly\nafter, the Lombards having recovered their estate, Charles the Great\nretook it, and gave it to the Church again; and Pope Leo the Third made\nCharles Emperor.\n\n_B._ But what right did the Pope then pretend for the creating of an\nEmperor?\n\n_A._ He pretended the right of being Christ\u2019s vicar; and what Christ\ncould give, his vicar might give; and you know that Christ was King of\nall the world.\n\n_B._ Yes, as God; and so he gives all the kingdoms of the world, which\nnevertheless proceed from the consent of people, either for fear or\nhope.\n\n_A._ But this gift of the empire was in a more special manner, in such a\nmanner as Moses had the government of Israel given him; or rather as\nJoshua had it given him, to go in and out before the people as the\nhigh-priest should direct him. And so the empire was understood to be\ngiven him, on condition to be directed by the Pope. For when the Pope\ninvested him with the regal ornaments, the people all cried out _Deus\ndat_, that is to say, it is God that gives it; and the Emperor was\ncontented so to take it. And from that time, all or most of the\nChristian Kings do put into their titles the words _Dei gratia_, that\nis, by the gift of God; and their successors use still to receive the\ncrown and sceptre from a bishop.\n\n_B._ It is certainly a very good custom, for Kings to be put in mind by\nwhose gift they reign; but it cannot from that custom be inferred that\nthey receive the kingdom by mediation of the Pope, or by any other\nclergy; for the Popes themselves received the Papacy from the Emperor.\nThe first that ever was elected Bishop of Rome after Emperors were\nChristians, and without the Emperor\u2019s consent, excused himself by\nletters to the Emperor with this: that the people and clergy of Rome\nforced him to take it upon him, and prayed the Emperor to confirm it,\nwhich the Emperor did; but with reprehension of their proceedings, and\nthe prohibition of the like for the time to come. The Emperor was\nLotharius, and the Pope Calixtus the First.\n\n_A._ You see by this the Emperor never acknowledged this gift of God was\nthe gift of the Pope, but maintained, the Popedom was the gift of the\nEmperor. But in process of time, by the negligence of the Emperors, (for\nthe greatness of Kings makes them that they cannot easily descend into\nthe obscure and narrow mines of an ambitious clergy), they found means\nto make the people believe, there was a power in the Pope and clergy,\nwhich they ought to submit unto, rather than to the commands of their\nown Kings, whensoever it should come into controversy: and to that end\ndevised and decreed many new articles of faith, to the diminution of the\nauthority of kings, and to the disjunction of them and their subjects,\nand to a closer adherence of their subjects to the Church of Rome;\narticles either not at all found in, or not well founded upon the\nScriptures; as first; that it should not be lawful for a priest to\nmarry.\n\n_B._ What influence could that have upon the power of Kings?\n\n_A._ Do you not see, that by this the King must of necessity either want\nthe priesthood, and therewith a great part of the reverence due to him\nfrom the most religious part of his subjects, or else want lawful heirs\nto succeed him: by which means, being not taken for the head of the\nChurch, he was sure, in any controversy between him and the Pope, that\nhis subjects would be against him?\n\n_B._ Is not a Christian King as much a bishop now, as the heathen Kings\nwere of old? for among them _episcopus_ was a name common to all Kings.\nIs not he a bishop now, to whom God hath committed the charge of all the\nsouls of his subjects, both of the laity and the clergy? And though he\nbe in relation to our Saviour, who is the chief pastor, but a sheep,\nyet, compared to his own subjects, they are all sheep, both laic and\ncleric, and he only shepherd. And seeing a Christian bishop is but a\nChristian endued with power to govern the clergy, it follows that every\nChristian king is not only a bishop, but an arch-bishop, and his whole\ndominion his diocese. And though it were granted, that imposition of\nhands is necessary from a priest; yet seeing Kings have the government\nof the clergy, that are his subjects even before baptism; the baptism\nitself, wherein he is received as a Christian, is a sufficient\nimposition of hands, so that whereas before he was a bishop, now he is a\nChristian bishop.\n\n_A._ For my part I agree with you: this prohibition of marriage to\npriests came in about the time of Pope Gregory the Seventh, and William\nthe First, King of England; by which means the Pope had in England, what\nwith secular and what with regular priests, a great many lusty bachelors\nat his service.\n\nSecondly, that auricular confession to a priest was necessary to\nsalvation. It is true, that before that time, confession to a priest was\nusual, and performed for the most part by him that confessed, in\nwriting. But that use was taken away about the time of King Edward III,\nand priests commanded to take confessions from the mouth of the\nconfitent: and men did generally believe, that without confession and\nabsolution before their departure out of the world, they could not be\nsaved; and having absolution from a priest, that they could not be\ndamned. You understand by this, how much every man would stand in awe of\nthe Pope and clergy, more than they would of the King; and what\ninconvenience it is to a state for their subjects to confess their\nsecret thoughts to spies.\n\n_B._ Yes, as much as eternal torture is more terrible than death, so\nmuch they would fear the clergy more than the King.\n\n_A._ And though perhaps the Roman clergy will not maintain, that a\npriest hath power to remit sins absolutely, but only with a condition of\nrepentance, yet the people were never so instructed by them; but were\nleft to believe, that whensoever they had absolution, their precedent\nsins were all discharged, when their penance, which they took for\nrepentance, was performed. Within the same time began the article of\ntransubstantiation. For it had been disputed a long time before, in what\nmanner a man did eat the body of our Saviour Jesus Christ, as being a\npoint very difficult for a man to conceive and imagine clearly; but now\nit was made very clear, that the bread was transubstantiated into\nChrist\u2019s body, and so was become no more bread, but flesh.\n\n_B._ It seems then that Christ had many bodies, and was in as many\nplaces at once, as there were communicants. I think the priests then\nwere so wanton, as to insult upon the dulness, not only of common\npeople, but also of kings and their councillors.\n\n_A._ I am now in a narration, not in a disputation; and therefore I\nwould have you at this time to consider nothing else, but what effect\nthis doctrine would work upon kings and their subjects, in relation to\nthe clergy, who only were able of a piece of bread to make our Saviour\u2019s\nbody, and thereby at the hour of death to save their souls.\n\n_B._ For my part, it would have an effect on me, to make me think them\ngods, and to stand in awe of them as of God himself, if he were visibly\npresent.\n\n_A._ Besides these, and other articles tending to the upholding of the\nPope\u2019s authority, they had many fine points in their ecclesiastical\npolity, conducing to the same end; of which I will mention only such as\nwere established within the same time. For then it was the order came up\nof preaching friars, that wandered up and down, with power to preach in\nwhat congregation they pleased, and were sure enough to instil into the\npeople nothing that might lessen the obedience to the Church of Rome;\nbut, on the contrary, whatsoever might give advantage to it against the\ncivil power. Besides, they privately insinuated themselves with women\nand men of weak judgment, confirming their adherence to the Pope, and\nurging them, in the time of their sickness, to be beneficial to it by\ncontribution of money, or building religious houses, or pious works and\nnecessary for the remission of their sins.\n\n_B._ I do not remember that I have read of any kingdom or state in the\nworld, where liberty was given to any private man to call the people\ntogether, and make orations frequently to them, or at all, without first\nmaking the state acquainted, except only in Christendom. I believe the\nheathen Kings foresaw, that a few such orators would be able to make a\ngreat sedition. Moses did indeed command to read the Scriptures and\nexpound them in the Synagogues every Sabbath-day. But the Scriptures\nthen were nothing else but the laws of the nation, delivered unto them\nby Moses himself. And I believe it would do no hurt, if the laws of\nEngland also were often read and expounded in the several congregations\nof Englishmen, at times appointed, that they may know what to do; for\nthey know already what to believe.\n\n_A._ I think that neither the preaching of friars nor monks, nor of\nparochial priests, tended to teach men what, but whom to believe. For\nthe power of the mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief\nof the people. And the end which the Pope had in multiplying sermons,\nwas no other but to prop and enlarge his own authority over all\nChristian Kings and States.\n\nWithin the same time, that is, between the time of the Emperor Charles\nthe Great and of King Edward the Third of England, began their second\npolity; which was, to bring religion into an art, and thereby to\nmaintain all the decrees of the Roman Church by disputation; not only\nfrom the Scriptures, but also from the philosophy of Aristotle, both\nmoral and natural. And to that end the Pope exhorted the said Emperor by\nletter, to erect schools of all kinds of literature; and from thence\nbegan the institution of universities; for not long after, the\nuniversities began in Paris and in Oxford. It is true, that there were\nschools in England before that time, in several places, for the\ninstruction of children in the Latin tongue, that is to say, in the\ntongue of the Church. But for an university of learning, there was none\nerected till that time; though it be not unlikely there might be then\nsome that taught philosophy, logic, and other arts, in divers\nmonasteries, the monks having little else to do but to study. After some\ncolleges were built to that purpose, it was not long time before many\nmore were added to them, by the devotion of princes and bishops, and\nother wealthy men: and the discipline therein was confirmed by the Popes\nthat then were; and abundance of scholars sent thither by their friends\nto study, as to a place from whence the way was open and easy to\npreferment both in Church and Commonwealth. The profit the Church of\nRome expected from them, and in effect received, was the maintenance of\nthe Pope\u2019s doctrine, and of his authority over kings and their subjects,\nby school-divines; who striving to make good many points of faith\nincomprehensible, and calling in the philosophy of Aristotle to their\nassistance, wrote great books of school-divinity, which no man else, nor\nthey themselves, were able to understand; as any man may perceive that\nshall consider the writings of Peter Lombard, or Scotus, or of him that\nwrote commentaries upon him, or of Suarez, or any other school-divine of\nlater times. Which kind of learning nevertheless hath been much admired\nby two sorts of men, otherwise prudent enough. The one of which sorts\nwere of those that were already devoted and really affectionate to the\nRoman Church; for they believed the doctrine before, but admired the\narguments because they understood them not, and yet found the\nconclusions to their mind. The other sort were negligent men, that had\nrather admire with others, than take the pains to examine. So that all\nsorts of people were fully resolved, that both the doctrine was true,\nand the Pope\u2019s authority no more than what was due to him.\n\n_B._ I see that a Christian king, or state, how well soever provided he\nbe of money and arms, where the Church of Rome hath such authority, will\nhave but a hard match of it, for want of men. For their subjects will\nhardly be drawn into the field and fight with courage against their\nconsciences.\n\n_A._ It is true that great rebellions have been raised by Church-men in\nthe Pope\u2019s quarrel against kings, as in England against King John, and\nin France against King Henry IV. Wherein the Kings had a more\nconsiderable part on their sides, than the Pope had on his; and shall\nalways have so, if they have money. For there are but few whose\nconsciences are so tender as to refuse money when they want it. But the\ngreat mischief done to kings upon pretence of religion is, when the Pope\ngives power to one king to invade another.\n\n_B._ I wonder how King Henry the Eighth could then so utterly extinguish\nthe authority of the Pope in England, and that without any rebellion at\nhome, or any invasion from abroad.\n\n_A._ First, the priests, monks, and friars, being in the height of their\npower, were now for the most part grown insolent and licentious; and\nthereby the force of their arguments was now taken away by the scandal\nof their lives, which the gentry and men of good education easily\nperceived: and the Parliament consisting of such persons, were therefore\nwilling to take away their power: and generally the common people, which\nfrom a long custom had been in love with Parliaments, were not\ndispleased therewith. Secondly, the doctrine of Luther beginning a\nlittle before, was now by a great many men of the greatest judgment so\nwell received, as that there was no hope to restore the Pope to his\npower by rebellion. Thirdly, the revenue of abbeys and all other\nreligious houses, falling thereby into the King\u2019s hands, and by him\nbeing disposed of to the most eminent gentlemen in every county, could\nnot but make them do their best to confirm themselves in the possession\nof them. Fourthly, King Henry was of a nature quick and severe in the\npunishing of such as should be the first to oppose his designs. Lastly,\nas to invasion from abroad, in case the Pope had given the kingdom to\nanother prince, it had been in vain; for England is another manner of\nkingdom than Navarre. Besides, the French and Spanish forces were\nemployed at that time one against another: and though they had been at\nleisure, they would have found perhaps no better success than the\nSpaniards found afterwards in 1588. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the\ninsolence, avarice, and hypocrisy of the then clergy, and\nnotwithstanding the doctrine of Luther, if the Pope had not provoked the\nKing by endeavouring to cross his marriage with his second wife, his\nauthority might have remained in England till there had risen some other\nquarrel.\n\n_B._ Did not the bishops, that then were, and had taken an oath, wherein\nwas, amongst other things, that they should defend and maintain the\nlegal rights of St. Peter: (the words are, _Regalia Sancti Petri_, which\nnevertheless some have said are _regulas Sancti Petri_, that is to say,\nSt. Peter\u2019s rules or doctrine; and that the clergy afterward did read\nit, being perhaps written in short-hand, by a mistake to the Pope\u2019s\nadvantage _regalia_): did not, I say, the bishops oppose that Act of\nParliament against the Pope, and against the taking of the oath of\nsupremacy?\n\n_A._ No, I do not find that the bishops did many of them oppose the\nKing; for having no power without him, it had been great imprudence to\nprovoke his anger. There was besides a controversy in those times\nbetween the Pope and the bishops, most of which did maintain that they\nexercised their jurisdiction episcopal in the right of God, as\nimmediately as the Pope himself did exercise the same over the whole\nChurch. And because they saw that by this Act of the King in Parliament\nthey were to hold their power no more of the Pope, and never thought of\nholding it of the King, they were perhaps better content to let that Act\nof Parliament pass. In the reign of King Edward VI the doctrine of\nLuther had taken so great root in England, that they threw out also a\ngreat many of the Pope\u2019s new articles of faith; which Queen Mary\nsucceeding him restored again, together with all that had been abolished\nby Henry VIII, saving that which could not be restored, the religious\nhouses; and the bishops and clergy of King Edward were partly burnt for\nheretics, partly fled, and partly recanted. And they that fled betook\nthemselves to those places beyond sea, where the reformed religion was\neither protected or not persecuted; who, after the decease of Queen\nMary, returned again to favour and preferment under Queen Elizabeth,\nthat restored the religion of her brother King Edward. And so it hath\ncontinued till this day, excepting the interruption made in this late\nrebellion of the presbyterians and other democratical men. But though\nthe Romish religion were now cast out by the law, yet there were\nabundance of people, and many of them of the nobility, that still\nretained the religion of their ancestors, who as they were not much\nmolested in points of conscience, so they were not by their own\ninclination very troublesome to the civil government; but by the secret\npractice of the Jesuits and other emissaries of the Roman Church, they\nwere made less quiet than they ought to have been; and some of them to\nventure on the most horrid act that ever had been heard of before, I\nmean the Gunpowder Treason. And upon that account, the Papists of\nEngland have been looked upon as men that would not be sorry for any\ndisorders here that might possibly make way to the restoring of the\nPope\u2019s authority. And therefore I named them for one of the distempers\nof the state of England in the time of our late King Charles.\n\n_B._ I see that Monsieur Mornay du Plessis, and Dr. Morton, Bishop of\nDurham, writing of the progress of the Pope\u2019s power, and intituling\ntheir books, one of them, _The Mystery of Iniquity_, the other, _The\nGrand Imposture_, were both in the right. For I believe there was never\nsuch another cheat in the world, and I wonder that the Kings and States\nof Christendom never perceived it.\n\n_A._ It is manifest they did perceive it. How else durst they make war\nagainst the Pope, and some of them take him out of Rome itself and carry\nhim away prisoner? But if they would have freed themselves from his\ntyranny, they should have agreed together, and made themselves every\none, as Henry VIII did, head of the Church within their own respective\ndominions. But not agreeing, they let his power continue, every one\nhoping to make use of it, when there should be cause, against his\nneighbour.\n\n_B._ Now, as to that other distemper by Presbyterians, how came their\npower to be so great, being of themselves, for the most part, but so\nmany poor scholars?\n\n_A._ This controversy between the Papist and the Reformed Churches,\ncould not choose but make every man, to the best of his power, examine\nby the Scriptures, which of them was in the right; and to that end they\nwere translated into vulgar tongues; whereas before, the translation of\nthem was not allowed, nor any man to read them but such as had express\nlicense so to do. For the Pope did concerning the Scriptures the same\nthat Moses did concerning Mount Sinai. Moses suffered no man to go up to\nit to hear God speak or gaze upon him, but such as he himself took with\nhim; and the Pope suffered none to speak with God in the Scriptures,\nthat had not some part of the Pope\u2019s spirit in him, for which he might\nbe trusted.\n\n_B._ Certainly Moses did therein very wisely, and according to God\u2019s own\ncommandment.\n\n_A._ No doubt of it, and the event itself hath made it appear so. For\nafter the Bible was translated into English, every man, nay, every boy\nand wench, that could read English, thought they spoke with God\nAlmighty, and understood what he said, when by a certain number of\nchapters a day they had read the Scriptures once or twice over. The\nreverence and obedience due to the Reformed Church here, and to the\nbishops and pastors therein, was cast off, and every man became a judge\nof religion, and an interpreter of the Scriptures to himself.\n\n_B._ Did not the Church of England intend it should be so? What other\nend could they have in recommending the Bible to me, if they did not\nmean I should make it the rule of my actions? Else they might have kept\nit, though open to themselves, to me sealed up in Hebrew, Greek, and\nLatin, and fed me out of it in such measure as had been requisite for\nthe salvation of my soul and the Church\u2019s peace.\n\n_A._ I confess this licence of interpreting the Scripture was the cause\nof so many several sects, as have lain hid till the beginning of the\nlate King\u2019s reign, and did then appear to the disturbance of the\ncommonwealth. But to return to the story. Those persons that fled for\nreligion in the time of Queen Mary, resided, for the most part, in\nplaces where the Reformed religion was professed and governed by an\nassembly of ministers; who also were not a little made use of, for want\nof better statesmen, in points of civil government. Which pleased so\nmuch the English and Scotch Protestants that lived amongst them, that at\ntheir return they wished there were the same honour and reverence given\nto the ministry in their own countries. In Scotland, King James being\nthen young, soon with the help of some of the powerful nobility they\nbrought it to pass. Also they that returned into England in the\nbeginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, endeavoured the same here,\nbut could never effect it till this last rebellion, nor without the aid\nof the Scots. And it was no sooner effected, but they were defeated\nagain by the other sects, which, by the preaching of the Presbyterians\nand private interpretation of Scripture, were grown numerous.\n\n_B._ I know indeed that in the beginning of the late war, the power of\nthe Presbyterians was so very great, that, not only the citizens of\nLondon were almost all of them at their devotion, but also the greatest\npart of all other cities and market-towns of England. But you have not\nyet told me by what art and what degrees they became so strong.\n\n_A._ It was not their own art alone that did it, but they had the\nconcurrence of a great many gentlemen, that did no less desire a popular\ngovernment in the civil state than these ministers did in the Church.\nAnd as these did in the pulpit draw the people to their opinions, and to\na dislike of the Church-government, Canons, and Common-prayer-book, so\ndid the other make them in love with democracy by their harangues in the\nParliament, and by their discourses and communication with people in the\ncountry, continually extolling liberty and inveighing against tyranny,\nleaving the people to collect of themselves that this tyranny was the\npresent government of the state. And as the Presbyterians brought with\nthem into their churches their divinity from the universities, so did\nmany of the gentlemen bring their politics from thence into the\nParliament; but neither of them did this very boldly in the time of\nQueen Elizabeth. And though it be not likely that all of them did it out\nof malice, but many of them out of error, yet certainly the chief\nleaders were ambitious ministers and ambitious gentlemen; the ministers\nenvying the authority of bishops, whom they thought less learned; and\nthe gentlemen envying the privy-council, whom they thought less wise\nthan themselves. For it is a hard matter for men, who do all think\nhighly of their own wits, when they have also acquired the learning of\nthe university, to be persuaded that they want any ability requisite for\nthe government of a commonwealth, especially having read the glorious\nhistories and the sententious politics of the ancient popular\ngovernments of the Greeks and Romans, amongst whom kings were hated and\nbranded with the name of tyrants, and popular government (though no\ntyrant was ever so cruel as a popular assembly) passed by the name of\nliberty. The Presbyterian ministers, in the beginning of the reign of\nQueen Elizabeth, did not, because they durst not, publicly preach\nagainst the discipline of the Church. But not long after, by the favour\nperhaps of some great courtier, they went abroad preaching in most of\nthe market-towns of England, as the preaching friars had formerly done,\nupon working-days in the morning; in which sermons, these and others of\nthe same tenets, that had charge of souls, both by the manner and matter\nof their preaching, applied themselves wholly to the winning of the\npeople to a liking of their doctrines and good opinion of their persons.\n\nAnd first, for the manner of their preaching; they so framed their\ncountenance and gesture at their entrance into the pulpit, and their\npronunciation both in their prayer and sermon, and used the Scripture\nphrase (whether understood by the people or not), as that no tragedian\nin the world could have acted the part of a right godly man better than\nthese did; insomuch that a man unacquainted with such art, could never\nsuspect any ambitious plot in them to raise sedition against the state,\nas they then had designed; or doubt that the vehemence of their voice\n(for the same words with the usual pronunciation had been of little\nforce) and forcedness of their gesture and looks, could arise from\nanything else but zeal to the service of God. And by this art they came\ninto such credit, that numbers of men used to go forth of their own\nparishes and towns on working-days, leaving their calling, and on\nSundays leaving their own churches, to hear them preach in other places,\nand to despise their own and all other preachers that acted not so well\nas they. And as for those ministers that did not usually preach, but\ninstead of sermons did read to the people such homilies as the Church\nhad appointed, they esteemed and called them dumb dogs.\n\nSecondly, for the matter of their sermons, because the anger of the\npeople in the late Roman usurpation was then fresh, they saw there could\nbe nothing more gracious with them than to preach against such other\npoints of the Romish religion as the bishops had not yet condemned; that\nso receding further from popery than they did, they might with glory to\nthemselves leave a suspicion on the bishops, as men not yet well purged\nfrom idolatry.\n\nThirdly, before their sermons, their prayer was or seemed to be\n_extempore_, which they pretended to be dictated by the spirit of God\nwithin them, and many of the people believed or seemed to believe it.\nFor any man might see, that had judgment, that they did not take care\nbeforehand what they should say in their prayers. And from hence came a\ndislike of the common-prayer-book, which is a set form, premeditated,\nthat men might see to what they were to say _amen_.\n\nFourthly, they did never in their sermons, or but lightly, inveigh\nagainst the lucrative vices of men of trade or handicraft; such as are\nfeigning, lying, cozening, hypocrisy, or other uncharitableness, except\nwant of charity to their pastors and to the faithful: which was a great\nease to the generality of citizens and the inhabitants of market-towns,\nand no little profit to themselves.\n\nFifthly, by preaching up an opinion that men were to be assured of their\nsalvation by the testimony of their own private spirit, meaning the Holy\nGhost dwelling within them. And from this opinion the people that found\nin themselves a sufficient hatred towards the Papists, and an ability to\nrepeat the sermons of these men at their coming home, made no doubt but\nthat they had all that was necessary, how fraudulently and spitefully\nsoever they behaved themselves to their neighbours that were not\nreckoned amongst the saints, and sometimes to those also.\n\nSixthly, they did, indeed, with great earnestness and severity, inveigh\noften against two sins, carnal lusts and vain swearing; which, without\nquestion, was very well done. But the common people were thereby\ninclined to believe, that nothing else was sin, but that which was\nforbidden in the third and seventh commandments (for few men do\nunderstand by the name of lust any other concupiscence, than that which\nis forbidden in that seventh commandment; for men are not ordinarily\nsaid to lust after another man\u2019s cattle, or other goods or possessions):\nand therefore never made much scruple of the acts of fraud and malice,\nbut endeavoured to keep themselves from uncleanness only, or at least\nfrom the scandal of it. And, whereas they did, both in their sermons and\nwritings, maintain and inculcate, that the very first motions of the\nmind, that is to say, the delight men and women took in the sight of one\nanother\u2019s form, though they checked the proceeding thereof so that it\nnever grew up to be a design, was nevertheless a sin, they brought young\nmen into desperation and to think themselves damned, because they could\nnot (which no man can, and is contrary to the constitution of nature)\nbehold a delightful object without delight. And by this means they\nbecame confessors to such as were thus troubled in conscience, and were\nobeyed by them as their spiritual doctors in all cases of conscience.\n\n_B._ Yet divers of them did preach frequently against oppression.\n\n_A._ It is true, I had forgot that; but it was before such as were free\nenough from it; I mean the common people, who would easily believe\nthemselves oppressed, but never oppressors. And therefore you may reckon\nthis among their artifices, to make the people believe they were\noppressed by the King, or perhaps by the bishops, or both; and incline\nthe meaner sort to their party afterwards, when there should be\noccasion. But this was but sparingly done in the time of Queen\nElizabeth, whose fear and jealousy they were afraid of. Nor had they as\nyet any great power in the Parliament-house, whereby to call in question\nher prerogative by petitions of right and other devices, as they did\nafterwards, when democratical gentlemen had received them into their\ncounsels for the design of changing the government from monarchical to\npopular, which they called liberty.\n\n_B._ Who would think that such horrible designs as these could so easily\nand so long remain covered with the cloak of godliness? For that they\nwere most impious hypocrites, is manifest enough by the war these\nproceedings ended in, and by the impious acts in that war committed. But\nwhen began first to appear in Parliament the attempt of popular\ngovernment, and by whom?\n\n_A._ As to the time of attempting the change of government from\nmonarchical to democratical, we must distinguish. They did not challenge\nthe sovereignty in plain terms, and by that name, till they had slain\nthe King; nor the rights thereof altogether by particular heads, till\nthe King was driven from London by tumults raised in that city against\nhim, and retired for the security of his person to York; where he had\nnot been many days, when they sent unto him nineteen propositions,\nwhereof above a dozen were demands of several powers, essential parts of\nthe power sovereign. But before that time they had demanded some of them\nin a petition which they called a Petition of Right; which nevertheless\nthe King had granted them in a former Parliament, though he deprived\nhimself thereby, not only of the power to levy money without their\nconsent, but also of his ordinary revenue by custom of tonnage and\npoundage, and of the liberty to put into custody such men as he thought\nlikely to disturb the peace and raise sedition in the kingdom. As for\nthe men that did this, it is enough to say they were members of the last\nParliament, and of some other Parliaments in the beginning of King\nCharles and the end of King James his reign; to name them all is not\nnecessary, further than the story shall require. Most of them were\nmembers of the House of Commons; some few also, of the Lords; but all,\nsuch as had a great opinion of their sufficiency in politics, which they\nthought was not sufficiently taken notice of by the King.\n\n_B._ How could the Parliament, when the King had a great navy, and a\ngreat number of trained soldiers, and all the magazines of ammunition in\nhis power, be able to begin the war?\n\n_A._ The King had these things indeed in his right; but that signifies\nlittle, when they that had the custody of the navy and magazines, and\nwith them all the trained soldiers, and in a manner all his subjects,\nwere, by the preaching of Presbyterian ministers, and the seditious\nwhisperings of false and ignorant politicians, made his enemies; and\nwhen the King could have no money but what the Parliament should give\nhim, which you may be sure should not be enough to maintain his regal\npower, which they intended to take from him. And yet, I think, they\nnever would have ventured into the field, but for that unlucky business\nof imposing upon the Scots, who were all Presbyterians, our book of\nCommon-prayer. For I believe the English would never have taken well\nthat the Parliament should make war upon the King, upon any provocation,\nunless it were in their own defence, in case the King should first make\nwar upon them; and, therefore, it behoved them to provoke the King, that\nhe might do something that might look like hostility. It happened in the\nyear 1637, that the King, by the advice, as it is thought, of the\nArchbishop of Canterbury, sent down a book of Common-prayer into\nScotland, not differing in substance from ours, nor much in words\nbesides the putting of the word Presbyter for that of Minister,\ncommanding it to be used, for conformity to this kingdom, by the\nministers there, for an ordinary form of Divine service. This being read\nin the church at Edinburgh, caused such a tumult there, that he that\nread it had much ado to escape with his life; and gave occasion to the\ngreatest part of the nobility and others to enter, by their own\nauthority, into a covenant amongst themselves, which impudently they\ncalled a covenant with God, to put down episcopacy, without consulting\nwith the King: which they presently did, animated thereto by their own\nconfidence, or by assurance from some of the democratical Englishmen\nthat in former Parliaments had been the greatest opposers of the King\u2019s\ninterest, that the King would not be able to raise an army to chastise\nthem without calling a Parliament, which would be sure to favour them.\nFor the thing which those democraticals chiefly then aimed at, was to\nforce the King to call a Parliament, which he had not done for ten years\nbefore, as having found no help, but hindrance to his designs in the\nParliaments he had formerly called. Howsoever, contrary to their\nexpectation, by the help of his better-affected subjects of the nobility\nand gentry, he made a shift to raise a sufficient army to have reduced\nthe Scots to their former obedience, if it had proceeded to battle. And\nwith this army he marched himself into Scotland; where the Scotch army\nwas also brought into the field against him, as if they meant to fight.\nBut then the Scotch sent to the King for leave to treat by commissioners\non both sides; and the King, willing to avoid the destruction of his own\nsubjects, condescended to it. The issue was peace; and the King\nthereupon went to Edinburgh, and passed an Act of Parliament there to\ntheir satisfaction.\n\n_B._ Did he not then confirm episcopacy?\n\n_A._ No, but yielded to the abolishing of it: but by this means the\nEnglish were crossed in their hope of a Parliament. But the said\ndemocraticals, formerly opposers of the King\u2019s interest, ceased not to\nendeavour still to put the two nations into a war; to the end the King\nmight buy the Parliament\u2019s help at no less a price than sovereignty\nitself.\n\n_B._ But what was the cause that the gentry and nobility of Scotland\nwere so averse from the episcopacy? For I can hardly believe that their\nconsciences were extraordinarily tender, nor that they were so very\ngreat divines, as to know what was the true Church-discipline\nestablished by our Saviour and his apostles; nor yet so much in love\nwith their ministers, as to be over-ruled by them in the government\neither ecclesiastical or civil. For in their lives they were just as\nother men are, pursuers of their own interests and preferments, wherein\nthey were not more opposed by the bishops than by their Presbyterian\nministers.\n\n_A._ Truly I do not know; I cannot enter into other men\u2019s thoughts,\nfarther than I am led by the consideration of human nature in general.\nBut upon this consideration I see first, that men of ancient wealth and\nnobility are not apt to brook, that poor scholars should (as they must,\nwhen they are made bishops) be their fellows. Secondly, that from the\nemulation of glory between the nations, they might be willing to see\nthis nation afflicted by civil war, and might hope, by aiding the rebels\nhere, to acquire some power over the English, at least so far as to\nestablish here the Presbyterian discipline; which was also one of the\npoints they afterwards openly demanded. Lastly, they might hope for, in\nthe war, some great sum of money, as a reward of their assistance,\nbesides great booty, which they afterwards obtained. But whatsoever was\nthe cause of their hatred to bishops, the pulling of them down was not\nall they aimed at: if it had, now that episcopacy was abolished by act\nof Parliament, they would have rested satisfied, which they did not. For\nafter the King was returned to London, the English Presbyterians and\ndemocraticals, by whose favour they had put down bishops in Scotland,\nthought it reason to have the assistance of the Scotch for the pulling\ndown of bishops in England. And in order thereunto, they might perhaps\ndeal with the Scots secretly, to rest unsatisfied with that\npacification, which they were before contented with. Howsoever it was,\nnot long after the King was returned to London, they sent up to some of\ntheir friends at court a certain paper, containing, as they pretended,\nthe articles of the said pacification; a false and scandalous paper,\nwhich was by the King\u2019s command burnt, as I have heard, publicly. And so\nboth parties returned to the same condition they were in, when the King\nwent down with his army.\n\n_B._ And so there was a great deal of money cast away to no purpose. But\nyou have not told me who was general of that army.\n\n_A._ I told you the King was there in person. He that commanded under\nhim was the Earl of Arundel, a man that wanted not either valour or\njudgment. But to proceed to battle or to treaty, was not in his power,\nbut in the King\u2019s.\n\n_B._ He was a man of a most noble and loyal family, and whose ancestors\nhad formerly given a great overthrow to the Scots, in their own country;\nand in all likelihood he might have given them the like now, if they had\nfought.\n\n_A._ He might indeed: but it had been but a kind of superstition to have\nmade him general upon that account, though many generals heretofore have\nbeen chosen for the good luck of their ancestors in like occasions. In\nthe long war between Athens and Sparta, a general of the Athenians by\nsea won many victories against the Spartans; for which cause, after his\ndeath, they chose his son for general with ill success. The Romans that\nconquered Carthage by the valour and conduct of Scipio, when they were\nto make war again in Afric against C\u00e6sar, chose another Scipio for\ngeneral; a man valiant and wise enough, but he perished in the\nemployment. And to come home to our own nation, the Earl of Essex made a\nfortunate expedition to Cadiz; but his son, sent afterwards to the same\nplace, could do nothing. It is but a foolish superstition, to hope that\nGod has entailed success in war upon a name or family.\n\n_B._ After the pacification broken, what succeeded next?\n\n_A._ The King sent Duke Hamilton with commission and instructions into\nScotland, to call a Parliament there, and to use all the means he could\notherwise; but all was to no purpose. For the Scots were now resolved to\nraise an army and to enter into England, to deliver, as they pretended,\ntheir grievances to his majesty in a petition; because the King, they\nsaid, being in the hands of evil councillors, they could not otherwise\nobtain their right. But the truth is, they were animated to it by the\ndemocratical and Presbyterian English, with a promise of reward and hope\nof plunder. Some have said, that Duke Hamilton also did rather encourage\nthem to, than deter them from, the expedition; as hoping by the disorder\nof the two kingdoms, to bring to pass that which he had formerly been\naccused to endeavour, to make himself King of Scotland. But I take this\nto have been a very uncharitable censure, upon so little ground to judge\nso hardly of a man, that afterwards lost his life in seeking to procure\nthe liberty of the King his master. This resolution of the Scots to\nenter England being known, the King wanting money to raise an army\nagainst them, was now, as his enemies here wished, constrained to call a\nparliament, to meet at Westminster the 13th day of April 1640.\n\n_B._ Methinks a Parliament of England, if upon any occasion, should\nfurnish the King with money now in war against the Scots, out of an\ninveterate disaffection to that nation that had always anciently taken\npart with their enemies the French, and which always esteemed the glory\nof England for an abatement of their own.\n\n_A._ It is indeed commonly seen that neighbour nations envy one\nanother\u2019s honour, and that the less potent bears the greater malice; but\nthat hinders them not from agreeing in those things which their common\nambition leads them to. And therefore the King found not the more, but\nthe less help from this Parliament: and most of the members thereof, in\ntheir ordinary discourses, seemed to wonder why the King should make a\nwar upon Scotland; and in that Parliament sometimes called them _their\nbrethren the Scots_. But instead of taking the King\u2019s business, which\nwas the raising of money, into their consideration, they fell upon the\nredressing of grievances, and especially such ways of levying money as\nin the late intermission of Parliaments the King had been forced to use;\nsuch as were ship-money, for knighthood, and such other vails (as one\nmay call them) of the regal office, which lawyers had found justifiable\nby the ancient records of the kingdom. Besides, they fell upon the\nactions of divers ministers of state, though done by the King\u2019s own\ncommand and warrant. Insomuch, that before they were to come to the\nbusiness for which they were called, the money which was necessary for\nthis war (if they had given any, as they never meant to do) had come too\nlate. It is true, there was mention of a sum of money to be given the\nKing, by way of bargain, for the relinquishing of his right to\nship-money, and some other of his prerogatives, but so seldom, and\nwithout determining any sum, that it was in vain for the King to hope\nfor any success; and therefore upon the 5th of May following he\ndissolved it.\n\n_B._ Where then had the King money to raise and pay his army?\n\n_A._ He was forced the second time to make use of the nobility and\ngentry, who contributed some more, some less, according to the greatness\nof their estates; but amongst them all they made up a very sufficient\narmy.\n\n_B._ It seems then that the same men, that crossed his business in the\nParliament, now out of Parliament advanced it all they could. What was\nthe reason of that?\n\n_A._ The greatest part of the Lords in Parliament, and of the gentry\nthroughout England, were more affected to monarchy than to a popular\ngovernment, but so as not to endure to hear of the King\u2019s absolute\npower; which made them in time of Parliament easily to condescend to\nabridge it, and bring the government to a mixed monarchy, as they called\nit; wherein the absolute sovereignty should be divided between the King,\nthe House of Lords, and the House of Commons.\n\n_B._ But how, if they cannot agree?\n\n_A._ I think they never thought of that; but I am sure they never meant\nthe sovereignty should be wholly either in one or both houses. Besides,\nthey were loath to desert the King, when he was invaded by foreigners;\nfor the Scotch were esteemed by them as a foreign nation.\n\n_B._ It is strange to me, that England and Scotland being but one\nisland, and their language almost the same, and being governed by one\nKing, should be thought foreigners to one another. The Romans were\nmasters of many nations, and to oblige them the more to obey the edicts\nand laws sent unto them from the city of Rome, they thought fit to make\nthem all Romans; and out of divers nations, as Spain, Germany, Italy,\nand France, to advance some, that they thought worthy, even to be\nsenators of Rome, and to give every one of the common people the\nprivileges of the city of Rome, by which they were protected from the\ncontumelies of other nations where they resided. Why were not the Scotch\nand English in like manner united into one people?\n\n_A._ King James at his first coming to the crown of England did\nendeavour it, but could not prevail. But for all that, I believe the\nScotch have now as many privileges in England as any nation had in Rome,\nof those which were so as you say made Romans. For they are all\nnaturalized, and have right to buy land in England to themselves and\ntheir heirs.\n\n_B._ It is true of them, that were born in Scotland after the time that\nKing James was in possession of the kingdom of England.\n\n_A._ There be very few now that were born before. But why have they a\nbetter right that were born after, than they that were born before?\n\n_B._ Because they were born subjects to the King of England, and the\nrest not.\n\n_A._ Were not the rest born subjects to King James? And was not he King\nof England?\n\n_B._ Yes, but not then.\n\n_A._ I understand not the subtilty of that distinction. But upon what\nlaw is that distinction grounded? Is there any statute to that purpose?\n\n_B._ I cannot tell; I think not; but it is grounded upon equity.\n\n_A._ I see little equity in this; that those nations that are bound to\nequal obedience to the same King, should not have equal privileges. And\nnow seeing there be so very few born before King James\u2019s coming in, what\ngreater privilege had those ingrafted Romans by their naturalization in\nthe state of Rome, or in the state of England the English themselves,\nmore than the Scotch?\n\n_B._ Those Romans, when any of them were in Rome, had their voice in the\nmaking of laws.\n\n_A._ And the Scotch have their Parliaments, wherein their assent is\nrequired to the laws there made, which is as good. Have not many of the\nprovinces of France their several parliaments and several constitutions?\nAnd yet they are all equally natural subjects of the King of France. And\ntherefore for my part I think they were mistaken, both English and\nScotch, in calling one another foreigners. Howsoever that be, the King\nhad a very sufficient army, wherewith he marched towards Scotland; and\nby the time he was come to York, the Scotch army was drawn up to the\nfrontiers and ready to march into England; which also they presently\ndid; giving out all the way, that their march should be without damage\nto the country, and that their errand was only to deliver a petition to\nthe King, for the redress of many pretended injuries they had received\nfrom such of the court, whose counsel the King most followed. So they\npassed through Northumberland quietly, till they came to a ford in the\nriver of Tyne, a little above Newcastle, where they found some little\nopposition from a party of the King\u2019s army sent thither to stop them,\nwhom the Scotch easily mastered; and as soon as they were over, seized\nupon Newcastle, and coming further on, upon the city of Durham; and sent\nto the King to desire a treaty, which was granted; and the commissioners\non both sides met at Ripon. The conclusion was, that all should be\nreferred to the Parliament, which the King should call to meet at\nWestminster on the 3rd of November following, being in the same year\n1640; and thereupon the King returned to London.\n\n_B._ So the armies were disbanded?\n\n_A._ No; the Scotch army was to be defrayed by the counties of\nNorthumberland and Durham, and the King was to pay his own, till the\ndisbanding of both should be agreed upon in Parliament.\n\n_B._ So in effect both the armies were maintained at the King\u2019s charge,\nand the whole controversy to be decided by a Parliament almost wholly\nPresbyterian, and as partial to the Scotch as themselves could have\nwished.\n\n_A._ And yet for all this they durst not presently make war upon the\nKing: there was so much yet left of reverence to him in the hearts of\nthe people, as to have made them odious, if they had declared what they\nintended. They must have some colour or other to make it believed that\nthe King made war first upon the Parliament. And besides, they had not\nyet sufficiently disgraced him in sermons and pamphlets, nor removed\nfrom about him those they thought could best counsel him. Therefore they\nresolved to proceed with him like skilful hunters; first to single him\nout, by men disposed in all parts to drive him into the open field; and\nthen in case he should but seem to turn head, to call that a making of\nwar against the Parliament.\n\nAnd first they called in question such as had either preached or written\nin defence of any of those rights, which, belonging to the Crown, they\nmeant to usurp, and take from the King to themselves: whereupon some few\npreachers and writers were imprisoned, or forced to fly. The King not\nprotecting these, they proceeded to call in question some of the King\u2019s\nown actions in his ministers, whereof they imprisoned some, and some\nwent beyond sea. And whereas certain persons, having endeavoured by\nbooks and sermons to raise sedition, and committed other crimes of high\nnature, had therefore been censured by the King\u2019s council in the\nStar-chamber, and imprisoned; the Parliament by their own authority, to\ntry, it seems, how the King and the people would take it, (for their\npersons were inconsiderable), ordered their setting at liberty; which\nwas accordingly done, with great applause of the people, that flocked\nabout them in London, in manner of a triumph. This being done without\nresistance, the King\u2019s right to ship-money\u2014\n\n_B._ Ship-money! what\u2019s that?\n\n_A._ The Kings of England, for the defence of the sea, had power to tax\nall the counties of England, whether they were maritime or not, for the\nbuilding and furnishing of ships; which tax the King had then lately\nfound cause to impose, and the Parliament exclaimed against it as an\noppression. And by one of their members that had been taxed but 20_s._\n(mark the oppression; a Parliament-man of 500_l._ a year, land-taxed at\n20_s._!) they were forced to bring it to a trial at law, he refusing\npayment; and he was cast. Again, when all the judges of Westminster were\ndemanded their opinions concerning the legality of it, of twelve that\nthere are, it was judged legal by ten; for which though they were not\npunished, yet they were affrighted by the Parliament.\n\n_B._ What did the Parliament mean, when they did exclaim against it as\nillegal? Did they mean it was against statute-law, or against the\njudgments of lawyers given heretofore, which are commonly called\nreports; or did they mean it was against equity, which I take to be the\nsame with the law of nature?\n\n_A._ It is a hard matter, or rather impossible, to know what other men\nmean, especially if they be crafty: but sure I am, equity was not their\nground for this pretence of immunity from contributing to the King but\nat their own pleasure. For when they have laid the burthen of defending\nthe whole kingdom, and governing it, upon any person whatsoever, there\nis very little equity he should depend on others for the means of\nperforming it; or if he do, they are his Sovereign, not he theirs. And\nas for the common law contained in reports, they have no force but what\nthe King gives them. Besides, it were more unreasonable, that a corrupt\nor foolish judge\u2019s unjust sentence should by any time, how long soever,\nobtain the authority and force of a law. But amongst the statute laws\nthere is one, called Magna Charta, or the Great Charter of the liberties\nof Englishmen, in which there is one article, wherein a King heretofore\nhath granted that no man shall be distrained, that is, have his goods\ntaken from him, otherwise than by the law of the land.\n\n_B._ Is not that a sufficient ground for their purpose?\n\n_A._ No: that leaves us in the same doubt, which you think it clears.\nFor where was that law of the land then? Did they mean another Magna\nCharta, that was made by some King more ancient yet? No: that statute\nwas made, not to exempt any man from payments to the public, but for\nsecuring every man from such as abused the King\u2019s power by\nsurreptitiously obtaining the King\u2019s warrants, to the oppressing of\nthose against whom he had any suit in law. But it was conducing to the\nends of some rebellious spirits in this Parliament, to have it\ninterpreted in the wrong sense, and suitable enough to the understanding\nof the rest, or most part of them, to let it pass.\n\n_B._ You make the members of that Parliament very simple men; and yet\nthe people chose them for the wisest of the land.\n\n_A._ If craft be wisdom, they were wise enough. But wise, as I define\nit, is he that knows how to bring his business to pass, without the\nassistance of knavery and ignoble shifts, by the sole strength of his\ngood contrivance. A fool may win from a better gamester by the advantage\nof false dice, and packing of cards.\n\n_B._ According to your definition, there be few wise men now-a-days.\nSuch wisdom is a kind of gallantry, that few are brought up to, and most\nthink folly. Fine cloaths, great feathers, civility towards men that\nwill not swallow injuries, and injury towards them that will, is the\npresent gallantry. But when the Parliament afterwards, having gotten the\npower into their hands, levied money for their own use; what said the\npeople to that?\n\n_A._ What else, but that it was legal and to be paid, as being imposed\nby consent of Parliaments.\n\n_B._ I have heard often that they ought to pay what was imposed by\nconsent of Parliaments to the use of the King, but to their own use\nnever before. I see by this, it is easier to gull the multitude, than\nany one man amongst them. For what one man, that has not his natural\njudgment depraved by accident, could be so easily cozened in a matter\nthat concerns his purse, had he not been passionately carried away by\nthe rest to change of government, or rather to a liberty of every one to\ngovern himself?\n\n_A._ Judge then, what kind of men such a multitude of ignorant people\nwere like to elect for their burgesses and knights of shires.\n\n_B._ I can make no other judgment, but that they who were then elected,\nwere just such as had been elected for former Parliaments, and as are\nlike to be elected for Parliaments to come. For the common people have\nbeen, and always will be, ignorant of their duty to the public, as never\nmeditating any thing but their particular interest; in other things\nfollowing their immediate leaders; which are either the preachers, or\nthe most potent of the gentlemen that dwell amongst them: as common\nsoldiers for the most part follow their immediate captains, if they like\nthem. If you think the late miseries have made them wiser, that will\nquickly be forgot, and then we shall be no wiser than we were.\n\n_A._ Why may not men be taught their duty, that is, the science of just\nand unjust, as divers other sciences have been taught, from true\nprinciples and evident demonstration; and much more easily than any of\nthose preachers and democratical gentlemen could teach rebellion and\ntreason?\n\n_B._ But who can teach what none have learned? Or, if any man hath been\nso singular, as to have studied the science of justice and equity; how\ncan he teach it safely, when it is against the interest of those that\nare in possession of the power to hurt him?\n\n_A._ The rules of just and unjust sufficiently demonstrated, and from\nprinciples evident to the meanest capacity, have not been wanting; and\nnotwithstanding the obscurity of their author, have shined, not only in\nthis, but also in foreign countries, to men of good education. But they\nare few, in respect of the rest of the men, whereof many cannot read;\nmany, though they can, have no leisure; and of them that have leisure,\nthe greatest part have their minds wholly employed and taken up by their\nprivate businesses or pleasures. So that it is impossible that the\nmultitude should ever learn their duty, but from the pulpit and upon\nholidays; but then, and from thence, it is, that they learned their\ndisobedience. And, therefore, the light of that doctrine has been\nhitherto covered and kept under here by a cloud of adversaries, which no\nprivate man\u2019s reputation can break through, without the authority of the\nUniversities. But out of the Universities, came all those preachers that\ntaught the contrary. The Universities have been to this nation, as the\nwooden horse was to the Trojans.\n\n_B._ Can you tell me why and when the Universities here, and in other\nplaces, first began?\n\n_A._ It seems, for the time, they began in the reign of the Emperor\nCharles the Great. Before which time, I doubt not, but that there were\nmany grammar schools for the Latin tongue, which was the natural\nlanguage of the Roman Church; but for Universities, that is to say,\nschools for the sciences in general, and especially for divinity, it is\nmanifest that the institution of them was recommended by the Pope\u2019s\nletter to the Emperor Charles the Great, and recommended further by a\nCouncil held in his time, I think, at Chalons-sur-Saone; and not long\nafter was erected an University at Paris, and the college called\nUniversity College at Oxford. And so by degrees several bishops,\nnoblemen, and rich men, and some Kings and Queens, contributing\nthereunto, the Universities obtained at last their present splendour.\n\n_B._ But what was the Pope\u2019s design in it?\n\n_A._ What other design was he like to have, but what you heard before,\nthe advancement of his own authority in the countries where the\nUniversities were erected? There they learned to dispute for him, and\nwith unintelligible distinctions to blind men\u2019s eyes, whilst they\nencroached upon the rights of kings. And it was an evident argument of\nthat design, that they fell in hand with the work so quickly. For the\nfirst Rector of the University of Paris, as I have read somewhere, was\nPeter Lombard, who first brought in them the learning called\nSchool-divinity; and was seconded by John Scot of Duns, who lived in, or\nnear the same time; whom any ingenious reader, not knowing what was the\ndesign, would judge to have been two of the most egregious blockheads in\nthe world, so obscure and senseless are their writings. And from these\nthe schoolmen that succeeded, learnt the trick of imposing what they\nlist upon their readers, and declining the force of true reason by\nverbal forks; I mean, distinctions that signify nothing, but serve only\nto astonish the multitude of ignorant men. As for the understanding\nreaders, they were so few, that these new sublime doctors cared not what\nthey thought. These schoolmen were to make good all the articles of\nfaith, which the Popes from time to time should command to be believed:\namongst which, there were very many inconsistent with the rights of\nkings, and other civil sovereigns, as asserting to the Pope all\nauthority whatsoever they should declare to be necessary _in ordine ad\nspiritualia_, that is to say, in order to religion.\n\nFrom the Universities also it was, that all preachers proceeded, and\nwere poured out into city and country, to terrify the people into an\nabsolute obedience to the Pope\u2019s canons and commands, which, for fear of\nweakening kings and princes too much, they durst not yet call laws.\n\nFrom the Universities it was, that the philosophy of Aristotle was made\nan ingredient in religion, as serving for a salve to a great many absurd\narticles, concerning the nature of Christ\u2019s body, and the estate of\nangels and saints in heaven; which articles they thought fit to have\nbelieved, because they bring, some of them profit, and others reverence\nto the clergy, even to the meanest of them. For when they shall have\nmade the people believe that the meanest of them can make the body of\nChrist; who is there that will not both show them reverence, and be\nliberal to them or to the Church, especially in the time of their\nsickness, when they think they make and bring unto them their Saviour?\n\n_B._ But, what advantage to them, in these impostures, was the doctrine\nof Aristotle?\n\n_A._ They have made more use of his obscurity than of his doctrine. For\nnone of the ancient philosophers' writings are comparable to those of\nAristotle, for their aptness to puzzle and entangle men with words, and\nto breed disputation, which must at last be ended in the determination\nof the Church of Rome. And yet in the doctrine of Aristotle, they made\nuse of many points; as, first, the doctrine of separated essences.\n\n_B._ What are separated essences?\n\n_A._ Separated beings.\n\n_B._ Separated from what?\n\n_A._ From every thing that is.\n\n_B._ I cannot understand the being of any thing, which I understand not\nto be. But what can they make of that?\n\n_A._ Very much, in questions concerning the nature of God, and\nconcerning the estate of man\u2019s soul after death, in heaven, hell, and\npurgatory; by which you and every man know, how great obedience, and how\nmuch money they gain from the common people. Whereas Aristotle holdeth\nthe soul of man to be the first giver of motion to the body, and\nconsequently to itself; they make use of that in the doctrine of free\nwill. What, and how they gain by that, I will not say. He holdeth forth,\nthat there be many things that come to pass in this world from no\nnecessity of causes, but mere contingency, casuality, and fortune.\n\n_B._ Methinks, in this they make God stand idle, and to be a mere\nspectator of the games of fortune; for what God is the cause of, must\nneeds come to pass, and, in my opinion, nothing else. But, because there\nmust be some ground for the justice of the eternal torment of the\ndamned; perhaps it is this, that men\u2019s wills and propensions are not,\nthey think, in the hands of God, but of themselves; and in this also I\nsee somewhat conducing to the authority of the Church.\n\n_A._ This is not much; nor was Aristotle of such credit with them, but\nthat when his opinion was against theirs, they could slight him.\nWhatsoever he says is impossible in nature, they can prove well enough\nto be possible, from the Almighty power of God, who can make many bodies\nto be in one and the self-same place, and one body to be in many places\nat the same time, if the doctrine of transubstantiation require it,\nthough Aristotle deny it. I like not the design of drawing religion into\nan art, whereas it ought to be a law; and though not the same in all\ncountries, yet in every country indisputable; nor that they teach it\nnot, as arts ought to be taught, by shewing first the meaning of their\nterms, and then deriving from them the truth they would have us believe:\nnor that their terms are for the most part unintelligible; though, to\nmake it seem rather want of learning in the reader, than want of fair\ndealing in themselves, they are, for the most part, Latin and Greek\nwords, wryed a little at the point, towards the native language of the\nseveral countries where they are used. But that which is most\nintolerable is, that all clerks are forced to make as if they believed\nthem, if they mean to have any Church preferment, the keys whereof are\nin the Pope\u2019s hands; and the common people, whatsoever they believe of\nthose subtile doctrines, are never esteemed better sons of the Church\nfor their learning. There is but one way there to salvation; that is,\nextraordinary devotion and liberality to the Church, and readiness for\nthe Church\u2019s sake, if it be required, to fight against their natural and\nlawful sovereigns.\n\n_B._ I see what use they make of Aristotle\u2019s logic, physics, and\nmetaphysics; but I see not yet how his politics can serve their turn.\n\n_A._ Nor I. It has, I think, done them no good, though it has done us\nhere much hurt by accident. For men, grown weary at last of the\ninsolence of the priests, and examining the truth of these doctrines\nthat were put upon them, began to search the sense of the Scriptures, as\nthey are in the learned languages; and consequently studying Greek and\nLatin, became acquainted with the democratical principles of Aristotle\nand Cicero, and from the love of their eloquence fell in love with their\npolitics, and that more and more, till it grew into the rebellion we now\ntalk of, without any other advantage to the Roman Church but that it was\na weakening to us, whom, since we broke out of their net in the time of\nHenry VIII, they have continually endeavoured to recover.\n\n_B._ What have they gotten by the teaching of Aristotle\u2019s ethics?\n\n_A._ It is some advantage to them, that neither the morals of Aristotle,\nnor of any other, have done them any harm, nor us any good. Their\ndoctrines have caused a great deal of dispute concerning virtue and\nvice, but no knowledge of what they are, nor any method of obtaining\nvirtue nor of avoiding vice. The end of moral philosophy is, to teach\nmen of all sorts their duty, both to the public and to one another. They\nestimate virtue, partly by a mediocrity of the passions of men, and\npartly by that that they are praised. Whereas, it is not the much or\nlittle praise that makes an action virtuous, but the cause; nor much or\nlittle blame that makes an action vicious, but its being unconformable\nto the laws in such men as are subject to the law, or its being\nunconformable to equity or charity in all men whatsoever.\n\n_B._ It seems you make a difference between the ethics of subjects, and\nthe ethics of sovereigns.\n\n_A._ So I do. The virtue of a subject is comprehended wholly in\nobedience to the laws of the commonwealth. To obey the laws, is justice\nand equity, which is the law of nature, and, consequently, is civil law\nin all nations of the world; and nothing is injustice or iniquity,\notherwise, than it is against the law. Likewise, to obey the laws, is\nthe prudence of a subject; for without such obedience the commonwealth\n(which is every subject\u2019s safety and protection) cannot subsist. And\nthough it be prudence also in private men, justly and moderately to\nenrich themselves, yet craftily to withhold from the public or defraud\nit of such part of their wealth, as is by law required, is no sign of\nprudence, but of want of knowledge of what is necessary for their own\ndefence.\n\nThe virtues of sovereigns are such as tend to the maintenance of peace\nat home, and to the resistance of foreign enemies. Fortitude is a royal\nvirtue; and though it be necessary in such private men as shall be\nsoldiers, yet, for other men, the less they dare, the better it is both\nfor the commonwealth and for themselves. Frugality (though perhaps you\nwill think it strange) is also a royal virtue: for it increases the\npublic stock, which cannot be too great for the public use, nor any man\ntoo sparing of what he has in trust for the good of others. Liberality\nalso is a royal virtue: for the commonwealth cannot be well served\nwithout extraordinary diligence and service of ministers, and great\nfidelity to their Sovereign; who ought therefore to be encouraged, and\nespecially those that do him service in the wars. In sum, all actions\nand habits are to be esteemed good or evil by their causes and\nusefulness in reference to the commonwealth, and not by their\nmediocrity, nor by their being commended. For several men praise several\ncustoms, and that which is virtue with one, is blamed by others; and,\ncontrarily, what one calls vice, another calls virtue, as their present\naffections lead them.\n\n_B._ Methinks you should have placed among the virtues that, which, in\nmy opinion, is the greatest of all virtues, religion.\n\n_A._ So I have, though, it seems, you did not observe it. But whither do\nwe digress from the way we were in?\n\n_B._ I think you have not digressed at all; for I suppose, your purpose\nwas, to acquaint me with the history, not so much of those actions that\npassed in the time of the late troubles, as of their causes, and of the\ncouncils and artifice by which they were brought to pass. There be\ndivers men that have written the history, out of whom I might have\nlearned what they did, and somewhat also of the contrivance; but I find\nlittle in them of what I would ask. Therefore, since you were pleased to\nenter into this discourse at my request, be pleased also to inform me\nafter my own method; and for the danger of confusion that may arise from\nthat, I will take care to bring you back to the place from whence I drew\nyou; for I well remember where it was.\n\n_A._ Well then, to your question concerning religion, inasmuch as I told\nyou, that all virtue is comprehended in obedience to the laws of the\ncommonwealth, whereof religion is one, I have placed religion amongst\nthe virtues.\n\n_B._ Is religion then the law of a commonwealth?\n\n_A._ There is no nation in the world, whose religion is not established,\nand receives not its authority from the laws of that nation. It is true,\nthat the law of God receives no evidence from the laws of men. But\nbecause men can never by their own wisdom come to the knowledge of what\nGod hath spoken and commanded to be observed, nor be obliged to obey the\nlaws whose author they know not, they are to acquiesce in some human\nauthority or other. So that the question will be, whether a man ought in\nmatter of religion, that is to say, when there is question of his duty\nto God and the King, to rely upon the preaching of his fellow-subjects\nor of a stranger, or upon the voice of the law?\n\n_B._ There is no great difficulty in that point. For there are none that\npreach here or anywhere else, or at least ought to preach, but such as\nhave authority so to do from him or them that have the sovereign power.\nSo that if the King gives us leave, you or I may as lawfully preach as\nthey that do; and I believe we should perform that office a great deal\nbetter, than they that preached us into the rebellion.\n\n_A._ The Church morals are in many points very different from these,\nthat I have here set down, for the doctrine of virtue and vice; and yet\nwithout any conformity with that of Aristotle. For in the Church of\nRome, the principal virtues are, to obey their doctrine, though it be\ntreason, and that is to be religious; to be beneficial to the clergy,\nthat is their piety and liberality; and to believe upon their word that\nwhich a man knows in his conscience to be false, which is the faith they\nrequire. I could name a great many more such points of their morals, but\nthat I know you know them already, being so well versed in the cases of\nconscience written by their schoolmen, who measure the goodness and\nwickedness of all actions, by their congruity with the doctrine of the\nRoman clergy.\n\n_B._ But what is the moral philosophy of the Protestant clergy in\nEngland?\n\n_A._ So much as they show of it in their life and conversation, is for\nthe most part very good, and of very good example; much better than\ntheir writings.\n\n_B._ It happens many times that men live honestly for fear, who, if they\nhad power, would live according to their own opinions; that is, if their\nopinions be not right, unrighteously.\n\n_A._ Do the clergy in England pretend, as the Pope does, or as the\nPresbyterians do, to have a right from God immediately, to govern the\nKing and his subjects in all points of religion and manners? If they do,\nyou cannot doubt but that if they had number and strength, which they\nare never like to have, they would attempt to obtain that power, as the\nothers have done.\n\n_B._ I would be glad to see a system of the present morals, written by\nsome divine of good reputation and learning, of the late King\u2019s party.\n\n_A._ I think I can recommend unto you the best that is extant, and such\na one as (except a few passages that I mislike) is very well worth your\nreading. The title of it is, _The whole Duty of Man laid down in a plain\nand familiar way_. And, yet, I dare say, that if the Presbyterian\nministers, even those of them which were the most diligent preachers of\nthe late sedition, were to be tried by it, they would go near to be\nfound not guilty. He has divided the duty of man into three great\nbranches; which are, his duty to God, to himself, and to his neighbour.\nIn his duty to God, he puts the acknowledgment of him in his essence and\nhis attributes, and in the believing of his word. His attributes are\nomnipotence, omniscience, infiniteness, justice, truth, mercy, and all\nthe rest that are found in Scripture. Which of these did not those\nseditious preachers acknowledge equally with the best of Christians? The\nword of God are the books of Holy Scripture, received for canonical in\nEngland.\n\n_B._ They receive the word of God; but it is according to their own\ninterpretation.\n\n_A._ According to whose interpretation was it received by the bishops\nand the rest of the loyal party, but their own? He puts for another\nduty, obedience and submission to God\u2019s will. Did any of them, nay, did\nany man living, do any thing, at any time, against God\u2019s will?\n\n_B._ By God\u2019s will, I suppose, he means there his revealed will, that is\nto say, his commandments, which I am sure they did most horribly break,\nboth by their preaching and otherwise.\n\n_A._ As for their own actions, there is no doubt but all men are guilty\nenough, if God deal severely with them, to be damned. And for their\npreaching, they will say, they thought it agreeable to God\u2019s revealed\nwill in the Scriptures. If they thought it so, it was not disobedience,\nbut error. And how can any man prove they thought otherwise?\n\n_B._ Hypocrisy hath this great prerogative above other sins, that it\ncannot be accused.\n\n_A._ Another duty he sets down is, to honour Him in his house (that is,\nthe Church), in his possessions, in his day, in his word and sacraments.\n\n_B._ They perform this duty as well, I think, as any other ministers, I\nmean the loyal party; and the Presbyterians have always had an equal\ncare to have God\u2019s house free from profanation; to have tithes duly\npaid, and offerings accepted; to have the sabbath day kept holy, the\nword preached, and the Lord\u2019s supper and baptism duly administered. But\nis not keeping of the feasts and fasts, one of those duties that belong\nto the honour of God? If it be, the Presbyterians fail in that.\n\n_A._ Why so? They kept some holidays, and they had fasts amongst\nthemselves, though not upon the same days that the Church ordains, but\nwhen they thought fit; as when it pleased God to give the King any\nnotable victory. And they governed themselves in this point by the Holy\nScripture, as they pretend to believe. And who can prove they do not\nbelieve so?\n\n_B._ Let us pass over all other duties, and come to that duty which we\nowe to the King, and consider whether the doctrine taught by those\ndivines which adhered to the King, be such in that point, as may justify\nthe Presbyterians, that incited the people to rebellion. For that is the\nthing you call in question.\n\n_A._ Concerning our duty to our rulers, he hath these words: \u201cAn\nobedience we must pay, either active or passive; the active, in the case\nof all lawful commands, that is, whenever the magistrate commands\nsomething which is not contrary to some command of God, we are then\nbound to act according to that command of the magistrate, to do the\nthings he requires; but when he enjoins any thing contrary to what God\nhath commanded, we are not then to pay him this active obedience; we\nmay, nay we must, refuse thus to act (yet, here we must be very well\nassured, that the thing is so contrary, and not pretend conscience for a\ncloak of stubbornness); we are, in that case, to obey God rather than\nmen; but even this is a season for the passive obedience; we must\npatiently suffer what he inflicts on us for such refusal, and not, to\nsecure ourselves, rise up against him.\u201d\n\n_B._ What is there in this, to give colour to the late rebellion?\n\n_A._ They will say they did it in obedience to God, inasmuch as they did\nbelieve it was according to the Scripture; out of which they will bring\nexamples, perhaps of David and his adherents, that resisted King Saul,\nand of the prophets afterward, that vehemently from time to time\npreached against the idolatrous Kings of Israel and Judah. Saul was\ntheir lawful King, and yet they paid him neither active nor passive\nobedience; for they did put themselves into a posture of defence against\nhim, though David himself spared his person. And so did the\nPresbyterians put into their commissions to their general, that they\nshould spare the King\u2019s person. Besides, you cannot doubt but that they,\nwho in the pulpit did animate the people to take arms in the defence of\nthe then Parliament, alleged Scripture, that is, the word of God for it.\nIf it be lawful then for subjects to resist the King, when he commands\nanything that is against the Scripture, that is, contrary to the command\nof God, and to be judge of the meaning of the Scripture, it is\nimpossible that the life of any King, or the peace of any Christian\nkingdom, can be long secure. It is this doctrine that divides a kingdom\nwithin itself, whatsoever the men be, loyal or rebels, that write or\npreach it publicly. And thus you see that if those seditious ministers\nbe tried by this doctrine, they will come off well enough.\n\n_B._ I see it; and wonder at people that have never spoken with God\nAlmighty, nor knowing one more than another what he hath said, when the\nlaws and the preacher disagree, should so keenly follow the minister,\n(for the most part an ignorant, though a ready-tongued, scholar), rather\nthan the laws, that were made by the King with the consent of the peers\nand the commons of the land.\n\n_A._ Let us examine his words a little nearer. First, concerning passive\nobedience. When a thief hath broken the laws, and according to the law\nis therefore executed, can any man understand that this suffering of his\nis in obedience to the law? Every law is a command to do, or to forbear:\nneither of these is fulfilled by suffering. If any suffering can be\ncalled obedience, it must be such as is voluntary; for no involuntary\naction can be counted a submission to the law. He that means that his\nsuffering should be taken for obedience, must not only not resist, but\nalso not fly, nor hide himself to avoid his punishment. And who is there\namongst them that discourse of passive obedience, when his life is in\nextreme danger, that will voluntarily present himself to the officers of\njustice? Do not we see that all men, when they are led to execution, are\nboth bound and guarded, and would break loose if they could, and get\naway? Such is their passive obedience. Christ saith (Matth. xxiii, 2,\n3): _The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' chair; all therefore,\nwhatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do_: which is a doing\nan active obedience. And yet the Scribes and Pharisees appear not by the\nScripture to have been such godly men, as never to command any thing\nagainst the revealed will of God.\n\n_B._ Must tyrants also be obeyed in every thing actively? Or is there\nnothing wherein a lawful King\u2019s command may be disobeyed? What if he\nshould command me with my own hands to execute my father, in case he\nshould be condemned to die by the law?\n\n_A._ This is a case that need not be put. We never have read nor heard\nof any King or tyrant so inhuman as to command it. If any did, we are to\nconsider whether that command were one of his laws. For by disobeying\nKings, we mean the disobeying of his laws, those his laws that were made\nbefore they were applied to any particular person; for the King, though\nas a father of children, and a master of domestic servants, yet he\ncommands the people in general never but by a precedent law, and as a\npolitic, not a natural person. And if such a command as you speak of\nwere contrived into a general law (which never was, nor never will be),\nyou were bound to obey it, unless you depart the kingdom after the\npublication of the law, and before the condemnation of your father.\n\n_B._ Your author says further, in refusing active obedience to the King,\nthat commanded anything contrary to God\u2019s law, we must be very well\nassured that the thing is so contrary. I would fain know how it is\npossible to be assured.\n\n_A._ I think you do not believe that any of those refusers do,\nimmediately from God\u2019s own mouth, receive any command contrary to the\ncommand of the King, who is God\u2019s lieutenant, nor any other way than you\nand I do, that is to say, than by the Scriptures. And because men do,\nfor the most part, rather draw the Scripture to their own sense, than\nfollow the true sense of the Scripture, there is no other way to know,\ncertainly, and in all cases, what God commands, or forbids us to do, but\nby the sentence of him or them that are constituted by the King to\ndetermine the sense of the Scripture, upon hearing of the particular\ncase of conscience which is in question. And they that are so\nconstituted, are easily known in all Christian commonwealths, whether\nthey be bishops, or ministers, or assemblies, that govern the Church\nunder him or them that have the sovereign power.\n\n_B._ Some doubts may be raised from this that you now say. For if men be\nto learn their duty from the sentence which other men shall give\nconcerning the meaning of the Scriptures, and not from their own\ninterpretation, I understand not to what end they were translated into\nEnglish, and every man not only permitted, but also exhorted, to read\nthem. For what could that produce, but diversity of opinion, and\nconsequently, as man\u2019s nature is, disputation, breach of charity,\ndisobedience, and at last rebellion? Again, since the Scripture was\nallowed to be read in English, why were not the translations such as\nmight make all that is read, understood even by mean capacities? Did not\nthe Jews, such as could read, understand their law in the Jewish\nlanguage, as well as we do our statute laws in English? And as for such\nplaces of the Scripture, as had nothing of the nature of a law, it was\nnothing to the duty of the Jews, whether they were understood or not,\nseeing nothing is punishable but the transgression of some law. The same\nquestion I may ask concerning the New Testament. For, I believe, that\nthose men to whom the original language was natural, did understand\nsufficiently what commands and councils were given them by our Saviour\nand his apostles, and his immediate disciples. Again, how will you\nanswer that question which was put by St. Peter and St. John (_Acts_ iv,\n19), when by Annas the high-priest, and others of the Council of\nJerusalem, they were forbidden to teach any more in the name of Jesus:\n_Whether it is right in the sight of God, to hearken unto you more than\nunto God?_\n\n_A._ The case is not the same. Peter and John had seen and daily\nconversed with our Saviour; and by the miracles he wrought, did know he\nwas God, and consequently knew certainly that their disobedience to the\nhigh-priest\u2019s present command was just. Can any minister now say, that\nhe hath immediately from God\u2019s own mouth received a command to disobey\nthe King, or know otherwise than by the Scripture, that any command of\nthe King, that hath the form and nature of a law, is against the law of\nGod, which in divers places, directly and evidently, commandeth to obey\nhim in all things? The text you cite does not tell us, that a minister\u2019s\nauthority, rather than a Christian King\u2019s, shall decide the questions\nthat arise from the different interpretations of the Scripture. And\ntherefore, where the King is head of the Church, and by consequence (to\nomit that the Scripture itself was not received but by the authority of\nKings and States) chief judge of the rectitude of all interpretations of\nthe Scripture, to obey the King\u2019s laws and public edicts, is not to\ndisobey, but to obey God. A minister ought not to think that his skill\nin the Latin, Greek, or Hebrew tongues, if he have any, gives him a\nprivilege to impose upon all his fellow subjects his own sense, or what\nhe pretends to be his sense, of every obscure place of Scripture: nor\nought he, as oft as he hath found out some fine interpretation, not\nbefore thought on by others, to think he had it by inspiration: for he\ncannot be assured of that; no, nor that his interpretation, as fine as\nhe thinks it, is not false: and then all his stubbornness and contumacy\ntowards the King and his laws, is nothing but pride of heart and\nambition, or else imposture. And whereas you think it needless, or\nperhaps hurtful, to have the Scriptures in English, I am of another\nmind. There are so many places of Scripture easy to be understood, that\nteach both true faith and good morality (and that as fully as is\nnecessary to salvation), of which no seducer is able to dispossess the\nmind of any ordinary reader, that the reading of them is so profitable\nas not to be forbidden without great damage to them and the\ncommonwealth.\n\n_B._ All that is required, both in faith and manners, for man\u2019s\nsalvation, is, I confess, set down in Scripture as plainly as can be.\n_Children obey your parents in all things: Servants obey your masters:\nLet all men be subject to the higher powers, whether it be the King or\nthose that are sent by him_: _Love God with all your soul, and your\nneighbour as yourself_: are words of the Scripture, which are well\nenough understood; but neither children, nor the greatest part of men,\ndo understand why it is their duty to do so. They see not that the\nsafety of the commonwealth, and consequently their own, depends upon\ntheir doing it. Every man by nature, without discipline, does in all his\nactions look upon, as far as he can see, the benefit that shall redound\nto himself from his obedience. He reads that covetousness is the root of\nall evil; but he thinks, and sometimes finds, it is the root of his\nestate. And so in other cases the Scripture says one thing, and they\nthink another, weighing the commodities or incommodities of this present\nlife only, which are in their sight, never putting into the scales the\ngood and evil of the life to come, which they see not.\n\n_A._ All this is no more than happens where the Scripture is sealed up\nin Greek and Latin, and the people taught the same things out of them by\npreachers. But they that are of a condition and age fit to examine the\nsense of what they read, and that take a delight in searching out the\ngrounds of their duty, certainly cannot choose but by their reading of\nthe Scriptures come to such a sense of their duty, as not only to obey\nthe laws themselves, but also to induce others to do the same. For\ncommonly men of age and quality are followed by their inferior\nneighbours, that look more upon the example of those men whom they\nreverence, and whom they are unwilling to displease, than upon precepts\nand laws.\n\n_B._ These men, of the condition and age you speak of, are, in my\nopinion, the unfittest of all others to be trusted with the reading of\nthe Scriptures. I know you mean such as have studied the Greek or Latin,\nor both tongues, and that are withal such as love knowledge, and\nconsequently take delight in finding out the meaning of the most hard\ntexts, or in thinking they have found it, in case it be new and not\nfound out by others. These are therefore they, that pr\u00e6termitting the\neasy places which teach them their duty, fall to scanning only of the\nmysteries of religion. Such as are: _How it may be made out with wit,\nthat there be three that bear rule in heaven, and those three but one?\nHow the Deity could be made flesh? How that flesh could be really\npresent in many places at once? Where is the place, and what the\ntorments, of hell?_ And other metaphysical doctrines: _Whether the will\nof man be free, or governed by the will of God? Whether sanctity comes\nby inspiration or education? By whom Christ now speaks to us, whether by\nthe King, or by the clergy, or by the Bible, to every man that reads it\nand interprets it to himself, or by a private spirit to every private\nman?_ These and the like points are the study of the curious, and the\ncause of all our late mischief, and the cause that makes the plainer\nsort of men, whom the Scripture had taught belief in Christ, love\ntowards God, obedience to the King, and sobriety of behaviour, forget it\nall, and place their religion in the disputable doctrines of these your\nwise men.\n\n_A._ I do not think these men fit to interpret the Scripture to the\nrest, nor do I say that the rest ought to take their interpretation for\nthe word of God. Whatsoever is necessary for them to know, is so easy,\nas not to need interpretation: whatsoever is more, does them no good.\nBut in case any of those unnecessary doctrines shall be authorized by\nthe laws of the King or other state, I say it is the duty of every\nsubject not to speak against them: in as much as it is every man\u2019s duty\nto obey him or them that have the sovereign power, and the wisdom of all\nsuch powers to punish such as shall publish or teach their private\ninterpretations, when they are contrary to the law, and likely to\nincline men to sedition or disputing against the law.\n\n_B._ They must punish then the most of those that have had their\nbreeding in the Universities. For such curious questions in divinity are\nfirst started in the Universities, and so are all those politic\nquestions concerning the rights of civil and ecclesiastic government;\nand there they are furnished with arguments for liberty out of the works\nof Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, and out of the histories of Rome\nand Greece, for their disputation against the necessary power of their\nsovereigns. Therefore I despair of any lasting peace amongst ourselves,\ntill the Universities here shall bend and direct their studies to the\nsettling of it, that is, to the teaching of absolute obedience to the\nlaws of the King, and to his public edicts under the Great Seal of\nEngland. For I make no doubt, but that solid reason, backed with the\nauthority of so many learned men, will more prevail for the keeping of\nus in peace within ourselves, than any victory can do over the rebels.\nBut I am afraid that it is impossible to bring the Universities to such\na compliance with the actions of state, as is necessary for the\nbusiness.\n\n_A._ Seeing the Universities have heretofore from time to time\nmaintained the authority of the Pope, contrary to all laws divine,\ncivil, and natural, against the right of our Kings, why can they not as\nwell, when they have all manner of laws and equity on their side,\nmaintain the rights of him that is both sovereign of the kingdom, and\nhead of the Church?\n\n_B._ Why then were they not in all points for the King\u2019s power,\npresently after that King Henry VIII was in Parliament declared head of\nthe Church, as much as they were before for the authority of the Pope?\n\n_A._ Because the clergy in the Universities, by whom all things there\nare governed, and the clergy without the Universities, as well bishops\nas inferior clerks, did think that the pulling down of the Pope was the\nsetting up of them, as to England, in his place, and made no question,\nthe greatest part of them, but that their spiritual power did depend not\nupon the authority of the King, but of Christ himself, derived to them\nby a successive imposition of hands from bishop to bishop;\nnotwithstanding they knew that this derivation passed through the hands\nof popes and bishops whose authority they had cast off. For though they\nwere content that the divine right, which the Pope pretended to in\nEngland, should be denied him, yet they thought it not so fit to be\ntaken from the Church of England, whom they now supposed themselves to\nrepresent. It seems they did not think it reasonable that a woman, or a\nchild, or a man that could not construe the Hebrew, Greek, or Latin\nBible, nor know perhaps the declensions and conjugations of Greek or\nLatin nouns and verbs, should take upon him to govern so many learned\ndoctors in matters of religion; meaning matters of divinity: for\nreligion has been for a long time, and is now by most people, taken for\nthe same thing with divinity, to the great advantage of the clergy.\n\n_B._ And especially now amongst the Presbyterians. For I see few that\nare by them esteemed very good Christians, besides such as can repeat\ntheir sermons, and wrangle for them about the interpretation of the\nScripture, and fight for them also with their bodies or purses, when\nthey shall be required. To believe in Christ is nothing with them,\nunless you believe as they bid you. Charity is nothing with them, unless\nit be charity and liberality to them, and partaking with them in\nfaction. How we can have peace while this is our religion, I cannot\ntell. _H\u00e6ret lateri lethalis arundo._ The seditious doctrine of the\nPresbyterians has been stuck so hard in the people\u2019s heads and memories,\n(I cannot say into their hearts; for they understand nothing in it, but\nthat they may lawfully rebel), that I fear the commonwealth will never\nbe cured.\n\n_A._ The two great virtues, that were severally in Henry VII and Henry\nVIII, when they shall be jointly in one King, will easily cure it. That\nof Henry VII was, without much noise of the people to fill his coffers;\nthat of Henry VIII was an early severity; but this without the former\ncannot be exercised.\n\n_B._ This that you say looks, methinks, like an advice to the King, to\nlet them alone till he have gotten ready money enough to levy and\nmaintain a sufficient army, and then to fall upon them and destroy them.\n\n_A._ God forbid that so horrible, unchristian, and inhuman a design\nshould ever enter into the King\u2019s heart. I would have him have money\nenough readily to raise an army able to suppress any rebellion, and to\ntake from his enemies all hope of success, that they may not dare to\ntrouble him in the reformation of the Universities; but to put none to\ndeath without the actual committing such crimes as are already made\ncapital by the laws. The core of rebellion, as you have seen by this,\nand read of other rebellions, are the Universities; which nevertheless\nare not to be cast away, but to be better disciplined: that is to say,\nthat the politics there taught be made to be, as true politics should\nbe, such as are fit to make men know, that it is their duty to obey all\nlaws whatsoever that shall by the authority of the King be enacted, till\nby the same authority they shall be repealed; such as are fit to make\nmen understand, that the civil laws are God\u2019s laws, as they that make\nthem are by God appointed to make them; and to make men know, that the\npeople and the Church are one thing, and have but one head, the King;\nand that no man has title to govern under him, that has it not from him;\nthat the King owes his crown to God only, and to no man, ecclesiastic or\nother; and that the religion they teach there, be a quiet waiting for\nthe coming again of our blessed Saviour, and in the mean time a\nresolution to obey the King\u2019s laws, which also are God\u2019s laws; to injure\nno man, to be in charity with all men, to cherish the poor and sick, and\nto live soberly and free from scandal; without mingling our religion\nwith points of natural philosophy, as freedom of will, incorporeal\nsubstance, everlasting nows, ubiquities, hypostases, which the people\nunderstand not, nor will ever care for. When the Universities shall be\nthus disciplined, there will come out of them, from time to time,\nwell-principled preachers, and they that are now ill-principled, from\ntime to time fall away.\n\n_B._ I think it a very good course, and perhaps the only one that can\nmake our peace amongst ourselves constant. For if men know not their\nduty, what is there that can force them to obey the laws? An army, you\nwill say. But what shall force the army? Were not the trained bands an\narmy? Were they not the janissaries, that not very long ago slew Osman\nin his own palace at Constantinople? I am therefore of your opinion,\nboth that men may be brought to a love of obedience by preachers and\ngentlemen that imbibe good principles in their youth at the\nUniversities, and also that we never shall have a lasting peace, till\nthe Universities themselves be in such manner, as you have said,\nreformed; and the ministers know they have no authority but what the\nsupreme civil power gives them; and the nobility and gentry know that\nthe liberty of a state is not an exemption from the laws of their own\ncountry, whether made by an assembly or by a monarch, but an exemption\nfrom the constraint and insolence of their neighbours.\n\nAnd now I am satisfied in this point, I will bring you back to the place\nfrom whence my curiosity drew you to this long digression. We were upon\nthe point of ship-money; one of those grievances which the Parliament\nexclaimed against as tyrannical and arbitrary government; thereby to\nsingle out, as you called it, the King from his subjects, and to make a\nparty against him, when they should need it. And now you may proceed, if\nit please you, to such other artifices as they used to the same purpose.\n\n_A._ I think it were better to give over here our discourse of this\nbusiness, and refer it to some other day that you shall think fit.\n\n_B._ Content. That day I believe is not far off.\n\n\n\n\n PART II.\n\n ==========\n\n_A._ You are welcome; yet, if you had staid somewhat longer, my memory\nwould have been so much the better provided for you.\n\n_B._ Nay, I pray you give me now what you have about you; for the rest I\nam content you take what time you please.\n\n_A._ After the Parliament had made the people believe that the exacting\nof ship-money was unlawful, and the people thereby inclined to think it\ntyrannical; in the next place, to increase their disaffection to his\nMajesty, they accused him of a purpose to introduce and authorize the\nRoman religion in this kingdom: than which nothing was more hateful to\nthe people; not because it was erroneous, which they had neither\nlearning nor judgment enough to examine, but because they had been used\nto hear it inveighed against in the sermons and discourses of the\npreachers whom they trusted to. And this was indeed the most effectual\ncalumny, to alienate the people\u2019s affections from him, that could\npossibly be invented. The colour they had for this slander was, first,\nthat there was one Rosetti, Resident, at and a little before that time,\nfrom the Pope, with the Queen; and one Mr. George Con, Secretary to the\nCardinal Francisco Barberini, nephew to Pope Urban VIII, sent over,\nunder favour and protection of the Queen, as was conceived, to draw as\nmany persons of quality about the court, as he should be able, to\nreconcile themselves to the Church of Rome: with what success I cannot\ntell; but it is likely he gained some, especially of the weaker sex; if\nI may say, they were gained by him, when not his arguments, but hope of\nfavour from the Queen, in all probability prevailed upon them.\n\n_B._ In such a conjuncture as that was, it had perhaps been better they\nhad not been sent.\n\n_A._ There was exception also taken at a convent of friars-capucins in\nSomerset-House, though allowed by the articles of marriage: and it was\nreported, that the Jesuits also were shortly after to be allowed a\nconvent in Clerkenwell. And in the mean time, the principal secretary,\nSir Francis Windebank, was accused for having by his warrant set at\nliberty some English Jesuits, that had been taken and imprisoned for\nreturning into England after banishment, contrary to the statute which\nhad made it capital. Also the resort of English Catholics to the Queen\u2019s\nchapel, gave them colour to blame the Queen herself, not only for that,\nbut also for all the favours that had been shown to the Catholics; in so\nmuch that some of them did not stick to say openly, that the King was\ngoverned by her.\n\n_B._ Strange injustice! The Queen was a Catholic by profession, and\ntherefore could not but endeavour to do the Catholics all the good she\ncould: she had not else been truly that which she professed to be. But\nit seems they meant to force her to hypocrisy, being hypocrites\nthemselves. Can any man think it a crime in a devout lady, of what sect\nsoever, to seek the favour and benediction of that Church whereof she is\na member?\n\n_A._ To give the Parliament another colour for their accusation on foot\nof the King, as to introducing of Popery, there was a great controversy\nbetween the Episcopal and Presbyterian clergy about free-will. The\ndispute began first in the Low Countries, between Gomar and Arminius, in\nthe time of King James, who foreseeing it might trouble the Church of\nEngland, did what he could to compose the difference. And an assembly of\ndivines was thereupon got together at Dort, to which also King James\nsent a divine or two, but it came to nothing; the question was left\nundecided, and became a subject to be disputed of in the universities\nhere. All the Presbyterians were of the same mind with Gomar: but a very\ngreat many others not; and those were called here Arminians, who,\nbecause the doctrine of free-will had been exploded as a Papistical\ndoctrine, and because the Presbyterians were far the greater number, and\nalready in favour with the people, were generally hated. It was easy,\ntherefore, for the Parliament to make that calumny pass currently with\nthe people, when the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Laud, was for\nArminius, and had a little before, by his power ecclesiastical,\nforbidden all ministers to preach to the people of predestination; and\nwhen all ministers that were gracious with him, and hoped for any Church\npreferment, fell to preaching and writing for free-will, to the\nuttermost of their power, as a proof of their ability and merit.\nBesides, they gave out, some of them, that the Archbishop was in heart a\nPapist; and in case he could effect a toleration here of the Roman\nreligion, was to have a cardinal\u2019s hat: which was not only false, but\nalso without any ground at all for a suspicion.\n\n_B._ It is a strange thing, that scholars, obscure men that could\nreceive no clarity but from the flame of the state, should be suffered\nto bring their unnecessary disputes, and together with them their\nquarrels, out of the universities into the commonwealth; and more\nstrange, that the state should engage in their parties, and not rather\nput them both to silence.\n\n_A._ A state can constrain obedience, but convince no error, nor alter\nthe mind of them that believe they have the better reason. Suppression\nof doctrines does but unite and exasperate, that is, increase both the\nmalice and power of them that have already believed them.\n\n_B._ But what are the points they disagree in? Is there any controversy\nbetween Bishop and Presbyterian concerning the divinity or humanity of\nChrist? Do either of them deny the Trinity, or any article of the creed?\nDoes either party preach openly, or write directly, against justice,\ncharity, sobriety, or any other duty necessary to salvation, except only\nthe duty to the King; and not that neither, but when they have a mind\neither to rule or destroy the King? Lord have mercy upon us! Can nobody\nbe saved that understands not their disputations? Or is there more\nrequisite, either of faith or honesty, for the salvation of one man than\nanother? What needs so much preaching of faith to us that are no\nheathens, and that believe already all that Christ and his apostles have\ntold us is necessary to salvation, and more too? Why is there so little\npreaching of justice? I have indeed heard righteousness often\nrecommended to the people, but I have seldom heard the word justice in\ntheir sermons; nay, though in the Latin and Greek Bible the word justice\noccur exceeding often, yet in the English, though it be a word that\nevery man understands, the word righteousness (which few understand to\nsignify the same, but take it rather for rightness of opinion, than of\naction or intention), is put in the place of it.\n\n_A._ I confess I know very few controversies amongst Christians, of\npoints necessary to salvation. They are the questions of authority and\npower over the Church, or of profit, or of honour to Churchmen, that for\nthe most part raise all the controversies. For what man is he, that will\ntrouble himself and fall out with his neighbours for the saving of my\nsoul, or the soul of any other than himself? When the Presbyterian\nministers and others did so seriously preach sedition, and animate men\nto rebellion in these late wars; who was there that had not a benefice,\nor having one feared not to lose it, or some other part of his\nmaintainance, by the alteration of the Government, that did voluntary,\nwithout any eye to reward, preach so earnestly against sedition, as the\nother party preached for it? I confess, that for aught I have observed\nin history, and other writings of the heathens, Greek and Latin, that\nthose heathens were not at all behind us in point of virtue and moral\nduties, notwithstanding that we have had much preaching, and they none\nat all. I confess also, that considering what harm may proceed from a\nliberty that men have, upon every Sunday and oftener, to harangue all\nthe people of a nation at one time, whilst the state is ignorant of what\nthey will say; and that there is no such thing permitted in all the\nworld out of Christendom, nor therefore any civil wars about religion; I\nhave thought much preaching an inconvenience. Nevertheless, I cannot\nthink that preaching to the people the points of their duty, both to God\nand man, can be too frequent; so it be done by grave, discreet, and\nancient men, that are reverenced by the people; and not by light\nquibbling young men, whom no congregation is so simple as to look to be\ntaught by (as being a thing contrary to nature), or to pay them any\nreverence, or to care what they say, except some few that may be\ndelighted with their jingling. I wish with all my heart, there were\nenough of such discreet and ancient men, as might suffice for all the\nparishes of England, and that they would undertake it. But this is but a\nwish; I leave it to the wisdom of the State to do what it pleaseth.\n\n_B._ What did they next?\n\n_A._ Whereas the King had sent prisoners into places remote from London,\nthree persons that had been condemned for publishing seditious doctrine,\nsome in writing, some in public sermons; the Parliament (whether with\nhis Majesty\u2019s consent or no, I have forgotten), caused them to be\nreleased and to return to London; meaning, I think, to try how the\npeople would be pleased therewith, and, by consequence, how their\nendeavours to draw the people\u2019s affections from the King had already\nprospered. When these three came through London, it was a kind of\ntriumph, the people flocking together to behold them, and receiving them\nwith such acclamations, and almost adoration, as if they had been let\ndown from heaven; insomuch as the Parliament was now sufficiently\nassured of a great and tumultuous party, whensoever they should have\noccasion to use it. On confidence whereof they proceeded to their next\nplot, which was to deprive the King of such ministers as by their\nwisdom, courage, and authority, they thought most able to prevent, or\noppose their further designs against the King. And first, the House of\nCommons resolved to impeach the Earl of Strafford, Lord Lieutenant of\nIreland, of high-treason.\n\n_B._ What was that Earl of Strafford before he had that place? And how\nhad he offended the Parliament or given them cause to think he would be\ntheir enemy? For I have heard that in former Parliaments he had been as\nparliamentary as any other.\n\n_A._ His name was Sir Thomas Wentworth, a gentleman both by birth and\nestate very considerable in his own county, which was Yorkshire; but\nmore considerable for his judgment in the public affairs, not only of\nthat county, but generally of the kingdom; and was therefore often\nchosen for the Parliament, either as burgess for some borough, or knight\nof the shire. For his principles of politics, they were the same that\nwere generally proceeded upon by all men else that were thought fit to\nbe chosen for the Parliament; which are commonly these: to take for the\nrule of justice and government the judgments and acts of former\nParliaments, which are commonly called precedents; to endeavour to keep\nthe people from being subject to extra-parliamentary taxes of money, and\nfrom being with parliamentary taxes too much oppressed; to preserve to\nthe people their liberty of body from the arbitrary power of the King\nout of Parliament; to seek redress of grievances.\n\n_B._ What grievances?\n\n_A._ The grievances were commonly such as these; the King\u2019s too much\nliberality to some favourite; the too much power of some minister or\nofficer of the commonwealth; the misdemeanour of judges, civil or\nspiritual; but especially all unparliamentary raising of money upon the\nsubjects. And commonly of late, till such grievances be redressed, they\nrefuse, or at least make great difficulty, to furnish the King with\nmoney necessary for the most urgent occasions of the commonwealth.\n\n_B._ How then can a King discharge his duty as he ought to do, or the\nsubject know which of his masters he is to obey? For here are manifestly\ntwo powers, which, when they chance to differ, cannot both be obeyed.\n\n_A._ It is true; but they have not often differed so much to the danger\nof the commonwealth, as they have done in this Parliament, 1640. In all\nthe Parliaments of the late King Charles before the year 1640, my Lord\nof Strafford did appear in opposition to the King\u2019s demands as much as\nany man, and was for that cause very much esteemed and cried up by the\npeople as a good patriot, and one that courageously stood up in defence\nof their liberties; and for the same cause was so much the more hated,\nwhen afterwards he endeavoured to maintain the royal and just authority\nof his Majesty.\n\n_B._ How came he to change his mind so much as it seems he did?\n\n_A._ After the dissolution of the Parliament holden in the years 1627\nand 1628, the King, finding no money to be gotten from Parliaments which\nhe was not to buy with the blood of such servants and ministers as he\nloved best, abstained a long time from calling any more, and had\nabstained longer if the rebellion of the Scotch had not forced him to\nit. During that Parliament the King made Sir Thomas Wentworth a baron,\nrecommended to him for his great ability, which was generally taken\nnotice of by the disservice he had done the King in former Parliaments,\nbut which might be useful for him in the times that came on: and not\nlong after he made him of the Council, and after that again Lieutenant\nof Ireland, which place he discharged with great satisfaction and\nbenefit to his Majesty, and continued in that office, till, by the envy\nand violence of the Lords and Commons of that unlucky Parliament of\n1640, he died. In which year he was made general of the King\u2019s forces\nagainst the Scots that then entered into England, and the year before,\nEarl of Strafford. The pacification being made, and the forces on both\nsides disbanded, and the Parliament at Westminster now sitting, it was\nnot long before the House of Commons accused him to the House of Lords\nfor high-treason.\n\n_B._ There was no great probability of his being a traitor to the King,\nfrom whose favour he had received his greatness, and from whose\nprotection he was to expect his safety. What was the treason they laid\nto his charge?\n\n_A._ Many articles were drawn up against him, but the sum of them was\ncontained in these two: first, that he had traitorously endeavoured to\nsubvert the fundamental laws and government of the realm; and in stead\nthereof to introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical government against law:\nsecondly, that he had laboured to subvert the rights of Parliaments, and\nthe ancient course of Parliamentary proceedings.\n\n_B._ Was this done by him without the knowledge of the King?\n\n_A._ No.\n\n_B._ Why then, if it were treason, did not the King himself call him in\nquestion by his attorney? What had the House of Commons to do, without\nhis command, to accuse him in the House of Lords? They might have\ncomplained to the King, if he had not known it before. I understand not\nthis law.\n\n_A._ Nor I.\n\n_B._ Had this been by any former statutes made treason?\n\n_A._ Not that I ever heard of; nor do I understand how anything can be\ntreason against the King, that the King, hearing and knowing, does not\nthink treason. But it was a piece of that Parliament\u2019s artifice, to put\nthe word _traiterously_ to any article exhibited against any man whose\nlife they meant to take away.\n\n_B._ Was there no particular instance of action or words, out of which\nthey argued that endeavour of his to subvert the fundamental laws of\nParliament, whereof they accused him?\n\n_A._ Yes; they said he gave the King counsel to reduce the Parliament to\ntheir duty by the Irish army, which not long before my Lord of Strafford\nhimself had caused to be levied there for the King\u2019s service. But it was\nnever proved against him, that he advised the King to use it against the\nParliament.\n\n_B._ What are those laws that are called fundamental? For I understand\nnot how one law can be more fundamental than another, except only that\nlaw of nature that binds us all to obey him, whosoever he be, whom\nlawfully and for our own safety, we have promised to obey; nor any other\nfundamental law to a King, but _salus populi_, the safety and well-being\nof his people.\n\n_A._ This Parliament, in the use of their words, when they accused any\nman, never regarded the signification of them, but the weight they had\nto aggravate their accusation to the ignorant multitude, which think all\nfaults heinous that are expressed in heinous terms, if they hate the\nperson accused, as they did this man not only for being of the King\u2019s\nparty, but also for deserting the Parliament\u2019s party as an apostate.\n\n_B._ I pray you tell me also what they meant by arbitrary government,\nwhich they seemed so much to hate? Is there any governor of a people in\nthe world that is forced to govern them, or forced to make this and that\nlaw, whether he will or no? I think not: or if any be, he that forces\nhim does certainly make laws, and govern arbitrarily.\n\n_A._ That is true; and the true meaning of the Parliament was, that not\nthe King, but they themselves, should have the arbitrary government, not\nonly of England, but of Ireland, and, as it appeared by the event, of\nScotland also.\n\n_B._ How the King came by the government of Scotland and Ireland by\ndescent from his ancestors, everybody can tell; but if the King of\nEngland and his heirs should chance (which God forbid) to fail, I cannot\nimagine what title the Parliament of England can acquire thereby to\neither of those nations.\n\n_A._ Yes; they will say they had been conquered anciently by the English\nsubjects' money.\n\n_B._ Like enough, and suitable to the rest of their impudence.\n\n_A._ Impudence in democratical assemblies does almost all that is done;\nit is the goddess of rhetoric, and carries proof with it. For what\nordinary man will not, from so great boldness of affirmation, conclude\nthere is great probability in the thing affirmed? Upon this accusation\nhe was brought to his trial in Westminster Hall before the House of\nLords, and found guilty, and presently after declared traitor by a bill\nof attainder, that is, by Act of Parliament.\n\n_B._ It is a strange thing that the Lords should be induced, upon so\nlight grounds, to give a sentence, or give their assent to a bill, so\nprejudicial to themselves and their posterity.\n\n_A._ It was not well done, and yet, as it seems, not ignorantly; for\nthere is a clause in the bill, that it should not be taken hereafter for\nan example, that is for a prejudice, in the like case hereafter.\n\n_B._ That is worse than the bill itself, and is a plain confession that\ntheir sentence was unjust. For what harm is there in the examples of\njust sentences? Besides, if hereafter the like case should happen, the\nsentence is not at all made weaker by such a provision.\n\nA, Indeed I believe that the Lords, most of them, were not of themselves\nwilling to condemn him of treason; they were awed to it by the clamour\nof common people that came to Westminster, crying out, _Justice, Justice\nagainst the Earl of Strafford!_ The which were caused to flock thither\nby some of the House of Commons, that were well assured, after the\ntriumphant welcome of Prynne, Burton, and Bastwick, to put the people\ninto tumult upon any occasion they desired. They were awed unto it\npartly also by the House of Commons itself, which if it desired to undo\na Lord, had no more to do but to vote him a delinquent.\n\n_B._ A delinquent; what is that? A sinner is it not? Did they mean to\nundo all sinners?\n\n_A._ By delinquent they meant only a man to whom they would do all the\nhurt they could. But the Lords did not yet, I think, suspect they meant\nto cashier their whole House.\n\n_B._ It is a strange thing the whole House of Lords should not perceive\nthat the ruin of the King\u2019s power, and the weakening of it, was the\nruin, or weakening of themselves. For they could not think it likely\nthat the people ever meant to take the sovereignty from the King to give\nit to them, who were few in number, and less in power than so many\nCommoners, because less beloved by the people.\n\n_A._ But it seems not so strange to me. For the Lords, for their\npersonal abilities, as they were no less, so also they were no more\nskilful in the public affairs, than the knights and burgesses. For there\nis no reason to think, that if one that is to-day a knight of the shire\nin the lower House, be to-morrow made a Lord and a member of the higher\nHouse, he is therefore wiser than he was before. They are all, of both\nHouses, prudent and able men as any in the land, in the business of\ntheir private estates, which require nothing but diligence and natural\nwit to govern them. But for the government of a commonwealth, neither\nwit, nor prudence, nor diligence, is enough, without infallible rules\nand the true science of equity and justice.\n\n_B._ If this be true, it is impossible any commonwealth in the world,\nwhether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, should continue long\nwithout change, or sedition tending to change, either of the government\nor of the governors.\n\n_A._ It is true; nor have any the greatest commonwealths in the world\nbeen long free from sedition. The Greeks had for awhile their petty\nkings, and then by sedition came to be petty commonwealths; and then\ngrowing to be greater commonwealths, by sedition again became\nmonarchies; and all for want of rules of justice for the common people\nto take notice of; which if the people had known in the beginning of\nevery of these seditions, the ambitious persons could never have had the\nhope to disturb their government after it had been once settled. For\nambition can do little without hands, and few hands it would have, if\nthe common people were as diligently instructed in the true principles\nof their duty, as they are terrified and amazed by preachers, with\nfruitless and dangerous doctrines concerning the nature of man\u2019s will,\nand many other philosophical points that tend not at all to the\nsalvation of the soul in the world to come, nor to their ease in this\nlife, but only to the direction towards the clergy of that duty which\nthey ought to perform to the King.\n\n_B._ For aught I see, all the states of Christendom will be subject to\nthese fits of rebellion, as long as the world lasteth.\n\n_A._ Like enough; and yet the fault, as I have said, may be easily\nmended, by mending the Universities.\n\n_B._ How long had the Parliament now sitten?\n\n_A._ It began November the 3d, 1640. My Lord of Strafford was impeached\nof treason before the Lords, November the 12th, sent to the Tower\nNovember the 22d, his trial began March the 22d, and ended April the\n13th. After his trial he was voted guilty of high-treason in the House\nof Commons, and after that in the House of Lords, May the 6th, and on\nthe 12th of May beheaded.\n\n_B._ Great expedition; but could not the King, for all that, have saved\nhim by a pardon?\n\n_A._ The King had heard all that passed at his trial, and had declared\nhe was unsatisfied concerning the justice of their sentence. And, I\nthink, notwithstanding the danger of his own person from the fury of the\npeople, and that he was counselled to give way to his execution, not\nonly by such as he most relied on, but also by the Earl of Strafford\nhimself, he would have pardoned him, if that could have preserved him\nagainst the tumult raised and countenanced by the Parliament itself, for\nthe terrifying of those they thought might favour him. And yet the King\nhimself did not stick to confess afterwards, that he had done amiss, in\nthat he did not rescue him.\n\n_B._ It was an argument of good disposition in the King. But I never\nread that Augustus C\u00e6sar acknowledged that he had done a fault, in\nabandoning Cicero to the fury of his enemy Antonius: perhaps because\nCicero, having been of the contrary faction to his father, had done\nAugustus no service at all out of favour to him, but only out of enmity\nto Antonius, and out of love to the senate, that is indeed out of love\nto himself that swayed the senate; as it is very likely the Earl of\nStrafford came over to the King\u2019s party for his own ends, having been so\nmuch against the King in former Parliaments.\n\n_A._ We cannot safely judge of men\u2019s intentions. But, I have observed\noften, that such as seek preferment, by their stubbornness have missed\nof their aim; and on the other side, that those princes that with\npreferment are forced to buy the obedience of their subjects, are\nalready, or must be soon after, in a very weak condition. For in a\nmarket where honour and power is to be bought with stubbornness, there\nwill be a great many as able to buy as my Lord Strafford was.\n\n_B._ You have read, that when Hercules fighting with the Hydra, had cut\noff any one of his many heads, there still arose two other heads in its\nplace; and yet at last he cut them off all.\n\n_A._ The story is told false. For Hercules at first did not cut off\nthose heads, but bought them off; and afterwards, when he saw it did him\nno good, then he cut them off, and got the victory.\n\n_B._ What did they next?\n\n_A._ After the first impeachment of the Earl of Strafford, the House of\nCommons, upon December the 18th, accused the Archbishop of Canterbury\nalso of high-treason, that is, of design to introduce arbitrary\ngovernment, &c.; for which he was, February the 18th, sent to the Tower;\nbut his trial and execution were deferred a long time, till January the\n10th, 1643, for the entertainment of the Scots, that were come into\nEngland to aid the Parliament.\n\n_B._ Why did the Scots think there was so much danger in the Archbishop\nof Canterbury? He was not a man of war, nor a man able to bring an army\ninto the field; but he was perhaps a very great politician.\n\n_A._ That did not appear by any remarkable event of his counsels. I\nnever heard but he was a very honest man for his morals, and a very\nzealous promoter of the Church-government by bishops, and that desired\nto have the service of God performed, and the house of God adorned, as\nsuitably as was possible to the honour we ought to do to the Divine\nMajesty. But to bring, as he did, into the State his former\ncontroversies, I mean his squabblings in the University about free-will,\nand his standing upon punctilios concerning the service-book and its\nrubrics, was not, in my opinion, an argument of his sufficiency in\naffairs of state. About the same time they passed an act, which the King\nconsented to, for a triennial Parliament, wherein was enacted, that\nafter the present Parliament there should be a Parliament called by the\nKing within the space of three years, and so from three years to three\nyears, to meet at Westminster upon a certain day named in the act.\n\n_B._ But what if the King did not call it, finding it perhaps\ninconvenient, or hurtful to the safety or peace of his people, which God\nhath put into his charge? For I do not well comprehend how any sovereign\ncan well keep a people in order when his hands are tied, or when he hath\nany other obligation upon him than the benefit of those he governs; and\nat this time, for any thing you have told me, they acknowledged the King\nfor their sovereign.\n\n_A._ I know not; but such was the act. And it was further enacted, that\nif the King did it not by his own command, then the Lord Chancellor or\nthe Lord Keeper for the time being, should send out the writs of\nsummons; and if the Chancellor refused, then the Sheriffs of the several\ncounties should of themselves, in their next county-courts before the\nday set down for the Parliament\u2019s meeting, proceed to the election of\nthe members for the said Parliament.\n\n_B._ But what if the sheriffs refused?\n\n_A._ I think they were to be sworn to it: but for that, and other\nparticulars, I refer you to the act.\n\n_B._ To whom should they be sworn, when there is no Parliament?\n\n_A._ No doubt but to the King, whether there be a Parliament sitting or\nno.\n\n_B._ Then the King may release them of their oath.\n\n_A._ Besides, they obtained of the King the putting down the\nStar-chamber, and the High-Commission Courts.\n\n_B._ Besides, if the King, upon the refusal, should fall upon them in\nanger; who shall (the Parliament not sitting) protect either the\nChancellor or the sheriffs in their disobedience?\n\n_A._ I pray you do not ask me any reason of such things I understand no\nbetter than you. I tell you only an act passed to that purpose, and was\nsigned by the King in the middle of February, a little before the\nArchbishop was sent to the Tower. Besides this bill, the two Houses of\nParliament agreed upon another, wherein it was enacted, that the present\nParliament should continue till both the Houses did consent to the\ndissolution of it; which bill also the King signed the same day he\nsigned the warrant for the execution of the Earl of Strafford.\n\n_B._ What a great progress made the Parliament towards the ends of the\nmost seditious Members of both Houses in so little time! They sat down\nin November, and now it was May; in this space of time, which is but\nhalf a year, they won from the King the adherence which was due to him\nfrom his people; they drove his faithfullest servants from him; beheaded\nthe Earl of Strafford; imprisoned the Archbishop of Canterbury; obtained\na triennial Parliament after their own dissolution, and a continuance of\ntheir own sitting as long as they listed: which last amounted to a total\nextinction of the King\u2019s right, in case that such a grant were valid;\nwhich I think it is not, unless the Sovereignty itself be in plain terms\nrenounced, which it was not. But what money, by way of subsidy or\notherwise, did they grant the King, in recompense of all these his large\nconcessions?\n\n_A._ None at all; but often promised they would make him the most\nglorious King that ever was in England; which were words that passed\nwell enough for well meaning with the common people.\n\n_B._ But the Parliament was contented now? For I cannot imagine what\nthey should desire more from the King, than he had now granted them.\n\n_A._ Yes; they desired the whole and absolute sovereignty, and to change\nthe monarchical government into an oligarchy; that is to say, to make\nthe Parliament, consisting of a few Lords and about four hundred\nCommoners, absolute in the sovereignty, for the present, and shortly\nafter to lay the House of Lords aside. For this was the design of the\nPresbyterian ministers, who taking themselves to be, by divine right,\nthe only lawful governors of the Church, endeavoured to bring the same\nform of Government into the civil state. And as the spiritual laws were\nto be made by their synods, so the civil laws should be made by the\nHouse of Commons; who, as they thought, would no less be ruled by them\nafterwards, than they formerly had been: wherein they were deceived, and\nfound themselves outgone by their own disciples, though not in malice,\nyet in wit.\n\n_B._ What followed after this?\n\n_A._ In August following, the King supposing he had now sufficiently\nobliged the Parliament to proceed no further against him, took a journey\ninto Scotland, to satisfy his subjects there, as he had done here;\nintending, perhaps, so to gain their good wills, that in case the\nParliament here should levy arms against him, they should not be aided\nby the Scots: wherein he also was deceived. For though they seemed\nsatisfied with what he did, whereof one thing was his giving way to the\nabolition of episcopacy; yet afterwards they made a league with the\nParliament, and for money, when the King began to have the better of the\nParliament, invaded England in the Parliament\u2019s quarrel. But this was a\nyear or two after.\n\n_B._ Before you go any further, I desire to know the ground and original\nof that right, which either the House of Lords, or House of Commons, or\nboth together, now pretend to.\n\n_A._ It is a question of things so long past, that they are now\nforgotten. Nor have we any thing to conjecture by, but the records of\nour own nation, and some small and obscure fragments of Roman histories:\nand for the records, seeing they are of things done only, sometimes\njustly, sometimes unjustly, you can never by them know what right they\nhad, but only what right they pretended.\n\n_B._ Howsoever, let me know what light we have in this matter from the\nRoman histories.\n\n_A._ It would be too long, and an useless digression, to cite all the\nancient authors that speak of the forms of those commonwealths, which\nwere amongst our first ancestors the Saxons and other Germans, and of\nother nations, from whom we derive the titles of honour now in use in\nEngland; nor will it be possible to derive from them any argument of\nright, but only examples of fact, which, by the ambition of potent\nsubjects, have been oftener unjust than otherwise. And for those Saxons\nor Angles, that in ancient times by several invasions made themselves\nmasters of this nation, they were not in themselves one body of a\ncommonwealth, but only a league of divers petty German lords and states,\nsuch as was the Grecian army in the Trojan war, without other obligation\nthan that which proceeded from their own fear and weakness. Nor were\nthose lords, for the most part, the sovereigns at home in their own\ncountry, but chosen by the people for the captains of the forces they\nbrought with them. And therefore it was not without equity, when they\nhad conquered any part of the land, and made some one of them king\nthereof, that the rest should have greater privileges than the common\npeople and soldiers: amongst which privileges, a man may easily\nconjecture this to be one; that they should be made acquainted, and be\nof council, with him that hath the sovereignty in matter of government,\nand have the greatest and most honourable offices both in peace and war.\nBut because there can be no government where there is more than one\nsovereign, it cannot be inferred that they had a right to oppose the\nKing\u2019s resolutions by force, nor to enjoy those honours and places\nlonger than they should continue good subjects. And we find that the\nKings of England did, upon every great occasion, call them together by\nthe name of discreet and wise men of the kingdom, and hear their\ncounsel, and make them judges of all causes, that during their sitting\nwere brought before them. But as he summoned them at his own pleasure,\nso had he also ever the power at his pleasure to dissolve them. The\nNormans also, that descended from the Germans, as we did, had the same\ncustoms in this particular; and by this means, this privilege of the\nlords to be of the King\u2019s great council, and when they were assembled,\nto be the highest of the King\u2019s courts of justice, continued still after\nthe Conquest to this day. But though there be amongst the lords divers\nnames or titles of honour, yet they have their privilege only by the\nname of baron, a name received from the ancient Gauls; amongst whom,\nthat name signified the King\u2019s man, or rather one of his great men: by\nwhich it seems to me, that though they gave him counsel when he required\nit, yet they had no right to make war upon him if he did not follow it.\n\n_B._ When began first the House of Commons to be part of the King\u2019s\ngreat council?\n\n_A._ I do not doubt but that before the Conquest some discreet men, and\nknown to be so by the King, were called by special writ to be of the\nsame council, though they were not lords; but that is nothing to the\nHouse of Commons. The knights of shires and burgesses were never called\nto Parliament, for aught that I know, till the beginning of the reign of\nEdward I, or the latter end of the reign of Henry III, immediately after\nthe misbehaviour of the barons; and, for aught any man knows, were\ncalled on purpose to weaken that power of the lords, which they had so\nfreshly abused. Before the time of Henry III, the lords were descended,\nmost of them, from such as in the invasions and conquests of the Germans\nwere peers and fellow-kings, till one was made king of them all; and\ntheir tenants were their subjects, as it is at this day with the lords\nof France. But after the time of Henry III, the kings began to make\nlords in the place of them whose issue failed, titulary only, without\nthe lands belonging to their title; and by that means, their tenants\nbeing no longer bound to serve them in the wars, they grew every day\nless and less able to make a party against the King, though they\ncontinued still to be his great council. And as their power decreased,\nso the power of the House of Commons increased; but I do not find they\nwere part of the King\u2019s council at all, nor judges over other men;\nthough it cannot be denied, but a King may ask their advice, as well as\nthe advice of any other. But I do not find that the end of their\nsummoning was to give advice, but only, in case they had any petitions\nfor redress of grievances, to be ready there with them whilst the King\nhad his great council about him. But neither they nor the lords could\npresent to the King, as a grievance, that the King took upon him to make\nthe laws; to choose his own privy-counsellors; to raise money and\nsoldiers; to defend the peace and honour of the kingdom; to make\ncaptains in his army; to make governors of his castles, whom he pleased.\nFor this had been to tell the King, that it was one of their grievances\nthat he was King.\n\n_B._ What did the Parliament do, whilst the King was in Scotland?\n\n_A._ The King went in August; after which, the Parliament, September the\n8th, adjourned till the 20th of October; and the King returned about the\nend of November following. In which time the most seditious of both\nHouses, and which had designed the change of government and to cast off\nmonarchy, but yet had not wit enough to set up any other government in\nits place, and consequently left it to the chance of war, made a cabal\namongst themselves; in which they projected how, by seconding one\nanother, to govern the House of Commons, and invented how to put the\nkingdom, by the power of that House, into a rebellion, which they then\ncalled a posture of defence against such dangers from abroad, as they\nthemselves should feign and publish. Besides, whilst the King was in\nScotland, the Irish Papists got together a great party, with an\nintention to massacre the Protestants there, and had laid a design for\nthe seizing, on October the 23rd, of Dublin Castle, where the King\u2019s\nofficers of the government of that country made their residence; and had\neffected it, had it not been discovered the night before. The manner of\nthe discovery, and the murders they committed in the country afterwards,\nI need not tell you, since the whole story of it is extant.\n\n_B._ I wonder they did not expect and provide for a rebellion in\nIreland, as soon as they began to quarrel with the King in England. For\nwas there any body so ignorant, as not to know that the Irish Papists\ndid long for a change of religion there, as well as the Presbyterians in\nEngland? Or, that in general, the Irish nation did hate the name of\nsubjection to England, nor would longer be quiet, than they feared an\narmy out of England to chastise them? What better time then could they\ntake for their rebellion than this, wherein they were encouraged, not\nonly by our weakness caused by this division between the King and his\nParliament, but also by the example of the Presbyterians, both of the\nScotch and English nation? But what did the Parliament do upon this\noccasion, in the King\u2019s absence?\n\n_A._ Nothing; but consider what use they might make of it to their own\nends; partly, by imputing it to the King\u2019s evil counsellors, and partly,\nby occasion thereof to demand of the King the power of pressing and\nordering soldiers; which power whosoever has, has also, without doubt,\nthe whole sovereignty.\n\n_B._ When came the King back?\n\n_A._ He came back the 25th of November; and was welcomed with the\nacclamations of the common people, as much as if he had been the most\nbeloved of all the Kings that were before him; but found not a reception\nby the Parliament, answerable to it. They presently began to pick new\nquarrels against him, out of every thing he said to them. December the\n2nd, the King called together both Houses of Parliament, and then did\nonly recommend unto them the raising of succours for Ireland.\n\n_B._ What quarrel could they pick out of that?\n\n_A._ None: but in order thereto, as they may pretend, they had a bill in\nagitation to assert the power of levying and pressing soldiers to the\ntwo Houses of the Lords and Commons; which was as much as to take from\nthe King the power of the militia, which is in effect the whole\nsovereign power. For he that hath the power of levying and commanding\nthe soldiers, has all other rights of sovereignty which he shall please\nto claim. The King, hearing of it, called the Houses of Parliament\ntogether again, on December the 14th, and then pressed again the\nbusiness of Ireland: (as there was need; for all this while the Irish\nwere murdering the English in Ireland, and strengthening themselves\nagainst the forces they expected to come out of England): and withal,\ntold them he took notice of the bill in agitation for pressing of\nsoldiers, and that he was contented it should pass with a _salvo jure_\nboth for him and them, because the present time was unseasonable to\ndispute it in.\n\n_B._ What was there unreasonable in this?\n\n_A._ Nothing: what is unreasonable is one question, what they quarrelled\nat is another. They quarrelled at this: that his Majesty took notice of\nthe bill, while it was in debate in the House of Lords, before it was\npresented to him in the course of Parliament; and also that he showed\nhimself displeased with those that propounded the said bill; both which\nthey declared to be against the privileges of Parliament, and petitioned\nthe King to give them reparation against those by whose evil counsel he\nwas induced to it, that they might receive condign punishment.\n\n_B._ This was cruel proceeding. Do not the Kings of England use to sit\nin the Lords' House when they please? And was not this bill in debate\nthen in the House of Lords? It is a strange thing that a man should be\nlawfully in the company of men, where he must needs hear and see what\nthey say and do, and yet must not take notice of it so much as to the\nsame company; for though the King was not present at the debate itself,\nyet it was lawful for any of the Lords to make him acquainted with it.\nAny one of the House of Commons, though not present at a proposition or\ndebate in the House, nevertheless hearing of it from some of his\nfellow-members, may certainly not only take notice of it, but also speak\nto it in the House of Commons: but to make the King give up his friends\nand counsellors to them, to be put to death, banishment, or\nimprisonment, for their good-will to him, was such a tyranny over a\nking, no king ever exercised over any subject but in cases of treason or\nmurder, and seldom then.\n\n_A._ Presently hereupon began a kind of war between the pens of the\nParliament and those of the secretaries, and other able men that were\nwith the King. For upon the 15th of December they sent to the King a\npaper called _A Remonstrance of the State of the Kingdom_, and with it a\npetition; both which they caused to be published. In the remonstrance\nthey complained of certain mischievous designs of a malignant party,\nthen, before the beginning of the Parliament, grown ripe; and did set\nforth what means had been used for the preventing of it by the wisdom of\nthe Parliament; what rubs they had found therein; what course was fit to\nbe taken for restoring and establishing the ancient honour, greatness,\nand safety, of the Crown and nation.\n\nAnd first, of these designs the promoters and actors were, they said,\nJesuited Papists:\n\nSecondly, the bishops, and that part of the clergy that cherish\nformality as a support of their own ecclesiastical tyranny and\nusurpation:\n\nThirdly, counsellors and courtiers, that for private ends, they said,\nhad engaged themselves to further the interests of some foreign princes.\n\n_B._ It may very well be, that some of the bishops, and also some of the\ncourt, may have, in pursuit of their private interest, done something\nindiscreetly, and perhaps wickedly. Therefore I pray you tell me in\nparticular what their crimes were: for methinks the King should not have\nconnived at anything against his own supreme authority.\n\n_A._ The Parliament were not very keen against them that were against\nthe King; they made no doubt but all they did was by the King\u2019s command;\nbut accused thereof the bishops, counsellors, and courtiers, as being a\nmore mannerly way of accusing the King himself, and defaming him to his\nsubjects. For the truth is, the charge they brought against them was so\ngeneral as not to be called an accusation, but railing. As first, they\nsaid they nourished questions of prerogative and liberty between the\nKing and his people, to the end that seeming much addicted to his\nMajesty\u2019s service, they might get themselves into places of greatest\ntrust and power in the kingdom.\n\n_B._ How could this be called an accusation, in which there is no fact\nfor any accusers to apply their proofs to, or their witnesses. For\ngranting that these questions of prerogative had been moved by them, who\ncan prove that their end was to gain to themselves and friends the\nplaces of trust and power in the kingdom?\n\n_A._ A second accusation was, that they endeavoured to suppress the\npurity and power of religion.\n\n_B._ That is canting; it is not in man\u2019s power to suppress the power of\nreligion.\n\n_A._ They meant that they suppressed the doctrine of the Presbyterians;\nthat is to say, the very foundation of the then Parliament\u2019s treacherous\npretensions.\n\nA third, that they cherished Arminians, Papists, and libertines (by\nwhich they meant the common Protestants, which meddle not with\ndisputes), to the end they might compose a body fit to act according to\ntheir counsels and resolutions.\n\nA fourth, that they endeavoured to put the King upon other courses of\nraising money, than by the ordinary way of Parliaments.\n\nJudge whether these may be properly called accusations, or not rather\nspiteful reproaches of the King\u2019s government.\n\n_B._ Methinks this last was a very great fault. For what good could\nthere be in putting the King upon an odd course of getting money, when\nthe Parliament was willing to supply him, as far as to the security of\nthe kingdom, or to the honour of the King, should be necessary?\n\n_A._ But I told you before, they would give him none, but with a\ncondition he should cut off the heads of whom they pleased, how\nfaithfully soever they had served him. And if he would have sacrificed\nall his friends to their ambition, yet they would have found other\nexcuses for denying him subsidies; for they were resolved to take from\nhim the sovereign power to themselves; which they could never do without\ntaking great care that he should have no money at all. In the next\nplace, they put into the remonstrance, as faults of them whose counsel\nthe King followed, all those things which since the beginning of the\nKing\u2019s reign were by them misliked, whether faults or not, and whereof\nthey were not able to judge for want of knowledge of the causes and\nmotives that induced the King to do them, and were known only to the\nKing himself and such of his privy-council as he revealed them to.\n\n_B._ But what were those particular pretended faults?\n\n_A._ 1. The dissolution of his first Parliament at Oxford. 2. The\ndissolution of his second Parliament, being in the second year of his\nreign. 3. The dissolution of his Parliament in the fourth year of his\nreign. 4. The fruitless expedition against Calais. 5. The peace made\nwith Spain, whereby the Palatine\u2019s cause was deserted, and left to\nchargeable and hopeless treaties. 6. The sending of commissions to raise\nmoney by way of loan. 7. Raising of ship-money. 8. Enlargement of\nforests, contrary to Magna Charta. 9. The design of engrossing all the\ngunpowder into one hand, and keeping it in the Tower of London. 10. A\ndesign to bring in the use of brass money. 11. The fines, imprisonments,\nstigmatizings, mutilations, whippings, pillories, gags, confinements,\nand banishments, by sentence in the Court of Star-chamber. 12. The\ndisplacing of judges. 13. Illegal acts of the Council-table. 14. The\narbitrary and illegal power of the Earl Marshal\u2019s Court. 15. The abuses\nin Chancery, Exchequer-chamber, and Court of Wards. 16. The selling of\ntitles of honour, of judges, and serjeants' places, and other offices.\n17. The insolence of bishops and other clerks, in suspensions,\nexcommunications, deprivations, and degradations, of divers painful, and\nlearned, and pious ministers.\n\n_B._ Were there any such ministers degraded, deprived, or\nexcommunicated?\n\n_A._ I cannot tell. But I remember I have heard threatened divers\npainful, unlearned, and seditious ministers.\n\n18. The excess of severity of the High Commission-Court. 19. The\npreaching before the King against the property of the subject, and for\nthe prerogative of the King above the law. And divers other petty\nquarrels they had to the government, which though they were laid upon\nthis faction, yet they knew they would fall upon the King himself in the\njudgment of the people, to whom, by printing, it was communicated.\n\nAgain, after the dissolution of the Parliament May the 5th, 1640, they\nfind other faults; as the dissolution itself; the imprisoning some\nmembers of both Houses; a forced loan of money attempted in London; the\ncontinuance of the Convocation, when the Parliament was ended; and the\nfavour shewed to Papists by Secretary Windebank and others.\n\n_B._ All this will go current with common people for misgovernment, and\nfor faults of the King, though some of them were misfortunes; and both\nthe misfortunes and the misgovernment, if any were, were the faults of\nthe Parliament; who, by denying to give him money, did both frustrate\nhis attempts abroad, and put him upon those extraordinary ways, which\nthey call illegal, of raising money at home.\n\n_A._ You see what a heap of evils they have raised to make a show of\nill-government to the people, which they second with an enumeration of\nthe many services they have done the King in overcoming a great many of\nthem, though not all, and in divers other things; and say, that though\nthey had contracted a debt to the Scots of 220,000_l._ and granted six\nsubsidies, and a bill of poll-money worth six subsidies more, yet that\nGod had so blessed the endeavours of this Parliament, that the kingdom\nwas a gainer by it: and then follows the catalogue of those good things\nthey had done for the King and kingdom. For the kingdom they had done,\nthey said, these things: they had abolished ship-money; they had taken\naway coat and conduct money, and other military charges, which, they\nsaid, amounted to little less than the ship-money; that they suppressed\nall monopolies, which they reckoned above a million yearly saved by the\nsubject; that they had quelled living grievances, meaning evil\ncounsellors and actors, by the death of my Lord of Strafford, by the\nflight of the Chancellor Finch, and of Secretary Windebank, by the\nimprisonment of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and of Judge Bartlet, and\nthe impeachment of other bishops and judges; that they had passed a bill\nfor a triennial Parliament, and another for the continuance of the\npresent Parliament, till they should think fit to dissolve themselves.\n\n_B._ That is to say, for ever, if they be suffered. But the sum of all\nthese things, which they had done for the kingdom, is, that they had\nleft it without government, without strength, without money, without\nlaw, and without good counsel.\n\n_A._ They reckoned, also, putting down of the High-Commission, and the\nabating of the power of the Council-table, and of the bishops and their\ncourts; the taking away of unnecessary ceremonies in religion; removing\nof ministers from their livings, that were not of their faction, and\nputting in such as were.\n\n_B._ All this was but their own, and not the kingdom\u2019s business.\n\n_A._ The good they had done the King, was first, they said, the giving\nof 25,000_l._ a month for the relief of the northern counties.\n\n_B._ What need of relief had the northern counties, more than the rest\nof the counties of England?\n\n_A._ Yes; in the northern counties were quartered the Scotch army, which\nthe Parliament called in to oppose the King, and consequently their\nquarter was to be discharged.\n\n_B._ True; but by the Parliament that called them in.\n\n_A._ But they say no; and that this money was given to the King, because\nhe is bound to protect his subjects.\n\n_B._ He is no further bound to that, than they to give him money\nwherewithal to do it. This is very great impudence; to raise an army\nagainst the King, and with that army to oppress their fellow-subjects;\nand then require that the King should relieve them, that is to say, be\nat the charge of paying the army that was raised to fight against him.\n\n_A._ Nay, further; they put to the King\u2019s account the 300,000_l._ given\nto the Scots, without which they would not have invaded England; besides\nmany other things, that I now remember not.\n\n_B._ I did not think there had been so great impudence and villainy in\nmankind.\n\n_A._ You have not observed the world long enough to see all that is ill.\nSuch was their remonstrance, as I have told you. With it they sent a\npetition, containing three points: 1. That his Majesty would deprive the\nbishops of their votes in Parliament, and remove such oppressions in\nreligion, church-government, and discipline, as they had brought in; 2.\nThat he should remove from his council all such as should promote the\npeople\u2019s grievances, and employ in his great and public affairs such as\nthe Parliament should confide in; 3. That he would not give away the\nlands escheated to the Crown by the rebellion in Ireland.\n\n_B._ This last point, methinks, was not wisely put in at this time: it\nshould have been reserved till they had subdued the rebels, against whom\nthere were yet no forces sent over. It is like selling the lion\u2019s skin\nbefore they had killed him. But what answer was made to the other two\npropositions?\n\n_A._ What answer should be made, but a denial? About the same time the\nKing himself exhibited articles against six persons of the Parliament,\nfive whereof were of the House of Commons and one of the House of Lords,\naccusing them of high-treason; and upon the 4th of January, went himself\nto the House of Commons to demand those five of them. But private notice\nhaving been given by some treacherous person about the King, they had\nabsented themselves; and by that means frustrated his Majesty\u2019s\nintentions. And after he was gone, the House making a heinous matter of\nit, and a high breach of their privileges, adjourned themselves into\nLondon, there to sit as a general committee, pretending they were not\nsafe at Westminster: (for the King, when he went to the House to demand\nthose persons, had somewhat more attendance with him, but not otherwise\narmed than his servants used to be, than he ordinarily had): and would\nnot be pacified, though the King did afterwards waive the prosecution of\nthose persons, unless he would also discover to them those that gave him\ncounsel to go in that manner to the Parliament House, to the end they\nmight receive condign punishment; which was the word they used instead\nof cruelty.\n\n_B._ This was a harsh demand. Was it not enough that the King should\nforbear his enemies, but also that he must betray his friends? If they\nthus tyrannize over the King before they have gotten the sovereign power\ninto their hands, how will they tyrannize over their fellow subjects\nwhen they have gotten it?\n\n_A._ So as they did.\n\n_B._ How long stayed that committee in London?\n\n_A._ Not above two or three days; and then were brought from London to\nthe Parliament House by water in great triumph, guarded with a\ntumultuous number of armed men, there to sit in security in despite of\nthe King, and make traitorous acts against him, such and as many as they\nlisted; and under favour of these tumults, to frighten away from the\nHouse of Peers all such as were not of their own faction. For at this\ntime the rabble was so insolent, that scarce any of the bishops durst go\nto the House for fear of violence upon their persons: in so much as\ntwelve of them excused themselves of coming thither; and by way of\npetition to the King, remonstrated that they were not permitted to go\nquietly to the performance of that duty, and protesting against all\ndeterminations, as of none effect, that should pass in the House of\nLords during their forced absence. Which the House of Commons taking\nhold of, sent up to the Peers one of their members, to accuse them of\nhigh-treason. Whereupon ten of them were sent to the Tower; after which\ntime there were no more words of their high-treason; but there passed a\nbill by which they were deprived of their votes in Parliament, and to\nthis bill they got the King\u2019s assent. And, in the beginning of September\nafter, they voted that the bishops should have no more to do in the\ngovernment of the Church; but to this they had not the King\u2019s assent,\nthe war being now begun.\n\n_B._ What made the Parliament so averse to episcopacy; and especially\nthe House of Lords, whereof the bishops were members? For I see no\nreason why they should do it to gratify a number of poor parish priests,\nthat were Presbyterians, and that were never likely any way to serve the\nLords; but, on the contrary, to do their best to pull down their power,\nand subject them to their synods and classes.\n\n_A._ For the Lords, very few of them did perceive the intentions of the\nPresbyterians; and, besides that, they durst not, I believe, oppose the\nLower House.\n\n_B._ But why were the Lower House so earnest against them?\n\n_A._ Because they meant to make use of their tenets, and with pretended\nsanctity to make the King and his party odious to the people, by whose\nhelp they were to set up democracy and depose the King, or to let him\nhave the title only so long as he should act for their purposes. But not\nonly the Parliament, but in a manner all the people of England, were\ntheir enemies, upon the account of their behaviour, as being, they said,\ntoo imperious. This was all that was colourably laid to their charge;\nthe main cause of pulling them down, was the envy of the Presbyterians,\nthat incensed the people against them, and against episcopacy itself.\n\n_B._ How would the Presbyterians have the Church to be governed?\n\n_A._ By national and provincial synods.\n\n_B._ Is not this to make the national assembly an archbishop, and the\nprovincial assemblies so many bishops?\n\n_A._ Yes; but every minister shall have the delight of sharing the\ngovernment, and consequently of being able to be revenged on them that\ndo not admire their learning and help to fill their purses, and win to\ntheir service them that do.\n\n_B._ It is a hard case, that there should be two factions to trouble the\ncommonwealth, without any interest in it of their own, other than every\nparticular man may have; and that their quarrels should be only about\nopinions, that is, about who has the most learning; as if their learning\nought to be the rule of governing all the world. What is it they are\nlearned in? Is it politics and rules of state? I know, it is called\ndivinity; but I hear almost nothing preached but matter of philosophy.\nFor religion in itself admits no controversy. It is a law of the\nkingdom, and ought not to be disputed. I do not think they pretend to\nspeak with God and know his will by any other way than reading the\nScriptures, which we also do.\n\n_A._ Yes, some of them do, and give themselves out for prophets by\nextraordinary inspiration. But the rest pretend only, for their\nadvancement to benefices and charge of souls, a greater skill in the\nScriptures than other men have, by reason of their breeding in the\nUniversities, and knowledge there gotten of the Latin tongue, and some\nalso of the Greek and Hebrew tongues, wherein the Scripture was written;\nbesides their knowledge of natural philosophy, which is there publicly\ntaught.\n\n_B._ As for the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew tongues, it was once, to the\ndetection of Roman fraud, and to the ejection of the Romish power, very\nprofitable, or rather necessary; but now that is done, and we have the\nScripture in English, and preaching in English, I see no great need of\nLatin, Greek, and Hebrew. I should think myself better qualified by\nunderstanding well the languages of our neighbours, French, Dutch, and\nItalian. I think it was never seen in the world, before the power of\npopes was set up, that philosophy was much conducing to power in a\ncommonwealth.\n\n_A._ But philosophy, together with divinity, have very much conduced to\nthe advancement of the professors thereof to places of the greatest\nauthority, next to the authority of kings themselves, in most of the\nancient kingdoms of the world; as is manifestly to be seen in the\nhistory of those times.\n\n_B._ I pray you cite me some of the authors and places.\n\n_A._ First, what were the Druids of old time in Britanny and France?\nWhat authority these had you may see in C\u00e6sar, Strabo, and others, and\nespecially in Diodorus Siculus, the greatest antiquary perhaps that ever\nwas; who speaking of the Druids, whom he calls Sarovides, in France,\nsays thus:\u2014\u201cThere be also amongst them certain philosophers and\ntheologians, that are exceedingly honoured, whom they also use as\nprophets. These men, by their skill in augury and inspection into the\nbowels of the beasts sacrificed, foretell what is to come, and have the\nmultitude obedient to them.\u201d And a little after,\u2014\u201cIt is a custom amongst\nthem, that no man may sacrifice without a philosopher; because, say\nthey, men ought not to present their thanks to the Gods, but by them\nthat know the divine nature, and are as it were of the same language\nwith them; and that all good things ought by such as these to be prayed\nfor.\u201d\n\n_B._ I can hardly believe that those Druids were very skilful, either in\nnatural philosophy, or moral.\n\n_A._ Nor I; for they held and taught the transmigration of souls from\none body to another, as did Pythagoras; which opinion whether they took\nfrom him, or he from them, I cannot tell.\n\nWhat were the Magi in Persia, but philosophers and astrologers? You know\nhow they came to find our Saviour by the conduct of a star, either from\nPersia itself, or from some country more eastward than Judea. Were not\nthese in great authority in their country? And are they not in most\nparts of Christendom thought to have been Kings?\n\nEgypt hath been thought by many, the most ancient kingdom and nation of\nthe world, and their priests had the greatest power in civil affairs,\nthat any subjects ever had in any nation. And what were they but\nphilosophers and divines? Concerning whom, the same Diodorus Siculus\nsays thus: \u201cThe whole country of Egypt being divided into three parts,\nthe body of the priests have one, as being of most credit with the\npeople both for their devotion towards the Gods, and also for their\nunderstanding gotten by education;\u201d and presently after, \u201cFor generally\nthese men, in the greatest affairs of all, are the King\u2019s counsellors,\npartly executing, and partly informing and advising; foretelling him\nalso, by their skill in astrology and art in the inspection of\nsacrifices, the things that are to come, and reading to him out of their\nholy books such of the actions there recorded as are profitable for him\nto know. It is not there as in Greece, one man or one woman that has the\npriesthood; but they are many that attend the honours and sacrifices of\nthe Gods, and leave the same employment to their posterity, which, next\nto the King, have the greatest power and authority.\u201d\n\nConcerning the judicature amongst the Egyptians, he saith thus: \u201cFrom\nout of the most eminent cities, Hieropolis, Thebes, and Memphis, they\nchoose judges, which are a council not inferior to that of Areopagus in\nAthens, or that of the senate in Laced\u00e6mon. When they are met, being in\nnumber thirty, they choose one from amongst themselves to be\nchief-justice, and the city whereof he is, sendeth another in his\nplace.\u201d This chief-justice wore about his neck, hung in a gold chain, a\njewel of precious stones, the name of which jewel was _truth_; which,\nwhen the chief-justice had put on, then began the pleading, &c.; and\nwhen the judges had agreed on the sentence, then did the chief-justice\nput this jewel of truth to one of the pleas. You see now what power was\nacquired in civil matters by the conjuncture of philosophy and divinity.\n\nLet us come now to the commonwealth of the Jews. Was not the priesthood\nin a family, namely, the Levites, as well as the priesthood of Egypt?\nDid not the high-priest give judgment by the breast-plate of Urim and\nThummim? Look upon the kingdom of Assyria, and the philosophers and\nChaldeans. Had they not lands and cities belonging to their family, even\nin Abraham\u2019s time, who dwelt, you know, in Ur of the Chaldeans. Of these\nthe same author says thus: \u201cThe Chaldeans are a sect in politics, like\nto that of the Egyptian priests; for being ordained for the service of\nthe Gods, they spend the whole time of their life in philosophy; being\nof exceeding great reputation in astrology, and pretending much also to\nprophecy, foretelling things to come by purifications and sacrifices,\nand to find out by certain incantations the preventing of harm, and the\nbringing to pass of good. They have also skill in augury, and in the\ninterpretation of dreams and wonders, nor are they unskilful in the art\nof foretelling by the inwards of beasts sacrificed; and have their\nlearning not as the Greeks; for the philosophy of the Chaldeans goes to\ntheir family by tradition, and the son receives it from his father.\u201d\n\nFrom Assyria let us pass into India, and see what esteem the\nphilosophers had there. \u201cThe whole multitude,\u201d says Diodorus, \u201cof the\nIndians, is divided into seven parts; whereof the first, is the body of\nphilosophers; for number the least, but for eminence the first; for they\nare free from taxes, and as they are not masters of others, so are no\nothers masters of them. By private men they are called to the sacrifices\nand to the care of burials of the dead, as being thought most beloved of\nthe Gods and skilful in the doctrine concerning hell; and for this\nemployment receive gifts and honours very considerable. They are also of\ngreat use to the people of India; for being taken at the beginning of\nthe year into the great assembly, they foretell them of great droughts,\ngreat rains, also of winds, and of sicknesses, and of whatsoever is\nprofitable for them to know beforehand.\u201d\n\nThe same author, concerning the laws of the \u00c6thiopians, saith thus: \u201cThe\nlaws of the \u00c6thiopians seem very different from those of other nations,\nand especially about the election of their Kings. For the priests\npropound some of the chief men amongst them, named in a catalogue, and\nwhom the God (which, according to a certain custom, is carried about to\nfeastings) does accept of; him the multitude elect for their King, and\npresently adore and honour him as a God, put into the government by\ndivine providence. The King being chosen, he has the manner of his life\nlimited to him by the laws, and does all other things according to the\ncustom of the country, neither rewarding nor punishing any man otherwise\nthan from the beginning is established amongst them by law. Nor use they\nto put any man to death, though he be condemned to it, but to send some\nofficer to him with a token of death; who seeing the token, goes\npresently to his house, and kills himself presently after. But the\nstrangest thing of all is, that which they do concerning the death of\ntheir Kings. For the priests that live in Meroe, and spend their time\nabout the worship and honour of the Gods, and are in greatest authority;\nwhen they have a mind to it, send a messenger to the King to bid him\ndie, for that the Gods have given such order, and that the commandments\nof the immortals are not by any means to be neglected by those who are,\nby nature, mortal; using also other speeches to him, which men of simple\njudgment, and that have not reason enough to dispute against those\nunnecessary commands, as being educated in an old and indelible custom,\nare content to admit of. Therefore in former times the Kings did obey\nthe priests, not as mastered by force and arms, but as having their\nreason mastered by superstition. But in the time of Ptolemy II,\nErgamenes, King of the \u00c6thiopians, having had his breeding in philosophy\nafter the manner of the Greeks, being the first that durst dispute their\npower, took heart as befitted a King; came with soldiers to a place\ncalled Abaton, where was then the golden temple of the \u00c6thiopians;\nkilled all the priests, abolished the custom, and rectified the kingdom\naccording to his will.\u201d\n\n_B._ Though they that were killed were most damnable impostors, yet the\nact was cruel.\n\n_A._ It was so. But were not the priests cruel, to cause their Kings,\nwhom a little before they adored as Gods, to make away themselves? The\nKing killed them, for the safety of his person; they him, out of\nambition or love of change. The King\u2019s act may be coloured with the good\nof his people; the priests had no pretence against their kings, who were\ncertainly very godly, or else would never have obeyed the command of the\npriests by a messenger unarmed, to kill themselves. Our late King, the\nbest King perhaps that ever was, you know, was murdered, having been\nfirst persecuted by war, at the incitement of Presbyterian ministers;\nwho are therefore guilty of the death of all that fell in that war;\nwhich were, I believe, in England, Scotland, and Ireland, near 100,000\npersons. Had it not been much better that those seditious ministers,\nwhich were not perhaps 1000, had been all killed before they had\npreached? It had been, I confess, a great massacre; but the killing of\n100,000 is a greater.\n\n_B._ I am glad the bishops were out of this business. As ambitious as\nsome say they are, it did not appear in that business, for they were\nenemies to them that were in it.\n\n_A._ But I intend not by these quotations to commend either the divinity\nor the philosophy of those heathen people; but to show only what the\nreputation of those sciences can effect among the people. For their\ndivinity was nothing but idolatry; and their philosophy, (excepting the\nknowledge which the Egyptian priests, and from them the Chaldeans, had\ngotten by long observation and study in astronomy, geometry, and\narithmetic), very little; and that in great part abused in astrology and\nfortune-telling. Whereas the divinity of the clergy of this nation,\n(considered apart from the mixture that has been introduced by the\nChurch of Rome, and in part retained here, of the babbling philosophy of\nAristotle and other Greeks, that has no affinity with religion, and\nserves only to breed disaffection, dissension, and finally sedition and\ncivil war, as we have lately found by dear experience in the differences\nbetween the Presbyterians and Episcopals), is the true religion. But for\nthese differences both parties, as they came in power, not only\nsuppressed the tenets of one another, but also whatsoever doctrine\nlooked with an ill aspect upon their interest; and consequently all true\nphilosophy, especially civil and moral, which can never appear\npropitious to ambition, or to an exemption from their obedience due to\nthe sovereign power.\n\nAfter the King had accused the Lord Kimbolton, a member of the House of\nLords, and Hollis, Haslerigg, Hampden, Pym, and Stroud, five members of\nthe Lower House, of high-treason; and after the Parliament had voted out\nthe bishops from the House of Peers; they pursued especially two things\nin their petitions to his Majesty. The one was, that the King would\ndeclare who were the persons that advised him to go, as he did, to the\nParliament-house to apprehend them, and that he would leave them to the\nParliament to receive condign punishment; and this they did, to stick\nupon his Majesty the dishonour of deserting his friends, and betraying\nthem to his enemies. The other was, that he would allow them a guard out\nof the city of London, to be commanded by the Earl of Essex; for which\nthey pretended, they could not else sit in safety; which pretence was\nnothing but an upbraiding of his Majesty for coming to Parliament better\naccompanied than ordinary, to seize the said five seditious members.\n\n_B._ I see no reason, in petitioning for a guard, they should determine\nit to the city of London in particular, and the command by name to the\nEarl of Essex, unless they meant the King should understand it for a\nguard against himself.\n\n_A._ Their meaning was, that the King should understand it so, and, as I\nverily believe, they meant he should take it for an affront: and the\nKing himself understanding it so, denied to grant it; though he were\nwilling, if they could not otherwise be satisfied, to command such a\nguard to wait upon them as he would be responsible for to God Almighty.\nBesides this, the city of London petitioned the King (put upon it, no\ndoubt, by some members of the Lower House) to put the Tower of London\ninto the hands of persons of trust, meaning such as the Parliament\nshould approve of, and to appoint a guard for the safety of his Majesty\nand the Parliament. This method of bringing petitions in a tumultuary\nmanner, by great multitudes of clamorous people, was ordinary with the\nHouse of Commons, whose ambition could never have been served by way of\nprayer and request, without extraordinary terror.\n\nAfter the King had waived the prosecution of the five members, but\ndenied to make known who had advised him to come in person to the House\nof Commons, they questioned the Attorney-General, who by the King\u2019s\ncommand had exhibited the articles against them, and voted him a breaker\nof the privilege of Parliament; and no doubt had made him feel their\ncruelty, if he had not speedily fled the land.\n\nAbout the end of January, they made an order of both Houses of\nParliament, to prevent the going over of popish commanders into Ireland;\nnot so much fearing that, as that by this the King himself choosing his\ncommanders for that service, might aid himself out of Ireland against\nthe Parliament. But this was no great matter, in respect of a petition\nthey sent his Majesty about the same time, that is to say, about the\n27th or 28th of January, 1641,^\u2020 [Sidenote: \u2020 Feb. 2nd, 1641.] wherein\nthey desired in effect the absolute sovereignty of England; though by\nthe name of sovereignty they challenged it not whilst the King was\nliving. For to the end that the fears and dangers of this kingdom might\nbe removed, and the mischievous designs of those who are enemies to the\npeace of it, might be prevented, they pray, that his Majesty would be\npleased to put forthwith, first, the Tower of London, second, all other\nforts, third, the whole militia of the kingdom, into the hands of such\npersons as should be recommended to him by both the Houses of\nParliament. And this they style a necessary petition.\n\n_B._ Were there really any such fears and dangers generally conceived\nhere? Or did there appear any enemies at that time with such designs as\nare mentioned in the petition?\n\n_A._ Yes. But no other fear of danger, but such as any discreet and\nhonest man might justly have of the designs of the Parliament itself;\nwho were the greatest enemies to the peace of the kingdom that could\npossibly be. It is also worth observing, that this petition began with\nthese words, _Most gracious Sovereign_: so stupid they were as not to\nknow, that he that is master of the militia, is master of the kingdom,\nand consequently is in possession of a most absolute sovereignty. The\nKing was now at Windsor, to avoid the tumults of the common people\nbefore the gates of Whitehall, together with their clamours and affronts\nthere. The 9th of February after, he came to Hampton Court, and thence\nhe went to Dover with the Queen, and the Princess of Orange, his\ndaughter; where the Queen with the Princess of Orange embarked for\nHolland, but the King returned to Greenwich, whence he sent for the\nPrince of Wales and the Duke of York, and so went with them towards\nYork.\n\n_B._ Did the Lords join with the Commons in this petition for the\nmilitia?\n\n_A._ It appears so by the title; but I believe they durst not but do it.\nThe House of Commons took them but for a cypher; men of title only,\nwithout real power. Perhaps also the most of them thought, that the\ntaking of the militia from the King would be an addition to their own\npower; but they were very much mistaken, for the House of Commons never\nintended they should be sharers in it.\n\n_B._ What answer made the King to this petition?\n\n_A._ The following: \u201cHis Majesty having well considered of this\npetition, and being desirous to express how willing he is to apply a\nremedy, not only to your _dangers_, but even to your _doubts_ and\n_fears_, he therefore returns this answer, That when he shall know the\nextent of power which is intended to be established in those persons,\nwhom you desire to be the commanders of the militia in the several\ncounties, and likewise to what time it shall be limited, that no power\nshall be executed by his Majesty alone without the advice of Parliament,\nthen he will declare, that (for the securing you from all dangers or\njealousies of any) his Majesty will be content to put in all the places,\nboth of forts and militia in the several counties, such persons as both\nthe Houses of Parliament shall either approve, or recommend unto him; so\nthat you declare before unto his Majesty the names of the persons whom\nyou approve or recommend, unless such persons shall be named, against\nwhom he shall have just and unquestionable exception.\u201d\n\n_B._ What power, for what time, and to whom, did the Parliament grant,\nconcerning the militia?\n\n_A._ The same power which the King had before planted in his lieutenants\nand deputy-lieutenants, in the several counties, and without other\nlimitation of time but their own pleasure.\n\n_B._ Who were the men that had this power?\n\n_A._ There is a catalogue of them printed. They are very many, and most\nof them lords; nor is it necessary to have them named; for to name them\nis, in my opinion, to brand them with the mark of disloyalty or of\nfolly. When they had made a catalogue of them, they sent it to the King,\nwith a new petition for the militia. Also presently after, they sent a\nmessage to his Majesty, praying him to leave the Prince at Hampton\nCourt; but the King granted neither.\n\n_B._ Howsoever, it was well done of them to get hostages, if they could,\nof the King, before he went from them.\n\n_A._ In the meantime, to raise money for the reducing of Ireland, the\nParliament invited men to bring in money by way of adventure, according\nto these propositions. 1. That two millions and five hundred thousand\nacres of land in Ireland, should be assigned to the adventurers, in this\nproportion:\n\n For an adventure of 200_l._ 1,000 acres Ulster.\n in\n\n 300_l._ 1,000 acres in Connaught.\n\n 450_l._ 1,000 acres in Munster.\n\n 600_l._ 1,000 acres in Leinster.\n\nAll according to English measure, and consisting of meadow, arable, and\nprofitable pasture; bogs, woods, and barren mountains, being cast in\nover and above. 2. A revenue was reserved to the Crown, from one penny\nto three-pence on every acre. 3. That commissions should be sent by the\nParliament, to erect manors, settle wastes, and commons, maintain\npreaching ministers, create corporations, and regulate plantations. The\nrest of the propositions concern only the times and manner of payment of\nthe sums subscribed by the adventurers. And to these propositions his\nMajesty assented; but to the petition of the militia, his Majesty denied\nhis assent.\n\n_B._ If he had not, I should have thought it a great wonder. What did\nthe Parliament after this?\n\n_A._ They sent him another petition, which was presented to him when he\nwas at Theobald\u2019s, in his way to York; wherein they tell him plainly,\nthat unless he be pleased to assure them by those messengers then sent,\nthat he would speedily apply his royal assent to the satisfaction of\ntheir former desires, they shall be enforced, for the safety of his\nMajesty and his kingdoms, to dispose of the militia by the authority of\nboth Houses, &c. They petition his Majesty also to let the Prince stay\nat St. James\u2019s, or some other of his Majesty\u2019s houses near London. They\ntell him also, that the power of raising, ordering, and disposing of the\nmilitia, cannot be granted to any corporation, without the authority and\nconsent of the Parliament, and that those parts of the kingdom, which\nhave put themselves into a posture of defence, have done nothing therein\nbut by direction of both Houses, and what is justifiable by the laws of\nthis kingdom.\n\n_B._ What answer made the King to this?\n\n_A._ It was a putting of themselves into arms, and under officers such\nas the Parliament should approve of. 4. They voted that his Majesty\nshould be again desired that the Prince might continue about London.\nLastly, they voted a declaration to be sent to his Majesty by both the\nHouses; wherein they accuse his Majesty of a design of altering\nreligion, though not directly him, but them that counselled him; whom\nthey also accused of being the inviters and fomenters of the Scotch war,\nand framers of the rebellion in Ireland; and upbraid the King again for\naccusing the Lord Kimbolton and the five members, and of being privy to\nthe purpose of bringing up his army, which was raised against the Scots,\nto be employed against the Parliament. To which his Majesty sent his\nanswer from Newmarket. Whereupon it was resolved by both Houses, that in\nthis case of extreme danger and of his Majesty\u2019s refusal, the ordinance\nagreed upon by both Houses for the militia doth oblige the people by the\nfundamental laws of this kingdom; and also, that whosoever shall execute\nany power over the militia, by colour of any commission of lieutenancy,\nwithout consent of both Houses of Parliament, shall be accounted a\ndisturber of the peace of the kingdom. Whereupon his Majesty sent a\nmessage to both Houses from Huntingdon, requiring obedience to the laws\nestablished, and prohibiting all subjects, upon pretence of their\nordinance, to execute anything concerning the militia which is not by\nthose laws warranted. Upon this, the Parliament vote a standing to their\nformer votes; as also, that when the Lords and Commons in Parliament,\nwhich is the supreme court of judicature in the kingdom, shall declare\nwhat the law of the land is, to have this not only questioned, but\ncontradicted, is a high breach of the privilege of Parliament.\n\n_B._ I thought that he that makes the law, ought to declare what the law\nis. For what is it else to to make a law, but to declare what it is? So\nthat they have taken from the King, not only the militia, but also the\nlegislative power.\n\n_A._ They have so; but I make account that the legislative power, and\nindeed all power possible, is contained in the power of the militia.\nAfter this, they seize such money as was due to his Majesty upon the\nbill of tonnage and poundage, and upon the bill of subsidies, that they\nmight disable him every way they possibly could. They sent him also many\nother contumelious messages and petitions after his coming to York;\namongst which one was: \u201cThat whereas the Lord Admiral, by indisposition\nof body, could not command the fleet in person, he would be pleased to\ngive authority to the Earl of Warwick to supply his place;\u201d when they\nknew the King had put Sir John Pennington in it before.\n\n_B._ To what end did the King entertain so many petitions, messages,\ndeclarations and remonstrances, and vouchsafe his answers to them, when\nhe could not choose but clearly see they were resolved to take from him\nhis royal power, and consequently his life? For it could not stand with\ntheir safety to let either him or his issue live, after they had done\nhim so great injuries.\n\n_A._ Besides this, the Parliament had at the same time a committee\nresiding at York, to spy what his Majesty did, and to inform the\nParliament thereof, and also to hinder the King from gaining the people\nof that county to his party: so that when his Majesty was courting the\ngentlemen there, the committee was instigating the yeomanry against him.\nTo which also the ministers did very much contribute; so that the King\nlost his opportunity at York.\n\n_B._ Why did not the King seize the committee into his hands, or drive\nthem out of town?\n\n_A._ I know not; but I believe he knew the Parliament had a greater\nparty than he, not only in Yorkshire but also in York. Towards the end\nof April, the King, upon petition of the people of Yorkshire to have the\nmagazine of Hull to remain still there, for the greater security of the\nnorthern parts, thought fit to take it into his own hands. He had a\nlittle before appointed governor of that town the Earl of Newcastle. But\nthe townsmen, having been already corrupted by the Parliament, refused\nto receive him, but refused not to receive Sir John Hotham, appointed to\nbe governor by the Parliament. The King therefore coming before the\ntown, guarded only by his own servants and a few gentlemen of the\ncountry thereabouts, was denied entrance by Sir John Hotham, that stood\nupon the wall; for which act he presently caused Sir John Hotham to be\nproclaimed traitor, and sent a message to the Parliament, requiring\njustice to be done upon the said Hotham, and that the town and magazine\nmight be delivered into his hands. To which the Parliament made no\nanswer, but instead thereof published another declaration, in which they\nomitted nothing of their former slanders against his Majesty\u2019s\ngovernment, but inserted certain propositions declarative of their own\npretended right: viz. 1. That whatsoever they declare to be law, ought\nnot to be questioned by the King: 2. That no precedents can be limits to\nbound their proceedings: 3. That a Parliament, for the public good, may\ndispose of anything wherein the King or subject hath a right; and that\nthey, without the King, are this Parliament, and the judge of this\npublic good, and that the King\u2019s consent is not necessary: 4. That no\nmember of either House ought to be troubled for treason, felony, or any\nother crime, unless the cause be first brought before the Parliament,\nthat they may judge of the fact and give leave to proceed, if they see\ncause: 5. That the sovereign power resides in both Houses, and that the\nKing ought to have no negative voice: 6. That the levying of forces\nagainst the personal commands of the King (though accompanied with his\npresence) is not levying war against the King, but the levying war\nagainst his laws and authority (which they have power to declare and\nsignify), though not against his person, is levying war against the\nKing; and that treason cannot be committed against his person, otherwise\nthan as he is entrusted with the kingdom and discharging that trust; and\nthat they have a power to judge whether he discharge this trust or not:\n7. That they may depose the King when they will.\n\n_B._ This is plain dealing and without hypocrisy. Could the city of\nLondon swallow this?\n\n_A._ Yes; and more too, if need be. London, you know, has a great belly,\nbut no palate nor taste of right and wrong. In the Parliament-roll of\nHenry IV, amongst the articles of the oath the King at his coronation\ntook, there is one runs thus: _Concedes justas leges et consuetudines\nesse tenendas; et promittes per te eas esse protegendas, et ad honorem\nDei corroborandas, quas vulgus elegerit_. Which the Parliament urged for\ntheir legislative authority, and therefore interpret _quas vulgus\nelegerit_, which the people shall choose; as if the King should swear to\nprotect and corroborate laws before they were made, whether they be good\nor bad; whereas the words signify no more, but that he shall protect and\ncorroborate such laws as they have chosen, that is to say, the Acts of\nParliament then in being. And in the records of the Exchequer it is\nthus: _Will you grant to hold and keep the laws and rightful customs\nwhich the commonalty of this your kingdom have, and will you defend and\nuphold them? &c._ And this was the answer his Majesty made to that\npoint.\n\n_B._ And I think this answer very full and clear. But if the words were\nto be interpreted in the other sense, yet I see no reason why the King\nshould be bound to swear to them. For Henry IV came to the Crown by the\nvotes of a Parliament not much inferior in wickedness to this Long\nParliament, that deposed and murdered their lawful King; saving that it\nwas not the Parliament itself, but the usurper that murdered King\nRichard II.\n\n_A._ About a week after, in the beginning of May, the Parliament sent\nthe King another paper, which they styled the humble petition and advice\nof both Houses, containing nineteen propositions; which when you shall\nhear, you shall be able to judge what power they meant to leave to the\nKing more than to any one of his subjects. The first of them is this:\n\n1. That the Lords and others of his Majesty\u2019s privy-council, and all\ngreat officers of state, both at home and abroad, be put from their\nemployments and from his council, save only such as should be approved\nof by both Houses of Parliament; and none put into their places but by\napprobation of the said Houses. And that all privy-councillors take an\noath for the due execution of their places, in such form as shall be\nagreed upon by the said Houses.\n\n2. That the great affairs of the kingdom be debated, resolved, and\ntransacted only in Parliament; and such as shall presume to do any thing\nto the contrary, be reserved to the censure of the Parliament; and such\nother matters of the state as are proper for his Majesty\u2019s\nprivy-council, shall be debated and concluded by such as shall from time\nto time be chosen for that place by both Houses of Parliament; and that\nno public act concerning the affairs of the kingdom, which is proper for\nhis Majesty\u2019s privy-council, be esteemed valid, as proceeding from the\nroyal authority, unless it be done by the advice and consent of the\nmajor part of the council, attested under their hands; and that the\ncouncil be not more than twenty-five, nor less than fifteen; and that\nwhen a councillor\u2019s place falls void in the interval of Parliament, it\nshall not be supplied without the assent of the major part of the\ncouncil; and that such choice also shall be void, if the next Parliament\nafter confirm it not.\n\n3. That the Lord High Steward of England, Lord High Constable, Lord\nChancellor, or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, Lord Treasurer, Lord\nPrivy-Seal, Earl Marshal, Lord Admiral, Warden of the Cinque Ports,\nChief Governor of Ireland, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Master of the\nWards, Secretaries of State, two Chief Justices and Chief Baron, be\nalways chosen with the approbation of both Houses of Parliament; and in\nthe intervals of Parliament, by the major part of the privy-council.\n\n4. That the government of the King\u2019s children shall be committed to such\nas both Houses shall approve of; and in the intervals of Parliament,\nsuch as the privy-council shall approve of; that the servants then about\nthem, against whom the Houses have just exception, should be removed.\n\n5. That no marriage be concluded or treated of for any of the King\u2019s\nchildren, without consent of Parliament.\n\n6. That the laws in force against Jesuits, priests, and popish\nrecusants, be strictly put in execution.\n\n7. That the votes of Popish lords in the House of Peers be taken away,\nand that a bill be passed for the education of the children of Papists\nin the Protestant religion.\n\n8. That the King will be pleased to reform the Church-government and\nliturgy in such manner as both Houses of Parliament shall advise.\n\n9. That he would be pleased to rest satisfied with that course that the\nLords and Commons have appointed for ordering the militia, and recal his\ndeclarations and proclamations against it.\n\n10. That such members as have been put out of any place or office since\nthis Parliament began, may be restored, or have satisfaction.\n\n11. That all privy-councillors and judges take an oath, (the form\nwhereof shall be agreed on and settled by act of Parliament), for the\nmaintaining of the Petition of Right, and of certain statutes made by\nthe Parliament.\n\n12. That all the judges and officers placed by approbation of both\nHouses of Parliament, may hold their places _quam diu bene se\ngesserint._\n\n13. That the justice of Parliament may pass upon all delinquents,\nwhether they be within the kingdom or fled out of it; and that all\npersons cited by either House of Parliament, may appear and abide the\ncensure of Parliament.\n\n14. That the general pardon offered by his Majesty, be granted with such\nexceptions as shall be advised by both Houses of Parliament.\n\n_B._ What a spiteful article was this! All the rest proceeded from\nambition, which many times well-natured men are subject to; but this\nproceeded from an inhuman and devilish cruelty.\n\n_A._ 15. That the forts and castles be put under the command of such\npersons as, with the approbation of the Parliament, the King shall\nappoint.\n\n16. That the extraordinary guards about the King be discharged; and for\nthe future none raised but according to the law, in case of actual\nrebellion or invasion.\n\n_B._ Methinks these very propositions sent to the King are an actual\nrebellion.\n\n_A._ 17. That his Majesty enter into a more strict alliance with the\nUnited Provinces, and other neighbour Protestant Princes and States.\n\n18. That his Majesty be pleased, by act of Parliament, to clear the Lord\nKimbolton and the five members of the House of Commons, in such manner\nas that future Parliaments may be secured from the consequence of that\nevil precedent.\n\n19. That his Majesty be pleased to pass a bill for restraining peers\nmade hereafter from sitting or voting in Parliament, unless they be\nadmitted with consent of both Houses of Parliament.\n\nThese propositions granted, they promise to apply themselves to regulate\nhis Majesty\u2019s revenue to his best advantage, and to settle it to the\nsupport of his royal dignity in honour and plenty; and also to put the\ntown of Hull into such hands as his Majesty shall appoint with consent\nof Parliament.\n\n_B._ Is not that to put it into such hands as his Majesty shall appoint\nby the consent of the petitioners, which is no more than to keep it in\ntheir hands as it is? Did they want, or think the King wanted,\ncommon-sense, so as not to perceive that their promise herein was worth\nnothing?\n\n_A._ After the sending of these propositions to the King, and his\nMajesty\u2019s refusal to grant them, they began, on both sides, to prepare\nfor war. The King raised a guard for his person in Yorkshire, and the\nParliament, thereupon having voted that the King intended to make war\nupon his Parliament, gave order for the mustering and exercising the\npeople in arms, and published propositions to invite and encourage them\nto bring in either ready money or plate, or to promise under their hands\nto furnish and maintain certain numbers of horse, horsemen, and arms,\nfor the defence of the King and Parliament, (meaning by King, as they\nhad formerly declared, not his person, but his laws); promising to repay\ntheir money with interest of 8_l._ in the 100_l._ and the value of their\nplate with twelve-pence the ounce for the fashion. On the other side,\nthe King came to Nottingham, and there did set up his standard royal,\nand sent out commissions of array to call those to him, which by the\nancient laws of England were bound to serve him in the wars. Upon this\noccasion there passed divers declarations between the King and\nParliament concerning the legality of this array, which are too long to\ntell you at this time.\n\n_B._ Nor do I desire to hear any mooting about this question. For I\nthink that general law of _salus populi_, and the right of defending\nhimself against those that had taken from him the sovereign power, are\nsufficient to make legal whatsoever he should do in order to the\nrecovery of his kingdom, or to the punishing of the rebels.\n\n_A._ In the meantime the Parliament raised an army, and made the Earl of\nEssex general thereof; by which act they declared what they meant\nformerly, when they petitioned the King for a guard to be commanded by\nthe said Earl of Essex. And now the King sends out his proclamations,\nforbidding obedience to the orders of the Parliament concerning the\nmilitia; and the Parliament send out orders against the execution of the\ncommissions of array. Hitherto, though it were a war before, yet there\nwas no blood shed; they shot at one another nothing but paper.\n\n_B._ I understand now, how the Parliament destroyed the peace of the\nkingdom; and how easily, by the help of seditious Presbyterian ministers\nand of ambitious ignorant orators, they reduced this government into\nanarchy. But I believe it will be a harder task for them to bring in\npeace again, and settle the government, either in themselves, or any\nother governor, or form of government. For, granting that they obtained\nthe victory in this war, they must be beholden for it to the valour,\ngood conduct, or felicity of those to whom they give the command of\ntheir armies; especially to the general, whose good success will,\nwithout doubt, draw with it the love and admiration of the soldiers; so\nthat it will be in his power, either to take the government upon\nhimself, or to place it where himself thinks good. In which case, if he\ntake it not to himself, he will be thought a fool; and if he do, he\nshall be sure to have the envy of his subordinate commanders, who look\nfor a share either in the present government, or in the succession to\nit. For they will say: \u201cHas he obtained his power by his own, without\nour danger, valour, and counsel; and must we be his slaves, whom we have\nthus raised? Or, is not there as much justice on our side against him,\nas was on his side against the King?\u201d\n\n_A._ They will, and did; insomuch, that it was the reason why Cromwell,\nafter he had gotten into his own hands the absolute power of England,\nScotland, and Ireland, by the name of Protector, did never dare to take\nupon him the title of King, nor was ever able to settle it upon his\nchildren. His officers would not suffer it, as pretending after his\ndeath to succeed him; nor would the army consent to it, because he had\never declared to them against the government of a single person.\n\n_B._ But to return to the King. What means had he to pay, what provision\nhad he to arm, nay, means to levy, an army able to resist the army of\nthe Parliament, maintained by the great purse of the city of London and\ncontributions of almost all the towns corporate in England, and\nfurnished with arms as fully as they could require?\n\n_A._ It is true, the King had great disadvantages, and yet by little and\nlittle he got a considerable army, with which he so prospered as to grow\nstronger every day, and the Parliament weaker, till they had gotten the\nScotch with an army of 21,000 men to come into England to their\nassistance. But to enter into the particular narration of what was done\nin the war, I have not now time.\n\n_B._ Well then, we will talk of that at next meeting.\n\n ------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n PART III.\n\n ==========\n\n_B._ We left at the preparations on both sides for war; which when I\nconsidered by myself, I was mightily puzzled to find out what\npossibility there was for the King to equal the Parliament in such a\ncourse, and what hopes he had of money, men, arms, fortified places,\nshipping, counsel, and military officers, sufficient for such an\nenterprise against the Parliament, that had men and money as much at\ncommand, as the city of London, and other corporation towns, were able\nto furnish, which was more than they needed. And for the men they should\nset forth for soldiers, they were almost all of them spitefully bent\nagainst the King and his whole party, whom they took to be either\npapists, or flatterers of the King, or that had designed to raise their\nfortunes by the plunder of the city and other corporation towns. And\nthough I believe not that they were more valiant than other men, nor\nthat they had so much experience in the war as to be accounted good\nsoldiers; yet they had that in them, which in time of battle is more\nconducing to victory than valour and experience both together; and that\nwas spite.\n\nAnd for arms, they had in their hands the chief magazines, the Tower of\nLondon, and the town of Kingston-upon-Hull; besides most of the powder\nand shot that lay in several towns for the use of the trained bands.\n\nFortified places, there were not many then in England, and most of them\nin the hands of the Parliament.\n\nThe King\u2019s fleet was wholly in their command, under the Earl of Warwick.\n\nCounsellors, they needed no more than such as were of their own body.\n\nSo that the King was every way inferior to them, except it were,\nperhaps, in officers.\n\n_A._ I cannot compare their chief officers. For the Parliament, the Earl\nof Essex, after the Parliament had voted the war, was made general of\nall their forces both in England and Ireland, from whom all other\ncommanders were to receive their commissions.\n\n_B._ What moved them to make general the Earl of Essex? And for what\ncause was the Earl of Essex so displeased with the King, as to accept\nthat office?\n\n_A._ I do not certainly know what to answer to either of those\nquestions; but the Earl of Essex had been in the wars abroad, and wanted\nneither experience, judgment, nor courage, to perform such an\nundertaking. And besides that, you have heard, I believe, how great a\ndarling of the people his father had been before him, and what honour he\nhad gotten by the success of his enterprise upon Calais, and in some\nother military actions. To which I may add, that this Earl himself was\nnot held by the people to be so great a favourite at court as that they\nmight not trust him with their army against the King. And by this, you\nmay perhaps conjecture the cause for which the Parliament made choice of\nhim for general.\n\n_B._ But why did they think him discontented with the Court?\n\n_A._ I know not that; nor indeed that he was so. He came to the court,\nas other noblemen did, when occasion was, to wait upon the King; but had\nno office, till a little before this time, to oblige him to be there\ncontinually. But I believe verily, that the unfortunateness of his\nmarriages, had so discountenanced his conversation with the ladies, that\nthe court could not be his proper element, unless he had had some\nextraordinary favour there to balance that calamity. But for some\nparticular discontent from the King, or intention of revenge for any\nsupposed disgrace, I think he had none, nor that he was any ways\naddicted to Presbyterian doctrines, or other fanatic tenets in Church or\nState; saving only that he was carried away with the stream, in a\nmanner, of the whole nation, to think that England was not an absolute,\nbut a mixed monarchy; not considering that the supreme power must always\nbe absolute, whether it be in the King or in the Parliament.\n\n_B._ Who was the general of the King\u2019s army?\n\n_A._ None yet but himself; nor indeed had he yet any army. But there\ncoming to him at that time his two nephews, the Princes Rupert and\nMaurice, he put the command of his horse into the hands of Prince\nRupert, a man than whom no man living has a better courage, nor was more\nactive and diligent in prosecuting his commissions; and, though but a\nyoung man then, was not without experience in the conducting of\nsoldiers, as having been an actor in part of his father\u2019s wars in\nGermany.\n\n_B._ But how could the King find money to pay such an army as was\nnecessary for him against the Parliament?\n\n_A._ Neither the King nor Parliament had much money at that time in\ntheir own hands, but were fain to rely upon the benevolence of those\nthat took their parts. Wherein, I confess, the Parliament had a mighty\ngreat advantage. Those that helped the King in that kind, were only\nlords and gentlemen, which, not approving the proceedings of the\nParliament, were willing to undertake the payment, every one, of a\ncertain number of horse; which cannot be thought any very great\nassistance, the persons that payed them being so few. For other moneys\nthat the King then had, I have not heard of any, but what he borrowed\nupon jewels in the Low Countries. Whereas the Parliament had a very\nplentiful contribution, not only from London, but generally from their\nfaction in all other places of England, upon certain propositions,\npublished by the Lords and Commons in June 1642, (at what time they had\nnewly voted that the King intended to make war upon them), for bringing\nin of money or plate to maintain horse and horsemen, and to buy arms for\nthe preservation of the public peace, and for the defence of the King\nand both Houses of Parliament; for the re-payment of which money and\nplate, they were to have the public faith.\n\n_B._ What public faith is there, when there is no public? What is it\nthat can be called public, in a civil war, without the King?\n\n_A._ The truth is, the security was nothing worth, but served well\nenough to gull those seditious blockheads, that were more fond of change\nthan either of their peace or profit.\n\nHaving by this means gotten contributions from those that were\nwell-affected to their cause, they made use of it afterwards to force\nthe like contribution from others. For in November following, they made\nan ordinance for assessing also of those that had not contributed then,\nor had contributed, but not proportionably to their estates. And yet\nthis was contrary to what the Parliament promised and declared in the\npropositions themselves. For they declared, in the first proposition,\nthat no man\u2019s affections should be measured by the proportion of his\noffer, so that he expressed his good will to the service in any\nproportion whatsoever.\n\nBesides this, in the beginning of March following, they made an\nordinance, to levy weekly a great sum of money upon every county, city,\ntown, place, and person of any estate almost, in England; which weekly\nsum, as may appear by the ordinance itself, printed and published in\nMarch 1642 by order of both Houses, comes to almost 33,000_l._, and\nconsequently to above 1,700,000_l._ for the year. They had, besides all\nthis, the profits of the King\u2019s lands and woods, and whatsoever was\nremaining unpaid of any subsidy formerly granted him, and the tonnage\nand poundage usually received by the King; besides the profit of the\nsequestrations of great persons, whom they pleased to vote delinquents,\nand the profits of the bishops' lands, which they took to themselves a\nyear, or a little more, after.\n\n_B._ Seeing then the Parliament had such advantage of the King in money\nand arms and multitude of men, and had in their hands the King\u2019s fleet,\nI cannot imagine what hope the King could have, either of victory\n(unless he resigned into their hands the sovereignty), or subsisting.\nFor I cannot well believe he had any advantage of them either in\ncounsellors, conductors, or in the resolutions of his soldiers.\n\n_A._ On the contrary, I think he had also some disadvantage in that; for\nthough he had as good officers at least as any then served the\nParliament, yet I doubt he had not so useful counsel as was necessary.\nAnd for his soldiers, though they were men as stout as theirs, yet,\nbecause their valour was not sharpened so with malice as theirs was on\nthe other side, they fought not so keenly as their enemies did: amongst\nwhom there were a great many London apprentices, who, for want of\nexperience in the war, would have been fearful enough of death and\nwounds approaching visibly in glistering swords; but, for want of\njudgment, scarce thought of such death as comes invisibly in a bullet,\nand therefore were very hardly to be driven out of the field.\n\n_B._ But what fault do you find in the King\u2019s counsellors, lords, and\nother persons of quality and experience?\n\n_A._ Only that fault, which was generally in the whole nation, which\nwas, that they thought the government of England was not an absolute,\nbut a mixed monarchy; and that if the King should clearly subdue this\nParliament, that his power would be what he pleased, and theirs as\nlittle as he pleased: which they counted tyranny. This opinion, though\nit did not lessen their endeavour to gain the victory for the King in a\nbattle, when a battle could not be avoided, yet it weakened their\nendeavour to procure him an absolute victory in the war. And for this\ncause, notwithstanding that they saw that the Parliament was firmly\nresolved to take all kingly power whatsoever out of his hands, yet their\ncounsel to the King was upon all occasions, to offer propositions to\nthem of treaty and accommodation, and to make and publish declarations;\nwhich any man might easily have foreseen would be fruitless; and not\nonly so, but also of great disadvantage to those actions by which the\nKing was to recover his crown and preserve his life. For it took off the\ncourage of the best and forwardest of his soldiers, that looked for\ngreat benefit by their service out of the estates of the rebels, in case\nthey could subdue them; but none at all, if the business should be ended\nby a treaty.\n\n_B._ And they had reason: for a civil war never ends by treaty, without\nthe sacrifice of those who were on both sides the sharpest. You know\nwell enough how things passed at the reconciliation of Augustus and\nAntonius in Rome. But I thought that after they once began to levy\nsoldiers one against another, that they would not any more have returned\nof either side to declarations, or other paper war, which, if it could\nhave done any good, would have done it long before this.\n\n_A._ But seeing the Parliament continued writing, and set forth their\ndeclarations to the people against the lawfulness of the King\u2019s\ncommission of array, and sent petitions to the King as fierce and\nrebellious as ever they had done before, demanding of him that he would\ndisband his soldiers, and come up to the Parliament, and leave those\nwhom the Parliament called delinquents (which were none but the King\u2019s\nbest subjects) to their mercy, and pass such bills as they should advise\nhim; would you not have the King set forth declarations and\nproclamations against the illegality of their ordinances, by which they\nlevied soldiers against him, and answer those insolent petitions of\ntheirs?\n\n_B._ No; it had done him no good before, and therefore was not likely to\ndo him any afterwards. For the common people, whose hands were to decide\nthe controversy, understood not the reasons of either party; and for\nthose that by ambition were once set upon the enterprise of changing the\ngovernment, they cared not much what was reason and justice in the\ncause, but what strength they might procure by reducing the multitude\nwith remonstrances from the Parliament House, or by sermons in the\nchurches. And to their petitions, I would not have had any answer made\nat all, more than this; that if they would disband their army, and put\nthemselves upon his mercy, they should find him more gracious than they\nexpected.\n\n_A._ That had been a gallant answer indeed, if it had proceeded from him\nafter some extraordinary great victory in battle, or some extraordinary\nassurance of a victory at last in the whole war.\n\n_B._ Why, what could have happened to him worse than at length he\nsuffered, notwithstanding his gentle answers and all his reasonable\ndeclarations?\n\n_A._ Nothing; but who knew that?\n\n_B._ Any man might see that he was never likely to be restored to his\nright without victory: and such his stoutness being known to the people,\nwould have brought to his assistance many more hands than all the\narguments of law or force of eloquence, couched in declarations and\nother writings, could have done by far. And I wonder what kind of men\nthey were, that hindered the King from taking this resolution?\n\n_A._ You may know by the declarations themselves, which are very long\nand full of quotations of records and of cases formerly reported, that\nthe penners of them were either lawyers by profession, or such gentlemen\nas had the ambition to be thought so. Besides, I told you before, that\nthose which were then likeliest to have their counsel asked in this\nbusiness, were averse to absolute monarchy, as also to absolute\ndemocracy or aristocracy; all which governments they esteemed tyranny,\nand were in love with monarchy which they used to praise by the name of\nmixed monarchy, though it were indeed nothing else but pure anarchy. And\nthose men, whose pens the King most used in these controversies of law\nand politics, were such, if I have not been misinformed, as having been\nmembers of this Parliament, had declaimed against ship-money and other\nextra-parliamentary taxes, as much as any; but who when they saw the\nParliament grow higher in their demands than they thought they would\nhave done, went over to the King\u2019s party.\n\n_B._ Who were those?\n\n_A._ It is not necessary to name any man, seeing I have undertaken only\na short narration of the follies and other faults of men during this\ntrouble; but not, by naming the persons, to give you, or any man else,\noccasion to esteem them the less, now that the faults on all sides have\nbeen forgiven.\n\n_B._ When the business was brought to this height, by levying of\nsoldiers and seizing of the navy and arms and other provisions on both\nsides, that no man was so blind as not to see they were in an estate of\nwar one against another; why did not the King, by proclamation or\nmessage, according to his undoubted right, dissolve the Parliament, and\nthereby diminish in some part the authority of their levies, and of\nother their unjust ordinances?\n\n_A._ You have forgotten that I told you, that the King himself, by a\nbill that he passed at the same time when he passed the bill for the\nexecution of the Earl of Strafford, had given them authority to hold the\nParliament till they should by consent of both Houses dissolve\nthemselves. If therefore he had, by any proclamation or message to the\nHouses, dissolved them, they would to their former defamations of his\nMajesty\u2019s actions have added this, that he was a breaker of his word:\nand not only in contempt of him have continued their session, but also\nhave made an advantage of it to the increase and strengthening of their\nown party.\n\n_B._ Would not the King\u2019s raising of an army against them be interpreted\nas a purpose to dissolve them by force? And was it not as great a breach\nof promise to scatter them by force, as to dissolve them by\nproclamation? Besides, I cannot conceive that the passing of that act\nwas otherwise intended than conditionally; so long as they should not\nordain any thing contrary to the sovereign right of the King; which\ncondition they had already by many of their ordinances broken. And I\nthink that even by the law of equity, which is the unalterable law of\nnature, a man that has the sovereign power, cannot, if he would, give\naway the right of anything which is necessary for him to retain for the\ngood government of his subjects, unless he do it in express words,\nsaying, that he will have the sovereign power no longer. For the giving\naway that, which by consequence only, draws the sovereignty along with\nit, is not, I think, a giving away of the sovereignty; but an error,\nsuch as works nothing but an invalidity in the grant itself. And such\nwas the King\u2019s passing of this bill for the continuing of the Parliament\nas long as the two Houses pleased. But now that the war was resolved on\non both sides, what needed any more dispute in writing?\n\n_A._ I know not what need they had. But on both sides they thought it\nneedful to hinder one another, as much as they could, from levying of\nsoldiers; and, therefore, the King did set forth declarations in print,\nto make the people know that they ought not to obey the officers of the\nnew militia set up by ordinance of Parliament, and also to let them see\nthe legality of his own commissions of array. And the Parliament on\ntheir part did the like, to justify to the people the said ordinance,\nand to make the commission of array appear unlawful.\n\n_B._ When the Parliament were levying of soldiers, was it not lawful for\nthe King to levy soldiers to defend himself and his right, though there\nhad been no other title for it but his own preservation, and that the\nname of commission of array had never before been heard of?\n\n_A._ For my part, I think there cannot be a better title for war, than\nthe defence of a man\u2019s own right. But the people, at that time, thought\nnothing lawful for the King to do, for which there was not some statute\nmade by Parliament. For the lawyers, I mean the judges of the courts at\nWestminster, and some few others, though but advocates, yet of great\nreputation for their skill in the common-laws and statutes of England,\nhad infected most of the gentry of England with their maxims and cases\nprejudged, which they call precedents; and made them think so well of\ntheir own knowledge in the law, that they were very glad of this\noccasion to shew it against the King, and thereby to gain a reputation\nwith the Parliament of being good patriots, and wise statesmen.\n\n_B._ What was this commission of array?\n\n_A._ King William the Conqueror had gotten into his hands by victory all\nthe land in England, of which he disposed some part as forests and\nchases for his recreation, and some part to lords and gentlemen that had\nassisted him or were to assist him in the wars. Upon which he laid a\ncharge of service in his wars, some with more men, and some with less,\naccording to the lands he had given them: whereby, when the King sent\nmen unto them with commission to make use of their service, they were\nobliged to appear with arms, and to accompany the King to the wars for a\ncertain time at their own charges: and such were the commissions by\nwhich this King did then make his levies.\n\n_B._ Why then was it not legal?\n\n_A._ No doubt but it was legal. But what did that amount to with men,\nthat were already resolved to acknowledge for law nothing that was\nagainst their design of abolishing monarchy, and placing a sovereign and\nabsolute arbitrary power in the House of Commons.\n\n_B._ To destroy monarchy, and set up the House of Commons, are two\nbusinesses.\n\n_A._ They found it so at last, but did not think it so then.\n\n_B._ Let us now come to the military part.\n\n_A._ I intended only the story of their injustice, impudence, and\nhypocrisy; therefore, for the proceeding of the war, I refer you to the\nhistory thereof written at large in English. I shall only make use of\nsuch a thread as is necessary for the filling up of such knavery, and\nfolly also, as I shall observe in their several actions.\n\nFrom York the King went to Hull, where was his magazine of arms for the\nnorthern parts of England, to try if they would admit him. The\nParliament had made Sir John Hotham governor of the town, who caused the\ngates to be shut, and presenting himself upon the walls flatly denied\nhim entrance: for which the King caused him to be proclaimed traitor,\nand sent a message to the Parliament to know if they owned the action.\n\n_B._ Upon what grounds?\n\n_A._ Their pretence was this; that neither this nor any other town in\nEngland was otherwise the King\u2019s, than in trust for the people of\nEngland.\n\n_B._ But what was that to the Parliament?\n\n_A._ Yes, say they; for we are the representatives of the people of\nEngland.\n\n_B._ I cannot see the force of this argument: we represent the people,\n_ergo_, all that the people has is ours. The mayor of Hull did represent\nthe King. Is therefore all that the King had in Hull, the mayor\u2019s? The\npeople of England may be represented with limitations, as to deliver a\npetition or the like. Does it follow that they, who deliver the\npetition, have right to all the towns in England? When began this\nParliament to be a representative of England? Was it not November 3,\n1640? Who was it the day before, that is November 2, that had the right\nto keep the King out of Hull and possess it for themselves? For there\nwas then no Parliament. Whose was Hull then?\n\n_A._ I think it was the King\u2019s, not only because it was called the\nKing\u2019s town upon Hull, but because the King himself did then and ever\nrepresent the person of the people of England. If he did not, who then\ndid, the Parliament having no being?\n\n_B._ They might perhaps say, the people had then no representative.\n\n_A._ Then there was no commonwealth; and consequently, all the towns of\nEngland being the people\u2019s, you, and I, and any man else, might have put\nin for his share. You may see by this what weak people they were, that\nwere carried into the rebellion by such reasoning as the Parliament\nused, and how impudent they were that did put such fallacies upon them.\n\n_B._ Surely they were such as were esteemed the wisest men in England,\nbeing upon that account chosen to be of the Parliament.\n\n_A._ And were they also esteemed the wisest men of England, that chose\nthem?\n\n_B._ I cannot tell that. For I know it is usual with the freeholders in\nthe counties, and the tradesmen in the cities and boroughs, to choose,\nas near as they can, such as are most repugnant to the giving of\nsubsidies.\n\n_A._ The King in the beginning of August, after he had summoned Hull,\nand tried some of the counties thereabout what they would do for him,\nsets up his standard at Nottingham; but there came not in thither men\nenough to make an army sufficient to give battle to the Earl of Essex.\nFrom thence he went to Shrewsbury, where he was quickly furnished; and\nappointing the Earl of Lindsey to be general, he resolved to march\ntowards London. The Earl of Essex was now at Worcester with the\nParliament\u2019s army, making no offer to stop him in his passage; but as\nsoon as he was gone by, marched close after him.\n\nThe King, therefore, to avoid being enclosed between the army of the\nEarl of Essex and the city of London, turned upon him and gave him\nbattle at Edgehill: where though he got not an entire victory, yet he\nhad the better, if either had the better; and had certainly the fruit of\na victory, which was to march on in his intended way towards London: in\nwhich the next morning he took Banbury-castle, and from thence went to\nOxford, and thence to Brentford, where he gave a great defeat to three\nregiments of the Parliament\u2019s forces, and so returned to Oxford.\n\n_B._ Why did not the King go on from Brentford?\n\n_A._ The Parliament, upon the first notice of the King\u2019s marching from\nShrewsbury, caused all the trained-bands and the auxiliaries of the city\nof London (which was so frightened as to shut up all their shops) to be\ndrawn forth; so that there was a most complete and numerous army ready\nfor the Earl of Essex, that was crept into London just at the time to\nhead it. And this was it that made the King retire to Oxford. In the\nbeginning of February after, Prince Rupert took Cirencester from the\nParliament, with many prisoners and many arms: for it was newly made a\nmagazine. And thus stood the business between the King\u2019s and the\nParliament\u2019s greatest forces. The Parliament in the meantime caused a\nline of communication to be made about London and the suburbs, of twelve\nmiles in compass; and constituted a committee for the association, and\nthe putting into a posture of defence, of the counties of Essex,\nCambridge, Suffolk, and some others; and one of these commissioners was\nOliver Cromwell, from which employment he came to his following\ngreatness.\n\n_B._ What was done during this time in other parts of the country?\n\n_A._ In the west, the Earl of Stamford had the employment of putting in\nexecution the ordinance of Parliament for the militia; and Sir Ralph\nHopton for the King executed the commission of array. Between these two\nwas fought a battle at Liskeard in Cornwall, wherein Sir Ralph Hopton\nhad the victory, and presently took a town called Saltash, with many\narms and much ordnance and many prisoners. Sir William Waller in the\nmeantime seized Winchester and Chichester for the Parliament. In the\nnorth, for the commission of array, my Lord of Newcastle, and for the\nmilitia of the Parliament was my Lord Fairfax. My Lord of Newcastle took\nfrom the Parliament Tadcaster, in which were a great part of the\nParliament\u2019s forces for that country, and had made himself, in a manner,\nmaster of all the north. About this time, that is to say in February,\nthe Queen landed at Burlington, and was conducted by my Lord of\nNewcastle and the Marquis of Montrose to York, and not long after to the\nKing. Divers other little advantages, besides these, the King\u2019s party\nhad of the Parliament\u2019s in the north.\n\nThere happened also between the militia of the Parliament and the\nCommission of Array in Staffordshire, under my Lord Brook for the\nParliament and my Lord of Northampton for the King, great contention,\nwherein both these commanders were slain. For my Lord Brook, besieging\nLitchfield-Close, was killed with a shot; notwithstanding which they\ngave not over the siege till they were masters of the Close. But\npresently after, my Lord of Northampton besieged it again for the King;\nwhich to relieve, Sir William Brereton and Sir John Gell advanced\ntowards Litchfield, and were met at Hopton Heath by the Earl of\nNorthampton, and routed. The Earl himself was slain; but his forces with\nvictory returned to the siege again; and shortly after, seconded by\nPrince Rupert, who was then abroad in that country, carried the place.\nThese were the chief actions of this year, 1642; wherein the King\u2019s\nparty had not much the worse.\n\n_B._ But the Parliament had now a better army; insomuch that if the Earl\nof Essex had immediately followed the King to Oxford, not yet well\nfortified, he might in all likelihood have taken it. For he could not\nwant either men or ammunition, whereof the city of London, which was\nwholly at the Parliament\u2019s devotion, had store enough.\n\n_A._ I cannot judge of that. But this is manifest, considering the\nestate the King was in at his first marching from York, when he had\nneither money nor men nor arms enough to put them in hope of victory,\nthat this year, take it altogether, was very prosperous.\n\n_B._ But what great folly or wickedness do you observe in the\nParliament\u2019s actions for this first year?\n\n_A._ All that can be said against them in that point, will be excused\nwith the pretext of war, and come under one name of rebellion; saving\nthat when they summoned any town, it was always in the name of King and\nParliament, the King being in the contrary army, and many times beating\nthem from the siege. I do not see how the right of war can justify such\nimpudence as that. But they pretended that the King was always virtually\nin the two Houses of Parliament; making a distinction between his person\nnatural and politic; which made the impudence the greater, besides the\nfolly of it. For this was but an university quibble, such as boys make\nuse of in maintaining in the schools such tenets as they cannot\notherwise defend.\n\nIn the end of this year they solicited also the Scots to enter England\nwith an army, to suppress the power of the Earl of Newcastle in the\nNorth; which was a plain confession, that the Parliament\u2019s forces were,\nat this time, inferior to the King\u2019s. And most men thought, that if the\nEarl of Newcastle had then marched southward, and joined his forces with\nthe King\u2019s, most of the members of Parliament would have fled out of\nEngland.\n\nIn the beginning of 1643 the Parliament, seeing the Earl of Newcastle\u2019s\npower in the North grown so formidable, sent to the Scots to hire them\nto an invasion of England, and (to compliment them in the meantime) made\na covenant amongst themselves, such as the Scots had before taken\nagainst episcopacy, and demolished crosses and church-windows, such as\nhad in them any images of saints, throughout all England. Also in the\nmiddle of the year, they made a solemn league with the nation, which was\ncalled the Solemn League and Covenant.\n\n_B._ Are not the Scots as properly to be called foreigners as the Irish?\nSeeing then they persecuted the Earl of Strafford even to death, for\nadvising the King to make use of Irish forces against the Parliament,\nwith what face could they call in a Scotch army against the King?\n\n_A._ The King\u2019s party might easily here have discerned their design, to\nmake themselves absolute masters of the kingdom and to dethrone the\nKing. Another great impudence, or rather a bestial incivility, it was of\ntheirs, that they voted the Queen a traitor, for helping the King with\nsome ammunition and English forces from Holland.\n\n_B._ Was it possible that all this could be done, and men not see that\npapers and declarations must be useless; and that nothing could satisfy\nthem but the deposing of the King, and setting up of themselves in his\nplace?\n\n_A._ Yes; very possible. For who was there of them, though knowing that\nthe King had the sovereign power, that knew the essential rights of\nsovereignty? They dreamt of a mixed power, of the King and the two\nHouses. That it was a divided power, in which there could be no peace,\nwas above their understanding. Therefore they were always urging the\nKing to declarations and treaties, for fear of subjecting themselves to\nthe King in an absolute obedience; which increased the hope and courage\nof the rebels, but did the King little good. For the people either\nunderstand not, or will not trouble themselves with controversies in\nwriting, but rather, by his compliance and messages, go away with an\nopinion that the Parliament was likely to have the victory in the war.\nBesides, seeing the penners and contrivers of these papers were formerly\nmembers of the Parliament, and of another mind, and now revolted from\nthe Parliament because they could not bear that sway in the House which\nthey expected, men were apt to think they believed not what they writ.\n\nAs for military actions (to begin at the head quarters) Prince Rupert\ntook Birmingham, a garrison of the Parliament\u2019s. In July after, the\nKing\u2019s forces had a great victory over the Parliament\u2019s, near Devizes on\nRoundway-Down, where they took 2,000 prisoners, four brass pieces of\nordnance, twenty-eight colours, and all their baggage; and shortly\nafter, Bristol was surrendered to Prince Rupert for the King; and the\nKing himself marching into the west, took from the Parliament many other\nconsiderable places.\n\nBut this good fortune was not a little allayed by his besieging of\nGloucester, which after it was reduced to the last gasp, was relieved by\nthe Earl of Essex; whose army was before greatly wasted, but now\nsuddenly recruited with the trained bands and apprentices of London.\n\n_B._ It seems not only by this, but also by many examples in history,\nthat there can hardly arise a long or dangerous rebellion, that has not\nsome such overgrown city with an army or two in its belly to foment it.\n\n_A._ Nay more; those great capital cities, when rebellion is upon\npretence of grievances, must needs be of the rebel party: because the\ngrievances are but taxes, to which citizens, that is, merchants, whose\nprofession is their private gain, are naturally mortal enemies; their\nonly glory being to grow excessively rich by the wisdom of buying and\nselling.\n\n_B._ But they are said to be of all callings the most beneficial to the\ncommonwealth, by setting the poorer sort of people on work.\n\n_A._ That is to say, by making poor people sell their labour to them at\ntheir own prices; so that poor people, for the most part, might get a\nbetter living by working in Bridewell, than by spinning, weaving, and\nother such labour as they can do; saving that by working slightly they\nmay help themselves a little, to the disgrace of our manufacture. And as\nmost commonly they are the first encouragers of rebellion, presuming of\ntheir strength; so also are they, for the most part, the first to\nrepent, deceived by them that command their strength.\n\nBut to return to the war; though the King withdrew from Gloucester, yet\nit was not to fly from, but to fight with the Earl of Essex, which\npresently after he did at Newbury, where the battle was bloody, and the\nKing had not the worst, unless Cirencester be put into the scale, which\nthe Earl of Essex had in his way a few days before surprised.\n\nBut in the north and the west, the King had much the better of the\nParliament. For in the north, at the very beginning of the year, March\n29th, the Earls of Newcastle and Cumberland defeated the Lord Fairfax,\nwho commanded in those parts for the Parliament, at Bramham Moor; which\nmade the Parliament to hasten the assistance of the Scots.\n\nIn June following the Earl of Newcastle routed Sir Thomas Fairfax, son\nto the Lord Fairfax, upon Adderton Heath, and, in pursuit of them to\nBradford, took and killed 2,000 men, and the next day took the town and\n2,000 prisoners more (Sir Thomas himself hardly escaping) with all their\narms and ammunition; and besides this, made the Lord Fairfax quit\nHalifax and Beverley. Lastly, Prince Rupert relieved Newark, besieged by\nSir John Meldrun for the Parliament with 7,000 men, whereof 1,000 were\nslain; the rest upon articles departed, leaving behind them their arms,\nbag and baggage.\n\nTo balance in part this success, the Earl of Manchester, whose\nlieutenant-general was Oliver Cromwell, got a victory over the royalists\nnear Horncastle, of whom he slew 400, took 800 prisoners and 1,000 arms,\nand presently after took and plundered the city of Lincoln.\n\nIn the West, May the 16th, Sir Ralph Hopton at Stratton, in Cornwall,\nhad a victory over the Parliamentarians, wherein he took 1700 prisoners,\nthirteen brass pieces of ordnance, and all their ammunition, which was\nseventy barrels of powder; and the magazine of their other provisions in\nthe town.\n\nAgain at Lansdown, between Sir Ralph Hopton and the Parliamentarians\nunder Sir William Waller, was fought a fierce battle, wherein the\nvictory was not very clear on either side; saving that the\nParliamentarians might seem to have the better, because presently after\nSir William Waller followed Sir Ralph Hopton to Devizes, in Wiltshire,\nthough to his cost; for there he was overthrown, as I have already told\nyou.\n\nAfter this the King in person marched into the West, and took Exeter,\nDorchester, Barnstable, and divers other places; and had he not at his\nreturn besieged Gloucester, and thereby given the Parliament time for\nnew levies, it was thought by many he might have routed the House of\nCommons. But the end of this year was more favourable to the Parliament.\nFor in January the Scots entered England, and, March the 1st, crossed\nthe Tyne; and whilst the Earl of Newcastle was marching to them, Sir\nThomas Fairfax gathered together a considerable party in Yorkshire, and\nthe Earl of Manchester from Lyn advanced towards York; so that the Earl\nof Newcastle having two armies of the rebels behind him, and another\nbefore him, was forced to retreat to York; which those three armies\njoining presently besieged. And these are all the considerable military\nactions of the year 1643.\n\nIn the same year the Parliament caused to be made a new Great Seal. The\nLord Keeper had carried the former seal to Oxford. Hereupon the King\nsent a messenger to the judges at Westminster, to forbid them to make\nuse of it. This messenger was taken, and condemned at a council of war,\nand hanged for a spy.\n\n_B._ Is that the law of war?\n\n_A._ I know not: but it seems, when a soldier comes into the enemies'\nquarters without address or notice given to the chief commander, that it\nis presumed he comes as a spy. The same year, when certain gentlemen at\nLondon received a commission of array from the King to levy men for his\nservice in that city, being discovered, they were condemned, and some of\nthem executed. This case is not much unlike the former.\n\n_B._ Was not the making of a new Great Seal a sufficient proof that the\nwar was raised, not to remove evil counsellors from the King, but to\nremove the King himself from the government? What hope then could there\nbe had in messages and treaties?\n\n_A._ The entrance of the Scots was a thing unexpected to the King, who\nwas made to believe by continual letters from his commissioner in\nScotland, Duke Hamilton, that the Scotch never intended any invasion.\nThe Duke being then at Oxford, the King, assured that the Scotch were\nnow entered, sent him prisoner to Pendennis Castle in Cornwall.\n\nIn the beginning of the year 1644, the Earl of Newcastle being, as I\ntold you, besieged by the joint forces of the Scots, the Earl of\nManchester and Sir Thomas Fairfax, the King sent Prince Rupert to\nrelieve the town, and as soon as he could to give the enemy battle.\nPrince Rupert passing through Lancashire, and by the way having stormed\nthat seditious town of Bolton, and taken Stockford and Liverpool, came\nto York July the 1st, and relieved it; the enemy being risen thence to a\nplace called Marston Moor, about four miles off; and there was fought\nthat unfortunate battle, which lost the King in a manner all the north.\nPrince Rupert returned by the way he came, and the Earl of Newcastle to\nYork, and thence with some of his officers over the sea to Hamburgh.\n\nThe honour of this victory was attributed chiefly to Oliver Cromwell,\nthe Earl of Manchester\u2019s lieutenant-general. The Parliamentarians\nreturned from the field to the siege of York, which not long after, upon\nhonourable articles, was surrendered; not that they were favoured, but\nbecause the Parliament employed not much time nor many men in sieges.\n\n_B._ This was a great and sudden abatement of the King\u2019s prosperity.\n\n_A._ It was so; but amends was made him for it within five or six weeks\nafter. For Sir William Waller, after the loss of his army at\nRoundway-Down, had another raised for him by the city of London; who for\nthe payment thereof imposed a weekly tax of the value of one meal\u2019s meat\nupon every citizen. This army, with that of the Earl of Essex, intended\nto besiege Oxford; which the King understanding, sent the Queen into the\nwest, and marched himself towards Worcester. This made them to divide\nagain, and the Earl to go into the west, and Waller to pursue the King.\nBy this means, as it fell out, both their armies were defeated. For the\nKing turned upon Waller, routed him at Cropredy-bridge, took his train\nof artillery and many officers; and then presently followed the Earl of\nEssex into Cornwall, where he had him at such advantage, that the Earl\nhimself was fain to escape in a small boat to Plymouth; his horse broke\nthrough the King\u2019s quarters by night, but the infantry were all forced\nto lay down their arms, and upon condition never more to bear arms\nagainst the King were permitted to depart.\n\nIn October following was fought a second and sharp battle at Newbury.\nFor this infantry, making no conscience of the conditions made with the\nKing, being now come towards London as far as Basingstoke, had arms put\nagain into their hands; to whom some of the trained-bands being added,\nthe Earl of Essex had suddenly so great an army, that he attempted the\nKing again at Newbury; and certainly had the better of the day, but the\nnight parting them, had not a complete victory. And it was observed\nhere, that no part of the Earl\u2019s army fought so keenly as they who had\nlaid down their arms in Cornwall.\n\nThese were the most important fights in the year 1644, and the King was\nyet, as both himself and others thought, in as good condition as the\nParliament, which despaired of victory by the commanders they then used.\nTherefore they voted a new modelling of the army, suspecting the Earl of\nEssex, though I think wrongfully, to be too much a royalist, for not\nhaving done so much as they looked for in this second battle at Newbury.\nThe Earls of Essex and Manchester, perceiving what they went about,\nvoluntarily laid down their commissions; and the House of Commons made\nan ordinance, that no member of either House should enjoy any office or\ncommand, military or civil; with which oblique blow they shook off those\nthat had hitherto served them too well. And yet out of this ordinance\nthey excepted Oliver Cromwell, in whose conduct and valour they had very\ngreat confidence (which they would not have done, if they had known him\nas well then as they did afterwards), and made him lieutenant-general to\nSir Thomas Fairfax, their new-made general. In the commission to the\nEarl of Essex, there was a clause for the preservation of his Majesty\u2019s\nperson, which in this new commission was left out; though the Parliament\nas well as the general were as yet Presbyterian.\n\n_B._ It seems the Presbyterians also in order to their ends would fain\nhave had the King murdered.\n\n_A._ For my part I doubt it not. For a rightful king living, an usurping\npower can never be sufficiently secured.\n\nIn this same year the Parliament put to death Sir John Hotham and his\nson, for tampering with the Earl of Newcastle about the rendition of\nHull; and Sir Alexander Carew, for endeavouring to deliver up Plymouth,\nwhere he was governor for the Parliament; and the Archbishop of\nCanterbury, for nothing but to please the Scots; for the general article\nof going about to subvert the fundamental laws of the land, was no\naccusation, but only foul words. They then also voted down the Book of\nCommon-prayer, and ordered the use of a Directory, which had been newly\ncomposed by an Assembly of Presbyterian ministers. They were also then,\nwith much ado, prevailed with for a treaty with the King at Uxbridge;\nwhere they remitted nothing of their former demands. The King had also\nat this time a Parliament at Oxford, consisting of such discontented\nmembers as had left the Houses at Westminster; but few of them had\nchanged their old principles, and therefore that Parliament was not much\nworth. Nay rather, because they endeavoured nothing but messages and\ntreaties, that is to say, defeating of the soldiers' hope of benefit by\nthe war, they were thought by most men to do the King more hurt than\ngood.\n\nThe year 1645 was to the King very unfortunate; for by the loss of one\ngreat battle, he lost all he had formerly gotten, and at length his\nlife. The new modelled army, after consultation whether they should lay\nsiege to Oxford or march westward to the relief of Taunton, (then\nbesieged by the Lord Goring, and defended by Blake, famous afterwards\nfor his actions at sea), resolved for Taunton; leaving Cromwell to\nattend the motions of the King, though not strong enough to hinder him.\nThe King upon this advantage drew his forces and artillery out of\nOxford. This made the Parliament to call back their general, Fairfax,\nand order him to besiege Oxford. The King in the meantime relieved\nChester, which was besieged by Sir William Brereton, and coming back\ntook Leicester by force; a place of great importance, and well provided\nof artillery and provision.\n\nUpon this success it was generally thought that the King\u2019s party was the\nstronger. The King himself thought so; and the Parliament in a manner\nconfessed the same, by commanding Fairfax to rise from the siege, and\nendeavour to give the King battle. For the successes of the King, and\nthe divisions and treacheries growing now amongst themselves, had driven\nthem to rely upon the fortune of one day; in which, at Naseby, the\nKing\u2019s army was utterly overthrown, and no hope left him to raise\nanother. Therefore after the battle he went up and down, doing the\nParliament here and there some shrewd turns, but never much increasing\nhis number.\n\nFairfax in the meantime first recovered Leicester, and then marching\ninto the west subdued it all, except only a few places, forcing with\nmuch ado my Lord Hopton upon honourable conditions to disband his army,\nand with the Prince of Wales to pass over to Scilly; whence not long\nafter they went to Paris.\n\nIn April 1646 General Fairfax began to march back to Oxford. In the\nmeantime Rainsborough, who besieged Woodstock, had it surrendered. The\nKing therefore, who was now also returned to Oxford, from whence\nWoodstock is but six miles, not doubting but that he should there by\nFairfax be besieged, and having no army, to relieve him, resolved to get\naway disguised to the Scotch army about Newark; and thither he came the\n4th of May; and the Scotch army, being upon remove homewards, carried\nhim with them to Newcastle, whither he came May 13th.\n\n_B._ Why did the King trust himself with the Scots? They were the first\nthat rebelled. They were Presbyterians, that is, cruel; besides, they\nwere indigent, and consequently might be suspected would sell him to his\nenemies for money. And lastly, they were too weak to defend him, or keep\nhim in their country.\n\n_A._ What could he have done better? For he had in the winter before\nsent to the Parliament to get a pass for the Duke of Richmond and\nothers, to bring them propositions of peace; it was denied. He sent\nagain; it was denied again. Then he desired he might come to them in\nperson; this also was denied. He sent again and again to the same\npurpose; but instead of granting it, they made an ordinance, that the\ncommanders of the militia of London, in case the King should attempt to\ncome within the line of communication, should raise what force they\nthought fit to suppress tumults, to apprehend such as came with him, and\nto secure, that is to imprison, his person from danger. If the King had\nadventured to come, and had been imprisoned, what could the Parliament\nhave done with him? They had dethroned him by their votes, and therefore\ncould have no security whilst he lived, though in prison. It may be they\nwould not have put him to death by a high court of justice publicly, but\nsecretly some other way.\n\n_B._ He should have attempted to get beyond sea.\n\n_A._ That had been from Oxford very difficult. Besides, it was generally\nbelieved that the Scotch army had promised him, that not only his\nMajesty, but also his friends that should come with him, should be in\ntheir army safe; not only for their persons, but also for their honours\nand consciences. It is a pretty trick, when the army and the particular\nsoldiers of the army are different things, to make the soldiers promise\nwhat the army means not to perform.\n\nJuly the 11th the Parliament sent their propositions to the King at\nNewcastle; which propositions they pretended to be the only way to a\nsettled and well grounded peace. They were brought by the Earl of\nPembroke, the Earl of Suffolk, Sir Walter Earle, Sir John Hippisley, Mr.\nGoodwin, and Mr. Robinson; whom the King asked if they had power to\ntreat; and when they said no, why they might not as well have been sent\nby a trumpeter. The propositions were the same dethroning ones which\nthey used to send, and therefore the King would not assent to them. Nor\ndid the Scots swallow them at first, but made some exceptions against\nthem; only, it seems, to make the Parliament perceive they meant not to\nput the King into their hands gratis. And so at last the bargain was\nmade between them; and upon the payment of 200,000_l._ the King was put\ninto the hands of the commissioners, which the English Parliament sent\ndown to receive him.\n\n_B._ What a vile complexion has this action, compounded of feigned\nreligion and very covetousness, cowardice, perjury, and treachery!\n\n_A._ Now the war, that seemed to justify many unseemly things, is ended,\nyou will see almost nothing else in these rebels but baseness and\nfalseness besides their folly.\n\nBy this time the Parliament had taken in all the rest of the King\u2019s\ngarrisons; whereof the last was Pendennis Castle, whither Duke Hamilton\nhad been sent prisoner by the King.\n\n_B._ What was done during this time in Ireland and Scotland?\n\n_A._ In Ireland there had been a peace made by order from his Majesty\nfor a time, which by divisions amongst the Irish was ill kept. The\nPopish party, the Pope\u2019s nuncio being then there, took this to be the\ntime for delivering themselves from their subjection to the English.\nBesides, the time of the peace was now expired.\n\n_B._ How were they subject to the English, more than the English to the\nIrish? They were subject to the King of England; but so also were the\nEnglish to the King of Ireland.\n\n_A._ This distinction is somewhat too subtile for common understandings.\nIn Scotland the Marquis of Montrose for the King, with very few men and\nmiraculous victories, had overrun all Scotland, where many of his\nforces, out of too much security, were permitted to be absent for\nawhile; of which the enemy having intelligence, suddenly came upon them,\nand forced them to fly back into the Highlands to recruit; where he\nbegan to recover strength, when he was commanded by the King, then in\nthe hands of the Scots at Newcastle, to disband; and he departed from\nScotland by sea.\n\nIn the end of the same year, 1646, the Parliament caused the King\u2019s\nGreat Seal to be broken; also the King was brought to Holmeby, and there\nkept by the Parliament\u2019s commissioners. And here was an end of that war\nas to England and Scotland, but not to Ireland. About this time also\ndied the Earl of Essex, whom the Parliament had discarded.\n\n_B._ Now that there was peace in England, and the King in prison, in\nwhom was the sovereign power?\n\n_A._ The right was certainly in the King, but the exercise was yet in\nnobody; but contended for as in a game at cards, without fighting, all\nthe years 1647 and 1648, between the Parliament and Oliver Cromwell,\nlieutenant-general to Sir Thomas Fairfax.\n\nYou must know, that when King Henry VIII abolished the pope\u2019s authority\nhere, and took upon him to be the head of the Church, the bishops, as\nthey could not resist him, so neither were they discontented with it.\nFor whereas before the pope allowed not the bishops to claim\njurisdiction in their diocesses _jure divino_, that is of right\nimmediately from God, but by the gift and authority of the pope, now\nthat the pope was ousted, they made no doubt but that the divine right\nwas in themselves. After this, the city of Geneva, and divers other\nplaces beyond sea, having revolted from the papacy, set up presbyteries\nfor the government of their several churches. And divers English\nscholars, that went beyond sea during the persecution in the time of\nQueen Mary, were much taken with this government, and at their return in\nthe time of Queen Elizabeth, and ever since, have endeavoured, to the\ngreat trouble of the Church and nation, to set up that government here,\nwherein they might domineer and applaud their own wit and learning. And\nthese took upon them not only a Divine right, but also a Divine\ninspiration. And having been connived at, and countenanced sometimes in\ntheir frequent preaching, they introduced many strange and many\npernicious doctrines, out-doing the Reformation, as they pretended, both\nof Luther and Calvin; receding from the former divinity or church\nphilosophy (for religion is another thing), as much as Luther and Calvin\nhad receded from the pope; and distracted their auditors into a great\nnumber of sects, as Brownists, Anabaptists, Independents,\nFifth-monarchy-men, Quakers, and divers others, all commonly called by\nthe name of fanatics: insomuch as there was no so dangerous an enemy to\nthe Presbyterians, as this brood of their own hatching.\n\nThese were Cromwell\u2019s best cards, whereof he had a very great number in\nthe army, and some in the House, whereof he himself was thought one;\nthough he were nothing certain, but, applying himself always to the\nfaction that was strongest, was of a colour like it.\n\nThere were in the army a great number, if not the greatest part, that\naimed only at rapine and sharing the lands and goods of their enemies;\nand these also, upon the opinion they had of Cromwell\u2019s valour and\nconduct, thought they could not any way better arrive at their ends than\nby adhering to him. Lastly, in the Parliament itself, though not the\nmajor part, yet a considerable number were fanatics enough to put in\ndoubts, and cause delay in the resolutions of the House, and sometimes\nalso by advantage of a thin House to carry a vote in favour of Cromwell,\nas they did upon the 26th of July. For whereas on the 4th of May\nprecedent the Parliament had voted that the militia of London should be\nin the hands of a committee of citizens, whereof the Lord Mayor for the\ntime being should be one; shortly after, the Independents, chancing to\nbe the majority, made an ordinance, by which it was put into hands more\nfavourable to the army.\n\nThe best cards the Parliament had, were the city of London and the\nperson of the King. The General, Sir Thomas Fairfax, was right\nPresbyterian, but in the hands of the army, and the army in the hands of\nCromwell; but which party should prevail, depended on the playing of the\ngame. Cromwell protested still obedience and fidelity to the Parliament;\nbut meaning nothing less, bethought him and resolved on a way to excuse\nhimself of all that he should do to the contrary upon the army.\nTherefore he and his son-in-law, Commissary-General Ireton (as good at\ncontriving as himself, and at speaking and writing better), contrive how\nto mutiny the army against the Parliament. To this end they spread a\nwhisper through the army, that the Parliament, now they had the King,\nintended to disband them, to cheat them of their arrears, and to send\nthem into Ireland to be destroyed by the Irish. The army being herewith\nenraged, were taught by Ireton to erect a council amongst themselves of\ntwo soldiers out of every troop and every company, to consult for the\ngood of the army, and to assist at the council of war, and to advise for\nthe peace and safety of the kingdom. These were called adjutators; so\nthat whatsoever Cromwell would have to be done, he needed nothing to\nmake them do it but secretly to put it into the head of these\nadjutators. The effect of the first consultation was to take the King\nfrom Holmeby and to bring him to the army.\n\nThe general hereupon, by letter to the Parliament, excuses himself and\nCromwell, and the body of the army, as ignorant of the fact; and that\nthe King came away willingly with those soldiers that brought him:\nassuring them withal, that the whole army intended nothing but peace,\nnor opposed Presbytery, nor affected Independency, nor did hold any\nlicentious freedom in religion.\n\n_B._ It is strange that Sir Thomas Fairfax could be so abused by\nCromwell as to believe this which he himself here writes.\n\n_A._ I cannot believe that Cornet Joyce could go out of the army with\n1,000 soldiers to fetch the King, and neither the general nor the\nlieutenant-general, nor the body of the army take notice of it. And that\nthe King went willingly, appears to be false by a message sent on\npurpose from his Majesty to the Parliament.\n\n_B._ Here is perfidy upon perfidy: first, the perfidy of the Parliament\nagainst the King, and then the perfidy of the army against the\nParliament.\n\n_A._ This was the first trick Cromwell played, whereby he thought\nhimself to have gotten so great an advantage that he said openly, \u201cThat\nhe had the Parliament in his pocket,\u201d as indeed he had, and the city\ntoo. For upon the news of it they were, both one and the other, in very\ngreat disorder, and the more, because there came with it a rumour that\nthe army was marching up to London.\n\nThe King in the meantime, till his residence was settled at Hampton\nCourt, was carried from place to place, not without some ostentation;\nbut with much more liberty, and with more respect shewn him by far, than\nwhen he was in the hands of the Parliament\u2019s commissioners; for his own\nchaplains were allowed him, and his children and some friends permitted\nto see him. Besides that, he was much complimented by Cromwell, who\npromised him, in a serious and seeming passionate manner, to restore him\nto his right against the Parliament.\n\n_B._ How was he sure he could do that?\n\n_A._ He was not sure; but he was resolved to march up to the city and\nParliament, to set up the King again, and be the second man, unless in\nthe attempt he found better hope, than yet he had, to make himself the\nfirst man by dispossessing the King.\n\n_B._ What assistance against the Parliament and the city could Cromwell\nexpect from the King?\n\n_A._ By declaring directly for him he might have had all the King\u2019s\nparty, which were many more now since his misfortune than ever they were\nbefore. For in the Parliament itself, there were many that had\ndiscovered the hypocrisy and private aims of their fellows: many were\nconverted to their duty by their own natural reason; and their\ncompassion for the King\u2019s sufferings had begot generally an indignation\nagainst the Parliament: so that if they had been by the protection of\nthe present army brought together and embodied, Cromwell might have done\nwhat he had pleased, in the first place for the King, and in the second\nfor himself. But it seems he meant first to try what he could do without\nthe King; and if that proved enough, to rid his hands of him.\n\n_B._ What did the Parliament and city do to oppose the army?\n\n_A._ First, the Parliament sent to the general to redeliver the King to\ntheir commissioners. Instead of an answer to this, the army sent\narticles to the Parliament, and with them a charge against eleven of\ntheir members, all of them active Presbyterians: of which articles these\nare some: 1. That the House may be purged of those, who, by the\nself-denying ordinance, ought not to be there; 2. That such as abused\nand endangered the kingdom, might be disabled to do the like hereafter;\n3. That a day might be appointed to determine this Parliament; 4. That\nthey would make an account to the kingdom of the vast sums of money they\nhad received; 5. That the eleven members might presently be suspended\nsitting in the House. These were the articles that put them to their\ntrumps; and they answered none of them, but that of the suspension of\nthe eleven members, which they said they could not do by law till the\nparticulars of the charge were produced: but this was soon answered with\ntheir own proceeding against the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Earl\nof Strafford.\n\nThe Parliament being thus somewhat awed, and the King made somewhat\nconfident, he undertakes the city, requiring the Parliament to put the\nmilitia of London into other hands.\n\n_B._ What other hands? I do not well understand you.\n\n_A._ I told you that the militia of London was, on the 4th of May, put\ninto the hands of the lord-mayor and other citizens, and soon after put\ninto the hands of other men more favourable to the army. And now I am to\ntell you, that on July the 26th, the violence of certain apprentices and\ndisbanded soldiers forced the Parliament to re-settle it as it was, in\nthe citizens; and hereupon the two speakers and divers of the members\nran away to the army, where they were invited and contented to sit and\nvote in the council of war in nature of a Parliament. And out of the\ncitizens' hands they would have the militia taken away, and put again\ninto those hands out of which it was taken the 26th of July.\n\n_B._ What said the city to this?\n\n_A._ The Londoners manned their works, viz: the line of communication;\nraised an army of valiant men within the line; chose good officers, all\nbeing desirous to go out and fight whensoever the city should give them\norder; and in that posture stood expecting the enemy.\n\nThe soldiers in the meantime enter into an engagement to live and die\nwith Sir Thomas Fairfax, and the Parliament, and the army.\n\n_B._ That is very fine. They imitate that which the Parliament did, when\nthey first took up arms against the King, styling themselves the King\nand Parliament, maintaining that the King was always virtually in his\nParliament: so the army now, making war against the Parliament, called\nthemselves the Parliament and the army: but they might, with more\nreason, say, that the Parliament, since it was in Cromwell\u2019s pocket, was\nvirtually in the army.\n\n_A._ Withal they send out a declaration of the grounds of their march\ntowards London; wherein they take upon them to be judges of the\nParliament, and of who are fit to be trusted with the business of the\nkingdom, giving them the name, not of the Parliament, but of the\ngentlemen at Westminster. For since the violence they were under July\nthe 26th, the army denied them to be a lawful Parliament. At the same\ntime they sent a letter to the mayor and aldermen of London, reproaching\nthem with those late tumults; telling them they were enemies to the\npeace, treacherous to the Parliament, unable to defend either the\nParliament or themselves; and demanded to have the city delivered into\ntheir hands, to which purpose, they said, they were now coming to them.\nThe general also sent out his warrants to the counties adjacent,\nsummoning their trained soldiers to join with them.\n\n_B._ Were the trained soldiers part of the general\u2019s army?\n\n_A._ No, nor at all in pay, nor could be without an order of Parliament.\nBut what might an army not do, after it had mastered all the laws of the\nland? The army being come to Hounslow Heath, distant from London but ten\nmiles, the Court of Aldermen was called to consider what to do. The\ncaptains and soldiers of the city were willing, and well provided, to go\nforth and give them battle. But a treacherous officer, that had charge\nof a work on Southwark side, had let in within the line a small party of\nthe enemies, who marched as far as to the gate of London-bridge; and\nthen the Court of Aldermen, their hearts failing them, submitted on\nthese conditions: to relinquish their militia; to desert the eleven\nmembers; to deliver up the forts and line of communication, together\nwith the Tower of London, and all magazines and arms therein, to the\narmy; to disband their forces and turn out all the reformadoes, that is,\nall Essex\u2019s old soldiers; to draw off the guards from the Parliament.\nAll which was done, and the army marched triumphantly through the\nprincipal streets of the city.\n\n_B._ It is strange that the mayor and aldermen, having such an army,\nshould so quickly yield. Might they not have resisted the party of the\nenemy at the bridge, with a party of their own; and the rest of the\nenemies, with the rest of their own?\n\n_A._ I cannot judge of that: but to me it would have been strange if\nthey had done otherwise. For I consider the most part of rich subjects,\nthat have made themselves so by craft and trade, as men that never look\nupon anything but their present profit; and who, to every thing not\nlying in that way, are in a manner blind, being amazed at the very\nthought of plundering. If they had understood what virtue there is to\npreserve their wealth in obedience to their lawful sovereign, they would\nnever have sided with the Parliament; and so we had had no need of\narming. The mayor and aldermen therefore, being assured by this\nsubmission to save their goods, and not sure of the same by resisting,\nseem to me to have taken the wisest course. Nor was the Parliament less\ntame than the city. For presently, August the 6th, the general brought\nthe fugitive speakers and members to the House with a strong guard of\nsoldiers, and replaced the speakers in their chairs. And for this they\ngave the general thanks, not only there in the House, but appointed also\na day for a holy thanksgiving; and not long after made him Generalissimo\nof all the forces of England and Constable of the Tower. But in effect\nall this was the advancement of Cromwell; for he was the usufructuary,\nthough the property were in Sir Thomas Fairfax. For the Independents\nimmediately cast down the whole line of communication; divided the\nmilitia of London, Westminster and Southwark, which were before united;\ndisplaced such governors of towns and forts as were not for their turn,\nthough placed there by ordinance of Parliament; instead of whom, they\nput in men of their own party. They also made the Parliament to declare\nnull all that had passed in the Houses from July the 26th to August the\n6th, and clapped in prison some of the lords, and some of the most\neminent citizens, whereof the lord mayor was one.\n\n_B._ Cromwell had power enough now to restore the King. Why did he not?\n\n_A._ His main end was to set himself in his place. The restoring of the\nKing was but a reserve against the Parliament, which being in his\npocket, he had no more need of the King, who was now an impediment to\nhim. To keep him in the army was a trouble; to let him fall into the\nhands of the Presbyterians had been a stop to his hopes; to murder him\nprivately, besides the horror of the act, now whilst he was no more than\nlieutenant-general, would have made him odious without furthering his\ndesign. There was nothing better for his purpose than to let him escape\nfrom Hampton Court, where he was too near the Parliament, whither he\npleased beyond the sea. For though Cromwell had a great party in the\nParliament House whilst they saw not his ambition to be their master,\nyet they would have been his enemies as soon as that had appeared. To\nmake the King attempt an escape, some of those that had him in custody,\nby Cromwell\u2019s direction told him that the adjutators meant to murder\nhim; and withal caused a rumour of the same to be generally spread, to\nthe end it might that way also come to the King\u2019s ear, as it did.\n\nThe King, therefore, in a dark and rainy night, his guards being\nretired, as it was thought, on purpose, left Hampton Court and went to\nthe sea-side about Southampton, where a vessel had been bespoken to\ntransport him but failed; so that the King was forced to trust himself\nwith Colonel Hammond, then governor of the Isle of Wight; expecting\nperhaps some kindness from him, for Dr. Hammond\u2019s sake, brother to the\ncolonel and his Majesty\u2019s much favoured chaplain. But it proved\notherwise; for the colonel sent to his masters of the Parliament, to\nreceive their orders concerning him. This going into the Isle of Wight\nwas not likely to be any part of Cromwell\u2019s design, who neither knew\nwhither nor which way he would go; nor had Hammond known any more than\nother men, if the ship had come to the appointed place in due time.\n\n_B._ If the King had escaped into France, might not the French have\nassisted him with forces to recover his kingdom, and so frustrated the\ndesigns both of Cromwell and all the King\u2019s other enemies?\n\n_A._ Yes, much; just as they assisted his son, our present most gracious\nSovereign, who two years before fled thither out of Cornwall.\n\n_B._ It is methinks no great polity in neighbouring princes to favour,\nso often as they do, one another\u2019s rebels, especially when they rebel\nagainst monarchy itself. They should rather, first, make a league\nagainst rebellion, and afterwards, if there be no remedy, fight one\nagainst another. Nor will that serve the turn amongst Christian\nsovereigns, till preaching be better looked to, whereby the\ninterpretation of a verse in the Hebrew, Greek, or Latin Bible, is\noftentimes the cause of civil war and the deposing and assassinating of\nGod\u2019s anointed. And yet, converse with those divinity-disputers as long\nas you will, you will hardly find one in a hundred discreet enough to be\nemployed in any great affair either of war or peace. It is not the right\nof the sovereign, though granted to him by every man\u2019s express consent,\nthat can enable him to do his office; it is the obedience of the\nsubject, that must do that. For what good is it to promise allegiance,\nand then by and by to cry out, as some ministers did in the pulpit, _To\nyour tents, O Israel!_? Common people know nothing of right or wrong by\ntheir own meditation; they must therefore be taught the grounds of their\nduty, and the reasons why calamities ever follow disobedience to their\nlawful sovereigns. But to the contrary, our rebels were publicly taught\nrebellion in the pulpits; and that there was no sin, but the doing of\nwhat the preachers forbade, or the omission of what they advised. But\nnow the King was the Parliament\u2019s prisoner, why did not the\nPresbyterians advance their own interest by restoring him?\n\n_A._ The Parliament, in which there were more Presbyterians yet than\nIndependents, might have gotten what they would of the King during his\nlife, if they had not by an unconscionable and sottish ambition\nobstructed the way to their ends. They sent him four propositions, to be\nsigned and passed by him as Acts of Parliament; telling him, when these\nwere granted, they would send commissioners to treat with him of any\nother articles.\n\nThe propositions were these: First, that the Parliament should have the\nmilitia, and the power of levying money to maintain it, for twenty\nyears; and after that term, the exercise thereof to return to the King,\nin case the Parliament think the safety of the kingdom concerned in it.\n\n_B._ The first article takes from the King the militia, and consequently\nthe whole sovereignty for ever.\n\n_A._ The second was, that the King should justify the proceedings of the\nParliament against himself; and declare void all oaths and declarations\nmade by him against the Parliament.\n\n_B._ This was to make him guilty of the war, and of all the blood spilt\ntherein.\n\n_A._ The third was, to take away all titles of honour conferred by the\nKing since the Great Seal was carried to him in May 1642.\n\nThe fourth was, that the Parliament should adjourn themselves, when, and\nto what place, and for what time they pleased.\n\nThese propositions the King refused to grant, as he had reason; but sent\nothers of his own, not much less advantageous to the Parliament, and\ndesired a personal treaty with the Parliament for the settling of the\npeace of the kingdom. But the Parliament denying them to be sufficient\nfor that purpose, voted that there should be no more addresses made to\nhim, nor messages received from him; but that they would settle the\nkingdom without him. And this they voted partly upon the speeches and\nmenaces of the army-faction then present in the House of Commons,\nwhereof one advised these three points: 1. To secure the King in some\ninland castle with guards; 2. To draw up articles of impeachment against\nhim; 3. To lay him by, and settle the kingdom without him.\n\nAnother said, that his denying of the four bills was the denying\nprotection to his subjects; and that therefore they might deny him\nsubjection; and added, that till the Parliament forsook the army, the\narmy would never forsake the Parliament. This was threatening.\n\nLast of all, Cromwell himself told them, it was now expected that the\nParliament should govern and defend the kingdom, and not any longer let\nthe people expect their safety from a man whose heart God had hardened;\nnor let those, that had so well defended the Parliament, be left\nhereafter to the rage of an irreconcilable enemy, lest they seek their\nsafety some other way. This again was threatening; as also the laying\nhis hand upon his sword when he spake it.\n\nAnd hereupon the vote of non-addresses was made an ordinance; which the\nHouse would afterwards have recalled, but was forced by Cromwell to keep\ntheir word.\n\nThe Scotch were displeased with it; partly, because their brethren the\nPresbyterians had lost a great deal of their power in England; and\npartly also, because they had sold the King into their hands.\n\nThe King now published a passionate complaint to his people of this hard\ndealing with him; which made them pity him, but not yet rise in his\nbehalf.\n\n_B._ Was not this, think you, the true time for Cromwell to take\npossession?\n\n_A._ By no means. There were yet many obstacles to be removed. He was\nnot general of the army. The army was still for a Parliament. The city\nof London discontented about their militia. The Scots expected with an\narmy to rescue the King. His adjutators were levellers, and against\nmonarchy, who though they had helped him to bring under the Parliament,\nyet, like dogs that are easily taught to fetch, and not easily taught to\nrender, would not make him king. So that Cromwell had these businesses\nfollowing to overcome, before he could formally make himself a sovereign\nprince: 1. To be Generalissimo: 2. To remove the King: 3. To suppress\nall insurrections here: 4. To oppose the Scots: and lastly, to dissolve\nthe present Parliament. Mighty businesses, which he could never promise\nhimself to overcome. Therefore I cannot believe he then thought to be\nKing; but only by well serving the strongest party, which was always his\nmain polity, to proceed as far as that and fortune would carry him.\n\n_B._ The Parliament were certainly no less foolish than wicked, in\ndeserting thus the King, before they had the army at a better command\nthan they had.\n\n_A._ In the beginning of 1648 the Parliament gave commission to Philip\nEarl of Pembroke, then made Chancellor of Oxford, together with some of\nthe doctors there as good divines as he, to purge the University. By\nvirtue whereof they turned out all such as were not of their faction,\nand all such as had approved the use of the Common-prayer-book; as also\ndivers scandalous ministers and scholars, that is, such as customarily\nand without need took the name of God into their mouths, or used to\nspeak wantonly, or use the company of lewd women: and for this last I\ncannot but commend them.\n\n_B._ So shall not I; for it is just such another piece of piety, as to\nturn men out of an hospital because they are lame. Where can a man\nprobably learn godliness, and how to correct his vices, better than in\nthe universities erected for that purpose?\n\n_A._ It may be, the Parliament thought otherwise. For I have often heard\nthe complaints of parents, that their children were debauched there to\ndrunkenness, wantonness, gaming, and other vices consequent to these.\nNor is it a wonder amongst so many youths, if they did corrupt one\nanother in despite of their tutors, who oftentimes were little elder\nthan themselves. And therefore I think the Parliament did not much\nreverence that institution of universities, as to the bringing up of\nyoung men to virtue; though many of them learned there to preach, and\nbecame thereby capable of preferment and maintenance; and some others\nwere sent thither by their parents, to save themselves the trouble of\ngoverning them at home, during that time wherein children are least\ngovernable. Nor do I think the Parliament cared more for the clergy than\nother men did. But certainly an university is an excellent servant to\nthe clergy; and the clergy, if it be not carefully looked to, by their\ndissensions in doctrines and by the advantage to publish their\ndissensions, is an excellent means to divide a kingdom into factions.\n\n_B._ But seeing there is no place in this part of the world, where\nphilosophy and other human sciences are not highly valued; where can\nthey be learned better than in the Universities?\n\n_A._ What other sciences? Do not divines comprehend all civil and moral\nphilosophy within their divinity? And as for natural philosophy, is it\nnot removed from Oxford and Cambridge to Gresham College in London, and\nto be learned out of their gazettes? But we are gone from our subject.\n\n_B._ No; we are indeed gone from the greater businesses of the kingdom;\nto which, if you please, let us return.\n\n_A._ The first insurrection, or rather tumult, was that of the\napprentices, on the 9th of April. But this was not upon the King\u2019s\naccount, but arose from a customary assembly of them for recreation in\nMoorfields, whence some zealous officers of the trained soldiers would\nneeds drive them away by force; but were themselves routed with stones;\nand had their ensign taken away by the apprentices, which they carried\nabout in the streets, and frighted the lord mayor into his house; where\nthey took a gun called a drake; and then they set guards at some of the\ngates, and all the rest of the day childishly swaggered up and down: but\nthe next day the general himself marching into the city, quickly\ndispersed them. This was but a small business, but enough to let them\nsee that the Parliament was ill-beloved of the people.\n\nNext, the Welch took arms against them. There were three colonels in\nWales, Langhorne, Poyer, and Powel, who had formerly done the Parliament\ngood service, but now were commanded to disband; which they refused to\ndo; and the better to strengthen themselves, declared for the King; and\nwere about 8,000.\n\nAbout the same time, in Wales also, was another insurrection, headed by\nSir Nicholas Keymish, and another under Sir John Owen; so that now all\nWales was in rebellion against the Parliament: and yet all these were\novercome in a month\u2019s time by Cromwell and his officers; but not without\nstore of bloodshed on both sides.\n\n_B._ I do not much pity the loss of those men, that impute to the King\nthat which they do upon their own quarrel.\n\n_A._ Presently after this, some of the people of Surrey sent a petition\nto the Parliament for a personal treaty between the King and Parliament;\nbut their messengers were beaten home again by the soldiers that were\nquartered about Westminster and the mews. And then the Kentish men\nhaving a like petition to deliver, and seeing how ill it was like to be\nreceived, threw it away and took up arms. They had many gallant\nofficers, and for general the Earl of Norwich; and increased daily by\napprentices and old disbanded soldiers. Insomuch as the Parliament was\nglad to restore to the city their militia, and to keep guards on the\nThames side: and then Fairfax marched towards the enemy.\n\n_B._ And then the Londoners, I think, might easily and suddenly have\nmastered, first the Parliament, and next Fairfax his 8,000, and lastly\nCromwell\u2019s army; or at least have given the Scotch army opportunity to\nmarch unfoughten to London.\n\n_A._ It is true: but the city was never good at venturing; nor were they\nor the Scots principled to have a King over them, but under them.\nFairfax marching with his 8,000 against the royalists, routed a part of\nthem at Maidstone; another part were taking in other places in Kent\nfurther off; and the Earl of Norwich with the rest came to Blackheath,\nand thence sent to the city to get passage through it, to join with\nthose which were risen in Essex under Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George\nLisle; which being denied, the greatest part of his Kentish men deserted\nhim. With the rest, not above 500, he crossed the Thames into the Isle\nof Dogs, and so to Bow, and thence to Colchester. Fairfax having notice\nof this, crossed the Thames at Gravesend; and overtaking them, besieged\nthem in Colchester. The town had no defence but a breastwork, and yet\nheld out, upon hope of the Scotch army to relieve them, the space of two\nmonths. Upon the news of the defeat of the Scots they were forced to\nyield. The Earl of Norwich was sent prisoner to London. Sir Charles\nLucas and Sir George Lisle, two loyal and gallant persons, were shot to\ndeath. There was also another little insurrection, headed by the Earl of\nHolland, about Kingston; but quickly suppressed, and he himself taken\nprisoner.\n\n_B._ How came the Scots to be so soon dispatched?\n\n_A._ Merely, as it is said, for want of conduct. Their army was led by\nDuke Hamilton, who was then set at liberty, when Pendennis Castle, where\nhe was prisoner, was taken by the Parliamentarians. He entered England\nwith horse and foot 15,000, to which came above 3,000 English royalists.\nAgainst these Cromwell marched out of Wales with horse and foot 11,000,\nand near to Preston in Lancashire, in less than two hours, defeated\nthem. And the cause of it is said to be, that the Scotch army was so\nordered as they could not all come to the fight, nor relieve their\nfellows. After the defeat, they had no way to fly but further into\nEngland; so that in the pursuit they were almost all taken, and lost all\nthat an army can lose; for the few that got home, did not all bring home\ntheir swords. Duke Hamilton was taken, and not long after sent to\nLondon. But Cromwell marched on to Edinburgh, and there, by the help of\nthe faction which was contrary to Hamilton\u2019s, he made sure not to be\nhindered in his designs; the first whereof was to take away the King\u2019s\nlife by the hand of the Parliament.\n\nWhilst these things passed in the north, the Parliament, Cromwell being\naway, came to itself, and recalling their vote of non-addresses, sent to\nthe King new propositions, somewhat, but not much, easier than formerly.\nAnd upon the King\u2019s answer to them, they sent commissioners to treat\nwith him at Newport in the Isle of Wight; where they so long dodged with\nhim about trifles, that Cromwell was come to London before they had\ndone, to the King\u2019s destruction. For the army was now wholly at the\ndevotion of Cromwell, who set the adjutators on work again to make a\nremonstrance to the House of Commons, wherein they require: 1. That the\nKing be brought to justice: 2. That the Prince and the Duke of York be\nsummoned to appear at a day appointed, and proceeded with, according as\nthey should give satisfaction: 3. That the Parliament settle the peace\nand future government, and set a reasonable period to their own sitting,\nand make certain future Parliaments annual or biennial: 4. That a\ncompetent number of the King\u2019s chief instruments be executed. And this\nto be done both by the House of Commons and by a general agreement of\nthe people testified by their subscriptions. Nor did they stay for an\nanswer, but presently set a guard of soldiers at the Parliament-house\ndoor, and other soldiers in Westminster Hall, suffering none to go into\nthe House but such as would serve their turns. All others were frighted\naway, or made prisoners, and some upon divers quarrels suspended; above\nninety of them, because they had refused to vote against the Scots; and\nothers, because they had voted against the vote of non-addresses: and\nthe rest were a House for Cromwell. The fanatics also in the city being\ncountenanced by the army, pack a new common-council, whereof any forty\nwas to be above the mayor; and their first work was to frame a petition\nfor justice against the King, which Tichborne, the mayor, involving the\ncity in the regicide, delivered to the Parliament.\n\nAt the same time, with the like violence, they took the King from\nNewport in the Isle of Wight, to Hurst Castle, till things were ready\nfor his trial. The Parliament in the meantime, to avoid perjury, by an\nordinance declared void the oaths of supremacy and allegiance, and\npresently after made another to bring the King to his trial.\n\n_B._ This is a piece of law that I understood not before, that when many\nswear singly, they may, when they are assembled, if they please, absolve\nthemselves.\n\n_A._ The ordinance being drawn up was brought into the House, where\nafter three several readings it was voted, \u201cthat the Lords and Commons\nof England, assembled in Parliament, do declare, that by the fundamental\nlaws of the realm, it is treason in the King of England to levy war\nagainst the Parliament.\u201d And this vote was sent up to the Lords; and\nthey denying their consent, the Commons in anger made another vote;\n\u201cThat all members of committees should proceed and act in any ordinance,\nwhether the Lords concurred or no; and that the people, under God, are\nthe original of all just power; and that the House of Commons have the\nsupreme power of the nation; and that whatsoever the House of Commons\nenacteth, is law.\u201d All this passed _nemine contradicente_.\n\n_B._ These propositions fight not only against the King of England, but\nagainst all the kings of the world. It were good they thought on it. But\nyet, I believe, under God the original of all laws was in the people.\n\n_A._ But the people, for them and their heirs, by consent and oaths,\nhave long ago put the supreme power of the nation into the hands of\ntheir kings, for them and their heirs; and consequently into the hands\nof this King, their known and lawful heir.\n\n_B._ But does not the Parliament represent the people?\n\n_A._ Yes, to some purposes; as to put up petitions to the King, when\nthey have leave, and are grieved; but not to make a grievance of the\nKing\u2019s power. Besides, the Parliament never represents the people but\nwhen the King calls them; nor is it to be imagined that he calls a\nParliament to depose himself. Put the case, every county and borough\nshould have given this Parliament for a benevolence a sum of money; and\nthat every county, meeting in their county-court or elsewhere, and every\nborough in their town-hall, should have chosen men to carry their\nseveral sums respectively to the Parliament. Had not these men\nrepresented the whole nation?\n\n_B._ Yes, no doubt.\n\n_A._ Do you think the Parliament would have thought it reasonable to be\ncalled to account by this representative?\n\n_B._ No, sure; and yet I must confess the case is the same.\n\n_A._ This ordinance contained, first, a summary of the charge against\nthe King, in substance this; that not content with the encroachments of\nhis predecessors upon the freedom of the people, he had designed to set\nup a tyrannical government; and to that end, had raised and maintained\nin the land a civil war against the Parliament, whereby the country hath\nbeen miserably wasted, the public treasure exhausted, thousands of\npeople murdered, and infinite other mischiefs committed. Secondly, a\nconstitution passed of a high court of justice, that is, of a certain\nnumber of commissioners, of whom any twenty had power to try the King,\nand to proceed to sentence according to the merit of the cause, and see\nit speedily executed.\n\nThe commissioners met on Saturday, January 20th, in Westminster Hall,\nand the King was brought before them; where, sitting in a chair, he\nheard the charge read, but denied to plead to it either guilty or not\nguilty, till he should know by what lawful authority he was brought\nthither. The president told him that the Parliament affirmed their own\nauthority; and the King still persevered in his refusal to plead. Though\nmany words passed between him and the president, yet this was the\nsubstance of it all.\n\nOn Monday January 22nd the court met again, and the solicitor moved that\nif the King persisted in denying the authority of the court, the charge\nmight be taken _pro confesso_: but the King still denied their\nauthority.\n\nThey met again January the 23rd, and then the solicitor moved the court\nfor judgment; whereupon the King was required to give his final answer;\nwhich was again a denial of their authority.\n\nLastly, they met again January the 27th, where the King desired to be\nheard before the Lords and Commons in the Painted Chamber, and promising\nafter that to abide the judgment of the court. The commissioners retired\nfor half an hour to consider of it, and then returning caused the King\nto be brought again to the bar, and told him that what he proposed was\nbut another denial of the court\u2019s jurisdiction; and that if he had no\nmore to say, they would proceed. Then the King answering that he had no\nmore to say, the president began a long speech in justification of the\nParliament\u2019s proceedings, producing the examples of many kings killed or\ndeposed by wicked Parliaments, ancient and modern, in England, Scotland,\nand other parts of the world. All which he endeavoured to justify from\nthis only principle; that the people have the supreme power, and the\nParliament is the people. This speech ended, the sentence of death was\nread; and the same upon Tuesday after, January 30th, executed at the\ngate of his own palace of Whitehall. He that can delight in reading how\nvillainously he was used by the soldiers between the sentence and\nexecution, may go to the chronicle itself; in which he shall see what\ncourage, patience, wisdom, and goodness was in this prince, whom in\ntheir charge the members of that wicked Parliament styled tyrant,\ntraitor, and murderer.\n\nThe King being dead, the same day they made an act of Parliament, that\nwhereas several pretences might be made to the crown, &c. it is enacted\nby this present Parliament and by authority of the same, that no person\npresume to declare, proclaim, or publish, or any way promote Charles\nStuart, son of Charles late King of England, commonly called Prince of\nWales, or any other person, to be King of England or Ireland, &c.\n\n_B._ Seeing the King was dead, and his successor barred; by what\ndeclared authority was the peace maintained?\n\n_A._ They had, in their anger against the Lords, formerly declared the\nsupreme power of the nation to be in the House of Commons; and now, on\nFebruary the 5th, they vote the House of Lords to be useless and\ndangerous. And thus the kingdom is turned into a democracy, or rather an\noligarchy: for presently they made an act, that none of those members,\nwho were secluded for opposing the vote of non-addresses, should ever be\nre-admitted. And these were commonly called the secluded members; and\nthe rest were by some styled a Parliament, and by others the Rump.\n\nI think you need not now have a catalogue, either of the vices, or of\nthe crimes, or of the follies of the greatest part of them that composed\nthe Long Parliament; than which greater cannot be in the world. What\ngreater vices than irreligion, hypocrisy, avarice and cruelty; which\nhave appeared so eminently in the actions of Presbyterian members, and\nPresbyterian ministers? What greater crimes than blaspheming and killing\nGod\u2019s anointed; which was done by the hands of the Independents; but by\nthe folly and first treason of the Presbyterians who betrayed and sold\nhim to his murderers? Nor was it a little folly in the Lords, not to see\nthat by the taking away of the King\u2019s power they lost withal their own\nprivileges; or to think themselves, either for number or judgment, any\nway a considerable assistance to the House of Commons. And for those men\nwho had skill in the laws, it was no great sign of understanding not to\nperceive that the laws of the land were made by the King, to oblige his\nsubjects to peace and justice, and not to oblige himself that made them.\nAnd lastly and generally, all men are fools which pull down anything\nwhich does them good, before they have set up something better in its\nplace. He that would set up democracy with an army, should have an army\nto maintain it; but these men did it, when those men had the army that\nwere resolved to pull it down. To these follies I might add the folly of\nthose fine men, which out of their reading of Tully, Seneca, or other\nanti-monarchics, think themselves sufficient politicians, and show their\ndiscontents when they are not called to the management of the state, and\nturn from one side to another upon every neglect they fancy from the\nKing or his enemies.\n\n\n\n\n PART IV.\n\n ==========\n\n_A._ You have seen the Rump in possession, as they believed, of the\nsupreme power over the two nations of England and Ireland, and the army\ntheir servant; though Cromwell thought otherwise, serving them\ndiligently for the advancement of his own purposes. I am now therefore\nto show you their proceedings.\n\n_B._ Tell me first, how this kind of government under the Rump or relic\nof a House of Commons is to be called?\n\n_A._ It is doubtless an oligarchy. For the supreme authority must needs\nbe in one man or in more. If in one, it is monarchy; the Rump therefore\nwas no monarchy. If the authority were in more than one, it was in all,\nor in fewer than all. When in all, it is democracy; for every man may\nenter into the assembly which makes the Sovereign Court; which they\ncould not do here. It is therefore manifest, that the authority was in a\nfew, and consequently the state was an oligarchy.\n\n_B._ Is it not impossible for a people to be well governed, that are to\nobey more masters than one?\n\n_A._ Both the Rump and all other sovereign assemblies, if they have but\none voice, though they be many men, yet are they but one person. For\ncontrary commands cannot consist in one and the same voice, which is the\nvoice of the greatest part; and therefore they might govern well enough,\nif they had honesty and wit enough.\n\nThe first act of the Rump was the exclusion of those members of the\nHouse of Commons, which had been formerly kept out by violence for the\nprocuring of an ordinance for the King\u2019s trial; for these men had\nappeared against the ordinance of non-addresses, and therefore were\nexcluded, because they might else be an impediment to their future\ndesigns.\n\n_B._ Was it not rather, because in the authority of few they thought the\nfewer the better, both in respect of their shares and also of a nearer\napproach in every one of them to the dignity of king?\n\n_A._ Yes certainly, that was their principal end.\n\n_B._ When these were put out, why did not the counties and boroughs\nchoose others in their places?\n\n_A._ They could not do that without order from the House.\n\nAfter this they constituted a council of forty persons, which they\ntermed a Council of State, whose office was to execute what the Rump\nshould command.\n\n_B._ When there was neither King nor House of Lords, they could not call\nthemselves a Parliament; for a Parliament is a meeting of the King,\nLords, and Commons, to confer together about the businesses of the\ncommonwealth. With whom did the Rump confer?\n\n_A._ Men may give to their assembly what name they please, what\nsignification soever such name might formerly have had; and the Rump\ntook the name of Parliament, as most suitable to their purpose, and such\na name, as being venerable amongst the people for many hundred years,\nhad countenanced and sweetened subsidies and other levies of money,\notherwise very unpleasant to the subject. They took also afterwards\nanother name, which was _Custodes Libertatis Angli\u00e6_, which title they\nused only in their writs issuing out of the courts of justice.\n\n_B._ I do not see how a subject that is tied to the laws, can have more\nliberty in one form of government than another.\n\n_A._ Howsoever to the people, that understand by liberty nothing but\nleave to do what they list, it was a title not ingrateful.\n\nTheir next work was to set forth a public declaration, that they were\nfully resolved to maintain the fundamental laws of the nation, as to the\npreservation of the lives, liberties, and proprieties of the people.\n\n_B._ What did they mean by the fundamental laws of the nation?\n\n_A._ Nothing but to abuse the people. For the only fundamental law in\nevery commonwealth, is to obey the laws from time to time, which he\nshall make to whom the people have given the supreme power. How likely\nthen are they to uphold the fundamental laws, that had murdered him who\nwas by themselves so often acknowledged for their lawful sovereign?\nBesides, at the same time that this declaration came forth, they were\nerecting that High Court of Justice which took away the lives of Duke\nHamilton, the Earl of Holland, and the Lord Capel. Whatsoever they meant\nby a fundamental law, the erecting of this court was a breach of it, as\nbeing warranted by no former law or example in England.\n\nAt the same time also they levied taxes by soldiers, and to soldiers\npermitted free quarter, and did many other actions, which if the King\nhad done, they would have said had been done against the liberty and\npropriety of the subject.\n\n_B._ What silly things are the common sort of people, to be cozened as\nthey were so grossly!\n\n_A._ What sort of people, as to this matter, are not of the common sort?\nThe craftiest knaves of all the Rump were no wiser than the rest whom\nthey cozened. For the most of them did believe that the same things\nwhich they imposed upon the generality, were just and reasonable; and\nespecially the great haranguers, and such as pretended to learning. For\nwho can be a good subject in a monarchy, whose principles are taken from\nthe enemies of monarchy, such as were Cicero, Seneca, Cato, and other\npoliticians of Rome, and Aristotle of Athens, who seldom spake of kings\nbut as of wolves and other ravenous beasts? You may perhaps think a man\nhas need of nothing else to know the duty he owes to his governor, and\nwhat right he has to order him, but a good natural wit; but it is\notherwise. For it is a science, and built upon sure and clear\nprinciples, and to be learned by deep and careful study, or from masters\nthat have deeply studied it. And who was there in the Parliament or in\nthe nation, that could find out those evident principles, and derive\nfrom them the necessary rules of justice, and the necessary connexion of\njustice and peace? The people have one day in seven the leisure to hear\ninstruction, and there are ministers appointed to teach them their duty.\nBut how have those ministers performed their office? A great part of\nthem, namely, the Presbyterian ministers, throughout the whole war,\ninstigated the people against the King; so did also Independents and\nother fanatic ministers. The rest, contented with their livings,\npreached in their parishes points of controversy, to religion\nimpertinent, but to the breach of charity among themselves very\neffectual; or else eloquent things, which the people either understood\nnot, or thought themselves not concerned in. But this sort of preachers,\nas they did little good, so they did little hurt. The mischief proceeded\nwholly from the Presbyterian preachers, who, by a long practised,\nhistrionic faculty, preached up the rebellion powerfully.\n\n_B._ To what end?\n\n_A._ To the end that the State becoming popular, the Church might be so\ntoo, and governed by an Assembly; and by consequence, as they thought,\nseeing politics are subservient to religion, they might govern, and\nthereby satisfy not only their covetous humour with riches, but also\ntheir malice with power to undo all men that admired not their wisdom.\nYour calling the people silly things, obliged me by this digression to\nshow you, that it is not want of wit, but want of the science of\njustice, that brought them into these troubles. Persuade, if you can,\nthat man that has made his fortune, or made it greater, or an eloquent\norator, or a ravishing poet, or a subtle lawyer, or but a good hunter or\na cunning gamester, that he has not a good wit; and yet there were of\nall these a great many so silly, as to be deceived by the Rump and\nmembers of the same Rump. They wanted not wit, but the knowledge of the\ncauses and grounds upon which one person has a right to govern, and the\nrest an obligation to obey; which grounds are necessary to be taught the\npeople, who without them cannot live long in peace amongst themselves.\n\n_B._ Let us return, if you please, to the proceedings of the Rump.\n\n_A._ In the rest of this year they voted a new stamp for the coin of\nthis nation. They considered also of agents to be sent to foreign\nstates; and having lately received applause from the army for their work\ndone by the High Court of Justice, and encouragement to extend the same\nfurther, they perfected the said High Court of Justice, in which were\ntried Duke Hamilton, the Earl of Holland, Lord Capel, the Earl of\nNorwich, and Sir John Owen; whereof, as I mentioned before, the three\nfirst were beheaded. This affrighted divers of the King\u2019s party out of\nthe land; for not only they, but all that had borne arms for the King,\nwere at that time in very great danger of their lives. For it was put to\nthe question by the army at a council of war, whether they should be all\nmassacred or no; where the noes carried it but by two voices. Lastly,\nMarch the 24th, they put the Mayor of London out of his office, fined\nhim 2,000_l._, disfranchised him, and condemned him to two months\nimprisonment in the Tower, for refusing to proclaim the act for\nabolishing the kingly power. And thus ended the year 1648 and the\nmonthly fast; God having granted that which they fasted for, the death\nof the King and the possession of his inheritance. By these their\nproceedings they had already lost the hearts of the generality of the\npeople, and had nothing to trust to but the army; which was not in their\npower, but in Cromwell\u2019s; who never failed, when there was occasion, to\nput them upon all exploits that might make them odious to the people, in\norder to his future dissolving them whensoever it should conduce to his\nends.\n\nIn the beginning of 1649 the Scots, discontented with the proceedings of\nthe Rump against the late King, began to levy soldiers in order to a new\ninvasion of England. The Irish rebels, for want of timely resistance\nfrom England, were grown terrible; and the English army at home,\ninfected by the adjutators, were casting how to share the land amongst\nthe godly, meaning themselves and such others as they pleased, who were\ntherefore called Levellers. Also the Rump for the present were not very\nwell provided of money, and, therefore, the first thing they did, was\nthe laying of a tax upon the people of 90,000_l._ a month for the\nmaintenance of the army.\n\n_B._ Was it not one of their quarrels with the King, that he had levied\nmoney without the consent of the people in Parliament?\n\n_A._ You may see by this, what reason the Rump had to call itself a\nParliament. For the taxes imposed by Parliament were always understood\nto be by the people\u2019s consent, and consequently legal. To appease the\nScots, they sent messengers with flattering letters to keep them from\nengaging for the present King: but in vain: for they would hear nothing\nfrom a House of Commons, as they called it, at Westminster, without a\nKing and Lords. But they sent commissioners to the King, to let him know\nwhat they were doing for him: for they were resolved to raise an army of\n17,000 foot and 6,000 horse for themselves.\n\nTo relieve Ireland, the Rump had resolved to send eleven regiments\nthither out of the army in England. This happened well for Cromwell. For\nthe levelling soldiers, which were in every regiment many, and in some\nthe major part, finding that instead of dividing the land at home they\nwere to venture their lives in Ireland, flatly denied to go; and one\nregiment, having cashiered their colonel about Salisbury, was marching\nto join with three regiments more of the same resolution; but both the\ngeneral and Cromwell falling upon them at Burford, utterly defeated\nthem, and soon after reduced the whole army to their obedience. And thus\nanother of the impediments to Cromwell\u2019s advancement was soon removed.\nThis done, they came to Oxford, and thence to London: and at Oxford,\nboth the general and Cromwell were made doctors of the civil law; and at\nLondon, feasted and presented by the city.\n\n_B._ Were they not first made masters, and then doctors?\n\n_A._ They had made themselves already masters, both of the laws and\nParliament. The army being now obedient, the Rump sent over those eleven\nregiments into Ireland, under the command of Dr. Cromwell, intituled\ngovernor of that kingdom, the Lord Fairfax being still general of all\nthe forces, both here and there.\n\nThe Marquis, now Duke, of Ormond was the King\u2019s lieutenant of Ireland;\nand the rebels had made a confederacy amongst themselves; and these\nconfederates had made a kind of league with the lieutenant, wherein they\nagreed, upon liberty given them in the exercise of their religion, to be\nfaithful to and assist the King. To these also were joined some forces\nraised by the Earls of Castlehaven and Clanricarde and my Lord\nInchiquin; so that they were the greatest united strength in the island.\nBut there were amongst them a great many other Papists, that would by no\nmeans subject themselves to Protestants; and these were called the\nNuntio\u2019s party, as the others were called the confederate party. These\nparties not agreeing, and the confederate party having broken their\narticles, the lord-lieutenant seeing them ready to besiege him in\nDublin, and not able to defend it, did, to preserve the place for the\nProtestants, surrender it to the Parliament of England; and came over to\nthe King at that time when he was carried from place to place by the\narmy. From England he went over to the Prince, now King, residing then\nat Paris.\n\nBut the confederates, affrighted with the news that the Rump was sending\nover an army thither, desired the Prince by letters, to send back my\nLord of Ormond, engaging themselves to submit absolutely to the King\u2019s\nauthority, and to obey my Lord of Ormond as his lieutenant. And hereupon\nhe was sent back. This was about a year before the going over of\nCromwell.\n\nIn which time, by the dissensions in Ireland between the confederate\nparty and the Nuntio\u2019s party, and discontents about command, this\notherwise sufficient power effected nothing; and was at last defeated,\nAugust the 2nd, by a sally out of Dublin, which they were besieging.\nWithin a few days after arrived Cromwell, who with extraordinary\ndiligence and horrid executions, in less than a twelvemonth that he\nstayed there, subdued in a manner the whole nation; having killed or\nexterminated a great part of them, and leaving his son-in-law Ireton to\nsubdue the rest. But Ireton died there before the business was quite\ndone, of the plague. This was one step more towards Cromwell\u2019s\nexaltation to the throne.\n\n_B._ What a miserable condition was Ireland reduced to by the learning\nof the Roman, as well as England was by the learning of the Presbyterian\nclergy.\n\n_A._ In the latter end of the preceding year the King was come from\nParis to the Hague; and shortly after came thither from the Rump their\nagent Dorislaus, doctor of civil law, who had been employed in the\ndrawing up of the charge against the late King. But the first night he\ncame, as he was at supper, a company of cavaliers, near a dozen, entered\nhis chamber, killed him, and got away. Not long after also their agent\nat Madrid, one Ascham, one that had written in defence of his masters,\nwas killed in the same manner. About this time came out two books, one\nwritten by Salmasius, a Presbyterian, against the murder of the King;\nanother written by Milton, an English Independent, in answer to it.\n\n_B._ I have seen them both. They are very good Latin both, and hardly to\nbe judged which is better; and both very ill reasoning, hardly to be\njudged which is worse; like two declamations, _pro_ and _con_, made for\nexercise only in a rhetoric school by one and the same man. So like is a\nPresbyterian to an Independent.\n\n_A._ In this year the Rump did not much at home; save that in the\nbeginning they made England a free state by an act which runs thus: \u201cBe\nit enacted and declared by this present Parliament, and by the authority\nthereof, that the people of England, and all the dominions and\nterritories thereunto belonging, are, and shall be, and are hereby\nconstituted, made, and declared a commonwealth and free state, &c.\u201d\n\n_B._ What did they mean by a free state and commonwealth? Were the\npeople no longer to be subject to laws? They could not mean that: for\nthe Parliament meant to govern them by their own laws, and punish such\nas broke them. Did they mean that England should not be subject to any\nforeign kingdom or commonwealth? That needed not be enacted, seeing\nthere was no king nor people pretended to be their masters. What did\nthey mean then?\n\n_A._ They meant that neither this king, nor any king, nor any single\nperson, but only that they themselves would be the people\u2019s masters, and\nwould have set it down in those plain words, if the people could have\nbeen cozened with words intelligible, as easily as with words not\nintelligible.\n\nAfter this they gave one another money and estates out of the lands and\ngoods of the loyal party. They enacted also an engagement to be taken by\nevery man, in these words: _You shall promise to be true and faithful to\nthe commonwealth of England, as it is now established, without King or\nHouse of Lords._\n\nThey banished also from within twenty miles of London all the royal\nparty, forbidding also every one of them to depart more than five miles\nfrom his dwelling-house.\n\n_B._ They meant perhaps to have them ready, if need were, for a\nmassacre. But what did the Scots in this time?\n\n_A._ They were considering of the officers of the army which they were\nlevying for the King, how they might exclude from command all such as\nhad loyally served his father, and all Independents, and all such as\ncommanded in Duke Hamilton\u2019s army; and these were the main things that\npassed this year.\n\nThe Marquis of Montrose, that in the year 1645 had with a few men and in\nlittle time done things almost incredible against the late King\u2019s\nenemies in Scotland, landed now again, in the beginning of the year\n1650, in the north of Scotland, with commission from the present King,\nhoping to do him as good service as he had formerly done his father. But\nthe case was altered; for the Scotch forces were then in England in the\nservice of the Parliament; whereas now they were in Scotland, and many\nmore for their intended invasion newly raised. Besides, the soldiers\nwhich the Marquis brought over were few, and foreigners; nor did the\nHighlanders come in to him, as he expected; insomuch as he was soon\ndefeated, and shortly after taken, and, with more spiteful usage than\nrevenge required, executed by the Covenanters of Edinburgh, May the 2nd.\n\n_B._ What good could the King expect from joining with these men, who\nduring the treaty discovered so much malice to him in one of his best\nservants?\n\n_A._ No doubt, their churchmen being then prevalent, they would have\ndone as much to this King as the English Parliament had done to his\nfather, if they could have gotten by it that which they foolishly\naspired to, the government of the nation. I do not believe that the\nIndependents were worse than the Presbyterians: both the one and the\nother were resolved to destroy whatsoever should stand in the way to\ntheir ambition. But necessity made the King pass over both this and many\nother indignities from them, rather than suffer the pursuit of his right\nin England to cool, and be little better than extinguished.\n\n_B._ Indeed I believe a kingdom, if suffered to become an old debt, will\nhardly ever be recovered. Besides, the King was sure, wheresoever the\nvictory lighted, he could lose nothing in the war but enemies.\n\n_A._ About the time of Montrose\u2019s death, which was in May, Cromwell was\nyet in Ireland, and his work unfinished. But finding, or by his friends\nadvertised, that his presence in the expedition now preparing against\nthe Scots would be necessary to his design, he sent to the Rump to know\ntheir pleasure concerning his return. But for all that, he knew, or\nthought it was not necessary to stay for their answer, but came away,\nand arrived at London the 6th of June following, and was welcomed by the\nRump. Now General Fairfax, who was truly what he pretended to be, a\nPresbyterian, had been so catechised by the Presbyterian ministers here,\nthat he refused to fight against the brethren in Scotland; nor did the\nRump nor Cromwell go about to rectify his conscience in that point. And\nthus Fairfax laying down his commission, Cromwell was now made general\nof all the forces in England and Ireland; which was another step to the\nsovereign power.\n\n_B._ Where was the King?\n\n_A._ In Scotland, newly come over. He landed in the north, and was\nhonourably conducted to Edinburgh, though all things were not yet well\nagreed on between the Scots and him. For though he had yielded to as\nhard conditions as the late King had yielded to in the Isle of Wight,\nyet they had still somewhat to add, till the King, enduring no more,\ndeparted from them towards the north again. But they sent messengers\nafter him to pray him to return, but they furnished these messengers\nwith strength enough to bring him back, if he should have refused. In\nfine they agreed; but would not suffer either the King, or any royalist,\nto have command in the army.\n\n_B._ The sum of all is, the King was there a prisoner.\n\n_A._ Cromwell from Berwick sends a declaration to the Scots, telling\nthem he had no quarrel against the people of Scotland, but against the\nmalignant party that had brought in the King, to the disturbance of the\npeace between the two nations; and that he was willing, either by\nconference to give and receive satisfaction, or to decide the justice of\nthe cause by battle. To which the Scots answering, declare, that they\nwill not prosecute the King\u2019s interest before and without his\nacknowledgment of the sins of his house and his former ways, and\nsatisfaction given to God\u2019s people in both kingdoms. Judge by this\nwhether the present King were not in as bad a condition here, as his\nfather was in the hands of the Presbyterians of England.\n\n_B._ Presbyterians are everywhere the same: they would fain be absolute\ngovernors of all they converse with; and have nothing to plead for it,\nbut that where they reign, it is God that reigns, and nowhere else. But\nI observe one strange demand, that the King should acknowledge the sins\nof his house; for I thought it had been certainly held by all divines,\nthat no man was bound to acknowledge any man\u2019s sins but his own.\n\n_A._ The King having yielded to all that the Church required, the Scots\nproceeded in their intended war. Cromwell marched on to Edinburgh,\nprovoking them all he could to battle; which they declining, and\nprovisions growing scarce in the English army, Cromwell retired to\nDunbar, despairing of success; and intending by sea or land to get back\ninto England. And such was the condition which this general Cromwell, so\nmuch magnified for conduct, had brought his army to, that all his\nglories had ended in shame and punishment, if fortune and the faults of\nhis enemies had not relieved him. For as he retired, the Scots followed\nhim close all the way till within a mile of Dunbar. There is a ridge of\nhills, that from beyond Edinburgh goes winding to the sea, and crosses\nthe highway between Dunbar and Berwick, at a village called\nCopperspeith, where the passage is so difficult, that had the Scots sent\ntimely thither a very few men to guard it, the English could never have\ngotten home. For the Scots kept the hills, and needed not have fought\nbut upon great advantage, and were almost two to one. Cromwell\u2019s army\nwas at the foot of those hills, on the north side; and there was a great\nditch or channel of a torrent between the hills and it; so that he could\nnever have got home by land, nor without utter ruin of the army\nattempted to ship it; nor have stayed where he was, for want of\nprovisions. Now Cromwell knowing the pass was free, and commanding a\ngood party of horse and foot to possess it, it was necessary for the\nScots to let them go, whom they bragged they had impounded, or else to\nfight; and therefore with the best of their horse they charged the\nEnglish, and made them at first shrink a little. But the English foot\ncoming on, the Scots were put to flight; and the flight of the horse\nhindered the foot from engaging; who therefore fled, as did also the\nrest of their horse. Thus the folly of the Scottish commanders brought\nall their odds to an even lay between two small and equal parties;\nwherein fortune gave the victory to the English, who were not many more\nin number than those that were killed and taken prisoners of the Scots;\nand the Church lost their cannon, bag and baggage, with 10,000 arms, and\nalmost their whole army. The rest were got together by Lesley to\nStirling.\n\n_B._ This victory happened well for the King. For had the Scots been\nvictors, the Presbyterians, both here and there, would have domineered\nagain, and the King been in the same condition his father was in at\nNewcastle, in the hands of the Scottish army. For in pursuit of this\nvictory, the English at last brought the Scots to a pretty good habit of\nobedience for the King, whensoever he should recover his right.\n\n_A._ In pursuit of this victory the English marched to Edinburgh\n(quitted by the Scots), fortified Leith, and took in all the strength\nand castles they thought fit on this side the Frith, which now was\nbecome the bound betwixt the two nations. And the Scotch ecclesiastics\nbegan to know themselves better; and resolved in their new army, which\nthey meant to raise, to admit some of the royalists into command.\nCromwell from Edinburgh marched towards Stirling, to provoke the enemy\nto fight, but finding danger in it returned to Edinburgh and besieged\nthe castle. In the meantime he sent a party into the west of Scotland to\nsuppress Strachan and Kerr, two great Presbyterians that were there\nlevying forces for their new army. And in the same time the Scots\ncrowned the King at Scone.\n\nThe rest of this year was spent in Scotland, on Cromwell\u2019s part, in\ntaking of Edinburgh Castle and in attempts to pass the Frith, or any\nother ways to get over to the Scottish forces; and on the Scots' part,\nin hastening their levies for the north.\n\n_B._ What did the Rump at home during this time?\n\n_A._ They voted liberty of conscience to the sectaries; that is, they\nplucked out the sting of Presbytery, which consisted in a severe\nimposing of odd opinions upon the people, impertinent to religion, but\nconducing to the advancement of the power of the Presbyterian ministers.\nAlso they levied more soldiers, and gave the command of them to\nHarrison, now made major-general, a Fifth-monarchy-man; and of these\nsoldiers two regiments of horse and one of foot were raised by the\nFifth-monarchy-men and other sectaries, in thankfulness for this their\nliberty from the Presbyterian tyranny. Also they pulled down the late\nKing\u2019s statue in the Exchange, and in the niche where it stood, caused\nto be written these words: _Exit tyrannus, Regum ultimus, etc._\n\n_B._ What good did that do them, and why did they not pull down the\nstatues of all the rest of the Kings?\n\n_A._ What account can be given of actions that proceed not from reason,\nbut spite and such-like passions? Besides this, they received\nambassadors from Portugal and from Spain, acknowledging their power. And\nin the very end of the year they prepared ambassadors to the Netherlands\nto offer them friendship. All they did besides, was persecuting and\nexecuting of royalists.\n\nIn the beginning of the year 1651 General Dean arrived in Scotland; and\non the 11th of April the Scottish Parliament assembled, and made certain\nacts in order to a better uniting of themselves, and better obedience to\nthe King, who was now at Stirling with the Scottish forces he had,\nexpecting more now in levying. Cromwell from Edinburgh went divers times\ntowards Stirling to provoke the Scots to fight. There was no ford there\nto pass over his men; at last boats being come from London and\nNewcastle, Colonel Overton (though it was long first, for it was now\nJuly) transported 1,400 foot of his own, besides another regiment of\nfoot and four troops of horse, and entrenched himself at Northferry on\nthe other side; and before any help could come from Stirling,\nMajor-General Lambert also was got over with as many more. By this time\nSir John Browne was come to oppose them with 4,500 men, whom the English\nthere defeated, killing about 2,000 and taking prisoners 1,600. This\ndone, and as much more of the army transported as was thought fit,\nCromwell comes before St. Johnstone\u2019s (from whence the Scottish\nParliament, upon the news of his passing the Frith, was removed to\nDundee) and summons it; and the same day had news brought him that the\nKing was marching from Stirling towards England; which was true. But\nnotwithstanding the King was three days' march before him, he resolved\nto have the town before he followed him; and accordingly had it the next\nday by surrender.\n\n_B._ What hopes had the King in coming into England, having before and\nbehind him none, at least none armed, but his enemies?\n\n_A._ Yes; there was before him the city of London, which generally hated\nthe Rump, and might easily be reckoned for 20,000 well-armed soldiers;\nand most men believed they would take his part, had he come near the\ncity.\n\n_B._ What probability was there of that? Do you think the Rump was not\nsure of the services of the mayor and those that had command of the city\nmilitia? And if they had been really the King\u2019s friends, what need had\nthey to stay for his coming up to London? They might have seized the\nRump, if they had pleased, which had no possibility of defending\nthemselves; at least they might have turned them out of the House.\n\n_A._ This they did not; but on the contrary, permitted the recruiting of\nCromwell\u2019s army, and the raising of men to keep the country from coming\nin to the King. The King began his march from Stirling the last of July,\nand August the 22nd came to Worcester by way of Carlisle with a weary\narmy of about 13,000, whom Cromwell followed, and joining with the new\nlevies environed Worcester with 40,000, and on the 3rd of September\nutterly defeated the King\u2019s army. Here Duke Hamilton, brother of him\nthat was beheaded, was slain.\n\n_B._ What became of the King?\n\n_A._ Night coming on, before the city was quite taken he left it; it\nbeing dark and none of the enemy\u2019s horse within the town to follow him,\nthe plundering foot having kept the gates shut, lest the horse should\nenter and have a share of the booty. The King before morning got into\nWarwickshire, twenty-five miles from Worcester, and there lay disguised\nawhile, and afterwards went up and down in great danger of being\ndiscovered, till at last he got over into France, from Brighthelmstone\nin Sussex.\n\n_B._ When Cromwell was gone, what was further done in Scotland?\n\n_A._ Lieutenant-General Monk, whom Cromwell left there with 7,000, took\nStirling August 14th by surrender, and Dundee the 3rd of September, by\nstorm, because it resisted. This the soldiers plundered, and had good\nbooty, because the Scots for safety had sent thither their most precious\ngoods from Edinburgh and St. Johnstone\u2019s. He took likewise by surrender\nAberdeen, and the place where the Scottish ministers first learned to\nplay the fool, St. Andrew\u2019s. Also in the Highlands, Colonel Alured took\na knot of lords and gentlemen, viz. four earls and four lords and above\ntwenty knights and gentlemen, whom he sent prisoners into England. So\nthat there was nothing more to be feared from Scotland: all the trouble\nof the Rump being to resolve what they should do with it. At last they\nresolved to unite and incorporate it into one commonwealth with England\nand Ireland. And to that end sent thither St. John, Vane, and other\ncommissioners, to offer them this union by public declaration, and to\nwarn them to choose their deputies of shires and burgesses of towns, and\nsend them to Westminster.\n\n_B._ This was a very great favour.\n\n_A._ I think so: and yet it was by many of the Scots, especially by the\nministers and other Presbyterians, refused. The ministers had given way\nto the levying of money for the payment of the English soldiers; but to\ncomply with the declaration of the English commissioners they absolutely\nforbad.\n\n_B._ Methinks this contributing to the pay of their conquerors was some\nmark of servitude; whereas entering into the union made them free, and\ngave them equal privilege with the English.\n\n_A._ The cause why they refused the union, rendered by the Presbyterians\nthemselves, was this: that it drew with it a subordination of the Church\nto the civil state in the things of Christ.\n\n_B._ This is a downright declaration to all kings and commonwealths in\ngeneral, that a Presbyterian minister will be a true subject to none of\nthem in the things of Christ; which things what they are, they will be\njudges themselves. What have we then gotten by our deliverance from the\nPope\u2019s tyranny, if these petty men succeed in the place of it, that have\nnothing in them that can be beneficial to the public, except their\nsilence? For their learning, it amounts to no more than an imperfect\nknowledge of Greek and Latin, and an acquired readiness in the Scripture\nlanguage, with a gesture and tone suitable thereunto; but of justice and\ncharity, the manners of religion, they have neither knowledge nor\npractice, as is manifest by the stories I have already told you. Nor do\nthey distinguish between the godly and the ungodly but by conformity of\ndesign in men of judgment, or by repetition of their sermons in the\ncommon sort of people.\n\n_A._ But this sullenness of the Scots was to no purpose. For they at\nWestminster enacted the union of the two nations and the abolition of\nmonarchy in Scotland, and ordained punishment for those that should\ntransgress that act.\n\n_B._ What other business did the Rump this year?\n\n_A._ They sent St. John and Strickland ambassadors to the Hague, to\noffer league to the United Provinces; who had audience March the 3rd;\nSt. John in a speech showing those states what advantage they might have\nby this league in their trade and navigations, by the use of the English\nports and harbours. The Dutch, though they showed no great forwardness\nin the business, yet appointed commissioners to treat with them about\nit. But the people were generally against it, calling the ambassadors\nand their followers, as they were, traitors and murderers, and made such\ntumults about their house that their followers durst not go abroad till\nthe States had quieted them. The Rump advertised hereof, presently\nrecalled them. The compliment which St. John gave to the commissioners\nat their taking leave, is worth your hearing. _You have_, said he, _an\neye upon the event of the affairs of Scotland, and therefore do refuse\nthe friendship we have offered. Now I can assure you, many in the\nParliament were of opinion that we should not have sent any ambassadors\nto you till we had separated those matters between them and that king,\nand then expected your ambassadors to us. I now perceive our error, and\nthat those gentlemen were in the right. In a short time you shall see\nthat business ended; and then you will come and seek what we have freely\noffered, when it shall perplex you that you have refused our proffer._\n\n_B._ St. John was not sure that the Scottish business would end as it\ndid. For though the Scots were beaten at Dunbar, he could not be sure of\nthe event of their entering England, which happened afterward.\n\n_A._ But he guessed well: for within a month after the battle at\nWorcester, an act passed forbidding the importing of merchandize in\nother than English ships. The English also molested their fishing upon\nour coast. They also many times searched their ships (upon occasion of\nour war with France), and made some of them prize. And then the Dutch\nsent their ambassadors hither to desire what they before refused; but\npartly also to inform themselves what naval forces the English had\nready, and how the people here were contented with the government.\n\n_B._ How sped they?\n\n_A._ The Rump showed now as little desire of agreement as the Dutch did\nthen; standing upon terms never likely to be granted. First, for the\nfishing on the English coast, that they should not have it without\npaying for it. Secondly, that the English should have free trade from\nMiddleburgh to Antwerp, as they had before their rebellion against the\nKing of Spain. Thirdly, they demanded amends for the old, but never to\nbe forgotten business of Amboyna. So that the war was already certain,\nthough the season kept them from action till the spring following. The\ntrue quarrel, on the English part, was that their proffered friendship\nwas scorned, and their ambassadors affronted; on the Dutch part, was\ntheir greediness to engross all traffic, and a false estimate of our and\ntheir own strength.\n\nWhilst these things were doing, the relics of the war, both in Ireland\nand Scotland, were not neglected, though those nations were not fully\npacified till two years after. The persecution also of royalists still\ncontinued, amongst whom was beheaded one Mr. Love, for holding\ncorrespondence with the King.\n\n_B._ I had thought a Presbyterian minister, whilst he was such, could\nnot be a royalist, because they think their assembly have the supreme\npower in the things of Christ; and by consequence they are in England,\nby a statute, traitors.\n\n_A._ You may think so still: for though I called Mr. Love a royalist, I\nmeant it only for that one act for which he was condemned. It was he who\nduring the treaty at Uxbridge, preaching before the commissioners there,\nsaid, it was as possible for heaven and hell, as for the King and\nParliament, to agree. Both he and the rest of the Presbyterians are and\nwere enemies to the King\u2019s enemies, Cromwell and his fanatics, for their\nown and not for the King\u2019s sake. Their loyalty was like that of Sir John\nHotham\u2019s, that kept the King out of Hull, and afterwards would have\nbetrayed the same to the Marquis of Newcastle. These Presbyterians\ntherefore cannot be rightly called loyal, but rather doubly perfidious,\nunless you think that as two negatives make an affirmative, so two\ntreasons make loyalty.\n\nThis year also were reduced to the obedience of the Rump the islands of\nScilly and Man, and the Barbadoes, and St. Christopher\u2019s. One thing fell\nout that they liked not, which was, that Cromwell gave them warning to\ndetermine their sitting, according to the bill for triennial\nParliaments.\n\n_B._ That I think indeed was harsh.\n\n_A._ In the year 1652, May the 14th, began the Dutch war, in this\nmanner. Three Dutch men-of-war, with divers merchants from the\nstraights, being discovered by one Captain Young, who commanded some\nEnglish frigates, the said Young sent to their admiral to bid him strike\nhis flag, a thing usually done in acknowledgment of the English dominion\nin the narrow seas; which accordingly he did. Then came up the\nvice-admiral, and being called to as the other was, to take down his\nflag, he answered plainly he would not: but after the exchange of four\nor five broadsides and mischief done on either part, he took it down.\nBut Captain Young demanded also, either the vice-admiral himself or his\nship to make good the damage already sustained; to which the\nvice-admiral answered that he had taken in his flag, but would defend\nhimself and his ship. Whereupon Captain Young consulting with the\ncaptains of his other ships, lest the beginning of the war in this time\nof treaty should be charged upon himself, and night also coming on,\nthought fit to proceed no further.\n\n_B._ The war certainly began at this time. But who began it?\n\n_A._ The dominion of the seas belonging to the English, there can be no\nquestion but the Dutch began it: and that the said dominion belonged to\nthe English, it was confessed at first by the admiral himself peaceably,\nand at last by the vice-admiral taking in their flags.\n\nAbout a fortnight after there happened another fight upon the like\noccasion. Van Tromp, with forty-two men-of-war, came to the back of\nGoodwin Sands, Major Bourne being then with a few of the Parliament\nships in the Downs, and Blake with the rest further westward; and sent\ntwo captains of his to Bourne, to excuse his coming thither. To whom\nBourne returned this answer, that the message was civil, but that it\nmight appear real he ought to depart. So Van Tromp departed, meaning,\nnow Bourne was satisfied, to sail towards Blake, and he did so; but so\ndid also Bourne, for fear of the worst. When Van Tromp and Blake were\nnear one another, Blake made a shot over Van Tromp\u2019s ship, as a warning\nto him to take in his flag. This he did thrice, and then Van Tromp gave\nhim a broadside; and so began the fight, (at the beginning whereof\nBourne came in), and lasted from two o\u2019clock till night, the English\nhaving the better, and the flag, as before, making the quarrel.\n\n_B._ What needs there, when both nations were heartily resolved to\nfight, to stand so much upon this compliment of who should begin? For as\nto the gaining of friends and confederates thereby, I think it was in\nvain; seeing princes and states in such occasions look not much upon the\njustice of their neighbours, but upon their own concernment in the\nevent.\n\n_A._ It is commonly so; but in this case, the Dutch knowing the dominion\nof the narrow seas to be a gallant title, and envied by all the nations\nthat reach the shore, and consequently that they were likely to oppose\nit, did wisely enough in making this point the state of the quarrel.\nAfter this fight the Dutch ambassadors residing in England sent a paper\nto the council of state, wherein they styled this last encounter a rash\naction, and affirmed it was done without the knowledge and against the\nwill of their lords the States-general, and desired them that nothing\nmight be done upon it in heat, which might become irreparable. The\nParliament hereupon voted: 1. That the States-general should pay the\ncharges they were at, and for the damages they sustained upon this\noccasion. 2. That this being paid, there should be a cessation of all\nacts of hostility, and a mutual restitution of all ships and goods\ntaken. 3. And both these agreed to, that there should be made a league\nbetween the two commonwealths. These votes were sent to the Dutch\nambassadors in answer of the said paper; but with a preamble setting\nforth the former kindnesses of England to the Netherlands, and taking\nnotice of their new fleet of 150 men-of-war, without any other apparent\ndesign than the destruction of the English fleet.\n\n_B._ What answer made the Dutch to this?\n\n_A._ None. Van Tromp sailed presently to Zealand, and Blake with seventy\nmen-of-war to the Orkney Islands to seize their busses, and to wait for\nfive Dutch ships from the East Indies. And Sir George Askew, newly\nreturned from the Barbadoes, came into the Downs with fifteen\nmen-of-war, where he was commanded to stay for a recruit out of the\nThames.\n\nVan Tromp being recruited now to 120 sail, made account to get in\nbetween Sir George Askew and the mouth of the river, but was hindered so\nlong by contrary winds, that the merchants calling for his convoy he\ncould stay no longer; and so he went back into Holland, and thence to\nOrkney, where he met with the said five East India ships and sent them\nhome. And then he endeavoured to engage with Blake, but a sudden storm\nforced him to sea, and so dissipated his fleet that only forty-two came\nhome in a body, the rest singly as well as they could. Blake also came\nhome (but went first to the coast of Holland) with 900 prisoners and six\nmen-of-war taken, which were part of twelve which he found and took\nguarding their busses. This was the first bout after the war declared.\n\nIn August following there happened a fight between De Ruyter, the\nadmiral of Zealand, with fifty men-of-war, and Sir George Askew, near\nPlymouth, with forty, wherein Sir George had the better, and might have\ngot an entire victory had the whole fleet engaged. Whatsoever was the\nmatter, the Rump, though they rewarded him, never more employed him\nafter his return in their service at sea: but voted for the year to come\nthree generals, Blake that was one already, and Dean, and Monk.\n\nAbout this time the Archduke Leopold besieging Dunkirk, and the French\nsending a fleet to relieve it, General Blake lighting on the French at\nCalais, and taking seven of their ships, was cause of the town\u2019s\nsurrender.\n\nIn September they fought again, De Witt and De Ruyter commanding the\nDutch, and Blake the English; and the Dutch were again worsted.\n\nAgain, in the end of November, Van Tromp with eighty men-of-war shewed\nhimself at the back of Goodwin Sands; where Blake, though he had with\nhim but forty, adventured to fight with him, and had much the worst, and\nnight parting the fray, retired into the river Thames; whilst Van Tromp\nkeeping the sea, took some inconsiderable vessels from the English, and\nthereupon, as it was said, with a childish vanity hung out a broom from\nthe main-top-mast, signifying he meant to sweep the seas of all English\nshipping.\n\nAfter this, in February, the Dutch with Van Tromp were encountered by\nthe English under Blake and Dean near Portsmouth, and had the worst. And\nthese were all the encounters between them in this year in the narrow\nseas. They fought also once at Leghorn, where the Dutch had the better.\n\n_B._ I see no great odds yet on either side; if there were any, the\nEnglish had it.\n\n_A._ Nor did either of them the more incline to peace. For the\nHollanders, after they had sent ambassadors into Denmark, Sweden,\nPoland, and the Hanse Towns whence tar and cordage are usually had, to\nsignify the declaration of the war, and to get them to their party,\nrecalled their ambassadors from England. And the Rump without delay,\ngave them their parting audience, without abating a syllable of their\nformer severe propositions; and presently, to maintain the war for the\nnext year, laid a tax upon the people of 120,000_l._ _per mensem_.\n\n_B._ What was done in the mean time at home?\n\n_A._ Cromwell was now quarrelling with the last and greatest obstacle to\nhis design, the Rump. And to that end there came out daily from the army\npetitions, addresses, remonstrances, and other such papers; some of them\nurging the Rump to dissolve themselves and make way for another\nParliament. To which the Rump, unwilling to yield and not daring to\nrefuse, determined for the end of their sitting the 5th of November\n1654. But Cromwell meant not to stay so long.\n\nIn the meantime the army in Ireland was taking submissions, and granting\ntransportations of the Irish, and condemning whom they pleased in a High\nCourt of Justice erected there for that purpose. Amongst those that were\nexecuted, was hanged Sir Phelim O\u2019Neale, who first began the rebellion.\nIn Scotland the English built some citadels for the bridling of that\nstubborn nation. And thus ended the year 1652.\n\n_B._ Come we then to the year 1653.\n\n_A._ Cromwell wanted now but one step to the end of his ambition, and\nthat was to set his foot upon the neck of this Long Parliament; which he\ndid April the 23rd of this present year 1653, a time very seasonable.\nFor though the Dutch were not mastered yet, they were much weakened; and\nwhat with prizes from the enemy and squeezing the royal party, the\ntreasury was pretty full, and the tax of 120,000_l._ a month began to\ncome in; all which was his own in right of the army.\n\nTherefore, without more ado, attended by the Major-Generals Lambert and\nHarrison, and some other officers, and as many soldiers as he thought\nfit, he went to the Parliament House, and dissolved them, turning them\nout, and locked up the doors. And for this action he was more applauded\nby the people than for any of his victories in the war, and the\nParliament men as much scorned and derided.\n\n_B._ Now that there was no Parliament, who had the supreme power?\n\n_A._ If by power you mean the right to govern, nobody had it. If you\nmean the supreme strength, it was clearly in Cromwell, who was obeyed as\ngeneral of all the forces in England, Scotland, and Ireland.\n\n_B._ Did he pretend that for title?\n\n_A._ No: but presently after he invented a title, which was this; that\nhe was necessitated for the defence of the cause, for which at first the\nParliament had taken up arms, that is to say, rebelled, to have recourse\nto extraordinary actions. You know the pretence of the Long Parliament\u2019s\nrebellion was _salus populi_, the safety of the nation against a\ndangerous conspiracy of Papists and a malignant party at home; and that\nevery man is bound, as far as his power extends, to procure the safety\nof the whole nation, which none but the army were able to do, and the\nParliament had hitherto neglected. Was it not then the general\u2019s duty to\ndo it? Had he not therefore right? For that law of _salus populi_ is\ndirected only to those that have power enough to defend the people; that\nis, to them that have the supreme power.\n\n_B._ Yes, certainly, he had as good a title as the Long Parliament. But\nthe Long Parliament did represent the people; and it seems to me that\nthe sovereign power is essentially annexed to the representative of the\npeople.\n\n_A._ Yes, if he that makes a representative, that is in the present case\nthe King, do call them together to receive the sovereign power, and he\ndivest himself thereof; otherwise not. Nor was ever the Lower House of\nParliament the representative of the whole nation, but of the commons\nonly; nor had that House the power to oblige by their acts or\nordinances, any lord or any priest.\n\n_B._ Did Cromwell come in upon the only title of _salus populi_?\n\n_A._ This is a title that very few men understand. His way was to get\nthe supreme power conferred upon him by Parliament. Therefore he called\na Parliament, and gave it the supreme power, to the end that they should\ngive it to him again. Was not this witty? First, therefore, he published\na declaration of the causes why he dissolved the Parliament. The sum\nwhereof was, that instead of endeavouring to promote the good of God\u2019s\npeople, they endeavoured, by a bill then ready to pass, to recruit the\nHouse and perpetuate their own power. Next he constituted a council of\nstate of his own creatures, to be the supreme authority of England; but\nno longer than till the next Parliament should be called and met.\nThirdly, he summoned 142 persons, such as he himself or his trusty\nofficers made choice of; the greatest part of whom were instructed what\nto do; obscure persons, and most of them fanatics, though styled by\nCromwell men of approved fidelity and honesty. To these the council of\nstate surrendered the supreme authority, and not long after these men\nsurrendered it to Cromwell. July the 4th this Parliament met, and chose\nfor their Speaker one Mr. Rous, and called themselves from that time\nforward the Parliament of England. But Cromwell, for the more surety,\nconstituted also a council of state; not of such petty fellows as most\nof these were, but of himself and his principal officers. These did all\nthe business, both public and private; making ordinances, and giving\naudiences to foreign ambassadors. But he had now more enemies than\nbefore. Harrison, who was the head of the Fifth-monarchy-men, laying\ndown his commission, did nothing but animate his party against him; for\nwhich afterwards he was imprisoned. This little Parliament in the\nmeantime were making of acts so ridiculous and displeasing to the\npeople, that it was thought he chose them on purpose to bring all ruling\nParliaments into contempt, and monarchy again into credit.\n\n_B._ What acts were these?\n\n_A._ One of them was, that all marriages should be made by a justice of\npeace, and the banns asked three several days in the next market: none\nwere forbidden to be married by a minister, but without a justice of\npeace the marriage was to be void: so that divers wary couples, to be\nsure of one another, howsoever they might repent it afterwards, were\nmarried both ways. Also they abrogated the engagement, whereby no man\nwas admitted to sue in any court of law that had not taken it, that is,\nthat had not acknowledged the late Rump.\n\n_B._ Neither of these did any hurt to Cromwell.\n\n_A._ They were also in hand with an act to cancel all the present laws\nand law-books, and to make a new code more suitable to the humour of the\nFifth-monarchy-men; of whom there were many in this Parliament. Their\ntenet being, that there ought none to be sovereign but King Jesus, nor\nany to govern under him but the saints. But their authority ended before\nthis act passed.\n\n_B._ What is this to Cromwell?\n\n_A._ Nothing yet. But they were likewise upon an act, now almost ready\nfor the question, that Parliaments henceforward, one upon the end of\nanother, should be perpetual.\n\n_B._ I understand not this; unless Parliaments can beget one another\nlike animals, or like the ph\u0153nix.\n\n_A._ Why not like the ph\u0153nix? Cannot a Parliament at the day of their\nexpiration send out writs for a new one?\n\n_B._ Do you think they would not rather summon themselves anew; and to\nsave the labour of coming again to Westminster, sit still where they\nwere? Or if they summon the country to make new elections, and then\ndissolve themselves, by what authority shall the people meet in their\ncounty courts, there being no supreme authority standing?\n\n_A._ All they did was absurd, though they knew not that; no nor this,\nwhose design was upon the sovereignty, the contriver of this act, it\nseems, perceived not; but Cromwell\u2019s party in the House saw it well\nenough. And therefore, as soon as it was laid, there stood up one of the\nmembers and made a motion, that since the commonwealth was like to\nreceive little benefit by their sitting, they should dissolve\nthemselves. Harrison and they of his sect were troubled hereat, and made\nspeeches against it; but Cromwell\u2019s party, of whom the speaker was one,\nleft the House, and with the mace before them went to Whitehall, and\nsurrendered their power to Cromwell that had given it to them. And so he\ngot the sovereignty by an act of Parliament; and within four days after,\nDecember the 16th, was installed Protector of the three nations, and\ntook his oath to observe certain rules of governing, engrossed in\nparchment and read before him. The writing was called _the instrument_.\n\n_B._ What were the rules he swore to?\n\n_A._ One was, to call a Parliament every third year, of which the first\nwas to begin September the 3rd following.\n\n_B._ I believe he was a little superstitious in the choice of September\nthe 3rd, because it was lucky to him in 1650 and 1651, at Dunbar and\nWorcester; but he knew not how lucky the same would be to the whole\nnation in 1658 at Whitehall.\n\n_A._ Another was, that no Parliament should be dissolved till it had\nsitten five months; and those bills that they presented to him, should\nbe passed by him within twenty days, or else they should pass without\nhim.\n\nA third, that he should have a council of state of not above twenty-one,\nnor under thirteen; and that upon the Protector\u2019s death this council\nshould meet, and before they parted choose a new Protector. There were\nmany more besides, but not necessary to be inserted.\n\n_B._ How went on the war against the Dutch?\n\n_A._ The generals for the English were Blake, and Dean, and Monk; and\nVan Tromp for the Dutch; between whom was a battle fought the 2nd of\nJune, which was a month before the beginning of this little Parliament;\nwherein the English had the victory, and drove the enemies into their\nharbours, but with the loss of General Dean, slain by a cannon-shot.\nThis victory was great enough to make the Dutch send over ambassadors\ninto England, in order to a treaty; but in the meantime they prepared\nand put to sea another fleet, which likewise, in the end of July, was\ndefeated by General Monk, who got now a greater victory than before; and\nthis made the Dutch descend so far as to buy their peace with the\npayment of the charge of the war, and with the acknowledgment, amongst\nother articles, that the English had the right of the flag.\n\nThis peace was concluded in March, being the end of this year, but not\nproclaimed till April; the money, it seems, being not paid till then.\n\nThe Dutch war being now ended, the Protector sent his youngest son Henry\ninto Ireland, whom also some time after he made lieutenant there; and\nsent Monk lieutenant-general into Scotland, to keep those nations in\nobedience. Nothing else worth remembering was done this year at home;\nsaving the discovery of a plot of royalists, as was said, upon the life\nof the Protector, who all this while had intelligence of the King\u2019s\ndesigns from a traitor in his court, who afterwards was taken in the\nmanner and killed.\n\n_B._ How came he into so much trust with the King?\n\n_A._ He was the son of a colonel that was slain in the wars on the late\nKing\u2019s side. Besides, he pretended employment from the King\u2019s loyal and\nloving subjects here, to convey to his Majesty money as they from time\nto time should send him; and to make this credible, Cromwell himself\ncaused money to be sent to him.\n\nThe following year, 1654, had nothing of war, but was spent in civil\nordinances, in appointing of judges, preventing of plots (for usurpers\nare jealous), and in executing the King\u2019s friends and selling their\nlands. The 3rd of September, according to the instrument, the Parliament\nmet; in which there was no House of Lords, and the House of Commons was\nmade, as formerly, of knights and burgesses; but not as formerly, of two\nburgesses for a borough and two knights for a county; for boroughs for\nthe most part had but one burgess, and some counties six or seven\nknights. Besides, there were twenty members for Scotland, and as many\nfor Ireland. So that now Cromwell had nothing else to do but to show his\nart of government upon six coach-horses newly presented to him, which,\nbeing as rebellious as himself, threw him out of the coach-box and\nalmost killed him.\n\n_B._ This Parliament, which had seen how Cromwell had handled the two\nformer, the long one and the short one, had surely learned the wit to\nbehave themselves better to him than those had done?\n\n_A._ Yes, especially now that Cromwell in his speech at their first\nmeeting had expressly forbidden them to meddle either with the\ngovernment by a single person and Parliament, or with the militia, or\nwith perpetuating of Parliaments, or taking away liberty of conscience;\nand told them also that every member of the House, before they sat, must\ntake a recognition of his power in divers points. Whereupon, of above\n400 there appeared not above 200 at first; though afterwards some\nrelenting, there sat about 300. Again, just at their sitting down he\npublished some ordinances of his own, bearing date before their meeting;\nthat they might see he took his own acts to be as valid as theirs. But\nall this could not make them know themselves. They proceeded to debate\nof every article of the recognition.\n\n_B._ They should have debated that before they had taken it.\n\n_A._ But then they had never been suffered to sit. Cromwell being\ninformed of their stubborn proceedings, and out of hope of any supply\nfrom them, dissolved them.\n\nAll that passed besides in this year, was the exercise of the High Court\nof Justice upon some royalists for plots.\n\nIn the year 1655 the English, to the number of near 10,000, landed in\nHispaniola, in hope of the plunder of the gold and silver, whereof they\nthought there was great abundance in the town of Santo Domingo; but were\nwell beaten by a few Spaniards, and with the loss of near 1,000 men,\nwent off to Jamaica and possessed it.\n\nThis year also the royal party made another attempt in the west; and\nproclaimed there King Charles the Second; but few joining with them, and\nsome falling off, they were soon suppressed, and many of the principal\npersons executed.\n\n_B._ In these many insurrections, the royalists, though they meant well,\nyet they did but disservice to the King by their impatience. What hope\nhad they to prevail against so great an army as the Protector had ready?\nWhat cause was there to despair of seeing the King\u2019s business done\nbetter by the dissension and ambition of the great commanders in that\narmy, whereof many had the favour to be as well esteemed amongst them as\nCromwell himself?\n\n_A._ That was somewhat uncertain. The Protector, being frustrated of his\nhope of money at Santo Domingo, resolved to take from the royalists the\ntenth part yearly of their estates. And to this end chiefly, he divided\nEngland into eleven major-generalships, with commission to every\nmajor-general to make a roll of the names of all suspected persons of\nthe King\u2019s party, and to receive the tenth part of their estates within\nhis precinct; as also to take caution from them not to act against the\nstate, and to reveal all plots that should come to their knowledge; and\nto make them engage the like for their servants. They had commission\nalso to forbid horse-races and concourse of people, and to receive and\naccount for this decimation.\n\n_B._ By this the usurper might easily inform himself of the value of all\nthe estates in England, and of the behaviour and affection of every\nperson of quality; which has heretofore been taken for very great\ntyranny.\n\n_A._ The year 1656 was a Parliament-year by the instrument. Between the\nbeginning of this year and the day of the Parliament\u2019s sitting, which\nwas September 17, these major-generals, resided in several provinces,\nbehaving themselves most tyrannically. Amongst other of their tyrannies\nwas the awing of elections, and making themselves and whom they pleased\nto be returned members for the Parliament; which was also thought a part\nof Cromwell\u2019s design in their constitution: for he had need of a giving\nParliament, having lately, upon a peace made with the French, drawn upon\nhimself a war with Spain.\n\nThis year it was that Captain Stainer set upon the Spanish Plate-fleet,\nbeing eight in number, near Cadiz; whereof he sunk two, and took two,\nthere being in one of them two millions of pieces of eight, which\namounts to 400,000_l._ sterling.\n\nThis year also it was that James Naylor appeared at Bristol, and would\nbe taken for Jesus Christ. He wore his beard forked, and his hair\ncomposed to the likeness of that in the _Volto Santo_; and being\nquestioned, would sometimes answer _Thou sayest it_. He had also his\ndisciples, that would go by his horse\u2019s side to the mid-leg in dirt.\nBeing sent for by the Parliament, he was sentenced to stand on the\npillory, to have his tongue bored through, and to be marked on the\nforehead with the letter B, for blasphemy, and to remain in Bridewell.\nLambert, a great favourite of the army, endeavoured to save him, partly\nbecause he had been his soldier, and partly to curry favour with the\nsectaries of the army; for he was now no more in the Protector\u2019s favour,\nbut meditating how he might succeed him in his power.\n\nAbout two years before this, there appeared in Cornwall a prophetess,\nmuch famed for her dreams and visions, and hearkened to by many, whereof\nsome were eminent officers. But she and some of her accomplices being\nimprisoned, we heard no more of her.\n\n_B._ I have heard of another, one Lilly, that prophecied all the time of\nthe Long Parliament. What did they to him?\n\n_A._ His prophecies were of another kind; he was a writer of almanacs,\nand a pretender to a pretended art of judicial astrology; a meer cozener\nto get maintenance from a multitude of ignorant people; and no doubt had\nbeen called in question, if his prophecies had been any way\ndisadvantageous to that Parliament.\n\n_B._ I understand not how the dreams and prognostications of madmen (for\nsuch I take to be all those that foretell future contingencies) can be\nof any great disadvantage to the commonwealth.\n\n_A._ Yes, yes: know, there is nothing that renders human counsels\ndifficult, but the uncertainty of future time; nor that so well directs\nmen in their deliberations, as the foresight of the sequels of their\nactions; prophecy being many times the principal cause of the event\nforetold. If, upon some prediction, the people should have been made\nconfident that Oliver Cromwell and his army should be, upon a day to\ncome, utterly defeated; would not every one have endeavoured to assist,\nand to deserve well of the party that should give him that defeat? Upon\nthis account it was that fortune-tellers and astrologers were so often\nbanished out of Rome.\n\nThe last memorable thing this year, was a motion made by a member of the\nHouse, an alderman of London, that the Protector might be petitioned and\nadvised by the House to leave the title of Protector, and take upon him\nthat of King.\n\n_B._ That was indeed a bold motion, and which would, if prosperous, have\nput an end to many men\u2019s ambition, and to the licentiousness of the\nwhole army. I think the motion was made on purpose to ruin both the\nProtector himself and his ambitious officers.\n\n_A._ It may be so. In the year 1657 the first thing the Parliament did,\nwas the drawing up of this petition to the Protector, to take upon him\nthe government of the three nations, with the title of King. As of other\nParliaments, so of this, the greatest part had been either kept out of\nthe House by force, or else themselves had forborne to sit and become\nguilty of setting up this King Oliver. But those few that sat, presented\ntheir petition to the Protector, April the 9th, in the Banquetinghouse\nat Whitehall; where Sir Thomas Widdrington, the Speaker, used the first\narguments, and the Protector desired some time to seek God, the business\nbeing weighty. The next day they sent a committee to him to receive his\nanswer; which answer being not very clear, they pressed him again for a\nresolution; to which he made answer in a long speech, that ended in a\nperemptory refusal. And so retaining still the title of Protector, he\ntook upon him the government according to certain articles contained in\nthe said petition.\n\n_B._ What made him refuse the title of King?\n\n_A._ Because he durst not take it at that time; the army being addicted\nto their great officers, and amongst their great officers many hoping to\nsucceed him, and, the succession having been promised to Major-General\nLambert, would have mutinied against him. He was therefore forced to\nstay for a more propitious conjuncture.\n\n_B._ What were those articles?\n\n_A._ The most important of them were: 1. That he would exercise the\noffice of chief-magistrate of England, Scotland, and Ireland, under the\ntitle of Protector, and govern the same according to the said petition\nand advice: and that he would in his life-time name his successor.\n\n_B._ I believe the Scots, when they first rebelled, never thought of\nbeing governed absolutely, as they were by Oliver Cromwell.\n\n_A._ 2. That he should call a Parliament every three years at farthest.\n3. That those persons which were legally chosen members, should not be\nsecluded without consent of the House. In allowing this clause, the\nProtector observed not that the secluded members of this same\nParliament, are thereby re-admitted. 4. The members were qualified. 5.\nThe power of the other House was defined. 6. That no law should be made\nbut by act of Parliament. 7. That a constant yearly revenue of a million\nof pounds should be settled for the maintenance of the army and navy;\nand 300,000_l._ for the support of the government, besides other\ntemporary supplies as the House of Commons should think fit. 8. That all\nthe officers of state should be chosen by the Parliament. 9. That the\nProtector should encourage the ministry. Lastly, that he should cause a\nprofession of religion to be agreed on and published. There are divers\nothers of less importance. Having signed the articles, he was presently\nwith great ceremony installed anew.\n\n_B._ What needed that, seeing he was still but Protector?\n\n_A._ But the articles of this petition were not all the same with those\nof his former instrument. For now there was to be another House; and\nwhereas before, his council was to name his successor, he had power now\nto do it himself; so that he was an absolute monarch, and might leave\nthe succession to his son if he would, and so successively, or transfer\nit to whom he pleased.\n\nThe ceremony being ended, the Parliament adjourned to the 20th of\nJanuary following; and then the other House also sat with their fellows.\n\nThe House of Commons being now full, took little notice of the other\nHouse, wherein there were not of sixty persons above nine lords; but\nfell a questioning all that their fellows had done, during the time of\ntheir seclusion; whence had followed the avoidance of the power newly\nplaced in the Protector. Therefore, going to the House, he made a speech\nto them, ending in these words; _By the living God, I must, and do\ndissolve you_.\n\nIn this year, the English gave the Spaniard another great blow at Santa\nCruz, not much less than they had given him the year before at Cadiz.\n\nAbout the time of the dissolution of this Parliament, the royalists had\nanother design against the Protector; which was, to make an insurrection\nin England, the King being in Flanders ready to second them with an army\nthence. But this also was discovered by treachery, and came to nothing\nbut the ruin of those that were engaged in it; whereof many in the\nbeginning of the next year were by a High Court of Justice imprisoned,\nand some executed.\n\nThis year also was Major-General Lambert put out of all employment, a\nman second to none but Oliver in the favour of the army. But because he\nexpected by that favour, or by promise from the Protector, to be his\nsuccessor in the supreme power, it would have been dangerous to let him\nhave command in the army; the Protector having designed for his\nsuccessor his eldest son Richard.\n\nIn the year 1658, September the 3rd, the Protector died at Whitehall;\nhaving ever since his last establishment been perplexed with fear of\nbeing killed by some desperate attempt of the royalists.\n\nBeing importuned in his sickness by his privy-council to name his\nsuccessor, he named his son Richard; who, encouraged thereunto, not by\nhis own ambition, but by Fleetwood, Desborough, Thurlow, and other of\nhis council, was content to take it upon him; and presently, addresses\nwere made to him from the armies in England, Scotland and Ireland. His\nfirst business was the chargeable and splendid funeral of his father.\n\nThus was Richard Cromwell seated on the imperial throne of England,\nIreland, and Scotland, successor to his father; lifted up to it by the\nofficers of the army then in town, and congratulated by all the parts of\nthe army throughout the three nations; scarce any garrison omitting\ntheir particular flattering addresses to him.\n\n_B._ Seeing the army approved of him, how came he so soon cast off?\n\n_A._ The army was inconstant; he himself irresolute, and without any\nmilitary glory. And though the two principal officers had a near\nrelation to him; yet neither of them, but Lambert, was the great\nfavourite of the army; and by courting Fleetwood to take upon him the\nProtectorship, and by tampering with the soldiers, he had gotten again\nto be a colonel. He and the rest of the officers had a council at\nWallingford House, where Fleetwood dwelt, for the dispossessing of\nRichard; though they had not yet considered how the nations should be\ngoverned afterwards. For from the beginning of the rebellion, the method\nof ambition was constantly this, first to destroy, and then to consider\nwhat they should set up.\n\n_B._ Could not the Protector, who kept his court at Whitehall, discover\nwhat the business of the officers was at Wallingford House, so near him?\n\n_A._ Yes, he was by divers of his friends informed of it; and counselled\nby some of them, who would have done it, to kill the chief of them. But\nhe had not courage enough to give them such a commission. He took,\ntherefore, the counsel of some milder persons, which was to call a\nParliament. Whereupon writs were presently sent to those, that were in\nthe last Parliament, of the other House, and other writs to the sheriffs\nfor the election of knights and burgesses, to assemble on the 27th of\nJanuary following. Elections were made according to the ancient manner,\nand a House of Commons now of the right English temper, and about four\nhundred in number, including twenty for Scotland and as many for\nIreland. Being met, they take themselves, without the Protector and\nother House, to be a Parliament, and to have the supreme power of the\nthree nations.\n\nFor the first business, they intended the power of that other House: but\nbecause the Protector had recommended to them for their first business\nan act, already drawn up, for the recognition of his Protectoral power,\nthey began with that; and voted after a fortnight\u2019s deliberation, that\nan act should be made whereof this act of recognition should be part;\nand that another part should be for the bounding of the Protector\u2019s\npower, and for the securing the privileges of Parliament and liberties\nof the subject; and that all should pass together.\n\n_B._ Why did these men obey the Protector at first, in meeting upon his\nonly summons? Was not that as full a recognition of his power as was\nneedful? Why by this example did they teach the people that he was to be\nobeyed, and then by putting laws upon him, teach them the contrary? Was\nit not the Protector that made the Parliament? Why did they not\nacknowledge their maker?\n\n_A._ I believe it is the desire of most men to bear rule; but few of\nthem know what title one has to it more than another, besides the right\nof the sword.\n\n_B._ If they acknowledged the right of the sword, they were neither just\nnor wise to oppose the present government, set up and approved by all\nthe forces of the three kingdoms. The principles of this House of\nCommons were, no doubt, the very same with theirs that began the\nrebellion; and would, if they could have raised a sufficient army, have\ndone the same against the Protector; and the general of their army\nwould, in like manner, have reduced them to a Rump. For they that keep\nan army, and cannot master it, must be subject to it as much as he that\nkeeps a lion in his house. The temper of all the Parliaments, since the\ntime of Queen Elizabeth, has been the same with the temper of this\nParliament; and shall always be such, as long as the Presbyterians and\nmen of democratical principles have the like influence upon the\nelections.\n\n_A._ After, they resolved concerning the other House, that during this\nParliament they would transact with it, but without intrenching upon the\nright of the peers, to have writs sent to them in all future\nParliaments. These votes being passed, they proceed to another, wherein\nthey assume to themselves the power of the militia. Also to show their\nsupreme power, they delivered out of prison some of those that had been,\nthey said, illegally committed by the former Protector. Other points\nconcerning civil rights and concerning religion, very pleasing to the\npeople, were now also under their consideration. So that at the end of\nthis year the Protector was no less jealous of the Parliament, than of\nthe council of officers at Wallingford House.\n\n_B._ Thus it is when ignorant men will undertake reformation. Here are\nthree parties, the Protector, the Parliament, and the Army. The\nProtector against Parliament and army, the Parliament against army and\nProtector, and the army against Protector and Parliament.\n\n_A._ In the beginning of 1659 the Parliament passed divers other acts.\nOne was, to forbid the meetings in council of the army-officers without\norder from the Protector and both houses. Another, that no man shall\nhave any command or trust in the army, who did not first, under his\nhand, engage himself never to interrupt any of the members, but that\nthey might freely meet and debate in the House. And to please the\nsoldiers, they voted to take presently into their consideration the\nmeans of paying them their arrears. But whilst they were considering\nthis, the Protector, according to the first of those acts, forbad the\nmeeting of officers at Wallingford House. This made the government,\nwhich by the disagreement of the Protector and army was already loose,\nto fall in pieces. For the officers from Wallingford House, with\nsoldiers enough, came over to Whitehall, and brought with them a\ncommission ready drawn, giving power to Desborough to dissolve the\nParliament, for the Protector to sign; which also, his heart and his\nparty failing him, he signed. The Parliament nevertheless continued\nsitting; but at the end of the week the House adjourned till the Monday\nafter, being April the 25th. At their coming on Monday morning, they\nfound the door of the House shut up, and the passages to it filled with\nsoldiers, who plainly told them they must sit no longer. Richard\u2019s\nauthority and business in town being thus at an end, he retired into the\ncountry; where within a few days, upon promise of the payment of his\ndebts, which his father\u2019s funeral had made great, he signed a\nresignation of his Protectorship.\n\n_B._ To whom?\n\n_A._ To nobody. But after ten days' cessation of the sovereign power,\nsome of the Rumpers that were in town, together with the old Speaker Mr.\nWilliam Lenthal, resolved amongst themselves, and with Lambert,\nHazlerig, and other officers, who were also Rumpers, in all forty-two,\nto go into the House; which they did, and were by the army declared to\nbe the Parliament.\n\nThere were also in Westminster Hall at that time, about their private\nbusiness, some few of those whom the army had secluded in 1648, and were\ncalled the secluded members. These knowing themselves to have been\nelected by the same authority, and to have the same right to sit,\nattempted to get into the House, but were kept out by the soldiers. The\nfirst vote of the Rump reseated was, that such persons as, heretofore\nmembers of this Parliament, have not sitten in this Parliament since the\nyear 1648, shall not sit in this House till further order of the\nParliament. And thus the Rump recovered their authority May the 7th\n1659, which they lost in April 1653.\n\n_B._ Seeing there had been so many shiftings of the supreme authority, I\npray you, for memory\u2019s sake, repeat them briefly in times and order.\n\n_A._ First, from 1640 to 1648, when the King was murdered, the\nsovereignty was disputed between King Charles I and the Presbyterian\nParliament. Secondly, from 1648 to 1653, the power was in that part of\nthe Parliament which voted the trial of the King, and declared\nthemselves, without King or House of Lords, to have the supreme\nauthority of England and Ireland. For there were in the Long Parliament\ntwo factions, the Presbyterian and Independent; the former whereof\nsought only the subjection of the King, not his destruction directly;\nthe latter sought directly his destruction; and this part is it, which\nwas called the Rump. Thirdly, from April the 20th to July the 4th, the\nsupreme power was in the hands of a council of state constituted by\nCromwell. Fourthly, from July the 4th to December the 12th of the same\nyear, it was in the hands of men called unto it by Cromwell, whom he\ntermed men of fidelity and integrity, and made them a Parliament; which\nwas called, in contempt of one of the members, Barebone\u2019s Parliament.\nFifthly, from December the 12th 1653 to September the 3rd 1658, it was\nin the hands of Oliver Cromwell, with the title of Protector. Sixthly,\nfrom September the 3rd 1658 to April the 25th 1659, Richard Cromwell had\nit as successor to his father. Seventhly, from April the 25th 1659 to\nMay the 7th of the same year, it was nowhere. Eighthly, from May the 7th\n1659, the Rump, which was turned out of doors in 1653, recovered it\nagain; and shall lose it again to a committee of safety, and again\nrecover it, and again lose it to the right owner.\n\n_B._ By whom, and by what art, came the Rump to be turned out the second\ntime?\n\n_A._ One would think them safe enough. The army in Scotland, which when\nit was in London had helped Oliver to put down the Rump, submitted now,\nbegged pardon, and promised obedience. The soldiers in town had their\npay mended, and the commanders everywhere took the old engagement,\nwhereby they had acknowledged their authority heretofore. They also\nreceived their commissions in the House itself from the speaker, who was\ngeneralissimo. Fleetwood was made lieutenant-general, with such and so\nmany limitations as were thought necessary by the Rump, that remembered\nhow they had been served by the general, Oliver. Also Henry Cromwell,\nlord-lieutenant of Ireland, having resigned his commission by command,\nreturned into England.\n\nBut Lambert, to whom, as was said, Oliver had promised the succession,\nand who as well as the Rump knew the way to the Protectorship by\nOliver\u2019s own footsteps, was resolved to proceed in it upon the first\nopportunity; which presented itself presently after. Besides some plots\nof royalists, whom after the old fashion they again persecuted, there\nwas an insurrection made against them by Presbyterians in Cheshire,\nheaded by Sir George Booth, one of the secluded members. They were in\nnumber about 3,000, and their pretence was for a free Parliament. There\nwas a great talk of another rising, or endeavour to rise, in Devonshire\nand Cornwall at the same time. To suppress Sir George Booth, the Rump\nsent down more than a sufficient army under Lambert; which quickly\ndefeated the Cheshire party, and recovered Chester, Liverpool, and all\nthe other places they had seized. Divers also of their commanders in and\nafter the battle were taken prisoners, whereof Sir George Booth himself\nwas one.\n\nThis exploit done, Lambert, before his return, caressed his soldiers\nwith an entertainment at his own house in Yorkshire, and got their\nconsent to a petition to be made to the House, that a general might be\nset up in the army; as being unfit that the army should be judged by any\npower extrinsic to itself.\n\n_B._ I do not see that unfitness.\n\n_A._ Nor I. But it was, as I have heard, an axiom of Sir Henry Vane\u2019s.\nBut it so much displeased the Rump, that they voted, that the having of\nmore generals in the army than were already settled, was unnecessary,\nburthensome, and dangerous to the commonwealth.\n\n_B._ This was not Oliver\u2019s method; for though this Cheshire victory had\nbeen as glorious as that of Oliver at Dunbar, yet it was not the victory\nthat made Oliver general, but the resignation of Fairfax, and the\nproffer of it to Cromwell by the Parliament.\n\n_A._ But Lambert thought so well of himself, as to expect it. Therefore,\nat his return to London, he and the other officers assembling at\nWallingford House, drew their petition into form, and called it a\nrepresentation; wherein the chief point was to have a general, but many\nothers of less importance were added; and this they represented to the\nHouse, October the 4th, by Major-General Desborough. And this so far\nawed them, as to teach them so much good manners as to promise to take\nit presently into debate. Which they did; and October the 12th, having\nrecovered their spirits, voted \u201cthat the commissions of Lambert,\nDesborough, and others of the council at Wallingford House, should be\nvoid: item, that the army should be governed by a commission to\nFleetwood, Monk, Hazlerig, Walton, Morley, and Overton, till February\nthe 12th following.\u201d And to make this good against the force they\nexpected from Lambert, they ordered Hazlerig and Morley to issue\nwarrants to such officers as they could trust, to bring their soldiers\nnext morning into Westminster; which was done somewhat too late. For\nLambert had first brought his soldiers thither, and beset the House, and\nturned back the Speaker, which was then coming to it; but Hazlerig\u2019s\nforces marching about St. James\u2019s park-wall, came into St. Margaret\u2019s\nchurchyard; and so both parties looked all day one upon another, like\nenemies, but offered not to fight: whereby the Rump was put out of\npossession of the House; and the officers continued their meeting as\nbefore, at Wallingford House.\n\nThere they chose from among themselves, with some few of the city, a\ncommittee, which they called a committee of safety, whereof the chief\nwere Lambert and Vane; who, with the advice of a general council of\nofficers, had power to call delinquents to trial, to suppress\nrebellions, to treat with foreign states, &c. You see now the Rump cut\noff, and the supreme power, which is charged with _salus populi_,\ntransferred to a council of officers. And yet Lambert hopes for it in\nthe end. But one of their limitations was, that they should within six\nweeks present to the army a new model of the government. If they had\ndone so, do you think they would have preferred Lambert or any other to\nthe supreme authority therein, rather than themselves?\n\n_B._ I think not. When the Rump had put into commission, amongst a\nfew others, for the government of the army, that is to say, for\nthe government of the three nations, General Monk, already\ncommander-in-chief of the army in Scotland, and that had done much\ngreater things in this war than Lambert, how durst they leave him\nout of this committee of safety? Or how could Lambert think that\nGeneral Monk would forgive it, and not endeavour to fasten the\nRump again?\n\n_A._ They thought not of him; his gallantry had been shown on remote\nstages, Ireland and Scotland. His ambition had not appeared here in\ntheir contentions for the government, but he had complied both with\nRichard and the Rump. After General Monk had signified by letter his\ndislike of the proceedings of Lambert and his fellows, they were much\nsurprised, and began to think him more considerable than they had done;\nbut it was too late.\n\n_B._ Why? His army was too small for so great an enterprise.\n\n_A._ The general knew very well his own and their forces, both what they\nwere then, and how they might be augmented, and what generally city and\ncountry wished for, which was the restitution of the King: which to\nbring about, there needed no more but to come with his army, though not\nvery great, to London: to the doing whereof, there was no obstacle but\nthe army with Lambert. What could he do in this case? If he had declared\npresently for the King or for a free Parliament, all the armies in\nEngland would have joined against him, and assuming the title of a\nParliament would have furnished themselves with money.\n\nGeneral Monk, after he had thus quarrelled by his letter with the\ncouncil-officers, secured first those officers of his own army, which\nwere Anabaptists and therefore not to be trusted, and put others into\ntheir places; then drawing his forces together, marched to Berwick.\nBeing there, he indicted a convention of the Scots, of whom he desired\nthat they would take order for the security of that nation in his\nabsence, and raise some maintenance for his army in their march. The\nconvention promised for the security of the nation their best endeavour,\nand raised him a sum of money, not great, but enough for his purpose,\nexcusing themselves upon their present wants. On the other side, the\ncommittee of safety with the greatest and best part of their army sent\nLambert to oppose him; but at the same time, by divers messages and\nmediators urged him to a treaty; which he consented to, and sent three\nofficers to London to treat with as many of theirs. These six suddenly\nconcluded, without power from the general, upon these articles: that the\nKing be excluded; a free state settled; the ministry and universities\nencouraged; with divers others. Which the general liked not, and\nimprisoned one of his commissioners for exceeding his commission.\nWhereupon another treaty was agreed on, of five to five. But whilst\nthese treaties were in hand, Hazlerig, a member of the Rump, seized on\nPortsmouth, and the soldiers sent by the committee of safety to reduce\nit, instead of that, entered into the town and joined with Hazlerig.\nSecondly, the city renewed their tumults for a free Parliament. Thirdly,\nthe Lord Fairfax, a member also of the Rump, and greatly favoured in\nYorkshire, was raising forces there behind Lambert, who being now\nbetween two armies, his enemies would gladly have fought with the\ngeneral. Fourthly, there came news that Devonshire and Cornwall were\nlisting of soldiers. Lastly, Lambert\u2019s army wanting money, and sure they\nshould not be furnished from the council of officers, which had neither\nauthority nor strength to levy money, grew discontented, and for their\nfree quarters were odious to the northern countries.\n\n_B._ I wonder why the Scots were so ready to furnish General Monk with\nmoney; for they were no friends to the Rump.\n\n_A._ I know not; but I believe the Scots would have parted with a\ngreater sum, rather than the English should not have gone together by\nthe ears amongst themselves. The council of officers being now beset\nwith so many enemies, produced speedily their model of government; which\nwas to have a free Parliament, which should meet December the 15th, but\nwith such qualifications of no King, no House of Lords, as made the city\nmore angry than before. To send soldiers into the west to suppress those\nthat were rising there, they durst not, for fear of the city; nor could\nthey raise any other for want of money. There remained nothing but to\nbreak, and quitting Wallingford House to shift for themselves. This\ncoming to the knowledge of their army in the north, they deserted\nLambert; and the Rump, the 26th of December, repossessed the House.\n\n_B._ Seeing the Rump was now reseated, the business pretended by General\nMonk for his marching to London, was at an end.\n\n_A._ The Rump, though seated, was not well settled, but in the midst of\nso many tumults for a free Parliament had as much need of the general\u2019s\ncoming up now as before. He therefore sent them word, that because he\nthought them not yet secure enough, he would come up to London with his\narmy; which they not only accepted, but also intreated him to do, and\nvoted him for his services 1000_l._ a year.\n\nThe general marching towards London, the country every where petitioned\nhim for a free Parliament. The Rump, to make room in London for his\narmy, dislodged their own. The general for all that, had not let fall a\nword in all this time that could be taken for a declaration of his final\ndesign.\n\n_B._ How did the Rump revenge themselves on Lambert?\n\n_A._ They never troubled him; nor do I know any cause of so gentle\ndealing with him: but certainly Lambert was the ablest of any officer\nthey had to do them service, when they should have means and need to\nemploy him. After the general was come to London, the Rump sent to the\ncity for their part of a tax of 100,000_l._ a month, for six months,\naccording to an act which the Rump had made formerly before their\ndisseisin by the committee of safety. But the city, who were adverse to\nthe Rump, and keen upon a free Parliament, could not be brought to give\ntheir money to their enemies and to purposes repugnant to their own.\nHereupon the Rump sent order to the general to break down the city gates\nand their portcullises, and to imprison certain obstinate citizens. This\nhe performed, and it was the last service he did them.\n\nAbout this time the commission, by which general Monk with others had\nthe government of the army put into their hands by the Rump before the\nusurpation of the council of officers, came to expire; which the present\nRump renewed.\n\n_B._ He was thereby the sixth part of the general of the whole forces of\nthe commonwealth. If I had been as the Rump, he should have been sole\ngeneral. In such cases as this, there cannot be a greater vice than\npinching. Ambition should be liberal.\n\n_A._ After the pulling down of the city gates, the general sent a letter\nto the Rump, to let them know that that service was much against his\nnature, and to put them in mind how well the city had served the\nParliament throughout the whole war.\n\n_B._ Yes. But for the city the Parliament never could have made the war,\nnor the Rump ever have murdered the King.\n\n_A._ The Rump considered not the merit of the city, nor the good-nature\nof the general. They were busy. They were giving out commissions, making\nof acts for abjuration of the King and his line, and for the old\nengagement, and conferring with the city to get money. The general also\ndesired to hear conference between some of the Rump and some of the\nsecluded members, concerning the justice of their seclusion, and of the\nhurt that could follow from their readmission: and it was granted, after\nlong conference. The general finding the Rump\u2019s pretences unreasonable\nand ambitious, declared himself with the city for a free Parliament, and\ncame to Westminster with the secluded members, (whom he had appointed to\nmeet and stay for him at Whitehall), and replaced them in the House\namongst the Rumpers; so that now the same cattle that were in the House\nof Commons in 1640, except those that were dead and those that went from\nthem to the late King at Oxford, are all there again.\n\n_B._ But this, methinks, was no good service to the King, unless they\nhad learned better principles.\n\n_A._ They had learned nothing. The major part was now again\nPresbyterian. It is true they were so grateful to General Monk as to\nmake him general of all the forces in the three nations. They did well\nalso to make void the engagement; but it was because those acts were\nmade to the prejudice of their party; but recalled none of their own\nrebellious ordinances, nor did anything in order to the good of the\npresent King; but on the contrary, they declared by a vote, that the\nlate King began the war against his two Houses.\n\n_B._ The two Houses considered as two persons, were they not two of the\nKing\u2019s subjects? If a king raise an army against his subject, is it\nlawful for that subject to resist with force, when, as in this case, he\nmight have had peace upon his submission?\n\n_A._ They knew they had acted vilely and sottishly; but because they had\nalways pretended to greater than ordinary wisdom and godliness, they\nwere loath to confess it. The Presbyterians now saw their time to make a\nConfession of their Faith, and presented it to the House of Commons to\nshow they had not changed their principles; which, after six readings in\nthe House, was voted to be printed, and once a year to be read publicly\nin every church.\n\n_B._ I say again, this re-establishing of the Long Parliament was no\ngood service to the King.\n\n_A._ Have a little patience. They were re-established with two\nconditions; one to determine their sitting before the end of March;\nanother to send out writs before their rising for new elections.\n\n_B._ That qualifies.\n\n_A._ That brought in the King: for few of this Long Parliament, the\ncountry having felt the smart of their former service, could get\nthemselves chosen again. This New Parliament began to sit April the 25th\n1660. How soon these called in the King; with what joy and triumph he\nwas received; how earnestly his Majesty pressed the Parliament for the\nact of oblivion, and how few were excepted out of it; you know as well\nas I.\n\n_B._ But I have not yet observed in the Presbyterians any oblivion of\ntheir former principles. We are but returned to the state we were in at\nthe beginning of the sedition.\n\n_A._ Not so: for before that time, though the Kings of England had the\nright of the militia in virtue of the sovereignty, and without dispute,\nand without any particular act of Parliament directly to that purpose;\nyet now, after this bloody dispute, the next, which is the present,\nParliament, in proper and express terms hath declared the same to be the\nright of the King only, without either of his Houses of Parliament;\nwhich act is more instructive to the people, than any arguments drawn\nfrom the title of sovereign, and consequently fitter to disarm the\nambition of all seditious haranguers for the time to come.\n\n_B._ I pray God it prove so. Howsoever, I must confess that this\nParliament has done all that a Parliament can do for the security of our\npeace: which I think also would be enough, if preachers would take heed\nof instilling evil principles into their auditory. I have seen in this\nrevolution a circular motion of the sovereign power through two\nusurpers, from the late King to this his son. For (leaving out the power\nof the council of officers, which was but temporary, and no otherwise\nowned by them but in trust) it moved from King Charles I to the Long\nParliament; from thence to the Rump; from the Rump to Oliver Cromwell;\nand then back again from Richard Cromwell to the Rump; thence to the\nLong Parliament; and thence to King Charles II, where long may it\nremain.\n\n_A._ Amen. And may he have as often as there shall be need such a\ngeneral.\n\n_B._ You have told me little of the general till now in the end: but\ntruly, I think the bringing of his little army entirely out of Scotland\nup to London, was the greatest stratagem that is extant in history.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n\n\n THE\n WHOLE ART OF RHETORIC.\n\n Di, majorum umbris tenuem, et sine pondere terram,\n Spirantesque crocos, et in urna perpetuum ver,\n Qui pr\u00e6ceptorem sancti voluere parentis\n Esse loco.\n JUVENAL, VII. 207-210.\n\n\n[The following is the Preface prefixed, in the 8vo. edition of 1681, to\n this piece and the Discourse of the Laws of England.]\n\n ==========\n\n TO THE READER.\n\nAlthough these pieces may appear fully to express their own real\nintrinsic value, as bearing the image and inscription of that great man\nMr. Hobbes; yet since common usage has rendered a preface to a book as\nnecessary as a porch to a church, and that in all things some ceremonies\ncannot be avoided, mode and custom in this point is dutifully to be\nobeyed.\n\nThat they are genuine, credible testimony might be produced, did not the\npeculiar fineness of thought and expression, and a constant undaunted\nresolution of maintaining his own opinions, sufficiently ascertain their\nauthor. Besides which, they are now published from his own true copies;\nan advantage which some of his works have wanted.\n\nThe first of them, being an abridgment containing the most useful part\nof Aristotle\u2019s rhetoric, was written some thirty years since. Mr. Hobbes\nin his book of _Human Nature_ had already described man, with an\nexactness almost equal to the original draught of nature; and in his\n_Elements of Law_ laid down the constitution of government, and shown by\nwhat armed reason it is maintained: and having demonstrated in the state\nof nature the primitive art of fighting to be the only medium whereby\nmen procured their ends, did in this design to show what power in\nsocieties has succeeded to reign in its stead, I mean the art of\nspeaking; which by use of common places of probability, and knowledge in\nthe manners and passions of mankind, through the working of belief is\nable to bring about whatsoever interest.\n\nHow necessary this art is to that of politic, is clearly evident from\nthat mighty force whereby the eloquence of the ancient orators\ncaptivated the minds of the people. Mr. Hobbes chose to recommend by his\ntranslation the rhetoric of Aristotle, as being the most accomplished\nwork on that subject which the world has yet seen; having been admired\nin all ages, and in particular highly approved by the father of the\nRoman eloquence, a very competent judge. To this he thought fit to add\nsome small matter relating to that part which concerns tropes and\nfigures; as also a short discovery of some little tricks of false and\ndeceitful reasoning.\n\nThe other piece is a discourse concerning the laws of England, and has\nbeen finished many years. Herein he has endeavoured to accommodate the\ngeneral notions of his politic to the particular constitution of the\nEnglish monarchy: a design of no small difficulty; wherein to have\nsucceeded deserves much honour; to have perchance miscarried, deserves\neasy pardon. It has had the good fortune to be much esteemed by the\ngreatest men of the profession of the law, and therefore may be presumed\nto contain somewhat excellent. However it is not to be expected that all\nmen should submit to his opinions, yet it is hoped none will be offended\nat the present publishing of these papers; since they will not find here\nany new fantastic notions, but only such things as have been already\nasserted with strength of argument by himself and other persons of\neminent learning. To the public at least this benefit may accrue, that\nsome able pen may undertake the controversy, being moved with the desire\nof that reputation which will necessarily attend victory over so\nconsiderable an adversary.\n\n\n\n\n THE\n\n WHOLE ART OF RHETORIC.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK I.\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\nTHAT RHETORIC IS AN ART CONSISTING NOT ONLY IN MOVING THE PASSIONS OF\n THE JUDGE, BUT CHIEFLY IN PROOFS: AND THAT THIS ART IS PROFITABLE.\n\n\nWe see that all men naturally are able in some sort to _accuse_ and\n_excuse_: some by chance; but some by method. This method may be\ndiscovered; and to discover method is all one with teaching an art. If\nthis art consisted in criminations only, and the skill to stir up the\njudge\u2019s anger, envy, fear, pity, or other affections; a rhetorician in\nwell ordered commonwealths and states, where it is forbidden to digress\nfrom the cause in hearing, could have nothing at all to say. For all\nthese perversions of the judge are beside the question. And that which\nthe pleader is to shew, and the judge to give sentence on, is this only:\n_It is so_, or _not so_. The rest hath been decided already by the\nlaw-maker; who judging of universals and future things, could not be\ncorrupted. Besides, it is an absurd thing for a man to make crooked the\nruler he means to use.\n\nIt consisteth therefore chiefly in proofs, which are inferences: and all\ninferences being _syllogisms_, a _logician_, if he would observe the\ndifference between a plain syllogism and an enthymeme, which is a\nrhetorical syllogism, would make the best _rhetorician_. For all\nsyllogisms and inferences belong properly to logic, whether they infer\ntruth or probability. And because without this art it would often come\nto pass that evil men, by the advantage of natural abilities, would\ncarry an evil cause against a good; it brings with it at least this\nprofit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the odds only\nin the merit of the cause. Besides, ordinarily those that are judges,\nare neither patient, nor capable of long scientifical proofs drawn from\nthe principles through many syllogisms; and therefore had need to be\ninstructed by the rhetorical and shorter way. Lastly, it were ridiculous\nto be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body, and not to\nbe ashamed of being inferior in the virtue of well expressing the mind.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE DEFINITION OF RHETORIC.\n\n\nRhetoric is that faculty, by which we understand what will serve our\nturn concerning any subject to win belief in the hearer.\n\nOf those things that beget belief, some require not the help of art, as\nwitnesses, evidences, and the like, which we invent not, but make use\nof; and some require art, and are invented by us.\n\nThe belief that proceeds from our invention, comes partly from the\nbehaviour of the speaker, partly from the passions of the hearer; but\nespecially from the proofs of what we allege.\n\nProofs are, in rhetoric, either _examples_ or _enthymemes_; as in logic,\n_inductions_ or _syllogisms_. For an example is a short induction, and\nan enthymeme a short syllogism; out of which are left, as superfluous,\nthat which is supposed to be necessarily understood by the hearer; to\navoid prolixity, and not to consume the time of public business\nneedlessly.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF ORATIONS: AND OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC.\n\nIn all orations, the hearer does either hear only, or judge also.\n\nIf he hear only, that is one kind of oration, and is called\n_demonstrative_.\n\nIf he judge, he must judge either of that which is to come, or of that\nwhich is past.\n\nIf of that which is to come, there is another kind of oration, and is\ncalled _deliberative_.\n\nIf of that which is past, then it is a third kind of oration,\n_judicial_.\n\nSo there are three kinds of orations; _demonstrative_, _judicial_, and\n_deliberative_.\n\nTo which belong their proper times. To the demonstrative, the _present_;\nto the judicial, the _past_; and to the deliberative, the _time to\ncome_.\n\nAnd their proper offices. To the deliberative, _exhortation_ and\n_dehortation_. To the judicial, _accusation_ and _defence_. And to the\ndemonstrative, _praising_ and _dispraising_.\n\nAnd their proper ends. To the deliberative, to prove a thing\n_profitable_ or _unprofitable_. To the judicial, _just_ or _unjust_. To\nthe demonstrative, _honourable_ or _dishonourable_.\n\nThe principles of rhetoric out of which _enthymemes_ are to be drawn,\nare the _common opinions_ that men have concerning _profitable_ and\n_unprofitable_; _just_ and _unjust_; _honourable_ and _dishonourable_;\nwhich are the points in the several kinds of orations questionable. For\nas in _logic_, where certain and infallible knowledge is the scope of\nour proof, the principles must be all _infallible truths_: so in\n_rhetoric_ the principles must be _common opinions_, such as the judge\nis already possessed with. Because the end of rhetoric is victory; which\nconsists in having gotten _belief_.\n\nAnd because nothing is profitable, unprofitable, just, unjust,\nhonourable or dishonourable, but what has been _done_, or _is to be\ndone_; and nothing is _to be done_, that is not _possible_; and because\nthere be degrees of profitable, unprofitable, just, unjust, honourable\nand dishonourable; an orator must be ready in other principles, namely,\nof what is _done_ and _not done_, _possible_ and _not possible_, _to\ncome_ and _not to come_, and what is _greater_ and what is _lesser_,\nboth in general, and particularly applied to the thing in question; as\nwhat is _more_ and _less_, generally; and what is _more profitable_ and\n_less profitable_, &c. particularly.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\nOF THE SUBJECT OF DELIBERATIVES; AND THE ABILITIES THAT ARE REQUIRED OF\n HIM THAT WILL DELIBERATE OF BUSINESS OF STATE.\n\n\nIn _deliberatives_ there are to be considered the _subject_ wherein, and\nthe _ends_ whereto, the orator exhorteth, or from which he dehorteth.\n\nThe _subject_ is always something in our own power, the knowledge\nwhereof belongs not to rhetoric, but for the most part to the politics;\nand may be referred in a manner to these five heads.\n\n1. _Of levying of money._ To which point he that will speak as he ought\nto do, ought to know beforehand the revenue of the state, how much it\nis, and wherein it consisteth, and also how great are the necessary\ncharges and expenses of the same. This knowledge is gotten partly by a\nman\u2019s own experience, partly by relations and accounts in writing.\n\n2. _Of peace and war._ Concerning which the counsellor or deliberator\nought to know the strength of the commonwealth, how much it both now is,\nand hereafter may be, and wherein that power consisteth. Which knowledge\nis gotten, partly by experience and relations at home, and partly by the\nsight of wars and of their events abroad.\n\n3. _Of the safeguard of the country._ Wherein he only is able to give\ncounsel, that knows the forms, and number, and places of the garrisons.\n\n4. _Of provision._ Wherein to speak well, it is necessary for a man to\nknow what is sufficient to maintain the state, what commodities they\nhave at home growing, what they must fetch in through need, and what\nthey may carry out through abundance.\n\n5. _Of making laws._ To which is necessary so much political or civil\nphilosophy, as to know what are the several kinds of governments, and by\nwhat means, either from without or from within, each of those kinds is\npreserved or destroyed. And this knowledge is gotten, partly by\nobserving the several governments in times past by history, and partly\nby observing the government of the times present in several nations, by\ntravel.\n\nSo that to him that will speak in a council of state, there is necessary\nthis; history, sight of wars, travel, knowledge of the revenue,\nexpenses, forces, havens, garrisons, wares, and provisions in the state\nhe lives in, and what is needful for that state either to export or\nimport.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n OF THE ENDS WHICH THE ORATOR IN DELIBERATIVES PROPOUNDETH, WHEREBY TO\n EXHORT OR DEHORT.\n\nAn orator, in _exhorting_, always propoundeth _felicity_, or some _part_\nof _felicity_, to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto: and in\n_dehortation_, the contrary.\n\nBy _felicity_ is meant commonly prosperity with virtue, or a continual\ncontent of the life with surety.\n\nAnd the _parts_ of it are such things as we call good in _body_, _mind_,\nor fortune; such as these that follow.\n\n1. _Nobility_, which to a state or nation is to have been ancient\ninhabitants; and to have had most anciently, and in most number, famous\ngenerals in the wars, or men famous for such things as fall under\nemulation. And to a private man, to have been descended lawfully of a\nfamily, which hath yielded most anciently, and in most number, men known\nto the world for virtue, riches, or any thing in general estimation.\n\n2. _Many and good children._ Which is also _public_ and _private_.\n_Public_, when there is much youth in the state endued with virtue;\nnamely, of the _body_, stature, beauty, strength, and dexterity; of the\n_mind_, valour and temperance: _private_, when a man hath many such\nchildren, both male and female. The virtues commonly respected in women,\nare of the _body_, beauty and stature; of the _mind_, temperance and\nhousewifery without sordidness.\n\n3. _Riches._ Which is money, cattle, lands, household-stuff, with the\npower to dispose of them.\n\n4. _Glory._ Which is the reputation of virtue, or of the possession of\nsuch things as all, or most men, or wise men desire.\n\n5. _Honour._ Which is the glory of benefiting, or being able to benefit\nothers. _To benefit others_, is to contribute somewhat, not easily had,\nto another man\u2019s safety or riches. The parts of _honour_ are sacrifices,\nmonuments, rewards, dedication of places, precedence, sepulchres,\nstatues, public pensions, adorations, presents.\n\n6. _Health._ Which is the being free from diseases, with strength to use\nthe body.\n\n7. _Beauty._ Which is to different ages different. To youth, strength of\nbody and sweetness of aspect. To full men, strength of body fit for the\nwars, and countenance sweet with a mixture of terror. To old men,\nstrength enough for necessary labours, with a countenance not\ndispleasing.\n\n8. _Strength._ Which is the ability to move any thing at pleasure of the\nmover. To move, is to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust down, to\npress together.\n\n9. _Stature._ Which is then _just_, when a man in height, breadth, and\nthickness of body doth so exceed the most, as nevertheless it be no\nhindrance to the quickness of his motion.\n\n10. _Good old age._ Which is that which comes late, and with the least\ntrouble.\n\n11. _Many and good friends._ Which is to have many that will do for his\nsake that which they think will be for his good.\n\n12. _Prosperity._ Which is to have all, or the most, or the greatest of\nthose goods which we attribute to fortune.\n\n13. _Virtue._ Which is then to be defined, when we speak of _praise_.\n\nThese are the grounds from whence we _exhort_.\n\n_Dehortation_ is from the contraries of these.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL.\n\n\nIn _deliberatives_, the principles or elements from whence we draw our\nproofs, are common opinions concerning good and evil. And these\nprinciples are either _absolute_ or _comparative_. And those that are\n_absolute_, are either _disputable_ or _indisputable_.\n\nThe _indisputable principles_ are such as these: _Good_, is that which\nwe love for itself. And that for which we love somewhat else. And that\nwhich all things desire. And that to every man which his reason\ndictates. And that which when we have, we are well or satisfied. And\nthat which satisfies. And the cause or effect of any of these. And that\nwhich preserves any of these. And that which keeps off or destroys the\ncontrary of any of these.\n\nAlso to take the _good_ and reject the _evil_, is _good_. And to take\nthe greater _good_, rather than the less; and the lesser _evil_ rather\nthan the greater. Further, all virtues are _good_. And pleasure. And all\nthings beautiful. And justice, valour, temperance, magnanimity,\nmagnificence, and other like habits. And health, beauty, strength, &c.\nAnd riches. And friends. And honour and glory. And ability to say or do:\nalso towardliness, will, and the like. And whatsoever art or science.\nAnd life. And whatsoever is just.\n\nThe _disputable principles_ are such as follow:\n\nThat is _good_, whose contrary is _evil_. And whose contrary is _good_\nfor our enemies. And whose contrary our enemies are glad of. And of\nwhich there cannot be too much. And upon which much labour and cost hath\nbeen bestowed. And that which many desire. And that which is praised.\nAnd that which even our enemies and evil men praise. And what good we\nprefer. And what we do advise. And that which is possible, is _good_ to\nundertake. And that which is easy. And that which depends on our own\nwill. And that which is proper for us to do. And what no man else can\ndo. And whatsoever is extraordinary. And what is suitable. And that\nwhich wants a little of being at an end. And what we hope to master. And\nwhat we are fit for. And what evil men do not. And what we love to do.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\n OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL,\n COMPARATIVELY.\n\n\nThe _colours_ of _good comparatively_ depend, partly, upon the following\ndefinitions of _comparatives_.\n\n1. _More_, is _so much and somewhat besides_.\n\n2. _Less_, is _that, which and somewhat else is so much_.\n\n3. _Greater_ and _more in number_ are said only _comparatively_ to\n_less_ and _fewer in number_.\n\n4. _Great_ and _little_, _many_ and _few_, are taken _comparatively_ to\nthe _most of the same kind_. So that _great_ and _many_, is that which\n_exceeds_; _little_ and _few_, is that which is _exceeded by, the most\nof the same kind_.\n\nPartly, from the precedent definitions of _good absolutely_.\n\nCommon opinions concerning _good comparatively_, then are these.\n\n_Greater good_ is many than fewer, or one of those many.\n\nAnd _greater_ is the kind, in which the greatest is greater than the\ngreatest of another kind. And _greater_ is that good than another good,\nwhose kind is _greater_ than another\u2019s kind. And _greater_ is that from\nwhich another good follows, than the good which follows. And of two\nwhich exceed a third, _greater_ is that which exceeds it most. And that\nwhich _causes_ the greater good. And that which _proceeds from_ a\ngreater good. And _greater_ is that which is chosen for itself, than\nthat which is chosen for somewhat else. And the _end_ greater than that\nwhich is _not_ the end. And that which _less_ needs other things, than\nthat which _more_. And that which is _independent_, than that which is\n_dependent_ of another. And the _beginning_, than _not_ the beginning.\n\n(Seeing the _beginning_ is a greater good or evil, than that which is\n_not_ the beginning; and the _end_, than that which is _not_ the end;\none may argue from this _colour_ both ways: as Leodamas against\nChabrias, would have the actor more to blame than the adviser; and\nagainst Callistratus, the adviser more than the actor.)\n\nAnd the _cause_, than _not_ the cause. And that which hath a _greater_\nbeginning or cause. And the beginning or cause of a _greater good or\nevil_. And that which is _scarce_, greater than that which is\n_plentiful_; because harder to get. And that which is _plentiful_, than\nthat which is _scarce_; because oftener in use. And that which is\n_easy_, than that which is _hard_. And that whose _contrary_ is greater.\nAnd that whose _want_ is greater. And _virtue_ than _not_ virtue, a\ngreater good. _Vice_ than _not_ vice, a greater evil. And greater good\nor evil is that, the _effects_ whereof are more _honourable_ or more\n_shameful_. And the _effects_ of greater virtues or vices. And the\nexcess whereof is more tolerable, a greater good. And those things which\nmay with more honour be desired. And the desire of better things. And\nthose things whereof the knowledge is better. And the knowledge of\nbetter things. And that which wise men prefer. And that which is in\nbetter men. And that which better men choose. And that which is more,\nthan that which is less _delightful_. And that which is more, than that\nwhich is less _honourable_. And that which we would have for ourselves\nand friends, a greater good; and the contrary, a greater evil. And that\nwhich is _lasting_, than that which is _not_ lasting. And that which is\n_firm_, than that which is _not_ firm. And what _many_ desire, than what\n_few_. And what the adversary or judge confesseth to be greater, is\ngreater. And _common_ than _not_ common. And _not_ common than _common_.\nAnd what is more laudable. And that which is more honoured, a greater\ngood. And that which is more punished, a greater evil. And both good and\nevil divided than undivided, _appear_ greater. And compounded than\nsimple, _appear_ greater. And that which is done with opportunity, age,\nplace, time, means disadvantageous, greater than otherwise. And that\nwhich is _natural_, than that which is _attained unto_. And the same\npart of that which is great, than of that which is less. And that which\nis nearest to the end designed. And that which is good or evil to _one\u2019s\nself_, than that which is _simply_ so. And _possible_, than _not_\npossible. And that which comes toward the end of our life. And that\nwhich we do _really_, than that which we do _for show_. And that which\nwe would _be_, rather than what we would _seem_ to be. And that which is\ngood _for more purposes_, is the greater good. And that which serves us\nin great necessity. And that which is joined with less trouble. And that\nwhich is joined with more delight. And of the two, that which added to a\nthird makes the whole the greater. And that which having, we are more\nsensible of. And in every thing, that which we most esteem.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\n OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF GOVERNMENTS.\n\n\nBecause _hortation_ and _dehortation_ concern the commonwealth, and are\ndrawn from the elements of good and evil; as we have spoken of them\nalready in the _abstract_, so we must speak of them also in the\n_concrete_, that is, of what is good or evil to each sort of\ncommonwealth in special.\n\nThe government of a commonwealth is either _democracy_, or\n_aristocracy_, or _oligarchy_, or _monarchy_.\n\n_Democracy_ is that, wherein all men with equal right are preferred to\nthe highest magistracy by lot.\n\n_Aristocracy_ is that, wherein the highest magistrate is chosen out of\nthose that have had the best education, according to what the laws\nprescribe for best.\n\n_Oligarchy_ is that, where the highest magistrate is chosen for wealth.\n\n_Monarchy_ is that, wherein one man hath the government of all; which\ngovernment, if he limit it by law, is called _kingdom_; if by his own\nwill, _tyranny_.\n\nThe end of _democracy_, or the people\u2019s government, is _liberty_.\n\nThe end of _oligarchy_, is the _riches of those that govern_.\n\nThe end of _aristocracy_, is _good laws_ and _good ordering of the\ncity_.\n\nThe end of _monarchy_ or _kings_, is _the safety of the people and\nconservation of his own authority_.\n\n_Good_ therefore in each sort of government, is that which conduceth to\nthese their ends.\n\nAnd because _belief_ is not gotten only by _proofs_, but also from\n_manners_; the _manners_ of each sort of commonwealth ought to be well\nunderstood by him that undertaketh to persuade or dissuade in matter of\nstate. Their _manners_ may be known by their _designs_; and their\n_designs_ by their _ends_; and their _ends_ by what we see them take\n_pleasure_ in. But of this more accurately in the politics.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\n OF THE COLOURS OF HONOURABLE AND DISHONOURABLE.\n\n\nIn a demonstrative oration, the subject whereof is _praise_ or\n_dispraise_, the proofs are to be drawn from the elements of\n_honourable_ and _dishonourable_.\n\nIn this place we anticipate the second way of getting _belief_; which is\nfrom the _manners_ of the speaker. For _praise_, whether it come in as\nthe principal business, or upon the by, depends still upon the same\n_principles_; which are these:\n\n_Honourable_, is that which we love for itself, and is withal laudable;\nand that _good_, which pleaseth us only because it is good; and virtue.\n\n_Virtue_ is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is good;\nand the faculty of doing many and great things well.\n\nThe kinds of it are these:\n\n1. _Justice_, which is a virtue whereby every man obtains what by law is\nhis.\n\n2. _Fortitude_, which is a virtue by which a man carries himself\nhonourably and according to the laws, in time of danger.\n\n3. _Temperance_, which is a virtue whereby a man governs himself in\nmatter of pleasure according to the law.\n\n4. _Liberality_, which is a virtue by which we benefit others in matter\nof money.\n\n5. _Magnanimity_, which is a virtue by which a man is apt to do great\nbenefits.\n\n6. _Magnificence_, which is a virtue by which a man is apt to be at\ngreat cost.\n\n7. _Prudence_, which is an _intellectual_ virtue, by which a man is able\nto deliberate well concerning any good leading to felicity.\n\nAnd _honourable_ are the causes and effects of things honourable. And\nthe works of virtue. And the signs of virtue. And those actions the\nreward whereof is _honour_. And the reward whereof is rather _honour_\nthan _money_. And that which we do not for our sakes. And what we do for\nour country\u2019s good, neglecting our own. And those things are\n_honourable_ which, good of themselves, are not so to the owner. And\nthose things which happen to the dead, rather than to the living. And\nwhat we do for other men, especially for benefactors. And bestowing of\nbenefits. And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of. And those\nthings which men strive for earnestly, but without fear of adversary.\n\nAnd of the more _honourable_ and better men, the virtues are more\n_honourable_. And more _honourable_ are the virtues that tend to other\nmen\u2019s benefit, than those which tend to one\u2019s own.\n\nAnd _honourable_ are those things which are just. And revenge is\n_honourable_. And victory. And honour. And monuments. And those things\nwhich happen not to the living. And things that excel. And what none can\ndo but we. And possessions we reap no profit by. And those things which\nare _had in honour_, particularly in several places. And the signs of\npraise. And to have nothing of the servile, mercenary, or mechanic.\n\nAnd that which _seems_ honourable; namely, such as follow: Vices\nconfining upon virtue. And the extremes of virtues. And what the\nauditors _think_ honourable. And that which is in estimation. And that\nwhich is done according to custom.\n\nBesides, in a _demonstrative_ oration, the orator must show that he whom\nhe praiseth, did what he praiseth unconstrainedly and willingly. And he\ndoes so, who does the same often.\n\n_Praise_ is speech, declaring the magnitude of a virtue, action, or\nwork. But to praise the work from the virtue of the worker, is a\ncircular proof.\n\n_To magnify_ and _to praise_, differ in themselves as _felicity_ and\n_virtue_. For praise declares a man\u2019s _virtue_; and _magnifying_\ndeclares his _felicity_.\n\nPraise is a kind of inverted precept. For to say, \u201c_Do it because it is\ngood_,\u201d is a precept; but to say, \u201c_He is good because he did it_,\u201d is\npraise. An orator in _praising_, must also use the forms of\n_amplification_; such as these: He was the first that did it. The only\nman that did it. The special man that did it. He did it with\ndisadvantage of time. He did it with little help. He was the cause that\nthe law ordained rewards and honours for such actions.\n\nFurther, he that will _praise_ a man, must compare him with others, and\nhis actions with the actions of others, especially with such as are\nrenowned.\n\nAnd _amplification_ is more proper to a _demonstrative_ oration, than to\nany other. For here the actions are confessed; and the orator\u2019s part is\nonly this, to contribute unto them magnitude and lustre.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER X.\n\n OF ACCUSATION AND DEFENCE, WITH THE DEFINITION OF INJURY.\n\n\nIn a _judicial_ oration, which consists in _accusation_ and _defence_,\nthe thing to be proved is, that _injury_ has been done: and the heads\nfrom whence the proofs are to be drawn are these three:\u2014\n\n1. The causes that move to injury.\n\n2. The persons apt to do injury.\n\n3. The persons obnoxious or apt to suffer injury.\n\nAn injury is a voluntary offending of another man contrary to the law.\n\n_Voluntary_ is that which a man does with knowledge, and without\ncompulsion.\n\nThe causes of _voluntary_ actions are intemperance, and a vicious\ndisposition concerning things desirable. As the covetous man does\nagainst the law out of an intemperate desire of money.\n\nAll actions proceed either from the doer\u2019s disposition, or not. Those\nthat proceed not from the doer\u2019s disposition, are such as he does by\n_chance_, by _compulsion_, or by _natural necessity_. Those that proceed\nfrom the doer\u2019s disposition, are such as he does by _custom_, or _upon\npremeditation_, or in _anger_, or out of _intemperance_.\n\n_By chance_ are said to be done those things, whereof neither the cause\nnor the scope is evident; and which are done neither orderly, nor\nalways, nor most commonly after the same manner.\n\n_By nature_ are said to be done those things, the causes whereof are in\nthe doer; and are done orderly, and always or for the most part after\nthe same manner.\n\n_By compulsion_ are done those things, which are against the appetite\nand ordination of the doer.\n\n_By custom_ those actions are said to be done, the cause whereof is\nthis, that the doer has done them often.\n\n_Upon premeditation_ are said to be done those things, which are done\nfor profit, as the end or the way to the end.\n\n_In anger_ are said to be done those things, which are done with a\npurpose of revenge.\n\n_Out of intemperance_ are said to be done those things, which are\ndelightful.\n\nIn sum, every _voluntary_ action tends either to _profit_ or _pleasure_.\n\nThe _colours_ of _profitable_, are already set down. The _colours_ of\nthat which is _pleasing_, follow next.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XI.\n\n OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING PLEASURE.\n\n\n_Pleasure_ is a sudden and sensible motion of the soul, towards that\nwhich is natural. _Grief_ is the contrary.\n\n_Pleasant_ therefore is that, which is the cause of such motion. And to\nreturn to one\u2019s own nature. And customs. And those things that are not\nviolent.\n\n_Unpleasant_ are those things which proceed from necessity, as cares,\nstudy, contentions. The contrary whereof, ease, remission from labour\nand care, also play, rest, sleep; are _pleasant_.\n\n_Pleasant_ also is that to which we have an appetite. Also the appetites\nthemselves, if they be sensual; as thirst, hunger, and lust. Also those\nthings to which we have an appetite upon persuasion and reason. And\nthose things we remember, whether they pleased or displeased then when\nthey were present. And the things we hope for. And anger. And to be in\nlove. And revenge. And victory: therefore also contentious games; as\ntables, chess, dice, tennis, &c.; and hunting; and suits in law. And\nhonour and reputation amongst men in honour and reputation. And to love.\nAnd to be beloved and respected. And to be admired. And to be flattered.\nAnd a flatterer: for he seems both to love and admire. And the same\nthing often. And change or variety. And what we return to afresh. And to\nlearn. And to admire. And to do good. And to receive good. And to help\nup again one that is fallen. And to finish that which is unperfect. And\nimitation; and therefore the art of painting; and the art of carving\nimages; and the art of poetry; and pictures and statues. And other men\u2019s\ndangers, so they be near. And to have escaped hardly.\n\nAnd things of a kind please one another. And every one himself. And\none\u2019s own pleases him. And to bear sway. And to be thought wise. And to\ndwell upon that which he is good at. And ridiculous actions, sayings,\nand persons.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XII.\n\nPRESUMPTIONS OF INJURY DRAWN FROM THE PERSONS THAT DO IT: OR COMMON\n OPINIONS CONCERNING THE APTITUDE OF PERSONS TO DO INJURY.\n\n\nOf the _causes_ which move to _injury_, namely, _profit and pleasure_,\nhas been already spoken (chap. VI, VII, XI). It follows next, to speak\nof the _persons_ that are apt to do injury.\n\nThe _doers of injury_ are: such as think they can do it. And such as\nthink to be undiscovered, when they have done it. And such as think,\nthough they be discovered, they shall not be called in question for it.\nAnd such as think, though they be called in question for it, that their\nmulct will be less than their gain, which either themselves or their\nfriends receive by the _injury_.\n\n_Able to do injury_ are: such as are eloquent. And such as are practised\nin business. And such as have skill in process. And such as have many\nfriends. And rich men. And such as have rich friends, or rich servants,\nor rich partners.\n\n_Undiscovered when they have done it_, are: such as are not apt to\ncommit the crimes whereof they are accused: as feeble men, slaughter;\npoor and not beautiful men, adultery. And such as one would think could\nnot chuse but be discovered. And such as do injuries, whereof there hath\nbeen no example. And such as have none or many enemies. And such as can\neasily conceal what they do. And such as have somebody to transfer the\nfault upon.\n\nThey that do injury _openly_ are: such, whose friends have been injured.\nAnd such as have the judges for friends. And such as can escape their\ntrial at law. And such as can put off their trial. And such as can\ncorrupt the judges. And such as can avoid the payment of their fine. And\nsuch as can defer the payment. And such as cannot pay at all. And such\nas by the injury get manifestly much, and presently; when the fine is\nuncertain, little, and to come. And such as get by the injury money, by\nthe penalty shame only. And such on the contrary as get honour by the\ninjury, and suffer the mulct of money only, or banishment, or the like.\nAnd such as have often escaped or been undiscovered. And such as have\noften attempted in vain. And such as consider present pleasure more than\npain to come, and so intemperate men are apt to do injury. And such as\nconsider pleasure to come more than present pain, and so temperate men\nare apt to do injury. And such as may seem to have done it by fortune,\nnature, necessity, or custom; and by error, rather than by injustice.\nAnd such as have means to get pardon. And such as want necessaries, as\npoor men; or unnecessaries, as rich men. And such as are of very good or\nvery bad reputation.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII.\n\n PRESUMPTIONS OF INJURY DRAWN FROM THE PERSONS THAT SUFFER, AND FROM THE\n MATTER OF THE INJURY.\n\n\nOf those that do injury, and why they do it, it hath been already\nspoken. Now of the _persons_ that suffer, and of the _matter_ wherein\nthey suffer, the _common opinions_ are these.\n\n_Persons_ obnoxious to injury are: such as have the things that we want,\neither as necessary, or as delightful. And such as are far from us. And\nsuch as are at hand. And such as are unwary and credulous. And such as\nare lazy. And such as are modest. And such as have swallowed many\ninjuries. And such as we have injured often before; and such as never\nbefore. And such as are in our danger. And such as are ill-beloved\ngenerally. And such as are envied. And our friends; and our enemies. And\nsuch as, wanting friends, have no great ability either in speech or\naction. And such as shall be losers by going to law: as strangers and\nworkmen. And such as have done the injuries they suffer. And such as\nhave committed a crime, or would have done, or are about to do. And such\nas, by doing them an injury, we shall gratify our friends or superiors.\nAnd such whose friendship we have newly left, and accuse. And such as\nanother would do the injury to, if we should not. And such as by\ninjuring, we get greater means of doing good.\n\nThe _matters_ wherein men are obnoxious to injury are: those things\nwherein all, or most men use to deal unjustly. And those things which\nare easily hid, and put off into other hands, or altered. And those\nthings which a man is ashamed to have suffered. And those things wherein\nprosecution of injury, may be thought a love of contention.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XIV.\n\n OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO BE KNOWN FOR THE DEFINITION OF\n JUST AND UNJUST.\n\n\nWhen the fact is evident, the next inquiry is, whether it be _just_ or\n_unjust_. For the definition of _just_ and _unjust_, we must know what\n_law_ is; that is, what the _law of nature_, what the _law of nations_,\nwhat the _law civil_, what _written law_, and what _unwritten law_ is:\nand what _persons_, that is, what a _public person_ or the _city_ is,\nand what a _private person_ or _citizen_ is.\n\n_Unjust_, in the opinion of all men, is that which is contrary to the\n_law of nature_.\n\n_Unjust_, in the opinion of all men of those nations which traffic and\ncome together, is that which is contrary to the _law common to those\nnations_.\n\n_Unjust_, only in one commonwealth, is that which is contrary to the\n_law civil_, or law of that commonwealth.\n\nHe that is accused to have done anything against the _public_, or a\n_private person_, is accused to do it either _ignorantly_, or\n_unwillingly_, or _in anger_, or _upon premeditation_.\n\nAnd because the defendant does many times confess the _fact_, but deny\nthe _unjustice_; as that he _took_, but did not _steal_; and _did_, but\nnot _adultery_; it is necessary to know the definitions of _theft_,\n_adultery_, and all other crimes.\n\nWhat facts are contrary to the _written laws_, may be known by the _laws\nthemselves_.\n\nBesides _written laws_, whatsoever is _just_ proceeds from _equity_ or\n_goodness_.\n\nFrom _goodness_ proceeds, that which we are praised or honoured for.\n\nFrom _equity_ proceed those actions, which though the written law\ncommand not, yet, being interpreted reasonably and supplied, seems to\nrequire at our hands.\n\nActions of _equity_ are such as these:\u2014Not too rigorously to punish\nerrors, mischances, or injuries. To pardon the faults that adhere to\nmankind. And not to consider the _law_, so much as the _law maker\u2019s\nmind_; and not the _words_, so much as the _meaning_ of the law. And not\nto regard so much the fact, as the intention of the doer; nor part of\nthe fact, but the whole; nor what the doer _is_, but what he _has been_\nalways or for the most part. And to remember better the good received,\nthan the ill. And to endure injuries patiently. And to submit rather to\nthe sentence of a judge, than of the sword. And to the sentence of an\narbitrator, rather than of a judge.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XV.\n\n OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING INJURIES, COMPARATIVELY.\n\n\n_Common opinions_ concerning injuries _comparatively_, are such as\nthese.\n\nGreater is the injury, which proceedeth from greater iniquity. And from\nwhich proceedeth greater damage. And of which there is no revenge. And\nfor which there is no remedy. And by occasion of which he that hath\nreceived the injury hath done some mischief to himself.\n\nHe does greater injury, that does it first, or alone, or with few; and\nhe that does it often.\n\nGreater injury is that, against which laws and penalties were first\nmade. And that, which is more brutal or more approaching to the actions\nof beasts. And that, which is done upon more premeditation. And by which\nmore laws are broken. And which is done in the place of execution. And\nwhich is of greatest shame to him that receives the injury. And which is\ncommitted against well deservers. And which is committed against the\n_unwritten_ law; because good men should observe the law for justice,\nand not for fear of punishment. And which is committed against the\n_written_ law; because he that will do injury, neglecting the penalty\nset down in the _written_ law, is much more likely to transgress the\n_unwritten_ law, where there is no penalty at all.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XVI.\n\n OF PROOFS INARTIFICIAL.\n\n\nOf _artificial proofs_ we have already spoken.\n\n_Inartificial proofs_, which we invent not, but make use of, are of five\nsorts.\n\n1. _Laws._ And those are _civil_ or _written law_: the _law or custom of\nnations_; and the _universal law of nature_.\n\n2. _Witnesses._ And those are such as concern _matter_, and such as\nconcern _manners_. Also they be _ancient_ or _present_.\n\n3. _Evidences_ or writings.\n\n4. _Question_ or torture.\n\n5. _Oaths._ And those be either _given_ or _taken_, or both, or neither.\n\nFor _laws_, we use them thus: when the _written law_ makes against us,\nwe appeal to the _law of nature_, alleging that to be greatest justice,\nwhich is greatest equity. That the _law of nature_ is immutable, the\n_written law_ mutable. That the _written law_ is but seeming justice;\nthe _law of nature_ very justice; and justice is among those things\nwhich are, and not which seem to be. That the judge ought to discern\nbetween true and adulterate justice. That they are better men that obey\nunwritten than written laws. That the law against us does contradict\nsome other law. And when the law has a double interpretation, that is\nthe true one which makes for us. And that the cause of the law being\nabolished, the law is no more of validity.\n\nBut when the _written law_ makes for us, and _equity_ for the adversary,\nwe must allege: That a man may use equity, not as a liberty to judge\nagainst the law; but only as a security against being forsworn, when he\nknows not the law. That men seek not equity because it is good simply,\nbut because good for them. That it is the same thing not to make, and\nnot to use the law. That as in other arts, and namely, in physic,\nfallacies are pernicious; so in a common-wealth it is pernicious to use\npretexts against the law. And that in common-wealths well instituted, to\nseem wiser than the laws is prohibited.\n\nFor _witnesses_, we must use them thus. When we have them not, we must\nstand for _presumptions_, and say: That in equity, sentence ought to be\ngiven according to the most probability. That presumptions are the\ntestimony of the things themselves, and cannot be bribed. That they\ncannot lie.\n\nWhen we have witnesses against him that has them not, we must say: That\npresumptions, if they be false, cannot be punished. That if presumptions\nwere enough, witnesses were superfluous.\n\nFor _writings_, when they favour us, we must say: That _writings_ are\nprivate and particular laws; and he that takes away the use of\nevidences, abolisheth the law. That since contracts and negociations\npass by _writings_, he that bars their use dissolves human society.\n\nAgainst them, if they favour the adversary, we may say: That since laws\ndo not bind that are fraudulently made to pass, much less writings; and\nthat the judge being to dispense justice, ought rather to consider what\nis just than what is in the writing. That writings may be gotten by\nfraud or force, but justice by neither. That the writing is repugnant to\nsome law, civil or natural; or to justice; or to honesty. That it is\nrepugnant to some other writing, before or after. That it crosses some\ncommodity of the judge; which must not be said directly, but implied\ncunningly.\n\nFor the _torture_, if the giving of it make for us, we must say: That it\nis the only testimony that is certain. But if it make for the adversary,\nwe may say: That men enforced by torture, speak as well that which is\nfalse as that which is true. That they, who can endure, conceal the\ntruth; and they who cannot, say that which is false, to be delivered\nfrom pain.\n\nFor _oaths_, he that will not put his adversary to his oath, may allege:\nThat he makes no scruple to be forsworn. That by swearing he will carry\nthe cause, which, not swearing, he must lose. That he had rather trust\nhis cause in the hands of the judge, than of the adversary.\n\nHe that _refuseth_ to take the oath may say: That the matter is not\nworth so much. That if he had been an evil man, he had _sworn_, and\ncarried his cause. That to try it by _swearing_, for a religious man\nagainst an irreligious is as hard a match, as to set a weak man against\na strong in combat.\n\nHe that is _willing_ to take the oath, may pretend: That he had rather\ntrust himself, than his adversary; and that it is equal dealing for an\nirreligious man to _give_, and for a religious man to _take_ the oath.\nThat it is his duty to take the oath, since he has required to have\n_sworn judges_.\n\nHe that _offers_ the oath, may pretend: That he does piously commit his\ncause to the Gods. That he makes his adversary himself judge. That it\nwere absurd for him not to swear, that has required the judges to be\nsworn.\n\nAnd of these are to be compounded the forms we are to use, when we would\n_give_, and _not take_ the oath; or _take_ and _not give_; or _both\ngive_ and _take_; or _neither give nor take_.\n\nBut if one have sworn contrary to a former oath, he may pretend: That he\nwas forced: that he was deceived; and that neither of these is\n_perjury_, since _perjury_ is voluntary.\n\nBut if the adversary do so, he may say: That he that stands not to what\nhe hath _sworn_, subverteth human society. And (turning to the judge):\nWhat reason have we to require, that you should be _sworn_ that judge\nour cause; when we will not stand to that we _swear_ ourselves?\n\nAnd so much for _proofs inartificial_.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK II.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n THE INTRODUCTION.\n\n\nOf _belief_ proceeding from our _invention_, that part which consisteth\nin _proof_ is already spoken of.\n\nThe other two parts follow; whereof one ariseth from the _manners_ of\nthe _speaker_, the other from the _passions_ of the _hearer_.\n\nThe _principles_, _colours_, or _common opinions_ upon which a man\u2019s\nbelief is grounded concerning the manners of him that speaks, are to be\nhad, partly out of that which hath before been said of _virtue_ (Book I.\nchap. 9); partly out of those things which shall be said by-and-by\nconcerning the _passions_. For a man is _believed_, either for his\n_prudence_ or for his _probity_, which are _virtues_; or for _good\nwill_, of which among the _passions_.\n\nThe _principles_ concerning belief, arising from the passion of the\nhearer, are to be gathered from that which shall now be said of the\nseveral passions in order.\n\nIn every one of which, three things are to be considered.\n\n1. First, _how_ men are affected.\n\n2. Secondly, _towards whom_.\n\n3. Thirdly, _for what_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n OF ANGER.\n\n\n_Anger_ is desire of revenge, joined with grief, for that he, or some of\nhis, is, or seems to be, _neglected_.\n\nThe object of anger is always some particular or individual thing.\n\nIn anger there is also pleasure proceeding from the imagination of\nrevenge to come.\n\nTo _neglect_, is to esteem little or nothing; and of three kinds: 1\n_Contempt_, 2 _Crossing_, 3 _Contumely_.\n\n_Contempt_, is when a man thinks another of little worth in comparison\nto himself.\n\n_Crossing_, is the hinderance of another man\u2019s will without design to\nprofit himself.\n\n_Contumely_, is the disgracing of another for his own pastime.\n\nThe _common opinions_ concerning anger are therefore such as follow.\nThey are easily angry, that think they are neglected. That think they\nexcel others; as the rich with the poor; the noble with the obscure, &c.\nAnd such as think they deserve well. And such as grieve to be hindered,\nopposed, or not assisted; and therefore sick men, poor men, lovers, and\ngenerally all that desire and attain not, are angry with those that,\nstanding by, are not moved by their wants. And such as having expected\ngood, find evil.\n\nThose that men are angry with, are: such as mock, deride, or jest at\nthem. And such as shew any kind of contumely towards them. And such as\ndespise those things which we spend most labour and study upon; and the\nmore, by how much we seem the less advanced therein. And our friends,\nrather than those that are not our friends. And such as have honoured\nus, if they continue not. And such as requite not our courtesy. And such\nas follow contrary courses, if they be our inferiors. And our friends,\nif they have said or done us evil, or not good. And such as give not ear\nto our entreaty. And such as are joyful or calm in our distress. And\nsuch as troubling us, are not themselves troubled. And such as willingly\nhear or see our disgraces. And such as neglect us in the presence of our\ncompetitors, of those we admire, of those we would have admire us, of\nthose we reverence, and of those that reverence us. And such as should\nhelp us, and neglect it. And such as are in jest, when we are in\nearnest. And such as forget us, or our names.\n\nAn orator therefore must so frame his judge or auditor by his oration,\nas to make him apt to _anger_: and then make his adversary appear such\nas men use to be _angry withal_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n OF RECONCILING, OR PACIFYING ANGER.\n\n_Reconciliation_ is the appeasing of anger.\n\nThose to whom men are easily reconciled, are: such as have not offended\nout of neglect. And such as have done it against their will. And such as\nwish done the contrary of what they have done. And such as have done as\nmuch to themselves. And such as confess and repent. And such as are\nhumbled. And such as do seriously the same things, that they do\nseriously. And such as have done them more good heretofore, than now\nhurt. And such as sue to them for any thing. And such as are not\ninsolent, nor mockers, nor slighters of others in their own disposition.\nAnd generally such as are of a contrary disposition to those whom men\nare usually angry withal. And such as they fear or reverence. And such\nas reverence them. And such as have offended their anger.\n\n_Reconcileable_ are: such as are contrarily affected to those, whom we\nhave said before to be easily angry. And such as play, laugh, make\nmerry, prosper, live in plenty; and, in sum, all that have no cause of\ngrief. And such as have given their anger time.\n\nMen lay down their anger for these causes. Because they have gotten the\nvictory. Because the offender has suffered more than they meant to\ninflict. Because they have been revenged of another. Because they think\nthey suffer justly. And because they think the revenge will not be felt,\nor not known that the revenge was theirs, and for such an injury. And\nbecause the offender is dead.\n\nWhosoever therefore would _assuage_ the anger of his _auditor_, must\nmake himself appear such as men use to be _reconciled_ unto: and beget\nin his _auditor_ such opinions as make him _reconcileable_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n OF LOVE AND FRIENDS.\n\n\nTo _love_ is to will well to another, and that for others, not for our\nown sake.\n\nA _friend_ is he that _loves_, and he that is _beloved_.\n\n_Friends_ one to another, are they that naturally _love_ one another.\n\nA _friend_ therefore is he; that rejoiceth at another\u2019s good. And that\ngrieves at his hurt. And that wishes the same with us to a third,\nwhether good or hurt. And that is _enemy_ or _friend_ to the same man.\n\nWe _love_ them: that have done good to us, or ours; especially if much,\nreadily, or in season. That are our friends' _friends_. That are our\nenemies' _enemies_. That are liberal. That are valiant. That are just.\nAnd that we would have love us. And good companions. And such as can\nabide jests. And such as break jests. And such as praise us, especially\nfor somewhat that we doubt of in ourselves. And such as are neat. And\nsuch as upbraid us not with our vices, or with their own benefits. And\nsuch as quickly forget injuries. And such as least observe our errors.\nAnd such as are not of ill tongue. And those that are ignorant of our\nvices. And such as cross us not when we are busy or angry. And such as\nare officious towards us. And those that are like us. And such as follow\nthe same course or trade of life, where they impeach not one another.\nAnd such as labour for the same thing, when both may be satisfied. And\nsuch as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults, so it be not in\ncontempt of us, and the faults such as the world, rather than their own\nconsciences, condemns. And such as are ashamed to tell us of their very\nfaults. And such as we would have honour us, and not envy, but imitate\nus. And such as we would do good to, except with greater hurt to\nourselves. And such as continue their friendship to the dead. And such\nas speak their mind. And such as are not terrible. And such as we may\nrely on.\n\nThe several _kinds_ of _friendship_, are _society_, _familiarity_,\n_consanguinity_, _affinity_ _&c._\n\nThe things that _beget love_, are, the bestowing of benefits, _gratis_;\n_unasked_; _privately_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n OF ENMITY AND HATRED.\n\nThe _colours_ or _common opinions_ concerning _hatred_, are to be taken\nfrom the _contrary_ of those which concern love and friendship.\n\n_Hatred_ differs from anger in this; that anger regards only what is\ndone to oneself; but _hatred_ not. And in this, that anger regards\nparticulars only; the other, universals also. And in this, that anger is\ncurable; hatred not. And in this, that anger seeks the vexation, hatred\nthe damage, of one\u2019s adversary. That with anger there is always joined\ngrief; with hatred, not always. That anger may at length be satiated;\nbut hatred never.\n\nHence it appears how the judge or auditor may be made _friend_ or\n_enemy_ to us, and how our adversary may be made appear _friend_ or\n_enemy_ to the judge; and how we may answer to our adversary, that would\nmake us appear _enemies_ to him.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n OF FEAR.\n\n_Fear_ is a trouble or vexation of the mind, arising from the\napprehension of an evil at hand, which may hurt or destroy. _Danger_ is\nthe nearness of the evil feared.\n\nThe _things_ to be feared are: such as have power to hurt. And the signs\nof will to do us hurt; as anger and hatred of powerful men. And\ninjustice joined with power. And valour provoked, joined with power. And\nthe fear of powerful men.\n\nThe _men_ that are to be feared, are: such as know our faults. And such\nas can do us injury. And such as think they are injured by us. And such\nas have done us injury. And our competitors in such things as cannot\nsatisfy both. And such as are feared by more powerful men than we are.\nAnd such as have destroyed greater men than we are. And such as use to\ninvade their inferiors. And men not passionate, but dissemblers and\ncrafty, are more to be feared than those that are hasty and free.\n\nThe things _especially_ to be feared, are: such, wherein if we err, the\nerror cannot be repaired; at least, not according to ours, but our\nadversary\u2019s pleasure. And such as admit either none, or not easy help.\nAnd such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pity\nthem.\n\nThey that _fear not_ are: such as expect not evil; or not now; or not\nthis; or not from these. And therefore men fear little in _prosperity_.\nAnd men fear little, that think they have suffered already.\n\nAn orator therefore that would put _fear_ into the auditor, must let him\nsee that he is obnoxious; and that greater than he do suffer and have\nsuffered from those, and at those times, they least thought.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\n OF ASSURANCE.\n\n_Assurance_ is hope, arising from an imagination that the help is near,\nor the evil afar off.\n\nThe things therefore that beget assurance are: the remoteness of those\nthings that are to be feared, and the nearness of their contraries. And\nthe facility of great or many helps or remedies. And neither to have\ndone, nor received injury. And to have no competitors, or not great\nones; or if great ones, at least friends, such as we have obliged, or\nare obliged to. And that the danger is extended to more or greater than\nus.\n\n_Assured_ or _confident_, are: they that have oft escaped danger. And\nthey, to whom most things have succeeded well. And they, that see their\nequals or inferiors not afraid. And they, that have wherewith to make\nthemselves feared; as wealth, strength, &c. And such as have done others\nno wrong. And such as think themselves in good terms with God Almighty.\nAnd such as think they will speed well, that are gone before.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\n OF SHAME.\n\n_Shame_ is a perturbation of the mind arising from the apprehension of\nevil, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a man\u2019s own, or his\nfriends' reputation.\n\nThe things therefore which men are _ashamed of_, are those actions which\nproceed from vice: as to throw away one\u2019s arms, to run away, signs of\ncowardliness. To deny that which is committed to one\u2019s trust, a sign of\ninjustice. To have lain with whom, where, and when, we ought not, signs\nof intemperance. To make gain of small and base things; not to help with\nmoney whom and how much we ought; to receive help from meaner men; to\nask money at use from such as one thinks will borrow of him; to borrow\nof him that expects payment of somewhat before lent; and to re-demand\nwhat one has lent, of him that one thinks will borrow more; and so to\npraise as one may be thought to ask; signs of wretchedness. To praise\none to his face; to praise his virtues too much, and colour his vices;\nsigns of flattery. To be unable to endure such labours as men endure\nthat are elder, tenderer, greater in quality, and of less strength than\nhe; signs of effeminacy. To be beholden often to another; and to upbraid\nthose that are beholden to him; signs of pusillanimity. To speak and\npromise much of one\u2019s self, more than is due; signs of arrogance. To\nwant those things which one\u2019s equals, all or most of them, have attained\nto, is also a thing to be ashamed of. And to suffer things ignominious;\nas to serve about another\u2019s person, or to be employed in his base\nactions.\n\nIn actions of intemperance, whether willingly or unwillingly committed,\nthere is _shame_; in actions of force, only when they are done\nunwillingly.\n\nThe men _before whom_ we are ashamed, are such as we respect: namely,\nthose that admire us. And those whom we desire should admire us. And\nthose whom we admire. Those that contend with us for honour. Those whose\nopinion we contemn not. And therefore men are most ashamed in the\npresence: of old and well bred men. Of those we are always to live with.\nOf those that are not guilty of the same fault. Of those that do not\neasily pardon. And of those that are apt to reveal our faults; such as\nare men injured, backbiters, scoffers, comic poets. And of those before\nwhom we have had always good success. And of those who never asked\nanything of us before. And of such as desire our friendship. And of our\nfamiliars, that know none of our crimes. And of such as will reveal our\nfaults to any of those that are named before.\n\nBut in the presence of such whose judgment most men despise, men are not\nashamed. Therefore we are ashamed also in the presence of those whom we\nreverence. And of those who are concerned in our own, or ancestors', or\nkinsfolk\u2019s, actions or misfortunes, if they be shameful. And of their\nrivals. And of those that are to live with them that know their\ndisgrace.\n\nThe _common opinions_ concerning _impudence_, are taken from the\ncontrary of these.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\n OF GRACE OR FAVOUR.\n\n_Grace_ is that virtue, by which a man is said to do a good turn or to\ndo service to a man in need, not for his own, but for his cause to whom\nhe does it.\n\n_Great_ grace is when the need is great; or when they are hard or\ndifficult things that are conferred; or when the time is seasonable; or\nwhen he that confers the _favour_, is the only or first man that did it.\n\n_Need_ is a desire, joined with grief, for the absence of the thing\ndesired. _Grace_ therefore it is not, if it be done to one that needs\nnot. Whosoever therefore would prove that he has done a _grace_ or\n_favour_, must show that he needeth it to whom it was done.\n\n_Grace_ it is not, which is done by chance. Nor which is done by\nnecessity. Nor which has been requited. Nor that which is done to one\u2019s\nenemy. Nor that which is a trifle. Nor that which is nought, if the\ngiver know the fault.\n\nAnd in this manner a man may go over the predicaments, and examine a\nbenefit, whether it be a _grace_ for being _this_, or for being _so\nmuch_, or for being _such_, or for being _now_, &c.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER X.\n\n OF PITY OR COMPASSION.\n\n_Pity_ is a perturbation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of\nhurt or trouble to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinks\nmay happen to himself or his.\n\nAnd because it appertains to _pity_ to think that he, or his, may fall\ninto the misery he pities in others; it follows that they be _most\ncompassionate_: who have passed through misery. And old men. And weak\nmen. And timorous men. And learned men. And such as have parents, wife\nand children. And such as think there be honest men.\n\nAnd that they are _less compassionate_: who are in great despair. Who\nare in great prosperity. And they that are angry; for they consider not.\nAnd they that are very confident; for they also consider not. And they\nthat are in the act of contumely; for neither do these consider. And\nthey that are astonished with fear. And they that think no man honest.\n\nThe _things_ to be pitied are: such as grieve, and withal hurt. Such as\ndestroy. And calamities of fortune, if they be great: as none or few\nfriends, deformity, weakness, lameness, &c. And evil that arrives where\ngood is expected. And after extreme evil, a little good. And through a\nman\u2019s life to have no good offer itself; or being offered, not to have\nbeen able to enjoy it.\n\n_Men_ to be pitied are: such as are known to us, unless they be so near\nto us, as their hurt be our own. And such as be of our own years. Such\nas are like us in manners. Such as are of the same, or like stock. And\nour equals in dignity. Those that have lately suffered, or are shortly\nto suffer injury: and those that have the marks of injury past. And\nthose that have the words or actions of them that be in present misery.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XI.\n\n OF INDIGNATION.\n\nOpposite in a manner to pity in _good_ men, is _indignation_; which is\ngrief for the prosperity of a man unworthy.\n\nWith _indignation_ there is always joined a joy for the prosperity of a\nman worthy; as _pity_ is always with contentment in the adversity of\nthem that deserve it.\n\nIn _wicked_ men the opposite of pity is _envy_; as also the companion\nthereof, _delight in the harm of_ _others_, which the Greeks in one word\nhave called \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1. But of these in the next chapter.\n\nMen conceive _indignation_ against others, not for their virtues, as\njustice, &c.; for these make men worthy; and in _indignation_ we think\nmen unworthy: but for those goods which men indued with virtue, and\nnoble men, and handsome men are worthy of. And for newly-gotten power\nand riches, rather than for ancient; and especially if by these he has\ngotten other goods, as by riches, command. The reason why we conceive\ngreater _indignation_ against new than ancient riches, is that the\nformer seem to possess that which is none of theirs, but the ancient\nseem to have but their own: for with common people, to have been so\nlong, is to be so by right. And for the bestowing of goods\nincongruously: as when the arms of the most valiant Achilles were\nbestowed on the most eloquent Ulysses. And for the comparison of the\ninferior in the same thing, as when one valiant is compared with a more\nvaliant; or whether absolutely superior, as when a good scholar is\ncompared with a good man.\n\n_Apt_ to indignation are: they that think themselves worthy of the\ngreatest goods, and do possess them. And they that are good. And they\nthat are ambitious. And such as think themselves deserve better what\nanother possesseth, than he that hath it.\n\n_Least apt_ to indignation are, such as are of a poor, servile, and not\nambitious nature.\n\nWho they are, that rejoice or grieve not at the adversity of him that\nsuffers worthily, and in what occasions, may be gathered from the\ncontrary of what has been already said.\n\nWhoever therefore would turn away the _compassion_ of the judge, he must\nmake him apt to _indignation_; and shew that his adversary is unworthy\nof the good, and worthy of the evil which happens to him.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XII.\n\n OF ENVY.\n\n_Envy_ is grief for the prosperity of such as ourselves, arising not\nfrom any hurt that we, but from the good that they receive.\n\nSuch as ourselves, I call those that are equal to us in blood, in age,\nin abilities, in glory, or in means.\n\nThey are apt to _envy_: that are within a little of the highest. And\nthose that are extraordinarily honoured for some quality that is\nsingular in them, especially wisdom or good fortune. And such as would\nbe thought wise. And such as catch at glory in every action. And men of\npoor spirits; for every thing appears great to them.\n\nThe _things_ which men envy in others are: such as bring glory. And\ngoods of fortune. And such things as we desire for ourselves. And things\nin the possession whereof we exceed others, or they us, a little.\n\nObnoxious to _envy_ are: men of our own time, of our own country, of our\nown age, and competitors of our glory; and therefore, those whom we\nstrive with for honour. And those that covet the same things that we do.\nAnd those that get quickly, what we hardly obtain, or not at all. And\nthose that attain unto, or do the things that turn to our reproach, not\nbeing done by us. And those that possess what we have possessed\nheretofore; so old and decayed men envy the young and lusty. And those\nthat have bestowed little, are subject to be envied by such as have\nbestowed much upon the same thing.\n\nFrom the contraries of these may be derived the principles concerning\njoy for other men\u2019s hurt.\n\nHe therefore that would not have his enemy prevail, when he craves\n_pity_ or other favour, must dispose the judge to _envy_; and make his\nadversary appear such as are above described to be subject to the _envy_\nof others.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII.\n\n OF EMULATION.\n\n_Emulation_ is grief arising from that our equals possess such goods as\nare had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not; not\nbecause they have them, but because not we also. No man therefore\n_emulates_ another in things whereof himself is not capable.\n\nApt to _emulate_ are: such as esteem themselves worthy of more than they\nhave. And young and magnanimous men. And such as already possess the\ngoods for which men are honoured: for they measure their worth by their\nhaving. And those that are esteemed worthy by others. And those whose\nancestors, kindred, familiars, nation, city, have been eminent for some\ngood, do _emulate_ others for that good.\n\n_Objects_ of emulation are, for _things_; virtues. And things whereby we\nmay profit others. And things whereby we may please others.\n\nFor _persons_: they that possess such things. And such as many desire to\nbe friends or acquainted with, or like unto. And they whose praises fly\nabroad.\n\nThe contrary of _emulation_ is _contempt_. And they that _emulate_ such\nas have the goods aforementioned, _contemn_ such as have them not. And\nthence it is, that men who live happily enough, unless they have the\ngoods which men honour, are nevertheless _contemned_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XIV.\n\n OF THE MANNERS OF YOUTH.\n\nOf _passions_ we have already spoken. We are next to speak of _manners_.\n\n_Manners_ are distinguished by _passions_, _habits_, _ages_, and\n_fortunes_.\n\nWhat kind of _manners_ proceed from _passions_, and from _virtues_ and\n_vices_, which are _habits_, hath been already shewed. There remains to\nbe spoken of the _manners_ that are peculiar to several _ages_ and\n_fortunes_.\n\nThe _ages_ are _youth_, _middle-age_, _old age_. And first of _youth_.\n\n_Young men_ are: violent in their desires. Prompt to execute their\ndesires. Incontinent. Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired\nbefore. Longing mightily, and soon satisfied. Apt to anger, and in their\nanger violent; and ready to execute their anger with their hands. Lovers\nof honour and of victory more than money, as having not been yet in\nwant. Well-natured, as having not been acquainted with much malice. Full\nof hope, both because they have not yet been often frustrated, and\nbecause they have by natural heat that disposition that other ages have\nby wine; youth being a kind of natural drunkenness; besides, hope is of\nthe time to come, whereof youth hath much, but of the time past little.\nCredulous, because not yet often deceived. Easily deceived, because full\nof hope. Valiant, because apt to anger and full of hope; whereof this\nbegets confidence, the other keeps off fear. Bashful, because they\nestimate the honour of actions by the precepts of the law. Magnanimous,\nbecause not yet dejected by the misfortunes of human life. And lovers of\nhonour more than of profit, because they live more by custom than by\nreason; and by reason we acquire profit, but virtue by custom. Lovers of\ntheir friends and companions. Apt to err in the excess rather than the\ndefect, contrary to that precept of Chilon, _Ne quid nimis_; for they\noverdo every thing: they love too much and hate too much; because\nthinking themselves wise, they are obstinate in the opinion they have\nonce delivered. Doers of injury, rather for contumely than for damage.\nMerciful, because, measuring others by their own innocence, they think\nthem better than they be, and therefore less to merit what they suffer;\nwhich is a cause of pity. And lovers of mirth, and by consequence such\nas love to jest at others.\n\n_Jesting_ is witty contumely.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XV.\n\n OF THE MANNERS OF OLD MEN.\n\nThe manners of _old_ men are in a manner the contraries of those of\n_youth_. They determine nothing. They do everything less vehemently than\nis fit. They never say, they know; but to everything they say, perhaps\nand peradventure; which comes to pass from that, having lived long, they\nhave often mistaken and been deceived. They are peevish, because they\ninterpret everything to the worst. And suspicious through incredulity,\nand incredulous by reason of their experience. They love and hate, as if\nthey meant to continue in neither. Are of poor spirits, as having been\nhumbled by the chances of life. And covetous, as knowing how easy it is\nto lose, and how hard to get. And timorous, as having been cooled by\nyears. And greedy of life; for good things seem greater by the want of\nthem. And lovers of themselves, out of pusillanimity. And seek profit\nmore than honour, because they love themselves; and profit is among the\ngoods that are not simply good, but good for one\u2019s self. And without\nbashfulness, because they despise seeming. And hope little; knowing by\nexperience that many times good counsel has been followed with ill\nevent; and because also they be timorous. And live by memory rather than\nhope; for memory is of the time past, whereof old men have good store.\nAnd are full of talk, because they delight in their memory. And vehement\nin their anger, but not stout enough to execute it. They have weak or no\ndesires, and thence seem temperate. They are slaves to gain. And live\nmore by reason than custom; because reason leads to profit, as custom to\nthat which is honourable. And do injury to endamage, and not in\ncontumely. And are merciful by compassion, or imagination of the same\nevils in themselves; which is a kind of infirmity, and not humanity, as\nin _young men_, proceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer\nevil. And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not far from evil\nbecause of their infirmity.\n\nSeeing then every man loves such men and their discourses which are most\nagreeable to their own manners; it is not hard to collect, how the\norator and his oration may be made acceptable to the hearer, whether\n_young_ or _old_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XVI.\n\n OF THE MANNERS OF MIDDLE-AGED MEN.\n\nThe manners of _middle-aged_ men, are between those of _youth_ and _old\nmen_. And therefore they neither dare, nor fear too much; but both as is\nfit. They neither believe all, nor reject all; but judge. They seek not\nonly what is honourable, nor only what is profitable; but both. They are\nneither covetous, nor prodigal; but in the mean. They are neither easily\nangry, nor yet stupid; but between both. They are valiant and withal\ntemperate.\n\nAnd in general, whatsoever is divided in _youth_ and _old men_, is\ncompounded in _middle-age_. And whereof the excess or defect is in\n_youth_ or _old men_, the mediocrity is in those of _middle-age_.\n\nMiddle-age for the _body_, I call the time from thirty to five and\nthirty years: for the _mind_, the nine-and-fortieth, or thereabouts.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XVII.\n\n OF THE MANNERS OF THE NOBILITY.\n\nOf manners that proceed from the several _ages_ we have already spoken.\nWe are next to speak of those that rise from several _fortunes_.\n\nThe manners of the _nobility_ are: to be ambitious. To undervalue their\nancestors' equals; for the goods of fortune seem the more precious for\ntheir antiquity.\n\n_Nobility_ is the virtue of a stock. And _generosity_, is not to\ndegenerate from the virtue of his stock. For as in plants, so in the\nraces of men, there is a certain progress; and they grow better and\nbetter to a certain point; and change, viz. subtile wits into madness,\nand staid wits into stupidity and blockishness.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XVIII.\n\n OF THE MANNERS OF THE RICH.\n\n_Rich_ men are contumelious, and proud; this they have from their\nriches; for seeing everything may be had for money, having money they\nthink they have all that is good. And effeminate: because they have\nwherewithal to subminister to their lust. And boasters of their wealth,\nand speak in high terms foolishly; for men willingly talk of what they\nlove and admire, and think others affect the same that they do; and the\ntruth is, all sorts of men submit to the rich. And think themselves\nworthy to command, having that by which men attain command. And in\ngeneral they have the manners of fortunate fools. They do injury, with\nintention not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through\nincontinence.\n\nThere is a difference between _new_ and _ancient_ riches. For they that\nare _newly_ come to wealth, have the same faults in a greater degree;\nfor _new riches_ are a kind of rudeness and apprenticeship of _riches_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XIX.\n\n OF THE MANNERS OF MEN IN POWER, AND OF SUCH AS PROSPER.\n\nThe manners of men _in power_, are the same, or better than those of the\n_rich_. They have a greater sense of honour than the rich, and their\nmanners are more manly. They are more industrious than the rich, for\n_power_ is sustained by industry. They are grave, but without\naustereness; for being in place conspicuous, they carry themselves the\nmore modestly; and have a kind of gentle and comely gravity, which the\n_Greeks_ call \u03c3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2. When they do injuries, they do great ones.\n\nThe manners of men that _prosper_, are compounded of the manners of the\n_nobility_, the _rich_, and those that are _in power_; for to some of\nthese all _prosperity_ appertains.\n\n_Prosperity_ in children, and goods of the body, make men desire to\nexceed others in the goods of fortune.\n\nMen that _prosper_ have this ill; to be more proud and inconsiderate\nthan others. And this good; that they worship God, trusting in him, for\nthat they find themselves to receive more good than proceeds from their\nindustry.\n\nThe manners of _poor_ men, _obscure_ men, men _without power_, and men\n_in adversity_, may be collected from the contrary of what has been\nsaid.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XX.\n\nCOMMON PLACES OR PRINCIPLES CONCERNING WHAT MAY BE DONE, WHAT HAS BEEN\n DONE, AND WHAT SHALL BE DONE; OR OF FACT POSSIBLE, PAST AND FUTURE.\n ALSO OF GREAT AND LITTLE.\n\nWe have hitherto set down such _principles_ as are peculiar to several\nkinds of orations. Now we are to speak of such _places_ as are _common_\nto them all; as these: _possible_, _done_, or _past_, _future_, _great_,\n_small_.\n\n_Possible_ is that: the contrary whereof is possible. And the like\nwhereof is possible. And than which some harder thing is possible. And\nthe beginning whereof is possible. And the end whereof is possible. And\nthe usual consequent whereof is possible. And whatsoever we desire. And\nthe beginning whereof is in the power of those whom we can either compel\nor persuade. And part whereof is possible. And part of the whole that is\npossible. And the general, if a particular. And a particular, if the\ngeneral. And of relatives, if one, the other. And that which without art\nand industry is possible, is much more so with art and industry. And\nthat which is possible to worse, weaker, and more unskilful men, is much\nmore so to better, stronger, and more skilful.\n\nThe principles concerning _impossible_ are the contraries of these.\n\nThat _has been done_: than which a harder thing has been done. And the\nconsequent whereof has been done. And that which being possible, he had\na will to do, and nothing hindered. And that which was possible to him\nin his anger. And that which he longed to do. And that which was before\nupon the point of doing. And whose antecedent has been done; or that for\nwhich it uses to be done. And if that for whose cause we do this, then\nthis.\n\nThe principles concerning _not done_ are the contraries of these.\n\nThat _shall be done_: which some man can, and means to do. And which\nsome man can, and desires to do. And which is in the way, and upon the\npoint to be done. And the antecedents whereof are past. And the motive\nwhereof is past.\n\nOf _great_ and _small_, _more_ and _less_, see Chapter VII. of Book I.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XXI.\n\n OF EXAMPLE, SIMILITUDE, AND FABLES.\n\nOf the _principles_, both general and special, from whence _proofs_ are\nto be drawn, has been already spoken. Now follow the _proofs_\nthemselves, which are _examples_ or _enthymemes_.\n\nAn _example_, is either an example _properly so called_, as some action\npast; or a _similitude_, which also is called a parable; or a _fable_,\nwhich contains some action feigned.\n\nAn example, _properly so called_, is this: _Darius came not into Greece\ntill he had first subdued Egypt; Xerxes also conquered Egypt first; then\nafterwards crossed the Hellespont; we ought therefore to hinder the King\nof Persia from conquering Egypt_.\n\nA _similitude_, or _parable_, is such as followeth: _They who choose\ntheir magistrates by lot, are like them that choose for their champions\nthose on whom the lot shall fall, rather than those who have the\ngreatest strength; and for their pilot, not him that hath skill, but him\nwhose name is drawn out of the urn_.\n\nA _fable_ is in this manner: _The horse desiring to drive out the stag\nfrom his common pasture, took a man to assist him; and having received\ninto his mouth a bridle, and a rider upon his back, obtained his intent,\nbut became subject to the man. So you of Himera, having, in hope to be\nrevenged of your enemies, given unto Phalaris sovereign authority, that\nis to say, taken a bridle into your mouths; if you shall also give him a\nguard to his person, that is, let him get up upon your backs, you become\nhis slaves presently, past recovery._\n\nTo find out _examples_, that is, actions done that may serve our\npurpose, is therefore hard, because not in our power. But to find\n_fables_ and _similitudes_, is easier; because, by conversing in\nphilosophy, a man may feign somewhat in nature like to the case in hand.\n\n_Examples_, _similitudes_, and _fables_, where _enthymemes_ are wanting,\nmay serve us in the beginning of an oration for inductions; otherwise\nare to be alleged after enthymemes, for testimonies.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XXII.\n\n OF A SENTENCE.\n\nA _sentence_ is an universal proposition concerning those things which\nare to be desired or avoided in the actions or passions of the common\nlife. As, _A wise man will not suffer his children to be over-learned_.\nAnd is to an _enthymeme_ in _rhetoric_, as any proposition is to a\n_syllogism_ in _logic_. And therefore a _sentence_, if the reason be\nrendered, becomes a _conclusion_; and both together make an _enthymeme_.\nAs for example: _To be over-learned, besides that it begets effeminacy,\nprocures envy. Therefore he that is wise will not suffer his children to\nbe over-learned._\n\nOf _sentences_ there be four sorts. For they either require proofs or\nnot, that is, are manifest or not.\n\nSuch as are manifest, are either so as soon as they are uttered; as,\n_Health is a great good_. Or as soon as they are considered; as, _Men\nuse to hate whom they have hurt_.\n\nSuch as are not manifest, are either conclusions of _enthymemes_; as,\n_He that is wise will not suffer his children, &c._ Or else are\n_enthymematical_; that is, have in themselves the force of an\n_enthymeme_; as _Mortal men ought not to carry immortal anger_.\n\nA _sentence_ not manifest, ought to be either _inferred_ or _confirmed_.\n_Inferred_ thus: _It is not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be\nenvied by one\u2019s fellow-citizens. A wise man, therefore, will not have\nhis children over-learned._ _Confirmed_ thus: _A wise man will not have\nhis children over-learned; seeing too much learning both softens a man\u2019s\nmind, and procures him envy among his fellow-citizens_.\n\nIf a reason be added to a manifest _sentence_, let it be short.\n\n_Sentences_ become not every man; but only old men, and such as be\nwell-versed in business. For to hear a young man speak sentences, is\nridiculous; and to hear an ignorant man speak sentences, is absurd.\n\n_Sentences_ generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought not\nto be neglected; because they pass for truths. And yet they may be\ndenied, when any laudable custom or humour may thereby be made appear in\nthe denier.\n\nThe commodities of _sentences_, are two. One proceeding from the vanity\nof the hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he\nhas found for true only in some particular; and therefore a man ought to\nconsider in every thing what opinion the hearer holds. Another is, that\nsentences do discover the manners and disposition of the speaker; so\nthat if they be esteemed good sentences, he shall be esteemed a good\nman; and if evil, an evil man.\n\nThus much of _sentences_, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be\nused; whom they become; and what is their profit.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XXIII.\n\n OF THE INVENTION OF ENTHYMEMES.\n\nSeeing an enthymeme differs from a logical syllogism, in that it neither\nconcludes out of every thing, nor out of remote principles; the _places_\nof it, from whence a man may argue, ought to be certain and determinate.\n\nAnd because whosoever makes a _syllogism_, rhetorical or other, should\nknow all or the most part of that which is in question; as, whosoever is\nto advise the Athenians in the question, whether they are to make war or\nno, must know what their revenues be, what and what kind of power they\nhave: and he that will praise them, must know their acts at Salamis,\nMarathon, &c.: it will be necessary for a good speaker to have in\nreadiness the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may\nspeak of.\n\nHe that is to speak _ex tempore_, must comprehend in his speech as much\nas he can of what is most _proper_ in the matter in hand.\n\n_Proper_, I call those things which are least common to others: as, he\nthat will praise Achilles, is not to declare such things as are common\nboth to him and Diomedes; as that he was a prince, and warred against\nthe Trojans: but such things as are proper only to Achilles; as that he\nkilled Hector and Cygnus; went to the war young and voluntary.\n\nLet this therefore be one general _place; from that which is proper_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XXIV.\n\n OF THE PLACES OF ENTHYMEMES OSTENSIVE.\n\nForasmuch as enthymemes either infer truly, or seem only so to do; and\nthey which do infer indeed, be either _ostensive_, or such as bring a\nman to some _impossibility_; we will first set down the places of\nenthymemes _ostensive_.\n\nAn _ostensive_ enthymeme is, wherein a man concludes the question from\nsomewhat granted.\n\nThat enthymeme which brings a man to an _impossibility_, is an enthymeme\nwherein from that which the adversary maintaineth, we conclude that\nwhich is manifestly _impossible_.\n\nAll _places_ have been already set down in a manner in the precedent\npropositions of _good_, _evil_, _just_, _unjust_, _honourable_, and\n_dishonourable_: namely, they have been set down as applied to\n_particular_ subjects, or in _concrete_. Here they are to be set down in\nanother manner; namely in the _abstract_ or _universal_.\n\nThe first _place_, then, let be from _contraries_; which in the\n_concrete_ or particulars is exemplified thus. _If intemperance be\nhurtful, temperance is profitable: and if intemperance be not hurtful,\nneither is temperance profitable._\n\nAnother _place_ may be from _cognomination_, or affinity of words: as in\nthis particular. _If what is just, be good; then what is justly, is\nwell: but justly to die, is not well: therefore not all that is just, is\ngood._\n\nA third from _relatives_; as, _This man has justly done, therefore the\nother has justly suffered._ But this _place_ sometimes deceives; for a\nman may suffer _justly_, yet not from _him_.\n\nA fourth from _comparison_, three ways.\n\nFrom the _great to the less_; as, _He has stricken his father; and\ntherefore this man._\n\nFrom the _less to the greater_: as, _The Gods know not all things; much\nless man._\n\nFrom _equality_: as, _If captains be not always the worse esteemed for\nlosing a victory; why should sophisters?_\n\nAnother from the time: as Philip to the Thebans: _If I had required to\npass through your country with my army, before I had aided you against\nthe Phoc\u00e6ans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is\nabsurd therefore to deny it me now, after I have trusted you._\n\nA sixth from _what the adversary says of himself_: as, _Iphicrates asked\nAristophon, whether he would take a bribe to betray the army; and he\nanswering no; What, says he, is it likely that Iphicrates would betray\nthe army, and Aristophon not?_\n\nThis _place_ would be ridiculous, where the _defendant_ were not in much\nmore estimation than the _accuser_.\n\nA seventh from the _definition_; as that of Socrates; _A spirit is\neither God, or the creature of God; and therefore he denies not that\nthere is a God, that confesses there are spirits_.\n\nAn eighth from the _distinction of an ambiguous word_.\n\nA ninth from _division_: as, _If all men do what they do for one of\nthree causes, whereof two are impossible; and the accuser charge not the\ndefendant with the third; it follows that he has not done it_.\n\nA tenth from _induction_: as, _At Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, &c.; and\ntherefore every where_.\n\nAn eleventh from _authority_, or precedent sentence; as that of Sappho,\nthat _Death is evil; for that the gods have judged it so, in excepting\nthemselves from mortality_.\n\nA twelfth from the _consequence_; as, _It is not good to be envied;\ntherefore neither to be learned. It is good to be wise, therefore also\nto be instructed._\n\nA thirteenth from _two contrary consequences_; as, _It is not good to be\nan orator; because if he speak the truth, he shall displease men, if he\nspeak falsely, he shall displease God_.\n\nHere is to be noted, that sometimes this argument may be retorted: as\nthus, _If you speak truth, you shall please God; if you speak untruth,\nyou shall please men; therefore by all means be an orator_.\n\nA fourteenth from the _quality that men have to praise one thing and\napprove another_: as, _We ought not to war against the Athenians upon no\nprecedent injury; for all men discommend injustice_. Again, _We ought to\nwar against the Athenians; for otherwise our liberty is at their mercy,\nthat is, is no liberty: but the preservation of liberty is a thing that\nall men will approve_.\n\nA fifteenth from _proportion_: as, _Seeing we naturalize strangers for\ntheir virtues, why should we not banish this stranger for his vices?_\n\nA sixteenth from _the similitude of consequents_: as _He that denies the\nimmortality of the gods, is no worse than he that has written the\ngeneration of the gods: for the same consequence follows of both, that\nsometimes there are none_.\n\nA seventeenth from that, _that men change their mind_: as, _If when we\nwere in banishment, we fought to recover our country, why should we not\nfight now to retain it?_\n\nAn eighteenth from _a feigned end_: as that _Diomedes chose Ulysses to\ngo with him, not as more valiant than another, but as one that would\npartake less of the glory_.\n\nA nineteenth from the _cause_; as if he would infer he did it from this,\n_that he had cause to do it_.\n\nA twentieth from _that which is incredible, but true_: as that _laws may\nneed a law to mend them, as well as fish bred in the salt water may need\nsalting_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XXV.\n\n OF THE PLACES OF ENTHYMEMES THAT LEAD TO\n\n IMPOSSIBILITY.\n\nLet the first place be from inspection of _times_, _actions_, or\n_words_, either of the adversary, or of the speaker, or both. Of the\nadversary: as, _He says he loves the people, and yet he was in the\nconspiracy of the Thirty_. Of the speaker; as, _He says I am\ncontentious, and yet I never began suit_. Of both; as, _He never\nconferred any thing to the benefit of the commonwealth; whereas I have\nransomed divers citizens with mine own money_.\n\nA second is from _shewing the cause which seemed amiss_, and serves for\nmen of good reputation that are accused; as, The mother that was accused\nof incest for being seen embracing her son, was absolved as soon as she\nmade appear that she embraced him upon his arrival from far by way of\nsalutation.\n\nA third, from _rendering of the cause_; as, Leodamas, to whom it was\nobjected, that he had, under the thirty tyrants, defaced the\ninscription, which the people had set up in a pillar, of his ignominy;\nanswered, _He had not done it; because it would have been more to his\ncommodity to let it stand; thereby to endear himself to the tyrants by\nthe testimony of the people\u2019s hatred_.\n\nA fourth from _better counsel_; as _He might have done better for\nhimself, therefore he did not this_. But this place deceives, when the\n_better counsel_ comes to mind after the fact.\n\nA fifth from _the incompatibility of the things to be done_; as, They\nthat did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the\nfuneral of Leucothea, were told that, _if they thought her a goddess,\nthey ought not to mourn; and if they thought her a mortal, they ought\nnot to sacrifice_.\n\nA sixth (which is proper to judicial orations) from an _inference of\nerror_; as, _If he did it not, he was not wise; therefore he did it_.\n\nEnthymemes that lead to _impossibility_, please more than _ostensive_.\nFor they compare and put contraries together, whereby they are the\nbetter set off and more conspicuous to the auditor.\n\nOf all enthymemes, they be best which we assent to as soon as hear. For\nsuch consent pleaseth us, and makes us favourable to the speaker.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XXVI.\n\n OF THE PLACES OF SEEMING ENTHYMEMES.\n\nOf _seeming_ enthymemes, one place may be from _the form of speaking_.\nAs when a man has repeated divers sentences, he brings in his conclusion\nas if it followed necessarily, though it do not.\n\nA second from _an ambiguous word_.\n\nA third from that which is _true, divided_, to that which is _false,\njoined_; as that of Orestes, _It was justice that I should revenge my\nfather\u2019s death, and it was justice my mother should die for killing my\nfather: therefore I justly killed my mother_. Or from that which is\n_true, joined_, to that which is _false, divided_; as, _one cup of wine,\nand one cup of wine, are hurtful; therefore one cup of wine is hurtful_.\n\nA fourth, from _amplification of the crime_. For neither is the\n_defendant_ likely to have committed the crime he _amplifies_; nor does\nthe _accuser_ seem, when he is passionate, to want ground for his\naccusation.\n\nA fifth from _signs_; as, when a man concludes the doing of the fact\nfrom the manner of his life.\n\nA sixth from _that which comes by chance_. As if from this, that the\ntyranny of Hipparchus came to be overthrown from the love of\nAristogeiton to Harmodius, a man should conclude that in a free\ncommonwealth loving of boys were profitable.\n\nA seventh from the _consequence_; as, _Banishment is to be desired,\nbecause a banished man has choice of places to dwell in_.\n\nAn eighth from _making that the cause which is not_; as, _In\nDemosthenes' government the war began; therefore Demosthenes governed\nwell. With the Peloponnesian war began the plague, therefore Pericles,\nthat persuaded that war, did ill._\n\nA ninth from _the omission of some circumstance_; as, _Helen did what\nwas lawful when she ran away with Paris, because she had her father\u2019s\nconsent to choose her own husband_; which was true only during the time\nthat she had not chosen.\n\nA tenth from that which is _probable_, in _some case_, to that which is\n_probable simply_; as, _It is probable he foresaw that if he did it he\nshould be suspected; therefore it is probable he did it not_. From this\nplace one may infer both ways that _he did it not_. For if he be not\nlikely to do it, it may be thought _he did it not_: again, if he were\nlikely to do it, it may be thought _he did it not_, for this, _that he\nknew he should be suspected_.\n\nUpon this place was grounded the art which was so much detested in\nProtagoras, of making the better cause seem the worse, and the worse the\nbetter.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XXVII.\n\n OF THE WAYS TO ANSWER THE ARGUMENTS OF THE ADVERSARY.\n\nAn _argument_ is answered by an _opposite syllogism_, or by an\n_objection_.\n\nThe places of _opposite syllogisms_ are the same with the places of\nsyllogisms, or enthymemes; for a rhetorical syllogism is an enthymeme.\n\nThe places of _objections_ are four.\n\nFirst, from _the same_. As, to the adversary that proves love to be good\nby an enthymeme, may be _objected_, that, _No want is good, and yet love\nis want_; or particularly thus, _The love of Myrrha to her father was\nnot good_.\n\nThe second from _contraries_. As, if the adversary say, _A good man does\ngood to his friends_, an _objection_ might be made, that then _an evil\nman will do also evil to his friends_.\n\nThe third from _similitude_. As thus, if the adversary say, all men that\nare injured do hate those that have injured them, it may be _objected_,\nthat then _all men that had received benefits should love their\nbenefactors_, that is to say, be grateful.\n\nThe fourth from the _authority of famous men_. As when a man shall say,\nthat drunken men ought to be pardoned those acts they do in their\ndrunkenness, because they know not what they do; the _objection_ may be,\nthat _Pittacus was of another mind, that appointed for such acts a\ndouble punishment; one for the act, another for the drunkenness_.\n\nAnd forasmuch as all enthymemes are drawn from _probability_, or\n_example_, or from a _sign fallible_, or from a _sign infallible_: an\nenthymeme from _probability_ may be confuted _really_, by showing that\nfor the most part it falls out otherwise; but _apparently_ or\n_sophistically_, by showing only that it does not fall out so always;\nwhereupon the judge thinks the _probability_ not sufficient to ground\nhis sentence upon. The reason whereof is this, that the judge, while he\nhears the fact proved _probable_, conceives it as true. For the\nunderstanding has no object but _truth_. And therefore, by-and-by, when\nhe shall hear _an instance_ to the contrary, and thereby find that he\nhad no necessity to think it _true_, presently changes his opinion, and\nthinks it _false_, and consequently not so much as _probable_. For he\ncannot at one time think the same thing both _probable_ and _false_; and\nhe that says a thing is _probable_, the meaning is, he thinks it _true_,\nbut finds not arguments enough to prove it.\n\nAn enthymeme, from a _fallible sign_, is answered by _showing_ the sign\nto be fallible.\n\nAn enthymeme from an _example_, is answered as an enthymeme from\n_probability_; _really_ by showing _more examples_ to the contrary;\n_apparently_, if he bring _examples_ enough to make it seem _not\nnecessary_.\n\nIf the adversary have more examples than we, we must make it appear that\nthey are not applicable to the case.\n\nAn enthymeme from an _infallible_ sign, if the proposition be _true_, is\nunanswerable.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XXVIII.\n\nAMPLIFICATION AND EXTENUATION ARE NOT COMMON PLACES. ENTHYMEMES, BY\n WHICH ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED, ARE THE SAME WITH THOSE BY WHICH THE\n MATTER IN QUESTION IS PROVED OR DISPROVED. OBJECTIONS ARE NOT\n ENTHYMEMES.\n\nThe first, that _amplification_ and _extenuation_ are not _common\nplaces_, appears by this, that amplification and extenuation do prove a\nfact to be _great_ or _little_; and are therefore enthymemes to be\n_drawn from_ common places, and therefore are not the _places_\nthemselves.\n\nThe second, that enthymemes, by which arguments are answered, are of the\nsame kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is\nmanifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was proved by\nthe other.\n\nThe third, that an _objection_ is no _enthymeme_, is apparent by this,\nthat an _objection_ is no more but an _opinion_, _example_, or other\n_instance_, produced to make appear that the adversary\u2019s argument does\nnot conclude.\n\nThus much of _examples_, _sentences_, _enthymemes_, and generally of all\nthings that belong to _argumentation_; from what _places_ they may be\ndrawn or answered.\n\nThere remain _elocution_ and _disposition_ to be spoken of in the next\nbook.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK III.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n OF THE ORIGINAL OF ELOCUTION AND PRONUNCIATION.\n\nThree things being necessary to an oration, namely _proof_, _elocution_,\nand _disposition_; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the\nother two in that which follows.\n\nAs for _action_ or _pronunciation_, so much as is necessary for an\norator may be fetched out of the book of the _Art of Poetry_, in which\nwe have treated of the _action_ of the _stage_. For _tragedians_ were\nthe first that invented such _action_, and that but of late; and it\nconsisteth in governing well the _magnitude_, _tone_, and _measure_ of\nthe _voice_; a thing less subject to _art_, than is either _proof_ or\n_elocution_.\n\nAnd yet there have been rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as\nserve for _poetry_. But _oratorical action_ has not been hitherto\nreduced to _art_. And _orators_ in the beginning, when they saw that the\n_poets_ in barren and feigned arguments nevertheless attained great\nreputation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice or connexion of\nwords, fell into a style, by imitation of them, approaching to verse,\nand made choice of words. But when the _poets_ changed their style, and\nlaid by all words that were not in common use, the _orators_ did the\nsame, and lighted at last upon words and a government of the voice and\nmeasures proper to themselves.\n\nSeeing therefore _pronunciation_ or _action_ are in some degree\nnecessary also for an _orator_, the precepts thereof are to be fetched\nfrom the _Art of Poetry_.\n\nIn the meantime this may be one general rule. If the _words_, _tone_,\n_greatness_ of the voice, _gesture_ of the body and countenance, seem to\nproceed all from one passion, then it is well pronounced. Otherwise not.\nFor when there appear more passions than one at once, the mind of the\nspeaker appears unnatural and distracted. Otherwise, as the mind of the\nspeaker, so the mind of the hearer always.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n OF THE CHOICE OF WORDS AND EPITHETS.\n\nThe virtues of a _word_ are two; the first, that it be _perspicuous_;\nthe second, that it be _decent_, that is, neither _above_ nor _below_\nthe thing signified, or, neither too humble nor too fine.\n\n_Perspicuous_ are all words that be _proper_.\n\n_Fine_ words are those, that are _borrowed_, or _translated_ from other\nsignifications; of which in the _Art of Poetry_.\n\nThe reason why _borrowed_ words please, is this. Men are affected with\n_words_, as they are with _men_; admiring in both that which is\n_foreign_ and _new_.\n\nTo make a _poem_ graceful, many things help; but few an _oration_. For\nto a _poet_ it sufficeth, with what _words_ he can, to set out his\n_poem_. But an _orator_ must not only do that, but also seem not to do\nit: for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he\nthinks; and thereby be the less believed; whereas _belief_ is the scope\nof his oration.\n\nThe _words_ that an _orator_ ought to use are of three sorts; _proper_,\nsuch as are _received_, and _metaphors_.\n\n_Words_ taken from foreign languages, words compounded, and words new\ncoined, are seldom to be used.\n\n_Synonymes_ belong to _poets_, and _equivocal_ words to _sophisters_.\n\nAn orator if he use _proper_ words, and _received_ and _good metaphors_,\nshall both make his oration _beautiful_, and not seem to intend it; and\nshall speak _perspicuously_. For in a _metaphor_ alone there is\n_perspicuity_, _novity_, and _sweetness_.\n\nConcerning _metaphors_ the rules are these:\n\n1. He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his _metaphor_\nfrom somewhat that is better. As for example, let him call a _crime_ an\n_error_. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him\ndraw his _metaphor_ from somewhat worse; as, calling _error_, _crime_.\n\n2. A _metaphor_ ought not to be so far-fetched, as that the similitude\nmay not easily appear.\n\n3. A _metaphor_ ought to be drawn from the noblest things; as the\n_poets_ do, that choose rather to say _rosy-fingered_, than\n_red-fingered Aurora_.\n\nIn like manner the rule of _epithets_ is, that he that will adorn,\nshould use those of the better sort; and he that will disgrace, should\nuse those of the worse. As Simonides being to write an _ode_ in honour\nof the victory gotten in a course by certain mules, being not well paid,\ncalled them by their name, \u1f29\u03bc\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, that signifies their propinquity to\nasses: but having received a greater reward, styles them the _sons of\nswift-footed coursers_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n OF THE THINGS THAT MAKE AN ORATION FLAT.\n\nThe things that make an oration _flat_ or _insipid_, are four:\n\n1. _Words compounded._ And yet a man may compound a word, when the\ncomposition is necessary for want of a simple word, and easy, and seldom\nused.\n\n2. _Foreign words._ As for example, such as are newly derived from the\nLatin; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are\nforeign in another language: and yet these may be used, so it be\nmoderately.\n\n3. _Long_, _impertinent_, and _often epithets_.\n\n4. _Metaphors indecent_ and _obscure_. _Obscure_ they are, when they are\nfar-fetched. _Indecent_, when they are _ridiculous_, as in _comedies_;\nor _too grave_, as in _tragedies_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n OF A SIMILITUDE.\n\nA _similitude_ differs from a _metaphor_ only by such particles of\ncomparison as these; _as_; _even_ _as_; _so_; _even so_, &c.\n\nA _similitude_ therefore is a _metaphor dilated_; and a _metaphor_ is a\n_similitude contracted_ into one word.\n\nA _similitude_ does well in an oration, so it be not too frequent; for\nit is poetical.\n\nAn example of the _similitude_, is this of Pericles, that said in his\noration, _that the B\u0153otians were like so many oaks in a wood, that did\nnothing but beat one another_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n OF THE PURITY OF LANGUAGE.\n\nFour things are necessary to make language pure.\n\n1. The right rendering of those _particles_, which some antecedent\n_particle_ does require; as to a _not only_, a _not also_; and then they\nare rendered right, when they are not suspended too long.\n\n2. _The use of proper words_, rather than _circumlocutions_; unless\nthere be motive to make one do it of purpose.\n\n3. That there be nothing of _double construction_, unless there be cause\nto do it of purpose; as the prophets of the heathen, who speak in\ngeneral terms, to the end they may the better maintain the truth of\ntheir prophecies; which is easier maintained in _generals_, than in\n_particulars_. For it is easier to divine whether a number be _even_ or\n_odd_, than _how many_; and that a thing _will be_, than _what_ it will\nbe.\n\n4. Concordance of gender, number, and person; as not to say _him_ for\n_her_, _man_ for _men_, _hath_ for _have_.\n\nIn sum, a man\u2019s language ought to be easy for another to read,\npronounce, and point.\n\nBesides, to divers _antecedents_, let divers _relatives_, or one common\nto them all, be correspondent; as, he _saw_ the colour, he _heard_ the\nsound; or he _perceived_ both colour and sound: but by no means, _he\nheard or saw_ both.\n\nLastly, that which is to be interposed by _parenthesis_, let it be done\nquickly: as, _I purposed, having spoken to him_ (_to this, and to this\npurpose_), _afterward to be gone_. For to put it off thus; _I resolved,\nafter I had spoken to him, to be gone; but the subject of my speech was\nto this and this purpose_; is vicious.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n OF THE AMPLITUDE AND TENUITY OF LANGUAGE.\n\nA man shall add _amplitude_ or _dignity_ to his language, but by such\nmeans as these.\n\n1. By changing the _name_ with the _definition_, as occasion shall\nserve. As, when the _name_ shall be indecent, by using the _definition_;\nor contrary.\n\n2. By _metaphors_.\n\n3. By using the _plural_ number for the _singular_.\n\n4. By _privative epithets_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\n OF THE CONVENIENCE OR DECENCY OF ELOCUTION.\n\n_Elocutions_ are made _decent_:\n\n1. By speaking _feelingly_; that is, with such passion as is fit for the\nmatter he is in; as, _angerly_ in matter of _injury_.\n\n2. By speaking as becomes the _person_ of the _speaker_; as for a\n_gentleman_ to speak _eruditely_.\n\n3. By speaking _proportionably_ to the matter; as of _great affairs_ to\nspeak in a _high_, and of _mean_, in a _low_ style.\n\n4. By abstaining from _compounded_, and from _out-landish words_: unless\na man speak _passionately_, and have already moved, and, as it were,\ninebriated his hearers; or _ironically_.\n\nIt confers also to persuasion very much, to use these ordinary forms of\nspeaking; _all men know_, _it is confessed by all_, _no man will deny_,\nand the like. For the hearer consents, surprised with the fear to be\nesteemed the only ignorant man.\n\nIt is good also, having used a word that signifies more than the matter\nrequires, to abstain from the _pronunciation_ and _countenance_ that to\nsuch a word belongs; that the disproportion between it and the matter\nmay the less appear. And when a man has said too much, it will show well\nto correct himself: for he will get belief by seeming to consider what\nhe says. But in this a man must have a care not to be too precise in\nshowing of this consideration. For the ostentation of carefulness is an\nargument oftentimes of lying; as may be observed in such as tell\nparticularities not easily observed, when they would be thought to speak\nmore precise truth than is required.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\n OF TWO SORTS OF STYLES.\n\nThere be two sorts of _styles_. The one _continued_, or to be\n_comprehended at once_; the other _divided_, or _distinguished_ by\nperiods.\n\nThe first sort was in use with ancient writers; but is now out of date.\nAn example of this _style_ is in the history of Herodotus; wherein there\nis no period till the end of the whole history.\n\nIn the other kind of _style_, that is distinguished by periods, a\n_period_ is such a part as is perfect in itself; and has such length, as\nmay easily be comprehended by the understanding.\n\nThis latter kind is pleasant, the former unpleasant; because this\nappears finite, the other infinite. In this the hearer has always\nsomewhat set out, and terminated to him; in the other he foresees no\nend, and has nothing finished to him. This may easily be committed to\nmemory, because of the measure and cadence; which is the cause that\nverses be easily remembered: the other not.\n\nEvery sentence ought to end with the _period_, and nothing to be\ninterposed.\n\n_Period_ is either _simple_, or _divided into parts_.\n\n_Simple_, is that which is _indivisible_; as, _I wonder you fear not\ntheir ends, whose actions you imitate_.\n\nA _period divided_, is that which not only has perfection and length\nconvenient for respiration, but also _parts_. As, _I wonder you are not\nafraid of their ends; seeing you imitate their actions_: where in these\nwords, _I wonder you are not afraid of their ends_, is one _colon_ or\n_part_; and in these, _seeing you imitate their actions_, another: and\nboth together make the period.\n\nThe _parts or members_, and _periods_, of speech, ought neither be _too\nlong_, nor _too short_.\n\n_Too long_, are they which are produced beyond the expectation of the\nhearer. _Too short_, are they that end before he expects it.\n\nThose that be _too long_, leave the hearer behind; like him that walking\ngoes beyond the usual end of the walk, and thereby out-goes him that\nwalks with him.\n\nThey that be _too short_, make the hearer stumble; for when he looks far\nbefore him, the end stops him before he be aware.\n\nA _period_ that is _divided_ into parts, is either _divided only_; or\nhas also an _opposition_ of the _parts_ one to another.\n\n_Divided only_ is such as this; _This the senate knows, the consul sees;\nand yet the man lives_.\n\nA _period_ with _opposition of parts_, called also _antithesis_, and the\nparts _antitheta_, is when _contrary parts_ are put together, or also\njoined by a third.\n\nContrary parts are put together as here; _The one has obtained glory,\nthe other riches; both by my benefit_.\n\n_Antitheta_ are therefore acceptable, because not only the _parts_\nappear the better for the _opposition_, but also for that they carry\nwith them a certain appearance of that kind of enthymeme, which leads to\n_impossibility_.\n\n_Parts_ or _members_ of a _period_, are said to be _equal_, when they\nhave altogether, or almost, equal number of syllables.\n\n_Parts_ or _members_ of a _period_, are said to be _like_, when they\n_begin_ or _end_ alike: and the more _similitudes_, and the greater\n_equality_ there is of syllables, the more graceful is the period.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\n OF THOSE THINGS THAT GRACE AN ORATION, AND MAKE IT DELIGHTFUL.\n\nForasmuch as there is nothing more delightful to a man, than to find\nthat he apprehends and learns easily; it necessarily follows, that those\n_words_ are most _grateful_ to the ear, that make a man seem to see\nbefore his eyes the things signified.\n\nAnd therefore _foreign_ words are unpleasant, because _obscure_; and\n_plain_ words, because _too manifest_, making us learn nothing new. But\n_metaphors_ please; for they beget in us, by the _genus_, or by some\n_common_ thing to that with another, a kind of _science_. As when an\n_old man_ is called _stubble_; a man suddenly learns that he grows up,\nflourisheth, and withers like grass, being put in mind of it by the\nqualities common to _stubble_ and to _old men_.\n\nThat which a _metaphor_ does, a _similitude_ does the same; but with\nless _grace_, because with more _prolixity_.\n\nSuch enthymemes are the most _graceful_, which neither are presently\nvery manifest, nor yet very hard to be understood; but are comprehended\nwhile they are uttering, or presently after, though not understood\nbefore.\n\nThe things that make a speech _graceful_, are these; _antitheta_,\n_metaphors_, and _animation_.\n\nOf _antitheta_ and _antithesis_ hath been spoken in the precedent\nchapter.\n\nOf _metaphors_, the most _graceful_ is that which is drawn from\n_proportion_.\n\nAristotle, in the twelfth chapter of his _Poetry_, defines a _metaphor_\nto be the translation of a name from one signification to another;\nwhereof he makes four kinds, 1. From the _general_ to the _particular_.\n2. From the _particular_ to the _general_. 3. From one _particular_ to\nanother. 4. From _proportion_.\n\nA metaphor from proportion is such as this; _A state without youth, is a\nyear without a spring_.\n\n_Animation_ is that expression which makes us seem to see the thing\nbefore our eyes. As he that said, _The Athenians poured out their city\ninto Sicily_; meaning, they sent thither the greatest army they could\nmake. And this is the greatest grace of an oration.\n\nIf therefore in the same sentence there concur both _metaphor_ and this\n_animation_, and also _antithesis_, it cannot choose but be very\n_graceful_.\n\nThat an oration is _graced_ by metaphor, animation, and antithesis, hath\nbeen said: but _how_ it is graced, is to be said in the next chapter.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER X.\n\n IN WHAT MANNER AN ORATION IS GRACED BY THE THINGS AFORESAID.\n\nIt is graced by _animation_, when the actions of living creatures are\nattributed to things without life; as when the _sword_ is said to\n_devour_.\n\nSuch _metaphors_ as these come into a man\u2019s mind by the observation of\nthings that have similitude and proportion one to another. And the more\nunlike and unproportionable the things be otherwise, the more _grace_\nhath the _metaphor_.\n\nA _metaphor_ without _animation_, adds _grace_ then, when the hearer\nfinds he learns somewhat by such use of the word.\n\nAlso _paradoxes_ are _graceful_, so men inwardly do believe them. For\nthey have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon\nthe similitude of words, which have usually one sense, and in the\npresent another; and somewhat like to those jests which are grounded\nupon the deceiving of a man\u2019s expectation.\n\nAnd _paragrams_, that is, allusions of words, are graceful, if they be\nwell placed, and in periods not too long, and with _antithesis_. For by\nthese means the ambiguity is taken away.\n\nAnd the more of these, namely, _metaphor_, _animation_, _antithesis_,\n_equality of members_, a period hath, the more graceful it is.\n\n_Similitudes_ grace an oration, when they contain also a _metaphor_.\n\nAnd _proverbs_ are graceful, because they are _metaphors_, or\ntranslations of words from one species to another.\n\nAnd _hyperboles_, because they also are _metaphors_. But they are\nyouthful, and bewray vehemence; and are used with most grace by them\nthat be angry; and for that cause are not comely in old men.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XI.\n\nOF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STYLE TO BE USED IN WRITING, AND THE STYLE\n TO BE USED IN PLEADING.\n\nThe _style_ that should be _read_, ought to be more exact and accurate.\nBut the _style_ of a _pleader_, ought to be suited to action and\npronunciation.\n\nOrations of them that _plead_, pass away with the hearing. But those\nthat are _written_, men carry about them, and are considered at leisure;\nand consequently must endure to be sifted and examined.\n\n_Written_ orations appear flat in _pleading_. And orations made for the\n_bar_, when the action is away, appear in _reading_ insipid.\n\nIn _written_ orations repetition is justly condemned. But in\n_pleadings_, by the help of action, and by some change in the _pleader_,\nrepetition becomes amplification.\n\nIn _written_ orations disjunctives do ill; as, _I came_, _I found him_,\n_I asked him_: for they seem superfluous, and but one thing, because\nthey are not distinguished by action. But in _pleadings_ it is\namplification; because that which is but one thing, is made to seem\nmany.\n\nOf _pleadings_, that which is _judicial_ ought to be more accurate than\nthat which is _before the people_.\n\nAnd an oration _to the people_ ought to be more accommodate to action,\nthan a _judicial_.\n\nAnd of _judicial_ orations, that ought to be more accurate, which is\nuttered to _few_ judges; and that ought to be more accommodate to\naction, which is uttered to _many_. As in a _picture_, the further he\nstands off that beholds it, the less need there is that the colours be\nfine; so in _orations_, the further the hearer stands off, the less need\nthere is for his oration to be elegant.\n\nTherefore _demonstrative_ orations are most proper for _writing_, the\nend whereof is to be _read_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XII.\n\n OF THE PARTS OF AN ORATION, AND THEIR ORDER.\n\nThe _necessary_ parts of an oration are but two; _propositions_ and\n_proof_; which are, as it were, the _problem_ and _demonstration_.\n\nThe _proposition_ is the explication or opening of the matter to be\n_proved_. And _proof_ is the _demonstration_ of the matter _propounded_.\n\nTo these _necessary parts_ are sometimes added two other, the _proem_\nand the _epilogue_; neither of which is any _proof_.\n\nSo that in some there be _four parts_ of an oration; the _proem_; the\n_proposition_, or as others call it, the _narration_; the _proofs_,\nwhich contain _confirmation_, _confutation_, _amplification_, and\n_diminution_; and the _epilogue_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII.\n\n OF THE PROEM.\n\nThe _proem_ is the beginning of an oration, and, as it were, the\npreparing of the way before one enter into it.\n\nIn some kinds of orations it resembles the _prelude_ of _musicians_, who\nfirst play what they list, and afterwards the tune they intended. In\nother kinds it resembles the _prologue_ of a _play_, that contains the\nargument.\n\nProems of the first sort, are most proper for _demonstrative_ orations;\nin which a man is free to foretell, or not, what points he will insist\nupon. And for the most part it is better not; because when a man has not\nobliged himself to a certain matter, _digression_ will seem _variety_;\nbut if he have engaged himself, _variety_ will be accounted\n_digression_.\n\nIn _demonstratives_, the matter of the _proem_ consisteth in the\n_praise_ or _dispraise_ of some _law_ or _custom_, or in _exhortation_\nor _dehortation_, or in something that serves to incline the hearer to\nthe purpose.\n\nProems of the second kind are most proper for _judicial_ orations. For\nas the _prologue_ in a _dramatic_, and the _exordium_ in an _epic_ poem,\nsetteth forth in few words the argument of the poem; so in a _judicial\noration_, the orator ought to exhibit a model of his oration, that the\nmind of the hearer may not be suspended, and for want of foresight err\nor wander.\n\nWhatsoever else belongs to a _proem_, is drawn from one of these four:\nfrom the _speaker_, from the _adversary_, from the _hearer_, or from the\n_matter_.\n\nFrom the _speaker_ and _adversary_, are drawn into proems such\ncriminations and purgations as belong not to the cause.\n\nTo the _defendant_, it is necessary in the proem to answer to the\naccusations of his _adversary_; that those being cleared, he may have a\nmore favourable entrance to the rest of his oration.\n\nBut to the _plaintiff_, it is better to cast his criminations all into\nthe _epilogue_; that the judge may the more easily remember them.\n\nFrom the _hearer_ and from the _matter_, are drawn into the proem such\nthings as serve to make the _hearer_ favourable or angry, attentive or\nnot attentive, as need shall require.\n\nAnd _hearers_ use to be attentive to _persons_ that are reputed _good_;\nto _things_ that are of _great consequence_, or that _concern\nthemselves_, or that are _strange_, or that _delight_.\n\nBut to make the _hearer_ attentive, is not the part of the _proem_ only,\nbut of any other part of the oration, and rather of any other part than\nof the proem. For the _hearer_ is everywhere more remiss than in the\nbeginning. And therefore wheresoever there is need, the orator must make\nappear both the _probity_ of his own _person_, and that the _matter_ in\nhand is of _great consequence_; or that it concerns the _hearer_, or\nthat it is _new_, or that it is _delightful_.\n\nHe that will have the hearer attentive to _him_, but not to the _cause_,\nmust on the other side make it seem that the _matter_ is a _trifle_\nwithout relation to the _hearer_, _common_ and _tedious_.\n\nThat the _hearer_ may be favourable to the _speaker_, one of two things\nis required: that he _love_ him, or that he _pity_ him.\n\nIn _demonstrative_ orations, he that _praises_ shall have the _hearer_\nfavourable, if he think himself or his own manners, or course of life,\nor anything he loves, comprehended in the same _praise_.\n\nOn the contrary, he that _dispraises_ shall be heard favourably, if the\n_hearer_ find his _enemies_, or _their courses_, or anything he _hates_,\ninvolved in the same _dispraise_.\n\nThe _proem_ of a _deliberative_ oration is taken from the same things\nfrom which are taken the _proems_ of _judicial_ orations. For the matter\nof a _deliberative_ oration needeth not that natural _proem_, by which\nis shown what we are to speak of, for that is already known; the _proem_\nin these being made only for the _speaker\u2019s_ or _adversary\u2019s_ sake, or\nto make the _matter_ appear _great_ or _little_, as one would have it;\nand is therefore to be taken from the _persons_ of the _plaintiff_ or\n_defendant_, or from the _hearer_, or from the _matter_, as in orations\n_judicial_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XIV.\n\n PLACES OF CRIMINATION AND PURGATION.\n\nOne, from the _removal of ill opinion_ in the hearer, imprinted in him\nby the adversary or otherwise.\n\nAnother from this: that the thing done is _not hurtful_, or _not to\nhim_, or _not so much_, or _not unjust_, or _not great_, or _not\ndishonourable_.\n\nA third from the _recompense_: as, _I did him harm, but withal I did him\nhonour_.\n\nA fourth from the _excuse_; as, _It was error_, _mischance_, or\n_constraint_.\n\nA fifth from the _intention_; as, _One thing was done, another meant_.\n\nA sixth from the _comprehension_ of the accuser; as, _What I have done,\nthe accuser has done the same_, or _his father_, _kinsman_, or _friend_.\n\nA seventh from the _comprehension_ of those that are in reputation; as,\n_What I did, such and such have done the same, who nevertheless are good\nmen_.\n\nAn eighth from _comparison_ with such as have been falsely accused or\nwrongfully suspected, and nevertheless found upright.\n\nA ninth from _recrimination_; as, _The accuser is a man of ill life, and\ntherefore not to be believed_.\n\nA tenth from that the _judgment_ belongs to another place, or time; as,\n_I have already answered_, or _am to answer elsewhere to this matter_.\n\nAn eleventh from _crimination_ of the crimination: as, _It serves only\nto pervert judgment_.\n\nA twelfth, which is common both to crimination and purgation, and is\ntaken from _some sign_; as, _Teucer is not to be believed, because his\nmother was Priam\u2019s sister_. On the other side, _Teucer is to be\nbelieved, because his father was Priam\u2019s enemy_.\n\nA thirteenth, proper to crimination only, from _praise and dispraise\nmixed_; as, to praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise\nin many words, and blame with effectual ones; or to praise many things\nthat are good, and then add one evil, but a great one.\n\nA fourteenth, common both to _crimination_ and _purgation_, is taken\nfrom the _interpretation of the fact_. For he that _purgeth_ himself,\n_interpreteth the fact_ always in the best sense; and he that\n_criminates_, always in the worst; as when Ulysses said, _Diomedes chose\nhim for his companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in\nhis exploit_: but his adversary said, _he chose him for his cowardice,\nas the most unlikely to share with him in the honour_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XV.\n\n OF THE NARRATION.\n\nThe _narration_ is not always continued, and of one piece; but\nsometimes, as in _demonstratives_, interrupted, and dispersed through\nthe whole oration.\n\nFor there being in a _narration_, something that falls not under art; as\nnamely, the actions themselves, which the orator inventeth not; he must\ntherefore bring in the _narration_ of them where he best may. As for\nexample, if being to praise a man, you would make a _narration_ of all\nhis acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you\nwill find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same acts again, while\nfrom some of them you praise his valour, and from others his wisdom;\nwhereby your oration shall have less variety, and shall less please.\n\nIt is not necessary always that the _narration_ be short. The true\nmeasure of it must be taken from the _matter_ that is to be laid open.\n\nIn the _narration_, as oft as may be, it is good to insert somewhat\ncommendable in one\u2019s self, and blameable in one\u2019s adversary: as, _I\nadvised him, but he would take no counsel_.\n\nIn _narrations_, a man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion,\nindignation, &c. in the hearer beside the purpose; as Ulysses in Homer,\nrelating his travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long\nin it that it consists of divers books: but when he comes home, tells\nthe same to his wife in thirty verses, leaving out what might make her\nsad.\n\nThe _narration_ ought also to be in such words as argue the _manners_,\nthat is some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although\nit be not expressed; as, _setting his arms a-kimbo, he answered, &c._;\nby which is insinuated the pride of him that so answered.\n\nIn an _oration_ a man does better to shew his affection than his\njudgment; that is, it is better to say, _I like this_, than to say,\n_this is better_. For by the one you would seem _wise_, by the other\n_good_. But _favour_ follows _goodness_; whereas _wisdom_ procures\n_envy_.\n\nBut if this affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be\nrendered, as did Antigone. For when she had said, _she loved her brother\nbetter than her husband or children_; she added, _for husband and\nchildren I may have more; but another brother I cannot, my parents being\nboth dead_. Or else a man must use this form of speaking; _I know this\naffection of mine seems strange to you; but nevertheless it is such_.\nFor it is not easily believed that any man has a mind to do any thing\nthat is not for his own good.\n\nBesides in a _narration_, not only the actions themselves, but the\npassions and signs that accompany them, are to be discovered.\n\nAnd in his _narration_ a man should make himself and his adversary be\nconsidered for such and such, as soon and as covertly as he can.\n\nA _narration_ may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning. In\n_deliberative_ orations, that is, wheresoever the question is of things\nto come, a _narration_, which is always of things past, has no place.\nAnd yet things past may be recounted, that men may _deliberate_ better\nof the future. But that is not as _narration_, but _proof_; for it is\n_example_.\n\nThere may also be _narration_ in _deliberatives_, in that part where\ncrimination and praise come in. But that part is not _deliberative_, but\n_demonstrative_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XVI.\n\n OF PROOF OR CONFIRMATION, AND REFUTATION.\n\n_Proofs_ are to be applied to something controverted.\n\nThe controversy in _judicial_ orations is, whether it has been _done_;\nwhether it has been _hurtful_; whether the matter be _so great_; and\nwhether it be _just, or no_.\n\nIn a question of _fact_, one of the parties of necessity is faulty; for\nignorance of the _fact_ is no excuse; and therefore the _fact_ is\nchiefly to be insisted on.\n\nIn _demonstratives_, the _fact_ for the most part is supposed: but the\n_honour_ and _profit_ of the fact are to be _proved_.\n\nIn _deliberatives_, the question is, whether the thing _be like to be,\nor likely to be so great_; or whether it be _just_; or whether it be\n_profitable_.\n\nBesides the application of the _proof_ to the question, a man ought to\nobserve whether his adversary have lied in any point without the cause.\nFor it is a sign he does the same in the cause.\n\nThe _proofs_ themselves are either _examples_, or _enthymemes_.\n\nA _deliberative_ oration, because it is of things to come, requireth\nrather _examples_ than _enthymemes_.\n\nBut a _judicial_ oration, being of things past, which have a necessity\nin them, and may be concluded syllogistically, requireth rather\n_enthymemes_.\n\n_Enthymemes_ ought not to come too thick together: for they hinder one\nanother\u2019s force by confounding the hearer.\n\nNor ought a man to endeavour to prove everything by enthymeme, lest like\nsome philosophers he collect what is _known_, from what is _less known_.\n\nNor ought a man to use enthymemes, when he would move the hearer to some\naffection. For seeing divers motions do mutually destroy or weaken one\nanother, he will lose either the _enthymeme_, or the _affection_ that he\nwould move.\n\nFor the same reason, a man ought not to use enthymemes when he would\nexpress _manners_.\n\nBut whether he would move _affection_, or insinuate his _manners_, he\nmay withal use _sentences_.\n\nA _deliberative_ oration is more difficult than a _judicial_, because it\nis of the _future_; whereas a _judicial_ is of that which is _past_, and\nthat consequently may be known; and because it has _principles_, namely,\nthe _law_; and it is easier to _prove_ from _principles_, than without.\n\nBesides, a _deliberative_ oration wants those helps of _turning to the\nadversary_, of _speaking of himself_, of _raising passion_.\n\nHe therefore that wants matter in a deliberative oration, let him bring\nin some person to praise or dispraise. And in demonstratives, he that\nhas nothing to say in _commendation_ or _discommendation_ of the\n_principal party_, let him _praise_ or _dispraise_ somebody else, as his\n_father_ or _kinsman_, or the very _virtues_ or _vices_ themselves.\n\nHe that wants not _proofs_, let him not only _prove_ strongly, but also\ninsinuate his _manners_: but he that has no _proof_, let him\nnevertheless insinuate his _manners_. For a _good man_ is as acceptable\nas an _exact oration_.\n\nOf _proofs_, those that _lead to an absurdity_, please better than those\nthat are _direct_ or _ostensive_; because from the comparison of\ncontraries, namely, _truth_ and _falsity_, the force of the syllogism\ndoes the better appear.\n\n_Confutation_ is also a part of _proof_. And he that speaks first, puts\nit _after_ his own proofs; unless the controversy contain many and\ndifferent matters. And he that speaks last, puts it _before_. For it is\nnecessary to make way for his own oration, by removing the objections of\nhim that spake before. For the mind abhors both the man and his oration,\nthat is damned beforehand.\n\nIf a man desire his _manners_ should appear well, lest speaking of\nhimself, he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation;\nor speaking of another, he seem contumelious or scurrilous; let him\nintroduce another person.\n\nLast of all, lest he cloy his hearer with _enthymemes_, let him vary\nthem sometimes with _sentences_, but such as have the same force. As\nhere is an _enthymeme_: _If it be then the best time to make peace, when\nthe best conditions of peace may be had; then the time is now, while our\nfortune is entire_. And this is a _sentence_ of equal force to it: _Wise\nmen make peace, while their fortune is entire_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XVII.\n\n OF INTERROGATIONS, ANSWERS, AND JESTS.\n\nThe times when it is fit to ask one\u2019s adversary a _question_, are\nchiefly four.\n\nThe first is, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, he\nhas already uttered one; and we would by _interrogation_ draw him to\nconfess the other.\n\nThe second, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, one is\nmanifest of itself, and the other likely to be fetched out by a\n_question_; then the _interrogation_ will be seasonable; and the absurd\nconclusion is presently to be inferred without adding that proposition\nwhich is manifest.\n\nThe third, when a man would make appear that his adversary does\ncontradict himself.\n\nThe fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as\nthese: _In some sort, it is so; in some sort, it is not so_.\n\nOut of these cases, it is not fit to _interrogate_. For he whose\nquestion succeeds not, is thought vanquished.\n\nTo equivocal _questions_ a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too\nbrief.\n\nTo _interrogations_, which we foresee tend to draw from us an _answer_\ncontrary to our purpose, we must, together with our _answer_, presently\ngive an _answer_ to the objection which is implied in the _question_.\n\nAnd where the question exacteth an answer that concludeth against us, we\nmust, together with our _answer_, presently _distinguish_.\n\n_Jests_ are dissolved by serious and grave discourse; and grave\ndiscourse is deluded by _jests_.\n\nThe several kinds of _jests_ are set down in the _Art of Poetry_.\nWhereof one kind is _ironia_, and tends to please one\u2019s self. The other\nis _scurrility_, and tends to please others.\n\nThe latter of these has in it a kind of baseness: the former may become\na man of good breeding.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER XVIII.\n\n OF THE EPILOGUE.\n\nThe _epilogue_ must consist of one of these four things.\n\nEither of _inclining the judge to favour his own_, or _disfavour the\nadversary\u2019s side_. For then, when all is said in the cause, is the best\nseason to _praise_ or _dispraise_ the parties.\n\nOr of _amplification_ or _diminution_. For when it appears what is good\nor evil, then is the time to show _how great_ or _how little_ that good\nor evil is.\n\nOr in _moving the judge to anger, love_, or other passion. For when it\nis manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it\nwill be opportune to _excite_ the judge.\n\nOr of _repetition_, that the judge may remember what has been said.\n\n_Repetition_ consisteth in the _matter_ and the _manner_. For the orator\nmust show that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his\noration; and _how_, namely, by comparing his arguments one by one with\nhis adversary\u2019s, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.\n\n ==========\n\n\n\n\n THE\n\n ART OF RHETORIC\n\n PLAINLY SET FORTH.\n\n WITH PERTINENT EXAMPLES\n\n FOR THE MORE EASY UNDERSTANDING AND\n PRACTICE OF THE SAME.\n\n BY\n\n THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMSBURY.\n\n\n\n\n THE\n\n ART OF RHETORIC.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\nRhetoric is an art of speaking finely. It hath two parts:\n\n1. Garnishing of speech, called _elocution_;\n\n2. Garnishing of the manner of utterance, called _pronunciation_.\n\nGarnishing of speech is the first part of rhetoric; whereby the speech\nitself is beautified and made fine. It is either the fine manner of\nwords, called a trope; or the fine shape or frame of speech, called a\nfigure.\n\nThe fine manner of words is a garnishing of speech, whereby one word is\ndrawn from its first proper signification to another; as in this\nsentence: _sin lieth at the door_: where _sin_ is put for the punishment\nof sin adjoined unto it: _lieth at the door_, signifieth at hand; as\nthat which lieth at the door, is ready to be brought in.\n\nThis changing of words was first found out by necessity, for the want of\nwords; afterwards confirmed by delight, because such words are pleasant\nand gracious to the ear. Therefore this change of signification must be\nshamefaced, and, as it were, maidenly, that it may seem rather to be led\nby the hand to another signification, than to be driven by force unto\nthe same.\n\nYet sometimes this fine manner of speech swerveth from this perfection;\nand then it is, either the abuse of this fine speech, called\n_katachresis_, or the excess of this fineness, called _hyperbole_.\n\n_Be not too just nor too wicked_; which speech, although it seem very\nhard, yet it doth, not without some fineness of speech, utter thus much;\n_That one seek not a righteousness beyond the law of God; and that when\nnone can live without all sin, yet that they take heed that sin bear not\ndominion over them_.\n\nAs, _My tears are my meat day and night. Those that hate me are more in\nnumber than the hairs of my head_. Both which do utter by an express of\nspeech, a great sorrow, and a great number of enemies.\n\nThe abuse of speech is, when the change of speech is hard, strange, and\nunwonted, as in the first example.\n\nThe excess of speech is, when the change of signification is very high\nand lofty, as in the second example, and Psalms vi. vii.\n\nBut the excellency or fineness of words or tropes, is most excellent,\nwhen divers are _shut up in one_, or _continued in many_.\n\nAn example of the first sort is in 2 Kings ii. 9: _I pray thee, let me\nhave a double portion of thy Spirit_: where by _Spirit_ is meant the\ngift of the Spirit; and by _thy Spirit_, the gift of the spirit like to\nthine.\n\nThe _continuance_ of tropes, called an allegory, is, when one kind of\ntrope is so continued, as, look with what kind of matter it be begun,\nwith the same it be ended. So in Psalm xxiii. _the care of God towards\nhis church_ is set forth in the words proper to _a shepherd_. So in the\nwhole book of Canticles, _the sweet conference of Christ and his\nchurch_, is set down by the words proper to _the husband and the wife_.\nSo old age is set down by this garnishing of speech, in Ecclesiastes\nxii. 5, 6.\n\nHitherto of the properties of a fine manner of words, called a trope.\nNow the divers sorts do follow. They are those which note out, 1, no\ncomparison, or are with some comparison; or, 2, no respect of division,\nor some respect.\n\nThe first is double: 1. The change of name, called a _metonymy_. 2. The\nmocking speech, called an _irony_.\n\nThe change of name is where the name of a thing is put for the name of a\nthing agreeing with it. It is double: 1. When the cause is put for the\nthing caused; and contrarywise. 2. When the thing to which anything is\nadjoined, is put for the thing adjoined; and contrarywise.\n\nThe change of name of the cause is when either the name of the _maker_,\nor the name of the _matter_, is put for the _thing made_.\n\nOf the _maker_, when the finder out, or the author of the thing, or the\ninstrument whereby the thing is done, is put for the _thing made_. So\nMoses is put for his writings: so love is put for liberality, or\nbestowing benefits, the fruit of love; so (Rom. i. 8): faith, the cause,\nis put for religious serving of God, the thing caused. So (James iii.)\nthe tongue, the instrument of speech, is put for the speech itself.\n_Rule thy tongue._\n\nOf the _matter_: _Thou art dust, and to dust shalt thou return_; that\nis, _one made of dust_.\n\nNow, on the other side, when the thing caused, or the effect, is put for\nany of these causes. So _the Gospel of God_ is called _the power of God\nto salvation_; that is, the instrument of the power of God. So _love_ is\nsaid to be _bountiful_, because it causeth one to be bountiful. St. Paul\nsaith, _The bread that we break, is it not in the communion of the body\nand blood of Christ?_ That is, an instrument of the communion of the\nbody of Christ. So _the body_ is said to be an _earthly tabernacle_;\nthat is, a tabernacle made of earth.\n\nThe change of name, or _metonymy_, where the subject, or that which hath\nanything adjoined, is put for the thing adjoined, or adjunct. So the\nplace is put for those, or that in the place: _set thine house in\norder_; that is, thy household matters. _It shall be easier for Sodom\nand Gomorrha_; that is, the people in Sodom and Gomorrha. So _Moses'\nchair_ is put for the _doctrine_ taught in _Moses' chair_. So _all\nJericho and Jerusalem came out_; that is, all the men in Jericho and\nJerusalem. So before, _sin_ was put for the _punishment of sin_. _Let\nhis blood rest upon us and our children_; that is, the punishment which\nshall follow his death. So Christ said, _This is my body_; that is, a\nsign or sacrament of my body. _This wine is the new testament in my\nblood_; that is, a sign or seal of the new testament in my blood. So\nJohn saith, _I saw the Spirit descending in the likeness of a dove_;\nthat is, the sign of the Spirit.\n\nOn the other side, the adjunct is put for the thing to which it is\nadjoined. As Christ (1 Tim. i. 1) is called _our hope_; that is, on whom\nour hope did depend. So, _we are justified by faith_; that is, by Christ\napplied by faith. So, _love is the fulfilling of the law_; that is,\nthose things to which it is adjoined. _Hope_ for the _things hoped for_;\nas Rom. viii. 24. So in the Epistle to the Ephesians, v. 16: _The days\nare evil_; that is, the manner, conversation, and deeds of men in the\ndays.\n\nHitherto the _metonymy_, or change of name. Now followeth the mocking\nspeech, or _irony_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\nThe _mocking_ trope is, when one contrary is signified by another; as\nGod said, _Man is like to one of us_. So Christ saith, _Sleep on_; and\nyet by-and-by, _Arise, let us go_. So Paul saith, _You are wise, and I\nam a fool_.\n\nThis trope is conceived either by the contrariety of the matter, or the\nmanner of utterance, or both. So Elijah said to the prophets of Baal,\n_Cry aloud_, &c. So the Jews said unto Christ, _Hail, King of the Jews!_\n\nHitherto appertaineth the passing by a thing, which yet with a certain\nelegance noteth it. So Philemon 19: _That I say not, thou owest thyself\nunto me_.\n\nHitherto of the fineness of words which respect no division. Now\nfolloweth that which respecteth division, called _synechdoche_.\n\nA _synechdoche_ is when the name of the whole is given to the part; or\nthe name of the part to the whole. And it is double. 1. When the whole\nis put for the member, and contrarily. 2. When the general, or whole\nkind, is put for the special; or contrarily.\n\nSo St. John: _Not only for our sins, but for the sins of the whole\nworld_. So righteousness, a member of goodness, is put for all goodness;\nso unrighteousness is put for all manner of sins.\n\nExamples of the second sort, as these: So _Israel_ is put for _those of\nJuda_ sometimes. So _nations_ for _the heathen_. _A minister_ of Christ\nfor _an apostle_ of Christ, as Rom. xv. 16. _A minister_ put for _a\ndistributer_, as Rom. xii. 7.\n\nOn the other side, one sort or special is put for the whole sort or\ngeneral, in the examples following. In the Lord\u2019s prayer, _bread_, _one_\nhelp of life, is put for _all_ helps; _this day_, _one_ time for _all_\ntimes. So Solomon saith, _the thing of the day in his day_; that is, the\nthing of the time in his time.\n\nSo sometimes less is spoken, and yet more is understood; which is called\ndiminution, or _meiosis_. As James saith to him _that knoweth how to do\nwell and doth it not, it is sin_; that is a great sin. So our Saviour\nChrist saith, _If they had not known, they had had no sin_; that is, no\nsuch great sin as they have now. Likewise the denial by comparison.\n\nSo Solomon saith, _Receive my words, and not silver_; that is, my words\nrather than silver. So Paul saith, _I was sent to preach, and not to\nbaptize_; that is, not so much to baptize as to preach.\n\nHitherto of the fineness of words, which note out no comparison. Now\nfolloweth the fineness of words which noteth out comparison, called a\n_metaphor_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\nA _metaphor_ is when the like is signified by the like: as (1 Cor. iii.\n13) the Apostle saith, _doctrine must be tried by fire_; that is, the\nevidence of the word, spirit, _trying doctrine_, as fire doth metals. So\nChrist is said to _baptize with fire_; where _fire_ is put for the power\nof the Holy Ghost, purging as fire. So Christ saith, _none shall enter\ninto the kingdom of God but he that is born of the Holy Ghost and\nwater_. So Paul calleth himself the _father_ of the Corinthians, and\nsaid, _that he begat them in Christ_. So he calleth Timothy and Titus\nhis natural _sons in the faith_.\n\nHitherto of a trope or garnishing of speech in one word, where the\nmetaphor is most usual; then the change of name; then the _synechdoche_;\nand last of all, the _irony_. Now followeth the fine frame or shape of\nspeech, called a figure.\n\nA figure is a garnishing of speech wherein the course of the same is\nchanged, from the more simple and plain manner of speaking unto that\nwhich is more full of excellency and grace. For as in the fineness of\nwords, or a trope, words are considered asunder by themselves; so in the\nfine shape or frame of speech, or a figure, the apt and pleasant joining\ntogether of many words is noted.\n\nThe garnishing of the shape of speech, or a figure, is garnishing of\nspeech in words, or in a sentence.\n\nThe garnishing of speech in words, called _figura dictionis_, is wherein\nthe speech is garnished by the pleasant and sweet sound of words joined\ntogether.\n\nThis is either in the _measure_ of sounds; or in the _repetition_ of\nsounds.\n\nThe _measure_ of sounds is belonging either to poets, with us called\nrhymers; or orators, with us called eloquent pleaders.\n\nThe first is the measure of sounds by certain and continual spaces; and\nit is either rhyme or verse.\n\nRhyme is the first sort, containing a certain measure of syllables\nending alike; and these in the mother tongues are most fit for psalms,\nsongs, or sonnets.\n\nVerses are the second sort, containing certain feet fitly placed.\n\nA foot is a measure framed by the length and shortness of syllables; for\nthe several sorts whereof, as also of the verses of them, because we\nhave no worthy examples in our English tongue, we judge the large\nhandling of them should be more curious than necessary.\n\nThe measure of sounds belonging to orators, is that which, as it is not\nuncertain, so it differeth altogether from rhyme and verse, and is very\nchangeable with itself. Therefore in that eloquent speech you must\naltogether leave rhyme and verse, unless you allege it for authority and\npleasure.\n\nIn the beginning of the sentence little care is to be had, in the middle\nleast of all, and in the end chiefest regard is to be had; because the\nfall of the sentence is most marked, and therefore lest it fall out to\nbe harsh and unpleasant both to the mind and ear, there must be most\nvariety and change.\n\nNow this change must not be above six syllables from the end, and that\nmust be set down in feet of two syllables.\n\nAnd thus much of garnishing of speech by the _measure_ of sounds, rather\nto give some taste of the same to the readers, than to draw any to the\ncurious and unnecessary practice of it.\n\nNow followeth the _repeating_ of sounds.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n_Repetition_ of sounds is either of the _like_, or the _unlike_ sound.\n\nOf the _like_, is either _continued_ to the end of, or _broken_ off\nfrom, the _same_, or a _diverse_ sentence.\n\n_Continued_ to the end of the _same_ sentence is, when the same sound is\nrepeated without anything coming between, except a parenthesis; that is,\nsomething put in, without the which, notwithstanding, the sentence is\nfull. And it is a joining of the same sound, as Rom. i. 29: _All\nunrighteousness, fornication, wickedness_. And in the prayer of Christ,\n_My God, my God_. _From men by thine hand, O Lord, from men_, &c. (Psalm\nxvii. 14.)\n\n_Continued_ in a _diverse_ sentence is, either a redoubling, called\n_anadyplosis_; or a pleasant climbing, called _climax_.\n\nRedoubling is when the same sound is repeated in the end of the former\nsentence, and the beginning of the sentence following. As Psalm ix. 9:\n_The Lord also will be a refuge to the poor, a refuge, I say, in due\ntime_. Psalm xlviii. 14: _For this God is our God_. But more plain in\nPsalm xlviii. 8: _As we have heard, so have we seen in the city of our\nGod: God will establish it for ever_.\n\nA pleasant climbing, is a redoubling continued by divers degrees or\nsteps of the same sounds; as Rom. viii. 17: _If we be children, we be\nheirs, even heirs of God, annexed with Christ_. Rom. viii. 30: _Whom he\npredestinated, them also he called; and whom he called, them also he\njustified; and whom he justified, them also he glorified_. Also Rom. ix.\n14, 15.\n\nAnd hitherto of the same sound _continued to the end_. Now followeth the\nsame sound _broken off_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\nThe same sound _broken off_, is a repetition of the same in the\n_beginning_ or in the _end_.\n\nIn the _beginning_, it is called _anaphora_, a bringing of the same\nagain; as Rom. viii. 38, 39: _Nor death, nor life, nor angels, &c. nor\nany other creature, shall be able to separate us, &c._ So likewise\nEphes. iv. 11: _Some to be apostles, some preachers, &c._ So Galatians\nii. 14: _Nor Jew, Gentile, &c._ So likewise Hebrews xi. 1, 2.\n\nRepetition of the same sound _in the end_, is called _epistrophe_, a\nturning to the same sound in the end. So Ezekiel viii. 15: _Behold\ngreater abominations than these_. Lament. iii. 41, &c.: _Let us lift up\nour hearts with our hands unto God in the heavens; we have sinned and\nhave rebelled; therefore thou hast not spared_.\n\nWhen both of these are joined together, it is called a coupling or\nsymplote. As 2 Cor. vi. 4-11: _But in all things we approve ourselves as\nthe ministers of God, in much patience, in afflictions, &c._ See also 2\nCor. xi. 23.\n\nHitherto of the repetitions in the _same place_. Now of those that do\ninterchange their place.\n\nThey are either _epanalepsis_, which signifieth to take back; or\n_epanados_, which signifies the turning to the same tune.\n\nThe first is when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the\nending; as, 2 Sam. xviii. 33: _My son Absolom, my son_.\n\n_Epanados_ is when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the\nmiddle, in the middle and the end. Ezekiel xxxv, 6: _I will prepare thee\nunto blood, and blood shall pursue thee: except thou hate blood, even\nblood shall pursue thee_. And 2 Thes. ii. 4: _So that he that doth sit\nas God, in the temple of God, sheweth himself that he is God_.\n\nHitherto of the repetition of those sounds which are _like_. Now of\nthose that are _unlike_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n_Unlike_; a small changing of the name, as \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1; a small changing\nof the end or case, as \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd.\n\nA small change of name is, when a word, by the change of one letter or\nsyllable, the signification also is changed; as, Rom. v. 4: _Patience,\nexperience; and experience, hope_. 2 Cor. x. 3: _We walk after the\nflesh, not war in the flesh_. 2 Cor. vi. 8-9: _So by honour and\ndishonour, as unknown and yet known_.\n\nA small changing of the end or case, is when words of the same beginning\nrebound by divers ends: _Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no\nmore, death hath no more power over him. He that doth righteousness, is\nrighteous. If ye know that he is righteous, know ye that he that doeth\nrighteously, is born of him._ And of both these there are many in the\nScripture; but the translations cannot reach them.\n\nHitherto of the garnishing of the shape of speech, in _words_. Now\nfolloweth the garnishing of the shape of speech, in a _sentence_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\nGarnishing of the frame of speech in a _sentence_, is a garnishing of\nthe shape of speech, or a figure; which for the forcible moving of\naffections, doth after a sort beautify the sense and very meaning of a\nsentence. Because it hath in it a certain manly majesty, which far\nsurpasseth the soft delicacy or dainties of the former figures.\n\nIt is either the garnishing of speech _alone_, or _with others_.\n\nThe garnishing of speech _alone_, is when as the sentence is garnished\nwithout speech had to other. And it is either in regard of the _matter_;\nor of the _person_.\n\nIn regard of the _matter_; it is either a crying out, called\n_exclamation_; or a pulling or calling back of himself, called\n_revocation_.\n\nA crying out, or _exclamation_, is the first, which is set forth by a\nword of calling out. Sometimes of wonder, as, Rom. xi. 33: _O the depth\nof the judgments of God!_ Psal. viii. 1: _O Lord, how excellent is thy\nname!_ Sometimes of pity; also these words, _Behold_, _Alas_, _Oh_, be\nsigns of this figure, as, _O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which stonest the\nprophets_. Sometimes of desperation; as, _My sin is greater than can be\nforgiven. Behold, thou drivest me out, &c._ Sometimes of wishing: as,\nPsalm lxxxiv. 1: _O Lord of hosts, how amiable are thy tabernacles!_\nSometimes of disdaining: as, Rom. vii. 24: _O miserable wretch that I\nam, who shall deliver me from this body of sin!_ Sometimes of mocking:\nas they which said to our Saviour Christ, _Ah, thou that, &c._ Sometimes\nof cursing and detestation; as in David, _Let their table be made a\nsnare, and bow down their back always_.\n\nAlso when this figure is used in the end of a sentence, it is called a\nshooting out of the voice or \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1; as when the sins of Jezebel were\nspoken against, this is added at the end, _Seemed it a little to her to\ndo thus and thus_.\n\nSo after the high setting forth of the name of God, David shutteth up\nhis praise with this: _Blessed be his glorious name, and let all the\nearth be filled with his glory_. Sometimes here is used a certain\nliberty of speech, wherein is a kind of secret crying out: as Peter\n(Acts iii. 12,) saith: _Ye men of Israel, hear these words_. And Paul,\n(2 Cor. xi. 1): _Would to God you could suffer a little my foolishness,\nand indeed ye suffer me_.\n\nThus much of crying out. Now followeth the figure of calling back, or\n_revocation_.\n\n_Revocation_ is when any thing is called back; and it is as it were a\ncooling and quenching of the heat of the exclamation that went before.\n\nAnd this is either a _correction_ of one\u2019s self, called \u03b5\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2; or\na _holding_ of one\u2019s _peace_, called \u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c9\u03c0\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n\u0395\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 is correction, when something is called back that went\nbefore: as Paul correcteth his doubtfulness of Agrippa\u2019s belief, when he\nsaith, _Believest thou, King Agrippa? I know thou believest._ So, 1 Cor.\nxv. 10: _I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I_, &c.\n\nA _keeping of silence_, or \u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c9\u03c0\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, is when the course of the\nsentence bygone is so stayed, as thereby some part of the sentence, not\nbeing uttered, may be understood. So our Saviour Christ (John xii. 27)\nsaith, _My soul is heavy: what shall I say?_\n\nThus much of a figure garnishing the speech alone, in regard of the\n_matter_. Now followeth the garnishing of the speech alone, in regard of\nthe _person_.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\nGarnishing of the speech alone in regard of the _person_, is double:\neither in turning to the person called _apostrophe_; or feigning of the\nperson, called _prosopop\u0153ia_.\n\n_Apostrophe_, or turning to the person, is when the speech is turned to\nanother person than the speech appointed did intend or require. And this\n_apostrophe_ or turning is diversely seen, according to the diversity of\npersons. Sometimes it turneth to a man\u2019s person; as David in the sixth\nPsalm, where having gathered arguments of his safety, turneth hastily to\nthe wicked, saying, _Away from me, all ye workers of iniquity; for the\nLord hath heard the voice of my petition_.\n\nSometimes from a man to God, as Psalm iii. 3. David being dismayed with\nthe number of his enemies, turneth himself to God, saying: _But thou art\nmy buckler_, &c.\n\nSometimes to unreasonable creatures without sense; as Isaiah i. and\nIsaiah xxi.\n\n_Prosopop\u0153ia_, or a feigning of the person, is whereby we do feign\nanother person speaking in our speech. And it is double; _imperfect_ and\n_perfect_.\n\n_Imperfect_ is when the speech of another person is set down lightly and\nindirectly. As in Psalm. xi. 1. David bringeth in the wicked, _Who say\nunto my soul, fly as the bird unto yonder hill_.\n\nA perfect _prosopop\u0153ia_, is when the whole feigning of the person is set\ndown in our speech, with a fit entering into the same, and a leaving it\noff. So Wisdom, (Prov. viii.); where the entrance is in the first\nverses, her speech in the rest of the chapter.\n\nHitherto of the figures of sentences concerning one speaking alone. Now\nfollow the other, which concern the speeches of two.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\nThey which concern the speeches of two, are either in _asking_, or in\n_answering_.\n\nThat of _asking_, is either in _deliberation_; or in _preventing an\nobjection_.\n\n_Deliberation_ is when we do every now and then ask, as it were, reasons\nof our consultation, whereby the mind of the hearers wavering in doubt,\ndoth set down some great thing.\n\nThis deliberation is either in _doubting_, or in _communication_.\n\nA _doubting_ is a deliberating with ourselves, as Paul (1 Philipp. i.\n23, 24), doubting whether it were better to die than to live, he\ngarnisheth his speech in this manner: _For I am greatly in doubt on both\nsides, desiring to be loosed, and to be with Christ, which is best of\nall: nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you_.\n\n_Communication_ is a deliberation with others. As, Galatians iii. 1, 2:\n_O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, &c._\n\nAnd hitherto of the figure of speech between two, called _deliberation_.\n\nNow followeth the figure of speech between two, called the _preventing\nof an objection_, or _occupation_.\n\n_Occupation_ is, when we do bring an objection, and yield an answer unto\nit. Therefore this speech between two, in the first part, is called the\nsetting down of the objection or occupation: in the latter part, an\nanswering of the objection or the subjection: as Rom. vi. 1: _What shall\nwe say then? Shall we continue still in sin, that grace may abound?_ In\nwhich words is set down the objection: the answering in these words,\n_God forbid_. And here this must be marked, that the objection is many\ntimes wanting, which must be wisely supplied by considering the occasion\nand answer of it: as 1 Tim. v. 11, 12: _They will marry, having\ncondemnation_. Now lest any might say, what, _for marrying?_ He\nanswereth: _No, for denying their first faith_.\n\nHitherto of the figures of _asking_. Now followeth the figures of\n_answering_. They are either in _suffering_ of a deed, called\n_permission_; or, _granting_ of an argument, called _concession_.\n\n_Suffering_ of a deed or permission is, when mockingly we give liberty\nto any deed, being never so filthy; as Rev. xxii. 11: _Let him that is\nfilthy, be filthy still_. And 1 Cor. xiv. 38: _If any be ignorant, let\nhim be ignorant_.\n\nConcession or granting of an argument is, when an argument is mockingly\nyielded unto, as Ecclesiastes xi. 9: _Rejoice, O young man, in thy\nyouth, and let thy heart cheer thee, &c._\n\n\n\n\n THE ART OF SOPHISTRY.\n\n\n ==========\n\n\nAlthough the rules of Sophistry be needless for them that be perfect in\n logic; yet because the knowledge of them bringeth some profit to the\n young beginners, both for the ready answering of the subtle\n arguments, and the better practising of logic and rhetoric, we have\n thought good to turn it into the English tongue.\n\n_Sophistry_ is the feigned art of _elenches_, or coloured reasons.\n\nA coloured reason, or _elench_, is a show of reason to deceive withal.\nIt is either when the deceit lieth in the _words_; or in the default of\nlogic, called a _sophism_.\n\nIn _words_, is either when the deceit lieth in _one word_; or in _words\njoined together_. _If it were, it should be, whosoever._\n\nIn _one word_, is either the _darkness_ of a word; or, the\n_doubtfulness_ of a word.\n\nThe _darkness_ of a word, or an insolence, deceiveth, when by a reason\nthe meaning is not understood, whether the strangeness be through the\noldness, newness, or swelling vanity of the words; and of the last sort\nis that spoken of in 2 Peter ii. 18.\n\nBy this fallacy the Papists conclude, the Fathers to be on their side\nfor deserving by good works.\n\n_Whosoever saith man\u2019s merits are crowned, they say man\u2019s works do\ndeserve._\n\n_But the Fathers say, man\u2019s merits are crowned._\n\n_Therefore the Fathers say, man\u2019s works do deserve._\n\nWhere _merits_ is an old word, put for any works done under the hope of\nreward, whether it come by desert or freedom of promise.\n\n_Doubtfulness_ of a word, _likeness_ of name, is either called\n_homonymia_; or by a trope or fineness of speech.\n\nThe _likeness_ of name, or _homonymia_, is when one word is given to\nsignify divers things: as,\n\n_He that believeth shall be saved._\n\n_The hypocrites to whom our Saviour Christ would not commit himself,\nbelieved,_\n\n_Therefore they shall be saved._\n\nWhere faith doth note out both a justifying faith, and a dead faith.\n\nDoubtfulness by a trope, is when a word is taken properly, which is\nmeant figuratively or contrarily: As, _That which Christ saith is true_.\n\n _Christ saith that bread is his body._\n _Therefore it is true._\n\nWhere by _body_ is meant the sign or sacrament of his body.\n\nUnto the first, a perfect logician would answer, that the proposition is\nnot an axiom necessarily true, according to the rule of truth, because\nof the doubtfulness of the old and new signification of _merit_. And if\nthe word be far worn out of use, that it be not understood, then the\nanswer must be, I understand it not, or put your axiom in plain words.\n\nTo the second he would answer, that the proposition or first part is not\naccording to the rule of righteousness, because the proper subject and\nadjunct are not joined together: which _hath justifying faith, or\nbelieving sincerely, shall be saved_; and then the assumption being in\nthe same sense inferred is false.\n\nUnto the third he would answer, that the assumption is not necessarily\ntrue; because if the word _body_ be taken properly, it is not then true\nthat is set down; but if it be taken figuratively, it is true, and\ntherefore would bid him make the assumption necessarily true, and then\nsay, Christ saith in proper words, _it is my body_; and then it is\nfalse.\n\nHitherto of the fallacies in single words. Now of those that are joined\ntogether.\n\nIt is either _amphibolia_, or the doubtfulness of speech: or\n_exposition_, or unapt setting down of the reason.\n\nThe first is, when there is doubtfulness in the frame of speech; as\nthus, _if any obey not our word by a letter, note him_: where some refer\n_by a letter_, to the first part of the sentence, and some to the\nlatter; where the signification of the word and right pointing doth show\nthat it must be referred to the first.\n\nThe answer is, that the right and wise placing of the sentence is\nperverted.\n\nUnapt setting down of the reason, is when the parts of the question and\nthe reasons entreated, are not set down in fit words: as,\n\n_All sin is evil._\n\n_Every child of God doth sin._\n\n_Therefore every child of God is evil._\n\nHere the answer according to logic, is that the assumption doth not take\nthe argument out of the proposition, but putteth in another thing; and\nso it is no right frame of concluding, as appeareth by the definition of\nthe assumption.\n\nHitherto of the deceits of reason, which lie in _words_. Now of the\ndefault of logic, called _sophism_.\n\nIt is either _general_ or _special_. The _general_ are those which\ncannot be referred to any _part of logic_. They are either begging of\nthe question, called the petition of the principle; or bragging of no\nproof.\n\nBegging of the question, is when nothing is brought to prove but the\nquestion, or that which is doubtful: as,\n\n_That righteousness, which is both by faith and works, doth justify._\n\n_But this righteousness, is inherent righteousness_: Ergo.\n\nHere the proposition in effect is nothing but a question.\n\n_If together with the blood of Christ, we must make perfect satisfaction\nfor our sins before we come to heaven; then there must be purgatory for\nthem that die without perfection._\n\n_But the first is so_: Ergo.\n\nWhere the argument they bring is as doubtful, and needeth as much proof,\nas the question.\n\nThe answer is this, out of the definition of the syllogism; that there\nis no new argument invented; therefore it cannot be a certain frame of\nconcluding.\n\nBragging of no proof, is when that which is brought is too much, called\n_redounding_.\n\nIt is either impertinent to another matter, called _heterogenium_; or a\nvain repetition, called _tautologia_.\n\nImpertinent, or not to the purpose, is when anything is brought for a\nproof, which is nothing near to the matter in hand; whereunto the common\nproverb giveth answer, _I ask you of cheese, you answer me of chalk_.\n\nA vain repetition, is when the same thing in effect, though not in\nwords, is repeated; as they that after a long time of prayer say, _Let\nus pray_. And this fallacy our Saviour Christ (Matt. vi. 5) condemneth\nin prayer. And this is a fault in method.\n\n_Special_ are those, which may be referred to certain parts of logic,\nand they are of two sorts. Such as are referred to the spring of\nreasons, called _invention_; or to judgment.\n\nThose referred to invention, are when anything is put for a reason,\nwhich is not; as no cause for a cause, no effect for an effect; and so\nof the rest.\n\nIn the distribution this is a proper fallacy, when anything simply or\ngenerally granted, thereby is inferred a certain respect or special not\nmeant nor intended: as,\n\n_He that saith there are not seven sacraments, saith true._\n\n_He that saith there are only three, saith there are not seven._\n\n_Therefore he that saith there are three, saith true._\n\nThe right answer is, that the proposition is not necessarily true; for\nthere may be a way to say there are not seven, and yet affirm an\nuntruth.\n\nFallacies of judgment, are those that are referred to the judgment of\none sentence, or of more.\n\nOf one sentence, either to the proprieties of an axiom, or to the sorts.\n\nTo the proprieties, as when a true is put for a false, and contrarily:\nan affirmative for a negative, and contrarily. So some take the words of\nSt. John, _I do not say concerning it, that you shall not pray_, for no\ndenial; when as it doth deny to pray for that sin.\n\nTo the sorts, are referred either to the simple or compound.\n\nThe first, when the general is taken for the special, and contrarily. So\nthe Papists, by this fallacy, do answer to that general saying of Paul;\n_We are justified with faith without the works of the law_: which they\nunderstand of works done before faith, when that was never called in\ndoubt.\n\nThe fallacies which are referred to a compound axiom, are those which\nare referred either to a _disjoined_, or _knitting_ axiom. To a\n_disjoined_ axiom, when the parts indeed are not _disjoined_: as,\n_Solomon was either a king, or did bear rule_.\n\nTo a _knitting_ axiom, is when the parts are not necessarily knit\ntogether; as, _If Rome be on fire, the Pope\u2019s chair is burnt_.\n\nAnd hitherto of the first sort of fallacies referred to judgment. Now\nfolloweth the second.\n\nAnd they be either those that are referred to a _syllogism_; or to\n_method_. And they again are _general_, and _special_. _General_, which\nare referred to the general properties of a syllogism. It is either when\nall the parts are _denied_; or are _particular_. All parts denied: as,\n\n_No pope is a devil._\n\n_No man is a devil._\n\n_Therefore no man is a pope._\n\nAnd this must be answered, that it is not according to the definition of\na negative syllogism, which must always have one affirmative.\n\nAll particular: as, _some unlawful thing must be suffered; as, namely,\nthat which cannot be taken away_,\n\n_The stews is some unlawful thing._\n\n_Therefore the stews must be suffered._\n\nThis is answered, by the definition of a special syllogism; which is,\nthat hath one part general.\n\nThe _special_, are those which are simple or compound.\n\nThe _simple_ is of two sorts. The first is more plain. The second less\nplain.\n\nMore plain, is when the assumption is denied, or the question is not\nparticular: as,\n\n_Every apostle may preach abroad_:\n\n_Some apostle is not a pope_,\n\n_Therefore some pope may not preach abroad_.\n\nAlso, _every pope is a lord_:\n\n_Some pope may give an universal license._\n\n_Therefore every lord may give an universal license_.\n\nLess plain, hath one fallacy in common, when the proposition is special:\nas,\n\n_Some player is a rogue_:\n\n_Every vagabond is a rogue_,\n\n_Therefore every player is a vagabond_.\n\nAlso, _some player is a rogue_:\n\n_Every vagabond is a player_,\n\n_Therefore every player is a rogue_.\n\nThe fallacy of the first kind, is when all the parts be affirmative: as,\n\n_All Paul\u2019s bishops were ordained for unity._\n\n_All archbishops be ordained for unity._\n\n_Therefore all archbishops are Paul\u2019s bishops._\n\nThe fallacy of the second kind is when the assumption is denied: as,\n\n_Every puritan is a Christian._\n\n_No Lord Bishop is a puritan_,\n\n_Therefore no Lord Bishop is a Christian_.\n\nHitherto of the fallacies referred to a _simple_ syllogism. Now follow\nthose which are referred to a _compound_; which are those which are\nreferred either to the _connexive_, or to the _disjoined_.\n\nOf the first sort, one is when the first part or antecedent is denied,\nthat the second or consequent may be so likewise: as,\n\n_If any man have two benefices, he may escape unpunished at the bishop\u2019s\nhands._\n\n_But he may not have two benefices_,\n\n_Therefore he may not escape unpunished at the bishop\u2019s hands_.\n\nThe second part is affirmed, that the first may be so also: as,\n\n_If every ignorant minister were put out of the church, and a preacher\nin his place, we should have good order_,\n\n_But we have good order_.\n\n_Therefore every ignorant minister is put out of the church, and a\npreacher in his place._\n\nOf those referred to the disjoined, the first is when all the parts of\nthe disjunction or proposition are not affirmed: as,\n\n_Every ignorant minister is to be allowed, or not._\n\n_But he is not._\n\n_Therefore he is._\n\nThe second kind, is when the second part of the copulative negative\naxiom is denied, that the first may be so: as,\n\n_A non-resident is either a faithful, or unfaithful minister._\n\n_But he is unfaithful. Ergo, &c._\n\nAnd thus much of the fallacies in a syllogism.\n\nThe fallacy in method is when, to deceive withal, the end is set in the\nbeginning, the special before the general; good order be gone,\nconfounded; and finally when darkness, length, and hardness, is laboured\nafter.\n\n END OF VOL. VI.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note\n\nIn the Table of Contents, the third section of this volume is entitled\n\u201cThe Whole Art of Rhetoric\u201d. This title also serves as page header at p.\n#421. However, at p. 419, the title page contains \u201cThe Art of Rhetoric\u201d\n(also the title of the following fourth section). To avoid confusion,\nthe word \u201cWHOLE\u201d has been added to p. 419.\n\nAt 70.34 \u201c_[2. ]That the design...\u201d_ The number \u20182\u2019 has no preceding\n\u20181\u2019.\n\nErrors deemed most likely to be the printer\u2019s have been corrected, and\nare noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.\n\n 22.18 of the spiritual law[.] Added.\n 40.15 which he wi[./l]l, Replaced.\n 41.9 as in the Court of Common Pleas[.] Added.\n 60.20 there was a ne[e/c]essity Replaced.\n 108.5 was this here[it/ti]c Legat burnt? Transposed.\n 175.23 It seems therefo[ re,/re, ]if Shifted.\n 240.26 St[r]ange injustice! Inserted.\n 270.1 frustrate h[sa/is a]ttempts Replaced.\n 276.28 _[B./A.]_ But philosophy Replaced.\n 293.7 _quas vulgus eleger[e/i]t_ Replaced.\n 321.4 most benefica[i]l to the commonwealth Inserted.\n 388.33 there was no Parli[r/a]ment Replaced.\n 419.1 THE [WHOLE ]ART OF RHETORIC. Added.\n 423.9 to _accuse_ and _ex[s/c]use_ Replaced.","title":"The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 06 (of 11)","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":149360}