{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_77777/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_77777","id":"gutenberg_77777","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/77777","summary":null,"tags":["Epicureans (Greek philosophy)","Epicurus, 341 B.C.-270 B.C.","Philosophy, Ancient","Skeptics (Greek philosophy)","Stoics"],"text":"THE\n STOICS, EPICUREANS\n AND\n SCEPTICS\n\n\n TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF\n Dr E. ZELLER\n Professor of the University of Heidelberg\n\n BY\n REV. OSWALD J. REICHEL, B.C.L., M.A.\n sometime Vice-Principal of Cuddesden College\n\n\n NEW AND REVISED EDITION\n\n LONDON\n LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.\n AND NEW YORK: 15 EAST 16th STREET\n 1892\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThe present translation aims at supplying an introductory volume to a\nlater period of the history of mind in Greece, which may be\ncollectively described as the post-Aristotelian. To the moralist and\ntheologian no less than to the student of philosophy this period is one\nof peculiar interest; for it supplied the scientific mould into which\nChristianity in the early years of its growth was cast, and bearing the\nshape of which it has come down to us.\n\nThe translation has been carefully revised for the present edition,\nwith the view of rendering more clear any passages which seemed\nobscure.\n\n\n \u00c0 la Ronde, near Lympstone, Devon:\n August 1891.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nPART I.\n\nSTATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF GREECE AT THE CLOSE OF THE\nFOURTH CENTURY B.C.\n\n PAGE\n A. Merits and defects of the systems of Plato and Aristotle 1\n B. Connection between the theories of Aristotle and the\n Greek character 6\n C. Greece after the battle of Ch\u00e6ronea 12\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nCHARACTER AND CHIEF FEATURES OF THE POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.\n\n A. Causes forming the post-Aristotelian philosophy 15\n 1. Political causes 15\n 2. Intellectual causes 17\n B. Common characteristics of the post-Aristotelian philosophy 19\n 1. Theory subordinated to practice 19\n 2. Peculiar mode of treating the practical problem 21\n 3. These peculiarities illustrated by subsequent\n philosophy 22\n C. Development of the post-Aristotelian philosophy 25\n 1. Dogmatic Schools\u2014Stoics and Epicureans, Dogmatic\n Scepticism 25\n 2. Sceptical Schools\u2014influences producing\u2014Scepticism and\n Eclecticism 26\n 3. Religious School of Neoplatonists 31\n\n\nPART II.\n\nTHE STOICS.\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nHISTORY OF THE STOICS UNTIL THE END OF THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.\n\n A. Zeno 36\n B. Pupils of Zeno 40\n 1. Cleanthes 40\n 2. Aristo and Herillus 41\n 3. Other pupils 43\n C. Chrysippus and the later Stoics 45\n 1. Chrysippus 45\n 2. Later Stoics 48\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nAUTHORITIES FOR THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY; ITS PROBLEM AND DIVISIONS.\n\n A. Authorities 53\n 1. Review of authorities 53\n 2. Use to be made of authorities 55\n B. Problem proposed to the Stoic philosophy 56\n 1. Its practical character 56\n 2. Necessity for intellectual knowledge 58\n 3. Attitude towards logic and natural science of Aristo\u2014\n of Zeno and Cleanthes 59\n C. Divisions of philosophy 66\n 1. Threefold division 67\n 2. Relative importance of each part 68\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nLOGIC OF THE STOICS.\n\n A. General remarks 70\n 1. Field of Logic 70\n 2. Words and thoughts 73\n B. Theory of knowledge 75\n 1. General character of this theory 75\n 2. Prominent points in the theory\u2014perceptions\u2014\n conceptions\u2014standards of truth 77\n C. Formal logic 92\n 1. Utterance in general 92\n 2. Incomplete expression\u2014words\u2014the categories 94\n 3. Complete utterance\u2014judgment\u2014inference\u2014fallacies 110\n D. Estimate of Stoic logic 123\n 1. Its shortcomings 123\n 2. Its value 123\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE STUDY OF NATURE: 1. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS.\n\n A. Materialism 126\n 1. Meaning of the Stoic Materialism 126\n 2. Causes which led to Stoic Materialism 132\n 3. Consequences of Stoic Materialism\u2014individual\n perceptions\u2014theory of universal mingling 135\n B. Dynamical theory of Nature 139\n 1. Matter and force 139\n 2. Nature of force 141\n 3. Deity\u2014God as force\u2014God as matter 148\n C. Pantheism 156\n 1. God identical with the world 156\n 2. Relative difference between God and the world 158\n 3. Views of Bo\u00ebthus 159\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE STUDY OF NATURE: 2. COURSE, CHARACTER, AND GOVERNMENT OF THE\nUNIVERSE.\n\n A. The General Course of the Universe 161\n 1. Origin of the world 161\n 2. End of the world 163\n 3. Cycles in the world\u2019s course 165\n B. Government of the World 170\n 1. Nature of Destiny\u2014as Providence\u2014as Generative Reason 170\n 2. Arguments in favour of Providence 173\n 3. The idea of Providence determined 175\n C. Nature of the world 182\n 1. Its unity and perfection 183\n 2. Moral theory of the world 187\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE STUDY OF NATURE: 3. IRRATIONAL NATURE. THE ELEMENTS.\u2014THE UNIVERSE.\n\n A. The most general ideas on Nature 194\n B. The Elements 197\n C. The Universe 202\n 1. The stars 204\n 2. Meteorology 206\n 3. Plants and animals 208\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nTHE STUDY OF NATURE: 4. MAN.\n\n A. The Soul 210\n 1. Materialistic nature of the soul 210\n 2. Divisions of the soul 213\n B. The Individual Soul and the Soul of the Universe 216\n C. Freedom and Immortality 219\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nETHICS: 1. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY\nOF MORALITY.\n\n A. The Highest Good 225\n 1. Nature of the Highest Good 225\n 2. The Good and Evil 230\n 3. Pleasure and the Good 235\n 4. Negative character of Happiness 239\n 5. The Highest Good as Law 240\n B. Emotions and Virtue 243\n 1. The Emotions\u2014their nature\u2014varieties of 243\n 2. Idea of Virtue\u2014positive and negative aspects of\u2014the\n virtues severally\u2014their mutual relations\u2014unity of\n virtue 254\n C. The Wise Man 268\n 1. Wisdom and Folly 268\n 2. Universal Depravity 272\n 3. Conversion 275\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nETHICS: 2. THE STOIC THEORY OF MORALS AS MODIFIED IN PRACTICE.\n\n A. Things to be preferred and eschewed 278\n 1. Secondary goods 280\n 2. Classes of things indifferent 281\n 3. Collision of modified and abstract theory 284\n B. Perfect and intermediate duties 287\n C. Emotions 290\n 1. Permitted affections 290\n 2. Modification of apathy 292\n 3. The state of progress 293\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nETHICS: 3. APPLIED MORAL SCIENCE.\n\n A. The Individual 301\n 1. Importance attaching to the individual 301\n 2. Cynicism of the Stoics 305\n B. Social Relations 311\n 1. Origin and use of society 311\n 2. Justice and mercy 315\n 3. Friendship 317\n 4. The family and civil life\u2014aversion to political\n life\u2014citizenship of the world 320\n C. Man and the Course of the World 332\n 1. Submission to the course of nature 332\n 2. Suicide 335\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nTHE RELATION OF THE STOICS TO RELIGION.\n\n A. General connection of Stoicism and Religion 341\n 1. Connection of Stoicism with popular faith 343\n 2. Free criticism of popular belief 344\n 3. The truth in Polytheism 348\n 4. Doctrine of Demons 351\n B. The Allegorising spirit 354\n 1. Allegorical interpretation of myths 354\n 2. Interpretation of myths respecting the Gods 357\n 3. Allegory applied to heroic myths 367\n C. Prophetic powers 369\n 1. Divination 370\n 2. Prophecy explained by natural causes 374\n 3. Causes of divination 377\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nTHE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS.\n\n A. Inner connection of the system 381\n 1. Ethical side of Stoicism 382\n 2. Scientific side of the Stoic system 383\n 3. Connection of the moral and scientific elements 385\n B. Relation of Stoicism to previous systems 387\n 1. Its relation to Socrates and the Cynics 387\n 2. Relation to Megarians and Heraclitus 392\n 3. Relation to Aristotle 396\n 4. Relation to Plato 399\n C. The Stoic philosophy as a whole 400\n 1. Its place in history 400\n 2. Its onesidedness 402\n\n\nPART III.\n\nTHE EPICUREANS.\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nEPICUREANS AND THE EPICUREAN SCHOOL.\n\n A. Epicurus 404\n B. Scholars of Epicurus 408\n C. Epicureans of the Roman period 411\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nCHARACTER AND DIVISIONS OF THE EPICUREAN TEACHING. THE TEST-SCIENCE OF\nTRUTH.\n\n A. Character of Epicurean system 418\n 1. Its power of self-preservation 418\n 2. Aim of philosophy according to the Epicureans 420\n 3. Divisions of philosophy 424\n B. Canonic or the Test-Science of Truth 425\n 1. Sensation and perception 425\n 2. Notions 428\n 3. Opinions 429\n 4. Standard of truth subjective 431\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\n\nTHE EPICUREAN VIEWS OF NATURE.\n\n A. General Views on Nature 434\n 1. Object, value, and method of the study of nature 434\n 2. Mechanical explanation of nature 437\n 3. Atoms and empty space 439\n B. The World 444\n 1. The swerving aside of atoms 444\n 2. Origin of the world 447\n 3. Arrangement of the universe 449\n 4. Plants and animals 451\n C. Mankind 451\n 1. Origin of the human race 451\n 2. The soul 453\n 3. Sensation 457\n 4. Will 459\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\n\nVIEWS OF EPICURUS ON RELIGION.\n\n A. Criticism of the Gods and the popular faith 462\n B. The Gods according to Epicurus 464\n 1. Reasons for his belief 464\n 2. Nature of the Epicurean Gods 467\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\n\nTHE MORAL SCIENCE OF THE EPICUREANS: 1. GENERAL VIEWS.\n\n A. Pleasure 472\n 1. Pleasure the Highest Good 472\n 2. Freedom from pain 474\n B. Intellectual Happiness 476\n 1. Intelligence 476\n 2. Reasons for rising superior to the senses 478\n 3. Virtue 480\n C. The Wise Man 483\n\nCHAPTER XX.\n\nTHE EPICUREAN ETHICS CONTINUED: 2. SPECIAL POINTS.\n\n A. The Individual 485\n B. Civil Society and the Family 490\n 1. Civil society 490\n 2. Family life 492\n C. Friendship 493\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\n\nTHE EPICUREAN SYSTEM AS A WHOLE. ITS POSITION IN HISTORY.\n\n A. Coherence of the Epicurean teaching 499\n B. Historical position of Epicureanism 503\n 1. Relation to Stoicism 503\n 2. Relation to Aristippus 508\n 3. Relation to Democritus 510\n 4. Relation to Aristotle and Plato 511\n\n\nPART IV.\n\nTHE SCEPTICS: PYRRHO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII.\n\nPYRRHO.\n\n A. Historical position of Scepticism 514\n 1. Relation to cotemporary dogmatic systems 514\n 2. Causes producing it 515\n 3. Pyrrho and his followers 517\n B. Teaching of Pyrrho 521\n 1. Impossibility of knowledge 521\n 2. Withholding of judgment 523\n 3. Mental imperturbability 525\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\n\nTHE NEW ACADEMY.\n\n A. Arcesilaus 528\n 1. Denial of knowledge 528\n 2. Probability 534\n B. Carneades 535\n 1. Negative views of 538\n 2. Positive views of 553\n C. School of Carneades 563\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX 567\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\nSTATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF GREECE AT THE CLOSE OF THE\nFOURTH CENTURY.\n\n\n[A. Merits and defects of the systems of Plato and Aristotle.]\n\nIn Plato and Aristotle Greek Philosophy reached its greatest\nperfection. In their hands the Socratic philosophy of conceptions grew\ninto elaborate systems, which embraced the whole range of contemporary\nknowledge, and grouped it from definite points of view so as to afford\na connected view of the universe. The study of nature was by them\nsupplemented by careful enquiries into the subject of morals. It was,\nmoreover, transformed, enlarged, and enriched by Aristotle. In\nmetaphysics, the foundations for a philosophical structure were deeply\nlaid, everything being referred to first principles, in a way which no\nprevious philosopher had before attempted. A multitude of phenomena\nwhich earlier thinkers had carelessly passed over, more particularly\nthe phenomena of mental life, were pressed into the service of\nresearch; new questions were raised; new answers given. New ideas had\npenetrated every branch of knowledge. That idealism in which the Greek\nmind so beautifully and lucidly found expression had been set forth by\nPlato in brilliant purity, and had been by Aristotle combined with\ncareful observation. Practice and theory had brought the dialectical\nmethod to the position of an art. A valuable instrument of thought had\nbeen gained in the scientific use of terms of which Aristotle was the\nreal originator. Within a few generations the intellectual treasures of\nGreece had been manifoldly increased, both in extent and value. The\nheritage received by Socrates from his predecessors could hardly be\nrecognised as the same in that which Aristotle left to his successors.\n\nGreat as was the progress made by Greek philosophy in the fourth\ncentury before Christ, quite as great were the difficulties with which\nit had perpetually to contend; quite as difficult the problems on the\nsolution of which it had to labour. Aristotle had already pointed out\nthe weak points in the system of Plato, which rendered it impossible\nfor him to accept that system as satisfactory. From the platform of\nlater knowledge still further objections might be raised to it. Even in\nAristotle\u2019s own system inconsistencies on some of the most important\npoints might be found, concealed under a certain indefiniteness of\nexpression, but fatal if once brought to light to the soundness of the\nwhole. For with all his ingenuity, Aristotle never succeeded in\nharmoniously blending all the elements out of which his system was\ncomposed. Thus the divergencies of his immediate followers from the\noriginal Aristotelian teaching may be accounted for.\n\nNor were these defects of a kind that could be easily disposed of. The\ndeeper the enquiry is carried, the clearer it becomes that they were\ndefects embedded in the foundations of the systems both of Plato and\nAristotle, and underlying the whole previous range of philosophic\nthought. Omitting details and minor points, they may all be ultimately\nreferred to two: either to an imperfect knowledge and experience of the\nworld, or to the overhaste of idealistic philosophy to draw\nconclusions. To the former defect may be attributed the mistakes in\nnatural science into which Plato and Aristotle fell, and the limited\ncharacter of their view of history; to the latter, the Platonic theory\nof ideas with all that it involves\u2014the antithesis of ideas and\nappearances, of reason and the senses, of knowledge and ignorance, of\nthe present world and the world to come\u2014and likewise the corresponding\npoints in the system of Aristotle; such, for instance (to name some of\nthe principal ones only), as the relation of the particular and the\ngeneral, of form and matter, of God and the world, of the theory of\nfinal causes and natural explanations, of the rational and the\nirrational parts of the soul, of speculative theory and practice.\n\nBoth defects are closely connected. The Greek philosophers were content\nwith an uncertain and imperfect knowledge of facts, because they\ntrusted conceptions too implicitly, and were ignorant of their origin\nand worth; and they had this unconditional trust in the truth of\nconceptions because the study of nature was yet in its infancy. Their\nknowledge of history was too limited for them to see the difference\nbetween the results of careful observation and those of ordinary\nunmethodical experience, to realise the uncertainty of most of the\ntraditional principles and the necessity for a stricter method of\ninduction. The fault common to both Plato and Aristotle lay in\nattaching undue prominence to the dialectical method inherited from\nSocrates to the neglect of observation, and in assuming that\nconceptions expressing the very essence of things can be deduced in a\npurely logical way from current beliefs and the use of language. In\nPlato this dialectical exclusiveness appears most strongly, and finds\nstriking expression in his theory of recollection. If all conceptions\nare inherent from the moment of birth and need only the agency of\nsensible things to produce a consciousness of their existence, it is\nonly legitimate to infer that, to know the essence of things, we must\nlook within and not without, and obtain ideas by abstraction from the\nmind rather than by induction from experience. It is equally legitimate\nto infer that the ideas derived from the mind are the true standard by\nwhich experience must be judged. Whenever ideas and experience\ndisagree, instead of regarding ideas as at fault, we ought to look upon\nthe data of experience as imperfect, and as inadequately expressing the\nideas which constitute the thing as it really exists. Thus the whole\ntheory of ideas, and all that it implies, is seen to be a natural\ncorollary from the Socratic theory of conceptions. Even those parts of\nthis theory which seem most incongruous are best explained by being\nreferred to the principles of the Socratic process.\n\nFrom this defective assumption Aristotle is only partially free. He\nattempted, it is true, to supply the defects in the Socratic and\nPlatonic theory of conceptions by observation of a kind with which\nPlato\u2019s experimental knowledge cannot be compared either for accuracy\nor extent. With that attempt he also combined a complete transformation\nof the Platonic metaphysics, whereby he secured the same position for\nparticulars in relation to the universal that his predecessor had\nsecured for observation in relation to conceptional knowledge. But\nAristotle did not go far enough. In his theory of knowledge he cannot\nwholly discard the assumption that the soul has its knowledge by a\nprocess of development from within, and is not only endowed with the\ncapacity of thinking, but possesses also from its birth the substance\nof ideas. In his scientific method a critical investigation of common\nnotions and of idiom\u2014that in fact which he himself calls proof by\nprobabilities\u2014is constantly taking the place of strict induction. His\nendeavours to harmonise the two antagonistic currents in Plato\u2019s\nteaching may have been undertaken in all sincerity, but the antagonism\nwas too deeply seated to yield to his efforts. It not only reappears in\nthe fundamental ideas of his system, but it colours all its general\nresults. Beginning with the antithesis between form and matter, it ends\nin the contrast between the world and a soul independent of the world,\nin the conception of reason as something above man, never combining\nwith the lower parts of his nature to form one complete living unity.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Connection between the theories of Aristotle and Greek character.]\n\nGranting that the Socratic philosophy of conceptions is the source from\nwhich these peculiarities are derived, still that philosophy is itself\nonly the expression of the character of the nation which produced it.\nIn an earlier work it has been shown [1] that the most distinctive\nfeature of Greek life lay in confounding the outer and the inner\nworlds, in ingenuously assuming that the two originally corresponded,\nand are still in perfect harmony with one another. When the whole\nmental life of a people bears this impress, it is sure to be reflected\nin its philosophy also. Together with the advantages which accrue from\nthe confusion of the two, philosophy shares also the disadvantages\nwhich unavoidably attend any theory which ignores the real distinction\nbetween them. The mind only gradually and imperfectly becomes aware of\nthe distinctive peculiarity of mental life, of the notion of\npersonality, of the fact that moral rights and duties are independent\nof external circumstances, of the share of the individual will in\ncreating ideas. It has also less hesitation in transferring phases of\nconsciousness directly to things themselves, in regarding the world\nfrom ideal points of view borrowed from the sphere of mind, in\naccepting its own notions of things as realities without testing their\nactual truth, and even treating them as more real than the reality of\nthe senses, and in confounding the critical analysis of a notion with\nthe experimental investigation of a thing. If the philosophy of Greece\nin the time of its greatest perfection was not free from these defects;\nif, further, these defects were the cause of all the important faults\nin the systems of Plato and Aristotle; the creators of these systems\nand their immediate successors are not the only ones to blame; but the\nwhole mental peculiarity of the people is at fault of which within the\nprovince of science these men were the greatest representatives.\n\nAs the faults of the Platonic and Aristotelian systems are seen to be\nconnected with the general character of Greek life, it becomes obvious\nhow difficult it must have been for Greeks to emancipate themselves\nfrom them. To overcome the difficulty nothing short of a radical\nbreaking away from old lines of thought would avail. The origin of\nideas, the primary meaning of conceptions, must be enquired into with\nsearching thoroughness; a sharper distinction must be drawn between\nwhat is supplied from without and what is supplied from within; the\ntruth of axioms hitherto received in metaphysics must be more carefully\ninvestigated than had ever been done as yet. The intellect must\naccustom itself to an accuracy of observation, and to a strictness of\ninductive process, never before reached in Greece. Experimental\nsciences must attain a degree of completeness which it was vain to hope\nto reach by the methods and means then in vogue. The fashion of\nregarding nature as though it were a living being which allowed\nquestions as to facts to be answered by speculations as to final causes\nor by the desire of nature to realise beauty, must be abandoned.\nEnquiries into a man\u2019s moral nature and duties must be kept apart from\nthe simple study of his conduct in relation to natural surroundings,\nthe disastrous effects which flow from the confusion of the two being\nonly too apparent in the national type of the Greeks, in the\nexclusively political character of their morality, and in their\nadherence to slavery.\n\nBefore this pass could be reached how much was there not to alter in\nthe condition and mental habit of Greece! Could it indeed be expected\nthat a more vigorous and more scientific method would gain foothold so\nlong as the tendency to look upon the life of nature as analogous to\nthe life of man was kept alive by a religion such as that of Hellas? Or\nthat moral science would liberate itself from the trammels of Greek\npropriety of conduct, whilst in all practical matters those trammels\nwere in full force? Or that a clearer distinction would be drawn\nbetween what comes from without and what from within in ideas\u2014a\ndistinction which we vainly look for in Aristotle\u2014until a depth and an\nintensity had been given to the inner life, and until the rights and\nvalue of the individual as such had obtained a recognition which it\nrequired the combined influence of Christianity and the peculiar\nGermanic character to bring about? The more vividly the national type\nand the national conditions surrounding Greek philosophy are realised,\nthe firmer becomes the conviction, that to heal its defects\u2014which are\napparent even in its greatest and most brilliant achievements\u2014nothing\nshort of a revolution in the whole mental tone of Greece would\navail\u2014such as history has seen accomplished, but not till after many\nshifts and many centuries.\n\nOn the platform of the ancient life of Greece such a change could not\npossibly have come about. It may be that under more favourable\ncircumstances Greek philosophy might have further developed along the\nsame course of purely intellectual enquiry which it had previously so\nsuccessfully followed in the hands of its earlier representatives, more\nparticularly of Aristotle. What results might in this way have been\nattained, we cannot exactly determine. Speculation is, however,\nuseless. In point of fact, the historical circumstances under which\nphilosophy had to grow cannot be ignored. Philosophy had become what it\nwas under the influence of those circumstances. The Socratic theory of\nconceptions, and Plato\u2019s theory of ideas, presuppose on the one hand\nthe high culture of the age of Pericles, and the brilliant career of\nAthens and Greece following on the Persian war. They also presuppose\nthe political degradation and the moral exhaustion of Greece during and\nafter the Peloponnesian war. Aristotle, with his high intellectual\nculture, despairing of everything direct and practical, with his wide\nview of things, his knowledge of every kind, his system matured and\nelaborate, and embracing all the results of previous enquiry\u2014appears as\nthe child of an age which was bearing to the grave a great historical\nepoch, in which intellectual labour had begun to take the place of\nvigorous political action.\n\nThe bloom of Greek philosophy was short-lived, but not more short-lived\nthan the bloom of national life. The one was dependent on the other,\nand both were due to the action of the same causes. The Greeks, with a\nhigh appreciation of freedom, a ready aptitude for politics, and a\ngenius for artistic creations, produced within the sphere of politics\none result of its kind unrivalled and unique. They neglected, however,\nto lay the foundations wide and deep. Their political endurance was not\nequal to their versatility and restlessness. Communities limited in\nextent and simple in arrangement sufficed for them. But how could such\ncommunities include all branches of the Greek family, and satisfy at\nonce all legitimate aspirations? It is the same within the department\nof science. Prematurely concluding and rashly advancing from isolated\nexperiences without mediating links to the most general conceptions,\nthey constructed theories upon a foundation of limited and imperfect\nexperience, which it was wholly inadequate to bear. Whether, and in how\nfar, the intellect of Greece, if left to itself, might have remedied\nthese defects in a longer protracted calm of development, is a question\nwhich it is impossible to answer. As a fact, that intellect was far too\nintimately bound up with the political, the moral, and the religious\nlife\u2014in short, with the whole mental tone and culture of the people\u2014not\nto be seriously affected by a change in any one of them. It lay, too,\nin the character and historical progress of that people to have only a\nbrief period of splendour, and that soon over. At the time that the\nphilosophy of Greece reached its highest point in Plato and Aristotle,\nGreece was in all other respects in a hopeless state of decline.\nNotwithstanding individual attempts to revive it, the old morality and\npropriety of conduct had disappeared since the beginning of the\nPeloponnesian war. The old belief in the gods was likewise gone. To the\nbulk of the people the rising philosophy with its ethics afforded no\nsubstitute. Art, although carefully cultivated, failed to come up to\nthe excellence of the strictly classic period. Political relations\nbecame daily more unsatisfactory. In the fifth century before Christ\nthe rivalry of Athens and Sparta had ranged the states of Greece into\ntwo groups. In the succeeding century disunion spread further. The\neffort made by Thebes under Epaminondas to found a new leadership only\nmultiplied parties. Destitute of a political centre of gravity, the\nGreeks, of their own choice, drifted into a disgraceful dependence on\nthe conquered and now declining Persian empire. Persian gold wielded an\ninfluence which Persian arms had been unable to exercise. The petty\njealousies of tiny states and tribes frittered away in endless local\nfeuds resources which with unity and leadership might have accomplished\nwonders. Civil order declined, and with it the well-being and martial\nprowess of the nation declined also. The growing pursuit of the art of\nwar as a profession took the decision of battle more and more out of\nthe hands of free citizens, and placed it in those of the numerous\nbands of mercenaries which are one of the most baneful phenomena of\nthat age, a sure sign of the decline of freedom, and of the approach of\na military despotism. When by the rise of the Macedonian power the\ndanger of a military despotism loomed nearer, patriots in Greece\ncontinued to deceive themselves with the hope that their self-devotion\nwould avert the danger, but any unbiassed reader of history sees in the\nfailure of their attempts to avert it the natural and inevitable result\nof causes so deeply rooted in the Greek character and the course of\nGreek history, that neither the most heroic exertions of individuals,\nnor the united resistance of the divided states, which came too late,\ncould for one moment have rendered the final issue doubtful.\n\n\n\n\n[C. Greece after the battle of Ch\u00e6ronea.]\n\nBy the battle of Ch\u00e6ronea the doom of Greece was sealed. Never since\nthen has Greece attained to real political freedom. All attempts to\nshake off the Macedonian supremacy ended in humiliating disasters. In\nthe subsequent struggles Hellas, and Athens in particular, were the\nplay-ball of changing rulers, the continual arena of their warfare. The\nsecond half of the third century was reached before a purely Grecian\npower\u2014the Ach\u00e6an League\u2014was formed, round which the hopes of the nation\nrallied, but the attempt was wholly inadequate to meet the real\nrequirements of the times. Soon it became apparent that no remedies\nwere forthcoming to heal the ills from which the country was suffering.\nDiscord, their old hereditary failing, rendered it impossible for\nGreeks to be independent in foreign relations, or to be united and\nsettled at home. Their best resources were wasted in perpetual\nstruggles between Ach\u00e6ans, \u00c6tolians, and Spartans. The very individual\nwho led the Ach\u00e6ans against the Macedonians in the cause of\nindependence, called the Macedonians back to the Peloponnesus to gain\ntheir support against Sparta. When the supremacy of Macedonia was\nbroken by the arms of Rome, a more avowed dependence on Italian allies\nsucceeded. And when, in the year 146 B.C., the province of Achaia was\nincorporated into the Roman empire, even the shadow of freedom which up\nto that time had been assured departed for ever.\n\nSad as were the external affairs of Greece at this period, and marked\nas was the decline of its intellectual power, its mental horizon,\nnevertheless, extended and its culture became more generally diffused.\nThe Macedonian ascendency, which gave the death-blow to the\nindependence of Greece, also broke down the barriers which had hitherto\nseparated Greeks from foreigners. A new world was opened out before\nthem, and a vast territory offered for their energies to explore.\nGreece was brought into manifold contact with the Eastern nations\nbelonging to the Macedonian monarchy, whereby it secured for its\nculture the place of honour among them, but at the same time became\nsubject to a slow, but, in the long run, important back-current of\nOriental thought, traces of which appear in its philosophy a few\ncenturies later. By the side of the old famed centres of learning in\nthe mother country of Hellas, new centres arose, suited by position,\ninhabitants, and peculiar circumstances to unite the culture of East\nand West, and to fuse into one homogeneous mass the intellectual forces\nof different races. Whilst Hellas, by the number of emigrants who left\nher shores to settle in Asia and Egypt, was losing her population and\nthe Greeks in their ancestral homes were being ousted by foreigners,\nthey were gaining the most extensive intellectual conquests at the time\nover the very nations by and through whom they had been oppressed.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nCHARACTER AND CHIEF FEATURES OF THE POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n[A. Causes producing the post-Aristotelian philosophy.]\n\nThe circumstances which have been briefly sketched in the preceding\nchapter are of the greatest importance in their bearing on the\ncharacter of the post-Aristotelian philosophy. Greek philosophy, like\nGreek art, is the offspring of Greek political independence. In the\nwhirl of public life every one is thrown on himself and his own\nresources. Thereby, and by the emulation begotten of unlimited\ncompetition for all the good things of life, the Greek had learned to\nmake full use of his intellect. Consciousness of his dignity\u2014which a\nGreek associated far more closely than we do with the privilege of\ncitizenship\u2014and independence of the necessity of struggling for daily\nfood, had taught him independence of mind, and enabled him to devote\nhimself to the pursuit of knowledge without any ulterior aim. [2]\n\n\n\n[(1) Political causes.]\n\nWith the decline of political independence the mental powers of the\nnation were broken past remedy. No longer borne up by a powerful esprit\nde corps, weaned from the habit of working for the common weal, the\nmajority gave themselves up to the petty interests of private life and\npersonal affairs. Even the better disposed were too much occupied in\ncontending against the low tone and corruption of their times, to be\nable to devote themselves in moments of relaxation to independent\nspeculation. What could be expected in such an age as that which\npreceded the rise of the Stoic and Epicurean systems, but that\nphilosophy would become practical itself, if indeed it were studied at\nall?\n\nAn age like that did not require theoretical knowledge, but it did\nrequire moral bracing and strengthening. If these were not to be had\nfrom popular religion in its then state, was it matter for wonder that\nphilosophy should be looked to to supply the deficiency, seeing that in\nall cultivated circles philosophy had already taken the place of\nreligion? If we ask in what form, and in what form only, philosophy\ncould supply the deficiency under the then circumstances, the answer is\nnot far to seek. There was little room for creative effort, plenty for\nsustained endurance; little for activity without, plenty for activity\nwithin; little room for public life, plenty of room for private life.\nSo utterly hopeless had the public state of Greece become, that even\nthe few who made it their business to provide a remedy could only gain\nfor themselves the honour of martyrdom. As matters stood, the only\ncourse open for the best-intentioned was to withdraw entirely within\nthemselves, to entrench themselves within the safe barriers of their\ninner life against outward misfortunes, and to make happiness dependent\nentirely on their own inward state.\n\nStoic apathy, Epicurean self-contentment, and Sceptic imperturbability,\nwere the doctrines which suited the political helplessness of the age,\nand they were therefore the doctrines which met with the most general\nacceptance. There was yet another which suited it\u2014viz., the sinking of\nnational distinctions in the feeling of a common humanity, the\nseverance of morals from politics which characterises the philosophy of\nthe Alexandrian and Roman period. The barriers which kept nations apart\nhad been swept away, together with their national independence: East\nand West, Greeks and barbarians, were united in large empires, brought\ninto communication and forced into comparison with one another in\nmatters the most important. Philosophy declared that all men are of one\nblood and are equally privileged citizens of one empire, that morality\nrests on the relation of man to man, and is independent of nationality\nand position in the state; but in so doing it only explicitly stated a\ntruth which was partly realised and partly implied in actual life.\n\n\n\n[(2) Intellectual causes.]\n\nThe very course which philosophy itself had taken during the previous\ncentury and a half had prepared the way for the turn which now set in.\nSocrates and the Sophists, in different ways no doubt, had each devoted\nthemselves to the practical side of life; and thus the Cynic School was\nthe precursor of Stoicism, the Cyrenaic of Epicureanism. These two\nSchools are, however, only of minor importance in the general progress\nof philosophy in the fourth century, and sophistry by the close of the\nsame century was already a thing of the past. Socrates, it is true,\nwould have nothing to do with physical enquiries; yet he felt the\ndesire for knowledge far too keenly to bear comparison with the\npost-Aristotelian philosophers. Proposing to concern himself only with\nsubjects which were of practical use in life, he yet put forth a theory\nof knowledge which involved a reform quite as much of speculative as of\npractical philosophy, and that reform was accomplished on a grand scale\nby Plato and Aristotle.\n\nHowever little Greek philosophy as a whole developed during the fourth\ncentury along the lines of its subsequent expansion, still the\nspeculations of Plato and Aristotle necessarily helped to prepare for\nthe coming charge. The antagonism between the ideal and phenomenal\nworlds which Plato set up, and Aristotle vainly attempted to bridge\nover, leads ultimately to a contrast between the outer and the inner\nlife, between thought and the object of thought. The generic\nconceptions or forms, which Plato and Aristotle regard as most truly\nreal, are, after all, fabrications of the human mind. The conception of\nreason, even in its expanded form as the divine Reason, or reason of\nthe world, is an idea formed by abstraction from the inner life. And\nwhat is really meant by identifying form in itself with what is, and\nmatter with what is possible, or even (as Plato does) with what is not,\nor by placing God outside of and in contrast to the world, but the\nadmission that man finds in his own mind a higher and more real\nexistence than any which he finds outside of it, and that what is truly\ndivine and unlimited must be in the mind as an idea, apart from and\nindependent of all impressions from without? Plato and Aristotle in\nfact declared that reason constitutes the real essence of man\u2014reason\ncoming from above and uniting itself with the body, but in itself\nsuperior to the world of sense and life in time\u2014and that man\u2019s highest\nactivity is thought, turned away from all external things, and\nmeditating only on the inner world of ideas. It was only one step\nfurther in the same direction for the post-Aristotelian philosophy to\ncontemplate man in complete severance from the outer world, and to\nrefer him to himself for that satisfaction which he can find nowhere\nelse in life.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Common characteristics of the post-Aristotelian philosophy.]\n\nThis step was taken by the Schools of the Stoics, Epicureans, and\nSceptics which appeared in the first half of the third century before\nChrist, superseded the influence of the older Schools, and asserted\ntheir supremacy without great variation in their teaching until the\nbeginning of the first century. In whatever else these three Schools\nmay differ, at least they agree in two fundamental points, (1) in\nsubordinating theory to practice, and (2) in the peculiar character of\ntheir practical philosophy.\n\n\n\n[(1) Theory subordinated to practice.]\n\nThe subordination of theory to practice is most apparent in the School\nof Epicurus. It is nearly as clear in the case of the Sceptics, who,\ndenying all possibility of knowledge, left as the only ground of action\nconviction based on probabilities. Both Schools also agree in\nconsidering philosophy as only a means for securing happiness. By the\nStoics, on the other hand, the need of philosophic speculation was felt\nmore strongly; but even in their case it may be seen that speculation\nwas not pursued simply for its own sake, but for practical purposes, by\nwhich it was also determined. Thus the Stoics, like the Epicureans, in\nthe speculative part of their system confined themselves to current\nviews\u2014thereby showing that the source of their philosophical\npeculiarities lay elsewhere than in speculation, and that other studies\nhad greater value in their eyes, in which also they considered\nthemselves more proficient. They even expressly stated that the study\nof nature is only necessary as a help to the study of virtue. It is\nbeyond question, that their chief peculiarities, and those which give\nthem an importance in history, are ethical. The other parts of their\nsystem, more particularly those in which their distinctive tenets\nappear, are likewise regulated by practical considerations. This\nstatement will hereafter be shown in detail. It may suffice to observe\nnow, that the most important point in the logic of the Stoics\u2014the\nquestion as to the standard of truth\u2014was decided by a practical\npostulate; that the fundamental principles of the Stoic metaphysics are\nonly intelligible from the ground of their ethics; that for natural\nscience the Stoics did very little; that in their theory of final\ncauses on which they lay so much stress nature is explained by moral\nconsiderations; and that their natural as well as their positive\ntheology bears ample testimony to the practical tone of their system.\nStanding in advance of the Epicureans by their higher intellectual\ntraining and their learned energy, and in opposition to the Sceptics by\ntheir dogmatism, the Stoics nevertheless agree with both these Schools\nin the essentially practical character of their teaching.\n\n\n\n[(2) Peculiar mode of dealing with the practical problem.]\n\nThis relationship is more strikingly seen in the way in which they deal\nwith the practical problem. The Epicurean imperturbability is akin to\nthat of the Sceptics; both resemble the Stoic apathy. All three Schools\nare agreed that the only way to happiness consists in peace of mind,\nand in avoiding all those disturbances which sometimes arise from\nexternal influences, at other times from internal emotions; they are\nonly divided as to the means by which peace of mind may be secured.\nThey are also agreed in making moral activity independent of external\ncircumstances, and in separating morals from politics, although only\nthe Stoics set up the doctrine of the original unity of the whole human\nfamily, and insist on being citizens of the world. Through all the\nSchools runs the common trait of referring everything to the subject,\nand constantly falling back on man and his own inner life, one\nconsequence of which is the prominence given to action in preference to\nspeculation, and another that action is determined by personal\ncertainty, and a mental equilibrium which must be attained by the\nexercise of will and the cultivation of the intellect.\n\n\n\n[(3) Their peculiarities illustrated by subsequent philosophy.]\n\nThe same character belongs to philosophy in the centuries succeeding\nthe rise of these three Schools; during which the circumstances which\nproduced that character were not materially altered. In addition to the\nfollowers of the old Schools, Eclectics are now met with, who gather\nfrom every system what seems true and probable. In this process of\nselection their guiding principle is regard for the practical wants of\nman. Hence the ultimate standard of truth is placed in personal\nconsciousness. Everything is referred to the subject as its centre. In\nethics and natural theology the Eclectics were mainly indebted to the\nStoics. A new School of Sceptics also arose, not differing in its\ntendencies from the older one. Neopythagoreans and Platonists appeared,\nnot satisfied with human knowledge, but aspiring to higher revelations.\nProfessing to appeal to the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle, these\nphilosophers betray their connection with the later post-Aristotelian\nSchools, not only by borrowing largely from the Stoics for the material\nfor their theology and ethics, but also by their general tone;\nknowledge is for them less even than for the Stoics an end in itself,\nand they are further from natural science. With them philosophy is\nsubservient to the interests of religion; its aim is to bring men into\nproper relation with God; and the religious needs of mankind are the\nhighest authority for science.\n\nThe same observations apply also to Plotinus and his successors. These\nphilosophers are not lacking in an elaborate science of metaphysics.\nThe care which they devoted to this science leaves no doubt as to their\nlively interest in scientific completeness and systematic arrangement.\nFor all that their speculative efforts bear the same relation to the\npractical aim of philosophy as those of the Stoics, who in point of\nlearning and logical elaboration of a system are quite their equals. A\nreal interest in knowledge was no doubt one of the elements which\nbrought Neoplatonism into being; but it was not strong enough to\ncounterbalance another, the practical and religious sentiment. The mind\nwas not sufficiently independent to be able to get on without appealing\nto intellectual and theological authorities; the scientific procedure\nwas too mixed to lead to a simple study of things as they are. As in\nthe case of the Neopythagoreans, the ultimate ground of the system is a\nreligious want. The divine world is only a portion of human thought\nprojected out of the mind, and incapable of being fully grasped by the\nunderstanding. The highest business of philosophy is to reunite man\nwith the divine world external to himself. To attain this end, all the\nmeans which science supplies are employed. Philosophy endeavours to\nexplain the steps by which the finite gradually came to be separated\nfrom the original infinite being; it seeks to bring about a return by a\nregular and systematic course; and in this attempt the philosophic\nspirit of Greece, by no means extinct, proved its powers by a result of\nits kind unrivalled. In the first instance, no doubt, the problem was\nso raised as to press philosophy into the service of religion; but, in\nthe long run, it became apparent that, with the premises assumed, a\nscientific solution of the religious question was impossible. The idea\nof an original being with which the system started was a reflex of the\nreligious sentiment, and not the result of scientific research, and the\ndoctrine of a mystical union with a transcendental being was a\nreligious postulate, the gratuitous assumption of which betrays an\norigin in the mind of the thinker. The platform of Neoplatonism is the\nsame, therefore, as that of the other post-Aristotelian systems; and it\nis hardly necessary in proof of this position to point to the agreement\nof Neoplatonism in other respects with Stoicism, and especially in\nethics. Far as the two systems lie asunder, the one standing at the\nbeginning the other at the end of the post-Aristotelian philosophy,\nnevertheless both display one and the same attitude of thought; and we\npass from one to the other by a continuous series of intermediate\nlinks.\n\nIn passing from School to School the post-Aristotelian philosophy\nassumed, as might be expected, various modifications of character in\ncourse of time; nevertheless, it retained a certain mental habit and\ncertain common elements. Such was the neglect of intellectual\noriginality, which drove some thinkers to a sceptical denial of all\nknowledge, and induced others to take their knowledge at second hand\nfrom older authorities. Such was the prominence given to practical over\nspeculative questions. Such was the disregard for natural science, and,\nin comparison with former times, the greater importance attached to\ntheology, apparent not only in the controversy between the Epicureans\nand Stoics, but also in the apologetic writings of the Stoics and\nPlatonists. Such, too, was the negative morality which aimed at\nindependence of the outer world, at mental composure, and philosophic\ncontentment; the separation of morals from politics; the moral\nuniversalism and citizenship of the world; the going within self into\nthe depths of the soul, the will, and the thinking powers; the\ndeepening of the consciousness accompanied at the same time by a\nnarrowing and isolation of it, and the loss of a lively interest in the\nouter world, and in the simple scientific study thereof.\n\n\n\n\n[C. Development of post-Aristotelian philosophy.]\n\n[(1) Dogmatic Schools.]\n\n[(a) Stoics and Epicureans.]\n\nThis mental habit, first of all, found simple dogmatic expression in\nphilosophical systems. Not only moral science, but also logic and\nnatural science, were treated in a way consonant with it, although they\nwere partially built upon older views. In dealing with the moral\nproblem, two Schools come to view, markedly different and decided in\ntheir peculiarities. The Stoics regard almost exclusively the universal\nelement in man who seeks contentment within, the Epicureans catch at\nthe individual side of his being. The Stoics regard man exclusively as\na thinking being, the Epicureans as a creature of feeling. The Stoics\nmake happiness to consist in subordination to the law of the whole, in\nthe suppression of personal feelings and inclinations, in virtue; the\nEpicureans in individual independence of everything external, in the\nunruffled serenity of the inner life, in painlessness. The theoretical\nbases of their teaching correspond with these fundamental ethical\npositions.\n\n\n[(b) Dogmatic scepticism.]\n\nAlthough the rivalry between these two Schools was great, both,\nnevertheless, stand on the same platform. Absolute composure of mind,\nfreedom of the inner life from all disturbance from without, is the\ngoal at which both aim, although they follow different methods. Hence\nit becomes necessary to insist on the common element as the essential\naim and matter of philosophy. If the philosophic axioms of the two\nsystems contradict one another, it may be thence inferred that the aim\nof both may be attained independently of any definite dogmatic view; in\nshort, knowledge may be despaired of in order to pass from a\nrecognition of ignorance to a general indifference to everything and to\nan unconditional repose of mind. Thus Scepticism is connected with\nStoicism and Epicureanism, as the third chief form of the philosophy of\nthat age. Apart from Pyrrho\u2019s School, it is most effectually\nrepresented in the New Academy.\n\n\n\n[(2) Sceptical Schools.]\n\n[(a) Influences producing Scepticism.]\n\n[(\u03b1) Political influence of Rome.]\n\nThe rise, the growth, and the conflict of these three Schools, by the\nside of which the older Schools have only a subordinate value, occupies\nthe first portion of the period of post-Aristotelian philosophy, and\nextends from the end of the fourth to the beginning of the first\ncentury before Christ. The distinctive features of this epoch consist\npartly in the predominance of the above tendencies, and partly in their\nseparate existence, without modification by intermixture. After the\nmiddle of the second century a gradual change may be observed. Greece\nhad then become a Roman province, and the intellectual intercourse\nbetween Greece and Rome was continually on the increase. Many learned\nGreeks resided at Rome, frequently as the companions of families of\nhigh birth; others living in their own country, were visited by Roman\npupils. Was it possible that in the face of the clearly-defined and\nsharply-expressed Roman character, the power and independence of the\nGreek intellect, already unquestionably on the decline, would assert\nits ancient supremacy? Or that Greeks could become the teachers of\nRomans without accommodating themselves to their demands, and\nexperiencing in turn a reflex influence? Even Greek philosophy could\nnot withdraw itself from this influence. Its creative power was long\nsince in abeyance, and in Scepticism it had openly avowed that it could\nplace no trust in itself. To the practical sense of a Roman no\nphilosophical system commended itself which did not make for practical\nresults by the shortest possible route. To him practical needs were the\nultimate standard of truth. Little did he care for strict logic and\nargumentative accuracy in scientific procedure. Differences of schools,\nso long as they had no practical bearing, were for him of no\nimportance. No wonder that Greek philosophy, touched by the breath of\nRome, lent itself to Eclecticism!\n\n[(\u03b2) Intellectual influence of Alexandria.]\n\nWhilst on the one side of the world the Greeks were falling under the\ninfluence of the nation that had subdued them, on the other they were\nassimilating the views of the Oriental nations whom they had subdued by\nmartial as well as by mental superiority. For two centuries, in\nphilosophy at least, Greece had held her own against Oriental modes of\nthought. Now that her intellectual incapacity continually increased,\nthose modes of thought gained for themselves a foothold in her\nphilosophy. Alexandria was the place where the connection of Greece\nwith the East was first and most completely brought about. In that\ncentre of commerce for all parts of the globe, East and West entered\ninto a connection more intimate and more lasting than in any other\ncentre. Nor was this connection a mere accident of circumstances; it\nwas also a work of political forecast. From its founder, Ptolemy Soter,\nthe Ptolem\u00e6an dynasty inherited as the principle of government the rule\nalways to combine what is native with what is foreign, and to clothe\nnew things in the old and venerable forms of Egyptian custom and\nreligious ceremony. At Alexandria, accordingly, there arose, towards\nthe beginning of the first century before Christ, a School calling\nitself at first Platonic, afterwards Pythagorean, which later still, in\nthe shape of Neoplatonism, gained the ascendency over the whole domain\nof philosophy. The very fact, however, that such a change in\nphilosophic views did not appear sooner, is sufficient to show that it\nwas produced by external circumstances. But notwithstanding external\ncircumstances it would never have come about had not the intellect of\nGreece in the course of its own development been ripe for it.\n\n\n[(b) Scepticism and Eclecticism.]\n\nThe same remark holds good of the rise of that practical Eclecticism\nwhich we have before traced to the influence of Rome. Even in the\nperiod of intellectual exhaustion, Greek philosophy was not simply the\nresultant of its outward surroundings, but, under the influence of\noutward surroundings, took shape in a way indicated by its previous\nprogress. If the lingering remains of a few small Schools, which soon\nexpired, are excepted, there existed, after the beginning of the third\ncentury before Christ, only four great philosophic Schools\u2014the\nPeripatetic, the Stoic, the Epicurean, and the School of Platonists.\nThe last-named of these was converted to Scepticism by Arcesilaus.\nThese four Schools were all permanently established at Athens, where a\nlively interchange of thought took place between them, which renders a\nthorough comparison of their several teachings comparatively easy. It\nwas only natural that they would not long exist side by side without\nmaking overtures towards union and agreement. These overtures were\nfavoured by Scepticism, which, denying the possibility of knowledge,\nonly allowed a choice between probabilities, and decided that choice by\nthe standard of practical needs. Hence, towards the close of the second\ncentury before Christ, these philosophic Schools may be observed to\nemerge more or less from their exclusiveness. An eclectic tendency\nsteals over philosophy, aiming not so much at scientific knowledge as\nat attaining certain results for practical use. The distinctive\ndoctrines of each School drop into the background; and in the belief\nthat infallibility resides solely in the mind itself, such portions are\nselected from each system as seem most in harmony with the selecting\nmind. The germ of this eclectic mode of thought lay in Scepticism. On\nthe other hand, Eclecticism involves doubt. Hence, soon after the\nChristian era, a new school of doubt developed, which continued until\nthe third century. There was thus, on the one hand, a lively interest\nin knowledge, which was desired in the practical interest of religion\nand morals; and, on the other hand, a disbelief in the truths of\nexisting knowledge, and, indeed, of knowledge generally, openly avowed\nby some as Sceptics, secretly betrayed by others in the unsettledness\nof their Eclecticism. These two currents coalescing, led to the thought\nthat truth, which cannot be found in knowledge, exists somewhere\noutside of it, and must be looked for partly in the religious\ntraditions of the early days of Greece and the East, partly in direct\ndivine revelation. Then came in such a notion of God, and of His\nrelations to the world, as accords with this belief in revelation. Man\nknowing that truth lies outside himself, and doubting his own\ncapacities to attain it, removes deity, as the absolute source of\ntruth, into another world; and because the need of a revelation of\ntruth still exists, the interval between God and the world is peopled\nwith intermediate beings, who are sometimes conceived of as\nmetaphysical entities, and at other times appear as the demons of\npopular belief. This mental habit, which is connected with Plato and\nPythagoras, among the older systems, forms the transition to\nNeoplatonism. The appearance of Neoplatonism introduces the last stage\nin the development of Greek philosophy.\n\n\n\n[(3) Religious School of Neoplatonists.]\n\nYet even this turn in Greek philosophy was not uninfluenced by the\ncircumstances of the times. Since the end of the second century after\nChrist, the decline of the Roman Empire progressed apace. Dread of the\ndangers which threatened it on all sides, the pressure of the times and\ndistress made startling progress. All means of defence hitherto\nemployed had proved unavailing to stem destruction. With ruin\neverywhere impending, the desire and longing for higher assistance\nincreased. No such assistance was forthcoming from the old gods of Rome\nor the religious faith of the day; despite which circumstances were\ndaily becoming more hopeless. Then it was that the desire for foreign\nforms of worship which had been gradually spreading over the Roman\nworld since the last days of the Republic, and which the circumstances\nof the Empire had stimulated, gained ground. That desire was favoured\nby the highest power in the state, under the Oriental and half Oriental\nemperors who for nearly half a century after Septimius Severus occupied\nthe imperial throne. The state and the gods of the state were\ncontinually losing their hold on the respect of men. Meanwhile, on the\none hand, Oriental worships, mysteries old and new, and foreign heathen\nreligions of the most varying kinds, were ever gaining fresh adherents.\nOn the other, Christianity was rapidly acquiring a power which enabled\nit openly to enter the lists for supremacy among the recognised\nreligions of the state. The powerful monarchs who about the middle of\nthe third century attempted to refound the Empire, had not for their\nobject to restore a specifically Roman form of government, but to bring\nthe various elements which composed the Empire under one sovereign will\nby fixed forms of administration. In this attempt Diocletian and\nConstantine succeeded. The Roman character asserted itself, as a ruling\nand regulating power, but it did so under the influence of another\noriginally foreign character. The Empire was a congeries of nations\nartificially held together, and arranged on a carefully-designed plan;\nits centre of gravity lay not within the nation, but in the simple will\nof the prince, himself exalted above all rules and laws of state, and\ndeciding everything without appeal and without responsibility.\n\nIn like manner Neoplatonism united all the elements of previous\nphilosophical Schools into one comprehensive and well-arranged system,\nin which each class of existences had its definite place assigned to\nit. The initial point in this system, the all-embracing unity, was a\nbeing lying beyond the world, high above every notion that experience\nand conception can supply, unmixed with the process of life going on in\nthe world, and from his unattainable height causing all things, but\nhimself subject to no conditions of causality. Neoplatonism is the\nintellectual reproduction of Byzantine Imperialism. As Byzantine\nImperialism combines Oriental despotism with the Roman idea of the\nstate, so Neoplatonism supplements the scientific forms of Greek\nphilosophy with Oriental mysticism.\n\nIn Neoplatonism the post-Aristotelian philosophy had manifestly veered\nround into its opposite. Self-dependence and the self-sufficingness of\nthought made way for implicit resignation to higher powers, for a\ncraving for revelation, for an ecstatic departure from the sphere of\nconscious mental activity. Man has abandoned the idea of truth within\nfor truth to be found only in God. God stands there as abstract\nspirituality removed into another world in contrast to man and the\nworld of appearances. Speculation has but one aim\u2014to explain the\nprocession of the finite from the infinite, and the conditions of its\nreturn into the absolute; but neither of these problems can meet with a\nsatisfactory intellectual solution. Even this form of thought betrays\nundeniably the personal character of the post-Aristotelian philosophy,\nand is the natural outcome of previous teaching, as will be more fully\nseen in the sequel. With it the creative powers of the Greek mind were\nexhausted. After being driven step by step during centuries from the\nplatform of their own national philosophy, the Greeks were eventually\nentirely dislodged therefrom by the victory of Christianity.\nNeoplatonism made one more futile attempt to rescue the forms of Greek\nculture from its mighty rival, but when that attempt failed Greek\nreligion and Greek philosophy went down together.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\nTHE STOICS.\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nHISTORY OF THE STOICS UNTIL THE END OF THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.\n\n\nA striking feature in the history of the post-Aristotelian philosophy,\nand one which at the same time brings forcibly home the thorough change\nin its surroundings, is the fact that so many of its representatives\ncome from eastern countries in which Greek and Oriental modes of\nthought met and mingled. Although for centuries Athens still continued\nto have the reputation of being the chief seat of Greek philosophy, and\ndid not cease to be one of the most important seminaries of philosophy,\neven when it had to share that reputation with other cities, such as\nAlexandria, Rome, Rhodes, and Tarsus, yet at Athens itself there were\nteachers not a few whose foreign extraction indicates the age of\nHellenism. This remark applies primarily to the later Neoplatonic\nSchool: next to it it is of none more true than of the Stoic. With this\nfact may be also associated the world-citizenship of this School,\nthough it would be unfair to attribute a general characteristic of the\nthen state of the world to purely external circumstances. Nearly all\nthe most important Stoics before the Christian era belong by birth to\nAsia Minor, to Syria, and to the islands of the Eastern Archipelago.\nThen follow a series of Roman Stoics, by the side of whom the Phrygian\nEpictetus occupies a prominent place; but Greece proper is represented\nonly by men of third or fourth rate capacity.\n\n\n\n\n[A. Zeno.]\n\nThe founder of the Stoic School, Zeno [3] by name, was the son of\nMnaseas, [4] and a native of Citium [5] in Cyprus. Leaving his home, he\nrepaired to Athens, [6] about the year 320 B.C., [7] where he at first\njoined the Cynic Crates. [8] He appears to have soon become disgusted\nwith the extravagances of the Cynics\u2019 mode of life, [9] and his keen\ndesire for knowledge could find no satisfaction in a teaching so meagre\nas theirs. [10] To supply their defects he had recourse to Stilpo, who\nunited to the moral teaching of the Cynics the logical acumen of the\nMegarians. He also studied under Polemo, and it is said under\nXenocrates and Diodorus the logician, with whose pupil Philo [11] he\nwas on terms of intimacy. After a long course of intellectual\npreparation, he at last appeared as a teacher, soon after the beginning\nof the third, or perhaps during the last years of the fourth century\nB.C. From the Stoa \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03bb\u1f74, the place which he selected for delivering\nhis lectures, his followers derived their name of Stoics, having first\nbeen called after their master Zenonians. [12] Such was the universal\nrespect inspired by his earnestness, moral strictness, [13] and\nsimplicity of life, [14] and the dignity, modesty, and affability of\nhis conduct, [15] that Antigonus Gonatas vied with the city of Athens\nin showing appreciation of him. [16] Although lacking smoothness of\nstyle and using a language far from pure, [17] Zeno had nevertheless an\nextensive following. Leading a life of singular moderation, he reached\nan advanced age untouched by disease, although he naturally enjoyed\nneither robust health nor an attractive person. [18] A slight injury\nhaving at length befallen him, which he regarded as a hint of destiny,\nhe put an end to his own life. [19] His not very numerous writings [20]\nhave been lost, with the exception of a few fragments, some no doubt\ndating from the time when, as a pupil of Crates, he adhered more\nstrictly to Cynic ideas than was afterwards the case. [21] This point\nought not to be forgotten in sketching his teaching.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Pupils of Zeno.]\n\n[(1) Cleanthes.]\n\nThe successor to the chair of Zeno was Cleanthes, [22] a native of\nAssos in the Troad, [23] a man of strong and firm character, of unusual\nendurance, energy, and contentment, but also slow of apprehension, and\nsomewhat heavy in intellect. Resembling Xenocrates in mind, Cleanthes\nwas in every way adapted to uphold his master\u2019s teaching, and to\nrecommend it by the moral weight of his own character, but he was\nincapable of expanding it more completely, or of establishing it on a\nwider basis. [24]\n\n\n\n[(2) Aristo and Herillus.]\n\nBesides Cleanthes, the best known among the pupils of Zeno are Aristo\nof Chios, [25] and Herillus of Carthage, [26] who diverged from his\nteaching in the most opposite directions, Aristo confining himself\nrigidly to Cynicism, Herillus approximating to the leading positions\nheld by the Peripatetic School.\n\n\n\n[(3) Other pupils.]\n\nOther pupils of Zeno were Pers\u00e6us, a countryman and companion of Zeno;\n[27] Aratus, the well-known poet of Soli; [28] Dionysius of Heraclea in\nPontus, who afterwards joined the Cyrenaic or Epicurean School; [29]\nand Sph\u00e6rus from the Bosporus, who studied first in the School of Zeno,\nand afterwards in that of Cleanthes, and was the friend and adviser of\nCleomenes, the unfortunate Spartan reformer. [30] Of a few other pupils\nof Zeno the names are also known; [31] but nothing beyond their names.\nNo appreciable addition was made to the Stoic doctrine by any one of\nthem.\n\n\n\n\n[C. Chrysippus and the later Stoics.]\n\n[(1) Chrysippus.]\n\nIt was therefore fortunate for Stoicism that Cleanthes was followed in\nthe presidency of the School by a man of learning and argumentative\npower like Chrysippus. [32] In the opinion of the ancients, Chrysippus\nwas the second founder of Stoicism. [33] Born [34] in the year 280\nB.C., [35] at Soli in Cilicia, [36] after being a pupil of Cleanthes\n[37] and it is said even of Zeno [38] himself, he succeeded, on the\ndeath of Cleanthes, to the conduct of his School. [39] He is also said\nto have attended the lectures of Arcesilaus and Lacydes, philosophers\nof the Middle Academy; [40] whose critical methods he so thoroughly\nappropriated, that later Stoics accused him of furnishing Carneades\nwith the necessary weapons for attacking them, [41] by the masterly\nmanner in which he raised philosophical doubts without being able to\nanswer them satisfactorily. This critical acuteness and skill, more\nthan anything else, entitle him to be regarded as the second founder of\nStoicism. [42] In learning, too, he was far in advance of his\npredecessors, and passed for the most industrious and learned man of\nantiquity. [43] Independent in tone, as his general conduct and\nintellectual self-reliance [44] often proved, [45] he deviated from the\nteaching of Zeno and Cleanthes, as might be expected, in many respects.\n[46] Still, the fundamental principles of the system were not altered\nby him; only their intellectual treatment was perfected and deepened.\nIn fact, the Stoic doctrine was expanded by him with such completeness\nin details, that hardly a gleaning was left for his successors to\ngather up. [47] In multitude of writings [48] he exceeded Epicurus;\n[49] their titles, and a comparatively small number of fragments, being\nall that have come down to us. [50] With such an extraordinary literary\nfertility, it will be easily understood that their artistic value is\nnot very high. The ancients are unanimous in complaining of their\ncareless and impure language, of their dry and often obscure style, of\ntheir prolixity, their endless repetitions, their frequent and lengthy\ncitations, and their too frequent appeals to etymologies, authorities,\nand other irrelevant proofs. [51] But by Chrysippus the Stoic teaching\nwas brought to completeness; and when he died, in the year 206 B.C.,\n[52] the form was in every respect fixed in which Stoicism would be\nhanded down for the next following centuries.\n\n\n\n[(2) Later Stoics.]\n\nA cotemporary of Chrysippus, but probably somewhat his senior, was\nTeles, from whose writings a few extracts [53] have been preserved by\nStob\u00e6us, [54] in the shape of popular moral considerations written from\na Cynic or Stoical point of view. The same age also produced the\nCyrenaic Eratosthenes, [55] a man distinguished in every branch of\nknowledge, but particularly celebrated for his mathematical\nattainments, who was gained for Stoicism by Aristo. [56] Another\ncotemporary of Chrysippus, and perhaps his fellow-student, [57] who in\nmany respects approximated to the teaching of the Peripatetics, [58]\nwas the Stoic Bo\u00ebthus. The proper scholars of Chrysippus were without\ndoubt numerous; [59] but few of their names are known to us. [60] The\nmost important among them appear to have been Zeno of Tarsus, [61] and\nDiogenes of Seleucia, [62] who succeeded Chrysippus in the presidency\nof the School. [63] The pupil and successor of Diogenes, in his turn,\nwas Antipater of Tarsus, [64] in connection with whom Archedemus his\ncountryman is frequently mentioned. [65] Under Pan\u00e6tius, Antipater\u2019s\nscholar, Stoicism entered the Roman world, and there underwent internal\nchanges, to which attention will be drawn in the sequel. [66]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nAUTHORITIES FOR THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY: ITS PROBLEM AND DIVISIONS.\n\n\n[A. Authorities for the Stoic philosophy.]\n\n[(1) Review of authorities.]\n\nTo give a faithful exposition of the Stoic philosophy is a work of more\nthan ordinary difficulty, owing to the circumstance that all the\nwritings of the earlier Stoics, with the exception of a few fragments,\nhave been lost. [67] Those Stoics whose complete works are still\nextant\u2014Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Heraclitus, Cornutus\u2014lived\nunder the Roman Empire, and therefore belong to a time in which all\nSchools alike exposed to foreign influences had surrendered or lost\nsight of many of their original peculiarities, and had substituted new\nelements in their place. The same remark applies to writers like\nCicero, Plutarch, Diogenes, Sextus Empiricus, and the commentators on\nAristotle, who may be considered as authorities at second hand for the\nteaching of the Stoics; but it is more than doubtful whether everything\nwhich they mention as Stoic teaching really belongs to the older\nmembers of that School. That teaching can, however, be ascertained with\nsufficient certainty on most of the more important points, partly by\ncomparing accounts when they vary, partly by looking to definite\nstatements on which authorities agree for the teaching and points of\ndifference between individual philosophers, such as Zeno, Cleanthes,\nChrysippus; partly too by consulting such fragments of their writings\nas are still extant. Yet, when the chief points have been settled in\nthis way, many difficulties still remain. In the first place, it will\nbe found that only isolated points of their teaching, with at most a\nfew arguments on which to base them, are recorded; but the real\nconnection of their tenets, and the motives which gave rise to them,\ncan only be known by conjecture. Had the writings of Zeno and\nChrysippus come down to us in their entirety, we should have had a much\nsurer foundation on which to build, and far less would have been left\nto conjecture. An opportunity, too, would then have been afforded of\ntracing the inward growth of the Stoic teaching, and of deciding how\nmuch of that teaching was due to Zeno, and how much to Chrysippus. That\nthis work of discrimination can now only be done very imperfectly, is\nthe second difficulty, and it arises from the nature of the\nauthorities. It may be ascertained without difficulty what the teaching\nof the Stoics was since the time of Chrysippus, but only on a few\npoints are the differences between Chrysippus and his predecessors\nknown. For the most part, the authorities do not hesitate to attribute\nto the founder of the School all that was known to them as belonging to\nits later members, just as everything Pythagorean was directly\nattributed to Pythagoras, and everything Platonic to Plato. Still,\nthere can be no doubt that the Stoic teaching was very considerably\nexpanded by Chrysippus, and altered in many ways. But how considerable\nthe alterations were, and in what they consisted, are questions upon\nwhich there is little direct evidence.\n\n\n\n[(2) Use to be made of authorities.]\n\nThe path is thus marked out, which must be followed in giving an\nexposition of the Stoic philosophy. If full information were\nforthcoming respecting the rise of the Stoic system and the form it\nassumed under each one of its representatives, it would be most natural\nto begin by reviewing the motives which led Zeno to his peculiar\nteaching, and by describing the system as it grew up. Next it would be\nright to trace step by step the changes and expansions which it\nreceived at the hands of each succeeding teacher. In default of the\nnecessary information for such a treatment of the subject, it will be\nbetter to pursue another course. The Stoic teaching will have to be\ntreated as a whole, in which the contributions of individuals can no\nlonger be distinguished. It will have to be set forth in the form which\nit assumed after the time of Chrysippus. The share of individuals in\nconstructing the system, and their deviations from the general type,\ncannot be considered, except in cases where they are placed beyond\ndoubt by the statements of the ancients, or by well-founded historical\nsurmises. Stoicism will have to be described in the first place as it\nis traditionally known, without having its principles explained or\nresolved into their component factors; without even considering how\nthey grew out of previous systems. Not till this has been done will it\nbe possible to analyse the purport and structure of the system, so as\nto fathom its leading motives, to understand the connection of its\nvarious parts, and thus to ascertain its true position in history.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Problem proposed to the Stoic philosophy.]\n\nProceeding next to ask in what form the problem of philosophy presented\nitself to the Stoics, three points deserve to be specially noticed. 1.\nIn the first place, philosophy was determined practically by an end in\nview. 2. The character of this end was decided by the idea of\nconformity with reason; and 3, this view was substantiated by\nintellectual proof.\n\n\n\n[(1) Its practical character.]\n\nThe real business of all philosophy, according to the Stoics, is the\nmoral conduct of man. Philosophy is the exercise of an art, and more\nparticularly of the highest art\u2014virtue: [68] it is therefore the\nlearning of virtue. Now virtue can only be learnt by exercise, and\ntherefore philosophy is at the same time virtue, [69] and the several\nparts of philosophy are so many distinct virtues. [70] Morality is the\ncentral point towards which all other enquiries converge. Even natural\nscience, although lauded as the inmost shrine of philosophy, is,\naccording to Chrysippus, only necessary for the philosopher to enable\nhim to distinguish between things good and evil, between what should be\ndone and what should be left undone. [71] So far from approving pure\nspeculation, which Plato and Aristotle had commended as the height of\nhuman happiness, Chrysippus plainly asserted that to live for\nspeculation is equivalent to living only for pleasure. [72] With this\nview of Chrysippus most of the statements of the Stoics as to the\nrelation of various branches of philosophy to each other agree,\nalthough there is a certain amount of vagueness about them, owing to\nreasons which will shortly be mentioned; and on no other hypothesis can\nthe internal structure and foundation of their system be satisfactorily\nexplained. It is enough to remark here, as has been done before, [73]\nthat the most important and most distinctive points established by the\nStoic School belong to the sphere of ethics. In logic and natural\nscience the School displays far less independence, for the most part\nfollowing older teachers; and it is expressly noted, as a deviation\nfrom the ordinary teaching of the School, that Herillus, the pupil of\nZeno, declared knowledge to be the highest good, thus making it the\nchief end in philosophy. [74]\n\n\n\n[(2) Necessity for intellectual knowledge.]\n\nThis view of the problem of philosophy is more precisely defined by the\nStoic doctrine of virtue. Philosophy should lead to right action and to\nvirtue. But right action is, according to the Stoics, only rational\naction, and rational action is action which is in harmony with human\nand inanimate nature. Virtue consists therefore in bringing man\u2019s\nactions into harmony with the laws of the universe, and with the\ngeneral order of the world. This is only possible when man knows that\norder and those laws; and thus the Stoics are brought back to the\nprinciples of Socrates, that virtue may be learnt; that knowledge is\nindispensable for virtue, or rather that virtue is identical with right\nknowledge. They define virtue in so many words as knowledge, vice as\nignorance. If sometimes they seem to identify virtue with strength of\nwill, it is only because they consider strength of will to be\ninseparable from knowledge, so that the one cannot be conceived without\nthe other. Hence the practical study of philosophy conducts with them\nto the intellectual; philosophy is not only virtue, but without\nphilosophy no virtue is possible. [75] Granting that the attainment of\nvirtue, and the happiness of a moral life, are the chief ends which the\nStoics propose to themselves, still the possession of a comprehensive\nscientific knowledge is indispensable, as the only means thereto.\n\n\n\n[(3) Position towards logic and natural science.]\n\n[(a) Aristo\u2019s views.]\n\nThese remarks prove the need for the Stoics of that kind of scientific\nknowledge which has to do with life, the morals and the actions of\nmankind, in short, of Ethics. Whether further scientific knowledge is\nnecessary, was a question on which the earliest adherents of the Stoic\nteaching expressed different opinions. Zeno\u2019s pupil, Aristo of Chios,\nheld that the sole business of man is to pursue virtue, [76] and that\nthe sole use of language is to purify the soul. [77] This purifying\nprocess, however, is neither to be found in logical subtleties nor in\nnatural science. Logic, as doing more harm than good, he compared to a\nspider\u2019s web, which is as useless as it is curious; [78] or else to the\nmud on a road. [79] Those who studied it he likened to people eating\nlobsters, who take a great deal of trouble for the sake of a little bit\nof meat enveloped in much shell. [80] Convinced, too, that the wise man\nis free from every deceptive infatuation, [81] and that doubt, for the\npurpose of refuting which logic has been invented, can be more easily\novercome by a healthy tone of mind [82] than by argument, he felt no\nparticular necessity for logic. Nay, more, he considered that excessive\nsubtlety transforms the healthy action of philosophy into an unhealthy\none. [83] Just as little was Aristo disposed to favour the so-called\nencyclical knowledge: those who devote themselves to this knowledge\ninstead of to philosophy he compared to the suitors of Penelope, who\nwon the maids but not the mistress. [84] Natural science would probably\nhave received a more favourable treatment at the hands of Aristo, had\nhe not shared the opinion of Socrates, that it is a branch of knowledge\nwhich transcends the capacity of the human mind; [85] and having once\nembraced this notion, he was inclined to pronounce all physical\nenquiries useless. His attitude towards other sciences has therefore\nbeen generally expressed by saying that he excluded from philosophy\nboth logic and natural science, on the ground that both are useless;\nthe former being irrelevant, and the latter transcending our powers.\n[86] Even ethics was limited by Aristo to most fundamental notions\u2014to\nenquiries into good and evil, virtue and vice, wisdom and folly. The\nspecial application of these notions to the moral problems suggested by\nparticular relations in life, he declared to be useless and futile;\nproper for nursemaids and trainers of young children, but not becoming\nfor philosophers; [87] wherever there is a proper knowledge and a right\ndisposition, such particular applications will come of themselves\nwithout teaching; but when these are wanting, all exhortations are\nuseless. [88]\n\n\n[(b) Views of Zeno and Cleanthes.]\n\nThese views are mentioned as peculiar to Aristo, and as points in which\nhe differed from the rest of his School; and, to judge from his\ncontroversial tone, the opposite views were those almost universally\nentertained by Stoics. That controversial tone, in fact, appears to\nhave been directed not only against assailants from without\u2014such as the\nPeripatetics and Platonists\u2014but far more against those members of the\nStoic School, who attached greater importance than he did to special\nethical investigations, and to logical and physical enquiries. Among\ntheir number must have been Zeno and Cleanthes; for Zeno set the\nexample to his School of dividing philosophy into logic, ethics, and\nnatural science; [89] witness the titles of his logical and physical\ntreatises [90] and also the statements in reference to theoretical\nknowledge and natural science which are expressly attributed to him.\nMoreover, Zeno himself recommended to others, and himself pursued,\nlogical enquiries. [91] Indeed, his whole mental habit, [92] with its\nkeen appreciation of even the subtleties of the Megarians, bears\ntestimony to an intellectual type of thought which is far removed from\nthat of Aristo. [93] It was, moreover, Zeno who chose that curt and\nunadorned logical style, which is found in its greatest perfection in\nChrysippus. [94] Logical and scientific treatises are also known to\nhave been written by Cleanthes, [95] who, in his division of\nphilosophy, allotted separate parts to logic, to rhetoric, and to\nnatural science, [96] and the name of Cleanthes is one of frequent\noccurrence, not only in the natural science, but more particularly in\nthe theology of the Stoics. Still more exhaustive enquiries into logic\nand natural science appear to have been set on foot by Sph\u00e6rus. [97]\nThese prove that the energies of the Stoic School must have been\ndirected to these subjects before the time of Chrysippus, although\nthese branches of science were no doubt subservient to ethics, whilst\nethics held the most important and highest place in their philosophy.\nAt a later time, when Chrysippus had expanded the system of the Stoics\nin every direction, and especial attention had been devoted to logic,\nthe necessity for these sciences came to be generally recognised. More\nespecially was this the case with regard to natural science, including\n\u2018theology.\u2019 All ethical enquiries must start, according to Chrysippus,\nwith considering the universal order and arrangement of the world. Only\nby a study of nature, and a knowledge of what God is, can anything\nreally satisfactory be stated touching good and evil, and all that is\ntherewith connected. [98]\n\nLess obvious is the connection between logic and the ultimate aim of\nall philosophical enquiries. Logic is compared by the Stoics to the\nshell of an egg, or to the wall of a city or garden; [99] and is\nconsidered to be of importance, because it contributes towards the\ndiscovery of truth and the avoiding of error. [100] The value of logic\nin their eyes is, therefore, essentially due to its scientific method;\nits proper aim is the art of technical reasoning; and thus, following\nAristotle, an unusually full treatment is allowed to the doctrine of\nthe syllogism. [101] That the value attached to logic must have been\nconsiderable is proved by the extraordinary care which Chrysippus\ndevoted to the subject; [102] hence, the Stoics would never allow, in\ndispute with the Peripatetics, that logic was only an instrument, and\nnot a part of philosophy. To later writers that stiff logical mode of\ndescription, regardless of all beauty of language, appeared to be a\npeculiarity of the Stoic school, [103] and hence that School was\ncharacteristically known as the School of the Reasoners. [104] Frequent\ninstances will be found hereafter of the Stoic preference for dry\nargument and formal logic; [105] in Chrysippus this fondness\ndegenerated to a dry formalism devoid of taste. [106]\n\n\n\n\n[C. Divisions of philosophy.]\n\nThe foregoing remarks have already established the three main divisions\nof philosophy [107] which were universally acknowledged by the Stoics\n[108]\u2014Logic, Natural Science, and Ethics. As regards the relative worth\nand sequence of these divisions, very opposite views may be deduced\nfrom the principles of the [(1) Threefold division.] Stoic teaching.\nThere can be no doubt, and, indeed, all are agreed in allowing, that\nlogic was subservient to the other two branches of science, being only\nan outpost of the system. If therefore in arranging the parts the\nadvance is from the less important to the more important, logic will\nhold the first place. It will occupy the last place if the opposite\nmode of procedure is followed. But the relation existing between ethics\nand natural science is an open question. On the one hand, ethics\nappears to be the higher science, the crowning point of the system, the\nsubject towards which the whole philosophical activity of the School\nwas directed; for philosophy is practical knowledge, and its object is\nto lead to virtue and happiness. On the other hand, virtue and the\ndestiny of man consist in conformity to the laws of nature, which it is\nthe province of science to investigate. Therefore, natural science has\nthe higher object. It lays down the universal laws which in ethics are\napplied to man. To it, therefore, in the graduated scale of sciences,\nbelongs the higher rank.\n\n\n\n[(2) Relative importance of each part.]\n\nIn attempting to harmonise these opposite considerations, the Stoics\ndid not always succeed. At one time natural science is preferred to\nethics, at another time ethics to natural science, [109] in the\nenumeration of the several branches of philosophy. In the comparisons\nby means of which their relations to each other were explained, [110]\nethics appears at one time, at another time natural science, to be the\naim and soul of the whole system. Different views were even entertained\nin reference to the order to be followed in teaching these sciences.\n[111] In describing the Stoic system, preference will be here given to\nthat arrangement which begins with logic and goes on to natural\nscience, ending with ethics; not only because that arrangement has\namong its supporters the oldest and most distinguished adherents of the\nStoic School, but also because in this way the internal relation of the\nthree parts to each other can be most clearly brought out. Allowing\nthat, in many essential respects, natural science is modified by\nethical considerations; still, in the development of the system, the\nchief results of science are used as principles on which ethical\ndoctrines are founded; and logic, although introduced later than the\nother two branches of study, is the instrument by means of which they\nare put into scientific shape. If the opportunity were afforded of\ntracing the rise of the Stoic teaching in the mind of its founder, it\nwould probably be possible to show how the physical and logical parts\nof the system gradually gathered around the original kernel of ethics.\nBut knowing Stoicism only as we do from the form which it attained\nafter the time of Chrysippus, it will be enough, in analysing that\nform, to proceed from without to within, and to advance from logic\nthrough natural science to ethics. When this has been done it will be\ntime to go back over the same ground, and to explain how from the\nethical tone of Stoicism its peculiar speculative tenets may be\ndeduced.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nLOGIC OF THE STOICS.\n\n\n[A. General remarks.]\n\n[(1) Field of logic.]\n\nUnder the head of Logic, in the Stoic use of the term after the time of\nChrysippus, a number of intellectual enquiries are included which would\nnot now be considered to belong to philosophy at all. One common\nelement, however, characterised them all\u2014they all referred to the\nformal conditions of thought and expression. Logic was primarily\ndivided into two parts, sharply marked off from each other, roughly\ndescribed as the art of speaking continuously and the art of\nconversing. The former is known as Rhetoric, the latter as Dialectic.\n[112] To these two was added, as a third part, the doctrine of a\nstandard of truth, or the theory of knowledge; and, according to some\nauthorities, [113] a fourth part, consisting of enquiries into the\nformation of conceptions. By others, these enquiries were regarded as\nthe third main division, the theory of knowledge being included under\ndialectic. [114] By rhetoric, however, little else was meant than a\ncollection of artificial rules, of no philosophical value; [115] and\ndialectic was in great measure occupied with enquiries referring to\nprecision of expression. Dialectic is defined to be the science or art\nof speaking well; [116] and since speaking well consists in saying what\nis becoming and true, [117] dialectic is used to express the knowledge\nof what is true or false, or what is neither one nor the other, [118]\ncorrectness of expression being considered inseparable [(2) Words and\nthoughts.] from correctness of thought. Words and thoughts are,\naccording to this view, the very same things regarded under different\naspects. The same idea (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2), which is a thought as long as it\nresides within the breast, is a word as soon as it comes forth. [119]\nAccordingly, dialectic consists of two main divisions, treating\nrespectively of utterance and the thing uttered, thoughts and words.\n[120] Both divisions, again, have several subdivisions, [121] which are\nonly imperfectly known to us. [122] Under the science of utterance,\nwhich was generally placed before the science of things uttered, [123]\nare included, not only instruction as to sounds and speech, but also\nthe theories of poetry and music, these arts being ranked under the\nhead of the voice and of sound on purely external considerations. [124]\nWhat is known of the teaching of the Stoics on these subjects,\nconsisting, as it does, of a mass of definitions, differences, and\ndivisions, has so little philosophical value, that it need not detain\nattention longer. [125] Two parts only of the Stoic logic possess any\nreal interest\u2014the theory of knowledge, and that part of dialectic which\ntreats of ideas, and which in the main agrees with our formal logic.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Theory of knowledge.]\n\n[(1) General character of this theory.]\n\nThe Stoic theory of knowledge turns about the enquiry for a criterion\nor standard by which what is true in notions may be distinguished from\nwhat is false. Since every kind of knowledge, no matter what be its\nobject, must be tested by this standard, it follows that the standard\ncannot be sought in the subject-matter of notions, but, on the\ncontrary, in their form. The enquiry after a standard becomes therefore\nidentical with another\u2014the enquiry as to what kind of notions supply a\nknowledge that may be depended upon, or what activity of the power of\nforming conceptions carries with it a pledge of its own truth. It is\nimpossible to answer these questions without investigating the origin,\nthe various kinds, and the value and importance of notions. Hence the\nproblem proposed to the Stoics is reduced to seeking by an analysis of\nnotions to obtain a universally valid standard by which their truth may\nbe tested.\n\nWhether this enquiry was pursued by the older Stoics in all its\ncomprehensiveness is a point on which we have no information. Bo\u00ebthus,\nwhose views on this subject were attacked by Chrysippus, had assumed\nthe existence of several standards, such as Reason, Perception, Desire,\nKnowledge. Others, in the vaguest manner, had spoken of Right Reason\n(\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) as being the standard of truth. [126] Hence it may be\ninferred that before the time of Chrysippus the Stoics had no\ndistinctly developed theory of knowledge. Nevertheless there are\nexpressions of Zeno and Cleanthes still extant which prove that the\nessential parts of the later theory were already held by these\nphilosophers, [127] although it is no doubt true that it first received\nthat scientific form in which alone it is known to us at the hands of\nChrysippus.\n\n\n\n[(2) Prominent points in the theory of knowledge.]\n\nThe character of this theory of knowledge appears mainly in three\nparticulars:\u2014(1) In the importance attached by the Stoics to the\nimpressions of the senses. This feature they inherited from the Cynics\nand shared with the Epicureans. (2) In the exaltation of expression\ninto a conception\u2014a trait distinguishing this from either of the two\nother contemporary Schools. (3) In the practical turn given to the\nquestion of a criterion or standard of truth. We proceed to the\nexpansion of this theory in detail.\n\n\n[(a) Perceptions the result of impressions from without.]\n\nThe origin of all perceptions (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9) may be referred to the action\nof some object (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd) on the soul, [128] the soul at birth\nresembling a blank page, and only receiving definite features by\nexperience from without. [129] By the elder Stoics, this action of\nobjects on the soul was regarded as grossly material, Zeno defining a\nperception to be an impression (\u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) made on the soul, [130] and\nCleanthes took this definition so literally as to compare the\nimpression on the soul to the impression made by a seal on wax. [131]\nBeing himself a very exact pupil of Zeno, Cleanthes probably rendered\nthe views of Zeno correctly in this comparison. The difficulties of\nthis view were recognised by Chrysippus, who accordingly defined a\nperception to be the change (\u1f11\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) produced in the soul by an\nobject, or, more accurately, the change produced thereby in the ruling\npart of the soul; [132] and whereas his predecessors had only\nconsidered sensible things to be objects, he included among objects\nconditions and activities of the mind. [133] The mode, however, in\nwhich the change was produced in the soul did not further engage his\nattention.\n\n\n[(b) Conceptions formed from perceptions.]\n\nIt follows, as a necessary corollary from this view, that the Stoics\nregarded sensation as the only source of all perceptions: the soul is a\nblank leaf, sensation is the hand which fills it with writing. But this\nis not all. Perceptions give rise to memory, repeated acts of memory to\nexperience, [134] and conclusions based on experience suggest\nconceptions which go beyond the sphere of direct sensation. These\nconclusions rest either upon the comparison, or upon the combination of\nperceptions, or else upon analogy; [135] some add, upon transposition\nand contrast. [136] The formation of conceptions by means of these\nagencies sometimes takes place methodically and artificially, at other\ntimes naturally and spontaneously. [137] [(\u03b1) \u039a\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9 formed\nnaturally.] In the latter way are formed the primary conceptions,\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 or \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9, which were regarded by the Stoics as the\nnatural types of truth and virtue, and as the distinctive possession of\nrational beings. [138] To judge by many expressions, it might seem that\nby primary conceptions, or \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9, [139] innate ideas were\nmeant; but this view would be opposed to the whole character and\nconnection of the system. In reality, these primary conceptions, or\n\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9, are only those conceptions which, by reason of the\nnature of thought, can be equally deduced by all men from experience;\neven the highest ideas, those of good and evil, having no other origin.\n[140] The artificial formation of conceptions gives rise to knowledge,\nwhich is defined by the Stoics to be a fixed and immovable conception,\nor system of such conceptions. [141] Persistently maintaining, [(\u03b2)\nKnowledge formed artificially.] on the one hand, that knowledge is a\nsystem of artificial conceptions, impossible without a logical process,\nthey must, on the other hand, have felt it imperative from this\nplatform that knowledge should agree in its results with primary\nconceptions, [142] agreement with nature being in every department\ntheir watchword. For them it was as natural to derive support for their\nsystem from a supposed agreement with nature, as it was easy for their\nopponents to show that this agreement with nature was imaginary, and\nthat many of their assertions were wholly opposed to general opinions.\n[143]\n\n\n[(c) Relation of perceptions and conceptions.]\n\nPerceptions, and the conclusions based upon them, [144] being thus,\naccording to the Stoics, the two sources of all notions, the further\nquestion arises, How are these two sources related to each other? It\nmight have been expected that only perceptions would be stated to be\noriginally and absolutely true, since all general conceptions are based\non them. Nevertheless, the Stoics are far from saying so. Absolute\ncertainty of conviction they allow only to knowledge, and therefore\ndeclare that the truth of the perceptions of the senses depends on\ntheir relation to thought. [145] Truth and error do not belong to\ndisconnected notions, but to notions combined in the form of a\njudgment, and a judgment is produced by an effort of thought. Hence\nsensations, taken alone, are the source of no knowledge, knowledge\nfirst arising when the activity of the understanding is allied to\nsensation. [146] Or, starting from the relation of thought to its\nobject, since like can only be known by like according to the\nwell-known adage, the rational element in the universe can only be\nknown by the rational element in man. [147] But again, the\nunderstanding has no other material to work upon but that supplied by\nsensation, and general conceptions are only obtained from sensation by\nconclusions. The mind, therefore, has the capacity of formally working\nup the material supplied by the senses, but to this material it is\nlimited. Still, it can progress from perceptions to notions not\nimmediately given in sensation, such as the conceptions of what is good\nand of God. And since, according to the Stoic teaching, material\nobjects only possess reality, the same vague inconsistency may be\nobserved in their teaching as has been noticed in Aristotle\n[148]\u2014reality attaching to individuals, truth to general notions. This\ninconsistency, however, is more marked in their case than in that of\nAristotle, because the Stoics so far adhere to the Cynic nominalism\n[149] as to assert that no reality attaches to thought. [150] Such an\nassertion makes it all the more difficult to understand how greater\ntruth can be attributed to thought, unreal as it is said to be, than to\nsensations of real and material objects. Do we then ask in what the\npeculiar character of thought consists, the Stoics, following\nAristotle, reply that in thought the idea of universality is added to\nthat which presents itself in sensation as a particular. [151] More\nimportance was attached by them to another point\u2014the greater certainty\nwhich belongs to thought than to sensation. All the definitions given\nabove point to the immovable strength of conviction as the distinctive\nfeature of knowledge; [152] and of like import is the language\nattributed to Zeno, [153] comparing simple sensation with an extended\nfinger, assent, as being the first activity of the power of judgment,\nwith a closed hand, conception with the fist, and knowledge with one\nfist firmly grasped by the other. According to this view, the whole\ndifference between the four processes is one of degree, and depends on\nthe greater or less strength of conviction, on the mental exertion and\ntension. [154] It is not an absolute difference in kind, but a relative\ndifference, a gradual shading off of one into the other.\n\n\n[(d) The standard of truth.]\n\n[(\u03b1) Practical need of such a standard.]\n\nFrom these considerations it follows that in the last resort only a\nrelative distinction is left whereby the truth of notions may be\ntested. Even the general argument for the possibility of knowledge\nstarts with the Stoics by practically taking something for granted.\nWithout failing to urge intellectual objections\u2014and often most\npertinent ones [155]\u2014against Scepticism, as was indeed natural,\nparticularly since the time of Chrysippus, [156] the Stoics\nnevertheless specially took up their stand on one point, which was\nthis, that, unless the knowledge of truth were possible, it would be\nimpossible to act on fixed principles and convictions. [157] Thus, as a\nlast bulwark against doubt, practical needs are appealed to.\n\n[(\u03b2) Irresistible perceptions the standard of truth.]\n\nThe same result is obtained from a special enquiry into the nature of\nthe standard of truth. If the question is asked, How are true\nperceptions distinguished from false ones? the immediate reply given by\nthe Stoics is, that a true perception is one which represents a real\nobject as it really is. [158] You are no further with this answer, and\nthe question has again to be asked, How may it be known that a\nperception faithfully represents a reality? The Stoics can only reply\nby pointing to a relative, but not to an absolute, test\u2014the degree of\nstrength with which certain perceptions force themselves on our notice.\nBy itself a perception does not necessarily carry conviction or assent\n(\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2); for there can be no assent until the faculty of\njudgment is directed towards the perception, either for the purpose of\nallowing or of rejecting it, truth and error residing in judgment.\nAssent therefore, generally speaking, rests with us, as does also the\npower of decision; and a wise man differs from a fool quite as much by\nconviction as by action. [159] Some of our perceptions are, however, of\nsuch a kind that they at once oblige us to bestow on them assent,\ncompelling us not only to regard them as probable, but also as true\n[160] and conformable to the actual nature of things. Such perceptions\nproduce in us that strength of conviction which the Stoics call a\nconception; they are therefore termed conceptional perceptions.\nWhenever a perception forces itself upon us in this irresistible form,\nwe are no longer dealing with a fiction of the imagination, but with\nsomething real; but whenever the strength of conviction is wanting, we\ncannot be sure of the truth of our perception. Or, expressing the same\nidea in the language of Stoicism, conceptional or irresistible\nperceptions, \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76, are the standard of truth. [161]\nThe test of irresistibility [(\u03b3) Primary conceptions a standard as well\nas irresistible perceptions.] (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2) was, in the first place,\nunderstood to apply to sensations from without, such sensations,\naccording to the Stoic view, alone supplying the material for\nknowledge. An equal degree of certainty was, however, attached to terms\ndeduced from originally true data, either by the universal and natural\nexercise of thought, or by scientific processes of proof. Now, since\namong these derivative terms some\u2014the primary conceptions (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9), for instance\u2014serve as the basis for deriving others, it may\nin a certain sense be asserted that sensation and primary conceptions\nare both standards of truth. [162] In strict accuracy, neither\nsensation nor primary conceptions (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2) can be called standards.\nThe real standard, whereby the truth of a perception is ascertained,\nconsists in the power, inherent in certain perceptions, of carrying\nconviction\u2014\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\u2014a power which belongs, in the first place,\nto sensations, whether of objects without or within, and, in the next\nplace, to primary conceptions formed from them in a natural way\u2014\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9 or \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. On the other hand, conceptions and terms formed\nartificially can only have their truth established by being subjected\nto a scientific process of proof. How, after these statements, the\nStoics could attribute a greater strength of conviction to artificial\nthan to primary conceptions; [163] how they could raise doubts as to\nthe trustworthiness of simple sensations, [164] is one of the paradoxes\nof the Stoic system, which prove the existence, as in so many other\nsystems, of a double current of thought. There is, on the one hand, a\nseeking for what is innate and original, a going back to nature, an\naversion to everything artificial and of human device, inherited by\nStoicism from its ancestral Cynicism. On the other hand, there is a\ndesire to supplement the Cynic appeal to nature by a higher culture,\nand to assign scientific reasons for truths which the Cynics laid down\nas self-evident.\n\nThe latter tendency will alone explain the care and precision which the\nStoics devoted to studying the forms and rules which govern\nintellectual processes. Attention to this branch of study may be\nnoticed in Zeno and his immediate successors at the first separation of\nStoicism from Cynicism. [165] Aristo is the only Stoic who is opposed\nto it, his whole habit of mind being purely that of a Cynic. In\nChrysippus it attained its greatest development, and by Chrysippus the\nformal logic of the Stoics reached scientific completeness. In later\ntimes, when Stoicism reverted more nearly to its original Cynic type,\nand appealed directly to the immediate suggestions of the mind, it lost\nits interest in logic, as may be observed in Musonius, Epictetus, and\nothers. For the present, however, let it suffice to consider the logic\nof Chrysippus, as far as that is known to us.\n\n\n\n\n[C. Formal logic.]\n\n[(1) Utterance in general.]\n\nThe term formal logic is here used to express those investigations\nwhich the Stoics included under the doctrine of utterance. [166] The\ncommon object of those enquiries is that which is thought, or, as the\nStoics called it, that which is uttered (\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd), understanding thereby\nthe substance of thought\u2014thought regarded by itself as a distinct\nsomething, differing alike from the external object to which it refers,\nfrom the sound by which it is expressed, and from the power of mind\nwhich produces it. For this reason, they maintain that only utterance\nis not material; things are always material; even the process of\nthought consists in a material change within the soul, and an uttered\nword, in a certain movement of the atmosphere. [167] A question is here\nsuggested in passing, which should not be lost sight of, viz. How far\nwas it correct for the Stoics to speak of thoughts as existing, seeing\nthey are not material, since, according to their teaching, reality only\nbelongs to material things? [168]\n\nUtterance may be either perfect or imperfect. It is perfect when it\ncontains a proposition; imperfect when the proposition is incomplete.\n[169] The portion of logic, therefore, which treats of utterance falls\ninto two parts, devoted respectively to the consideration of complete\nand incomplete expression.\n\n\n\n[(2) Incomplete expression.]\n\n[(a) The grammar of words.]\n\nIn the section devoted to incomplete expression, much is found which we\nshould include under grammar rather than under logic. Thus all\nincomplete expressions are divided into two groups\u2014one group includes\nproper names and adjectives, the other includes verbs. [170] These two\ngroups are used respectively to express what is essential and what is\naccidental, [171] and are again divided into a number of subdivisions\nand varieties. [172] To this part of logic investigations into the\nformation and division of conceptions, and the doctrine of the\ncategories, properly belong; but it cannot be said with certainty what\nplace they occupy in the logic of the Stoics. [173]\n\nCertain it is that these researches introduced little new matter. All\nthat is known of the Stoic views in reference to the formation, the\nmutual relation and the analysis of conceptions, differs only from the\ncorresponding parts in the teaching of Aristotle by the change of a few\nexpressions, and a slightly altered order of treatment. [174]\n\n\n[(b) The Stoic Categories.]\n\nOf greater importance is the Stoic doctrine of the categories. [175] In\nthis branch of logic, the Stoics again follow Aristotle, but not\nwithout deviating from him in three points. Aristotle referred his\ncategories to no higher conception, but looked upon them severally as\nthe highest class-conceptions; the Stoics referred them all to one\nhigher conception. Aristotle enumerated ten categories; the Stoics\nthought that they could do with four, [176] which four only partially\ncoincide with those of Aristotle. Aristotle placed the categories side\nby side, as co-ordinate, so that no object could come under a second\ncategory in the same respect in which it came under the first one;\n[177] the Stoics placed them one under the other, as subordinate, so\nthat every preceding category is more accurately determined by the next\nsucceeding one.\n\n[(\u03b1) Highest Conception\u2014an indefinite Something.]\n\nThe highest conception of all was apparently by the older Stoics\ndeclared to be the conception of Being. Since, however, speaking\nstrictly, only what is material can be said to have any being, and many\nof our notions refer to incorporeal and therefore unreal objects, the\nconception of Something [178] was in later times put in the place of\nthe conception of Being. This indefinite Something comprehends alike\nwhat is material and what is not material\u2014in other words, what has\nbeing and what has not being; and the Stoics appear to have made this\ncontrast the basis of a real division of things. [179] When it becomes\na question, however, of formal elementary conceptions or categories,\nother points are emphasised which have no connection with the division\ninto things material and things not material. Of this kind are the four\nhighest conceptions, [180]\u2014all subordinate to the conception of\nSomething, viz. subject-matter or substance (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) property\nor form (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd), variety (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd), and variety of relation (\u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd). [181]\n\n[(\u03b2) Category of subject-matter or substance.]\n\nThe first of these categories [182] denotes the subject-matter of\nthings in themselves (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd), the material of which they are\nmade, irrespective of any and every quality, [183] the something which\nunderlies all definite being, and which alone has a substantial value.\n[184] Following Aristotle, the Stoics distinguish, [185] in this\ncategory of matter, between matter in general, or universal matter, and\nthe particular matter or material out of which individual things are\nmade. The former alone is incapable of being increased or diminished.\nFar otherwise is the material of which particular things are made. This\ncan be increased and diminished, and, indeed, is ever undergoing\nchange; so much so, that the only feature which continues the same\nduring the whole term of its existence [186] and constitutes its\nidentity, is its quality.\n\n[(\u03b3) The category of property.]\n\nThe second category, that of property [187] or form, comprises all\nthose essential attributes, by means of which a definite character is\nimpressed on matter otherwise indeterminate. [188] If the definite\ncharacter be one which belongs to a group or class, it is called a\ncommon quality\u2014\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7\u2014or, if it be something peculiar and\ndistinctive, it is called a distinctive quality\u2014\u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd. [189]\nProperties therefore combined with matter constitute the special\nmaterials out of which individual things are made; [190] and quality in\nthis combination (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd), corresponds, as Trendelenburg has well shown,\n[191] with the form (\u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2) of Aristotle. [192] It may, in fact, like\nthat, be described as the active and efficient part of a thing. [193]\nAristotle\u2019s form, however, expresses only the non-material side of a\nthing, whereas quality is regarded by the Stoics as something\nmaterial\u2014in fact, as an air-current. [194] Hence the mode in which a\nquality is conceived to reside in matter is that of an intermingling of\nelements. [195] The same theory of intermingling applies of course to\nthe union of several properties in one and the same matter, [196] and\nlikewise to the combination of several attributes to produce a single\nconception of quality. [197] In all cases the relation is supposed to\nbe materialistic, and is explained by the doctrine of the mutual\ninterpenetration of material things. [198] This explanation, indeed,\ncould not apply to every kind of attributes. Unable to dispense\nentirely with things not material, [199] the Stoics were obliged to\nadmit the existence of attributes belonging to immaterial things, these\nattributes being, of course, themselves not material. [200] What idea\nthey formed to themselves of these incorporeal attributes, when reality\nwas considered to belong only to things corporeal, it is, of course,\nimpossible for us to say. [201]\n\n[(\u03b4) The categories of variety and variety of relation.]\n\nThe two remaining categories include everything which may be excluded\nfrom the conception of a thing on the ground of being either\nnon-essential or accidental. In as far as such things belong to an\nobject taken by itself alone, they come under the category of variety\n(\u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd); but when they belong to it, because of its relation to\nsomething else, they come under the category of variety of relation\n(\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd). Variety includes all accidental qualities, which\ncan be assigned to any object independently of its relation to any\nother object. [202] Size, colour, place, time, action, passion,\npossession, motion, state, in short, all the Aristotelian categories,\nwith the exception of substance, whenever they apply to an object\nindependently of its relation to other objects, belong to the category\nof variety [203] (\u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd). On the other hand, those features and\nstates which are purely relative\u2014such as right and left, sonship and\nfatherhood, &c.\u2014come under the category of variety of relation (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af\n\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd); and from this category the simple notion of relation (\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1f76) must be distinguished. Simple relation (\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f76) is not treated as\na distinct category, since it includes not only accidental relations,\nbut also those essential properties (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70) which presuppose a definite\nrelation to something else\u2014such as knowledge and perception. [204]\n\n\n[(c) Relation of the categories to one another.]\n\nThe relation of these four categories to one another is such, that each\npreceding category is included in the one next following, and receives\nfrom it a more definite character. [205] Substance never occurs in\nreality without property, but has always some definite quality to give\nit a character. On the other hand, property is never met with alone,\nbut always in connection with some subject-matter. [206] Variety\npresupposes some definite substance, and variety of relation supposes\nthe existence of variety. [207] It will hereafter be seen how closely\nthese deductions, and, indeed, the whole doctrine of the categories,\ndepend on the metaphysical peculiarities of the Stoic system.\n\n\n\n[(3) Complete utterance.]\n\n[(a) Judgment.]\n\nPassing from incomplete to complete utterance, we come, in the first\nplace, to sentences or propositions, [208] all the various kinds of\nwhich, as they may be deduced from the different forms of syntax, are\nenumerated by the Stoics with the greatest precision. [209] Detailed\ninformation is, however, only forthcoming in reference to the theory of\njudgment (\u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1), which certainly occupied the chief and most\nimportant place in their speculations. A judgment is a perfect\nutterance, which is either true or false. [210] Judgments are divided\ninto two classes: simple judgments, and composite judgments. [211] By a\nsimple judgment the Stoics understand a judgment which is purely\ncategorical. [212] Under the head of composite judgments are comprised\nhypothetical, corroborative, copulative, disjunctive, comparative, and\ncausal [(\u03b1) Simple judgment.] judgments. [213] In the case of simple\njudgments, a greater or less definiteness of expression is substituted\nin place of the ordinary difference in respect of quantity; [214] and\nwith regard to quality, they not only make a distinction between\naffirmative and negative judgments, [215] but, following the various\nforms of language, they speak of judgments of general negation,\njudgments of particular negation, and judgments of double negation.\n[216] Only affirmative and negative judgments have a contradictory\nrelation to one another; all other judgments stand to each other in the\nrelation of contraries. [217] Of two propositions which are related as\ncontradictories, according to the old rule, one must be true and the\nother false. [218]\n\n[(\u03b2) Composite judgments.]\n\nAmong composite judgments the most important are the hypothetical and\nthe disjunctive. As regards the latter, next to no information has\nreached us. [219] A hypothetical judgment (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) is a judgment\nconsisting of two clauses, connected by the conjunction \u2018if,\u2019 and\nrelated to one another as cause and effect; the former being called the\nleading (\u1f21\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd), and the latter the concluding or inferential\nclause (\u03bb\u1fc6\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd). [220] In the correctness of the inference the truth of\na hypothetical judgment consists. As to the conditions upon which the\naccuracy of an inference rests, different opinions were entertained\nwithin the Stoic School itself. [221] In as far as the leading clause\nstates something, from the existence of which an inference may be drawn\nfor the statement in the concluding clause, it is also called an\nindication or suggestive sign. [222]\n\n[(\u03b3) Modality of judgments.]\n\nThe modality of judgments, which engaged the attention of Aristotle and\nhis immediate pupils so much, was likewise treated by the Stoics at\nconsiderable length; but of this branch of enquiry so much only is\nknown to us as concerns possible and necessary judgments, and it is the\noutcome chiefly of the contest between Chrysippus and the Megarian\nDiodorus. [223] It is in itself of no great value. By the Stoics,\nnevertheless, great value was attached to it, in the hope of escaping\nthereby the difficulties which necessarily result from their views on\nfreedom and necessity. [224]\n\n\n[(b) Inference.]\n\nIn their theory of illation, [225] to which the Stoics attached special\nvalue, and on which they greatly prided themselves, [226] chief\nattention was paid to hypothetical and disjunctive inferences. [227] In\nregard to these forms of inference, the rules they laid down are well\nknown: [228] and from these forms they invariably take their examples,\neven when treating of inference [(\u03b1) Hypothetical inference the\noriginal form.] in general. [229] According to Alexander, [230] the\nhypothetical and disjunctive forms are held to be the only regular\nforms of inference; [231] the categorical form is considered correct in\npoint of fact, but defective in syllogistic form. [232] In hypothetical\ninferences a distinction was also made between such as are connected\nand such as are disconnected. [233] In connected inferences the Stoics\nlook principally at the greater or less accuracy of expression, [234]\nand partly at the difference between correctness of form and truth of\nmatter. [235] They also remark that true conclusions do not always\nextend the field of knowledge; and that those which do frequently\ndepend on reasons conclusive for the individual, but not on proofs\nuniversally acknowledged. [236] The main point, however, to be\nconsidered in dividing inferences is their [(\u03b2) The five simple forms\nof hypothetical inference.] logical form. There are, according to\nChrysippus, [237] who herein adopted the division of Theophrastus, five\noriginal forms of hypothetical inference, the accuracy of which is\nbeyond dispute, and to which all other forms of inference may be\nreferred and by which they may be tested. [238] Yet even among these\nfive, importance is attached to some in which the same sentence is\nrepeated tautologically in the form of a conclusion, [239] which proves\nhow mechanical and barren must have been the formalism with which the\nStoic logic abounds.\n\n[(\u03b3) Composite forms of inference.]\n\nThe combination of these five simple forms of inference gives rise to\nthe composite forms of inference, [240] all of which may be again\nresolved into their simple forms. [241] Among composite forms of\ninference, those composed of similar parts are distinguished from those\ncomposed of dissimilar parts; [242] in the treatment of the former,\nhowever, such a useless formality is displayed, that it is hard to say\nwhat meaning the Stoics attached to them. [243] If two or more\ninferences, the conclusion of one of which is the first premiss of the\nother, are so combined that the judgment which constitutes the\nconclusion and premiss at once is omitted in each case, the result is a\nSorites or Chain-inference. The rules prescribed by the Peripatetics\nfor the Chain-inference are developed by the Stoics with a minuteness\nfar transcending all the requirements of science. [244] With these [(\u03b4)\nInference from a single premiss.] composite forms of inference\nAntipater contrasted other forms having only a single premiss, [245]\nbut it was an addition to the field of logic of very doubtful worth. On\na few other points connected with the Stoic theory of illation, we have\nvery imperfect information. [246] The loss, however, is not to be\nregretted, seeing that in what we already possess there is conclusive\nevidence that the objections brought against the Stoic logic were\nreally well deserved, because of the microscopic care expended by them\non the most worthless logical forms. [247]\n\n\n[(c) Refutation of fallacies.]\n\nNext to describing inferences which are valid, another subject engaged\nthe close attention of the Stoics, and afforded opportunity for\ndisplaying their dialectical subtlety. This is the enumeration and\nrefutation of false inferences, [248] and in particular the exposing of\nthe many fallacies which had become current since the age of the\nSophists and Megarians. In this department, as might be expected,\nChrysippus led the way. [249] Not that Chrysippus was always able to\novercome the difficulties that arose; witness his remarkable attitude\ntowards the Chain-inference, from which he thought to escape by\nwithholding judgment. [250] The fallacies, however, to which the Stoics\ndevoted their attention, and the way in which they met them, need not\noccupy our attention further. [251]\n\n\n\n\n[D. Estimate of Stoic Logic.]\n\n[(1) Its shortcomings.]\n\nIn all these researches the Stoics were striving to find firm ground\nfor a scientific process of proof. Great as was the value which they\nattached to such a process, they nevertheless admitted, as Aristotle\nhad done before, that everything could not be proved. Here was their\nweak point. Instead, however, of strengthening this weak point by means\nof induction, and endeavouring to obtain a more complete theory of\ninduction, they were content with conjectural data, sometimes\nself-evident, at other times depending for their truth on the truth of\ntheir inferences. [252] Thus, their theory of method, like their theory\nof knowledge, ended by an ultimate appeal to what is directly certain.\n\n\n\n[(2) Its value.]\n\nNo very high estimate can therefore be formed of the formal logic of\nthe Stoics. Incomplete as our knowledge of that logic may be, still\nwhat is known is enough to determine the judgment absolutely. We see\nindeed that the greatest care was expended by the Stoics since the time\nof Chrysippus in tracing the forms of intellectual procedure into their\nminutest ramifications, and referring them to fixed types. At the same\ntime, we see that the real business of logic was lost sight of in the\nprocess, the business of portraying the operations of thought, and\ngiving its laws, whilst the most useless trifling with forms was\nrecklessly indulged in. The Stoics can have made no discoveries of\nimportance even as to logical forms, or they would not have been passed\nover by writers ever on the alert to note the slightest deviation from\nthe Aristotelian logic. Hence the whole contribution of the Stoics to\nthe field of logic consists in their having clothed the logic of the\nPeripatetics with a new terminology, and having developed certain parts\nof it with painful minuteness, whilst they wholly neglected other\nparts, as was the fate of the part treating of inference. Assuredly it\nwas no improvement for Chrysippus to regard the hypothetical rather\nthan the categorical as the original form of inference. Making every\nallowance for the extension of the field of logic, in scientific\nprecision it lost more than it gained by the labours of Chrysippus. The\nhistory of philosophy cannot pass over in silence this branch of the\nStoic system, so carefully cultivated by the Stoics themselves, and so\ncharacteristic of their intellectual attitude. Yet, when all has been\nsaid, the Stoic logic is only an outpost of their system, and the care\nwhich was lavished on it since the time of Chrysippus indicates the\ndecline of intellectual originality.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE STUDY OF NATURE. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS.\n\n\nOf far more importance in the Stoic system than the study of logic was\nthe study of nature. This branch of learning, notwithstanding an appeal\nto older views, was treated by them with more independence than any\nother. The subjects which it included may be divided under four heads,\nviz.: 1. Fundamental positions; 2. The course, character, and\ngovernment of the universe; 3. Irrational nature; and 4. Man. [253]\n\nThe present chapter will be devoted to considering the first of these\ngroups\u2014the fundamental positions held by the Stoics in regard to\nnature; among which three specially deserve notice\u2014their Materialism;\ntheir Dynamical view of the world; and their Pantheism.\n\n\n\n\n[A. Materialism.]\n\n[(1) Meaning of the Stoic materialism.]\n\n[(a) Material or corporeal objects.]\n\n[(\u03b1) Reality belongs to material objects only.]\n\nNothing appears more striking to a reader fresh from the study of Plato\nor Aristotle than the startling contrast to those writers presented by\nthe Materialism of the Stoics. Whilst so far following Plato as to\ndefine a real thing [254] to be anything possessing the capacity of\nacting or being acted upon, the Stoics nevertheless restricted the\npossession of this power to material objects. Hence followed their\nconclusion that nothing real exists except what is material; or, if\nthey could not deny existence in some sense or other to what is\nincorporeal, they were fain to assert that essential and real Being\nonly belongs to what is material, whereas of what is incorporeal only a\ncertain modified kind of Being can be predicated. [255] Following out\nthis view, it was natural that they should regard many things as\ncorporeal which are not generally considered such; for instance, the\nsoul and virtue. Nevertheless, it would not be correct to say [256]\nthat the Stoics gave to the conception of matter or corporeity a more\nextended meaning than it usually bears. For they define a body to be\nthat which has three dimensions, [257] and they also lay themselves out\nto prove how things generally considered to be incorporeal may be\nmaterial in the strictest sense of the term. Thus besides upholding the\ncorporeal character of all substances, including the human soul and\nGod, [258] they likewise assert that properties or forms are material:\nall attributes by means of which one object is distinguished from\nanother are produced by the existence [(\u03b2) Theory of air-currents.] of\ncertain air-currents, [259] which, emanating from the centre of an\nobject, diffuse themselves to its extremities, and having reached the\nsurface, return again to the centre to constitute the inward unity.\n[260] Nor was the theory of air-currents confined to bodily attributes.\nIt was applied quite as much to mental attributes. Virtues and vices\nare said to be material, [261] and are deduced from the tension\nimparted to the soul by atmospheric substances therein subsisting.\n[262] For the same reason the Good is called a body, for according to\nthe Stoics the Good is only a virtue, and virtue is a definite\ncondition of that material which constitutes the soul. [263] In the\nsame sense also truth is said to be material, personal and not\nindependent, truth being of course meant, [264] that is to say,\nknowledge, or a property of the soul that knows. And since according to\nthe Stoics knowledge consists in the presence of certain material\nelements within the soul, truth in the sense of knowledge may be\nrightly called something material. Even emotions, impulses, notions and\njudgments, in so far as they are due to material causes\u2014the\nair-currents pouring into the soul (\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1)\u2014were regarded as material\nobjects, and for the same reason not only artistic skill but individual\nactions were said to be corporeal. [265] Yet [(\u03b3) The causes of\nactions material.] certain actions, such as walking and dancing, can\nhardly have been called bodies by the Stoics, any more than being wise\nwas called a body; [266] but the objects which produced these actions,\nas indeed everything which makes itself felt, were considered to be\ncorporeal. To us it appears most natural to refer these actions to the\nsoul as their originating cause; but the Stoics, holding the theory of\nsubject-matter and property, preferred to refer each such action to\nsome special material as its cause, considering that an action is due\nto the presence of this material. The idealism of Plato was thus\nreproduced in a new form by the materialism of the Stoics. Plato had\nsaid, a man is just and musical when he participates in the idea of\njustice and music; the Stoics said, a man is virtuous when the material\nproducing virtue is in him; musical, when he has the material producing\nmusic.\n\n[(\u03b4) Wide extension of material.]\n\nMoreover, these materials produce the phenomena of life. Hence, not\ncontent with calling them bodies, the Stoics actually went so far as to\ncall them living beings. It seems, however, strange to hear such things\nas day and night, and parts of the day and parts of the night, months\nand years, even days of the month and seasons of the year, called\nbodies; [267] but by these singularly unhappy expressions Chrysippus\nappears to have meant little more than that the realities corresponding\nto these names depend on certain material conditions: by summer is\nmeant a certain state of the air when highly heated by the sun; by\nmonth the moon for a certain definite period during which it gives\nlight to the earth. [268] From all these examples one thing is clear,\nhow impossible the Stoics found it to assign reality to what is not\nmaterial.\n\n\n[(b) The incorporeal or non-material.]\n\nIn carrying out this theory, they could not, as might be expected,\nwholly succeed. Hence a Stoic could not deny that there are certain\nthings which it is absurd to call material. Among such include empty\nspace, place, time, and expression (\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd). [269] Admitting these to\nbe incorporeal, they still would not allow that they do not exist at\nall. This view belongs only to isolated members of the Stoic School,\nfor which they must be held personally responsible. [270] How they\ncould harmonise belief in incorporeal things with their tenet that\nexistence alone belongs to what is material is not on record.\n\n\n\n[(2) Causes which produced the Stoic materialism.]\n\nThe question next before us is: What led the Stoics to this\nmaterialism? It might be supposed that their peculiar theory of\nknowledge based on sensation was the cause; but this theory did not\npreclude the possibility of advancing from the sensible to the\nsuper-sensible. It might quite as well be said that their theory of\nknowledge was a consequence of their materialism, and that they\nreferred all knowledge to sensation, because they could allow no real\nbeing to anything which is not material. The probability therefore\nremains that their theory of knowledge and their materialistic view of\nnature both indicate one and the same habit of mind, and that both are\ndue to the action of the same causes.\n\n\n[(a) The Stoic materialism not an expansion of Peripatetic views.]\n\nNor will it do to seek for these causes in the influence exercised by\nthe Peripatetic or pre-Socratic philosophy on the Stoic School. At\nfirst sight, indeed, it might appear that the Stoics had borrowed from\nHeraclitus their materialism, together with their other views on\nnature; or else their materialism might seem to be an expansion of the\nmetaphysical notions of Plato and Aristotle. For if Aristotle denied\nPlato\u2019s distinction of form and matter to such an extent that he would\nhardly allow form to exist at all except in union with matter, might it\nnot appear to others more logical to do away with the distinction\nbetween them in thought, thus reducing both to a property of matter?\nWere there not difficulties in the doctrine of a God external to the\nworld, of a passionless Reason? Were there not even difficulties in the\nantithesis of form and matter, which Aristotle\u2019s system was powerless\nto overcome? And had not Aristoxenus and Dic\u00e6archus before the time of\nZeno, and Strato immediately after his time, been led from the ground\noccupied by the Peripatetics to materialistic views? And yet we must\npause before accepting this explanation. The founder of Stoicism\nappears, from what is recorded of his intellectual growth, to have been\nrepelled by the Peripatetic School more than by any other; nor is there\nthe least indication in the records of the Stoic teaching that that\nteaching resulted from a criticism of the Aristotelian and Platonic\nviews of a double origin of things. Far from it, the proposition that\neverything capable of acting or being acted upon must be material,\nappears with the Stoics as an independent axiom needing no further\nproof.\n\n\n[(b) The Stoic materialism not due to Heraclitus.]\n\nThe supposed connection between the Stoics and Heraclitus, so far from\nexplaining their materialistic views, already presumes their existence.\nYet long before Zeno\u2019s time the philosophy of Heraclitus as a living\ntradition had become extinct. No historical connection therefore, or\nrelation of original dependence, can possibly exist between the two,\nbut at most a subsequent perception of relationship can have directed\nZeno to Heraclitus. Zeno\u2019s own view of the world was not a consequence,\nbut the cause, of his sympathy with Heraclitus. In short, neither the\nPeripatetics nor Heraclitus can have given the first impulse to Zeno\u2019s\nmaterialism, although they may have helped in many ways to strengthen\nhis views on that subject, when already formed.\n\n\n[(c) Practical turn of the Stoic philosophy the cause.]\n\nThe real causes for these views must therefore be sought elsewhere, and\nwill be found in the central idea of the whole system of the Stoics\u2014the\npractical character of their philosophy. Devoting themselves from the\noutset with all their energies to practical enquiries, the Stoics in\ntheir theory of nature occupied the ground of common views, which know\nof no real object excepting what is grossly sensible and corporeal.\nTheir aim in speculation was to discover a firm basis for human\nactions. [271] In action, however, men are brought into direct and\nexperimental contact with objects. The objects thus presented to the\nsenses we are brought face to face with in naked reality, nor is an\nopportunity afforded for doubting their real being. Their reality is\nproved practically, inasmuch as it affects us and offers itself for the\nexercise of our powers. In every such exercise of power, both subject\nand object are always material. Even when an impression is conveyed to\nthe soul of man, the direct instrument is something material\u2014the voice\nor the gesture. In the region of experience there are no such things as\nnon-material impressions. This was the ground occupied by the Stoics: a\nreal thing is what either acts on us, or is acted upon by us. Such a\nthing is naturally material; and the Stoics with their practical ideas\nnot being able to soar above that which is most obvious, declared that\nreality belongs only to the world of bodies.\n\n\n\n[(3) Consequences of the Stoic materialism.]\n\nHerefrom it would appear to follow that only individual perceptions are\ntrue, and that all general conceptions without exception must be false.\nIf each notion (\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd) is incorporeal, and consequently unreal, [272]\nwill not absence of reality in a much higher degree belong to the\nnotion of what is general? [(a) Individual perceptions alone true; yet\na higher truth assigned to general conceptions.] Individual notions\nrefer directly to perceptions, i.e. to things incorporeal; nevertheless\nthey indirectly refer to the things perceived, i.e. to what is\nmaterial. But general notions do not even indirectly refer to anything\ncorporeal; they are pure fabrications of the mind, which have nothing\nreal as their object. This the Stoics explicitly maintained. [273] It\nwas therefore a gross inconsistency to attribute notwithstanding to\nthese general conceptions, to which no real objects correspond, a\nhigher truth and certainty than belongs to the perceptions of\nindividual objects, but an inconsistency which the Stoic system made\nnot the slightest attempt to overcome.\n\n\n[(b) Theory of universal intermingling.]\n\nThe materialism of the Stoics likewise led to some remarkable\nassertions in the province of natural science. If the attributes of\nthings, the soul and even the powers of the soul, are all corporeal,\nthe relation of attributes to their objects, of the soul to the body,\nof one body to another body, is that of mutual intermingling. [274]\nMoreover, inasmuch as the essential attributes of any definite material\nbelong to every part of that material, and the soul resides in every\npart of the body, without the soul\u2019s being identical with the body, and\nwithout the attributes being identical with the material to which they\nbelong, or with one another; it follows that one body may intermingle\nwith another not only by occupying the vacant spaces in that body, but\nby interpenetrating all its parts, without, however, being fused into a\nhomogeneous mass with it. [275] This view involves not only a denial of\nthe impenetrability of matter, but it further supposes that a smaller\nbody when mingled with a greater body will extend over the whole of the\nlatter. It is known as the Stoic theory of universal intermingling\n(\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd), and is alike different from the ordinary view of\nmechanical mixture and from that of chemical mixture. It differs from\nthe former in that every part of the one body is interpenetrated by\nevery part of the other; from the latter, because the bodies after\nmixture still retain their own properties. [276] This peculiar theory,\nwhich is one of the much debated but distinctive features of the Stoic\nsystem, [277] cannot have been deduced from physical causes. On the\ncontrary, the arguments by which Chrysippus supported it prove that it\nwas ultimately the result of metaphysical considerations. [278] We\nhave, moreover, no reason to doubt it as a fact, inasmuch as the\nmaterialistic undercurrent of the Stoic system affords the best\nexplanation of it.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Dynamical theory of nature.]\n\n[(1) Matter and force.]\n\nAlthough the stamp of materialism was sharply cut, and its application\nfearlessly made by the Stoics, they were yet far from holding the\nmechanical theory of nature, which appears to us to be a necessary\nconsequence of strict materialism. The universe was explained on a\ndynamical theory; the notion of force was placed above the notion of\nmatter. To matter, they held, alone belongs real existence; but the\ncharacteristic of real existence they sought in causation, in the\ncapacity to act and to be acted upon. [279] This capacity belongs to\nmatter only by virtue of certain inherent forces, which impart to it\ndefinite attributes. Let pure matter devoid of every attribute be\nconsidered, the matter which underlies all definite materials, and out\nof which all things are made; [280] it will be found to be purely\npassive, a something subject to any change, able to assume any shape\nand quality, but taken by itself devoid of quality and unable to\nproduce any change whatsoever. [281] This inert and powerless matter is\nfirst reduced into shape by means of attributes, [282] all of which\nsuppose tension in the air-currents which produce them, and\nconsequently suppose a force producing tension. [283] Even the shape of\nbodies, and the place they occupy in space, is, according to the\nStoics, something derivative, the consequence of tension; tension\nkeeping the different particles apart in one or the other particular\nway. [284] Just as some modern physiologists construct nature by\nputting together a sum of forces of attraction and repulsion, so the\nStoics refer nature to two forces, or, speaking more accurately, to a\ndouble kind of motion\u2014expansion and condensation. Expansion works\noutwardly, condensation inwardly; condensation produces being, or what\nis synonymous with it, matter; expansion gives rise to the attributes\nof things. [285] Whilst, therefore, they assert that everything really\nexisting must be material, they still distinguish in what is material\ntwo component parts\u2014the part which is acted upon, and the part which\nacts, or in other words matter and force. [286]\n\n\n\n[(2) The nature of force.]\n\n[(a) Force limited to the notion of efficient cause.]\n\nThe Stoics, however, would not agree with Plato and Aristotle so far as\nto allow to formal and final causes a place side by side with this\nacting force or efficient cause. If in general anything may be called a\ncause which serves to bring about a definite result [287]\u2014and various\nkinds of causes may be distinguished, according as they bring about\nthis result directly or indirectly, by themselves alone or by the help\nof others [288]\u2014in the highest sense there can be, according to the\nStoics, only one acting or efficient cause. The form is due to the\nworkman, and is therefore only a part of the efficient cause. The\ntype-form is only an instrument, which the workman employs in his work.\nThe final cause or end-in-chief, in as far as it represents the\nworkman\u2019s intention, is only an occasional cause; in as far as it\nbelongs to the work he is about, it is not a cause at all, but a\nresult. There can be but one pure and unconditional cause, just as\nthere can be but one matter; and to this efficient cause everything\nthat exists and everything that takes place must be referred. [289]\n\n\n[(b) Character of this efficient cause.]\n\nIn attempting to form a more accurate notion of this efficient cause,\nthe first point which deserves attention is, that the Stoics believed\nevery kind of action ultimately to proceed from one source. For how\ncould the world be such a self-circumscribed unity, such an harmonious\nwhole, unless it were governed by one and the same force? [290] Again,\nas everything which acts is material, the highest efficient cause must\nlikewise be considered material; and since all qualities and forces are\nproduced by vapour-like or fiery elements, can it be otherwise with the\nhighest acting force? [291] Everywhere warmth is the cause of\nnourishment and growth, life and motion; all things have in themselves\ntheir own natural heat, and are preserved and kept in life by the heat\nof the sun. What applies to parts of the world must apply to the world\nas a whole; hence heat or fire is the power to which the life and the\nexistence of the world must be referred. [292]\n\nThis power must be further defined to be the soul of the world, the\nhighest reason, a kind, beneficent, and philanthropic being; in short,\ndeity. The universal belief and the universal worship of God prove\nthis, as the Stoics think, beyond a doubt; [293] still more accurate\ninvestigation confirms it. Matter can never move or fashion itself;\nnothing but a power inherent as the soul is in man can produce these\nresults. [294] The world would not be the most perfect and complete\nthing it is unless Reason were inherent therein; [295] nor could it\ncontain any beings possessed of consciousness, unless it were conscious\nitself. [296] It could not produce creatures endowed with a soul and\nreason, unless it were itself endowed with a soul and reason. [297]\nActions so far surpassing man\u2019s power could not exist, unless there\nwere a cause for them in perfection equally surpassing man. [298] The\nsubordination of means to ends which governs the world in every part\ndown to the minutest details would be inexplicable, unless the world\nowed its origin to a reasonable creator. [299] The graduated rank of\nbeings would be incomplete, unless there were a highest Being of all\nwhose moral and intellectual perfection cannot be surpassed. [300]\nAlthough this perfection belongs, in the first place, to the world as a\nwhole, [301] nevertheless, as in everything consisting of many parts,\nso in the world the ruling part must be distinguished from other parts.\nIt is the part from which all acting forces emanate and diffuse\nthemselves over the world, [302] whether the seat of this efficient\nforce be placed in the heaven, as was done by Zeno, Chrysippus, and the\nmajority of the Stoics; [303] or in the sun, as by Cleanthes; [304] or\nin the centre of the world, as by Archedemus. [305] This primary source\nof all life and motion, the highest Cause and the highest Reason, is\nGod. God, therefore, and formless matter, are the two ultimate grounds\nof things. [306]\n\n\n\n[(3) Deity.]\n\n[(a) The conception of Deity more accurately defined.]\n\nThe language used by the Stoics in reference to the Deity at one time\ngives greater prominence to the material, at another to the spiritual\nside of their conception of God. As a rule, both are united in\nexpressions which only cease to be startling when taken in connection\nwith Stoic views in general. God is spoken of as being Fire, Ether,\nAir, most commonly as being \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 or Atmospheric-Current, pervading\neverything without exception, what is most base and ugly, as well as\nwhat is most beautiful. [307] He is further described [308] as the\nSoul, the Mind, or the Reason of the world; as a united Whole,\ncontaining in Himself the germs of all things; as the Connecting\nelement in all things; as Universal Law, Nature, Destiny, Providence;\nas a perfect, happy, ever kind and all-knowing Being; nor was it hard\nto show that no conception could be formed of God without these\nattributes. [309] Both kinds of expression are combined in the\nassertion that God is the fiery Reason of the World, the Mind in\nMatter, the reasonable Air-Current, penetrating all things, and\nassuming various names according to the material in which He resides,\nthe artistically moulding Fire, containing in Himself the germs of\neverything, and producing according to an unalterable law the world and\nall that is therein. [310]\n\nAs used in the Stoic system, these expressions generally mean one and\nthe same thing. It is an unimportant difference whether the original\ncause is described as an Air-Current or as Ether, or as Heat or as\nFire. It is an Air-Current, for Air-Currents are, as we have already\nseen, the causes of the properties of things, giving them shape and\nconnection. It is also Fire, for by fire is only meant the warm air, or\nthe fiery fluid, which is sometimes called Ether, at other times Fire,\nat other times Heat, [311] and which is expressly distinguished from\nordinary fire. [312] Moreover the terms, Soul of the world, Reason of\nthe world, Nature, Universal Law, Providence, Destiny\u2014all mean the same\nthing, the one primary force penetrating the whole world. Even the more\nabstract expressions, Law, Providence, Destiny, have with the Stoics an\nessentially gross meaning, implying not only the form according to\nwhich the world is arranged and governed, but also the essential\nsubstance of the world, as a power above everything particular and\nindividual. [313] If Nature must be distinguished from Destiny, and\nboth of these notions again from Zeus, [314] the distinction can only\nconsist herein, that the three conceptions describe one original Being\nat different stages of His manifestation and growth. Viewed as the\nwhole of the world it is called Zeus; viewed as the inner power in the\nworld, Providence or Destiny; [315] and to prove this identity at the\nclose of every period, so taught Chrysippus, Zeus goes back into\nProvidence. [316]\n\nUpon closer examination, even the difference between the materialistic\nand idealistic description of God vanishes. God, according to Stoic\nprinciples, can only be invested with reality when He has a material\nform. Hence, when He is called the Soul, the Mind, or the Reason of the\nworld, this language does not exclude, but rather presupposes, that\nthese conceptions have bodies; and such bodies the Stoics thought to\ndiscern in that heated fluid which they at one time call the\nall-penetrating Breath, at another Ether, or primary Fire. [317] Each\nof these two determinations appeared to them indispensable, [318] and\nboth became identical by assuming, as the Stoics did, that the infinite\ncharacter of the divine Reason depends on the purity and lightness of\nthe fiery material which composes it. [319] Seneca is therefore only\nfollowing out the principles of his School when he pronounces it\nindifferent whether God is regarded as Destiny or as an all-pervading\nBreath. [320] Those who charge the Stoics with inconsistency for\ncalling God at one time Reason, at another Soul of the universe, at\nanother Destiny, at another Fire, Ether, or even the Universe, [321]\nforget that they are attaching to these terms a meaning entirely\ndifferent from that in which they were used by them. [322]\n\n\n[(b) God original matter.]\n\nThe more the two sides of the conception of God\u2014the material and the\nideal\u2014are compared, the clearer it becomes that there is no difference\nbetween God and primary Matter. Both are one and the same substance,\nwhich, when regarded as the universal substratum, is known as\nundetermined matter; but when conceived of as acting force, is called\nall-pervading Ether, all-warming Fire, all-penetrating Air, Nature,\nSoul of the world, Reason of the world, Providence, Destiny, God.\nMatter and power, material and form, are not, as with Aristotle, things\nradically different, though united from all eternity. Far from it, the\nforming force resides in matter as such; it is in itself something\nmaterial; it is identical with Ether, or Fire-element, or Breath. Hence\nthe difference between efficient and material cause, between God and\nmatter, resolves itself into the difference between Breath and other\nelements. This difference, too, is no original or ultimate difference.\nAccording to the Stoic teaching, every particular element has in\nprocess of time developed out of primary fire or God, and to God it\nwill return at the end of every period of the world. [323] It is\ntherefore only a derivative and passing difference with which we are\nhere concerned. But taking the conception of Deity in its full meaning,\nit may be described as primary matter, as well as primary power. The\nsum total of all that is real is the divine Breath, moving forth from\nitself and returning to itself again. [324] Deity itself is primary\nfire, containing in itself in germ both God and matter; [325] the world\nin its original gaseous condition; [326] the Universal Substance\nchanging into particular elements, and from them returning to itself\nagain, which regarded in its real form as God includes at one time\neverything, at another only a part of real existence. [327]\n\n\n\n\n[C. Pantheism.]\n\n[(1) God identical with the world.]\n\nFrom what has been said it follows that the Stoics admitted no\nessential difference between God and the world. Their system was\ntherefore strictly pantheistic. The world is the sum of all real\nexistence, and all real existence is originally contained in deity,\nwhich is at once the matter of everything and the creative force which\nmoulds this matter into particular individual substances. We can,\ntherefore, think of nothing which is not either immediately deity or a\nmanifestation of deity. In point of essence, therefore, God and the\nworld are the same; indeed, the two conceptions are declared by the\nStoics to be absolutely identical. [328] If they have nevertheless to\nbe distinguished, the distinction is only derivative and partial. The\nsame universal Being is called God when it is regarded as a whole,\nWorld when it is regarded as progressive in one of the many forms\nassumed in the course of its development. The difference, therefore, is\ntantamount to assigning a difference of meaning to the term world,\naccording as it is used to express the whole of what exists, or only\nthe derivative part. [329]\n\n\n\n[(2) Difference between God and the world only relative.]\n\nStill this distinction does not depend only upon our way of looking at\nthings, but it is founded in the nature of things. Primary force, as\nsuch, primary fire, primary reason, constitute what is primarily God.\nThings into which this primary substance has changed itself are only\ndivine in a derivative sense. Hence deity, which is ultimately\nidentical with the whole of the world, may again be described as a part\nof the world, as the leading part (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd), as the Soul of the\nworld, as the all-pervading fiery Breath. [330] The distinction,\nhowever, is only a relative one. What is not immediately divine is\nnevertheless divine derivatively, as being a manifestation of primary\nfire; and if the soul of the world is not identical with the body, at\nleast it pervades every part of that body. [331] It is a distinction,\ntoo, which applies only to a part of the conditions of the world. At\nthe end of every period, the sum of all derivative things reverts to\nthe unity of the divine Being, and the distinction between what is\noriginally and what is derivatively divine, in other words, the\ndistinction between God and the world, ceases.\n\n\n\n[(3) Bo\u00ebthus dissents from the pantheism of the Stoics.]\n\nBo\u00ebthus alone dissented from the pantheism of the Stoics by making a\nreal distinction between God and the world. Agreeing with the other\nStoics in considering deity to be an ethereal Substance, [332] he would\nnot allow that it resided, as the Soul, within the whole world, and,\nconsequently, he refused to call the world a living being. [333]\nInstead of doing so, he placed the seat of deity in the highest of the\nheavenly spheres, the sphere of the fixed stars, and made it operate\nupon the world from this abode. [334] The opposite view detracted, in\nhis eyes, from the unchangeable and exalted character of the divine\nBeing. How anxious he was to vindicate that character will also be seen\nin the way in which he differed from his fellow-Stoics in reference to\nthe destruction of the world.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE STUDY OF NATURE. COURSE, CHARACTER, AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\n\n[A. The general course of the universe.]\n\n[(1) Origin of the world.]\n\nBy virtue of a law inherent in nature, Primary Being passes over into\nparticular objects; for, involving as it does the conception of a\nforming and creating force, it must as necessarily develop into a\nuniverse, as a seed or ovum must develop into a plant or animal. [335]\nPrimary fire\u2014so taught the Stoics, following Heraclitus\u2014first goes over\ninto vapour, then into moisture; one part of this moisture is\nprecipitated in the form of earth, another remains as water, whilst a\nthird part evaporating constitutes atmospheric air, and air, again,\nenkindles fire out of itself. By the mutual play of these four elements\nthe world is formed, [336] built round the earth as a centre; [337]\nheat, as it is developed out of water, [338] moulding the chaotic mass.\nBy the separation of these elements, a distinction between the active\nand the passive powers of nature\u2014between the soul of the world and the\nbody of the world\u2014becomes apparent. The moisture into which the primary\nfire was first changed represents the body, just as the heat [339]\nlatent in it represents the soul; [340] or, taking the later fourfold\ndivision of the elements, the two lower ones correspond to matter, the\ntwo higher ones to acting force. [341]\n\n\n\n[(2) End of the world.]\n\nAs the distinction between matter and force has its origin in time, so\nit will also have an end in time. [342] Matter which primary Being has\nseparated from itself to form its body is being gradually resolved into\nprimary Being again; so that, at the end of the present course of\nthings, a general conflagration of the world will restore all things to\ntheir original form, in which everything derivative will have ceased to\nexist, and pure Deity, or primary fire, will alone remain in its\noriginal purity. [343] This resolution of the world into fire or ether,\n[344] the Stoics thought, would take place, through the same\nintermediate stages as its generation from the primary fire. [345]\nCleanthes, following his peculiar view as to the seat of the governing\n[346] force in the world, supposed that its destruction would come from\nthe sun. [347]\n\n\n\n[(3) Cycles in the world\u2019s course.]\n\nNo sooner, however, will everything have returned to its original\nunity, [348] and the course of the world have come to an end, than the\nformation of a new world will begin, [349] so exactly corresponding\nwith the previous world that every particular thing, every particular\nperson, and every occurrence will recur in it, [350] precisely as they\noccurred in the world preceding. Hence the history of the world and of\nDeity\u2014as, indeed, with the eternity of matter and acting force, must\nnecessarily be the case\u2014revolves in an endless cycle through exactly\nthe same stages. [351] Still there were not wanting, even in\ncomparatively early times, members of the Stoic School who entertained\ndoubts on this teaching; and among the most distinguished of the later\nStoics some gave it up altogether. [352] Besides the periodical\ndestruction by fire, periodical destructions by floods [353] were also\nassumed; there being, however, a difference of opinion as to whether\nthe whole universe, or only the earth and its inhabitants, were subject\nto these floods. [354]\n\n\n\n\n[B. Government of the world.]\n\n[(1) Nature of Destiny.]\n\n[(a) Destiny as Providence.]\n\nOne point established by the generation and destruction of the\nworld\u2014the uncertainty of all particular things, and the unconditional\ndependence of everything on a universal law and the course of the\nuniverse\u2014is a leading one in the Stoic enquiries into nature. All\nthings in nature come about by virtue of a natural and unchangeable\nconnection of cause and effect, as the nature of the universe and the\ngeneral law require. This absolute necessity, regulating all Being and\nBecoming, is expressed in the conception of Fate or Destiny (\u1f21\n\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7). [355] Viewed from the point of view of natural science,\nDestiny is only another name for primary Being, for the all-pervading,\nall-producing Breath, for the artistic fire which is the soul of the\nworld. [356] But again the activity of this Being being always rational\nand according to law, Destiny may also be described as the Reason of\nthe World, as universal Law, as the rational form of the world\u2019s\ncourse. [357] When regarded as the groundwork of natural formations,\nthis primary Being or general Law is called Nature; but when it appears\nas the cause of the orderly arrangement and development of the world,\nit is known as Providence; [358] or in popular language it is called\nZeus, or the will of Zeus; and in this sense it is said that nothing\nhappens without the will of Zeus. [359]\n\n\n[(b) Destiny as generative reason.]\n\nIn action as the creative force in nature, this universal Reason also\nbears the name of Generative Reason (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2). It bears this\nname more immediately in relation to the universe, not only as being\nthe generating power by which all things are produced from primary fire\nas from seed according to an inner law, but because in the present\ncondition of things all form and shape, all life and reason, grow out\nof it, in short, because primary fire and reason contain in themselves\nthe germ of all things. [360] In the same sense, generative powers in\nthe plural, or \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af, are spoken of as belonging to Deity\nand Nature; and in treating of man, \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af denote the\ngenerative powers as a part of the soul, and must be thought of as\nbearing the same relation to the individual soul that the generative\npowers of Nature do to the soul of nature. [361] By the term Generative\nReason, therefore, must be understood the creative and forming forces\nin nature, which have collectively produced the universe, and\nparticular exercises of which produce individual things. These forces,\nagreeably with the ordinary Stoic speculations, are spoken of as the\noriginal material, or material germ of things. On the other hand, they\nalso constitute the form of things\u2014the law which determines their shape\nand qualities, the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\u2014only we must beware of trying to think of form\napart from matter. Just as the igneous or ethereal material of primary\nBeing is in itself the same as the forming and creating element in\nthings, the Reason of the world or the Soul of nature; so the\natmospheric substance in the seeds of individual things, in which the\nStoics thought the generative power (\u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1) alone resides, [362] is in\nitself the germ out of which the corresponding thing is produced by\nvirtue of an inherent law. [363] The inward form is the only permanent\nelement in things amid the perpetual change of materials. [364] It\nconstitutes the identity of the universe; and whereas matter is\nconstantly changing from one form to another, [365] the universal law\nof the process alone continues unchangeably the same.\n\n\n\n[(2) Arguments in favour of Providence.]\n\nAll parts of the Stoic system lead so unmistakeably to the conclusion,\nnot only that the world as a whole is governed by Providence, but that\nevery part of it is subject to the same unchangeable laws, that no\ndefinite arguments would appear necessary to establish this point.\nNevertheless, the Stoics lost no opportunity of meeting objections to\ntheir views [(a) Argument from the general convictions of mankind.] in\nthe fullest manner. [366] In the true spirit of a Stoic, Chrysippus\nappealed to the general conviction of mankind, as expressed in the\nnames used to denote fate and destiny, [367] and to the language of\npoetry. [368] [(b) Argument from the perfection of God.] Nor was it\ndifficult to show [369] that a divine government of the world followed\nof necessity from the Stoic conception of the perfection of God.\nBesides, in proving the existence of a God by the argument drawn from\nthe adaptation of means to ends, a providential government of the world\nwas at the same [(c) Argument from the theory of necessity.] time\nproved. [370] Chrysippus also thought to defend his theory of necessity\nin the same strictly logical manner. For must not every judgment be\neither true or false? [371] And does not this apply to judgments which\nrefer to future events, as well as to others? Judgments, however,\nreferring to the future can only be true when what they affirm must\ncome to pass of necessity; they can only be false when what they affirm\nis impossible; and, accordingly, everything that takes place must\nfollow of necessity from the causes which produce it. [372]\n\n\n[(d) Argument from foreknowledge of God.]\n\nThe same process of reasoning, transferred from the outer world to the\ninner world of mind, underlies the argument from the foreknowledge of\nGod. [373] If in the one case it is alleged that whatever is true,\nbefore it comes to pass, is necessary, so in the other it is said to be\nnecessary, if it can be truly known before it comes to pass.\n\n\n[(e) Argument from the existence of divination.]\n\nTo this argument may be added a further one to which the Stoics\nattached great importance\u2014the argument from the existence of\ndivination. [374] If it is impossible to know beforehand with certainty\nwhat is accidental, it is also impossible to predict it.\n\n\n\n[(3) The idea of Providence determined.]\n\n[(a) Providence as necessity.]\n\nBut the real kernel of the Stoic fatalism is expressed in the maxim,\nthat nothing can take place without a sufficient cause, nor, under\ngiven circumstances, can happen differently from what has happened.\n[375] This were as impossible, according to the Stoics, as for\nsomething to come out of nothing; [376] were it possible, the unity of\nthe world would be at an end, consisting, as it does, in the chain-like\ndependence of cause upon cause, and in the absolute necessity of\neverything and of every change. [377] The Stoic doctrine of necessity\nwas the direct consequence of the Stoic pantheism. The divine power\nwhich rules the world could not be the absolute uniting cause of all\nthings, if there existed anything in any sense independent of it, and\nunless one unchanging causal connection governed every thing.\n\n\n[(b) Providence directed immediately to the universe, indirectly to\nindividuals.]\n\nDivine Providence, therefore, does not extend to individual things\ntaken by themselves, but only to things in their relation to the whole.\nEverything being in every respect determined by this relation, and\nbeing consequently subject to the general order of the world, it\nfollows that we may say that God cares not only for the universe, but\nfor all individual members of the universe. [378] The converse of this\nmay also be asserted with equal justice, viz. that God\u2019s care is\ndirected to the whole, and not to individuals, and that it extends to\nthings great, but not to things small. [379] Directly it always extends\nto the whole, indirectly to individuals throughout the whole, in so far\nas they are therein contained, and their condition is determined by its\ncondition. [380] The Stoic notion of Providence is therefore entirely\nbased on a view of the universe as a whole; individual things and\npersons can only come into consideration as dependent parts of this\nwhole.\n\n\n[(c) Difficulties connected with the theory of necessity.]\n\n[(\u03b1) Statement of several difficulties.]\n\nThe Stoics were thus involved in a difficulty which besets every theory\nof necessity\u2014the difficulty of doing justice to the claims of morality,\nand of vindicating the existence of moral responsibility. This\ndifficulty became for them all the more pressing the higher those\nclaims were advanced, and the more severely they judged the great\nmajority of their fellow-men. [381] To overcome it, Chrysippus appears\nto have made most energetic efforts. [382] The existence of chance he\ncould not allow, it being his aim to establish that what seems to be\naccidental has always some hidden cause. [383] Nor would he allow that\neverything is necessary, since that can only be called necessary which\ndepends on no external conditions, and is therefore always true; [384]\nin other words, what is eternal and unchangeable, not that which comes\nto pass in time, however inevitable it may be. [385] And, by a similar\nprocess of reasoning, he still tried to rescue the idea of the\nPossible, little as that idea accords with the Stoic system. [386]\n\n[(\u03b2) Moral responsibility vindicated.]\n\nIn reference to human actions, the Stoics did not allow the freedom of\nthe will, in the proper sense of the term; [387] but were of opinion\nthat absence of freedom does not prejudice the character of the will as\na deciding power. For is not one and the same all-determining power\neverywhere active, working in each particular being according to the\nlaw of its nature, in one way in organic beings, in another in\ninorganic beings, differently again in animals and plants, in rational\nand irrational creatures? [388] And albeit every action may be brought\nabout by the co-operation of causes depending on the nature of things\nand the character of the agent, is it not still free, the resultant of\nour own impulses and decision? [389] Involuntary it would only be were\nit produced by external causes alone, without any co-operation, on the\npart of our wills, with external causes. [390] Moral responsibility,\naccording to the Stoics, depends only on freedom of the will. What\nemanates from my will is my action, no matter whether it be possible\nfor me to act differently or not. [391] Praise and blame, rewards and\npunishment, express the judgment of society relative to the character\nof certain persons or actions. [392] Whether they could have been\ndifferent, or not, is irrelevant. Otherwise virtue and vice must be set\ndown as things not in our power, for which, consequently, we are not\nresponsible, seeing that when a man is once virtuous or vicious, he\ncannot be otherwise; [393] and the highest perfection, that of the\nGods, is absolutely unchangeable. [394] Chrysippus [395] even\nendeavoured to show, not only that his whole theory of destiny was in\nharmony with the claims of morality and moral responsibility, but that\nit presupposed their existence. The arrangement of the universe, he\nargued, involves law, and law involves the distinction between what is\nconventionally right and what is conventionally wrong, between what\ndeserves praise and what deserves blame. [396] Moreover, it is\nimpossible to think of destiny without thinking of the world, or to\nthink of the world without thinking of the Gods, who are supremely\ngood. Hence the idea of destiny involves also that of goodness, which\nagain includes the contrast between virtue and vice, between what is\npraiseworthy and what is blameworthy. [397] If his opponents objected\nthat, if everything is determined by destiny, individual action is\nsuperfluous, since what has been once foreordained must happen, come\nwhat may, Chrysippus replied:\u2014There is a distinction to be made between\nsimple and complex predestination; the consequences of human actions\nbeing simply results of those actions, are quite as much foreordained\nas the actions themselves. [398]\n\nFrom these observations, it appears that the Stoics never intended to\nallow man to hold a different position, in regard to destiny, from that\nheld by other beings. All the actions of man\u2014in fact, his destiny\u2014are\ndecided by his relation to things: one individual only differs from\nanother in that one acts on his own impulse, and agreeably with his own\nfeelings, whereas another, under compulsion and against his will,\nconforms to the eternal law of the world. [399]\n\n\n\n\n[C. Nature of the world.]\n\nEverything in the world being produced by one and the same divine\npower, the world, as regards its structure, is an organic whole, in\nrespect of its [(1) Its unity and perfections.] constitution perfect.\nThe unity of the world, a doctrine distinguishing the Stoics from the\nEpicureans, followed as a corollary from the unity of primary substance\nand of primary force. [400] It was further proved by the intimate\nconnection, or, as the Stoics called it, the sympathy of all its parts,\nand, in particular, by the coincidence of the phenomena of earth and\nheaven. [401] The perfection of the world follows generally from a\nconsideration of fundamental principles. [402] But the Stoics made use\nof many arguments in support of its perfection, appealing, after the\nexample of preceding philosophers, sometimes to its beauty, and, at\nother times, to the adaptation of means to ends. [403] An appeal to\nbeauty is the assertion of Chrysippus, that nature made many creatures\nfor the sake of beauty, the peacock, for instance, for the sake of its\ntail [404];\u2014and the dictum of Marcus Aurelius, that what is purely\nsubsidiary and subservient to no purpose, even what is ugly or\nfrightful in nature, has peculiar attractions of its own; [405] and the\nsame kind of consideration may have led to the Stoic assertion, that no\ntwo things in nature are altogether alike. [406] Their chief argument,\nhowever, for the beauty of the world, was based on the shape, the size,\nand the colour of the heavenly structure. [407]\n\nThe other line of argument is followed not so much in individual\nexpressions. But owing no doubt to the pre-eminently practical\ncharacter of its treatment of things, the Stoic view of nature, like\nthe Socratic, has ever an eye on the adaptation of means to ends in the\nworld. As, on the one hand, this adaptation of means to ends is the\nmost convincing proof of the existence of deity, so, on the other hand,\nby it, more than by anything else, the divine government of the world\nmakes itself manifest. [408] Like Socrates, however, they took a very\nsuperficial view of the adaptation of means to ends, arguing that\neverything in the world was created for the benefit of some other\nthing\u2014plants for the support of animals, animals for the support and\nthe service of man, [409] the world for the benefit of Gods and men\n[410]\u2014not unfrequently degenerating into the ridiculous and pedantic,\nin their endeavours to trace the special end for which each thing\nexists. [411] But, in asking the further question, For what purpose do\nGods and men exist? they could not help being at length carried beyond\nthe idea of a relative end to the idea of an end-in-itself. The end for\nwhich Gods and men exist is that of mutual society. [412] Or,\nexpressing the same idea in language more philosophical, the end of man\nis the contemplation and imitation of the world; man has only\nimportance as being a part of a whole; only this whole is perfect and\nan end-in-itself. [413]\n\n\n\n[(2) Moral theory of the world.]\n\nThe greater the importance attached by the Stoics to the perfection of\nthe world, the less were they able to avoid the difficult problem of\nreconciling the various forms of evil in the world. By the attention\nwhich, following the example of Plato, they gave to this question, they\nmay be said to be the real creators of the moral theory of the world.\n[414] The character of this moral theory was already determined by\ntheir system. Subordinating individuals, as that system did, to the law\nof the whole, it met the charges preferred against the evil found in\nthe world by the general maxim, that imperfection in details is\nnecessary for the perfection of the whole. [415] This maxim, however,\nmight be explained in several ways, according to the meaning assigned\nto the term necessary. If necessity is taken to be physical, the\nexistence of evil is excused as being a natural necessity, from which\nnot even deity could grant exemption. If, on the other hand, the\nnecessity is not a physical one, but one arising from the relation of\nmeans to ends, evil is justified as a condition or necessary means for\nbringing about good. Both views are combined in the three chief\nquestions involved in the moral theory of the world: the existence of\nphysical evil, the existence of moral evil, and the relation of outward\ncircumstances to morality.\n\n\n[(a) Existence of physical evil.]\n\nThe existence of physical evil gave the Stoics little trouble, since\nthey refused to regard it as an evil at all, as will be seen in\ntreating of their ethical system. It was enough for them to refer evils\nof this kind\u2014diseases, for instance\u2014to natural causes, and to regard\nthem as the inevitable consequences of causes framed by nature to serve\na definite purpose. [416] Still, they did not fail to point out that\nmany things only become evil by a perverted use, [417] and that other\nthings, ordinarily regarded as evils, are of the greatest value. [418]\n\n\n[(b) Existence of moral evil]\n\nGreater difficulty was found by the Stoics to beset the attempt to\njustify the existence of moral evil, and the difficulty was enhanced in\ntheir case by the prevalence and intensity of moral evil in the world\n[419] according to their view. By their theory of necessity they were\nprevented from shifting the responsibility for moral evil from natural\nlaw or deity on to man, which is one way out of the difficulty. In not\naltogether eschewing this course, and yet refusing to allow to deity\nany participation in evil, and referring evil to the free will and\nintention of man, [420] they acted as other systems of necessity have\ndone before, [421] reserving the final word. The real solution which\nthey gave to the difficulty is to be found partly in the assertion that\neven the deity is not able to keep human nature free from faults, [422]\nand partly in the consideration that the existence of evil is\nnecessary, as a counterpart and supplement to good, [423] and that, in\nthe long run, evil will be turned by the deity into good. [424]\n\n\n[(c) Connection between virtue and happiness.]\n\nThe third point in their moral theory of the world, the connection\nbetween moral worth and happiness, engaged all the subtlety of\nChrysippus and his followers. To deny any connection between them would\nhave been to contradict the ordinary views of the relation of means to\nends. Besides, they were prepared to regard some part of the evils of\nlife as divine judgments. [425] Still there were facts which could not\nbe reconciled with this view\u2014the misfortunes of the virtuous, the good\nfortune of the vicious\u2014and these required explanation. The task of\nexplaining them appears to have involved the Stoics in considerable\nembarrassment, nor were their answers altogether satisfactory. [426]\nThe spirit of their system, however, rendered only one explanation\npossible: no real evil could happen to the virtuous, no real good\nfortune could fall to the lot of the vicious. [427] Apparent misfortune\nwill be regarded by the wise man partly as a natural consequence,\npartly as a wholesome training for his moral powers; [428] there is\nnothing which is not matter for rational action: everything that\nhappens, when rightly considered, contributes to our good; nothing that\nis secured by moral depravity is in itself desirable. [429] With this\nview it was possible to connect a belief in divine punishment, by\nsaying that what to a good man is a training of his powers, is a real\nmisfortune and consequently a punishment to a bad man; but we are not\nin a position to say whether the scattered hints of Chrysippus really\nbear this meaning.\n\nThe whole investigation is one involving much doubt and inconsistency.\nNatural considerations frequently intertwine with considerations based\non the adaptation of means to ends; the divine power is oftentimes\ntreated as a will working towards a definite purpose, at one time\narranging all things for the best with unlimited power, at another time\naccording to an unchangeable law of nature; [430] but all these\ninconsistencies and defects belong to other moral theories of the\nworld, quite as much as they belong to that of the Stoics.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nIRRATIONAL NATURE. THE ELEMENTS. THE UNIVERSE.\n\n\nTurning from the questions which have hitherto engaged our attention to\nnatural science in the stricter sense of the term, we must first touch\nupon [A. The most general ideas on nature.] a few characteristic\nquestions affecting the general conditions of all existence. In these\nthe Stoics hold little that is of a distinctive character. The matter\nor substance of which all things are made is corporeal. [431] All that\nis corporeal is infinitely divisible, although it is never infinitely\ndivided. [432] At the same time, all things are exposed to the action\nof change, since one material is constantly going over into another.\n[433] Herein the Stoics follow Aristotle, in contrast to the mechanical\ntheory of nature, [434] and distinguish change in quality from mere\nmotion in space. They enumerate several varieties of each kind. [435]\nNevertheless, they look upon motion in space as the primary form of\nmotion. [436] Under the conception of motion, they, moreover, include\naction and suffering. [437] The condition of all action is contact;\n[438] and since the motions of different objects in nature are due to\nvarious causes, and have a variety of characters, the various kinds of\naction must be distinguished which correspond with them. [439] In all\nthese statements there is hardly a perceptible deviation from\nAristotle.\n\nOf a more peculiar character are the views of the Stoics as to the\nintermingling of substances, to which reference has already been made.\n[440] With regard to Time and Space, they found some innovations on\nAristotle\u2019s theory to be necessary. Space (\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2), according to their\nview, is the room occupied by a body, [441] the distance enclosed\nwithin the limits of a body. [442] From Space they distinguish the\nEmpty. The Empty is not met with in the universe, but beyond the\nuniverse it extends indefinitely. [443] And hence they assert that\nSpace is limited, like the world of matter, and that the Empty is\nunlimited. [444] Nay, not only Space, but Time also, is by them set\ndown as immaterial; [445] and yet to the conception of Time a meaning\nas concrete as possible is given, in order that Time may have a real\nvalue. Zeno defined Time as the extension of motion; Chrysippus defines\nit, more definitely, as the extension of the motion of the world. [446]\nThe Stoics affirm the infinite divisibility of Time and Space, [447]\nbut do not appear to have instituted any deep researches into this\npoint.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Elements.]\n\nIn expanding their views on the origin of the world, the Stoics begin\nwith the doctrine of the four elements, [448] a doctrine which, since\nthe time of Aristotle and Plato, was the one universally accepted. They\neven refer this doctrine to Heraclitus, desiring, above all things, to\nfollow his teaching in natural science. [449] On a previous occasion,\nthe order and the stages have been pointed out, according to which\nprimary fire developed into the several elements in the formation of\nthe world. [450] In the same order, these elements now go over one into\nthe other. Yet, in this constant transformation of materials, in the\nperpetual change of form to which primary matter is subject, in this\nflux of all its parts, the unity of the whole still remains untouched.\n[451] The distinctive characteristic of fire is heat; that of air is\ncold; that of water, moisture; dryness that of the earth. [452] These\nessential qualities, however, are not always found in the elements to\nwhich they belong in a pure state, [453] and hence every element has\nseveral forms and varieties. [454] Among the four essential qualities\nof the elements, Aristotle had already singled out two, viz. heat and\ncold, as the active ones, calling dryness and moisture the passive\nones. The Stoics do the same, only more avowedly. They consider the two\nelements to which these qualities properly belong to be the seat of all\nactive force, and distinguish them from the other two elements, as the\nsoul is distinguished from the body. [455] In their materialistic\nsystem, the finer materials, as opposed to the coarser, occupy the\nplace of incorporeal forces.\n\nThe relative density of the elements also determines their place in the\nuniverse. Fire and air are light; water and earth are heavy. Fire and\nair move away from the centre of the universe; [456] water and earth\nare drawn towards it; [457] and thus, from above to below\u2014or, what is\nthe same thing, from without to within\u2014the four layers of fire, air,\nwater, and earth are formed. [458] The fire on the circumference goes\nby the name of Ether. [459] Its most remote portion was called by Zeno\nHeaven; [460] and it differs from earthly fire not only by its greater\npurity, [461] but also because the motion of earthly fire is in a\nstraight line, whereas the motion of the Ether is circular. [462]\nBecause of this difference of motion, Aristotle supposed a radical\ndifference to exist between these two kinds of fire, but the Stoics did\nnot feel it necessary to admit such a difference. [463] They could\nalways maintain that, when beyond the limits of its proper locality,\nfire tried to return to it as quickly as possible, whereas within those\nlimits it moved in the form of a circle.\n\n\n\n\n[C. The universe.]\n\nHolding this view of the elements, the Stoics, it will be seen, did not\ndeviate to any very great extent, in their ideas of the World, from\nAristotle and the views which were generally entertained. In the centre\nof the Universe reposes the globe of the earth; [464] around it is\nwater, above the water is air. These three strata form the kernel of\nthe world, which is in a state of repose, [465] and around these the\nEther revolves in a circle, together with the stars which are set\ntherein. At the top, in one stratum, are all the fixed stars; under the\nstratum containing the fixed stars are the planets, in seven different\nstrata\u2014Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, then the Sun, and in the\nlowest stratum, bordering on the region of air, is the Moon. [466] Thus\nthe world consists, as with Aristotle, of a globe containing many\nstrata, one above another. [467] That it cannot be unlimited, as\nDemocritus and Epicurus maintain, follows from the very nature of body.\n[468] The space within the world is fully occupied by the material of\nthe world, without a vacant space being anywhere left. [469] Outside\nthe world, however, is empty space, or else how\u2014the Stoics asked\u2014would\nthere be a place into which the world could be resolved at the general\nconflagration? [470] Moreover, this empty space must be unlimited; for\nhow can there be a limit, or any kind of boundary, to that which is\nimmaterial and non-existent? [471] But although the world is in empty\nspace, it does not move, for the half of its component elements being\nheavy, and the other half light, as a whole it is neither heavy nor\nlight. [472]\n\n\n\n[(1) Stars.]\n\nThe stars are spherical masses, [473] consisting of fire; but the fire\nis not in all cases equally pure, [474] and is sustained, as Heraclitus\ntaught, by evaporations from the earth and from water. [475] With this\nprocess of sustentation the motion of the stars is brought into\nconnection, their orbit extending over the space in which they obtain\ntheir nutriment. [476] Not only the sun, but the moon also, was\nbelieved to be larger than the earth. [477] Plato and Aristotle had\nalready held that the stars are living rational divine beings; and the\nsame view was entertained by the Stoics, not only because of the\nwonderful regularity of their motion and orbits, but also from the very\nnature of the material of which they consist. [478] The earth,\nlikewise, is filled by an animating soul; or else how could it supply\nplants with animation, and afford nutriment to the stars? [479] Upon\nthe oneness of the soul, which permeates all its parts, depends, in the\nopinion of the Stoics, the oneness of the universe.\n\n\n\n[(2) Meteorology.]\n\nMost thoroughly, however, did the Stoics\u2014and, in particular, Posidonius\n[480]\u2014devote themselves to investigating those problems, which may be\nsummed up under the name of meteorology. This portion, however, of\ntheir enquiries is of little value for illustrating their philosophical\ntenets, and it may suffice to mention in a note the objects which it\nincluded, and the sources whence information may be obtained. [481] The\nsame treatment may be given to the few maxims laid down by the Stoics\non the subject of inorganic nature which have come down to us. [482]\nNor need we mention here the somewhat copious writings of Posidonius,\n[483] on the subjects of geography, history, and mathematics.\n\n\n\n[(3) Plants and animals.]\n\nLittle attention was devoted by the Stoics to the world of plants and\nanimals. About this fact there can be no doubt, since we neither hear\nof any treatises by the Stoics on this subject, nor do they appear to\nhave advanced any peculiar views. The most prominent point is, that\nthey divided all things in nature into four classes\u2014those of inorganic\nbeings, plants, animals, and rational beings. In beings belonging to\nthe first class a simple quality (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2) constitutes the bond of union;\nin those of the second class, a forming power (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2); in those of the\nthird class, a soul; and in those of the fourth class, a rational soul.\n[484] By means of this division, the various branches of a science of\nnature were mapped out, based on a gradually increasing development of\nthe powers of life. No serious attempt was made by the Stoics to work\nout this thought. With the single exception of man, we know exceedingly\nlittle of their views on organic beings. [485]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nTHE STUDY OF NATURE. MAN.\n\n\n[A. The soul.]\n\n[(1) Materialistic nature of the soul.]\n\nThe Stoic teaching becomes peculiarly interesting, when it treats of\nMan; and the line it here follows is decided by the tone of the whole\nsystem. On the one hand, the Stoic materialism shows itself most\nunmistakeably in the department of anthropology; on the other hand, the\nconviction that all actions must be referred to active powers, and all\nthe several active powers to one original power, can not be held\nwithout leading to a belief in the oneness and in the regulating\ncapacity of the soul. Not only does it follow, as a corollary from the\nmaterialistic view of the world, that the soul must be in its nature\ncorporeal, but the Stoics took pains to uphold this view by special\narguments. Whatever, they said, influences the body, and is by it\ninfluenced in turn, whatever is united with the body and again\nseparated from it, must be corporeal. How, then, can the soul be other\nthan corporeal? [486] Whatever has extension in three dimensions is\ncorporeal; this is the case with the soul, since it extends in three\ndirections over the whole body. [487] Thought, moreover, and motion are\ndue to animal life. [488] Animal life is nurtured and kept in health by\nthe breath of life. [489] Experience proves that mental qualities are\npropagated by natural generation; they must, therefore, be connected\nwith a corporeal substratum. [490] As therefore, the mind is nothing\nbut fiery breath, so the human soul is described by the Stoics\nsometimes as fire, sometimes as breath, at other times, more\naccurately, as warm breath, diffused throughout the body, and forming a\nbond of union for the body, [491] in the very same way that the soul of\nthe world is diffused throughout the world, and forms a bond of union\nfor the world. [492] This warm breath was believed to be connected with\nthe blood; and hence the soul was said to be fed by vapours from the\nblood, just as the stars are fed by vapours from the earth. [493]\n\nThe same hypothesis was also used to explain the origin of the soul.\nOne part of the soul was believed to be transmitted to the young in the\nseed. [494] From the part so transmitted there arises, by development\nwithin the womb, first the soul of a plant; and this becomes the soul\nof a living creature after birth by the action of the outer air. [495]\nThis view led to the further hypothesis that the seat of the soul must\nbe in the breast, not in the brain; since not only breath and warm\nblood, but also the voice, the immediate expression of thought, comes\nfrom the breast. [496]\n\n\n\n[(2) Divisions of the soul.]\n\nNor is this hypothesis out of harmony with the notions otherwise\nentertained by the Stoics as to the nature of man. Plato and Aristotle\nhad already fixed on the heart as the central organ of the lower\npowers; the brain they assigned to reason, with the view of\ndistinguishing the rational from the mere animal soul. [497] When,\ntherefore, the Stoics assimilated man\u2019s rational activity to the\nactivity of the senses, deducing both from one and the same source, it\nwas natural that they would depart from Aristotle\u2019s view. Accordingly,\nthe various parts of the soul were supposed to discharge themselves\nfrom their centre in the heart into the several organs, in the form of\natmospheric currents. Seven such parts are enumerated, besides the\ndominant part or reason, which was also called \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd,\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, or \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2. These seven parts consist of the five senses,\nthe power of reproduction, and the power of speech; [498] and,\nfollowing out their view of the close relation of speech and thought,\n[499] great importance is attached to the power of speech. [500] At the\nsame time, the Stoics upheld the oneness of the substance of the soul\nwith greater vigour than either Plato or Aristotle had done. Reason, or\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, is with them the primary power, of which all other\npowers are only parts, or derivative powers. [501] Even feeling and\ndesire they derive from it, in direct contradiction to the teaching of\nPlato and Aristotle; [502] and this power is declared to be the seat of\npersonal identity, a point on which former philosophers had refrained\nfrom expressing any opinion. [503]\n\n\n\n\n[B. The individual soul and the soul of the universe.]\n\nThe individual soul bears the same relation to the soul of the universe\nthat a part does to the whole. The human soul is not only a part, as\nare all other living powers, of the universal power of life, but,\nbecause it possesses reason, it has a special relationship to the\nDivine Being [504]\u2014a relationship which becomes closer in proportion as\nwe allow greater play to the divine element in ourselves, i.e. to\nreason. [505] On this very account, however, the soul cannot escape the\nlaw of the Divine Being, in the shape of general necessity, or destiny.\nIt is a mere delusion to suppose that the soul possesses a freedom\nindependent of the world\u2019s course. The human will, like everything else\nin the world, is bound into the indissoluble chain of natural causes,\nand that irrespectively of our knowing by what causes the will is\ndecided or not. Its freedom consists in this, that, instead of being\nruled from without, it obeys the call of its own nature, external\ncircumstances concurring. [506] To this power of self-determination,\nhowever, the greatest value is attached. Not only are our actions due\nto it to such an extent that only because of it can they be considered\nours, [507] but even our judgments are, as the Stoics thought,\ndependent on it. The soul itself being open to truth or error,\nconvictions are quite as much in our power as actions: [508] both are\nalike the necessary result of the will. And just as the individual soul\ndoes not possess activity independently of the universal soul, no more\ncan the individual soul escape the law of destiny. It, too, at the end\nof the world\u2019s course, will be resolved into the primary substance, the\nDivine Being. The only point about which the Stoics were undecided was,\nwhether all souls would last until that time as separate souls, which\nwas the view of Cleanthes, or only the souls of the wise, as Chrysippus\nheld. [509]\n\n\n\n\n[C. Freedom and immortality.]\n\nThe effects of the Stoic principles appear unmistakeably in the above\nstatements. They, however, pervade the whole body of the Stoical views\non man. [510] From one point of view, the theory of necessity, and the\ndenial of everlasting life after death, seem quite unintelligible in a\nsystem the moral tone of which is so high; yet the connection of these\ntheories with the Stoic ethics is very intimate. These theories\ncommended themselves to the Stoics, as they have done in later times to\nSpinoza and Schleiermacher, because they corresponded with their\nfundamental view of morality, according to which the individual is the\ninstrument of reason in general, and a dependent portion of the\ncollective universe. Moreover, since the Stoics admitted a future\nexistence, of limited, but yet indefinite, length, the same practical\nresults followed from their belief as from the current belief in\nimmortality. The statements of Seneca, [511] that this life is a\nprelude to a better; that the body is a lodging-house, from which the\nsoul will return to its own home; his joy in looking forward to the day\nwhich will rend the bonds of the body asunder, which he, in common with\nthe early Christians, calls the birthday of eternal life; [512] his\ndescription of the peace of the eternity there awaiting us, of the\nfreedom and bliss of the heavenly life, of the light of knowledge which\nwill there be shed on all the secrets of nature; [513] his language on\nthe future recognition and happy society of souls made perfect; [514]\nhis seeing in death a great day of judgment, when sentence will be\npronounced on every one; [515] his making the thought of a future life\nthe great stimulus to moral conduct here; [516] even the way in which\nhe consoles himself for the destruction of the soul by the thought that\nit will live again in another form hereafter [517]\u2014all contain nothing\nat variance with the Stoic teaching, however near they may approach to\nPlatonic or even Christian modes of thought. [518] Seneca merely\nexpanded the teaching of his School in one particular direction, in\nwhich it approaches most closely to Platonism; and, of all the Stoics,\nSeneca was the most distinctly Platonic.\n\nExcepting the two points which have been discussed at an earlier time,\n[519] and one other point relating to the origin of ideas and emotions,\nwhich will be considered subsequently, little is on record relating to\nthe psychological views of the Stoics.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF\nMORALITY.\n\n\nWhatever attention the Stoics paid to the study of nature and to logic,\nthe real kernel of their system lies, as has been already observed, in\ntheir Ethics; even natural science, that \u2018most divine part of\nphilosophy,\u2019 was only pursued as an intellectual preparation for\nEthics. In the field of Ethics the true spirit of the Stoic system may\ntherefore be expected to appear, and it may be anticipated that this\nsubject will be treated by them with special care. Nor is this\nexpectation a vain one; for here the springs of information flowing\nfreely give ample data respecting the Stoic doctrine of morality.\nNevertheless, respecting the formal grouping of these data only vague\nand contradictory statements are forthcoming. Moreover, the Stoics\nappear to have followed such different courses and to have been so\nlittle afraid of repetition, that it is hardly possible to obtain a\ncomplete survey of their whole system by following any one of the\ntraditional divisions. [520]\n\nProceeding to group the materials in such a way as to give the clearest\ninsight into the peculiarities and connection of the Stoic principles,\nthe first distinction to be made will be one between morality in\ngeneral and particular points in morality. In considering morality in\ngeneral, those statements which give the abstract theory of morals will\nbe distinguished from those which modify it with a view to meet\npractical wants. The former again may be grouped round three\npoints:\u2014the enquiry into the highest good, that into the nature of\nvirtue, and that relating to the wise man.\n\n\n\n\n[A. The highest good.]\n\n[(1) Nature of the highest good.]\n\nThe enquiry into the destiny and end of man turns, with the Stoics, as\nit did with all moral philosophers since the time of Socrates, about\nthe fundamental conception of the good, and the ingredients necessary\nto make up the highest good or happiness. [521] Happiness, they\nconsider, can only be sought in rational activity or virtue. Speaking\nmore explicitly, [522] the primary impulse of every being is towards\nself-preservation and self-gratification. [523] It follows that every\nbeing pursues those things which are most suited to its nature, [524]\nand that such things only have for it a value (\u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1). Hence the highest\ngood\u2014the end-in-chief, [525] or happiness\u2014can only be found in what is\nconformable to nature. [526]\u2014Nothing can be conformable to nature for\nany individual thing, unless it be in harmony with the law of the\nuniverse, [527] or with the universal reason of the world; nor, in the\ncase of a conscious and reasonable being, unless it proceeds from a\nrecognition of this general law\u2014in short, from rational intelligence.\n[528] In every enquiry into what is conformable to nature, all turns\nupon agreement with the essential constitution of the being, and this\nessential constitution consists, in the case of a man, simply in\nreason. [529] One and the same thing, therefore, is always meant,\nwhether, with Zeno, life according to nature is spoken of as being in\nharmony with oneself, or whether, following Cleanthes, it is simply\nsaid to be the agreement of life with nature, and whether, in the\nlatter case, \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 is taken to mean the world at large, or is limited\nto human nature in particular. [530] In every case the meaning is, that\nthe life of the individual approximates to or falls short of the goal\nof happiness, exactly in proportion as it approaches to or departs from\nthe universal law of the world and the particular rational nature of\nman. In a word, a rational life, an agreement with the general course\nof the world, constitutes virtue. The principle of the Stoic morality\nmight therefore be briefly expressed in the sentence: Only virtue is\ngood, and happiness consists exclusively in virtue. [531] If, however,\nfollowing Socrates, the good is defined as being what is useful, [532]\nthen the sentence would run thus: Only Virtue is useful; advantage\ncannot be distinguished from duty, whilst to a bad man nothing is\nuseful, [533] since, in the case of a rational being, good and evil\ndoes not depend on what happens to him, but simply on his own conduct.\n[534] A view of life is here presented to us in which happiness\ncoincides with virtue, the good and the useful with duty and reason.\nThere is neither any good independently of virtue, nor is there in\nvirtue and for virtue any evil.\n\n\n\n[(2) The good and evil.]\n\nThe Stoics accordingly refused to admit the ordinary distinction,\nsanctioned by popular opinion and the majority of philosophers, between\nvarious kinds and degrees of good; nor would they allow bodily\nadvantages and external circumstances to be included among good things,\ntogether with mental and moral qualities. A certain difference between\ngoods they did not indeed deny, and various kinds are mentioned by them\nin their formal division of goods. [535] But these differences amount,\nin the end, to no more than this, that whilst some goods are good and\nuseful in themselves, others are only subsidiary to them. The existence\nof several equally primary goods appears to the Stoics to be at\nvariance with the conception of the good. That only is a good,\naccording to their view, which has an unconditional value. That which\nhas a value only in comparison with something else, or as leading to\nsomething else, does not deserve to be called a good. The difference\nbetween what is good and what is not good is not only a difference of\ndegree, but also one of kind; and what is not a good per se can never\nbe a good under any circumstances. [536] The same remarks apply to\nevil. That which is not in itself an evil can never become so from its\nrelation to something else. Hence only that which is absolutely good,\nor virtue, can be considered a good; and only that which is absolutely\nbad, or vice, [537] can be considered an evil. All other things,\nhowever great their influence may be on our state, belong to a class of\nthings neither good nor evil, but indifferent, or \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1. [538]\nNeither health, nor riches, nor honour, not even life itself, is a\ngood; and just as little are the opposite states\u2014poverty, sickness,\ndisgrace, and death\u2014evils. [539] Both are in themselves indifferent, a\nmaterial which may either be employed for good or else for evil. [540]\n\nThe Academicians and Peripatetics were most vigorously attacked by the\nStoics for including among goods external things which are dependent on\nchance. For how can that be a good under any circumstances, which bears\nno relation to man\u2019s moral nature, and is even frequently obtained at\nthe cost of morality? [541] If virtue renders a man happy, it must\nrender him perfectly happy in himself, since no one can be happy who is\nnot happy altogether. Were anything which is not in man\u2019s power allowed\nto influence his happiness, it would detract from the absolute worth of\nvirtue, and man would never be able to attain to that imperturbable\nserenity of mind without which no happiness is conceivable. [542]\n\n\n\n[(3) Pleasure and the good.]\n\nLeast of all, can pleasure be considered a good, or be regarded, as it\nwas by Epicurus, as the ultimate and highest object in life. He who\nplaces pleasure on the throne makes a slave of virtue; [543] he who\nconsiders pleasure a good ignores the real conception of the good and\nthe peculiar value of virtue; [544] he appeals to feelings, rather than\nto actions; [545] he requires reasonable creatures to pursue what is\nunreasonable, and souls nearly allied to God to go after the enjoyments\nof the lower animals. [546] Pleasure must never be the object of\npursuit, not even in the sense that true pleasure is invariably\ninvolved in virtue. That it no doubt is. [547] It is true that there is\nalways a peculiar satisfaction, and a quiet cheerfulness and peace of\nmind, in moral conduct, just as in immoral conduct there is a lack of\ninward peace; and in this sense it may be said that the wise man alone\nknows what true and lasting pleasure is. [548] But even the pleasure\nafforded by moral excellence ought never to be an object, but only a\nnatural consequence, of virtuous conduct; otherwise the independent\nvalue of virtue is impaired. [549]\n\nNor may pleasure be placed side by side with virtue, as a part of the\nhighest good, or be declared to be inseparable from virtue. Pleasure\nand virtue are different in essence and kind. Pleasure may be immoral,\nand moral conduct may go hand in hand with difficulties and pains.\nPleasure is found among the worst of men, virtue only amongst the good;\nvirtue is dignified, untiring, imperturbable; pleasure is grovelling,\neffeminate, fleeting. Those who look upon pleasure as a good are its\nslaves; those in whom virtue reigns supreme control pleasure, and hold\nit in check. [550] In no sense can pleasure be allowed to weigh in a\nquestion of morals; seeing it is not an end-in-itself, but only the\nresult of an action; [551] not a good, but something absolutely\nindifferent. The only point on which the Stoics are not unanimous is,\nwhether every pleasure is contrary to nature, [552] as the stern\nCleanthes, in the spirit of Cynicism, asserted, or whether there is\nsuch a thing as a natural and desirable pleasure. [553] Virtue, on the\nother hand, needs no extraneous additions, but contains in itself all\nthe conditions of happiness. [554] The reward of virtuous conduct, like\nthe punishment of wickedness, consists only in the character of those\nactions, one being according to nature, the other contrary to nature.\n[555] And so unconditional is this self-sufficiency of virtue, [556]\nthat the happiness which it affords is not increased by length of time.\n[557] Rational self-control is here recognised as the only good;\nthereby man makes himself independent of all external circumstances,\nabsolutely free, and inwardly satisfied. [558]\n\n\n\n[(4) Negative character of happiness.]\n\nThe happiness of the virtuous man\u2014and this is a very marked feature in\nStoicism\u2014is thus more negative than positive. It consists in\nindependence and peace of mind rather than in the enjoyment which moral\nconduct brings with it. In mental disquietude\u2014says Cicero, speaking as\na Stoic\u2014consists misery; in composure, happiness. How can he be\ndeficient in happiness, he enquires, whom courage preserves from care\nand fear, and self-control guards from passionate pleasure and desire?\n[559] How can he fail to be absolutely happy who is in no way dependent\non fortune, but simply and solely on himself? [560] To be free from\ndisquietude, says Seneca, is the peculiar privilege of the wise; [561]\nthe advantage which is gained from philosophy is, that of living\nwithout fear, and rising superior to the troubles of life. [562] Far\nmore emphatical than any isolated expressions is the support which this\nnegative view of moral aims derives from the whole character of the\nStoic ethics, the one doctrine of the apathy of the wise man\nsufficiently proving that freedom from disturbances, an unconditional\nassurance, and self-dependence, are the points on which these\nphilosophers lay especial value.\n\n\n\n[(5) The highest good as law.]\n\nThe Good, in as far as it is based on the general arrangement of the\nworld, to which the individual is subordinate, appears to man in the\ncharacter of Law. Law being, however, the law of man\u2019s own nature, the\nGood becomes the natural object of man\u2019s desire, and meets his natural\nimpulse. The conception of the Good as law was a view never unfamiliar\nto moral philosophy, but it was cultivated by the Stoics with peculiar\nzeal; [563] and forms one of the points on which Stoicism subsequently\ncame into contact, partly with Roman jurisprudence, partly with the\nethics of the Jews and Christians. Moreover, as the Stoics considered\nthat the Reason which governs the world is the general Law of all\nbeings, [564] so they recognised in the moral demands of reason the\npositive and negative aspects of the Law of God. [565] Human law comes\ninto existence when man becomes aware of the divine law, and recognises\nits claims on him. [566] Civil and moral law are, therefore, commands\nabsolutely imperative on every rational being. [567] No man can feel\nhimself to be a rational being without at the same time feeling himself\npledged to be moral. [568] Obedience to this law is imposed upon man,\nnot only by external authority, but by virtue of his own nature. The\ngood is for him that which deserves to be pursued\u2014the natural object of\nman\u2019s will; on the other hand, evil is that against which his will\nrevolts. [569] The former arouses his desire (\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae), the latter his\naversion (\u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae): [570] and thus the demands of morality are called\nforth by the natural impulse of a reasonable being, and are, at the\nsame time, also the object towards which that impulse is naturally\ndirected. [571]\n\n\n\n\n[B. Emotions and virtue.]\n\n[(1) The emotions.]\n\n[(a) Their nature.]\n\nHowever simple this state of things may be to a purely rational being,\nit must be remembered that man is not purely rational. [572] He has,\ntherefore, irrational as well as rational impulses. [573] He is not\noriginally virtuous, but he becomes virtuous by overcoming his\nemotions. Emotion or passion [574] is a movement of mind contrary to\nreason and nature, an impulse transgressing the right mean. [575] The\nPeripatetic notion, that certain emotions are in accordance with\nnature, was flatly denied by the Stoics. [576] The seat of the\nemotions\u2014and, indeed, of all impulses and every activity of the soul\n[577]\u2014is man\u2019s reason, the \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. [578] Emotion is that state of\nthe \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd in which it is hurried into what is contrary to nature\nby excess of impulse. Like virtue, emotion is due to a change taking\nplace simultaneously, not to the effect of a separate extraneous force.\n[579] Imagination, therefore, alone calls it into being, as it does\nimpulse in general. [580] All emotions arise from faults in judgment,\nfrom false notions of good and evil, and may therefore be called, in so\nmany words, judgments or opinions; [581]\u2014avarice, for instance, is a\nwrong opinion as to the value of money, [582] fear is a wrong opinion\nas regards future, trouble as regards present ills. [583] Still, as\nappears from the general view of the Stoics respecting impulses, [584]\nthis language does not imply that emotion is only a theoretical\ncondition. On the contrary, the effects of a faulty imagination\u2014the\nfeelings and motions of will, to which it gives rise\u2014are expressly\nincluded in its conception; [585] nor is it credible, as Galenus\nstates, [586] that this was only done by Zeno, and not by Chrysippus.\n[587] The Stoics, therefore, notwithstanding their theory of necessity,\ndid not originally assent to the Socratic dictum, that no one does\nwrong voluntarily. [588] Younger members of the School may have used\nthe dictum as an excuse for human faults, [589] fearing lest, in\nallowing freedom to emotions, they should admit that they were morally\nadmissible and give up the possibility of overcoming them. [590] Nay\nmore, as all that proceeds from the will and impulse is voluntary,\n[591] so too emotions are also in our power; and it is for us to say,\nin the case of convictions out of which emotions arise, as in the case\nof every other conviction, [592] whether we will yield or withhold\nassent. [593] Just as little would they allow that only instruction is\nneeded in order to overcome emotions; for all emotions arise, as they\nsay, from lack of self-control, [594] and differ from errors in that\nthey assert themselves and oppose our better intelligence. [595] How\nirregular and irrational impulses arise in reason was a point which the\nStoics never made any serious attempt to explain.\n\n\n[(b) Varieties of emotion.]\n\nEmotions being called forth by imagination, their character depends on\nthe kind of imagination which produces them. Now all impulses are\ndirected to what is good and evil, and consist either in pursuing what\nappears to be a good, or in avoiding what appears to be an evil. [596]\nThis good and this evil is sometimes a present, and sometimes a future\nobject. Hence there result four chief classes of faulty imagination,\nand, corresponding with them, four classes of emotions. From an\nirrational opinion as to what is good there arises pleasure, when it\nrefers to things present; desire, when it refers to things future. A\nfaulty opinion of present evils produces care; of future evils, fear.\n[597] Zeno had already distinguished these four principal varieties of\nemotions. [598] The same division was adopted by his pupil Aristo,\n[599] and afterwards became quite general. Yet the vagueness, already\nmentioned, appears in the Stoic system in the definition of individual\nemotions. By some, particularly by Chrysippus, the essence of emotions\nis placed in the imagination which causes them; by others, in the state\nof mind which the imagination produces. [600] The four principal\nclasses of emotions are again subdivided into numerous subordinate\nclasses, in the enumeration of which the Stoic philosophers appear to\nhave been more guided by the use of language than by psychology. [601]\n\nIn treating the subject of emotions in general, far less importance was\nattached by the Stoics to psychological accuracy than to considerations\nof moral worth. That the result could not be very satisfactory, follows\nfrom what has been already stated. [602] Emotions are impulses,\noverstepping natural limits, upsetting the proper balance of the soul\u2019s\npowers, contradicting reason\u2014in a word, they are failures, disturbances\nof mental health, and, if indulged in, become chronic diseases of the\nsoul. [603] Hence a Stoic demands their entire suppression: true virtue\ncan only exist where this process has succeeded. As being contrary to\nnature and symptoms of disease, the wise man must be wholly free from\nthem. [604] When we have once learnt to value things according to their\nreal worth, and to discover everywhere nature\u2019s unchanging law, nothing\nwill induce us to yield to emotion. [605] Hence the teaching of Plato\nand Aristotle, requiring emotions to be regulated, but not uprooted,\nwas attacked in the most vigorous manner by these philosophers. A\nmoderate evil, they say, always remains an evil. What is faulty and\nopposed to reason, ought never to be tolerated, not even in the\nsmallest degree. [606] On the other hand, when an emotion is regulated\nby and subordinated to reason, it ceases to be an emotion, the term\nemotion only applying to violent impulses, which are opposed to reason.\n[607] The statement of the Peripatetics, that certain emotions are not\nonly admissible, but are useful and necessary, appears of course to the\nStoics altogether wrong. [608] To them, only what is morally good\nappears to be useful: emotions are, under all circumstances, faults;\nand were an emotion to be useful, virtue would be advanced by means of\nwhat is wrong. [609] The right relation, therefore, towards\nemotions\u2014indeed, the only one morally tenable\u2014is an attitude of\nabsolute hostility. The wise man must be emotionless. [610] Pain he may\nfeel, but, not regarding it as an evil, he will suffer no affliction,\nand know no fear. [611] He may be slandered and ill-treated, but he\ncannot be injured or degraded. [612] Being untouched by honour and\ndishonour, he has no vanity. To anger [613] he never yields, nor needs\nthis irrational impulse, not even for valour and the championship of\nright. But he also feels no pity, [614] and exercises no indulgence.\n[615] For how can he pity others for what he would not himself consider\nan evil? How can he yield to a diseased excitement for the sake of\nothers, which he would not tolerate for his own sake? If justice calls\nfor punishment, feelings will not betray him into forgiveness. We shall\nsubsequently have an opportunity for learning the further application\nof these principles.\n\n\n\n[(2) Idea of virtue.]\n\n[(a) Positive and negative aspects.]\n\nVirtue is thus negatively defined as the being exempt from emotions, as\napathy. [616] There is also a positive side to supplement this negative\nview. Looking at the matter of virtuous action, this may be said to\nconsist in subordination to the general law of nature; looking at its\nmanner, in rational self-control. [617] Virtue is exclusively a matter\nof reason [618]\u2014in short, it is nothing else but rightly ordered\nreason. [619] To speak more explicitly, virtue contains in itself two\nelements\u2014one practical, the other speculative. At the root, and as a\ncondition of all rational conduct, lies, according to the Stoics, right\nknowledge. On this point they are at one with the well-known Socratic\ndoctrine, and with the teaching of the Cynics and Megarians. Natural\nvirtue, or virtue acquired only by exercise, they reject altogether.\nAfter the manner of Socrates, they define virtue as knowledge, vice as\nignorance, [620] and insist on the necessity of learning virtue. [621]\nEven the avowed enemy of all speculative enquiry, Aristo of Chios, was\non this point at one with the rest of the School. All virtues were by\nhim referred to wisdom, [622] and, consequently, he denied the claims\nof most to be virtues at all. [623]\n\nHowever closely the Stoics cling to the idea that all virtue is based\non knowledge, and is in itself nothing else but knowledge, they are not\ncontent with knowledge, or with placing knowledge above practical\nactivity, as Plato and Aristotle had done. As we have seen already,\nknowledge with them was only a means towards rational conduct, [624]\nand it is expressly mentioned, as a deviation from the teaching of the\nSchool, that Herillus of Carthage, Zeno\u2019s pupil, declared knowledge to\nbe the end of life, and the only unconditional good. [625] Virtue may,\nit is true, be called knowledge, but it is, at the same time,\nessentially health and strength of mind, a right state of the soul\nagreeing with its proper nature; [626] and it is required of man that\nhe should never cease to labour and contribute towards the common good.\n[627] Thus, according to Stoic principles, virtue is a combination of\ntheory and practice, in which action is invariably based on\nintellectual knowledge, but, at the same time, knowledge finds its\nobject in moral conduct\u2014it is, in short, power of will based on\nrational understanding. [628] This definition must not, however, be\ntaken to imply that moral knowledge precedes will, and is only\nsubsequently referred to will, nor conversely that the will only uses\nknowledge as a subsidiary instrument. In the eyes of a Stoic, knowledge\nand will are not only inseparable, but they are one and the same thing.\nVirtue cannot be conceived without knowledge, nor knowledge without\nvirtue. [629] The one, quite as much as the other, is a right quality\nof the soul, or, speaking more correctly, is the rightly endowed\nsoul,\u2014reason, when it is as it ought to be. [630] Hence virtue may be\ndescribed, with equal propriety, either as knowledge or as strength of\nmind; and it is irrelevant to enquire which of these two elements is\nanterior in point of time.\n\n\n[(b) The virtues severally.]\n\nBut how are we to reconcile with this view the Stoic teaching of a\nplurality of virtues and their mutual relations? As the common root\nfrom which they spring, Zeno, following Aristotle, regarded\nunderstanding, Cleanthes, strength of mind, Aristo, at one time health,\nat another the knowledge of good and evil. [631] Later teachers, after\nthe time of Chrysippus, thought that it consisted in knowledge or\nwisdom, understanding by wisdom absolute knowledge, the knowing all\nthings, human and divine. [632] From this common root, a multiplicity\nof virtues was supposed to proceed, which, after Plato\u2019s example, are\ngrouped round four principal virtues [633]\u2014intelligence, bravery,\njustice, self-control. [634] Intelligence consists in knowing what is\ngood and bad, and what is neither the one nor the other, the\nindifferent; [635] bravery, in knowing what to choose, what to avoid,\nand what neither to choose nor to avoid; or, substituting the\ncorresponding personal attitude for knowledge, bravery is fearless\nobedience to the law of reason, both in boldness and endurance. [636]\nSelf-control consists in knowing what to choose, and what to eschew,\nand what neither to choose nor eschew; [637] justice, in knowing how to\ngive to everyone what is his due. [638] In a corresponding manner, the\nprincipal faults are traced back to the conception of ignorance. [639]\nProbably all these definitions belong to Chrysippus. [640] Other\ndefinitions are attributed to his predecessors, [641] some more nearly,\nothers more remotely, agreeing with him in their conception of virtue.\nWithin these limits, a great number of individual virtues were\ndistinguished, their differences and precise shades of meaning being\nworked out with all the pedantry which characterised Chrysippus. [642]\nThe definitions of a portion of them have been preserved by Diogenes\nand Stob\u00e6us. [643] In a similar way, too, the Stoics carried their\nclassification of errors into the minutest details. [644]\n\n\n[(c) Mutual relation of the several virtues.]\n\nThe importance attaching to this division of virtues, the ultimate\nbasis on which it rests, and the relation which virtues bear, both to\none another and to the common essence of virtue, are topics upon which\nZeno never entered. Plutarch, at least, blames him [645] for treating\nvirtues as many, and yet inseparable, and at the same time for finding\nin all virtues only certain manifestations of the understanding. Aristo\nattempted to settle this point more precisely. According to his view,\nvirtue is in itself only one; in speaking of many virtues, we only\nrefer to the variety of objects with which that one virtue has to do.\n[646] The difference of one virtue from another is not one of inward\nquality, but depends on the external conditions under which they are\nmanifested; it only expresses a definite relation to something else,\nor, in the language of Herbart, an accidental aspect. [647] The same\nview would seem to be implied in the manner in which Cleanthes\ndetermines the relations of the principal virtues to one another. [648]\nIt was, however, opposed by Chrysippus. The assumption of many virtues,\nhe believed, rested upon an inward difference; [649] each definite\nvirtue, as also each definite fault, becoming what it does by a\npeculiar change in the character of the soul itself; [650] in short,\nfor a particular virtue to come into being, it is not enough that the\nconstituent element of all virtue should be directed towards a\nparticular object, but to the common element must be superadded a\nfurther characteristic element, or differentia; the several virtues\nbeing related to one another, as the various species of one genus.\n\nAll virtues have, however, one and the same end, which they compass in\ndifferent ways, and all presuppose the same moral tone and conviction,\n[651] which is only to be found where it is to be found perfect, and\nceases to exist the moment it is deprived of one of its component\nparts. [652] They are, indeed, distinct from one another, each one\nhaving its own end, towards which it is primarily directed; but, at the\nsame time, they again coalesce, inasmuch as none can pursue its own end\nwithout pursuing that of the others at the same time. [653]\nAccordingly, no part of virtue can be separated from its other parts.\nWhere one virtue exists, the rest exist also, and where there is one\nfault, there all is faulty. Even each single virtuous action contains\nall other virtues, for the moral tone of which it is the outcome\nincludes in itself all the rest. [654] What makes virtue virtue, and\nvice vice, is simply and solely the intention. [655] The will, although\nit may lack the means of execution, is worth quite as much as the deed;\n[656] a wicked desire is quite as criminal as the gratification of that\ndesire. [657] Hence only that action can be called virtuous which is\nnot only good in itself, but which proceeds from willing the good; and\nalthough, in the first instance, the difference between the discharge\nand the neglect of duty (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 and \u1f01\u03bc\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1) depends on the real\nagreement or disagreement of our actions with the moral law, [658] yet\nthat alone can be said to be a true and perfect discharge of duty which\narises from a morally perfect character. [659]\n\n\n[(d) Unity of virtue.]\n\nSuch a character, the Stoics held, must either exist altogether, or not\nat all; for virtue is an indivisible whole, which we cannot possess in\npart, but must either have or not have. [660] He who has a right\nintention and a right appreciation of good and evil, is virtuous; he\nwho has not these requisites is lacking in virtue; there is no third\nalternative. Virtue admits neither of increase nor diminution, [661]\nand there is no mean between virtue and vice. [662] This being the\ncase, and the value of an action depending wholly on the intention, it\nfollows, necessarily, that virtue admits of no degrees. If the\nintention must be either good or bad, the same must be true of actions;\nand if a good intention or virtue has in it nothing bad, and a bad\nintention has in it nothing good, the same is true of actions. A good\naction is unconditionally praiseworthy; a bad one, unconditionally\nblameworthy, the former being only found where virtue exists pure and\nentire; the latter, only where there is no virtue at all. All good\nactions are, on the one hand, according to the well-known paradox,\nequally good; all bad actions, on the other, equally bad. The standard\nof moral judgment is an absolute one; and when conduct does not\naltogether conform to this standard, it falls short of it altogether.\n[663]\n\n\n\n\n[C. The wise man.]\n\n[(1) Wisdom and folly.]\n\nFrom what has been said, it follows that there can be but one\nthoroughgoing moral distinction for all mankind, the distinction\nbetween the virtuous and the vicious; and that within each of these\nclasses there can be no difference in degree. He who possesses virtue\npossesses it whole and entire; he who lacks it lacks it altogether; and\nwhether he is near or far from possessing it is a matter of no moment.\nHe who is only a hand-breadth below the surface of the water will be\ndrowned just as surely as one who is five hundred fathoms deep; he who\nis blind sees equally little whether he will recover his sight\nto-morrow or never. [664] The whole of mankind are thus divided by the\nStoics into two classes\u2014those who are wise and those who are foolish;\n[665] and these two classes are treated by them as mutually exclusive,\neach one being complete in itself. Among the wise no folly, among the\nfoolish no wisdom of any kind, is possible. [666] The wise man is\nabsolutely free from faults and mistakes: all that he does is right; in\nhim all virtues centre; he has a right opinion on every subject, and\nnever a wrong one, nor, indeed, ever what is merely an opinion. The bad\nman, on the contrary, can do nothing aright; he has every kind of vice;\nhe has no right knowledge, and is altogether rude, violent, cruel, and\nungrateful. [667]\n\nThe Stoics delight in insisting upon the perfection of the wise man,\nand contrasting with it the absolute faultiness of the foolish man, in\na series of paradoxical assertions. [668] The wise man only is free,\nbecause he only uses his will to control himself; [669] he only is\nbeautiful, because only virtue is beautiful and attractive; [670] he\nonly is rich and happy (\u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03c2), because goods of the soul are the\nmost valuable, true riches consisting in being independent of wants.\n[671] Nay, more, he is absolutely rich, since he who has a right view\nof everything has everything in his intellectual treasury, [672] and he\nwho makes the right use of everything bears to everything the relation\nof owner. [673] The wise only know how to obey, and they also only know\nhow to govern; they only are therefore kings, generals, pilots; [674]\nthey only are orators, poets, and prophets; [675] and since their view\nof the Gods and their worship of the Gods is the true one, only amongst\nthem can true piety be found\u2014they are the only priests and friends of\nheaven; all foolish men, on the contrary, are impious, profane, and\nenemies of the Gods. [676] Only the wise man is capable of feeling\ngratitude, love, and friendship, [677] he only is capable of receiving\na benefit, nothing being of use or advantage to the foolish man. [678]\nTo sum up, the wise man is absolutely perfect, absolutely free from\npassion and want, absolutely happy; [679] as the Stoics conclusively\nassert, he in no way falls short of the happiness of Zeus, [680] since\ntime, the only point in which he differs from Zeus, does not augment\nhappiness at all. [681] On the other hand, the foolish man is\naltogether foolish, unhappy, and perverse; or, in the expressive\nlanguage of the Stoics, every foolish man is a madman, he being a\nmadman who has no knowledge of himself, nor of what most closely\naffects him. [682]\n\n\n\n[(2) Universal depravity.]\n\nThis assertion is all the more trenchant because the Stoics recognised\nneither virtue nor wisdom outside their own system or one closely\nrelated to it, and because they took a most unfavourable view of the\nmoral condition of their fellow-men. That they should do so was\ninevitable from their point of view. A system which sets up its own\nmoral idea against current notions so sharply as that of the Stoics can\nonly be the offspring of a thorough disapproval of existing\ncircumstances, and must, on the other hand, contribute thereto.\nAccording to the Stoic standard, by far the majority, indeed, almost\nthe whole of mankind, belong to the class of the foolish. If all\nfoolish people are equally and altogether bad, mankind must have seemed\nto them to be a sea of corruption and vice, from which, at best, but a\nfew swimmers emerge at spots widely apart. [683] Man passes his\nlife\u2014such had already been the complaint of Cleanthes [684]\u2014in\nwickedness. Only here and there does one, in the evening of life, after\nmany wanderings, attain to virtue. And that this was the common opinion\namong the successors of Cleanthes, is witnessed by their constant\ncomplaints of the depravity of the foolish, and of the rare occurrence\nof a wise man. [685]\n\nNo one probably has expressed this opinion more frequently or more\nstrongly than Seneca. We are wicked, he says; we have been wicked; we\nshall be wicked. Our ancestors complained of the decline of morals; we\ncomplain of their decline; and posterity will utter the very same\ncomplaint. The limits within which morality oscillates are not far\nasunder; the modes in which vice shows itself change, but its power\nremains the same. [686] All men are wicked; and he who has as yet done\nnothing wicked is at least in a condition to do it. All are thankless,\navaricious, cowardly, impious; all are mad. [687] We have all done\nwrong\u2014one in a less, the other in a greater degree; and we shall all do\nwrong to the end of the chapter. [688] One drives the other into folly,\nand the foolish are too numerous to allow the individual to improve.\n[689] He who would be angry with the vices of men, instead of pitying\ntheir faults, would never stop. So great is the amount of iniquity!\n[690]\n\nNo doubt the age in which Seneca lived afforded ample occasion for such\neffusions, but his predecessors must have found similar occasions in\ntheir own days. Indeed, all the principles of the Stoic School, when\nconsistently developed, made it impossible to consider the great\nmajority of men as anything else than a mass of fools and sinners. From\nthis sweeping verdict, even the most distinguished names were not\nexcluded. If asked for examples of wisdom, they would point to\nSocrates, Diogenes, Antisthenes, [691] and, in later times, to Cato;\n[692] but not only would they deny philosophic virtue, as Plato had\ndone before them, to the greatest statesmen and heroes of early times,\nbut they would deny to them all and every kind of virtue. [693] Even\nthe admission that general faults belong to some in a lower degree than\nto others can hardly be reconciled with their principle of the equality\nof all who are not wise. [694]\n\n\n\n[(3) Conversion.]\n\nThe two moral states being thus at opposite poles, a gradual transition\nfrom one to the other is, of course, out of the question. There may be\na progress from folly and wickedness in the direction of wisdom, [695]\nbut the actual passage from one to the other must be momentary and\ninstantaneous. [696] Those who are still progressing belong, without\nexception, to the class of the foolish; [697] and one who has lately\nbecome wise is in the first moment unconscious of his new state. [698]\nThe transition takes place so rapidly, and his former state affords so\nfew points of contact with the one on which he has newly entered, that\nthe mind does not keep pace with the change, and only becomes conscious\nof it by subsequent experience.\n\nIn this picture of the wise man, the moral idealism of the Stoic system\nattained its zenith. A virtuous will appears here so completely\nsundered from all outward conditions of life, so wholly free from all\nthe trammels of natural existence, and the individual has become so\ncompletely the organ of universal law, that it may be asked, What right\nhas such a being to call himself a person? How can such a being be\nimagined as a man living among fellow-men? Nor was this question\nunknown to the Stoics themselves. Unless they are willing to allow that\ntheir theory was practically impossible, and their ideal scientifically\nuntenable, how could they escape the necessity of showing that it might\nbe reconciled with the wants of human life and the conditions of\nreality? Let the attempt be once made, however, and withal they would\nbe forced to look for some means of adapting it to those very feelings\nand opinions towards which their animosity had formerly been so great.\nNor could the attempt be long delayed. Daily a greater value was\nattached to the practical working of their system, and to its agreement\nwith general opinion. The original direction of Stoic morality aimed at\nthe absolute and unconditional submission of the individual to the law\nof the universe, yet, in developing that theory, the rights of the\nindividual asserted themselves unmistakably. From this confluence of\nopposite currents arose a deviation from the rigid type of the Stoic\nsystem, some varieties of which, in the direction of the ordinary view\nof life, deserve now further consideration.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nTHE STOIC THEORY OF MORALS AS MODIFIED BY PRACTICAL NEEDS.\n\n\n[A. Things to be preferred and eschewed.]\n\nThe Stoic theory of Ethics is entirely rooted in the proposition, that\nonly virtue is a good and only vice an evil. This proposition, however,\nfrequently brought the Stoics into collision with current views; nor\nwas it without its difficulties for their own system. In the first\nplace, virtue is made to depend for its existence upon certain\nconditions, and to lead to certain results, from which it is\ninseparable. These results, we have already seen, [699] were included\nby the Stoics in the list of goods. Moreover, virtue is said to be the\nonly good, because only what is according to nature is a good, and\nrational conduct is for man the only thing according to nature. But can\nthis be so absolutely and unconditionally stated? According to the\nStoic teaching the instinct of self-preservation being the primary\nimpulse, does not this instinct manifestly include the preservation and\nadvancement of outward life? The Stoics, therefore, could not help\nincluding physical goods and activities among things according to\nnature\u2014for instance, health, a right enjoyment of the senses, and such\nlike. [700] Practically, too, the same admission was forced upon them\nby the consideration [701] that, if there is no difference in value\nbetween things in themselves, rational choice\u2014and, indeed, all acting\non motives\u2014is impossible. At the same time, they reject the notion that\nwhat is first according to nature must therefore be perfect or good,\njust as in theory they allow that the source of knowledge, but not\ntruth itself, is derived from the senses. When man has once recognised\nthe universal law of action, he will, according to their view, think\nlittle of what is sensuous and individual, and only look upon it as an\ninstrument in the service of virtue and reason. [702]\n\n\n\n[(1) Secondary goods.]\n\nStill, there remains the question, How can this be possible? and this\nis no easy one to answer. The contemporary opponents of the Stoics\nalready took exception to the way in which the first demands of nature\nwere by them excluded from the aims of a life [703] according to\nnature; and we, too, cannot suppress a feeling of perplexity at being\ntold that all duties aim at attaining what is primarily according to\nnature, but that what is according to nature must not be looked upon as\nthe aim of our actions; [704] since not that which is simply according\nto nature, but the rational choice and combination of what is according\nto nature constitutes the good. [705] Even if the Stoics pretend to\ndispose of this difficulty, they cannot, at least, fail to see that\nwhatever contributes to bodily well-being must have a certain positive\nvalue, and must be desirable in all cases in which no higher good\nsuffers in consequence; and, conversely, that whatever is opposed to\nbodily well-being, when higher duties are not involved, must have a\nnegative value (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1), and, consequently, deserve to be avoided.\n[706] Such objects and actions they would not, however, allow to be\nincluded in the class of goods which are absolutely valuable. [707] It\nwas therefore a blending of Peripatetic with Stoic teaching when\nHerillus, the fellow-student of Cleanthes, enumerated bodily and\noutward goods as secondary and subsidiary aims besides virtue. [708]\n\n\n\n[(2) Classes of things indifferent.]\n\nNor were the Stoics minded to follow the contemporary philosopher,\nAristo of Chios (who in this point, too, endeavoured to place their\nSchool on the platform of the Cynic philosophy), in denying any\ndifference in value between things morally indifferent [709] and in\nmaking the highest aim in life consist in indifference to all external\nthings. [710] Virtue with them bears, in comparison with the Cynic\nvirtue, a more positive character, that of an energetic will; they,\ntherefore, required some definite relation to the outward objects and\nconditions of this activity which should regulate the choosing or\nrejecting\u2014or, in other words, the practical decision. Accordingly, they\ndivided things indifferent into three classes. To the first class\nbelong all those things which, from a moral or absolute point of view,\nare neither good nor evil, but yet which have a certain value; no\nmatter whether this value belongs to them properly, because they are in\nharmony with human nature, or whether it belongs to them improperly,\nbecause they are means for advancing moral and natural life, or whether\nit belongs to them on both grounds. The second class includes\neverything which, either by itself or in its relation to higher aims,\nis opposed to nature and harmful. The third, things which, even in this\nconditional sense, have neither positive nor negative value. The first\nclass bears the name of things preferential (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd), or things\ndesirable; the second is the class of things to be eschewed\n(\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd); the third is the class of things intermediate. [711]\nThe last is called, in the strict sense, indifferent, \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd. [712]\nIt includes not only what is really indifferent, but whatever has such\na slight negative or positive value that it neither enkindles desire\nnor aversion. Hence the terms \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd are defined\nto mean respectively that which has an appreciable positive or negative\nvalue. [713] Under things preferential, the Stoics include partly\nmental qualities and conditions, such as talents and skill, even\nprogress towards virtue, in as far as it is not yet virtue; partly\nbodily advantage\u2014beauty, strength, health, life itself; partly external\ngoods\u2014riches, honour, noble birth, relations, &c. Under things to be\neschewed, they understand the opposite things and conditions; under\nthings indifferent, whatever has no appreciable influence on our\nchoice, such as the question whether the number of hairs on the head is\neven or uneven; whether I pick up a piece of waste paper from the\nfloor, or leave it; whether one piece of money or another is used in\n[(3) Collision of modified and abstract theory.] payment of a debt.\n[714] Yet they drew a sharp distinction between the purely relative\nvalue of things preferential, and the absolute value of things morally\ngood. Only the latter are really allowed to be called good, because\nthey only, under all circumstances, are useful and necessary. Of things\nmorally indifferent, on the other hand, the best may, under certain\ncircumstances, be bad, and the worst\u2014sickness, poverty, and the\nlike\u2014may, under certain circumstances, be useful. [715] Just as little\nwould they allow that the independence of the wise man suffered by the\nrecognition outside himself of a class of things preferential. For the\nwise man, said Chrysippus, [716] uses such things without requiring\nthem. Nevertheless, the admission of classes of things to be preferred\nand to be declined obviously undermines their doctrine of the good.\nBetween what is good and what is evil, a third group is introduced, of\ndoubtful character; and since we have seen the term \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd is only\napplied to this group in its more extended meaning, it became\nimpossible for them to refuse to apply the term good to things\ndesirable, [717] or to exclude unconditionally from the highest good\nmany of the things which they were in the habit of pronouncing\nindifferent. [718] Nor was this concession merely the yielding of a\nterm, as will appear when particular instances are considered. Not only\nmay Seneca [719] be heard, in Aristotelian manner, defending external\npossessions as aids to virtue\u2014not only Hecato, and even Diogenes,\nuttering ambiguous sentences as to permitted and forbidden gains\n[720]\u2014not only Pan\u00e6tius giving expression to much that falls short of\nStoic severity [721]\u2014but even Chrysippus avows that in his opinion it\nis silly not to desire health, wealth, and freedom from pain, [722] and\nthat a statesman may treat honour and wealth as real goods; [723]\nadding that the whole Stoic School agrees with him in thinking it no\ndisparagement for a wise man to follow a profession which lies under a\nstigma in the common opinion of Greece. [724] He did not even hesitate\nto assert that it is better to live irrationally than not to live at\nall. [725] It is impossible to conceal the fact that, in attempting to\nadapt their system to general opinion and to the conditions of\npractical life, the Stoics were driven to make admissions strongly at\nvariance with their previous theories. It may hence be gathered with\ncertainty that, in laying down those theories, they had overstrained a\npoint.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Perfect and intermediate duties.]\n\nBy means of this doctrine of things to be preferred and things to be\neschewed, a further addition was made to the conception of duty. Under\nduty, or what is proper, [726] we have already seen, the Stoics\nunderstand rational action in general, which becomes good conduct, or\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, by being done with a right intention. [727] The conception\nof duty, therefore, contains in itself the conception of virtuous\nconduct, and is used primarily to express what is good or rational.\nDuty thus appears to have a twofold meaning, in consequence of the\ntwofold characters of things desirable and things good. If the good\nwere the only permitted object of desire, there would, of course, be\nbut one duty\u2014that of realising the good; and the various actions which\ncontribute to this result would only be distinguished by their being\nemployed on a different material, but not in respect of their moral\nvalue. But if, besides what is absolutely good, there are things\nrelatively good, things not to be desired absolutely, but only in cases\nin which they may be pursued without detriment to the absolute good or\nvirtue\u2014if, moreover, besides vice, as the absolute evil, there are also\nrelative evils, which we have reason to avoid in the same cases\u2014the\nextent of our duties is increased likewise; a number of conditional\nduties are placed by the side of duties unconditional, differing from\nthe latter in that they aim at pursuing things to be preferred, and\navoiding things to be eschewed. From this platform, all that accords\nwith nature is regarded as proper, or a duty in the more extended sense\nof the term; and the conception of propriety is extended to include\nplants and animals. [728] Proper and dutiful actions are then divided\ninto those which are always such and those which are only such under\npeculiar circumstances\u2014the former being called perfect, the latter\nintermediate duties; [729] and it is stated, as a peculiarity of the\nlatter, that, owing to circumstances, a course of conduct may become a\nduty which would not have been a duty without those peculiar\ncircumstances. [730] In the wider sense of the term, every action is\nproper or in accordance with duty which consists in the choice of a\nthing to be preferred (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) and in avoiding a thing to be\neschewed. On the other hand, a perfect duty is only fulfilled by\nvirtuous action. A virtuous life and a wish to do good constitute the\nonly perfect duty. [731]\n\nSome confusion is introduced into this teaching by the fact that in\nsetting up the standard for distinguishing perfect from imperfect\nduties, the Stoics sometimes look at the real, sometimes at the\npersonal value, of actions, without keeping these two aspects distinct.\nThey therefore use the terms perfect and imperfect sometimes to express\nthe difference between conditional and unconditional duties; at other\ntimes, to express that between morality and law. [732] Far worse than\nthe formal defect is the grouping in this division under the conception\nof duty things of the most varied moral character. If once things which\nhave only a conditional value are admitted within the circle of duties,\nwhat is there to prevent their being defended, in the practical\napplication of the Stoic teaching, on grounds altogether repugnant to\nthe legitimate consequences of the Stoic principles?\n\n\n\n\n[C. Emotions.]\n\n[(1) Permitted affections.]\n\nIn accordance with these admissions, the Stoic system sought in another\nrespect to meet facts and practical wants by abating somewhat from the\nausterity of its demands. Consistently carried out, those demands\nrequire the unconditional extirpation of the whole sensuous nature,\nsuch as was originally expressed by the demand for apathy. But just as\nthe stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified by the admission of\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1, so this demand was modified in two ways; the first elements\nof the forbidden emotions were allowed under other names; and whilst\nemotions were still forbidden, certain mental affections were\npermitted, and even declared to be desirable. Taking the first point,\nit is allowed by the Stoics that the wise man feels pain, and that at\ncertain things he does not remain wholly calm. [733] This admission\nshows that their system was not identical with that of the Cynics.\n[734] It is not required that men should be entirely free from all\nmental affections, but only that they should refuse assent to them, and\nnot suffer them to obtain the mastery. [735] With regard to the other\npoint, they propound the doctrine of \u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9, or rational\ndispositions, which, as distinct from emotions, are to be found in the\nwise man, and in the wise man only. Of these rational dispositions,\nthey distinguish three chief besides several subordinate varieties.\n[736] Although this admission was intended to vindicate the absence of\nemotions in the wise man, since the permitted feelings are not\nemotions, still it made the boundary-line between emotions and feelings\nso uncertain that in practice the sharply-defined contrast between the\nwise and the foolish threatened wellnigh to disappear altogether.\n\n\n\n[(2) Modification of apathy.]\n\nThis danger appears more imminent when we observe the perplexity in\nwhich the Stoics were placed when asked to point out the wise man in\nexperience. For not only do opponents assert that, according to their\nown confession, no one, or as good as no one, can be found in actual\nhistory who altogether deserves that high title, [737] but even their\nown admissions agree therewith. [738] They describe even Socrates,\nDiogenes, and Antisthenes as not completely virtuous, but only as\ntravellers towards virtue. [739] It was of little avail to point to\nHercules or Ulysses, [740] or, with Posidonius, [741] to the mythical\ngolden age, in which the wise are said to have ruled. The pictures of\nthose heroes would have to be changed altogether, to bring them into\nharmony with the wise man of the Stoics; and Posidonius might be easily\ndisposed of on Stoic principles, by the rejoinder that virtue and\nwisdom are things of free exercise, and, since free exercise was\nwanting in the case of the first men, their condition can only have\nbeen a state of unconscious ignorance, and not one of perfection. [742]\nIf, in reality, there are no wise men, the division of men into wise\nand foolish falls at once to the ground: all mankind belong to the\nclass of fools; the conception of the wise man is an unreal fancy. It\nbecomes, then, difficult to maintain the assertion that all fools are\nequally foolish, and all the wise are equally wise. If, instead of\nproducing real wisdom, philosophy can only produce progress towards\nwisdom, it can hardly be expected to take such a modest estimate of its\nown success as to allow that there is no real distinction between a\nzealous student and a bigoted despiser of its doctrines.\n\n\n\n[(3) The state of progress.]\n\nIt was therefore natural that the Stoics, notwithstanding their own\nmaxims, found themselves compelled to recognise differences among the\nbad and differences among the good. In reference to their system these\ndifferences were, indeed, made to depend in the case of the bad upon\nthe greater or less difficulty of healing the moral defects, or, in the\ncase of the good, upon qualities morally indifferent. [743] It was also\nnatural that they should so nearly identify the state of \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u1f74\u2014or\nprogress towards wisdom, the only really existing state\u2014with wisdom\nthat it could hardly be distinguished therefrom. If there is a stage of\nprogress at which a man is free from all emotions, discharges all his\nduties, knows all that is necessary, and is even secure against the\ndanger of relapse, [744] such a stage cannot be distinguished from\nwisdom, either by its want of experience or by the absence of a clear\nknowledge of oneself. For has it not been frequently asserted that\nhappiness is not increased by length of time, and that the wise man is\nat first not conscious of his wisdom? [745] If, however, the highest\nstage of approximation to wisdom is supposed still to fall short of\nwisdom, because it is not sure of its continuance, and though free from\nmental diseases, it is not free from emotions, [746] how, it may be\nasked, do these passing emotions differ from the mental affections\nwhich are found in the wise man? Is there any real distinction between\nthem? If the progressing candidate has attained to freedom from\ndiseased mental states, is the danger of a relapse very great? Besides,\nthe Stoics were by no means agreed that the really wise man is free\nfrom all danger. Cleanthes held with the Cynics that virtue can never\nbe lost; Chrysippus admitted that, in certain cases, it is defectible.\n[747] After all this admission is only one among many traits which\nprove that the Stoics were obliged to abate from the original severity\nof their demands.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nAPPLIED MORAL SCIENCE.\n\n\nAll that has hitherto been stated has regard to the general principles\nonly of the Stoics touching the end and the conditions of moral action.\nWhether the mere exposition of principles be enough, or whether the\npractical application of these principles to the special relations of\nlife does not also form part of moral science\u2014is a question as to which\nthe Stoic School was not originally unanimous. Aristo, a Cynic on this\nas on other points, was of opinion that this whole branch of moral\nscience is useless and unnecessary; the philosopher must confine\nhimself exclusively to things which have a practical value, the\nfundamental ground of morality. [748] Within the Stoic School, however,\nthis view did not gain much support. Even Cleanthes, who otherwise\nagreed with Aristo, did not deny the value of the application of theory\nto details, provided the connection of details with general principles\nwere not lost sight of. [749] Nor can there be any doubt that, after\nthe time of Chrysippus, details engrossed much of the attention of the\nStoic philosophers. Posidonius enumerates, as belonging to the province\nof moral philosophy, precept, exhortation, and advice. [750] His\nteacher, Pan\u00e6tius, had discussed the hortatory side of morality [751]\nin three books on duties, which are imitated in Cicero\u2019s well-known\ntreatise. [752] The division of ethics attributed to Diogenes, [753]\nand by him referred to Chrysippus, leaves place for such discussions;\n[754] and, not to mention Aristo\u2019s opposition, which supposes the\nexistence of applied moral science, the example of his fellow-student\nPers\u00e6us, whose precepts for a science of banqueting [755] have been\nalready referred to, proves how early practical ethics had obtained a\nfooting within the Stoic School. Moreover, the elaborate theory of\nvirtue propounded by Chrysippus and his followers [756] can hardly have\nfailed to include many of the principal occurrences in life. Thus a\nnumber of particular precepts are known to us, which are partly quoted\nby other writers as belonging to the Stoics, and are partly to be found\nin the pages of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, and in Cicero\u2019s\ntreatise on duties. Indeed, the Stoics were the first who went at all\ndeeply into the subject of casuistry. [757] At a later epoch, when more\ngeneral questions had been settled by Chrysippus, the preference for\nparticular enquiries within the domain of applied moral science appears\nto have increased among the Stoics. [758] Probably none but the later\nmembers of the School advanced the unscientific assertion [759] that we\nought to confine ourselves to precepts for particular cases, since only\nthese have any practical value.\n\nIn this extension of the moral theory, besides the desire for\nscientific completeness, the endeavour may also be observed to\nsubordinate all sides of human activity to moral considerations. In the\nvirtuous man, as the Stoics held, everything becomes virtue; [760] and\nhence everything is included in moral philosophy. Thereby, without\ndoubt, the Stoic School contributed in no small degree towards settling\nand defining moral ideas, not only for its immediate contemporaries,\nbut also for all subsequent times. Nevertheless, the more the teaching\nof the School entered into the details of every-day life, the more\nimpossible it became to prevent practical considerations from\noverriding the natural severity of Stoic principles, or to keep the\nstrictness of scientific procedure from yielding to considerations of\nexperience.\n\nThe order and division which the Stoics adopted for discussing details\nin the hortatory part of moral science are not known to us; nor,\nindeed, is it known whether that order was uniform in all cases. [761]\nIt will be most convenient for the purpose of our present description\nto distinguish, in the first place, those points which refer to the\nmoral activity of the individual as such, and afterwards to go on to\nthose which relate to social life. Subsequently, the teaching of the\nStoics on the relation of man to the course of the world and to\nnecessity will engage our attention.\n\n\n\n\n[A. The individual.]\n\n[(1) Importance attached to the individual.]\n\nIt was in keeping with the whole tone of the Stoic system to devote, in\nethics, more attention to the conduct and duties of the individual than\nhad been done by previous philosophy. Not that previous philosophers\nhad altogether ignored this side. Indeed, Aristotle, in his\ninvestigations into individual virtue, had been led to enquire\ncarefully into individual morality. Still, with Aristotle, the\ninfluence of classic antiquity on the border-land of which he stands\nwas sufficiently strong to throw the individual into the background as\ncompared with the community, and to subordinate ethics to politics. In\nthe post-Aristotelian philosophy, this relation was exactly reversed.\nWith the decline of public life in Greece, intellectual interest in the\nstate declined also; and, in equal degree, the personality of the\nindividual and circumstances of private life came into prominence. This\nfeature may be already noticed in some of the older Schools, for\ninstance, in the Academy and Peripatetic School. The Peripatetic, in\nparticular, had, in the time of its first adherents, travelled far on\nthe road which the founder had struck out. Among the Stoics, the same\nfeature was required by the whole spirit of their system. If happiness\ndepends upon man\u2019s internal state and nothing external has power to\naffect it, the science which professes to lead man to happiness must\nprimarily busy itself with man\u2019s moral nature. It can only consider\nhuman society in as far as action for society forms part of the moral\nduty of the individual. Hence, in the Stoic philosophy, researches into\nthe duties of the individual occupy a large space, and there is a\ncorresponding subordination of politics. These duties form the subject\nof by far the greater part of the applied moral science of the Stoics;\nand it has been already set forth [762] how minutely they entered in\nthat study into possible details. At the same time, the scientific\nharvest resulting from these researches is by no means in proportion to\ntheir extent.\n\nConfining our attention to the two first books of Cicero\u2019s work, De\nOfficiis, to form some idea of the treatise of Pan\u00e6tius on duties, we\nfind, after a few introductory remarks, morality as such (honestum)\ndescribed, according to the scheme of the four cardinal virtues (i.\n5\u201342). In discussing the first of these, intelligence, love of research\nis recommended, and useless subtlety is deprecated. Justice and\ninjustice are next discussed, in all their various forms, due regard\nbeing had to the cases of ordinary occurrence in life. Liberality,\nkindness, and benevolence are treated as subdivisions of justice; and\nthis leads to a consideration of human society in all its various forms\n(c. 16\u201318, 60). Turning next to bravery (18, 61), the philosopher draws\nattention to the fact that bravery is inseparably connected with\njustice. He then describes it partly as it appears in the forms of\nmagnanimity and endurance, regardless of external circumstances, partly\nin the form of energetic courage; and, in so doing, he discusses\nvarious questions which suggest themselves, such as the nature of true\nand false courage, military and civil courage, and the exclusion of\nanger from valour. Lastly, the object of the fourth chief virtue (c.\n27) is described, in general terms, as what is proper (decorum,\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd), and the corresponding state as propriety, both in controlling\nthe impulses of the senses, in jest and play, and in the whole personal\nbearing. The peculiar demands made by individual nature, by time of\nlife, by civil position, are discussed. Even outward proprieties\u2014of\nspeech and conversation, of domestic arrangement, tact in behaviour,\n[763] honourable and dishonourable modes of life\u2014do not escape\nattention. [764]\n\nIn the second book of his work, Cicero considers the relation of\ninterest to duty; and having proved, at length, [765] that most that is\nadvantageous and disadvantageous is brought on us by other men, he\nturns to the means by which we may gain the support of others, and by\nwhich affection, trust, and admiration may be secured. He reviews\nvarious kinds of services for individuals and the state, and embraces\nthe opportunity to give expression to his abhorrence of despotism and\nrepublican servility to the people. The principles on which this review\nis conducted are such that objection can rarely be taken to them from\nthe platform of modern morality. Yet the Stoic bias is unmistakeably\npresent in the conception and support of the rules of life, and\nparticularly in the definitions of various virtues; few of the moral\njudgments, however, are other than might have been expressed from the\nplatform of the Platonic and Aristotelian ethics. [766] The same remark\nholds good of some other recorded points by means of which the Stoics\ngave a further expansion to their picture of the wise man. [767]\nRevolting as their tenets at times appear, there is yet little in their\napplication that deviated from the moral ideas generally current.\n\n\n\n[(2) Cynicism of the Stoics.]\n\n[(a) Connection of Stoics with Cynics.]\n\nMore peculiar, and at the same time more startling, is another feature\nabout the Stoics. Let not too much be made of the fact that they, under\ncertain circumstances, permitted a lie. [768] Were not Socrates and\nPlato, at least, of the same opinion? And, to be frank, we must admit\nthat, although in this respect moral theories are strict enough, yet\npractice is commonly far too lax now. Very repulsive, however, are many\nassertions attributed to the Stoics, respecting the attitude of the\nwise man to the so-called intermediate things. Was not the very\nindependence of externals, the indifference to everything but the moral\nstate, which found expression in the doctrine of things indifferent and\nof the wise man\u2019s apathy, at the root of that imperfection of life and\nprinciple which is so prominent in the Cynic School, the parent School\nof the Stoics? Granting that in the Stoic School this imperfection was\ntoned down and supplemented by other elements, still the tendency\nthereto was too deeply rooted from its origin, and too closely bound up\nwith its fundamental view of life, to be ever properly eradicated. It\ndid not require, indeed, a Cynic life from its members; nay, more, it\navowed that, except in rare cases, such a life ought not to be\nfollowed; [769] still the Cynic\u2019s life was its ideal; and when it\nasserted that it was not necessary for a wise man to be a Cynic, it\nimplied that, if once a Cynic, he would always be a Cynic. [770]\nStoicism took for its patterns [771] Antisthenes and Diogenes quite as\nmuch as Socrates; even those who held, with Seneca, [772] that a\nphilosopher ought to accommodate himself to prevailing customs, and,\nfrom regard to others, do what he would not himself approve, did not\ntherefore cease to bestow their highest admiration on Diogenes\u2019s\nindependence of wants, notwithstanding his eccentricities. [773] More\nconsistent thinkers even approximated to Cynicism in their moral\nprecepts, [774] and in later times a School of younger Cynics actually\ngrew out of the Stoic School.\n\n\n[(b) Instances of Cynicism.]\n\nBearing, as the Stoics did, this close relationship to the Cynics, it\ncannot astonish us to find amongst them many instances of the most\nrevolting traits in Cynicism. Their contempt for cultured habits and\nviolation of right feelings fully justify the righteous indignation of\ntheir opponents. Chrysippus regarded many things as perfectly harmless\nin which the religious feeling of Greece saw pollution, [775] and\npleaded in defence of his opinion the example of animals, to show that\nthey were according to nature. The care for deceased relatives he not\nonly proposed to limit to the simplest mode of burial, but would have\nit altogether put aside; and he made the horrible suggestion, which he\neven described in full, of using for purposes of nourishment the flesh\nof amputated limbs and the corpses of the nearest relatives. [776]\nGreat offence, too, was given by the Stoics, and, in particular, by\nChrysippus, in their treatment of the relation of the sexes to each\nother; nor can it be denied that some of their language on this subject\nsounds exceedingly offensive. The Cynic assertion, that anything which\nis in itself allowed may be mentioned plainly and without a\nperiphrasis, is also attributed to the Stoics. [777] By his proposals\nfor the dress of women, Zeno offended against propriety and modesty,\n[778] and both he and Chrysippus advocated community of wives in their\nstate of wise men. [779] It is, moreover, asserted that the Stoics\nraised no objection to the prevalent profligacy and the trade in\nunchastity, [780] nor to the still worse vice of unnatural crime. [781]\nMarriage among the nearest relatives was held to be consonant to nature\nby the leaders of the School; [782] and the atrocious shamelessness of\nDiogenes found supporters in Chrysippus, [783] perhaps, too, in Zeno.\n[784]\n\n\n[(c) Cynicism a theoretical consequence of Stoic principles.]\n\nIt would, however, be doing the Stoics a great injustice to take these\nstatements for more than theoretical conclusions drawn from the\nprinciples to which they were pledged. The moral character of Zeno,\nCleanthes, and Chrysippus is quite above suspicion. It seems,\ntherefore, strange that they should have felt themselves compelled to\nadmit in theory what strikes the natural feeling with horror. It\ncannot, however, be unconditionally accepted that the statements laid\nto their charge as they used them imply all that historians find in\nthem. Far from it; of some of their statements it may be said not only\nthat they do not justify conduct recognised to be immoral, but that\nthey are directed against actions customarily allowed, the argument\nbeing, that between such actions and actions admittedly immoral there\nis no real difference. This remark applies, in particular, to Zeno\u2019s\nlanguage on unnatural vice. [785] It was not, therefore, in opposition\nto the older Stoics, or a denial of their maxim that love is permitted\nto a wise man, [786] for the younger Stoics to condemn most explicitly\nany and every form of unchastity, and, in particular, the worst form of\nall, unnatural vice. [787] In the same way, the language permitting\nmarriage between those nearest of kin, when examined, is very much\nmilder than it seems. [788] And Zeno\u2019s proposition for a community of\nwives may be fairly laid to the charge of Plato, and excused by all the\ncharitable excuses of which Plato is allowed the benefit. [789]\n\nTaking the most unprejudiced view of the Stoic propositions, there are\nenough of them to arouse extreme dislike, even if they could, without\ndifficulty, be deduced from the fundamental principles of the system. A\nmoral theory which draws such a sharp distinction between what is\nwithout and what is within, that it regards the latter as alone\nessential, the former as altogether indifferent, which attaches no\nvalue to anything except virtuous intention, and places the highest\nvalue in being independent of everything\u2014such a moral theory must of\nnecessity prove wanting, whenever the business of morality consists in\nusing the senses as instruments for expressing the mind, and in raising\nnatural impulses to the sphere of free will. If its prominent features\nallow less to the senses than naturally belongs to them, there is a\ndanger that, in particular cases in which intentions are not so\nobvious, the moral importance of actions will often be ignored, and\nsuch actions treated as indifferent.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Social relations.]\n\nThe same observation will have to be made with regard to the positions\nwhich the Stoics laid down in reference to social relations. Not that\nit was their intention to detach man from his natural relation [(1)\nOrigin and use of society.] to other men. On the contrary, they hold\nthat the further man carries the work of moral improvement [(a) Origin\nof social claims.] in himself, the stronger he will feel drawn to\nsociety. But by the introduction of the idea of society, opposite\ntendencies arise in their ethics\u2014one towards individual independence,\nthe other in the direction of a well-ordered social life. The former\ntendency is the earlier one, and continues to predominate throughout;\nstill, the latter was not surreptitiously introduced\u2014nay, more, it was\nthe logical result of the Stoic principles, and to the eye of an\nEpicurean must have seemed a distinctive feature of Stoicism. In\nattributing absolute value only to rational thought and will, Stoicism\nhad declared man to be independent of anything external, and,\nconsequently, of his fellow-men. But since this value only attaches to\nrational thought and intention, the freedom of the individual also\ninvolves the recognition of the community, and brings with it the\nrequirement that everyone must subordinate his own wishes to the wishes\nand needs of others. Rational conduct and thought can only then exist\nwhen the conduct of the individual is in harmony with general law.\nGeneral law is the same for all rational beings. All rational beings\nmust therefore aim at the same end, and recognise themselves subject to\nthe same law. All must feel themselves portions of one connected whole.\nMan must not live for himself, but for society.\n\nThis connection between the individual and society is clearly set forth\nby the Stoics. The desire for society, they hold, is immediately\ninvolved in reason. By the aid of reason, man feels himself a part of a\nwhole, and, consequently, is bound to subordinate his private interests\nto the interests of the whole. [790] As like always attracts like, this\nremark holds true of everything endowed with reason, since the rational\nsoul is in all cases identical. From the consciousness of this unity,\nthe desire for society at once arises in individuals endowed with\nreason. [791] They are all in the service of reason; there is,\ntherefore, for all, but one right course and one law, [792] and they\nall contribute to the general welfare in obeying this law. The wise\nman, as a Stoic expresses it, is never a private man. [793]\n\nAt other times, social relations were explained by the theory of final\ncauses. [794] Whilst everything else exists for the sake of what is\nendowed with reason, individual beings endowed with reason exist for\nthe sake of each other. Their social connection is therefore a direct\nnatural command. [795] Towards animals we never stand in a position to\nexercise justice, nor yet towards ourselves. [796] Justice can only be\nexercised towards other men and towards God. [797] On the combination\nof individuals and their mutual support rests all their power over\nnature. A single man by himself would be the most helpless of\ncreatures. [798]\n\nThe consciousness of this connection between all rational beings finds\nample expression in Marcus Aurelius, the last of the Stoics. The\npossession of reason is, with him, love of society (vi. 14; x. 2).\nRational beings can only be treated on a social footing (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2)\n(vi. 23), and can only feel happy themselves when working for the\ncommunity (viii. 7); for all rational beings are related to one another\n(iii. 4), all form one social unit (\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1), of which each\nindividual is an integral part (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2) (ix. 23); one body, of\nwhich every individual is an organic member (\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2) (ii. 1; vii. 13).\nHence the social instinct is a primary instinct in man (vii. 55), every\nmanifestation of which contributes, either directly or indirectly, to\nthe good of the whole (ix. 23). Our fellow-men ought to be loved from\nthe heart. They ought to be benefited, not for the sake of outward\ndecency, but because the benefactor is penetrated with the joy of\nbenevolence, and thereby benefits himself. [799] Whatever hinders union\nwith others has a tendency to separate the members from the body, from\nwhich all derive their life (viii. 34); and he who estranges himself\nfrom one of his fellow-men voluntarily severs himself from the stock of\nmankind (xi. 8). We shall presently see that the language used by the\nphilosophic emperor is quite in harmony with the Stoic principles.\n\n\n\n[(2) Justice and mercy.]\n\nIn relation to our fellow-men, two fundamental points are insisted on\nby the Stoics\u2014the duty of justice and the duty of mercy. Cicero,\nwithout doubt following Pan\u00e6tius, [800] describes these two virtues as\nthe bonds which keep human society together, [801] and, consequently,\ngives to each an elaborate treatment. [802] In expanding these duties,\nthe Stoics were led by the fundamental principles of their system to\nmost distracting consequences. On the one hand, they required from\ntheir wise men that strict justice which knows no pity and can make no\nallowances; [803] hence their ethical system had about it an air of\nausterity, and an appearance of severity and cruelty. On the other\nhand, their principle of the natural connection of all mankind imposed\non them the practice of the most extended and unreserved charity, of\nbeneficence, gentleness, meekness, of an unlimited benevolence, and a\nreadiness to forgive in all cases in which forgiveness is possible.\nThis last aspect of the Stoic teaching appears principally in the later\nStoics\u2014in Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Musonius; [804] and\nit is quite possible that they may have given more prominence to it\nthan their predecessors. But the fact is there, that this aspect is\ndue, not only to the peculiar character of these individuals, but is\nbased on the spirit and tone of the whole system. [805]\n\nThe question then naturally arises, how these two opposites may be\nreconciled\u2014how stern justice may be harmonised with forgiveness and\nmercy. Seneca, who investigated the question fully, replies: Not\nseverity, but only cruelty, is opposed to mercy; for no one virtue is\nopposed to another: a wise man will always help another in distress,\nbut without sharing his emotion, without feeling misery or compassion;\nhe will not indulge, but he will spare, advise, and improve; he will\nnot remit punishments in cases in which he knows them to be deserved,\nbut, from a sense of justice, he will take human weakness into\nconsideration in allotting punishments, and make every possible\nallowance for circumstances. [806] Every difficulty is not, indeed,\nremoved by these statements; still, those which remain apply more to\nthe Stoic demand for apathy than to the reconciliation of the two\nvirtues which regulate our relations to our fellow-men. [807]\n\n\n\n[(3) Friendship.]\n\nThe society for which all rational beings are intended will naturally\nbe found to exist principally among those who have become alive to\ntheir rational nature and destiny\u2014in other words, among the wise. All\nwho are wise and virtuous are friends, because they agree in their\nviews of life, and because they all love one another\u2019s virtue. [808]\nThus every action of a wise man contributes to the well-being of every\nother wise man\u2014or, as the Stoics pointedly express it, if a wise man\nonly makes a rational movement with his finger, he does a service to\nall wise men throughout the world. [809] On the other hand, only a wise\nman knows how to love properly; true friendship only exists between\nwise men. [810] Only the wise man possesses the art of making friends,\n[811] since love is only won by love. [812] If, however, true\nfriendship is a union between the good and the wise, its value is\nthereby at once established; and hence it is distinctly enumerated\namong goods by the Stoics. [813]\n\nOn this point, difficulties reappear. How can this need of society be\nreconciled with the wise man\u2019s freedom from wants? If the wise man is\nself-sufficient, how can another help him? How can he stand in need of\nsuch help? The answers given by Seneca are not satisfactory. To the\nfirst question, he replies, that none but a wise man can give the right\ninducement to a wise man to call his powers into exercise. [814] He\nmeets the second by saying, that a wise man suffices himself for\nhappiness, but not for life. [815] Everywhere the wise man finds\ninducements to virtuous action; if friendship is not a condition of\nhappiness, it is not a good at all. Nor are his further observations\nmore satisfactory. The wise man, he says, [816] does not wish to be\nwithout friends, but still he can be without friends. But the question\nis not whether he can be, but whether he can be without loss of\nhappiness. If the question so put is answered in the negative, it\nfollows that the wise man is not altogether self-sufficing; if in the\naffirmative\u2014and a wise man, as Seneca affirms, will bear the loss of a\nfriend with calmness, because he comforts himself with the thought that\nhe can have another at any moment\u2014then friendship is not worth much.\nMoreover, if a wise man can help another by communicating to him\ninformation and method, since no wise man is omniscient, [817] is not a\nwise man, if not in possession of all knowledge, at least in possession\nof all knowledge contributing to virtue and happiness? If it be added,\nthat what one learns from another he learns by his own powers, and in\nconsequence of himself helping himself, does not this addition still\noverlook the fact that the teacher\u2019s activity is the condition of the\nlearner\u2019s? True and beautiful as is the language of Seneca: Friendship\nhas its value in itself alone; every wise man must wish to find those\nlike himself; the good have a natural love for the good; the wise man\nneeds a friend, not to have a nurse in sickness and an assistant in\ntrouble, but to have some one whom he can tend and assist, and for whom\nhe can live and die [818]\u2014nevertheless, this language does not meet the\ncritical objection, that one who requires the help of another, be it\nonly to have an object for his moral activity, cannot be wholly\ndependent on himself. If friendship, according to a previously quoted\ndistinction, [819] belongs to external goods, it makes man, in a\ncertain sense, dependent on externals. If its essence is placed in an\ninward disposition of friendliness, such a disposition depends on the\nexistence of those for whom it can be felt. Besides, it involves the\nnecessity of being reciprocated, and of finding expression in outward\nconduct, to such an extent that it is quite subversive of the absolute\nindependence of the individual.\n\n\n\n[(4) The family and political life.]\n\nNor is the friendship of the wise the only form of society which\nappeared to the Stoics necessary and essential. If man is intended\n[820] to associate with his fellow-men in a society regulated by\njustice and law, how can he withdraw from the most common\ninstitution\u2014the state? If virtue does not consist in idle\ncontemplation, but in action, how dare he lose the opportunity of\npromoting good and repressing evil by taking part in political life?\n[821] If laws further the well-being and security of the citizens, if\nthey advance virtue and happiness, how can the wise man fail to regard\nthem as beautiful and praiseworthy? [822] For the same reason,\nmatrimony will command his respect. He will neither deny himself a\nunion so natural and intimate, nor will he deprive the state of relays\nof men nor society of the sight of well-ordered family life. [823]\nHence, in their writings and precepts, the Stoics paid great attention\nto the state and to domestic life. [824] In marriage they required\nchastity and moderation. Love was to be a matter of reason, not of\nemotion\u2014not a yielding to personal attractions, nor a seeking sensual\ngratification. [825] As to their views on the constitution of a state,\nwe know [826] that they prefer a mixed constitution, compounded of the\nthree simple forms, without objecting to other forms of government. The\nwise man, according to Chrysippus, will not despise the calling of a\nprince, if his interest so require, and, if he cannot govern himself,\nwill reside at the court and in the camp of princes, particularly of\ngood princes. [827]\n\nThe ideal of the Stoics, however, was not realised in any one of the\nexisting forms of government, but in that polity of the wise which Zeno\ndescribed, undoubtedly when a Cynic, [828] but which was fully set\nforth by Chrysippus [829]\u2014a state without marriage, or family, or\ntemples, or courts, or public schools, or coins [830]\u2014a state excluding\nno other states, because all differences of nationality have been\nmerged in a common brotherhood of all men. [831] Such an ideal may show\nthat, for the Stoic philosophers, there could be no hearty sympathy\nwith the state or the family, their ideal state being, in truth, no\nlonger a state. Indeed, the whole tone of Stoicism, and still more, the\ncircumstances of the times to which it owed its rise and growth, were\nagainst such a sympathy. If Plato could find no place for a philosopher\nin the political institutions of his time, how could a Stoic, who\nlooked for happiness more exclusively in seclusion from the world, who\ncontrasted, too, the wise man more sharply with the multitude of fools,\nand lived for the most part under political circumstances far less\nfavourable than Plato? To him the private life of a philosopher must\nhave seemed beyond compare more attractive than a public career. An\nintelligent man, taking advice from Chrysippus, [832] avoids business;\nhe withdraws to peaceful retirement; and, though he may consider it his\nduty not to stand aloof from public life, still he can only actively\ntake a part in it in states which present an appreciable progress\ntowards perfection. [833] But where could such states be found? Did not\nChrysippus state it as his conviction that a statesman must either\ndisplease the Gods or displease the people? [834] And did not later\nStoics accordingly advise philosophers not to intermeddle at all in\ncivil matters? [835] Labour for the commonwealth is only then a duty\nwhen there is no obstacle to such labour; but, as a matter of fact,\nthere is always some obstacle, and in particular, the condition of all\nexisting states. [836] A philosopher who teaches and improves his\nfellow-men benefits the state quite as much as a warrior, an\nadministrator, or a civil functionary. [837]\n\n\n[(b) Practical aversion to political life.]\n\nFollowing out this idea, [838] Epictetus dissuades from matrimony and\nthe begetting of children. Allowing that the family relation may be\nadmitted in a community of wise men, he is of opinion that it is\notherwise under existing circumstances; for how can a true philosopher\nengage in connections and actions which withdraw him from the service\nof God? The last expression already implies that unfavourable times\nwere not the only cause deterring the Stoics from caring for family or\nthe state, but that the occupation in itself seemed to them a\nsubordinate and limited one. This is stated in plain terms by Seneca\nand Epictetus: He who feels himself a citizen of the world finds in an\nindividual state a sphere far too limited, and prefers devoting himself\nto the universe; [839] man is no doubt intended to be active, but the\nhighest activity is intellectual research. [840] On the subject of\ncivil society, opinions were likely to vary, according to the\npeculiarities and circumstances of individuals. The philosopher on the\nthrone was more likely than the freedman Epictetus to feel himself a\ncitizen of Rome as well as a citizen of the world, [841] and to lower\nthe demands made on a philosophic statesman. [842] At the same time,\nthe line taken by the Stoic philosophy cannot be ignored. A philosophy\nwhich attaches moral value to the cultivation of intentions only, and\nconsiders all external circumstances as indifferent, can hardly produce\na taste or a skill for overcoming those outward interests and\ncircumstances with which a politician is chiefly concerned. A system\nwhich regards the mass of men as fools, which denies to them every\nhealthy endeavour and all true knowledge, can hardly bring itself\nunreservedly to work for a state, the course and institutions of which\ndepend upon the majority of its members, and are planned with a view to\ntheir needs, prejudices, and customs. Undoubtedly, there were able\nstatesmen among the Stoics of the Roman period; but Rome, and not\nStoicism, was the cause of their statesmanship. Taken alone, Stoicism\ncould form excellent men, but hardly excellent statesmen. And, looking\nto facts, not one of the old masters of the School ever had or desired\nto have any public office. Hence, when their opponents urged that\nretirement was a violation of their principles, [843] Seneca could with\njustice meet the charge by replying, that the true meaning of their\nprinciples ought to be gathered from their actual conduct. [844]\n\n\n[(c) Citizenship of the world.]\n\nThe positive substitute wherewith the Stoics thought to replace the\nordinary relations of civil society was by a citizenship of the world.\nNo preceding system had been able to overcome the difficulty of\nnationalities. Even Plato and Aristotle shared the prejudice of the\nGreeks against foreigners. The Cynics alone appear as the precursors of\nthe Stoa, attaching slight value to the citizenship of any particular\nstate, in comparison with citizenship of the world. [845] With the\nCynics, this idea had not attained to the historical importance which\nafterwards belonged to it; nor was it used so much with a positive\nmeaning, to express the essential oneness of all mankind, as, in a\nnegative sense, to imply the philosopher\u2019s independence of country and\nhome. From the Stoic philosophy it first received a definite meaning,\nand was generally pressed into service. The causes of this change may\nbe sought, not only in the historical surroundings amongst which\nStoicism grew up, but also in the person of its founder. It was far\neasier for philosophy to overcome national dislikes, after the genial\nMacedonian conqueror had united the vigorous nationalities comprised\nwithin his monarchy, not only under a central government, but also in a\ncommon culture. [846] Hence the Stoic citizenship of the world may be\nappealed to, to prove the assertion, that philosophic Schools reflect\nthe existing facts of history. On the other hand, taking into account\nthe bias given to a philosopher\u2019s teaching by his personal\ncircumstances, Zeno, being only half a Greek, would be more ready to\nunderestimate the distinction of Greek and barbarian than any one of\nhis predecessors.\n\nHowever much these two causes\u2014and, in particular, the first\u2014must have\ncontributed to bring about the Stoic ideal of a citizenship of the\nworld, nevertheless the connection of this idea with the whole of their\nsystem is most obvious. If human society, as we have seen, has for its\nbasis the identity of reason in individuals, what ground have we for\nlimiting this society to a single nation, or feeling ourselves more\nnearly related to some men than to others? All men, apart from what\nthey have made themselves by their own exertions, are equally near,\nsince all equally participate in reason. All are members of one body;\nfor one and the same nature has fashioned them all from the same\nelements for the same destiny. [847] Or, as Epictetus expresses it in\nreligious language, [848] all men are brethren, since all have in the\nsame degree God for their father. Man, therefore, who and whatever else\nhe may be, is the object of our solicitude, simply as being man. [849]\nNo hostility and ill-treatment should quench our benevolence. [850] No\none is so low but that he has claims on the love and justice of his\nfellow-men. [851] Even the slave is a man deserving our esteem, and\nable to claim from us his rights. [852]\n\nIn their recognition of the universal rights of mankind the Stoics did\nnot go so far as to disapprove of slavery. Attaching in general little\nvalue to external circumstances, [853] they cared the less to throw\ndown the gauntlet to the social institutions and arrangements of their\ntime. Still, they could not wholly suppress a confession that slavery\nis unjust, [854] nor cease to aim at mitigating the evil both in theory\nand practice. [855] If all men are, as rational beings, equal, all men\ntogether form one community. Reason is the common law for all, and\nthose who owe allegiance to one law are members of one state. [856] If\nthe Stoics, therefore, compared the world, in its more extended sense,\nto a society, because of the connection of its parts, [857] they must,\nwith far more reason, have allowed that the world, in the narrower\nsense of the term, including all rational beings, forms one community,\n[858] to which individual communities are related, as the houses of a\ncity are to the city collectively. [859] Wise men, at least, if not\nothers, will esteem this great community, to which all men belong, far\nabove any particular community in which the accident of birth has\nplaced them. [860] They, at least, will direct their efforts towards\nmaking all men feel themselves to be citizens of one community; and,\ninstead of framing exclusive laws and constitutions, will try to live\nas one family, under the common governance of reason. [861] The\nplatform of social propriety receives hereby a universal width. Man, by\nwithdrawing from the outer world into the recesses of his own\nintellectual and moral state, becomes enabled to recognise everywhere\nthe same nature as his own, and to feel himself one with the universe,\nby sharing with it the same nature and the same destiny.\n\nBut, as yet, the moral problem is not exhausted. [C. Man and the course\nof the world.] Reason, the same as man\u2019s, rules pure and complete in\nthe universe; and if it is the business of man to give play to reason\nin his own conduct, and to recognise it in that of others, it is also\nhis duty to subordinate himself to collective reason, and to the course\nof the world, over which it presides. In conclusion, therefore, the\nrelation of man to the course of the world must be considered.\n\n\n\n[(1) Submission to the course of nature.]\n\nFirmly as the principles of the Stoic ethics insist upon moral conduct,\nthose ethics, judged by their whole tone, cannot rest short of\nrequiring an absolute resignation to the course of the universe. This\nrequirement is based quite as much upon the historical surroundings of\ntheir system as upon its intellectual principles. How, in an age in\nwhich political freedom was crushed by the oppression of the Macedonian\nand subsequently of the Roman dominion, and the Roman dominion was\nitself smothered under the despotism of imperialism, in which Might,\nlike a living fate, crushed every attempt at independent action\u2014how, in\nsuch an age, could those aiming at higher objects than mere personal\ngratification have any alternative but to resign themselves placidly to\nthe course of circumstances which individuals and nations were alike\npowerless to control? In making a dogma of fatalism, Stoicism was only\nfollowing the current of the age. At the same time, as will be seen\nfrom what has been said, it was only following the necessary\nconsequences of its own principles. All that is individual in the world\nbeing only the result of a general connection of cause and effect\u2014only\na carrying out of a universal law\u2014what remains possible, in the face of\nthis absolute necessity, but to yield unconditionally? How can yielding\nbe called a sacrifice, when the law to which we yield is nothing less\nthan the expression of reason? Hence resignation to the world\u2019s course\nwas a point chiefly insisted upon in the Stoic doctrine of morality.\nThe verses of Cleanthes, [862] in which he submits without reserve to\nthe leading of destiny, are a theme repeatedly worked out by the\nwriters of this School. The virtuous man, they say, will honour God by\nresigning his will to the divine will; the divine will he will think\nbetter than his own will; he will remember that under all circumstances\nwe must follow destiny, but that it is the wise man\u2019s prerogative to\nfollow of his own accord; that there is only one way to happiness and\nindependence\u2014that of willing nothing except what is in the nature of\nthings, and what will realise itself independently of our will. [863]\n\nSimilar expressions are not wanting amongst other philosophers.\nNevertheless, by the Stoic philosophy, the demand is pressed with\nparticular force, and is closely connected with its whole view of the\nworld. In resignation to destiny, the Stoic picture of the wise man is\ncompleted. Therewith is included that peace and happiness of mind, that\ngentleness and benevolence, that discharge of all duties, and that\nharmony of life, which together make up the Stoic definition of virtue.\n[864] Beginning by recognising the existence of a general law, morality\nends by unconditionally submitting itself to the ordinances of that\nlaw.\n\nThe one case in which this resignation would give place to active\nresistance to destiny is when man is placed in circumstances calling\nfor unworthy action or endurance. [865] Strictly speaking, the first\ncase can[(2) Suicide.] never arise, since, from the Stoic platform, no\nstate of life can be imagined which might not serve as an occasion for\nvirtuous conduct. It does, however, seem possible that even the wise\nman may be placed by fortune in positions which are for him\nunendurable; and in this case he is allowed to withdraw from them by\nsuicide. [866] The importance of this point in the Stoic ethics will\nbecome manifest from the language of Seneca, who asserts that the wise\nman\u2019s independence of externals depends, among other things, on his\nbeing able to leave life at pleasure. [867] To Seneca, the deed of the\nyounger Cato appears not only praiseworthy, but the crowning act of\nsuccess over destiny, the highest triumph of the human will. [868] By\nthe chief teachers of the Stoic School this doctrine was carried into\npractice. Zeno, in old age, hung himself, because he had broken his\nfinger; Cleanthes, for a still less cause, continued his abstinence\ntill he died of starvation, in order to traverse the whole way to\ndeath; and, in later times, the example of Zeno and Cleanthes was\nfollowed by Antipater. [869]\n\nIn these cases suicide appears not only as a way of escape, possible\nunder circumstances, but absolutely as the highest expression of moral\nfreedom. Whilst all are far from being advised to adopt this course,\n[870] everyone is required to embrace the opportunity of dying with\nglory, when no higher duties bind him to life. [871] Everyone is urged,\nin case of need, to receive death at his own hand, as a pledge of his\nindependence. Nor are cases of need decided by what really makes a man\nunhappy\u2014moral vice or folly. Vice and folly must be met by other means.\nDeath is no deliverance from them, since it makes the bad no better.\nThe one satisfactory reason which the Stoics recognised for taking\nleave of life is, when circumstances over which we have no control make\ncontinuance in life no longer desirable. [872]\n\nSuch circumstances may be found in the greatest variety of things. Cato\ncommitted suicide because of the downfall of the republic; Zeno,\nbecause of a slight injury received. According to Seneca, it is a\nsufficient reason for committing suicide to anticipate merely a\nconsiderable disturbance in our actions and peace of mind. [873] The\ninfirmity of age, incurable disease, a weakening of the powers of the\nmind, a great degree of want, the tyranny of a despot from which there\nis no escape, justify us\u2014and even, under circumstances, oblige us\u2014to\nhave recourse to this remedy. [874] Seneca, indeed, maintains that a\nphilosopher should never commit suicide in order to escape suffering,\nbut only to withdraw from restrictions in following out the aim of\nlife; but he is nevertheless of opinion that anyone may rightly choose\nan easier mode of death instead of a more painful one in prospect, thus\navoiding a freak of destiny and the cruelty of man. [875] Besides pain\nand sickness, Diogenes also mentions a case in which suicide becomes a\nduty, for the sake of others. [876] According to another authority,\n[877] five cases are enumerated by the Stoics in which it is allowed to\nput oneself to death; if, by so doing, a real service can be rendered\nto others, as in the case of sacrificing oneself for one\u2019s country; to\navoid being compelled to do an unlawful action; otherwise, on the\nground of poverty, chronic illness, or incipient weakness of mind.\n\nIn nearly all these cases, the things referred to belong to the class\nof things which were reckoned as indifferent by the Stoics; and hence\narises the apparent paradox, with which their opponents immediately\ntwitted them, that not absolute and moral evils, but only outward\ncircumstances, are admitted as justifying suicide. [878] The paradox,\nhowever, loses its point when it is remembered that, to the Stoics,\nlife and death are quite as much indifferent as all other external\nthings. [879] To them, nothing really good appears to be involved in\nthe question of suicide, but a choice between two things morally\nindifferent\u2014one of which, life, is only preferable to the other, death,\nwhilst the essential conditions for a life according to nature are\nsatisfied. [880] The philosopher, therefore, says Seneca, [881] chooses\nhis mode of death just as he chooses a ship for a journey or a house to\nlive in. He leaves life as he would leave a banquet\u2014when it is time. He\nlays aside his body when it no longer suits him, as he would lay aside\nworn-out clothes; and withdraws from life as he would withdraw from a\nhouse no longer weather-proof. [882]\n\nA very different question, however, it is, whether life can be treated\nin this way as something indifferent, and whether it is consistent with\nan unconditional resignation to the course of the world, to evade by\npersonal interposition what destiny with its unalterable laws has\ndecreed for us. Stoicism may, indeed, allow this course of action. But\nin so doing does it not betray its ill-success in the attempt to\ncombine, without contradiction, two main tendencies so different as\nthat of individual independence and that of submission to the universe?\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nTHE RELATION OF THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION.\n\n\n[A. General connection of Stoicism and religion.]\n\nIt would be impossible to give a full account of the philosophy of the\nStoics without treating of their theology; for no early system is so\nclosely connected with religion as that of the Stoics. Founded as is\ntheir whole view of the world upon the idea of one Divine Being,\nbegetting from Himself and containing in Himself all finite creatures,\nupholding them by His might, ruling them according to an unalterable\nlaw, and thus manifesting Himself everywhere, their philosophy bears a\ndecidedly religious character. Indeed, there is hardly a single\nprominent feature in the Stoic system which is not, more or less,\nconnected with theology. A very considerable portion of that system,\nmoreover, consists of strictly theological questions; such as arguments\nfor the existence of deity, and for the rule of Providence;\ninvestigations into the nature of God, His government, and presence in\nthe world; the relation of human activity to the divine ordinances; and\nall the various questions connected with the terms freedom and\nnecessity. The natural science of the Stoics begins by evolving things\nfrom God; it ends with resolving them again into God. God is thus the\nbeginning and end of the world\u2019s development. In like manner, their\nmoral philosophy begins with the notion of divine law, which, in the\nform of eternal reason, controls the actions of men; and ends by\nrequiring submission to the will of God, and resignation to the course\nof the universe. A religious sanction is thus given to all moral\nduties. All virtuous actions are a fulfilment of the divine will and\nthe divine law. That citizenship of the world, in particular, which\nconstitutes the highest point in the Stoic morality, is connected with\nthe notion of a common relationship of all men to God. Again, that\ninward repose of the philosopher, those feelings of freedom and\nindependence, on which so much stress is laid, rest principally on the\nconviction that man is related to God. In a word, Stoicism is not only\na system of philosophy, but also a system of religion. As such it was\nregarded by its first adherents, witness the fragments of Cleanthes;\n[883] and as such it afforded, in later times, together with Platonism,\nto the best and most cultivated men, whenever the influence of Greek\nculture extended, a substitute for declining natural religion, a\nsatisfaction for religious cravings, and a support for moral life.\n\nThis philosophic religion is quite independent of the traditional\nreligion. The Stoic philosophy contains no feature of importance which\nwe can pronounce with certainty to be taken from the popular faith. The\ntrue worship of God, according to their view, consists only in the\nmental effort to know God, and in a moral and pious life. [884] A\nreally acceptable prayer can have no reference to external goods; it\ncan only have for its object a virtuous and devout\n\n\n\n[(1) Connection of Stoicism, with popular faith.]\n\nmind. [885] Still, there were reasons which led the Stoics to seek a\ncloser union with the popular faith. A system which attached so great\nan importance to popular opinion, particularly in proving the existence\nof God, [886] could not, without extreme danger to itself, declare the\ncurrent opinions respecting the Gods to be erroneous. And again, the\nethical platform of the Stoic philosophy imposed on its adherents the\nduty of upholding rather than overthrowing the popular creed\u2014that creed\nforming a barrier against the violence of human passions. [887] The\npractical value of the popular faith may, then, be the cause of their\ntheological orthodoxy. Just as the Romans, long after all faith in the\nGods had been lost under the influence of Greek culture, [888] still\nfound it useful and necessary to uphold the traditional faith, so the\nStoics may have feared that, were the worship of the people\u2019s Gods to\nbe suspended, that respect for God and the divine law on which they\ndepended for the support of their own moral tenets would at the same\ntime be exterminated.\n\n\n\n[(2) Free criticism of popular belief.]\n\nMeantime, they did not deny that much in the popular belief would not\nharmonise with their principles; and that both the customary forms of\nreligious worship, and also the mythical representations of the Gods,\nwere altogether untenable. So little did they conceal their strictures,\nthat it is clear that conviction, and not fear (there being no longer\noccasion for fear), was the cause of their leaning towards tradition.\nZeno spoke with contempt of the erection of sacred edifices; for how\ncan a thing be sacred which is erected by builders and labourers? [889]\nSeneca denies the good of prayer. [890] He considers it absurd to\nentertain fear for the Gods, who are ever-beneficent beings. [891] God\nhe would have worshipped, not by sacrifices and ceremonies, but by\npurity of life; not in temples of stone, but in the shrine of the\nheart. [892] Of images of the Gods, and the devotion paid to them, he\nspeaks with strong disapprobation; [893] of the unworthy fables of\nmythology, with bitter ridicule; [894] and he calls the popular Gods,\nwithout reserve, creations of superstition, whom the philosopher only\ninvokes because it is the custom so to do. [895] Moreover, the Stoic in\nCicero, and the elder authorities quoted by him, allow that the popular\nbeliefs and the songs of the poets are full of superstition and foolish\nlegends. [896] Chrysippus is expressly said to have declared the\ndistinction of sex among the Gods, and other features in which they\nresemble men, to be childish fancies; [897] Zeno to have denied any\nreal existence to the popular deities, and to have transferred their\nnames to natural objects; [898] and Aristo [899] is charged with having\ndenied shape and sensation to the Deity. [900]\n\nThe Stoics were, nevertheless, not disposed to let the current beliefs\nquite fall through. Far from it, they thought to discover real germs of\ntruth in these beliefs, however inadequate they were in form. They\naccordingly made it their business to give a relative vindication to\nthe existing creed. Holding that the name of God belongs, in its full\nand original sense, only to the one primary Being, they did not\nhesitate to apply it, in a limited and derivative sense, to all those\nobjects by means of which the divine power is especially manifested.\nNay, more, in consideration of man\u2019s relationship to God, they found it\nnot unreasonable to deduce from the primary Being Gods bearing a\nresemblance to men. [901] Hence they distinguished, as Plato had done,\nbetween the eternal and immutable God and Gods created and transitory,\n[902] between God the Creator and Sovereign of the world, and\nsubordinate Gods; [903] in other words, between the universal divine\npower as a Unity working in the world, and its individual parts and\nmanifestations. [904] To the former they gave the name Zeus; to the\nlatter they applied the names of the other subordinate Gods.\n\n\n\n[(3) The truth in Polytheism.]\n\nIn this derivative sense, divinity was allowed to many beings by the\nStoics, and, in particular, to the stars, which Plato had called\ncreated Gods, which Aristotle had described as eternal divine beings,\nand the worship of which lay so near to the ancient cultus of nature.\nNot only by their lustre and effect on the senses, but far more by the\nregularity of their motions, do these stars prove that the material of\nwhich they consist is the purest, and that, of all created objects,\nthey have the largest share in the divine reason. [905] And so\nseriously was this belief held by the Stoics, that a philosopher of the\nunwieldy piety of Cleanthes so far forgot himself as to charge\nAristarchus of Samoa, the discoverer of the earth\u2019s motion round the\nsun, the Galil\u00e6o of antiquity, with impiety for wishing to remove the\nhearth of the universe from its proper place. [906] This deification of\nthe stars prepares us to find years, months, and seasons called Gods,\n[907] as was done by Zeno, or at least by his School. Yet, it must be\nremembered, that the Stoics referred these times and seasons to\nheavenly bodies, as their material embodiments. [908]\n\nAs the stars are the first manifestation, so the elements are the first\nparticular forms of the Divine Being, and the most common materials for\nthe exercise of the divine powers. It is, however, becoming that the\nall-pervading divine mind should not only be honoured in its primary\nstate, but likewise in its various derivate forms, as air, water,\nearth, and elementary fire. [909]\n\nAll other things, too, which, by their utility to man, display in a\nhigh degree the beneficent power of God, appeared to the Stoics to\ndeserve divine honours, such honours not being paid to the things\nthemselves, but to the powers active within them. They did not,\ntherefore, hesitate to give the names of Gods to fruits and wine, and\nother gifts of the Gods. [910]\n\nHow, then, could they escape the inference that among other beneficent\nbeings, the heroes of antiquity in particular deserve religious\nhonours, seeing that in these benefactors of mankind, whom legend\ncommemorates, the Divine Spirit did not show Himself under the lower\nform of a \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, as in the elements, nor yet as simple \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, as in\nplants, but as a rational soul? Such deified men had, according to the\nStoic view\u2014which, on this point, agrees with the well-known theory of\nEuemerus\u2014greatly helped to swell the number of the popular Gods; nor\nhad the Stoics themselves any objection to their worship. [911] Add to\nthis the personification of human qualities and states of mind, [912]\nand it will be seen what ample opportunity the Stoics had for\nrecognising everywhere in nature and in the world of man divine\nagencies and powers, and, consequently, Gods in the wider sense of the\nterm. [913] When once it is allowed that the name of God may be\ndiverted from the Being to whom it properly belongs and applied, in a\nderivative sense, to what is impersonal and a mere manifestation of\ndivine power, the door is opened to everything; and, with such\nconcessions, the Stoic system could graft into itself even exceptional\nforms of polytheism.\n\n\n\n[(4) Doctrine of demons.]\n\nWith the worship of heroes is also connected the doctrine of demons.\n[914] The soul, according to the Stoic view already set forth, is of\ndivine origin, a part of and emanation from God. Or, distinguishing\nmore accurately in the soul one part from the rest, divinity belongs to\nreason only, as the governing part. Now, since reason alone protects\nman from evil and conducts him to happiness\u2014this, too, was the popular\nbelief\u2014reason may be described as the guardian spirit, or demon, in\nman. Not only by the younger members of the Stoic School, by\nPosidonius, Seneca, Epictetus, and Antoninus, are the popular notions\nof demons, as by Plato aforetime, [915] explained in this sense, [916]\nbut the same method is pursued by Chrysippus, who made \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, or\nhappiness, consist in a harmony of the demon in man (which, in this\ncase, can only be his own will and understanding) with the will of God.\n[917] Little were the Stoics aware that, by such explanations, they\nwere attributing to popular notions a meaning wholly foreign to them.\nBut it does not therefore follow that they shared the popular belief in\nguardian spirits. [918] Their system, however, left room for believing\nthat, besides the human soul and the spirits of the stars, other\nrational souls might exist, having a definite work to perform in the\nworld, subject to the law of general necessity, and knit into the chain\nof cause and effect. Nay, more, such beings might seem to them\nnecessary for the completeness of the universe. [919] What reason have\nwe, then, to express doubt, when we are told that the Stoics believed\nin the existence of demons, playing a part in man and caring for him?\n[920] Is there anything extraordinary, from the Stoic platform, in\nholding that some of these demons are by nature inclined to do harm,\nand that these tormentors are used by the deity for the punishment of\nthe wicked, [921] especially when in such a strict system of necessity\nthese demons could only work, like the powers of nature, conformably\nwith the laws of the universe and without disturbing those laws,\noccupying the same ground as lightning, earthquakes, and drought? And\nyet the language of Chrysippus, when speaking of evil demons who\nneglect the duties entrusted to them, [922] sounds as though it were\nonly figurative and tentative language, not really meant. Besides, the\nlater Stoics made themselves merry over the Jewish and Christian\nnotions of demons and demoniacal possession. [923]\n\n\n\n\n[B. The Allegorising Spirit.]\n\nEven without accepting demons, there were not wanting in the Stoic\nsystem points with which the popular beliefs could be connected, if it\nwas necessary to find in these beliefs some deeper meaning. It mattered\nnot that these beliefs were often so distorted in the process of\naccommodation as to be no\n\n\n\n[(1) Allegorical interpretation of myths.]\n\nlonger recognised. The process required a regular code of\ninterpretation by means of which a philosophic mind could see its own\nthoughts in the utterances of commonplace thinkers. By the Stoics, as\nby their Jewish and Christian followers, this code of interpretation\nwas found in the method of allegorical interpretation\u2014a method which\nreceived a most extended application, in order to bridge over the gulf\nbetween the older and the more modern types of culture. [924] Zeno, and\nstill more Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and their successors, sought to\ndiscover natural principles and moral ideas\u2014the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, or\nphysic\u00e6 rationes,\u2014in the Gods of popular belief and the stories of\nthese Gods, [925] and supposed that such principles and ideas were\nrepresented in these stories in a sensuous form. [926] In this attempt,\nthey clung to the poems of Homer and Hesiod, the Bible of the Greeks,\n[927] without, however, excluding other mythology from the sphere of\ntheir investigation. One chief instrument which they, and modern lovers\nof the symbolical following in their footsteps, employed was a\ncapricious playing with etymologies of which so many instances are on\nrecord. [928] Like most allegorisers, they also laid down certain\nprinciples of interpretation sensible enough theoretically, [929] but\nproving, by the use which was made of them, that their scientific\nappearance was only a blind to conceal the most capricious vagaries.\nApproaching in some of their explanations to the original bases of\nmythological formation, they were still unable to shake off the curious\nnotion that the originators of myths, fully conscious of all their\nlatent meanings, had framed them as pictures to appeal to the senses;\n[930] and, in innumerable cases, they resorted to explanations so\nentirely without foundation that they would have been impossible to\nanyone possessing a sound view of nature and the origin of legends. To\nmake theory tally with practice, the founder of the School\u2014following\nAntisthenes, and setting an example afterwards repeated by both Jews\nand Christians\u2014maintained that Homer only in some places expressed\nhimself according to truth, in others according to popular opinion.\n[931] Thus did Stoicism surround itself with the necessary instruments\nfor the most extended allegorical and dogmatic interpretation.\n\n\n\n[(2) Interpretation of the myths respecting the gods.]\n\nProceeding further to enquire how this method was applied to particular\nstories, the first point which attracts attention is the contrast which\nthey draw between Zeus and the remaining Gods. From their belief in one\ndivine principle everywhere at work, it followed as a corollary that\nthis contrast, which elsewhere in Greek mythology is only a difference\nof degree, was raised to a specific and absolute difference. Zeus was\ncompared to other Gods as an incorruptible God to transitory divine\nbeings. To the Stoics, as to their predecessor Heraclitus, Zeus is the\none primary Being, who has engendered, and again absorbs into himself,\nall things and all Gods. He is the universe as a unity, the primary\nfire, the ether, the spirit of the world, the universal reason, the\ngeneral law or destiny. [932] All other Gods, as being parts of the\nworld, are only parts and manifestations of Zeus\u2014only special names of\nthe one God who has many names. [933] That part of Zeus which goes over\ninto air is called Here (\u1f00\u03ae\u03c1); and its lower strata, full of vapours,\nHades; that which becomes elementary fire is called Heph\u00e6stus; that\nwhich becomes water, Poseidon; that which becomes earth, Demeter,\nHestia, and Rhea; lastly, that portion which remains in the upper\nregion is called Athene in the more restricted sense. And since,\naccording to the Stoics, the finer elements are the same as spirit,\nZeus is not only the soul of the universe, but Athene, Reason,\nIntelligence, Providence. [934] The same Zeus appears in other respects\nas Hermes, Dionysus, Hercules. [935] The Homeric story of the binding\nand liberation of Zeus [936] points to the truth, already established\nin Providence, that the order of the world rests on the balance of the\nelements. The rise and succession of the elements is symbolised in the\nhanging of Here; [937] the arrangement of the spheres of the universe,\nin the golden chain by which the Olympians thought to pull down Zeus.\n[938] The lameness of Heph\u00e6stus goes partly to prove the difference of\nthe earthly from the heavenly fire, and partly implies that earthly\nfire can as little do without wood as the lame can do without a wooden\nsupport; and if, in Homer, Heph\u00e6stus is hurled down from heaven, the\nmeaning of the story is, that in ancient times men lighted their fires\nby lightning from heaven and the rays of the sun. [939] The connection\nof Here with Zeus [940] points to the relation of the ether to the air\nsurrounding it; and the well-known occurrence on Mount Ida was referred\nto the same event. [941] The still more offensive scene in the Samian\npicture was expounded by Chrysippus as meaning that the fertilising\npowers (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76) of God are brought to bear upon matter.\n[942] A similar meaning is found by Heraclitus in the story of Proteus,\n[943] and in that of the shield of Achilles. If Heph\u00e6stus intended this\nshield to be a representation of this world, what else is thereby meant\nbut that, by the influence of primary fire, matter has been shaped into\na world? [944]\n\nIn a similar way, the Homeric theomachy was explained by many to mean a\nconjunction of the seven planets, which would involve the world in\ngreat trouble. [945] Heraclitus, however, gives the preference to an\ninterpretation, half physical and half moral, which may have been\nalready advanced by Cleanthes. [946] Ares and Aphrodite, rashness and\nprofligacy, are opposed by Athene, or prudence; Leto, forgetfulness, is\nattacked by Hermes, the revealing word; [947] Apollo, the sun, by\nPoseidon, the God of the water, with whom, however, he comes to terms,\nbecause the sun is fed by the vapours of the water; Artemis, the moon,\nis opposed by Here, the air, through which it passes, and which often\nobscures it; Fluvius, or earthly water, by Heph\u00e6stus, or earthly fire.\n[948] That Apollo is the sun, and Artemis the moon, no one doubts;\n[949] nor did it cause any difficulty to these mythologists to find the\nmoon also in Athene. [950] Many subtle discussions were set on foot by\nthe Stoics respecting the name, the form, and the attributes of these\nGods, particularly by Cleanthes, for whom the sun had particular\nimportance, [951] as being the seat of the power which rules the world.\n[952] The stories of the birth of the Lotoides and the defeat of the\ndragon Pytho are, according to Antipater, symbolical of events which\ntook place at the formation of the world, and the creation of the sun\nand moon. [953] Others find in the descent of two Gods from Leto the\nsimpler thought, that sun and moon came forth out of darkness. [954] In\nthe same spirit, Heraclitus, without disparaging the original meaning\nof the story, sees in the swift-slaying arrows of Apollo a picture of\ndevastating pestilence; [955] but then, in an extraordinary manner,\nmisses the natural sense, in gathering from the Homeric story of\nApollo\u2019s reconciliation (Il. i. 53) the lesson, that Achilles stayed\nthe plague by the medical science which Chiron had taught him. [956]\n\nFar more plausible is the explanation given of the dialogue of Athene\nwith Achilles, and of Hermes with Ulysses. These dialogues are stated\nto be simply soliloquies of the two heroes respectively. [957] But the\nStoic skill in interpretation appears in its fullest glory in supplying\nthe etymological meanings of the various names and epithets which are\nattributed to Athene. [958] We learn, for instance, that the name\n\u03a4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 refers to the three divisions of philosophy. [959]\nHeraclitus discovers the same divisions in the three heads of Cerberus.\n[960] Chrysippus, in a diffuse manner, proves that the coming forth of\nthe Goddess from the head of Zeus is not at variance with his view of\nthe seat of reason. [961] It has been already observed that Dionysus\nmeans wine, and Demeter fruit; [962] but, just as the latter was taken\nto represent the earth and its nutritious powers, [963] so Dionysus was\nfurther supposed to stand for the principle of natural life, the\nproductive and sustaining breath of life; [964] and since this breath\ncomes from the sun, according to Cleanthes, it was not difficult to\nfind the sun represented by the God of wine. [965] Moreover, the\nstories of the birth of Dionysus, his being torn to pieces by Titans,\nhis followers, [966] no less than the rape of Proserpine, [967] and the\ninstitution of agriculture, [968] and the names of the respective Gods,\nafforded ample material for the interpreting tastes of the Stoics.\n\nThe Fates (\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9), as their name already indicates, stand for the\nrighteous and invariable rule of destiny; [969] the Graces (\u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2),\nas to whose names, number, and qualities Chrysippus has given the\nfullest discussion, [970] represent the virtues of benevolence and\ngratitude; [971] the Muses, the divine origin of culture. [972] Ares is\nwar; [973] Aphrodite, unrestrained passion, or, more generally, absence\nof control. [974] Other interpreters, and among them Empedocles,\nconsider Ares to represent the separating, Aphrodite the uniting, power\nof nature. [975] The stories of the two deities being wounded by\nDiomedes, [976] of their adulterous intrigues, and their being bound by\nHeph\u00e6stus, [977] are explained in various ways\u2014morally, physically,\ntechnically, and historically.\n\nIn the case of another God, Pan, the idea of the Allnear was suggested\nsimply by the name. His shaggy goat\u2019s feet were taken to represent the\nsolid earth, and the human form of his upper limbs implied that the\nsovereign power in the world resides above. [978] To the Stoic without\na misgiving as to these and similar explanations, [979] it was a matter\nof small difficulty to make the Titan \u1f38\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 stand for language or\n\u1f38\u03ac\u03c6\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, and \u039a\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 for quality or \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2. [980] Add to this the many\nmore or less ingenious explanations of the well-known stories of Uranos\nand Cronos, [981] and we are still far from having exhausted the\nresources of the Stoic explanations of mythology. The most important\nattempts of this kind have, however, been sufficiently noticed.\n\n\n\n[(3) Allegory applied to heroic myths.]\n\nBesides the legends of the Gods, the legends of the heroes attracted\nconsiderable attention in the Stoic Schools. Specially were the persons\nof Hercules and Ulysses singled out for the sake of illustrating the\nideal of the wise man. [982] But here, too, various modes of\ninterpretation meet and cross. According to Cornutus, [983] the God\nHercules must be distinguished from the hero of the same name\u2014the God\nbeing nothing less than Reason, ruling in the world without a superior;\n[984] and the grammarian makes every effort to unlock with this key his\nhistory and attributes. Nevertheless, with all his respect for\nCleanthes, [985] he could not accept that Stoic\u2019s explanation of the\ntwelve labours of Hercules. Heraclitus has probably preserved the chief\npoints in this explanation. Hercules is a teacher of mankind, initiated\ninto the heavenly wisdom. He overcomes the wild boar, the lion, and the\nbull, i.e. the lusts and passions of men; he drives away the deer, i.e.\ncowardice; he purifies the stall of Augeas from filth, i.e. he purifies\nthe life of men from extravagances; he frightens away the birds, i.e.\nempty hopes; and burns to ashes the many-headed hydra of pleasure. He\nbrings the keeper of the nether world to light, with his three\nheads\u2014these heads representing the three chief divisions of philosophy.\nIn the same way, the wounding of Here and Hades by Hercules is\nexplained. Here, the Goddess of the air, represents the fog of\nignorance, the three-barbed arrow undeniably (so thought the Stoics)\npointing to philosophy, with its threefold division, in its heavenly\nflight. The laying prostrate of Hades by that arrow implies that\nphilosophy has access even to things most secret. [986] The Odyssey is\nexplained by Heraclitus in the same strain, nor was he apparently the\nfirst so to do. [987] In Ulysses you behold a pattern of all virtues,\nand an enemy of all vices. [988] He flees from the country of the\nLotophagi, i.e. from wicked pleasures; he stays the wild rage of the\nCyclopes; he calms the winds, having first secured a prosperous passage\nby his knowledge of the stars; the attractions of pleasure in the house\nof Circe he overcomes, penetrates into the secrets of Hades, learns\nfrom the Sirens the history of all times, saves himself from the\nCharybdis of profligacy and the Scylla of shamelessness, and, in\nabstaining from the oxen of the sun, overcomes sensuous desires. Such\nexplanations may suffice to show how the whole burden of the myths was\nresolved into allegory by the Stoics, how little they were conscious of\nfoisting in foreign elements, and how they degraded to mere symbols of\nphilosophical ideas those very heroes on whose real existence they\ncontinually insisted.\n\n\n\n\n[C. Prophetic powers.]\n\nThe Stoic theology has engaged a good deal of our attention, not only\nbecause it is instructive to compare their views, in general and in\ndetail, with similar views advanced nowadays, but also because it forms\na very characteristic and important part of their entire system. To us,\nmuch of it appears to be a mere worthless trifling; but, to the Stoics,\nthese explanations were solemnly earnest. To them they seemed to be the\nonly means of rescuing the people\u2019s faith, of meeting the severe\ncharges brought against tradition and the works of the poets, on which\na Greek had been fed from infancy. [989] Unable to break entirely with\nthese traditions, they still would not sacrifice to them their\nscientific and moral convictions. Can we, then, wonder that they\nattempted the impossible, and sought to unite contradictions? or that\nsuch an attempt landed them in forced and artificial methods of\ninterpretation?\n\n\n\n[(1) Divination.]\n\nIllustrative of the attitude of the Stoics towards positive religion\nare their views on divination. [990] The importance attached by them to\nthe prophetic art appears in the diligence which the chiefs of this\nSchool devoted to discussing it. The ground for the later teaching\nhaving been prepared by Zeno and Cleanthes, Chrysippus gave the\nfinishing touch to the Stoic dogmas on the subject. [991] Particular\ntreatises respecting divination were drawn up by Sph\u00e6rus, Diogenes,\nAntipater, and, last of all, by Posidonius. [992] The subject was also\nfully treated by Bo\u00ebthus, and by Pan\u00e6tius from a somewhat different\nside. [993] The common notions as to prognostics and oracles could not\ncommend themselves to these philosophers, nor could they approve of\ncommon soothsaying. In a system so purely based on nature as theirs,\n[994] the supposition that God works for definite ends after the manner\nof men, exceptionally announcing to one or the other a definite\nresult\u2014in short, the marvellous\u2014was out of place. But to infer\nthence\u2014as their opponents, the Epicureans, did\u2014that the whole art of\ndivination is a delusion, was more than the Stoics could do. The belief\nin an extraordinary care of God for individual men was too comforting\nan idea for them to renounce; [995] they not only appealed to\ndivination as the strongest proof of the existence of Gods and the\ngovernment of Providence, [996] but they also drew the converse\nconclusion, that, if there be Gods, there must also be divination,\nsince the benevolence of the Gods would not allow them to refuse to\nmankind so inestimable a gift. [997] The conception of destiny, too,\nand the nature of man, appeared to Posidonius to lead to the belief in\ndivination; [998] if all that happens is the outcome of an unbroken\nchain of cause and effect, there must be signs indicating the existence\nof causes, from which certain effects result; [999] and if the soul of\nman is in its nature divine, it must also possess the capacity, under\ncircumstances, of observing what generally escapes its notice. [1000]\nLest, however, the certainty of their belief should suffer from lacking\nthe support of experience, the Stoics had collected a number of\ninstances of verified prophecies; [1001] but with so little\ndiscrimination, that we should only wonder at their credulity, did we\nnot know the low state of historical criticism in their time, and the\nreadiness with which, in all ages, men believe whatever agrees with\ntheir prejudices. [1002]\n\nIn what way, then, can the two facts be combined\u2014the belief in\nprophecy, on the one hand, and, on the other, the denial of unearthly\nomens arising [(2) Prophecy explained by a reference to natural\ncauses.] from an immediate divine influence? In answering this\nquestion, the Stoics adopted the only course which their system\nallowed. The marvellous, which, as such, they could not admit, was\nreferred to natural laws, [1003] from which it was speculatively\ndeduced. The admirable Pan\u00e6tius is the only Stoic who is reported to\nhave maintained the independence of his judgment by denying omens,\nprophecy, and astrology. [1004] Just as in modern times Leibnitz and so\nmany others both before and after him thought to purge away from the\nmarvellous all that is accidental and superhuman, and to find in\nwonders links in the general chain of natural causes, so, too, the\nStoics, by assuming a natural connection between the token and its\nfulfilment, made an effort to rescue omens and divination, and to\nexplain portents as the natural symptoms of certain occurrences. [1005]\nNor did they confine themselves to cases in which the connection\nbetween the prophecy and the event can be proved. [1006] They insisted\nupon divination in cases in which it cannot possibly be verified. The\nflight of birds and the entrails of victims are stated to be natural\nindications of coming events; and there is said to be even a formal\nconnection between the positions of the stars and the individuals born\nunder those positions. [1007] If it is urged, that in this case omens\nmust be far more numerous than they are supposed to be, the Stoics\nanswered, that omens are countless, but that only the meaning of a few\nis known to men. [1008] If the question is asked, how is it that, in\npublic sacrifices, the priest should always offer those very animals\nwhose entrails contain omens, Chrysippus and his followers did not\nhesitate to affirm that the same sympathy which exists between objects\nand omens also guides the sacrificer in the choice of a victim. [1009]\nAnd yet so bald was this hypothesis, that they had, at the same time, a\nsecond answer in reserve, viz. that the corresponding change in the\nentrails did not take place until the victim had been chosen. [1010] In\nsupport of such views, their only appeal was to the almighty power of\nGod; but, in making this appeal, the deduction of omens from natural\ncauses was at an end. [1011]\n\nThe Stoics could not altogether suppress a suspicion that an\nunchangeable predestination of all events has rendered individual\nactivity superfluous, [1012] nor meet the objection [1013] that, on the\nhypothesis of necessity, divination itself is unnecessary. [1014] They\nquieted themselves, however, with the thought that divination, and the\nactions resulting from divination, are included among the causes\nforeordained by destiny. [1015]\n\n\n\n[(3) Causes of divination.]\n\nDivination, or soothsaying, consists in the capacity to read and\ninterpret omens; [1016] and this capacity is, according to the Stoics,\npartly a natural gift, and partly acquired by art and study. [1017] The\nnatural gift of prophecy is based, as other philosophers had already\nlaid down, [1018] on the relationship of the human soul to God. [1019]\nSometimes it manifests itself in sleep, at other times in ecstasy.\n[1020] A taste for higher revelations will be developed, in proportion\nas the soul is withdrawn from the world of sense, and from all thought\nrespecting things external. [1021] The actual cause of the prophetic\ngift was referred to influences coming to the soul partly from God or\nthe universal spirit diffused throughout the world, [1022] and partly\nfrom the souls which haunt the air or demons. [1023] External causes,\nhowever, contribute to put people in a state of enthusiasm. [1024]\n\nArtificial prophesying, or the art of foretelling the future, depends\nupon observation and guess-work. [1025] One who could survey all causes\nin their effects on one another would need no observation. Such a one\nwould be able to deduce the whole series of events from the given\ncauses. But God alone is able to do this. Hence men must gather the\nknowledge of future events from the indications by which their coming\nis announced. [1026] These indications may be of every variety; and\nhence all possible forms of foretelling the future were allowed by the\nStoics; the inspection of entrails, divination by lightning and other\nnatural phenomena, by the flight of birds, and omens of every kind.\n[1027] Some idea of the mass of superstition which the Stoics admitted\nand encouraged may be gathered from the first book of Cicero\u2019s treatise\non divination. The explanation of these omens being, however, a matter\nof skill, individuals in this, as in every other art, may often go\nwrong in their interpretation. [1028] To make sure against mistakes\ntradition is partly of use, since it establishes by manifold\nexperiences the meaning of each omen; [1029] and the moral state of the\nprophet is quite as important for scientifically foretelling the future\nas for the natural gift of divination. Purity of heart is one of the\nmost essential conditions of prophetic success.\n\nIn all these questions the moral character of Stoic piety is ever to\nthe fore, and great pains were taken by the Stoics to bring their\nbelief in prophecy into harmony with their philosophic view of the\nworld. Nevertheless, it is clear that success could not be theirs\neither in making this attempt, or indeed in dealing with any other\nparts of the popular belief. Struggling with indefatigable zeal in an\nattempt so hopeless, they proved at least the sincerity of their wish\nto reconcile religion and philosophy; but they also disclosed by these\nendeavours a misgiving that science, which had put on so bold a face,\nwas not in itself sufficient, but needed support from the traditions of\nreligion, and from a belief in divine revelations. [1030] Probably we\nshall not be far wrong in referring to this practical need the seeming\nvagaries of men like Chrysippus, who, with the clearest intellectual\npowers, could be blind to the folly of the methods they adopted in\ndefending untenable and antiquated opinions. These vagaries show in\nStoicism practical interests preponderating over science. They also\nestablish the connection of Stoicism with Schools which doubted\naltogether the truth of the understanding, and thought to supplement it\nby divine revelations. Thus the Stoic theory of divination leads\ndirectly to the Neopythagorean and Neoplatonic doctrine of revelation.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nTHE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS HISTORICAL POSITION.\n\n\n[A. Inner connection of the Stoic system.]\n\nHaving now investigated the Stoic system in detail, we are in a\nposition to pass a definite judgment on the scope of the Stoic\nphilosophy, the import and the relation of its various parts, and its\nhistorical position. Its peculiar character manifests itself before all\nthings in the three points to which attention was drawn at the outset:\n[1031]\u2014its pre-eminently practical tone, the determination of this\npractical tendency by the notions of the good and of virtue, and the\nuse of logic and natural science as a scientific basis. Speculative\nknowledge is not, as we have seen, to the Stoics an end in itself, but\nonly a means for producing a right moral attitude; all philosophical\nresearch stands directly or indirectly in the service of virtue. Both\nin the earlier and in the later days of its existence the Stoic School\nadvocated this principle in the most determined and exclusive manner,\nnor was it even denied by Chrysippus, the chief representative of its\nscience and learning.\n\n\n\n[(1) Ethical side of Stoicism.]\n\nIf it be then asked what is the right moral attitude, the Stoics reply:\naction conformable to nature and reason\u2014in other words, virtue. Virtue,\nhowever, implies two things. On the one hand it implies the resignation\nof the individual to the universe, obedience to the universal law; on\nthe other hand it implies the harmony of man with himself, the dominion\nof the higher over the lower nature, of reason over emotion, and the\nrising superior to everything which does not belong to his true nature.\nBoth statements may be reconciled, because the law of morality is\naddressed only to reasonable beings, and is the law of their nature,\nand can only be carried into execution by their own exertions. Still,\nin the Stoic ethics, two currents of thought may be clearly\ndistinguished, which from time to time come into actual collision; the\none requiring the individual to live for the common good and for\nsociety, the other impelling him to live for himself only, to\nemancipate himself from all that is not himself, and to console himself\nwith the feeling of virtue. The first of these tendencies impels man to\nseek the society of others; the second enables him to dispense with it.\nFrom the former spring the virtues of justice, sociability, love of\nman; from the latter, the inner freedom and happiness of the virtuous\nman. The former culminates in citizenship of the world; the latter in\nthe self-sufficingness of the wise man. In as far as virtue includes\neverything that can be required of man, happiness depends on it alone;\nnothing is good but virtue, nothing is evil but vice; all that is not\nconnected with the moral nature is indifferent. On the other hand, in\nas far as virtue is based on human nature, it stands on the same\nfooting with all else that is conformable with nature. If its own\npeculiar value cannot be surrendered, no more can it be required that\nwe should be indifferent to its conformity to nature, that it should\nnot have for us some positive or negative value, or in some way affect\nour feelings. Therewith the doctrine of things indifferent and the wise\nman\u2019s freedom from emotions begins to totter. Lastly, if we look at the\nway in which virtue exists in man, we arrive at different results,\naccording as we look at its essence or its manifestation. Virtue\nconsists in acting conformably with reason, and reason is one and\nundivided; hence it appears that virtue forms an undivided unity, and\nmust be possessed whole and entire or not at all. From this proposition\nthe contrast of the wise and foolish man, with all its bluntness and\nextravagances, is only a legitimate consequence. Or, again, if we look\nat the conditions upon which, owing to human nature, the acquisition\nand possession of virtue depends, the conviction is inevitable that the\nwise man as drawn by the Stoics never occurs in reality. Hence the\nconclusion is undeniable that the contrast between wise men and fools\nis more uncertain than it at first appeared to be. Thus all the main\nfeatures of the Stoic ethics may be simply deduced from their one\nfundamental notion, that rational action or virtue is the only good.\n\n\n\n[(2) Scientific side of the Stoic system.]\n\nNot only does this view of ethics require a peculiar theory of the\nworld to serve as its scientific basis, but it has a reflex action\nalso, influencing alike the tone and the results of theoretic enquiry.\nIf the duty of man is declared to consist in bringing his actions into\nharmony with the laws of the universe, it becomes also necessary that\nhe should endeavour himself to know the world and its laws. The more\nhis knowledge of the world increases, the greater will be the value\nwhich he attaches to the forms of scientific procedure. If, moreover,\nman is required to be nothing more than an instrument of the universal\nlaw, it is only consistent to suppose an absolute regularity of\nprocedure in the universe, an unbroken connection of cause and effect,\nand ultimately to refer everything to one highest all-moving cause, and\nto include everything under one primary substance. If in human life the\nindividual has no rights as against the laws of the universe, then all\nthat is of individual occurrence in the world is powerless against\nuniversal necessity. On the other hand, if in the case of man\neverything turns upon strength of will, then likewise in the universe\nthe acting power must be regarded as the highest and most exalted.\nThere arises thus that view of the world as a series of forces which\nconstitutes one of the most peculiar and thorough-going characteristics\nof the Stoic view of nature. [1032] Lastly, if such excessive\nimportance is attached to practical conduct as is done by the Stoics,\nthat sensuous view of the world which finds its crudest expression in\nthe Stoic Materialism and reliance on the senses, [1033] will most\nnearly accord with speculation. At the same time the Materialism of the\nStoics is limited and corrected by the conception of the universe and\nof a divine all-penetrating power and reason, just as their appeal to\nthe senses is by the demand for the formation of conceptions, and the\ngeneral application of the process of demonstration; the truth of\nknowledge itself is based on a practical postulate, the greater or less\ncertainty of which is measured by the strength of personal conviction.\nIf these elements proved too contradictory to be harmonised; if the\nMaterialism of the Stoics was at variance with their view of the world\nas a series of forces; if appeals to the senses were obviously in\nconflict with logical method, it was at least thereby clearly\nestablished that a practical and not a purely intellectual interest lay\nat the root of their system.\n\n\n\n[(3) Connection of the moral and scientific elements.]\n\nThis statement must of course not be taken to mean that the Stoics\nfirst developed their ethical principles independently of their theory\nof the universe, and afterwards brought the two into connection with\neach other. On the contrary, it was by the peculiar connection of\ntheory and practice that Stoicism itself first came into existence. The\nleading thought of Zeno consists in the attempt to vindicate the\nsupremacy of virtue by a scientific knowledge of the laws of the world;\nand he becomes the founder of a new School only by bringing to Cynicism\nthose scientific ideas and aims which he had learned himself in the\nSchool of Polemo, Stilpo, and Diodorus, or otherwise gathered from a\nstudy of ancient philosophy. These elements are not therefore\naccidentally brought together in Stoicism, but they are co-extensive,\nand dependent one upon the other. As in the natural science and theory\nof knowledge of the Stoics, the experimental basis on which their\nsystem was built may be easily seen, so the peculiar development of\ntheir ethics supposes all those positions respecting the universe and\nthe powers therein at work, which form the most important part of their\nnatural science. Only by a scientific treatment of this kind was\nStoicism at all able to improve upon the imperfection of the Cynic\nethics, so far at least as it really did so, and to accommodate itself\nto the wants of human nature, so far as to be able to exercise an\ninfluence at large. Upon this union of ethics and metaphysics that\nreligious attitude of the Stoic system reposes, to which it owes in a\ngreat measure its historical importance. Thereby it occupies so\ninfluential a position in an age in which intellectual power was indeed\ndeclining, but in which the interest for science was keen. But that\nStoic physics and metaphysics should have adopted this line, and no\nother; that Zeno and his followers, who draw on former systems for\ntheir own on the most extensive scale, should have borrowed from these\nsystems these and no other positions, and expanded them in this and no\nother direction; these results are, doubtless, ultimately due to their\nmoral attitude. All that bore on the subject of ethics, and supported\nit, they appropriated; all that was opposed thereto they rejected. The\nStoic system as such owes its rise to a union of ethical and\nspeculative elements, in which both were more definitely determined by\none another; still the ethical platform is the one on which its\nformation commences, and which primarily determined its course and\nresults.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Relation of Stoicism to previous systems.]\n\n[(1) Its relation to Socrates and the Cynics.]\n\nIn order to obtain a more accurate notion of the rise of Stoicism, the\npremises on which it proceeds, and the grounds on which it is based, we\nmust take a glance at its relation to preceding systems. The Stoics\nthemselves deduced their philosophical pedigree directly from\nAntisthenes, and indirectly from Socrates. [1034] Clear as is their\nconnection with both these philosophers, it would nevertheless be a\nmistake to regard their teaching as a revival of Cynicism, still more\nto regard it as a simple following of Socrates. From both it\nundoubtedly borrowed much. The self-sufficiency of virtue, the\ndistinction of things good, evil, and indifferent, the ideal picture of\nthe wise man, the whole withdrawal from the outer world within the\nprecincts of the mind, and the strength of moral will, are ideas taken\nfrom the Cynics. In the spirit of Cynicism, too, it explained general\nideas as simply names. Not to mention many peculiarities of ethics, the\ncontrasting of one God with the many popular Gods, and the allegorical\nexplanation of myths, were likewise points borrowed from Cynicism. The\nidentification of virtue with intelligence, the belief that virtue was\none, and could be imparted by teaching, were at once in the spirit of\nSocrates and also in that of the Cynics. The argument for the existence\nof God based on the subordination of means to ends, the whole view of\nthe world as a system of means and ends, and the Stoic theory of\nProvidence, are views peculiarly Socratic; [1035] and the Stoics\nfollowed Socrates in ethics by identifying the good and the useful.\n\nAnd yet the greatness of the interval which separates the Stoics even\nfrom the Cynics becomes at once apparent on considering the relation of\nAristo to the rest of the Stoic School. In refusing to meddle with\nnatural or mental science, or even with ethical considerations at all,\nAristo faithfully reflects the principles of Antisthenes. In asserting\nthe unity of virtue to such an extent that all virtues are merged in\none, he was only repeating similar expressions of Antisthenes. In\ndenying any difference in value to things morally indifferent, and in\nplacing the highest morality in this indifference, he was, according to\nthe older writers, reasserting a Cynic tenet. [1036] Conversely in\ndenying these statements, as the great majority of Stoics did, the\npoints are indicated in which Stoicism differed from Cynicism. [1037]\nIn the feeling of moral independence, and in invincible strength of\nwill, the Cynic is opposed to the whole world; he needs for virtue no\nscientific knowledge of the world and its laws; he regards nothing\nexternal to himself; he allows nothing to influence his conduct, and\nattaches value to nothing; but, in consequence, he remains with his\nvirtue confined to himself; virtue makes him independent of men and\ncircumstances, but it has neither the will nor the power to interpose\neffectively in the affairs of life, and to infuse therein new moral\nnotions. Stoicism insists upon the self-sufficiency of virtue quite as\nstrongly as Cynicism, and will allow quite as little that anything\nexcept virtue can be a good in the strictest sense of the term. But in\nStoicism the individual is not nearly so sharply opposed to the outer\nworld as in Cynicism. The Stoic is too cultivated; he knows too well\nthat he is a part of the universe to ignore the value of an\nintellectual view of the world, or to neglect the natural conditions of\nmoral action, as things of no moment. What he aims at is not only a\nnegation\u2014independence from externals\u2014but a positive position\u2014life\naccording to nature; and that life only he considers according to\nnature which is in harmony with the laws of the universe as well as\nwith those of human nature. Hence Stoicism is not only far in advance\nof Cynicism by its intellectual attitude, but its moral philosophy also\nbreathes a freer and milder spirit. Let only the principles of the\nStoics on the necessity and value of scientific knowledge be compared\nwith the sophistical assertions of Antisthenes, destructive of all\nknowledge; or the cultivated logical form of the intellectual edifice\nof the Stoics, with the chaotic condition of Cynic thought; or the\ncareful metaphysical and psychological researches and the copious\nlearning of the School of Chrysippus, with the Cynics\u2019 contempt for all\ntheory and all learned research, and it becomes apparent at once how\ndeep-seated is the difference between the two systems, and how little\nStoicism as a philosophic system can be deduced from Cynicism.\n\nIn ethics, too, the difference of the two Schools is also fully\napparent. Stoic morality recognises, at least conditionally, a positive\nand negative value in external things and circumstances; the Cynic\nallows to these absolutely no value. The former forbids affection\ncontrary to reason, the latter any and every kind of affection. [1038]\nThe former throws the individual back upon human society, the latter\nisolates him. The former teaches citizenship of the world in a positive\nsense, requiring all to feel themselves one with their fellow-men; the\nlatter in a negative sense, that of feeling indifferent to home and\nfamily. The former has a pantheistic tone about it, due to the lively\nfeeling of the connection between man and the universe, and a definite\ntheological stamp owing to its taking a stand by positive religion; the\nlatter has a rationalistic character, owing to the enfranchisement of\nthe wise man from the prejudices of popular belief, with which it has\nexclusively to do. In all these respects Stoicism preserves the\noriginal character of the Socratic philosophy far better than Cynicism,\nwhich only caricatured them. Still it departs from that character in\ntwo respects. In point of theory the Stoic doctrine received a\nsystematic form and development such as Socrates never contemplated;\nand in natural science, it cultivated a field avoided by Socrates on\nprinciple, however much its doctrine of Providence, and its view of\nnature as a system of means subordinated to ends, may remind of\nSocrates. On the other hand, interest in science, although limited to\nthe subject of ethics, is with Socrates far deeper and stronger than\nwith the Stoics, the latter pursuing scientific research only as a\nmeans for solving moral problems. Hence the Socratic theory of a\nknowledge of conceptions, simple though it may sound, contained a\nfruitful germ of unexpanded speculation, in comparison with which all\nthat the Stoics did is fragmentary. The Stoic ethics are not only more\nexpanded and more carefully worked out in detail than those of\nSocrates, but they are also more logical in clinging to the principle\nthat virtue alone is an unconditional good. There are no concessions to\ncurrent modes of thought, such as Socrates allowed, who practically\nbased his doctrine of morals upon utility. On the other hand, the moral\nscience of the Stoics also falls far short of the frankness and\ncheerfulness of the Socratic view of life. If in many respects it toned\ndown the asperities of Cynicism, still it appropriated its leading\nprinciples far too unreservedly to avoid accepting a great number of\nits conclusions.\n\nAsking in the next place in how far the Stoics were induced by other\ninfluences to change and extend the platform of the Socratic\nphilosophy, we have for determining the practical side of their system,\nbesides the general tendency of the post-Aristotelian [(2) Relation to\nMegarians and Heraclitus.] philosophy, the example of Cynicism. Its\nspeculative development, on the other hand, is partly connected with\nthe Megarians, partly with Heraclitus; to the Megarians the personal\nconnection of Zeno with Stilpo points, to Heraclitus the fact that from\nhim the Stoics themselves deduced their views on natural science, which\nthey expanded in commentaries on his writings. [1039]\n\n\n[(a) The Megarians.]\n\nProbably the Megarian influence must not be rated too high. Zeno may\nhave thence received an impulse to that reasoning habit which appears\nwith him in a preference for compressed sharp-pointed syllogisms;\n[1040] but in post-Aristotelian times, contact with Megarians was no\nlonger wanted for this, and the greatest reasoner among the Stoics,\nChrysippus, appears not only to have had no personal relations to them,\nbut his logic is throughout a simple continuation of that of Aristotle.\n\n\n[(b) Heraclitus.]\n\nFar greater, and more generally recognised, is the importance of the\ninfluence which the views on nature of the philosopher of Ephesus\nexercised on the Stoics. A system which laid such emphasis on the\nsubordination of everything individual to the law of the universe,\nwhich singled out universal reason from the flux of things as the one\nthing everlastingly and permanently the same\u2014a system in many other\nways so nearly related to their own, must have strongly commended\nitself to their notice, and offered them many points with which to\nconnect their own. If to us the view that life is dependent for its\nexistence on matter is repulsive, it was otherwise to the Stoics; for\nthem this very theory possessed special attractions. Hence, with the\nexception of the threefold division of the elements, there is hardly a\nsingle point in the Heraclitean theory of nature which the Stoics did\nnot appropriate:\u2014fire or ether as the primary element, the oneness of\nthis element with universal reason, the law of the universe, destiny,\nGod, the flux of things, the gradual change of the primary element into\nthe four elements, and of these back to the primary element, the\nregular alternation of creation and conflagration in the world, the\noneness and eternity of the universe, the description of the soul as\nfiery breath, the identification of the mind with the demon, the\nunconditional sovereignty of the universal law over individuals\u2014these\nand many other points in the Stoic system, originally derived from\nHeraclitus, [1041] prove how greatly this system is indebted to him.\n\nNor must it be forgotten that there is nothing in Heraclitus analogous\nto the reasoning forms of the Stoics, nor can their ethical views be\nreferred to his few and undeveloped hints. With all the importance the\nStoics attached to natural science, it is with them only subordinate to\nmoral science; and the very fact that it is referred to Heraclitus as\nits author, proves its inferior position, and the want of any\nindependent interest in the subject. It is also unmistakeable that even\nin natural science the Stoics only partially follow Heraclitus, and\nthat principles taken from Heraclitus often bear an altered meaning\nwhen wrought into the Stoic system. Omitting minor points, not only is\nthe Stoic doctrine of nature in a formal point of view far more\ndeveloped, and with regard to its extension far more comprehensive,\nthan the corresponding doctrine of Heraclitus, but the whole Stoic view\nof the world is by no means so completely identical with his as might\nbe supposed. The flux of things, which the Stoics teach equally with\nHeraclitus, [1042] has not for them that overwhelming importance that\nit had for him. The matter of which the universe consists may be always\ngoing over into new forms, but, at the same time, it is for them the\npermanent material and essence of things. [1043] Individual substances,\ntoo, are treated by the Stoics as corporeally permanent. [1044]\nMoreover, from the material they distinguish the active principle,\nReason or deity, far more definitely than Heraclitus had done, and the\nsame distinction is carried into individual things in the contrast\nbetween matter and quality. Thereby it becomes possible for them to\ncontrast much more sharply than their predecessor had done the reason\nof the world, and the blindly working power of nature. Heraclitus, it\nwould appear, confined his attention to observing nature and describing\nits elementary meteorological processes. But the natural science of the\nStoics includes the idea of means working for ends. It sees the object\nin referring the whole arrangement of the world to man, and it pursues\nthis line of thought exclusively, neglecting in consequence science\nproper. Hence the idea of sovereign reason or the universal law had not\nthe same meaning in the minds of both. Heraclitus sees this reason,\nprimarily and chiefly, in the ordinary sequence of natural phenomena,\nin the regularity of the course by which to each individual phenomenon\nits place in the world, its extent and duration are prescribed\u2014in\nshort, in the unchanging coherence of nature. Without excluding this\naspect in their proofs of the existence of God and the rule of\nProvidence, the Stoics attach the chief importance to the\nserviceableness of the order of nature. The reason which rules the\nworld appears in Heraclitus primarily as a natural power; in the\nStoics, as intelligence working with a purpose. For Heraclitus Nature\nis the highest object, the object of independent and absolute interest;\nand hence the infinite Being is no more than the power which forms the\nworld. The Stoics regard nature from the platform of humanity, as a\nmeans for the wellbeing and activity of man. Their deity accordingly\ndoes not work as a simple power of nature, but essentially as the\nwisdom which cares for the wellbeing of man. The highest conception in\nthe system of Heraclitus is that of nature or destiny. Stoicism\naccepted this conception also, but at the same time developed it to the\nhigher idea of Providence.\n\n\n\n[(3) Connection with Aristotle.]\n\nShall we be wrong if we attribute this modification of the Heraclitean\ntheory of nature by the Stoics partly to the influence of Socrates\u2019 and\nPlato\u2019s theory of final causes, but in a still greater degree to the\ninfluence of the Aristotelian philosophy? To Aristotle belongs properly\nthe idea of matter without qualities, no less than the distinction\nbetween a material and a formal cause. Aristotle applied the idea of\npurpose to natural science far more extensively than any other system\nhad done before; and although the mode in which the Stoics expressed\nthis idea has more resemblance to the popular theological statements of\nSocrates and Plato than to Aristotle, still the Stoic conception of a\nnatural power working with a purpose, such as is contained in the idea\nof artificial fire and \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, is essentially Aristotelian.\nEven many positions which appear to be advanced in opposition to\nAristotle were yet connected with him. Thus the existence of ether as a\nbody distinct from the four elements is denied, and yet in point of\nfact it is asserted under a new name\u2014that of artificial fire. The\nPeripatetic doctrine of the origin of the rational soul is contradicted\nby the Stoic theory of development, and yet the latter is based on a\nstatement in Aristotle to the effect that the germ of the animal soul\nlies in the warm air [1045] which surrounds the seed, warm air which\nAristotle distinguishes from fire quite as carefully as Zeno and\nCleanthes distinguished the two kinds of fire. Even the point of\ngreatest divergence from Aristotelian teaching\u2014the transformation of\nthe human soul and the divine spirit into something corporeal\u2014might yet\nbe connected with Aristotle, and, indeed, the Peripatetic School here\ncomes to their assistance. For had not Aristotle described the ether as\nthe most divine body, the stars formed out of it as divine and happy\nbeings? Had he not brought down the acting and moving forces from a\nheavenly sphere to the region of earth? Had he not, as we have just\nseen, sought the germ of the soul in an ethereal matter? And might not\nothers go a little further and arrive at materialistic views? and all\nthe more so, seeing how hard it is to conceive the extra-mundane\nintelligence of Aristotle, at once as incorporeal, and yet touching and\nencircling the world of matter, and to make personal unity in the human\nsoul accord with an origin in a reason coming from above?\n\nThe way for Stoicism was more directly paved by the Aristotelian\nspeculations as to the origin of notions and conceptions. Here the\nStoics did little more than omit (in conformity with their principles)\nwhat their predecessor had said as to an original possession and\nimmediate knowledge of truth. It has been remarked on an earlier\noccasion how closely their formal logic followed that of Aristotle;\nthey contented themselves with building on Aristotelian foundations,\nand even their additions have more reference to grammar than to logic.\nThe actual influence of Peripatetic views on those of the Stoics\nappears to have been least in the province of ethics. Here the crudity\nof the Stoic conception of virtue, the entire suppression of emotions,\nthe absolute exclusion of everything external from the circle of moral\ngoods, the distinction between the wise and the foolish man, the\nattacks on a purely speculative life, present a sharp contrast to the\ncaution and many-sidedness of Aristotle\u2019s moral theory, to his careful\nweighing of current opinions and their practicability, to his\nrecognition of propriety in every shape and form, and to the praise\nwhich he lavishes on a purely speculative life. What the Stoics chiefly\nowe to Aristotle is the formal treatment of the materials and the\npsychological analysis of individual moral faculties. On the other\nhand, the province of ethics must be looked to for traces of the\nteaching which Zeno received from Polemo, perhaps even from Xenocrates.\n\n\n\n[(4) Connection with Plato.]\n\nThe speculative portions of Plato\u2019s teaching could offer no great\nattractions to practical men and materialists like the Stoics, either\nin their original form or in the form which they assumed in the older\nAcademy under Pythagorean influence. On the other hand, such points in\nPlatonism as the Socratic habit of making knowledge the foundation of\nvirtue, the comparative depreciation of external goods, the\ndisparagement of all that is sensual, the elevation and the purity of\nmoral idealism, and, in the older Academy, the demand for life\naccording to nature, the doctrine of the self-sufficingness of virtue,\nand the growing tendency to confine philosophy to practical issues\u2014all\nthese were questions for a Stoic full of interest. Unfounded as the\nnotion of the later Eclectics is, [1046] that the Stoic and Academician\nsystems of morality were altogether the same, the Stoics, nevertheless,\nappear to have received suggestions from the Academy which they carried\nout in a more determined spirit. Thus the theory of living according to\nnature belongs originally to the Academy, although the Stoics adopted\nit with a peculiar and somewhat different meaning. Besides influencing\nthe moral doctrines of the Stoics, the attitude assumed by the older\nAcademy towards positive religion may also have had some influence on\ntheir orthodoxy; their most prominent representative, Cleanthes, is in\nhis whole philosophic character the counterpart of Xenocrates. Although\nlater in its origin than Stoicism, the new Academy was not without\nimportant influence on that system, through the person of Chrysippus,\nbut this influence was at first only of an indirect kind, inasmuch as\nit obliged the Stoics by its logical contradiction to look about for a\nmore logical basis for their system, and therewith to attempt a more\nsystematic expansion of their teaching. [1047] Somewhat similar is the\neffect of Epicureanism, which by its strong opposition in the field of\nethics imparted decision and accuracy to the Stoic doctrine, and thus\nindirectly helped to form it.\n\n\n\n\n[C. The Stoic philosophy as a whole.]\n\n[(1) Its historical position.]\n\nBy the aid of these remarks it now becomes possible to give a\nsatisfactory account of the history of Stoicism. Belonging to an age of\nmoral debasement and political oppression, its founder, Zeno, conceived\nthe idea of liberating himself and all who were able to follow him from\nits degeneracy and slavery by means of a philosophy which, by purity\nand strength of moral will, would procure independence from all\nexternal things, and unruffled inward peace. That his endeavours should\nhave taken this practical turn, that he should have proposed to himself\nnot knowledge as such, but the moral exercise of knowledge as the\nobject to be realised, was in part due to his own personal character,\nand may be in part referred to the general circumstances of the times.\nOn nobler and more serious minds, these circumstances weighed too\nheavily not to call forth opposition and resistance in place of\nlistless contemplation. The sway of the Macedonian, and afterwards of\nthe Roman Empire, was far too despotic to allow the least prospect of\nopen resistance. Nor must it be overlooked that philosophy itself had\nreached a pass at which satisfactory answers to speculative problems\nwere no longer forthcoming; hence attention was naturally directed to\nquestions of morals.\n\nHaunted by this longing for virtue, Zeno must have felt attracted by a\nsystem of philosophy which had at an earlier period followed a similar\ncourse with marked success, viz. the system of the Cynics, and what he\ndoubtless identified therewith, the old Socratic teaching. [1048]\nAnxious to find a positive meaning and scientific basis for virtue, he\nstrove to appropriate from every system whatever agreed with the bent\nof his own mind. By using all the labours of his predecessors, and\nkeeping his eye steadily fixed upon the practical end of philosophy, he\nsucceeded in forming a new and more comprehensive system, which was\nafterwards completed by Chrysippus. In point of form this system was\nmost indebted to the Peripatetic philosophy; in point of matter, next\nto its debt to the Cynics, which has been already mentioned, its chief\nobligation was to Heraclitus. But the moral theory of the Stoics was as\nlittle identical with that of the Cynics, as the natural science of the\nStoics was with that of Heraclitus. If the divergence was, in the first\ninstance, due to the influence of the Stoic principles, still the\ninfluence of the Peripatetic teaching is unmistakeable in the natural\nand speculative science of the Stoics, and the influence of the Academy\nin their moral science. Stoicism does not, therefore, appear simply as\na continuation of Cynicism, nor yet as an isolated innovation, but,\nlike every other form of thought which marks an epoch, it worked up\ninto itself all previous materials, and produced from their combination\na new result. In this process of assimilation much that was beautiful\nand full of meaning was omitted; everything was absorbed that could be\nof use in the new career on which the Greek mind was about to enter.\n\n\n\n[(2) Its onesidedness.]\n\nIt was the fault of the age that it could no longer come up to the\nmany-sidedness of an Aristotle or a Plato. Stoicism, it is true,\napproximates thereto more nearly than any other of the\npost-Aristotelian systems. But in its practical view of philosophy, in\nits materialistic appeal to the senses, in its theoretical\nself-sufficiency, setting up the wise man as superior to the weaknesses\nand wants of human nature; in its citizenship of the world, throwing\npolitical interests into the background; and in so many other traits it\nis the fit exponent of an epoch in which the taste for purely\nscientific research and the delight in ethical speculation were at an\nend, whilst out of the overthrow of states, and the growth of freedom,\nthe idea of humanity was coming to the fore. Stoicism represented most\npowerfully the moral and religious convictions of such an age, yet not\nwithout onesidedness and exaggeration. By exercise of the will and by\nrational understanding, man is to become free and happy. This aim is,\nhowever, pursued so persistently that the natural conditions of human\nexistence and the claims of individuality are ignored. To man, regarded\nas the exponent of universal law, as little freedom of will is allowed\nby the Stoic natural science in face of the inexorable course of nature\nas freedom of action is allowed by the Stoic ethics in face of the\ndemands of duty. The universal claims of morality are alone\nacknowledged; the right of the individual to act according to his\npeculiar character, and to develop that character, is almost ignored.\nThe individual, as such, dwindles into obscurity, whilst a high place\nin the world is assigned to mankind collectively. The individual is\nsubordinated to the law of the whole; but by regarding nature as a\nsystem of means and ends, and introducing the belief in Providence and\nProphecy, the universe is again subordinated to the interests of man\u2014a\nview against which a more careful research has many objections to urge.\nIn both respects Epicureanism is in decided contrast to Stoicism,\nthough agreeing with it in the general tone of its practical philosophy\nand in its aim to make man independent of the outer world and happy in\nhimself.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPART III.\n\nTHE EPICUREANS.\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nEPICURUS AND THE EPICUREAN SCHOOL. [1049]\n\n\n[A. Epicurus.]\n\nEpicurus, the son of the Athenian Neocles, [1050] was born in Samos\n[1051] in the year 342 or 341 B.C. [1052] His early education appears\nto have been neglected; [1053] and his knowledge of previous\nphilosophic systems was very superficial, even at the time when he\nfirst came forward as an independent teacher. Still he can hardly have\nbeen so entirely self-taught as he wished to appear at a later period\nin life. The names, at least, of the individuals are on record who\ninstructed him in the systems of Democritus and Plato; [1054] and\nalthough it is by no means an ascertained fact that he subsequently\nattended the lectures of Xenocrates, [1055] on the occasion of a visit\nto Athens, [1056] no doubt can be felt that he was acquainted with the\nwritings of previous philosophers, from whom he borrowed important\nparts of his system [1057] and more particularly with those of\nDemocritus.\n\nAfter having been engaged as a teacher in several Schools [1058] in\nAsia Minor, he repaired to Athens about the year 306 B.C., [1059] and\nthere founded a School of his own. [1060] The meeting-place of this\nSchool was the founder\u2019s garden, [1061] and its centre of attraction\nwas the founder himself, around whom a circle of friends gathered, knit\ntogether by a common set of principles, by a common affection for a\nmaster whom they almost worshipped, and by a common enjoyment of\ncultivated society. [1062] Opponents charged the Epicureans with gross\nimpropriety, because they admitted not only women, [1063] but women of\nloose morality, [1064] to this circle of philosophic culture; but in\nthe then state of Greek society, such conduct does not appear\nextraordinary. Here Epicurus laboured for six and thirty years, during\nwhich he succeeded in impressing a stamp on his School which is now\nseen definite and unchanged after the lapse of centuries. In the year\n270 B.C. [1065] he succumbed to disease, the pains and troubles of\nwhich he bore with great fortitude. [1066] Out of the multitude of his\nwritings [1067] only a few have come down to us, and these are for the\nmost part unimportant ones. [1068] On the whole, these fragments [1069]\nbear out the unfavourable opinions which opponents have expressed with\nregard to his style. [1070]\n\n\n\n\n[B. Scholars of Epicurus.]\n\nAmong the numerous scholars of Epicurus [1071] the best known are\nMetrodorus [1072] and Poly\u00e6nus, [1073] both of whom died before their\nmaster; Hermarchus, [1074] upon whom the presidency of the School\ndevolved after the death of Epicurus; [1075] and Colotes, [1076]\nagainst whom Plutarch, four hundred years later, wrote a treatise. Many\nothers are also known, at least by name. [1077] The garden which\nEpicurus in his will left to the School [1078] continued after his\ndeath to be the external rallying-point for his followers. Hermarchus\nwas succeeded by Polystratus, [1079] with whom Hippoclides is also\nmentioned [1080] as joint-president. Hermarchus and Hippoclides were\nsucceeded by Dionysius, and Dionysius again by Basilides. [1081]\nProtarchus of Bargylium, [1082] and his pupil, Demetrius the Laconian,\n[1083] appear to belong to the second century before Christ; but the\ntime in which these philosophers flourished cannot be established with\ncertainty; and the same remark applies to several others whose names\nare on record. [1084]\n\n\n\n\n[C. Epicureans of the Roman period.]\n\nBefore the middle of the second century B.C. Epicureanism is said to\nhave obtained a footing in Rome. [1085] It is certain that it existed\nthere not long afterwards. C. Amafinius is mentioned as the first who\npaved the way for the spread of Epicurean doctrines by discussing them\nin Latin; [1086] and it is stated that these doctrines soon found many\nsupporters, attracted partly by their merits, but more often by the\nsimplicity and the ease with which they could be understood. [1087]\n\nTowards the close of the second century Apollodorus, one of the most\nvoluminous writers on philosophy, taught at Athens. [1088] His pupil,\nZeno of Sidon, the most important among the Epicureans of that age,\nlaboured for a long time successfully, both orally and in writing.\n[1089] About the same time Ph\u00e6drus is heard of in Rome and Athens,\n[1090] and at a little later period Philodemus, [1091] and Syro or\nSciro in Rome, [1092] and Patro, [1093] the successor of Ph\u00e6drus, in\nAthens. The number of Epicureans at Rome, known to us chiefly from\nCicero\u2019s writings, [1094] is not small. No one of them has obtained a\nhigher repute than T. Lucretius Carus. [1095] His poem, carefully\nreproducing the Epicurean notions on natural science, is one of the\nmost valuable sources for the knowledge of their system. Contemporary\nwith Lucretius was the celebrated physician Asclepiades of Bithynia,\n[1096] who resided at Rome, but to judge by the views on nature\nattributed to him, he was no genuine Epicurean, although connected with\nthe Epicurean School. [1097]\n\nIn the following century several supporters of the practical philosophy\nof the Epicureans are known to us, [1098] but no one apparently\napproaching Zeno or Ph\u00e6drus in scientific importance. Rehabilitated\nunder the Antonines by the establishment of a public chair in Athens,\nthe Epicurean School outlived most other systems, and continued to\nexist as late as the fourth century after Christ. [1099]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nCHARACTER AND DIVISIONS OF THE EPICUREAN TEACHING: THE TEST-SCIENCE OF\nTRUTH.\n\n\n[A. Character of Epicurean system.]\n\n[(1) Its power of self-preservation.]\n\nThe scientific value and capacity for development of Epicureanism are\nout of all proportion to its extensive diffusion and the length of time\nduring which it continued to flourish. No other system troubled itself\nso little about the foundation on which it rested; none confined itself\nso exclusively to the utterances of its founder. Such was the dogmatism\nwith which Epicurus propounded his precepts, such the conviction he\nentertained of their excellence, that his pupils were required to\ncommit summaries of them to memory; [1100] and the superstitious\ndevotion for the founder was with his approval [1101] carried to such a\nlength, that on no single point was the slightest deviation from his\ntenets permitted. Although, even in Cicero\u2019s time, the writings of\nEpicurus and Metrodorus found hardly a reader outside the School,\n[1102] yet it is asserted that as late as the first and second\ncenturies after Christ the Epicureans clung tenaciously to their\nmaster\u2019s teaching. [1103] Probably it was easier for an Epicurean than\nfor any other thinker to act thus. Like his master, [1104] he was\nindifferent to the labours of other philosophers, or unable to\nappreciate their merits. [1105] For us this conduct of theirs has one\nadvantage: we can be far more certain that the Epicurean teaching\nreflects that of the founder than we can that this is so in the case of\nthe Stoics. But this philosophical sterility, this mechanical handing\ndown of unchangeable principles, places the intellectual value of\nEpicureanism on the lowest level. The servile dependence of the\nEpicurean School on its founder can neither excuse its mental idleness\nnor recommend a system so powerless to give an independent training to\nits supporters.\n\n\n\n[(2) Aim of philosophy according to the Epicureans.]\n\nThe want of intellectual taste here displayed appears also in the view\ntaken by Epicurus of the aim and business of philosophy. If among the\nStoics the subordination of theory to practice was frequently felt,\namong the Epicureans this subordination was carried to such an extent\nas to lead to a depreciation of all science. The aim of philosophy was,\nwith them, to promote human happiness. Indeed, philosophy is nothing\nelse than an activity helping us to happiness by means of speech and\nthought. [1106] Nor is happiness, according to Epicurus, directly\npromoted by knowledge, but only indirectly in as far as knowledge\nministers to practical needs, or clears away hindrances to their\nattainment. All science which does not serve this end is superfluous\nand worthless. [1107] Epicurus, therefore, despised learning and\nculture, the researches of grammarians, and the lore of historians, and\ndeclared it a piece of good fortune for simplicity of feeling to be\nuncontaminated by learned rubbish. [1108] Nor was his opinion different\nrespecting mathematical science, of which he was wholly ignorant.\n[1109] The calculations of mathematicians, he maintained, are based on\nfalse principles; [1110] at any rate, they contribute nothing to human\nhappiness, and it is therefore useless and foolish to trouble oneself\nabout them. [1111] The theory of music and poetry he likewise found\nexceedingly irksome, although he took pleasure in music itself and the\ntheatre; [1112] and rhetoric, as an artificial guide to eloquence,\nseemed to him as worthless as the show-speeches which are the only\nresult of the study of it. The power of public speaking is a matter of\npractice and of momentary feeling, and hence the skilful speaker is far\nfrom being a good statesman. [1113] The greater part of logical\nenquiries fared no better in his judgment. Himself no logician, he set\nlittle store by logic. Definitions are of no use; the theory of\ndivision and proof may be dispensed with; the philosopher does best to\nconfine himself to words, and to leave all the logical ballast alone.\n[1114] Of all the questions which engrossed the attention of Stoic\nlogicians, one only, the theory of knowledge, was studied by Epicurus,\nand that in a very superficial way. [1115]\n\nFar greater, comparatively, was the importance he attached to the study\nof nature, [1116] but even natural science was deemed valuable not so\nmuch for its own sake as because of its practical use. The knowledge of\nnatural causes is the only means of liberating the soul from the\nshackles of superstition; this is the only use of natural science. If\nit were not for the thought of God and the fear of death, there would\nbe no need of studying nature. [1117] The investigation of our\ninstincts is also of use, because it helps us to control them, and to\nkeep them within their natural bounds. [1118] Thus the onesided\npractical view of philosophy which we have already encountered in\nStoicism was carried by the Epicureans to an extreme length.\n\n\n\n[(3) Divisions of philosophy.]\n\nNor is it otherwise than in harmony herewith that logic did not receive\na fuller or more perfect treatment in the further development of their\nsystem. Even the study of nature, going far more fully into particulars\nthan logic, was guided entirely by practical considerations, all\nscientific interest in nature being ignored. Following the usual\nmethod, however, the Epicureans divided philosophy into three parts\n[1119]\u2014logic, natural science, and moral science. Limiting the first of\nthese parts to one branch of logic, the part which deals with the\ncharacteristics of truth, and which they therefore called neither\nlogic, nor dialectic, but Canonic, they really reduced this part to a\nmere introductory appendage to the two other parts, [1120] and studied\nCanonic as a part of natural science. [1121] Natural science moreover\nwas so entirely subordinated to moral science, that we might almost\nfeel tempted to follow some modern writers [1122] in their view of the\nEpicurean system, by giving to moral science precedence of the two\nother parts, or at least of natural science. [1123] The School,\nhowever, followed the usual order, and not without reason; [1124] for\nalthough the whole tendency of the Epicurean Canonic and natural\nscience can only, like the Stoic, be explained by a reference to moral\nscience, yet moral science with them presupposes the test-science of\ntruth and natural science. We shall, therefore, do well to treat of\nCanonic in the first place, and subsequently to prove how this branch\nof study depends on Ethics.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Canonic or the test-science of truth.]\n\n[(1) Sensation and perception.]\n\nCanonic or the test-science of truth, as has been observed, is occupied\nwith investigating the standard of truth, and with enquiring into the\nmode of acquiring knowledge. The whole of formal logic, the doctrine of\nthe formation of conceptions and conclusions, is omitted by Epicurus.\n[1125] Even the theory of the acquisition of knowledge assumes with him\na very simple form. If the Stoics were fain, notwithstanding their\nideal ethics and their pantheistic speculations, ultimately to take\ntheir stand on materialism, could Epicurus avoid doing the same? In\nseeking a speculative basis for a view of life which refers everything\nto the feeling of pleasure or pain, he appealed far more unreservedly\nthan they had done to sensation. Now, since the senses can alone inform\nus what is pleasant or unpleasant, and what is desirable or the\ncontrary, our judgment as to truth or falsehood must ultimately depend\non the senses. Viewed speculatively, sensation is the standard of\ntruth; viewed practically, the feeling of pleasure or pain. [1126] If\nthe senses may not be trusted, still less may knowledge derived from\nreason be trusted, since reason itself is primarily and entirely\nderived from the senses. There remains, therefore, no distinctive mark\nof truth, and no possibility of certain conviction. We are at the mercy\nof unlimited doubt. If, however, this doubt is contradictory of\nitself\u2014for how can men declare they know, that they can know\nnothing?\u2014it is also contradictory of human nature, since it would do\naway not only with all knowledge but with every possibility of\naction\u2014in short, with all the conditions on which human life depends.\n[1127] To avoid doubt we must allow that sensation as such is always,\nand under all circumstances, to be trusted; nor ought the delusions of\nthe senses to shake our belief; the causes of these deceptions do not\nlie in sensation as such, but in our judgment about sensation. What the\nsenses supply is only that an object produces this or that effect upon\nus, and that this or that picture has impressed our soul. The facts\nthus supplied are always true, only it does not follow that the object\nexactly corresponds with the impression we receive of it, or that it\nproduces on others the same impression that it produces on us. Many\ndifferent pictures may emanate from one and the same object, and these\npictures may be changed on their way to the ear or eye. Pictures, too,\nmay strike our senses with which no real objects correspond. To\nconfound the picture with the thing, the impression made with the\nobject making the impression, is certainly an error, but this error\nmust not be laid to the charge of the senses, but to that of opinion.\n[1128] Indeed, how is it possible, asks Epicurus, [1129] to refute the\ntestimony of the senses? Can reason refute it? But reason is itself\ndependent on the senses, and cannot bear testimony against that on\nwhich its own claims to belief depend. Or can one sense convict another\nof error? But different sensations do not refer to the same object, and\nsimilar sensations have equal value. Nothing remains, therefore, but to\nattach implicit belief to every impression of the senses. Every such\nimpression is directly certain, and is accordingly termed by Epicurus\nclear evidence (\u1f10\u03bd\u03ac\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1). [1130] Nay, more, its truth is so paramount\nthat the impressions of madmen, and appearances in dreams, are true\nbecause they are caused by something real, [1131] and error only\nbecomes possible when we go beyond sensation.\n\n\n\n[(2) Notions.]\n\nThis going beyond sensation becomes, however, a necessity. By a\nrepetition of the same perception a notion (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2) arises. A notion,\ntherefore, is nothing else than the general picture retained in the\nmind of what has been perceived. [1132] On these notions retained by\nmemory depend all speaking and thinking. They are what commonly go\nunder the name of things; and speech is only a means of recalling\ndefinite perceptions [1133] to the memory. Notions are presupposed in\nall scientific knowledge. [1134] Together with sensations they form the\nmeasure of the truth of our convictions; [1135] and it holds true of\nthem as it did of sensations\u2014that they are true in themselves and need\nno proof. [1136] Taken by themselves, notions, like perceptions, are\nreflections in the soul of things on which the transforming action of\nthe mind, changing external impressions into conceptions, has not as\nyet been brought to bear.\n\n\n\n[(3) Opinion.]\n\nFor this very reason notion are not sufficient. From appearances we\nmust advance to their secret causes; from the known to the unknown.\n[1137] Far too little value was attached by Epicurus to the logical\nforms of thought, or he would have investigated more accurately the\nnature of this process of advancing. [1138] Thoughts, in his view,\nresult from sensations spontaneously, and although a certain amount of\nreflection is necessary for the process, yet it requires no scientific\nguidance. [1139] The thoughts arrived at in this way do not stand as a\nhigher genus above perceptions, but they are only opinions (\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2,\n\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1) without a note of truth in themselves, and depending for their\ntruth upon sensation. That opinion may be considered a true one which\nis based on the testimony of the senses, or is at least not contrary to\nthe senses, and that a false opinion in which the opposite is the case.\n[1140] Sometimes we suppose that upon certain present impressions other\nimpressions will follow: for instance, that a tower which appears round\nat a distance will appear round close at hand. In that case, if the\nreal perception corresponds with the assumption, the opinion is true,\notherwise it is false. [1141] At other times we suppose that certain\nappearances are due to secret causes: for instance, that empty space is\nthe cause of motion. If all appearances tally with their explanations,\nwe may consider our assumptions correct; if not, our assumptions are\nincorrect. [1142] In the first case the test of the truth of an opinion\nis that it is supported by experience; in the latter that it is not\nrefuted by experience. [1143] Have we not here all the leading features\nof a theory of knowledge based purely on sensation? The Epicurean\u2019s\ninterest in these questions was, however, far too slight to construct\nwith them a developed theory of materialism.\n\n\n\n[(4) Standard of truth subjective.]\n\nLittle pains seem to have been taken by Epicurus to overcome the\ndifficulties by which this view was beset. If all sensations as such\nare true, the saying of Protagoras necessarily follows that for each\nindividual that is true which seems to him to be true, that contrary\nimpressions about one and the same object are true, and that deceptions\nof the senses, so many instances of which are supplied by experience,\nare really impossible. To avoid these conclusions, Epicurus maintained\nthat for each different impression there is a different object-picture.\nWhat immediately affects our senses is not the object itself, but a\npicture of the object, and these pictures may be innumerable, a\ndifferent one being the cause of each separate sensation. Moreover,\nalthough the pictures emanating from the same object are in general\nnearly alike, it is possible that they may differ from one another\nowing to a variety of causes. If, therefore, the same object appears\ndifferent to different individuals, the cause of these different\nsensations is not one and the same, but a different one, and different\npictures must have affected their senses. If our own sensations deceive\nus, the blame does not belong to our senses, as though they had\ndepicted to us unreal objects, but to our judgment for drawing\nunwarranted inferences from pictures [1144] as to their causes.\n\nThis line of argument, however, only removes the difficulty one step\nfurther. Sensation is said always to reproduce faithfully the picture\nwhich affects the organs of sense, but the pictures do not always\nreproduce the object with equal faithfulness. How then can a faithful\npicture be known from one which is not faithful? To this question the\nEpicurean system can furnish no real answer. To say that the wise man\nknows how to distinguish a faithful from an unfaithful picture [1145]\nis to despair of an absolute standard at all, and to make the decision\nof truth or error depend upon the individual\u2019s judgment. Such a\nstatement reduces all our impressions of the properties of things to a\nrelative level. If sensation does not show us things themselves, but\nonly those impressions of them which happen to affect us, it does not\nsupply us with a knowledge of things as they are, but as they happen to\nbe related to us. It was, therefore, a legitimate inference from this\ntheory of knowledge for Epicurus to deny that colour belongs to bodies\nin themselves, since some only see colour in the dark, whilst others do\nnot. [1146] Like his predecessor, Democritus, he must have been brought\nto this view by his theory of atoms. Few of the properties belong to\natoms which we perceive in things, and hence all other properties must\nbe explained as not belonging to the essence, but only to the\nappearance of things. [1147] The taste for speculation was, however,\ntoo weak, and the need of a direct truth of the senses too strong in\nEpicurus for him to be able to turn his thoughts in this direction for\nlong. Whilst allowing to certain properties of things only a relative\nvalue, he had no wish to doubt the reality of objects, nor to disparage\nthe object-pictures which furnish us with sensations. [1148]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\n\nTHE EPICUREAN VIEWS ON NATURE.\n\n\n[A. General views on nature.]\n\n[(1) Object, value, and method of the study of nature.]\n\nIf Epicurus and his followers underrated logic, to natural science they\nattached a considerable value. This value was, however, exclusively\nderived from a sense of the practical advantages which a knowledge of\nnature confers in opposing superstition. Without such an object the\nstudy of nature would have seemed wholly superfluous. [1149] Such being\ntheir attitude of mind, the Epicureans were, as might have been\nexpected, indifferent about giving a complete and accurate explanation\nof phenomena. Their one aim was to put forward such a view of nature as\nwould do away with the necessity for supernatural intervention, without\nat the same time pretending to offer a sufficient solution of the\nproblems raised by science. [1150] Whilst, therefore, he devoted\nconsiderable attention to natural science, [1151] Epicurus does not\nseem to have considered certainty to be of importance, or even to be\npossible, in dealing with details of scientific study. Of the general\ncauses of things we can and ought to entertain a firm conviction, since\nthe possibility of overcoming religious prejudices and the fears\noccasioned by them depends on these convictions. No such result,\nhowever, follows from the investigation of details, which, on the\ncontrary, only tends to confirm prejudices in those who are not already\nemancipated from them. In dealing with details, therefore, it is enough\nfor Epicurus to show that various natural causes for phenomena may be\nimagined, and to offer various suggestions which dispense with the\nintervention of the Gods and the myths of a belief in Providence.\n[1152] To say that any one of these suggestions is the only possible\none, is in most cases to exceed the bounds of experience and human\nknowledge, and to go back to the capricious explanations of mythology.\n[1153] Possibly the world may move, and possibly it may be at rest.\nPossibly it may be round, or else it may be triangular, or have any\nother shape. Possibly the sun and the stars may be extinguished at\nsetting, and be lighted afresh at rising. It is, however, equally\npossible that they may only disappear under the earth and reappear\nagain, or that their rising and setting may be due to yet other causes.\nPossibly the waxing and waning of the moon may be caused by the moon\u2019s\nrevolving; or it may be due to an atmospheric change, or to an actual\nincrease and decrease in the moon\u2019s size, or to some other cause.\nPossibly the moon may shine with borrowed light, or it may shine with\nits own, experience supplying us with instances of bodies which give\ntheir own light, and of those which have their light borrowed. [1154]\nFrom these and such-like statements it appears that questions of\nnatural science in themselves have no value for Epicurus. Whilst\ngranting that only one natural explanation of phenomena is generally\npossible, yet in any particular case he is perfectly indifferent which\nexplanation is adopted.\n\n\n\n[(2) Mechanical explanation of nature.]\n\nGreat stress is, however, laid by him on the general explanation. In\ncontrast with the religious view which regards the world as a system of\nmeans leading to ends, the leading business of the natural science of\nthe Epicureans is to refer all phenomena to natural causes. To an\nEpicurean nothing appeals more absurd than to suppose that the\narrangements of nature have for their object the well-being of mankind,\nor that they have any object at all. The tongue is not given us for the\npurpose of speaking, nor the ears for the purpose of hearing. As a\nmatter of fact, it would, indeed, be more correct to say, that we speak\nbecause we have a tongue, and hear because we have ears. Natural powers\nhave acted purely according to the law of necessity, and among their\nvarious products there could not fail to be some presenting the\nappearance of purpose in their arrangement. In the case of man there\nhave resulted many such products and powers. But this result is by no\nmeans intentional; it is an accidental consequence of natural causes.\nIn explaining nature all thought of Gods must be put out of sight. For\ntheir happiness would be inconceivable, on the supposition that they\ncared for man and his welfare. [1155]\n\nConfining his interest in nature, as Epicurus did, entirely to this\ngeneral view of things, he was all the more inclined, in carrying it\ninto details, to rely upon some older system. No system, however,\nappeared to correspond better with his tone of mind than that of\nDemocritus, which, moreover, commended itself to him not only by\nabsolutely banishing the idea of final cause, but by referring\neverything to matter, and by its theory of atoms. As Epicurus places in\neach individual thing taken by itself the ultimate end of action, so\nDemocritus had theoretically made all that is real to consist in what\nis absolutely individual or in atoms. His natural science, therefore,\nseemed to present the most natural basis for the Epicurean Ethics. If\nthe Stoics, in their views of nature, closely followed Heraclitus,\nEpicurus in his followed Democritus still more closely, and hence, with\nthe exception of one single point, the additions made by Epicurus to\nthe theory of this philosopher are of no philosophical importance.\n\n\n\n[(3) Atoms and empty space.]\n\nWith Democritus Epicurus agreed in holding that there is no other form\nof reality except that of bodily reality. Every substance, he says in\nthe words of the Stoics, must affect others, and be affected by them;\nand whatever affects others or is itself affected, is corporeal.\nCorporeal substance is, therefore, the only kind of substance. [1156]\nThe various qualities of things, essential as well as accidental\nqualities, are accordingly not incorporeal existences, but simply\nchance modes of body, the former being called by Epicurus \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1,\nthe latter \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1. [1157] But a second something is necessary\nbesides corporeal substance in order to explain phenomena, viz. empty\nspace. That empty space exists is proved by the differences of weight\nin bodies. For what else could be the cause of this difference? [1158]\nIt is proved still more conclusively by motion, motion being impossible\nwithout empty space. [1159] Mind as a moving cause, however, seems to\nEpicurus altogether superfluous. Everything that exists consists of\nbodies and empty space, and there is no third thing. [1160]\n\nDemocritus had resolved the two conceptions of body and empty space\ninto the conceptions of being and not being. True to his position,\nEpicurus dispensed with this speculative basis, and clinging to the\nordinary notions of empty space, and of a material filling space,\n[1161] he simply proves these notions by the qualities of phenomena.\nFor this very reason Democritus\u2019s division of body into innumerable\nprimary particles or atoms appeared to him most necessary. All bodies\nknown to us by sensation are composed of parts. [1162] If the process\nof division were infinitely continued, all things would ultimately be\nresolved into the non-existent\u2014in this Epicurus and Democritus\nagree;\u2014and conversely all things must have been formed out of the\nnon-existent, in defiance of the first principle of natural science\nthat nothing can come from nothing, and that nothing can be resolved\ninto nothing. [1163] Hence, we must conclude that the primary component\nparts of things can neither have come into existence nor cease to\nexist, nor yet be changed in their nature. [1164] These primary bodies\ncontain no empty space in themselves, and hence can neither be divided\nnor destroyed, nor be changed in any way. [1165] They are so small that\nthey do not impress the senses, and as a matter of fact we do not see\nthem. Nevertheless they must not be regarded as mathematical atoms, the\nname atoms being assigned to them only because their bodily structure\nwill not admit of division. [1166] They have neither colour, warmth,\nsmell, nor any other property; properties belong only to distinct\nmaterials; [1167] and for this reason they must not be sought in the\nfour elements, all of which, as experience shows, come into being and\npass away. [1168] They possess only the universal qualities of all\ncorporeal things, viz. shape, size, and weight. [1169]\n\nNot only must atoms, like all other bodies, have shape, but there must\nexist among them indefinitely many varieties of shape, or it would be\nimpossible to account for the innumerable differences of things. There\ncannot, however, be really an infinite number of shapes, as Democritus\nmaintained, in any limited body\u2014this is intelligible of itself\u2014nor yet\nin the whole universe, [1170] since an unlimited number would make the\narrangement of the world impossible, everything in the world being\ncircumscribed by certain containing limits. [1171] Again, atoms must be\ndifferent in point of size; for all materials cannot be divided into\nparticles of equal size. Yet even to this difference there must be some\nlimitation. An atom must neither be so large as to become an object of\nsense, nor can it, after what has been said, be infinitely small.\n[1172] From difference in point of size the difference of atoms in\npoint of weight follows. [1173] In point of number atoms must be\ninnumerable, and in the same way empty space must be unbounded also.\nFor since everything bounded must be bounded by something, it is\nimpossible to imagine any bounds of the universe beyond which nothing\nexists, and hence there can be no bounds at all. The absence of bounds\nmust, apply to the mass of atoms quite as much as to empty space. If an\ninfinite number of atoms would not find room in a limited space,\nconversely a limited number of atoms would be lost in empty space, and\nnever able to form a world. [1174] In all these views Epicurus closely\nfollows Democritus, no doubt agreeing with him also in explaining the\nqualities of things by the composition of their atoms. [1175]\n\n\n\n\n[B. The world.]\n\n[(1) The swerving aside of atoms.]\n\nIn deducing the origin of things from their primary causes, Epicurus,\nhowever, deviates widely from his predecessor. Atoms\u2014so it was taught\nby both\u2014have by virtue of their weight been eternally engaged in a\ndownward motion. [1176] That all bodies should move downwards in empty\nspace seemed to Epicurus a matter of course; for whatever is heavy must\nfall unless it is supported. [1177] He was therefore opposed to the\nAristotelian view that heaviness shows itself in the form of attraction\ntowards a centre, and consequently to his further supposition that\ndownward mode of motion belongs only to certain bodies, circular motion\nbeing for others more natural. [1178] The objection that in endless\nspace there is no above or below he could meet only by appealing to\nexperience; [1179] some things always appear above our heads, others\nbeneath our feet. [1180] But whilst Democritus held that atoms in their\ndownward motion meet together, thus giving rise to a rotatory motion,\nno such view commended itself to Epicurus. Nay rather in his view all\natoms will fall equally fast, since empty space offers no resistance,\nand falling perpendicularly it is impossible to see how they can meet.\n[1181] To render a meeting possible he supposes the smallest possible\nswerving aside from the perpendicular line in falling. This assumption\nseemed to him indispensable, since it would be otherwise impossible to\nassert the freedom of the human will. For how can the will be free if\neverything falls according to the strict law of gravity? For the same\nreason this swerving aside was not supposed to proceed from any natural\nnecessity, but simply from the power of self-motion in the atoms.\n[1182] In consequence of their meeting one part of the atoms\nrebounds\u2014so Democritus also taught; the lighter ones are forced\nupwards, and from the upward and downward motions combined a rotatory\nmotion arises. [1183] When this motion takes place a clustering of\natoms is the consequence, which by their own motion separate themselves\nfrom the remaining mass, and form a world of themselves. [1184] Atoms\nbeing eternal and unchangeable, the process of forming worlds must go\non without beginning or end; [1185] and inasmuch as they are also\ninfinite in number, and empty space is infinite also, there must be an\ninnumerable number of worlds. [1186] In the character of these worlds\nthe greatest possible variety may be supposed, since it is most\nunlikely that the innumerable combinations of atoms all brought about\nat random will fall out alike. Equally impossible is it to assert that\nall these worlds are absolutely dissimilar. In general, Epicurus\nassumed that they are extremely different both in point of size and\narrangement, and that here and there one may be similar to our own.\n[1187] Moreover, since eternity affords time for all imaginable\ncombinations of atoms, nothing can ever be brought about now which has\nnot already existed. [1188] In one respect all worlds are alike; they\ncome into existence, are liable to decay, and, like all other\nindividual elements, are exposed to a gradual increase and decrease.\n[1189] So we might have assumed from other positions in his system.\nBetween the individual worlds both Democritus and Epicurus insert\nintermediate world-spaces, in which by the clustering of atoms from\ntime to time new worlds come into being. [1190]\n\n\n\n[(2) Origin of the world.]\n\nThe origin of our world is thus described. At a certain period of\ntime\u2014Lucretius [1191] believes at no very distant period\u2014a cluster of\natoms of varying shape and size was formed in this definite portion of\nspace. These atoms meeting, there first arose from the pressure and\nrebound of the quickly falling particles motions of every variety in\nevery direction. Soon the greater atoms pressing downwards, by dint of\nweight forced upwards the smaller and lighter atoms, the fiery ones\ntopmost and with the greatest impetus to form the ether, and afterwards\nthose which form the air. [1192] The upper pressure ceasing, these\nmasses, under the pressure of particles still joining it from below,\nspread forth sidewards, and thus the belts of fire and air were formed.\nNext uprose those atoms out of which the sun and stars are formed into\nthe heights, and at the same time the earth settled down, its inner\npart being partially exhausted in those places where the sea now is. By\nthe influence of the warmth of the ether, and the sun-heat, the\nearth-mass was bound together more closely, the sea was pressed out of\nit, and the surface assumed an uneven character. [1193] The world is\nshut off from other worlds and from empty space by those bodies which\nform its external boundary. [1194]\n\n\n\n[(3) Arrangement of the universe.]\n\nAsking, in the next place, what idea must be formed of the arrangement\nof the world, we are met by the two principles which Epicurus is never\nweary of inculcating; one, that we must explain nothing as an\nintentional arrangement by deity, but refer everything simply and\nsolely to mechanical causes; the other, that in explaining phenomena\nthe widest possible room must be given for hypotheses of every kind,\nand that nothing is more absurd than to abridge the wide range of\npossible explanations by exclusively deciding in favour of any one.\n[1195] Thereby the investigation of nature loses for him its value as\nsuch, nor is it of any great interest to us to follow his speculations\non nature into detail. On one point he dogmatises, protesting that the\nframework of heaven must not be considered the work of God, [1196] nor\nmust life and reason be attributed to the stars. [1197] Otherwise, on\nnearly all the questions which engaged the attention of astronomers at\nthat time, he observes the greatest indifference, treating the views of\nhis predecessors, good and bad alike, with an easy superficiality which\ncan only be explained by supposing him altogether indifferent [1198] as\nto their truth. The state of his own astronomical knowledge can,\nmoreover, be easily seen by recalling the notorious assertion [1199]\nthat the sun, the moon, and the stars are either not at all, or only a\nlittle larger, and may possibly be even less than they appear to be.\nThe Epicureans also thought to support their theory that the earth,\nborne by the air, reposes in the middle of the world\u2014a theory which on\ntheir hypothesis of the weight of bodies is impossible [1200]\u2014by the\ngradual diminution in weight of the surrounding bodies. [1201] It would\nbe impossible here to go through the treatment which they gave to\natmospheric and terrestrial phenomena, particularly as the principle\nalready indicated was most freely used, and many explanations were\ngiven as being all equally possible. [1202]\n\n\n\n[(4) Plants and animals.]\n\nOut of the newly made earth plants at first grew, [1203] and afterwards\nanimals came forth, since the latter, according to Lucretius, can by no\npossibility have fallen from heaven. [1204] In other worlds, likewise,\nliving beings came into existence, though not necessarily in all.\n[1205] Among these beings were originally, as Empedocles had previously\nsupposed, [1206] all sorts of composite or deformed creatures. Those,\nhowever, alone continued to exist which were fitted by nature to find\nsupport, to propagate, and to protect themselves from danger. Romantic\ncreatures, such as centaurs of chim\u00e6ras, can never have existed here,\nbecause the beings of which they are compounded would require\nconditions of life [1207] altogether different.\n\n\n\n\n[C. Mankind.]\n\n[(1) Origin of the human race.]\n\nAiming, as the Epicureans did, at explaining the origin of men and\nanimals in a purely natural manner, they likewise tried to form an\nidea, equally according to nature, of the original state and historical\ndevelopment of the human race. In this attempt they ignored all\nlegendary notions, and, notwithstanding their leaning towards\nmaterialism, they on the whole advocated perfectly sound views. The men\nof early times, so thought Lucretius, were stronger and more powerful\nthan the men of to-day. Rude and ignorant as beasts, they lived in the\nwoods in a perpetual state of warfare with the wild animals, without\njustice or society. [1208] The first and most important step in a\nsocial direction was the discovery of fire, the learning to build huts,\nand to clothe themselves in skins; then began marriage and domestic\nlife, [1209] and speech, originally not a matter of convention, but,\nlike the noises of animals, the natural expression of thoughts and\nfeelings, was developed. [1210] The older the human race grew, the more\nthey learned of the arts and skill which minister to the preservation\nand enjoyment of life. These arts were first learnt by experience,\nunder the pressure of nature, or the compulsion of want. What had thus\nbeen discovered was completed by reflection, the more gifted preceding\nthe rest as teachers. [1211] In exactly the same way civil society was\ndeveloped. Individuals built strongholds, and made themselves rulers.\nIn time the power of kings aroused envy, and they were massacred. To\ncrush the anarchy which then arose, magistrates were chosen, and order\nestablished by penal laws. [1212] It will subsequently be seen that\nEpicurus explained religion in the same way by natural growth.\n\n\n\n[(2) The soul.]\n\nThe apotheosis of nature, which has been apparent in Epicurus\u2019s whole\nview of history, becomes specially prominent in his treatment of\npsychology. This treatment could, after all that has been said, be only\npurely materialistic. The soul, like every other real being, is a body.\nIn support of this view the Epicureans appealed to the mutual relations\nof the body and the soul, agreeing on this point with the Stoics.\n[1213] The body of the soul, however, consists of the finest, lightest,\nand most easily moved atoms, as is manifest from the speed of thought,\nfrom the instantaneous dissolution of the soul after death, and,\nmoreover, from the fact that the soulless body is as heavy as the body\nin which there is a soul. [1214] Hence Epicurus, again agreeing with\nthe Stoics, describes the soul as a material resembling fire and air,\n[1215] or, more accurately, as composed of four elements, fire, air,\nvapour, and a fourth nameless element. It consists of the finest atoms,\nand is the cause of feeling, [1216] and according as one or other of\nthese elements preponderates, the character of man is of one or the\nother kind. [1217] Like the Stoics, Epicurus believed that the\nsoul-element is received by generation from the parents\u2019 souls, [1218]\nand that it is spread over the whole body, [1219] growing as the body\ngrows. [1220] At the same time he makes a distinction somewhat similar\nto that made by the Stoics in their doctrine of the sovereign part of\nthe soul (\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd). [1221] Only the irrational part of the soul is\ndiffused as a principle of life over the whole body; the rational part\nhas its seat in the breast. [1222] To the rational part belong mental\nactivity, sensation, and perception, the motion of the will and the\nmind, and in this latter sense life itself; both parts together make up\none being, yet they may exist in different conditions. The mind may be\ncheerful whilst the body and the irrational soul feel pain, or the\nreverse may be the case. It is even possible that portions of the\nirrational soul may be lost by the mutilation of the body, without\ndetriment to the rational soul, or consequently to life. [1223] When,\nhowever, the connection between soul and body is fully severed, then\nthe soul can no longer exist. Deprived of the surrounding shelter of\nthe body, its atoms are dispersed in a moment, owing to their\nlightness; and the body in consequence, being unable to exist without\nthe soul, goes over into corruption. [1224] If this view appears to\nhold out the most gloomy prospect for the future, Epicurus considers\nthat it cannot really be so. With life every feeling of evil ceases,\n[1225] and the time when we shall no longer exist affects us just as\nlittle as the time before we existed. [1226] Nay, more, he entertains\nthe opinion that his teaching alone can reconcile us to death by\nremoving all fear of the nether world and its terrors. [1227]\n\nAllowing that many of these statements are natural consequences of the\nprinciples of Epicurus, the distinction between a rational and an\nirrational soul must, nevertheless, at first sight seem strange in a\nsystem so thoroughly materialistic as was that of the Epicureans. And\nyet this distinction is not stranger than the corresponding parts of\nthe Stoic teaching. If the Stoic views may be referred to the\ndistinction which they drew in morals between the senses and the\nreason, not less are the Epicurean ethics marked by the same contrast\nbetween the general and the sensuous side of the mind. Hence Epicurus\nshares the Stoic belief in an ethereal origin of the human race; [1228]\nand although this belief as at first expressed only implies that man,\nlike other living beings, is composed of ethereal elements, yet there\nis connected with it the distinction already discussed in the case of\nthe Stoics between the higher and the lower parts of man, which\nultimately comes to be simply another mode of expressing the difference\nbetween mind and matter.\n\n\n\n[(3) Sensation.]\n\nAmong the phenomena of the soul\u2019s life sensation is made to harmonise\nwith the general principles of the Epicurean view of nature by the aid\nof Democritus\u2019s doctrine of atom-pictures (\u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03c9\u03bb\u03b1). From the surface of\nbodies\u2014this is the pith of that doctrine\u2014the finest possible particles\nare constantly being thrown off, which by virtue of their fineness\ntraverse the furthest spaces in an infinitely short time, hurrying\nthrough the void. [1229] Many of these exhalations are arrested by some\nobstacle soon after coming forth, or are otherwise thrown into\nconfusion. In the case of others the atoms for a long time retain the\nsame position and connection which they had in bodies themselves, thus\npresenting a picture of things, and only lacking corporeal solidity. As\nthese pictures are conveyed to the soul by the various organs of sense,\nour impressions of things arise. [1230] Even those impressions, which\nhave no corresponding real object, must be referred to such pictures\npresent in the soul. [1231] For often pictures last longer than things\nthemselves; [1232] and often by a casual combination of atoms pictures\nare formed in the air resembling no one single thing. Sometimes, too,\npictures of various kinds are combined on their way to the senses;\nthus, for instance, the notion of a Centaur is caused by the union of\nthe picture of a man with that of a horse, not only in our imagination,\nbut already previously in the atom-picture. [1233] If, therefore,\nsensation distorts or imperfectly represents real objects, it must be\nexplained as being due to some change or mutilation in the\natom-pictures before they reach our senses. [1234]\n\nIn thus explaining mental impressions, the Epicureans do not allow\nthemselves to be disturbed by the fact that we can recall at pleasure\nthe ideas of all possible things. The cause of this power was rather\nsupposed to be the circumstance that we are always surrounded by an\ninnumerable number of atom-pictures, none of which we perceive unless\nour attention is directed to them. Likewise the seeming motion of forms\nwhich we behold in dreams is explained by the hasty succession of\nsimilar atom-pictures, appearing to us as changes of one and the same\npicture. [1235] But besides receiving pictures supplied from without,\nspontaneous motion with regard to these pictures takes place on our\npart, a motion connected in the first instance with the soul\u2019s motion\nwhen it receives the outward impression, but not to be regarded as a\nsimple continuation thereof. This independent motion gives rise to\nopinion, and hence opinion is not so necessary or so universally true\nas feeling. It may agree with feeling, or it may not agree with it. It\nmay be true or it may be false. [1236] The conditions of its being true\nor false have been previously investigated. [1237]\n\n\n\n[(4) Will.]\n\nImpressions also give rise to will and action, the soul being set in\nmotion by impressions, and this motion extending from the soul to the\nbody. [1238] Into the nature of will, however, Epicurus does not appear\nto have instituted a more careful psychological investigation. It was\nenough for him to assert the freedom of the will. This freedom he\nconsiders absolutely indispensable, if anything we do is to be\nconsidered our own, unless we are prepared to despair of moral\nresponsibility altogether, and to resign ourselves to a comfortless and\ninexorable necessity. [1239] To make freedom possible, Epicurus had\nintroduced accident into the motion of atoms, and for the same reason\nhe denies the truth of disjunctive propositions which apply to the\nfuture. [1240] In the latter respect, he, no doubt, only attacked the\nmaterial truth of two clauses, without impugning the formal accuracy of\nthe disjunction, [1241] i.e. he did not deny that of two contradictory\ncases either one or the other must happen, nor did he deny the truth of\nsaying: To-morrow Epicurus will either be alive or not alive. But he\ndisputed the truth of each clause taken by itself. He denied the truth\nof the sentence, Epicurus will be alive; and equally that of its\ncontradictory, Epicurus will not be alive; on the ground that the one\nor the other statement only becomes true by the actual realisation of\nan event at present uncertain. [1242] For this he deserves little\nblame. Our real charge against him is that he did not more thoroughly\ninvestigate the nature of the will and the conception of freedom, and\nthat he treats the subject of the soul as scantily and superficially as\nhe had treated the subject of nature.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\n\nVIEWS OF EPICURUS ON RELIGION.\n\n\n[A. Criticism of the gods and the popular faith.]\n\nSatisfied with the results of his own enquiries into nature, Epicurus\nhoped by his view of the causes of things not only to displace the\nsuperstitions of a polytheistic worship, but also to uproot the\nprejudice in favour of Providence. Indeed, these two objects were\nplaced by him on exactly the same footing. So absurd did he consider\nthe popular notions respecting the Gods, that instead of blaming those\nwho attacked them, [1243] he believed it impious to acquiesce in them.\nReligion being, according to Lucretius, the cause of the greatest\nevils, [1244] he who displaces it to make way for rational views of\nnature deserves praise as having overcome the most dangerous enemy of\nmankind. All the language of Epicurus in disparagement of the art of\npoetry applies in a still higher degree to the religious errors\nfostered by poetry. [1245] Nor is it better with belief in Providence\nthan with the popular faith. This belief is also included in the\ncategory of romance; [1246] and the doctrine of fatalism, which was the\nStoic form for the same belief, was denounced as even worse than the\npopular faith. [1247] For how, asks the Epicurean, could divine\nProvidence have created a world in which evil abounds, in which virtue\noften fares ill, whilst vice is triumphant? How could a world have been\nmade for the sake of man, when man can only inhabit a very small\nportion of it? How could nature be intended to promote man\u2019s well-being\nwhen it so often imperils his life and labour, and sends him into the\nworld more helpless than any animal? How can we form a conception of\nbeings ruling over an infinite universe, and everywhere present to\nadminister everything in every place? [1248] What could have induced\nthese beings to create a world, and how and whence could they have\nknown how to create it, had not nature supplied them with an example?\n[1249] In fine, how could God be the happy Being He must be if the\nwhole burden of caring for all things and all events lay upon Him, or\nHe were swayed to and fro together with the body of the world? [1250]\nOr how could we feel any other feeling than that of fear in the\npresence of such a God who troubles himself about everything? [1251]\n\n\n\n\n[B. The gods according to Epicurus.]\n\n[(1) Reasons for his belief.]\n\nWith the denial of the popular Gods, the denial of demons, [1252] of\ncourse, goes hand in hand; and, together with Providence, the need of\nprayer [1253] and of prophecy is at the same time negatived. [1254] All\nthese notions, according to Epicurus, are the result of ignorance and\nfear. Pictures seen in dreams have been confounded with real\nexistences; regularity of motion in the heavenly bodies has been\nmistaken by the ignorant for the work of God; events which accidentally\nhappened in combination with others have been regarded as portents;\nterrific natural phenomena, storms and earthquakes, have engendered in\nmen\u2019s minds the fear of higher powers. [1255] Fear is therefore the\nbasis of religion; [1256] and, on the other hand, freedom from fear is\nthe primary object aimed at by philosophy.\n\nFor all that, Epicurus was unwilling to renounce belief in the Gods,\n[1257] nor is it credible that this unwillingness was simply a yielding\nto popular opinion. [1258] The language used by the Epicureans\ncertainly gives the impression of sincerity; and the time was past when\navowed atheism was attended with danger. Atheism would have been as\nreadily condoned in the time of Epicurus as the deism which denied most\nunreservedly the popular faith. It is, however, possible to trace the\ncauses which led Epicurus to believe that there are Gods. There was\nfirst the general diffusion of a belief in Gods which appeared to him\nto establish the truth of this belief, and hence he declared the\nexistence of Gods to be something directly certain, and grounded on a\nprimary notion (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2). [1259] Moreover, with his materialistic\ntheory of knowledge he no doubt supposed that the primary notion which\nconvinces us of the existence of Gods arises from the actual\ncontemplation of divine beings, and from the perception of those\natom-pictures from which Democritus had already deduced the belief in\nGods. [1260] And in addition to these theoretical reasons, Epicurus had\nalso another, half \u00e6sthetical, half religious\u2014the wish to see his ideal\nof happiness realised in the person of the Gods, [1261] and it is this\nideal which determines the character of all his notions respecting\nthem. His Gods are therefore, throughout, human beings. Religious\nbelief only knows beings such as these, or, as Epicurus expresses it,\nonly such beings come before us in those pictures of the Gods which\npresent themselves to our minds, sometimes in sleep, sometimes when we\nare awake. Reflection, too, convinces us that the human form is the\nmost beautiful, that to it alone reason belongs, and that it is the\nmost appropriate form for perfectly happy beings. [1262] Epicurus even\nwent so far as to attribute to the Gods difference of sex. [1263] At\nthe same time everything must be eliminated which is not appropriate to\na divine being.\n\n\n\n[(2) Nature of the Epicurean gods.]\n\nThe two essential characteristics of the Gods, according to Epicurus,\nare immortality and perfect happiness. [1264] Both of these\ncharacteristics would be impaired were we to attribute to the bodies of\nthe Gods the same dense corporeity which belongs to our own. We must,\ntherefore, only assign to them a body analogous to our body, ethereal,\nand consisting of the finest atoms. [1265] Such bodies would be of\nlittle use in a world like ours. In fact, they could not live in any\nworld without being exposed to the temporal ruin which will in time\noverwhelm it, and, meantime, to a state of fear, which would mar their\nbliss. Epicurus, therefore, assigns the space between the worlds for\ntheir habitation, where, as Lucretius remarks, troubled by no storms,\nthey live under a sky ever serene. [1266]\n\nNor can these Gods be supposed to care for the world and the affairs of\nmen, else their happiness would be marred by the most distressing\noccupation; but perfectly free from care and trouble, and absolutely\nregardless of the world, in eternal contemplation of their unchanging\nperfection, they enjoy the most unalloyed happiness. [1267] The view\nwhich the School formed to itself of this happiness we learn from\nPhilodemus. [1268] The Gods are exempt from sleep, sleep being a\npartial death, and not needed by beings who live without any exertion.\nAnd yet he believes that they require nourishment, though this must, of\ncourse, be of a kind suited to their nature. They also need dwellings,\n[1269] since every being requires some place wherein to dwell. Were\npowers of speech to be refused to them, they would be deprived of the\nhighest means of enjoyment\u2014the power of conversing with their equals.\nPhilodemus thinks it probable they use the Greek or some other closely\nallied language. [1270] In short, he imagines the Gods to be a society\nof Epicurean philosophers, who have everything that they can\ndesire\u2014everlasting life, no care, and perpetual opportunities of sweet\nconverse. Only such Gods,\u2014the Epicureans thought, [1271]\u2014need not be\nfeared. Only such Gods are free and pure, and worshipped because of\nthis very perfection. [1272] Moreover, these Gods are innumerable. If\nthe number of mortal beings is infinite, the law of counterpoise\nrequires that the number of immortal beings must not be less. [1273] If\nwe have only the idea of a limited number of Gods, it is because, owing\nto their being so much alike, [1274] we confound in our minds the\ninnumerable pictures of the Gods which are conveyed to our souls.\n\nPriding themselves, in contrast to the Stoics, on their agreement by\nmeans of this theology with the anthropomorphic views of the popular\nbelief, and even outdoing polytheism in the assumption of innumerable\nGods, [1275] the Epicureans were willing to join in the customary\nservices of religion, [1276] without being nearly so anxious as the\nStoics to prove themselves in harmony with the popular creed. Whilst\nthe Stoics in their anxiety to do this had plunged head over heels into\nallegory, no such tendency is observed on the part of the Epicureans.\nOnly the poet of the School gives a few allegorical interpretations of\nmythical ideas, and he does it with more taste and skill than is usual\nwith the Stoics. [1277] On other points the Epicureans, not excluding\nLucretius, observe towards the popular faith a negative attitude, that\nof opposing it by explanations; and by this attitude, without doubt,\nthey rendered one of the most important services to humanity.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\n\nTHE MORAL SCIENCE OF THE EPICUREANS. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.\n\n\n[A. Pleasure.]\n\n[(1) Pleasure the highest good.]\n\nNatural science is intended to overcome the prejudices which stand in\nthe way of happiness; moral science to give positive instruction as to\nthe nature and means of attaining to happiness. The speculative parts\nof the Epicurean system had already worked out the idea that reality\nbelongs only to individual things, and that all general order must be\nreferred to the accidental harmony of individual forces. The same idea\nis now met with in the sphere of morals, individual feeling being made\nthe standard, and individual well-being the object of all human\nactivity. Natural science, beginning with external phenomena, went back\nto the secret principles of these phenomena, accessible only to\nthought. It led from an apparently accidental movement of atoms to a\nuniverse of regular motions. Not otherwise was the course followed by\nEpicurus in moral science. Not content with human feelings alone, nor\nwith selfishly referring everything to the individual taken by himself\nalone, that science, in more accurately defining the conception of\nwell-being, ascertained that the same can only be found by rising\nsuperior to feelings and purely individual aims, in short by that very\nprocess of referring consciousness to itself and its universal being,\nwhich the Stoics declared to be the only path to happiness. It is for\nus now to portray this development of the Epicurean philosophy in its\nmost prominent features.\n\nThe only unconditional good, according to Epicurus, is pleasure; the\nonly unconditional evil is pain. [1278] No proof of this proposition\nseemed to him to be necessary; it rests on a conviction supplied by\nnature herself, and is the ground and basis of all our doing and not\ndoing. [1279] If proof, however, were required, he appealed to the fact\nthat all living beings from the first moment of their existence pursue\npleasure and avoid pain, [1280] and that consequently pleasure is a\nnatural good, and the normal condition of every being. [1281] Hence\nfollows the proposition to which Epicurus in common with all the\nphilosophers of pleasure appealed, that pleasure must be the object of\nlife.\n\n\n\n[(2) Freedom from pain.]\n\nAt the same time, this proposition was restricted in the Epicurean\nsystem by several considerations. In the first place, neither pleasure\nnor pain is a simple thing. There are many varieties and degrees of\npleasure and pain, and the case may occur in which pleasure has to be\nsecured by the loss of other pleasures, or even by pain, or in which\npain can only be avoided by submitting to another pain, or at the cost\nof some pleasure. In this case Epicurus would have the various feelings\nof pleasure and pain carefully weighed, and in consideration of the\nadvantages and disadvantages which they confer, would under\ncircumstances advise the good to be treated as an evil, and the evil as\na good. He would have pleasure forsworn if it would entail a greater\ncorresponding pain, and pain submitted to if it holds out the prospect\nof greater pleasure. [1282] He also agrees with Plato in holding that\nevery positive pleasure presupposes a want, i.e. a pain which it\nproposes to remove; and hence he concludes that the real aim and object\nof all pleasure consists in obtaining freedom from pain, [1283] and\nthat the good is nothing else but emancipation from evil. [1284] By a\nCyrenaic neither repose of soul nor freedom from pain, but a gentle\nmotion of the soul or positive pleasure was proposed as the object of\nlife; and hence happiness was not made to depend on man\u2019s general state\nof mind, but on the sum-total of his actual enjoyments. But Epicurus,\nadvancing beyond this position, recognised both the positive and the\nnegative side of pleasures, both pleasure as repose, and pleasure as\nmotion. [1285] Both aspects of pleasure, however, do not stand on the\nsame footing in his system. On the contrary, the essential and\nimmediate cause of happiness is repose of mind\u2014\u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1. Positive\npleasure is only an indirect cause of \u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1 in that it removes the\npain of unsatisfied craving. [1286] This mental repose, however,\ndepends essentially on the character of a man\u2019s mind, just as\nconversely positive pleasure in systems so materialistic must depend on\nsensuous attractions. It was consistent, therefore, on the part of\nAristippus to consider bodily gratification the highest pleasure; and\nconversely Epicurus was no less consistent in subordinating it to\ngratification of mind.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Intellectual happiness.]\n\nIn calling pleasure the highest object in life, says Epicurus, we do\nnot mean the pleasures of profligacy, nor indeed sensual enjoyments at\nall, but the freedom of the body from pain, and the freedom of the soul\nfrom disturbance. Neither feasts nor banquets, neither the lawful nor\nunlawful indulgence of the passions, nor the joys of the table, make\nlife happy, but a sober judgment, investigating the motives for action\nand for inaction, and dispelling those greatest enemies of our peace,\nprejudices. The root from which it springs,\n\n\n\n[(1) Intelligence.]\n\nand, therefore, the highest good, is intelligence. [1287] It is\nintelligence that leaves us free to acquire possession thereof, without\nbeing ever too early or too late. [1288] Our indispensable wants are\nsimple, little being necessary to ensure freedom from pain; other\nthings only afford change in enjoyment, by which the quantity is not\nincreased, or else they rest on a mere sentiment. [1289] The little we\nneed may be easily attained. Nature makes ample provision for our\nhappiness, would we only receive her gifts thankfully, not forgetting\nwhat she gives in thinking what we desire. [1290] He who lives\naccording to nature is never poor; the wise man living on bread and\nwater has no reason to envy Zeus; [1291] chance has little hold on him;\nwith him judgment is everything, [1292] and if that be right, he need\ntrouble himself but little about external mishaps. [1293] Not even\nbodily pain appeared to Epicurus so irresistible as to be able to cloud\nthe wise man\u2019s happiness. Although he regards as unnatural the Stoic\u2019s\ninsensibility to pain, [1294] still he is of opinion that the wise man\nmay be happy on the rack, and can smile at pains the most violent,\nexclaiming in the midst of torture, How sweet! [1295] A touch of forced\nsentiment may be discerned in the last expression, and a trace of\nself-satisfied exaggeration is manifest even in the beautiful language\nof the dying philosopher on the pains of disease. [1296] Nevertheless,\nthe principle involved is based in the spirit of the Epicurean\nphilosophy, and borne out by the testimony of the founder. The main\nthing, according to Epicurus, is not the state of the body, but the\nstate of the mind; bodily pleasure being of short duration, and having\nmuch about it to unsettle; mental enjoyments only being pure and\nincorruptible. For the same reason mental sufferings are more severe\nthan those of the body, since the body only suffers from present ills,\nwhilst the soul feels those past and those to come. [1297] In a life of\nlimited duration the pleasures of the flesh never attain their\nconsummation. Mind only, by consoling us for the limited nature of our\nbodily existence, can produce a life complete in itself, and not\nstanding in need of unlimited duration. [1298]\n\n\n\n[(2) Reasons for rising superior to the senses.]\n\nAt the same time, the Epicureans, if consistent with their principles,\ncould not deny that bodily pleasure is the earlier form, and likewise\nthe ultimate source, of all pleasure, and neither Epicurus nor his\nfavourite pupil Metrodorus shrank from making this admission; Epicurus\ndeclaring that he could form no conception of the good apart from\nenjoyments [1299] of the senses; Metrodorus asserting that everything\ngood has reference to the belly. [1300] For all that the Epicureans did\nnot feel themselves driven to give up the pre-eminence which they\nclaimed for goods of the soul over those of the body. Did even the\nStoics, notwithstanding the grossness of their theory of knowledge,\never abate their demand for a knowledge of conceptions; or cease to\nsubordinate the senses to reason, although they built their theory of\nmorals on nature? But all definite character has vanished from these\nintellectual joys and pains. The only distinctive feature which they\npossess is the addition either of memory, or of hope, or of fear [1301]\nto the present feeling of pleasure or pain; and their greater\nimportance is simply ascribed to the greater force or duration\nbelonging to ideal feelings as compared with the attractions which\nmomentarily impress the senses. [1302] Incidentally the remembrance of\nphilosophic discourses is mentioned [1303] as a counterpoise to bodily\npain; properly speaking, mental pleasures and pains are not different\nfrom other pleasures in kind, but only in degree, by reason of their\nbeing stronger and more enduring. Accordingly Epicurus cannot escape\nthe admission that we have no cause for rejecting gross and carnal\nenjoyments if these can liberate us from the fear of higher powers, of\ndeath, and of sufferings; [1304] and thus the only consolation he can\noffer in pain is the uncertain one that the most violent pains either\ndo not last long, or else put an end to life; and the less violent ones\nought to be endured since they do not exclude a counterbalancing\npleasure. [1305] Hence victory over the impression of the moment must\nbe won, not so much by mental force stemming the tide of feeling, as by\na proper estimate of the conditions and actions of the senses.\n\n\n\n[(3) Virtue.]\n\nIn no other way can the necessity of virtue be established in the\nEpicurean system. Agreeing with the strictest moralists, so far as to\nhold that virtue can be as little separated from happiness as happiness\nfrom virtue, [1306] having even the testimony of opponents as to the\npurity and integrity of his moral teaching, which in its results\ndiffered in no wise from that of the Stoics; [1307] Epicurus,\nnevertheless, holds a position of strong contrast to the Stoics in\nrespect of the grounds on which his moral theory is based. To demand\nvirtue for its own sake seemed to him a mere phantom of the\nimagination. Those only who make pleasure their aim have a real object\nin life. [1308] Virtue has only a conditional value [1309] as a means\nto happiness; or, as it is otherwise expressed, [1310] Virtue taken by\nitself does not render a man happy, but the pleasure arising from the\nexercise of virtue. This pleasure the Epicurean system does not seek in\nthe consciousness of duty fulfilled, or of virtuous action, but in the\nfreedom from disquiet, fear, and dangers, which follows as a\nconsequence from virtue. Wisdom and intelligence contribute to\nhappiness by liberating us from the fear of the Gods and of death, by\nmaking us independent of immoderate passions and vain desires, by\nteaching us to bear pain as something subordinate and passing, and by\npointing the way to a more cheerful and natural life. [1311]\nSelf-control aids, in that it points out the attitude to be assumed\ntowards pleasure and pain, so as to receive the maximum of enjoyment\nand the minimum of suffering; [1312] valour, in that it enables us to\novercome fear and pain; [1313] justice, in that it makes life possible\nwithout that fear of Gods and men, which ever haunts the transgressor.\n[1314] To the Epicurean virtue is never an end in itself, but only a\nmeans to an end lying beyond\u2014a happy life\u2014but withal a means so certain\nand necessary, that virtue can neither be conceived without happiness,\nnor happiness without virtue. However unnecessary it may seem, still\nEpicurus would ever insist that an action to be right must be done not\naccording to the letter, but according to the spirit of the law, not\nsimply from regard to others, or by compulsion, but from delight in\nwhat is good. [1315]\n\n\n\n\n[C. The wise man.]\n\nThe same claims were advanced by Epicurus on behalf of his wise man as\nthe Stoics had urged on behalf of theirs. Not only does he attribute to\nhim a control over pain, in nothing inferior to the Stoic insensibility\nof feeling, but he endeavours himself to describe the wise man\u2019s life\nas most perfect and satisfactory in itself. Albeit not free from\nemotions, and in particular susceptible to the higher feelings of the\nsoul such as compassion, the wise man finds his philosophic activity in\nno wise thereby impaired. [1316] Without despising enjoyment, he is\naltogether master of his desires, and knows how to restrain them by\nintelligence, so that they never exercise a harmful influence on life.\nHe alone has an unwavering certainty of conviction; [1317] he alone\nknows how to do the right thing in the right way; he alone, as\nMetrodorus observes, [1318] knows how to be thankful. Nay, more, he is\nso far exalted above ordinary men, that Epicurus promises his pupils\nthat, by carefully observing his teaching, they will dwell as Gods\namong men; [1319] so little can destiny influence him, that he calls\nhim happy under all circumstances. [1320] Happiness may, indeed, depend\non certain external conditions; it may even be allowed that the\ndisposition to happiness is not found in every nature, nor in every\nperson; [1321] but still, when it is found, its stability is sure, nor\ncan time affect its duration. For wisdom\u2014so Epicurus and the Stoics\nalike believed\u2014is indestructible, [1322] and the wise man\u2019s happiness\ncan never be increased by time. A life, therefore, bounded by time can\nbe quite as complete as one not so bounded. [1323]\n\nDifferent as are the principles and the tone of the systems of the\nStoics and of Epicurus, one and the same tendency may yet be traced in\nboth\u2014the tendency which characterises all the post-Aristotelian\nphilosophy\u2014the desire to place man in a position of absolute\nindependence by emancipating him from connection with the external\nworld, and by awakening in him the consciousness of the infinite\nfreedom of thought. [1324]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\n\nTHE EPICUREAN ETHICS CONTINUED: SPECIAL POINTS.\n\n\n[A. The individual.]\n\nThe general principles already laid down determine likewise the\ncharacter of particular points in the moral science of the Epicureans.\nEpicurus, it is true, never developed his moral views to a systematic\ntheory of moral actions and states, however much his pupils,\nparticularly in later times, busied themselves with morality and\nspecial points in a system of morals. [1325] Moreover, his fragmentary\nstatements and precepts are very imperfectly recorded. Still, all that\nis known corresponds with the notion which we must form in accordance\nwith those general views. All the practical rules given by Epicurus aim\nat conducting man to happiness by controlling passions and desires. The\nwise man is easily satisfied. He sees that little is necessary for\nsupplying the wants of nature, and for emancipating from pain; that\nimaginary wealth knows no limit, whereas the riches required by nature\nmay be easily acquired; [1326] that the most simple nourishment affords\nas much enjoyment as the most luxurious, and is at the same time far\nmore conducive to health; [1327] that therefore the restriction of\nwants rather than the increase of possessions makes really rich; [1328]\nand that he who is not satisfied with little will never be satisfied at\nall. [1329] He therefore can like Epicurus live upon bread and water,\n[1330] and at the same time think himself as happy as Zeus. [1331] He\neschews passions which disturb peace of mind and the repose of life;\nconsidering it foolish to throw away the present in order to obtain an\nuncertain future, or to sacrifice life itself for the means of life,\nseeing he can only once enjoy it. [1332] He therefore neither gives way\nto passionate love, nor to forbidden acts of profligacy. [1333] Fame he\ndoes not covet; and for the opinions of men he cares only so far as to\nwish not to be despised, since being despised would expose him to\ndanger. [1334] Injuries he can bear with calmness. [1335] He cares not\nwhat may happen to him after death; [1336] nor envies any one the\npossessions which he does not himself value. [1337]\n\nIt has been already seen how Epicurus thought to rise above pains, and\nto emancipate himself from the fear of the Gods and death. [1338] And\nit has been further noticed that he thinks to secure by means of his\nprinciples the same independence and happiness which the Stoics aspired\nto by means of theirs. But whilst the Stoics hoped to attain this\nindependence by crushing the senses, Epicurus was content to restrain\nand regulate them. Desires he would not have uprooted, but he would\nhave them brought into proper proportion to the collective end and\ncondition of life, into the equilibrium necessary for perfect repose of\nmind. Hence, notwithstanding his own simplicity, Epicurus is far from\ndisapproving, under all circumstances, of a fuller enjoyment of life.\nThe wise man will not live as a Cynic or a beggar. [1339] Care for\nbusiness he will not neglect; only he will not trouble himself too much\nabout it, and will prefer the business of education to any and every\nother. [1340] Nor will he despise the attractions of art, although he\nis satisfied when obliged to do without them. [1341] In short, his\nself-sufficiency will not consist in using little, but in needing\nlittle; and it is this freedom from wants which adds flavour to his\nmore luxurious enjoyments. [1342] His attitude to death is the same.\nNot fearing death, rather seeking it when he has no other mode of\nescaping unendurable suffering, he will resort to suicide if necessary,\nbut the cases will be rare, because he has learnt to be happy under all\nbodily pains. The Stoic\u2019s recommendation of suicide finds no favour\nwith him. [1343]\n\n\n\n\n[B. Civil society and the family.]\n\n[(1) Civil society.]\n\nHowever self-sufficing the wise man may be, still Epicurus will not\nseparate him from connection with others. Not, indeed, that he believed\nwith the Stoics in the natural relationship of all rational beings.\n[1344] Yet even he could form no idea of human life except in\nconnection with human society. He does not, however, assign the same\nvalue to all forms of social life. Civil society and the state have for\nhim the least attraction. Civil society is only an external association\nfor the purpose of protection. Justice reposes originally on a contract\nentered into for purposes of mutual security. [1345] Laws are made for\nthe sake of the wise, not to prevent their committing, but to prevent\ntheir suffering injustice. [1346] Law and justice are not, therefore,\nbinding for their own sake, but for the general good; nor is injustice\nto be condemned for its own sake, but only because the offender can\nnever be free from fear of discovery and punishment. [1347] There is\nnot, therefore, any such thing as universal, unchangeable justice. The\nclaims of justice only extend to a limited number of beings and\nnations\u2014those, in fact, which are able and willing to enter into the\nsocial compact. And the particular applications of justice which\nconstitute positive right differ in different cases, and change with\ncircumstances. What is felt to be conducive to mutual security must\npass for justice, and whenever a law is seen to be inexpedient it is no\nlonger binding. [1348] The wise man will therefore only enter into\npolitical life in case and in as far as this is necessary for his own\nsafety. Sovereign power is a good, inasmuch as it protects from harm.\nHe who pursues it, without thereby attaining this object, acts most\nfoolishly. [1349] Since private individuals live as a rule much more\nquietly and safely than statesmen, it was natural that the Epicureans\nshould be averse to public affairs; public life, after all, is a\nhindrance to what is the real end-in-chief\u2014wisdom and happiness. [1350]\nTheir watchword is \u039b\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5 \u03b2\u03b9\u03ce\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2. [1351] To them the golden mean seemed\nby far the most desirable lot in life. [1352] They only advise citizens\nto take part in public affairs when special circumstances render it\nnecessary, [1353] or when an individual has such a restless nature that\nhe cannot be content with the quiet of private life. [1354] Otherwise\nthey are too deeply convinced of the impossibility of pleasing the\nmasses to wish even to make the attempt. [1355] For the same reason\nthey appear to have been partisans of monarchy. The stern and\nunflinching moral teaching of the Stoics had found its political\nexpression in the unbending republican spirit, so often encountered at\nRome. Naturally the soft and timid spirit of the Epicureans took\nshelter under a monarchical constitution. Of their political principles\none thing at least is known, that they did not consider it degrading\nfor a wise man to pay court to princes, and under all circumstances\nthey recommended unconditional obedience to the powers that be. [1356]\n\n\n\n[(2) Family life.]\n\nFamily life is said to have been deprecated by Epicurus equally with\ncivil life. [1357] Stated thus baldly, this is an exaggeration. It\nappears, however, to be established, that Epicurus believed it to be\ngenerally better for the wise man to forego marriage and the rearing\nof children, since he would thereby save himself many disturbances.\n[1358] It is also quite credible that he declared the love of children\ntowards parents to be no inborn feeling. [1359] This view is, after\nall, only a legitimate consequence of his materialism; but it did not\noblige him to give up parental love altogether. Nay, it is asserted of\nhim that he was anything but a stranger to family affections. [1360]\n\n\n\n\n[C. Friendship.]\n\nThe highest form of social life was considered by Epicurus to be\nfriendship\u2014a view which is peculiar in a system that regarded the\nindividual as the atom of society. Such a system naturally attributes\nmore value to a connection with others freely entered upon and based on\nindividual character and personal inclination, than to one in which a\nman finds himself placed without any choice, as a member of a society\nfounded on nature or history. The basis, however, on which the\nEpicurean friendship rests is very superficial; regard is mainly had to\nits advantages, and in some degree to the natural effects of common\nenjoyments; [1361] but it is also treated in such a way, that its\nscientific imperfection has no influence on its moral importance. Only\none section of the School, and that not the most consistent, maintained\nthat friendship is pursued in the first instance for the sake of its\nown use and pleasure, but that it subsequently becomes an unselfish\nlove. [1362] The assumption that among the wise there exists a tacit\nagreement requiring them to love one another as much as they love\nthemselves, is clearly only a lame shift. [1363] Still, the Epicureans\nwere of opinion that a grounding of friendship on motives of utility\nwas not inconsistent with holding it in the highest esteem. Friendly\nconnection with others affords so pleasant a feeling of security, that\nit entails the most enjoyable consequences; and since this connection\ncan only exist when friends love one another as themselves, it follows\nthat self-love and the love of a friend must be equally strong. [1364]\n\nEven this inference sounds forced, nor does it fully state the grounds\non which Epicurus\u2019s view of the value of friendship reposes. That view,\nin fact, was anterior to all the necessary props of the system. What\nEpicurus requires is primarily enjoyment. The first conditions of such\nenjoyment, however, are inward repose of mind, and the removal of fear\nof disturbances. But Epicurus was far too effeminate and dependent on\nexternals to trust his own powers to satisfy these conditions. He\nneeded the support of others, not only to obtain their help in\nnecessity and trouble, and to console himself for the uncertainty of\nthe future, but still more, to make sure of himself and his principles\nby having the approval of others, and thus obtaining an inward\nsatisfaction which he could not otherwise have had. Thus, the approval\nof friends is to him the pledge of the truth of his convictions. In\nsympathy with friends his mind first attains to a strength by which it\nis able to rise above the changing circumstances of life. General ideas\nare for him too abstract, too unreal. A philosopher who considers\nindividual beings as alone real, and perceptions as absolutely true,\ncannot feel quite happy and sure of his ground, unless he finds others\nto go with him. [1365] The enjoyment which he seeks is the enjoyment of\nhis own cultivated personality; and wherever this standard prevails,\nparticular value is attached to the personal relations of society, and\nto friendship. [1366]\n\nHence Epicurus uses language on the value and necessity of friendship\nwhich goes far beyond the grounds on which he bases it. Friendship is\nunconditionally the highest of earthly goods. [1367] It is far more\nimportant in whose company we eat and drink, than what we eat and\ndrink. [1368] In case of emergency, the wise man will not shrink from\nsuffering the greatest pains, even death, for his friend. [1369]\n\nIt is well known that the conduct of Epicurus and his followers was in\nharmony with these professions. The Epicurean friendship is hardly less\ncelebrated than the Pythagorean. [1370] There may be an offensive\nmawkishness and a tendency to mutual admiration apparent in the\nrelations of Epicurus to his friends, [1371] but of the sincerity of\nhis feelings there can be no doubt. One single expression referring to\nthe property of friends, [1372] is enough to prove what a high view\nEpicurus held of friendship; and there is evidence to show that he\naimed at a higher improvement of his associates. [1373]\n\nIn other respects Epicurus bore the reputation of being a kind,\nbenevolent, and genial companion. [1374] His teaching bears the same\nimpress. It meets the inexorable sternness of the Stoics by insisting\non compassion and forgiveness, [1375] and supersedes its own egotism by\nthe maxim that it is more blessed to give than to receive. [1376] The\nnumber of such maxims on record is, no doubt, limited; nevertheless,\nthe whole tone of the Epicurean School is a pledge of the humane and\ngenerous character of its moral teaching. [1377] To this trait that\nSchool owes its chief importance in history. By its theory of utility\nit undoubtedly did much harm, partly exposing, partly helping forward,\nthe moral decline of the classic nations. Still, by drawing man away\nfrom the outer world within himself, by teaching him to seek happiness\nin the beautiful type of a cultivated mind content with itself, it\ncontributed quite as much as Stoicism, though after a gentler fashion,\nto the development and the extension of a more independent and more\nuniversal morality.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\n\nTHE EPICUREAN SYSTEM AS A WHOLE; ITS POSITION IN HISTORY.\n\n\n[A. Inner connection of the Epicurean teaching.]\n\nIt has often been urged against the Epicurean philosophy, that it is\ndeficient both in coherence and consistency. Nor is this objection\nwithout foundation. If we come to the study of it, looking for a\ncomplete scientific groundwork, or a strictly logical development, we\nshall certainly be disappointed. It is not difficult to show in what\ncontradictions Epicurus was involved; in professing to trust the senses\nwholly and entirely, and yet going beyond the senses to the hidden\ncauses of things; in despising logical forms and laws, and at the same\ntime building up his whole system on deductions; in holding that all\nsensations are true, but yet maintaining that a portion of the\nrealities which they represent as belonging to things is only relative.\nNor were these the only inconsistencies. At one time only natural\ncauses and laws are acknowledged, and any such thing as free will and\nimagination is ignored; at another, by the doctrine of the swerving\naside of atoms and of the human will, unexplained caprice is elevated\nto the rank of law. Pleasures and pains are all referred to bodily\nsensations, and yet mental states are called higher and more important;\nnay, more, even from a basis of selfishness rules and precepts of\nhumanity, justice, love, faithfulness, and devotion are deduced. It\nought not, however, to be forgotten that the Stoics, to whom the claim\nof clear and consistent thought cannot be denied, were involved in\nsimilar difficulties. They, like the Epicureans, built up a rational\nsystem on a basis of the senses. They, too, constructed an ideal theory\nof morals on a material groundwork of metaphysics. They, too, declared\nthat universal law is the only active power, whilst they maintained\nthat reality belongs only to the world of matter. They, too, deduced a\nstrict theory of virtue from the principle of self-preservation; not to\nmention the inconsistent attitude which they assumed towards the\npopular religion. To deny to the Stoics a unity and connectedness of\nsystem, because of these scientific defects and inconsistencies, would\nbe felt to be doing them an injustice. And can Epicureanism be fairly\ncondemned, when its faults are essentially of the same kind (though a\nlittle more obvious) as those of the Stoics, without a single\nextenuating circumstance which can be urged on its behalf?\n\nThe strongest argument in favour of Epicureanism is that the\ndevelopment of the system does not pretend to rest upon an intellectual\nplatform. Epicurus sought in philosophy a path to happiness, a school\nof practical wisdom. For him knowledge has only a secondary value,\nbecause it contributes to this end; indeed, both the tone and the\nresults of his intellectual activity were determined by a reference to\nthis end. In the case of the Stoics, however, it has been already seen\nthat the comparative subordination of Logic and Natural Science to\nMoral Science, the going back to the older view of nature, the\nvindication of the truth of the senses and of the reality of matter,\ngrew out of their peculiarly one-sided view of the scope of philosophy.\nIn the case of Epicurus the same results appear, and all the more\nmarkedly, since Epicurus did not, like the Stoics, look for happiness\nin subordination to a universal law, but in individual gratification or\npleasure. For him the recognition of a universal law had not the same\nimportance as for the Stoics; and consequently Epicurus did not feel\nthe same need of a scientific method as they had done. He could\ntherefore more exclusively content himself with the impressions of the\nsenses, and regard them as the only unfailing source of knowledge. No\nnecessity compelled him to advance from pure materialism to a view of\nmatter in which it is described as possessing a soul, and made to be\nthe bearer of reason. In fact, the more exclusively everything was\nreferred by him to mechanical causes, the more easily could he regard\nthe individual as independent of all superhuman forces in his pursuit\nof happiness, and left entirely to himself and his natural powers. No\nsystem in ancient times has so consistently carried out the mechanical\nview of nature as that of the Atomists. None, therefore, afforded such\na strong metaphysical support to the Epicurean views of the absolute\nworth of the individual. It was as natural for Epicurus to build on the\nteaching of Democritus as for the Stoics to build on that of\nHeraclitus. But Epicurus, influenced probably more by practical than by\nscientific considerations, allowed himself, by his theory of the\nswerving aside of atoms, to destroy the consistency of the theory of\nDemocritus. [1378]\n\nIt is hardly necessary to notice here how the distinctive features of\nthe Epicurean morals were developed out of their theory of happiness,\nin contrast to the Stoic teaching. The happiness of Epicurus, however,\ndoes not depend upon sensual gratification as such, but upon repose of\nmind and cheerfulness of disposition. His theory of morals, therefore,\nnotwithstanding its foundation in pleasure, bears a nobler character,\nwhich is seen in its language as to the wise man\u2019s relations to the\npains and passions of the body, to poverty and riches, to life and\ndeath, quite as much as in the mild humanity and the warm and hearty\nappreciation of friendship by the Epicurean School. The rationalising\nspirit of that School was undoubtedly opposed to any religious belief\nwhich supposed an intervention of God in the course of the world, or\nthe world\u2019s influence on man for weal or woe; but its appeal to the\nsenses without criticism placed no objection in the way of admitting\ndivine beings, from whom no such intervention need be feared. Nay,\nmore, this belief seemed the most natural ground for explaining the\npopular belief in Gods. It satisfied an inborn and apparently keenly\nfelt want by supplying an appropriate object of devotion, and a\nstandard by which to test the accuracy of moral ideas. Hence,\nnotwithstanding scientific defects and contradictions, the whole system\nof Epicurus bears a definite stamp. All the essential parts of that\nsystem are subservient to one and the same end. The consistent working\nout of a scientific view of nature is looked for in vain; but there is\nno lack of consistency arising from an undeniable reference of the\nindividual to a definite and practical standard.\n\n\n\n\n[B. Historical position of Epicureanism.]\n\n[(1) Relation to Stoicism.]\n\nLooking to the wider historical relations of the Epicurean system, the\nfirst point which calls for remark is the relation of that system to\nStoicism. The contrast between the two Schools is obvious; attention\nhaving been already drawn to it on all the more important points. It is\nlikewise well known that a constant rivalry existed between the two\nSchools during their whole careers, that the Stoics looked down on the\nEpicureans, and circulated many calumnies with respect to their morals.\nFor these statements proofs may be found in the preceding pages.\nNevertheless, the two Schools are related in so many respects, that\nthey can only be regarded as parallel links connected in one chain,\ntheir differences being varieties where the same main tendency\n\n\n[(a) Points of agreement.]\n\nexists. Both agree in the general character of their philosophy. In\nboth practical considerations prevail over speculation. Both treat\nnatural science and logic as sciences subsidiary to ethics\u2014natural\nscience especially in view of its bearing on religion. Both attach more\nimportance to natural science than to logic. If the Epicurean neglect\nof scientific rules forms a contrast to the care which the Stoics\ndevoted thereto, both Schools are at least agreed in one thing\u2014in\ndisplaying greater independence in investigating the question as to a\ntest of truth. By both this standard was placed in the senses; and to\nall appearances both were led to take this view by the same cause;\nappeals to the senses being a consequence of their purely practical way\nof looking at things. Both, moreover, employed against scepticism the\nsame practical postulate\u2014the argument that knowledge must be possible,\nor no certainty of action would be possible. They even agree in not\nbeing content with the phenomena supplied by the senses as such,\nalthough Epicurus as little approved of the Stoic theory of\nirresistible impressions as he did of their logical analysis of the\nforms of thought. With such appeals to the senses how could there be\nany other result than materialism both in the Stoic and Epicurean\nsystems? But it is strange that the materialism in both Schools should\nbe based on the same definition of reality, corresponding with their\npractical way of looking at things. [1379]\n\n\n[(b) Points of difference.]\n\nIn the unfolding and detailed exposition of their materialistic views\nthe systems diverge, more widely, perhaps, than the philosophers\nthemselves, whose leading they professed to follow. These divergencies\nappear particularly on the subject of nature, the Stoics regarding\nnature as a system of design, the Epicureans explaining it as a\nmechanical product. Whilst the Stoics adhered to fatalism, and saw God\neverywhere, the Epicureans held the theory of atoms, and the theory of\nnecessity. Whilst the Stoics were speculatively orthodox, the\nEpicureans were irreligious freethinkers. Both meet again in that\nbranch of natural science which is most important in respect of\nmorals\u2014the part dealing with man. Both hold that the soul is a fiery\natmospheric substance. Even the proof for this view, derived from the\nmutual influence of body and soul, is common to both. Both distinguish\nbetween the higher and the lower parts of the soul, and thus even the\nEpicureans in their psychology allow a belief in the superiority of\nreason to the senses, and in the divine origin of the soul.\n\nThe arena of the warmest dispute between the two Schools is, however,\nethics. Yet, even on this ground, they are more nearly related than\nappears at first sight. No greater contrast appears to be possible than\nthat between the Epicurean theory of pleasure and the Stoic theory of\nvirtue; and true it is that the two theories are diametrically\nopposite. Nevertheless, not only are both aiming at one and the same\nend\u2014the happiness of mankind\u2014but the conditions of happiness are also\nlaid down by both in the same spirit. According to Zeno virtue,\naccording to Epicurus pleasure, is the highest and only good; but the\nformer in making virtue consist essentially in withdrawal from the\nsenses or insensibility; the latter in seeking pleasure in repose of\nmind or imperturbability, are expressing the same belief. Man can only\nfind unconditional and enduring satisfaction, when by means of\nknowledge he attains to a condition of mind at rest with itself, and\nalso to an independence of external attractions and misfortunes. The\nsame unlimited appeal to personal truth is the common groundwork of\nboth systems. Both have expanded this idea under the same form\u2014that of\nthe ideal wise man\u2014for the most part with the same features. The wise\nman of Epicurus is, as we have seen, superior to pain and want; he\nenjoys an excellence which cannot be lost; and he lives among men a\nvery God in intelligence and happiness. Thus, when worked out into\ndetails, the difference in the estimate of pleasure and virtue by the\nStoics and Epicureans seems to vanish. Neither the Stoic can separate\nhappiness from virtue, nor the Epicurean separate virtue from\nhappiness.\n\nBut, whilst recommending a living for society, both systems take no\nreal interest in social life. The recognition of a natural society\namongst mankind, of certain positive relations to state and family,\nabove all, a clear enunciation of a citizenship of the world,\ncharacterise the Stoics. The pursuit of friendship, and the gentle\nhumanity of their ethics, characterise the Epicureans. Together with\nthese peculiarities one common feature cannot be ignored. Both have\nrenounced the political character of the old propriety of conduct, and\ndiverting their attention from public life, seek to find a basis for\nuniversal morality in the simple relation of man to man.\n\n\n[(c) The relationship greater than the difference.]\n\nThe united weight of all these points of resemblance is sufficient to\nwarrant the assertion that, notwithstanding their differences, the\nStoics and Epicureans stand on the same footing, and that the sharpness\nof the contrast between them is owing to their laying hold of opposite\nsides of one and the same principle. Abstract personality, and\nself-consciousness developed into a generic idea, is for both the\nhighest aim. Compared with it not only the state of the senses, but the\nscientific knowledge of things, and the realisation of moral ideas in a\ncommonwealth, are of minor importance. In this self-consciousness\nhappiness consists. To implant it in man is the object of philosophy,\nand knowledge is only of value when and in as far as it ministers to\nthis end. The point of difference between the two Schools is their view\nof the conditions under which that certainty of consciousness is\nattained. The Stoics hope to attain it by the entire subordination of\nthe individual to universal law. The Epicureans, on the other hand, are\nof opinion that man can only then be content in himself when he is\nrestrained by nothing external to himself. The first condition of\nhappiness consists in liberating individual life from all dependence on\nothers, and all disturbing causes. The former, therefore, make virtue,\nthe latter make personal well-being or pleasure, the highest good. By\nthe Epicureans, however, pleasure is usually conceived as of a purely\nnegative character, as being freedom from pain, and is referred to the\nwhole of human life. Hence it is always made to depend on the\nmoderation of desires, on indifference to outward ills, and the state\nof the senses, on intelligence and actions conformable with\nintelligence, in short, on virtue and wisdom. Hence, too, the\nEpicureans arrive by a roundabout course at the same result as the\nStoics\u2014the conviction that happiness can only be the lot of those who\nare altogether independent of external things, and enjoy perfect inward\nharmony.\n\n\n\n[(2) Relation to Aristippus.]\n\nTowards the older philosophy Epicureanism bears nearly the same\nrelation as Stoicism. True it is that Epicurus and his School would not\nrecognise their obligation to either one or other of their\npredecessors. [1380] But far from disproving the influence of previous\nsystems on his own, this conduct only shows the personal vanity of\nEpicurus. Epicureanism, like Stoicism, starts with the object of\nbringing down science from metaphysical speculation to the simpler form\nof a practical science of life. Both systems of philosophy, therefore,\nturn away from Plato and Aristotle, whose labours they notably neglect,\nto Socrates and those Socratic Schools which, without more extensive\nmeddling with science, are content with ethics. Circumstances, however,\nled Epicurus to follow Aristippus as Zeno had followed Antisthenes. Not\nonly in morals did Epicurus derive his principle of pleasure from the\nCyrenaics; he likewise derived from them his theory of knowledge, that\nthe sense-impressions are the only source of ideas, and that every\nfeeling is true in itself. Nor can he altogether deny that feelings\nonly furnish direct information respecting our personal states, and\nrespecting the relative properties of things. With the Cyrenaics, too,\nhe taught that true pleasure can only be secured by philosophic\nintelligence, and that this intelligence aims, before all things, at\nliberating the mind from passion, fear, and superstition. At the same\ntime, he is by no means prepared to follow the Cyrenaics unreservedly.\nHis theory of morals differs, as has already been seen, from the\nCyrenaic theory in this important particular, that not sensual and\nindividual pleasure, but mental repose and the whole state of the mind\nis regarded as the ultimate end, and the highest good in life. It was\nthus impossible for him to be content, as the Cyrenaics were, with\nfeelings only, with individual and personal impressions. He could not\nhelp requiring conviction which reposed on a real knowledge of things,\nsince only on such conviction can an equable and certain tone of mind\ndepend.\n\n\n\n[(3) Relation to Democritus.]\n\nEpicurus, therefore, not only differed from Aristippus with regard to\nfeelings, by referring all feelings to impressions from without, of\nwhich he considered them true representations, but he felt himself\ncalled upon to oppose the Cyrenaic contempt for theories of nature,\njust as the Stoics had opposed the Cynic contempt for science. To the\nphysics of Democritus he looked for a scientific basis for his ethics,\njust as they had looked to the system of Heraclitus. But the closer he\nclung to Democritus, owing to the weakness of his own interest in\nnature, the more it becomes apparent that his whole study of nature was\nsubservient to a moral purpose, and hence of a purely relative value.\nAccordingly, he had not the least hesitation in setting consistency at\ndefiance, by assuming the swerving aside of atoms and the freedom of\nthe will. It is not only altogether improbable that Epicurus was but a\nsecond edition of Democritus\u2014for history knows of no such\nrepetitions\u2014but as a matter of fact it is false. Closer observation\nproves that even when the two philosophers agree in individual\nstatements, the meaning which they attach to these assertions and the\nwhole spirit of their systems are widely divergent. Democritus aims at\nexplaining natural phenomena by natural causes. He wishes, in short,\nfor a science of nature purely for its own sake. Epicurus wishes for a\nview of nature which shall be able to avert disturbing influences from\nman\u2019s inner life. Natural science stands with him entirely in the\nservice of ethics. If in point of substance his system is borrowed from\nanother system, yet its whole position and treatment supposes an\nentirely new view of things. The Socratic introspection, and the\nSophistic resolution of natural philosophy into personal rationalising,\nare its historical antecedents; and it owes its existence to that\ngeneral dislike for pure theory, which constitutes the common\npeculiarity of all the post-Aristotelian systems.\n\n\n\n[(4) Relation to Aristotle and Plato.]\n\nExcepting the systems named, Epicureanism, so far as is known, is\nconnected with no other previous system. Even its attack upon those\nsystems appears to have consisted of general dogmatic and superficial\nstatements. Still it must not be forgotten that Epicureanism\npresupposes the line of thought originated by Socrates, not only as\nfound in the collateral Cyrenaic branch, but as found in the main line\nof regular development by Plato and Aristotle. The view of Plato and\nAristotle, which distinguishes the immaterial essence from the sensible\nappearance of things, and attributes reality only to the former, is\nundoubtedly attacked by Epicurus as by Zeno, on metaphysical grounds.\nPractically, however, he approaches very much nearer to this view in\nall those points in which his teaching deviates from the Cyrenaic and\nresembles that of the Stoics.\n\nIt has been observed on a former occasion that the indifference to the\nimmediate conditions of the senses, the withdrawal of the mind within\nitself, the contentment with itself of the thinking subject, which\nEpicurus no less than the Stoics and cotemporary Sceptics required, is\nitself a consequence of the idealism of Plato and Aristotle. Even the\nmaterialism of the post-Aristotelian systems, it is said, was by no\nmeans a going back to the old pre-Socratic philosophy of nature, but a\none-sided practical apprehension of that idealism. These systems deny a\nsoul in nature or a soul in man, because they look exclusively to\nconsciousness and to personal activity for independence of the senses.\nThe correctness of this observation may be easily proved from the\nEpicurean teaching, notwithstanding the severity and harshness of its\nmaterialism. Why was it that Epicurus relentlessly banished from nature\nall immaterial causes and all idea of purpose? And why did he confine\nhimself exclusively to a mechanical explanation of nature? Was it not\nbecause he felt afraid that the admission of any other than material\ncauses would imperil the certainty of consciousness; because he feared\nto lose the firm groundwork of reality by admitting invisible forces,\nand to expose human life to influences beyond calculation if he allowed\nanything immaterial? Yet in his view of life, how little does he adhere\nto present facts, since his wise man is made to enjoy perfect happiness\nby himself alone, independent of everything external. The same ideal is\nreproduced in the Epicurean Gods. In their isolated contemplation of\nthemselves, what else do they resemble but the God of Aristotle, who,\naloof from all intermeddling with the world, meditates on himself\nalone? No doubt the independent existence of the thinking mind is held\nby Aristotle in a clear and dignified manner. By Epicurus it is\npourtrayed in a sensuous, and, therefore, a contradictory form. But the\nconnection of the views of both cannot be ignored. There is a similar\ngeneral relation between the Epicurean philosophy and that of Plato and\nAristotle. [1381] Little as the former can be compared with the latter\nin breadth and depth, it must not, therefore, be regarded as an\nintellectual monstrosity. Epicureanism is a tenable though one-sided\nexpression of a certain stage in the development of the intellect of\nGreece.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPART IV.\n\nTHE SCEPTICS\u2014PYRRHO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII.\n\nPYRRHO.\n\n\n[A. Historical position of Scepticism.]\n\nStoicism and Epicureanism are alike in one respect: they commence the\npursuit of happiness with definite dogmatic statements. The Sceptic\nSchools, however, attempt to reach the same end by denying every\ndogmatic position. Varied as the paths may be, the result is in all\ncases the same; happiness is made to consist in the exaltation of the\nmind above all external objects, in the withdrawal of man within his\nown thinking self. Moving in the same sphere\n\n\n\n[(1) Its relation to cotemporary dogmatic systems.]\n\nas the cotemporary dogmatic systems, the post-Aristotelian Scepticism\ntakes a practical view of the business of philosophy, and estimates the\nvalue of theoretical enquiries by their influence on the state and\nhappiness of man. It moreover agrees with cotemporary systems in its\nethical view of life; the object at which it aims is the same as that\nat which those systems aim, viz. repose of mind, and imperturbability.\nIt differs from them, none the less; for the Epicureans and Stoics made\nmental repose to depend on a knowledge of the world and its laws,\nwhereas the Sceptics are of opinion that it can only be obtained by\ndespairing of all knowledge. Hence, with the former morality depends on\na positive conviction as to the highest Good; with the latter, morality\nconsists in indifference to all that appears as Good to men. Important\nas this difference may be, it must not therefore be forgotten that\nScepticism generally revolves in the same sphere as Stoicism and\nEpicureanism, and that in renouncing all claim to knowledge, and all\ninterest in the external world, it is only pushing to extremes that\nwithdrawal of man into himself which we have seen to be the common\nfeature of these Schools. Not only, therefore, do these three lines of\nthought belong to one and the same epoch, but such is their internal\nconnection that they may be regarded as three branches of a common\nstock.\n\n\n\n[(2) Causes producing it.]\n\nMore than one point of departure was offered to Scepticism by the\nearlier philosophy. The Megarian criticism and the Cynic teaching had\ntaken up a position subversive of all connection of ideas, and of all\nknowledge. Pyrrho, too, had received from the School of Democritus an\nimpulse to doubt. [1382] In particular, the development of the Platonic\nand Aristotelian speculations by those who were not able to follow\nthem, had made men mistrustful of all speculation, until they at last\ndoubted the possibility of all knowledge. Not seldom do Sceptical\ntheories follow times of great philosophical originality. A stronger\nimpulse was given in the sequel by the Stoic and Epicurean systems.\nRelated to Scepticism by their practical tone, it was natural that\nthese systems should afford fuel to Scepticism. At the same time the\nunsatisfactory groundwork upon which they were built, and the contrast\nbetween their moral and physical teaching, promoted destructive\ncriticism. If, according to the Stoics and Epicureans, the particular\nand the universal elements in the personal soul, the isolation of the\nindividual as an independent atom, and his being merged in a\npantheistic universe, are contrasted without being reconciled; among\nthe Sceptics this contrast has given place to neutrality. Neither the\nStoic nor the Epicurean theory can claim our adherence; neither the\nunconditional value of pleasure, nor yet the unconditional value of\nvirtue; neither the truth of the senses nor the truth of rational\nknowledge; neither the Atomist\u2019s view of nature, nor the Pantheistic\nview as it found expression in Heraclitus. The only thing which remains\ncertain amid universal uncertainty is abstract personality content with\nitself, personality forming at once the starting-point and the goal of\nthe two contending systems.\n\nThe important back-influence of Stoicism and Epicureanism upon\nScepticism may be best gathered from the fact that Scepticism only\nattained a wide extension and a more comprehensive basis in the New\nAcademy after the appearance of those systems. Before that time its\nleading features had been indeed laid down by Pyrrho, but they had\nnever been developed into a permanent School of Scepticism, nor given\nrise to an expanded theory of doubt.\n\n\n\n[(3) Pyrrho and his followers.]\n\nPyrrho was a native of Elis, [1383] and may therefore have early made\nthe acquaintance of the Elean and Megarian criticism\u2014that criticism, in\nfact, which was the precursor of subsequent Scepticism. It can,\nhowever, hardly be true that Bryso was his instructor. [1384] To\nAnaxarchus, a follower of Democritus, he attached himself, and\naccompanied that philosopher with Alexander\u2019s army as far as India.\n[1385] Perhaps, however, he is less indebted to Anaxarchus for the\nsceptical than for the ethical parts of his teaching. [1386] At a later\nperiod he resided in his native city, [1387] honoured by his\nfellow-citizens, [1388] but in poor circumstances, [1389] which he bore\nwith his characteristic repose of mind. [1390] He died, it would\nappear, at an advanced age, [1391] between 275 and 270 B.C., leaving no\nwritings behind. [1392] Even the ancients, therefore, only knew his\nteaching by that of his pupils, among whom Timon of Phlius was the most\ndistinguished. [1393] Besides Timon several other of his pupils are\nknown by name. [1394] His School, however, was short-lived. [1395] Soon\nafter Timon it seems to have become extinct. [1396] Those who were\ndisposed to be sceptical now joined the New Academy, towards whose\nfounder even Timon made no secret of his grudge. [1397]\n\n\n\n\n[B. Teaching of Pyrrho.]\n\n[(1) Impossibility of knowledge.]\n\nThe little which is known of Pyrrho\u2019s teaching may be summed up in the\nthree following statements: We can know nothing as to the nature of\nthings: Hence the right attitude towards them is to withhold judgment:\nThe necessary result of suspending judgment is imperturbability. He who\nwill live happily\u2014for happiness is the starting-point with the\nSceptics\u2014must, according to Timon, take these things into\nconsideration: What is the nature of things? What ought our attitude to\nthings to be? What is the gain resulting from these relations? [1398]\nTo the first of these three questions Pyrrho can only reply by saying\nthat things are altogether inaccessible to knowledge, and that whatever\nproperty may be attributed to a thing, with equal justice the opposite\nmay be predicated. [1399] In support of this statement Pyrrho appears\nto have argued that neither the senses nor reason furnish certain\nknowledge. [1400] The senses do not show things as they are, but only\nas they appear to be. [1401] Rational knowledge, even where it seems to\nbe most certain, in the sphere of morals, does not depend upon real\nknowledge, but only upon tradition and habit. [1402] Against every\nstatement the opposite may be advanced with equal justice. [1403] If,\nhowever, neither the senses nor reason alone can furnish trustworthy\ntestimony, no more can the two combined, and thus the third way is\nbarred, by which we might possibly have advanced to knowledge. [1404]\nHow many more of the arguments quoted by the later Sceptics belong to\nPyrrho it is impossible to say. The short duration and diffusion of\nPyrrho\u2019s School renders it probable that with him Scepticism was not\nfar advanced. The same result appears to follow from its further\ndevelopment in the Academy. The ten \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9, or aspects under which\nsceptical objections were grouped, cannot with certainty be attributed\nto any one before \u00c6nesidemus. [1405] Portions of the arguments used at\na later day may be borrowed from Pyrrho and his pupils, [1406] but it\nis impossible to discriminate these portions with certainty.\n\n\n\n[(2) Withholding of judgment.]\n\nThus, if knowledge of things proves to be a failure, there only remains\nas possible an attitude of pure Scepticism; and therein is contained\nthe answer to the second question. We know nothing whatever of the real\nnature of things, and hence can neither believe nor assert anything as\nto their nature. We cannot say of anything that it is or is not; but we\nmust abstain from every opinion, allowing that of all which appears to\nus to be true, the opposite may with equal justice be true. [1407]\nAccordingly, all our statements (as the Cyrenaics taught) only express\nindividual opinions, and not absolute realities. We cannot deny that\nthings appear to be of this or the other kind; but we can never say\nthat they are so. [1408] Even the assertion that things are of this or\nthe other kind is not an assertion, but a confession by the individual\nof his state of mind. [1409] Hence, too, the universal rule of\nindecision cannot be taken as an established principle, but only as a\nconfession, and, therefore, as only problematical. [1410] It must,\nhowever, remain a matter of doubt how far the captious turns of\nexpression by which the Sceptics thought to parry the attacks of their\nopponents come from Pyrrho\u2019s School. The greater part, it is clear,\ncame into use in the struggle with the Dogmatists, and are not older\nthan the development of the Stoic theory of knowledge by Chrysippus,\nand the criticism of Carneades to which it gave rise. In this\ndespairing of anything like certain conviction consists \u1f00\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1,\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03af\u03b1, or \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74, the withholding of judgment or state of\nindecision which Pyrrho and Timon regard as the only true attitude in\nspeculation, [1411] and from which the whole School derived its\ndistinctive name. [1412]\n\n\n\n[(3) Mental imperturbability.]\n\nFrom this state of indecision, Timon, in reply to the third question,\nargues that mental imperturbability or \u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1 proceeds, which can\nalone conduct to true happiness. [1413] Men are disturbed by views and\nprejudices which mislead them into the efforts of passion. Only the\nSceptic who has suspended all judgment is in a condition to regard\nthings with absolute calmness, unruffled by passion or desire. [1414]\nHe knows that it is a fond delusion to suppose that one external\ncondition is preferable to another. [1415] In reality only the tone of\nmind or virtue possesses value. [1416] Thus, by withdrawing within\nhimself, man reaches happiness, which is the goal of all philosophy.\n[1417] Absolute inactivity being, however, impossible, the Sceptic will\nact on probabilities, and hence follow custom; [1418] but at the same\ntime he will be conscious that such conduct does not rest on a basis of\nfirm conviction. [1419] The province of uncertain opinion includes all\npositive judgments respecting good and evil. Only in this conditional\nform will Timon allow of goodness and divine goodness as standards of\nconduct. [1420] The real object of Scepticism is, therefore, a purely\nnegative one\u2014indifference. It cannot even be proved [1421] that\nPyrrho\u2019s School so far accommodated itself to life, as to make\nmoderation rather than indifference the regulating principle for\nunavoidable actions and desires. In this direction the School seems to\nhave done but little.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\n\nTHE NEW ACADEMY.\n\n\n[A. Arcesilaus.]\n\nPlato\u2019s School was the first to put Scepticism on a firm footing, and\nto cultivate it as a system. It has been already remarked that after\nthe time of Xenocrates this School gradually deserted speculative\nenquiries, and limited itself to Ethics. To this new tendency it\nconsistently adhered, when, shortly after the beginning of the third\ncentury before Christ,\n\n\n\n[(1) Denial of knowledge.]\n\nit took a fresh lease of life. Instead, however, of simply ignoring\ntheoretical knowledge, as it had hitherto done, it assumed towards\nknowledge an attitude of opposition, hoping to arrive at security and\nhappiness in life by being persuaded of the impossibility of knowledge.\nHow far this result was due to the example set by Pyrrho it is\nimpossible to establish authoritatively. But it is not in itself\nprobable that the learned originator of this line of thought in the\nAcademy should have ignored the views of a philosopher whose work had\nbeen carried on at Elis in his own lifetime, and whose most\ndistinguished pupil, a personal acquaintance of his own, was then\nworking at Athens as a prolific writer. [1422] The whole tone and\ncharacter, moreover, of the Scepticism of the New Academy betrays\neverywhere the presence of Stoic influences. By the confidence of its\nassertions it provokes contradiction and doubt, without its being\nnecessary to seek an explanation by improbable conjectures as to the\npersonal relations of Arcesilaus and Zeno. [1423]\n\nThis connection of the New Academy with Stoicism can be proved in the\ncase of its first founder, [1424] Arcesilaus. [1425] The doubts of this\nphilosopher are directed not only to knowledge derived from the senses,\nbut to rational knowledge as well. [1426] The principal object of his\nattack was, however, the Stoic theory of irresistible impressions;\n[1427] and in overthrowing that theory Arcesilaus, it would seem,\nbelieved he had exploded every possibility of rational knowledge; for\nthe Stoic appeal to the senses he regarded as the only possible form of\na theory of knowledge, and the theories of Plato and Aristotle he\nignored altogether. Indeed, no peculiar arguments against knowledge are\nreferred to him. The old sceptical arguments of Plato and Socrates, of\nAnaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, are\nrepeated, [1428] all of which apply only to the knowledge of the\nsenses, and not to rational knowledge. Nevertheless, Arcesilaus aimed\nat overthrowing the latter along with the former. [1429] The opinion\nthat he only used doubt to prepare for or to conceal genuine Platonism,\n[1430] is opposed to all credible authorities. It appears, however,\nestablished that he deemed it unnecessary to refute the theory of a\nknowledge existing independently of the senses.\n\nThe Stoic arguments in favour of irresistible impressions Arcesilaus\nmet by asserting that an intermediate something between knowledge and\nopinion, a kind of conviction common to the wise and the unwise, such\nas the Stoic \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2, is inconceivable; the wise man\u2019s conviction is\nalways knowledge, that of the fool is always opinion. [1431] Going then\nfarther into the idea of \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, he endeavoured to show\nthat it contained an internal contradiction; for to conceive\n(\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2) is to approve (\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), and approval never applies to\nsensation, but only to thoughts and general ideas. [1432] Lastly, if\nthe Stoics regarded force of conviction as the distinctive mark of a\ntrue or irresistible conception, and as belonging to it in distinction\nfrom every other, the Sceptic rejoined that such conceptions do not\nexist, and that no true conception is of such a nature, but that a\nfalse one may be equally irresistible. [1433] If no certainty of\nperception is possible, no knowledge is possible. [1434] And since the\nwise man\u2014for on this point Arcesilaus agrees with the Stoics\u2014must only\nconsider knowledge, and not opinion, nothing remains for him but to\nabstain from all and every statement, and to despair of any certain\nconviction. [1435] It is therefore impossible to know anything, nor can\nwe even know for certain that we do not know anything. [1436] It was\nquite in accordance with this theory for Arcesilaus to lay down no\ndefinite view in his lectures, but only to refute the views of others.\n[1437] Even his disparaging remarks on dialectic, [1438] supposing them\nto be genuine, [1439] are not at variance with this conduct. He might\nconsider the arguments of the Stoics and the sophisms of the Megarians\nas useless, whilst, at the same time, he was convinced that no real\nknowledge could be attained by any other means. He might even have\ninferred from their sterility, that thought leads to truth quite as\nlittle as the senses. There is no real difference between the result at\nwhich he arrived and that of Pyrrho. [1440]\n\nIf opponents asserted that by denying knowledge all possibility of\naction is denied, [1441] Arcesilaus declined to accede to this\nstatement. No firm conviction is, as he maintained, necessary for a\ndecision of the will; for an action to come about a perception\ninfluences the will immediately, leaving the question as to its truth\nentirely out of sight. [1442] In order to act sensibly\n\n\n\n[(2) Probability.]\n\nwe need no knowledge; for this purpose probability is quite enough; any\none can follow probability, even though he is conscious of the\nuncertainty of all knowledge. Thus probability is the highest standard\nfor practical life. [1443] We are but scantily informed how Arcesilaus\napplied this principle to the sphere of morals, but a few of his\nutterances are on record. [1444] All bear witness to the beautiful\nspirit of moderation in the moral theory of the Academy, which was\notherwise exemplified in his own life. [1445]\n\n\n\n\n[B. Carneades.]\n\nComparing with the theory of Arcesilaus that which was propounded by\nCarneades a century later, the same leading features are found to be\nunderlying; but the points have been more carefully worked out, and the\ntheory placed on a wider footing. Of the immediate followers of\nArcesilaus [1446] it can only be stated that they clung to their\nteacher. It may be presumed that they did little in the way of\nexpansion, since the ancients are silent as to their labours; Carneades\n[1447] is only mentioned as the continuer of the Academic Scepticism.\nThe importance of Carneades is therefore very great, whence he is in\nconsequence called the founder of the third or New Academy; [1448] and\nit is justly great, witness the admiration which his talents called\nforth among cotemporaries and posterity, [1449] and the flourishing\ncondition in which he left his School. [1450] Himself a pupil of\nChrysippus, and resembling him in tone of mind, [1451] Carneades\nexpanded not only the negative side of the Sceptical theory in all\ndirections with an acuteness entitling him to the first place among the\nancient Sceptics, but he was also the first to investigate the positive\nside of Scepticism, the doctrine of probability, and to determine the\ndegrees and conditions of probability. By his labours in both ways he\nbrought the philosophy of Scepticism to its greatest scientific\nperfection.\n\n\n\n[(1) Negative side of his teaching.]\n\nAs regards the negative side of these investigations, or the refutation\nof dogmatism, the attacks of Carneades were directed partly against the\nformal possibility of knowledge, and partly against the chief actual\nresults of the knowledge of his day. In both respects he had mainly to\ndo with the Stoics, [1452] though he did not confine himself to them.\n\n\n[(a) Denial of possibility of formal knowledge.]\n\nTo prove the impossibility of knowledge in general, he appeals\nsometimes to experience. There is no kind of conviction which does not\nsometimes deceive us; consequently there is none which guarantees its\nown truth. [1453] Going then further into the nature of our notions, he\nargues, that since notions consist in the change produced on the soul\nby impressions from without, they must, to be true, not only furnish\ninformation as to themselves, but also as to the objects producing\nthem. Now, this is by no means always the case, many notions avowedly\ngiving a false impression of things. Hence the note of truth cannot\nreside in an impression as such, but only in a true impression. [1454]\nIt is, however, impossible to distinguish with certainty a true\nimpression from one that is false. For independently of dreams,\nvisions, and the fancies of madmen, in short, of all the unfounded\nchimeras which force themselves on our notice under the guise of truth,\n[1455] it is still undeniable that many false notions closely resemble\ntrue ones. The transition, too, from truth to falsehood is so gradual,\nthe interval between the two is occupied by intermediate links so\ninnumerable, and gradations so slight, that they imperceptibly pass one\ninto the other, and it becomes impossible to draw a boundary line\nbetween the two opposite spheres. [1456] Not content with proving this\nassertion in regard to impressions of the senses, Carneades went on to\nprove it with regard to general notions based on experience and\nintellectual conceptions. [1457] He showed that it is impossible for us\nto distinguish objects so much alike as one egg is to another; that at\na certain distance the painted surface seems raised, and a square tower\nseems round; that an oar in the water seems broken, and the\nneck-plumage of a pigeon assumes different colours in the sun; that\nobjects on the shore seem to be moving as we sail by, and so forth;\n[1458] in all these cases the same strength of conviction belongs to\nthe false as to the true impressions. [1459] He showed further that\nthis applies equally to purely intellectual ideas; that many logical\ndifficulties cannot be solved; [1460] that no absolute distinction can\nbe drawn between much and little, in short between all differences in\nquantity; and that it is the most natural course in all such cases to\nfollow Chrysippus, and to avoid the dangerous inferences which may be\ndrawn by withholding judgment. [1461] Arguing from these facts,\nCarneades concluded at first in regard to impressions of the senses,\nthat there is no such thing as \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 in the Stoic sense\nof the term, in other words, that no perception contains in itself\ncharacteristics, by virtue of which its truth may be inferred with\ncertainty. [1462] This fact being granted, the possibility is in his\nopinion precluded of there residing in the understanding a standard for\nthe distinction of truth from falsehood. The understanding\u2014and this\nbelief was shared by his opponents\u2014must derive its material from the\nsenses. [1463] Logic tests the formal accuracy of combinations of\nthought, but gives no insight into their import. [1464] Direct proofs\nof the uncertainty of intellectual convictions are not therefore\nneeded. The same result may also be attained in a more personal way, by\nraising the question, how individuals obtain their knowledge. He can\nonly be said to know a thing who has formed an opinion respecting it.\nIn the mean time, until he has decided in favour of some definite\nopinion, he has still no knowledge. And what dependence can be placed\non the judgment of one who has no knowledge? [1465]\n\n\n[(b) Attack on the scientific knowledge of the time.]\n\n[(\u03b1) The physical views of the Stoics attacked.]\n\nIn these formal enquiries into the possibility of knowledge, Carneades\nhad chiefly to deal with the Stoics, with whom he holds a common ground\nin his appeal to the senses. The Stoics were also his chief opponents\nin his polemic against the material results of the dogmatic philosophy.\nNatural science having throughout the period of the post-Aristotelian\nphilosophy been subordinated to ethics, ethics likewise engaged more\nattention at the hands of Carneades than science. [1466] In as far as\nhe studied Natural science, he appears to have been entirely opposed to\nthe Stoic treatment of the subject, and to this circumstance we owe it,\nthat better information is forthcoming regarding his scientific, or\nrather his theological, investigations than regarding his moral views.\nThe Stoic theories of God and of final causes [1467] afforded ample\nscope for the exercise of his ingenuity, and from the ground he\noccupied it was not difficult for him to expose the weak points of that\ntheory. The Stoics had appealed in support of the belief in God to the\nconsensus gentium. How close at hand was the answer, [1468] that the\nuniversality of this belief was neither proved to exist, nor as a\nmatter of fact did it exist, but that in no case could the opinion of\nan ignorant multitude decide anything. The Stoics thought to find a\nproof of divine providence in the manner in which portents and\nprophecies come true. To expose this delusion, no very expanded\ncriticism of divination was necessary. [1469] Going beyond this,\nCarneades proceeded to call in question the cardinal point of the Stoic\nsystem\u2014the belief in God, the doctrine of the soul and reason of the\nuniverse, and of the presence of design in its arrangements. How, he\nasks, is the presence of design manifested? Whence all the things which\ncause destruction and danger to men if it be true that God has made the\nworld for the sake of man? [1470] If reason is praised as the highest\ngift of God, is it not manifest that the majority of men only use it to\nmake themselves worse than brutes? In bestowing such a gift God must\nhave been taking but little care of this majority. [1471] Even if we\nattribute to man direct blame for the misuse of reason, still, why has\nGod bestowed on him a reason which can be so much abused? [1472] The\nStoics themselves say that a wise man can nowhere be found. They admit,\ntoo, that folly is the greatest misfortune. How, then, can they speak\nof the care bestowed by God on men, when, on their own confession, the\nwhole of mankind is sunk in the deepest misery? [1473] But allowing\nthat the Gods could not bestow virtue and wisdom upon all, they could,\nat least, have taken care that it should go well with the good. Instead\nof this, the experience of hundreds of cases shows that the upright man\ncomes to a miserable end; that crime succeeds; and that the criminal\ncan enjoy the fruits of his misdeeds undisturbed. Where, then, is the\nagency of Providence? [1474] The facts being entirely different from\nwhat the Stoics suppose, what becomes of their inferences? Allowing the\npresence of design in the world, and granting that the world is as\nbeautiful and good as possible, why is it inconceivable that nature\nshould have formed the world according to natural laws without the\nintervention of God? Admitting, too, the connection of parts in the\nuniverse, why should not this connection be the result simply of\nnatural forces, without a soul of the universe or a deity? [1475] Who\ncan pretend to be so intimately acquainted with the powers of nature,\nas to be able to prove the impossibility of this assumption? Zeno\nargued that rational things are better than things irrational, that the\nworld is the best possible, and must therefore be rational. Man, says\nSocrates, can only derive his soul from the world; therefore the world\nmust have a soul. But what, replies the Academician, [1476] is there to\nshow that reason is best for the world, if it be the best for us? or\nthat there must be a soul in nature for nature to produce a soul? What\nman is not able to produce, that, argues Chrysippus, must have been\nproduced by a higher being\u2014by deity. But to this inference the same\nobjection was raised by the Academicians as to the former one, viz.\nthat it confounds two different points of view. There may, indeed, be a\nBeing higher than man. But why must there needs be a rational man-like\nBeing? Why a God? Why not nature herself? [1477] Nor did the argument\nseem to an Academician more conclusive, that as every house is destined\nto be inhabited, so, too, the world must be intended for the habitation\nof God. To this there was the obvious reply: [1478] If the world were a\nhouse, it might be so; but the very point at issue is whether it is a\nhouse constructed for a definite purpose, or whether it is simply an\nundesigned result of natural forces.\n\n[(\u03b2) Theological views of the Stoics attacked.]\n\nNot content with attacking the conclusiveness of the arguments upon\nwhich the Stoics built their belief in a God, the scepticism of the\nAcademy sought to demonstrate that the idea of God itself is an\nuntenable one. The line of argument which Carneades struck out for this\npurpose is essentially the same as that used in modern times to deny\nthe personality of God. The ordinary view of God regards Him as an\ninfinite, but, at the same time, as a separate Being, possessing the\nqualities and living the life of an individual. To this view Carneades\nobjected, on the ground that the first assertion contradicts the\nsecond; and argues that it is impossible to apply the characteristics\nof personal existence to God without limiting His infinite nature.\nWhatever view we may take of God, we must regard Him as a living Being;\nand every living being is composite, having parts and passions, and is\ntherefore destructible. [1479] Moreover, every living being has a\nsense-nature. Far, therefore, from refusing such a nature to God,\nCarneades attributed to Him, in the interest of omniscience, other\norgans of sense than the five we possess. Now, everything capable of\nimpressions through the senses is also liable to change, sensation,\naccording to the definition of Chrysippus, being nothing more than a\nchange of soul. Every such being must therefore be capable of pleasure\nand pain, without which sensation is inconceivable. Whatever is capable\nof change is liable to destruction; whatever is susceptible to pain is\nalso liable to deterioration, pain being caused by deterioration, and\nis also liable to destruction. [1480] As the capacity for sensation, so\ntoo the desire for what is in harmony with nature, and the dislike of\nwhat is opposed to nature, belong to the conditions of life. Whatever\nhas the power of destroying any being is opposed to the nature of that\nbeing, everything that lives being exposed to annihilation. [1481]\nAdvancing from the conception of a living being to that of a rational\nbeing, all virtues would have to be attributed to God as well as bliss.\nBut how, asks Carneades, can any virtue be ascribed to God? Every\nvirtue supposes an imperfection, in overcoming which it consists. He\nonly is continent who might possibly be incontinent, and persevering\nwho might be indulgent. To be brave, a man must be exposed to danger;\nto be magnanimous, he must be exposed to misfortunes. A being not\nfeeling attraction for pleasure, nor aversion for pain and\ndifficulties, dangers and misfortunes, would not be capable of virtue.\nJust as little could we predicate prudence of a being not susceptible\nof pleasure and pain; prudence consisting in knowing what is good, bad,\nand morally indifferent. But how can there be any such knowledge where\nthere is no susceptibility to pleasure or pain? Or how can a being be\nconceived of capable of feeling pleasure, but incapable of feeling\npain, since pleasure can only be known by contrast with pain, and the\npossibility of increasing life always supposes the possibility of\nlessening it? Nor is it otherwise with intelligence (\u03b5\u1f50\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03af\u03b1). He only\nis intelligent who always discovers what will subserve his purpose. If,\nhowever, he must discover it, it cannot have been previously known to\nhim. Hence intelligence can only belong to a being who is ignorant\nabout much. Such a being can never feel sure that sooner or later\nsomething will not cause his ruin. He will therefore be exposed to\nfear. A being susceptible of pleasure and exposed to pain, a being who\nhas to contend with dangers and difficulties, and who feels pain and\nfear, must inevitably, so thought Carneades, be finite and\ndestructible. If, therefore, we cannot conceive of God except in this\nform, we cannot conceive of Him at all, our conception being\nself-destructive. [1482]\n\nThere is yet another reason, according to Carneades, why God cannot\nhave any virtue; because virtue is above its possessor, and there can\nbe nothing above God. [1483] Moreover, what is the position of God in\nregard to speech? It was easy to show the absurdity of attributing\nspeech to Him, [1484] but to call him speechless (\u1f04\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2) seemed also\nto be opposed to the general belief. [1485] Quite independently,\nhowever, of details, the inconceivableness of God appears, so soon as\nthe question is raised, whether the deity is limited or unlimited,\nmaterial or immaterial. God cannot be unlimited; for what is unlimited\nis necessarily immovable because it has no place, and soulless because\nby virtue of its boundlessness it cannot form a whole permeated by a\nsoul; but God we ordinarily think of both as moving and as endowed with\na soul. Nor can God be limited; for all that is limited is incomplete.\nMoreover, God cannot be immaterial, for Carneades, like the Stoics,\nheld that what is immaterial possesses neither soul, feeling, nor\nactivity. Neither can he be material, all composite bodies being liable\nto change and destruction, and simple bodies, fire, water, and the\nlike, possessing neither life nor reason. [1486] If, then, all the\nforms under which we think of God are impossible, His existence cannot\nbe asserted.\n\n[(\u03b3) Polytheistic views attacked.]\n\nEasier work lay before the Sceptics in criticising polytheistic views\nof religion and their defence by the Stoics. Among the arguments\nemployed by Carneades to overthrow them, certain chain-arguments are\nprominent, by means of which he endeavoured to show that the popular\nbelief has no distinctive marks for the spheres of God and man. If Zeus\nis a God, he argues, his brother Poseidon must likewise be one, and if\nhe is one, the rivers and streams must also be Gods. If Helios is a\nGod, the appearance of Helios above the earth, or day, must be a God;\nand, consequently, month, year, morning, midday, evening, must all be\nGods. [1487] Polytheism is here refuted by establishing an essential\nsimilarity between what is accepted as God and what is avowedly not a\nGod. It may readily be supposed that this was not the only proof of the\nacuteness of Carneades\u2019 reasoning. [1488]\n\nDivination, to which the Stoics attached especial importance, [1489]\nwas vigorously assailed. Carneades proved that no peculiar range of\nsubjects belonged thereto, but that in all cases which admit\nprofessional judgment experts pass a better judgment than diviners.\n[1490] To know accidental events beforehand is impossible; it is\nuseless to know those that are necessary and unavoidable, nay, more, it\nwould even be harmful. [1491] No causal connection can be conceived of\nbetween a prophecy and the ensuing realisation. [1492] If the Stoics\nmet him by pointing to fulfilled prophecies, he replied that the\ncoincidence was accidental, [1493] at the same time declaring many such\nstories to be without doubt false. [1494]\n\n[(\u03b4) Moral views of the Stoics attacked.]\n\nConnected probably with these attacks on divination was the defence by\nCarneades of the freedom of the will. The Stoic fatalism he refuted by\nan appeal to the fact that our decision is free; and since the Stoics\nappealed in support of their view to the law of causality, he likewise\nattacked this law. [1495] In so doing his intention was not to assert\nanything positive respecting the nature of the human will, but only to\nattack the Stoic assertion, and if for his own part he adhered to the\nold Academic doctrine of a free will, he still regarded that doctrine\nas only probable.\n\nLess information exists as to the arguments by which Carneades sought\nto assail the current principles of morality. Nevertheless, enough is\nknown to indicate the course taken by his Scepticism in relation\nthereto. In the second of the celebrated speeches which he delivered at\nRome in the year 156 B.C., [1496] he denied that there is such a thing\nas natural right: all laws are only positive civil institutions devised\nby men for the sake of safety and advantage, and for the protection of\nthe weak; and hence he is regarded as foolish who prefers justice to\ninterest, which after all is the only unconditional end. In support of\nthese statements he appealed to the fact that laws change with\ncircumstances, and are different in different countries. He pointed to\nthe example of great nations, such as the Romans, all of whom attained\nto greatness by unrighteous means. He impressed into his service the\nmany casuistical questions raised by the Stoics, expressing the opinion\nthat in all these cases it is better to commit the injury which brings\nadvantage\u2014for instance, to murder another to save one\u2019s own life\u2014than\nto postpone advantage to right, and hence inferred that intelligence is\na state of irreconcileable opposition to justice. [1497]\n\nThis free criticism of dogmatic views could not fail to bring Carneades\nto the same result as his predecessors. Knowledge is absolutely\nimpossible. A man of sense will look at everything from all sides and\ninvariably withhold judgment, thus guarding himself against error.\n[1498] And to this conviction he clings so persistently that he\naltogether refuses to listen to the objection that the wise man must be\nat least convinced of the impossibility of any firm conviction. [1499]\nThe earlier Sceptics, far from attributing on this ground an equal\nvalue to all notions, had not dispensed with reasons for actions and\n\n\n\n[(2) Positive side of the teaching of Carneades.]\n\n[(a) Theory of probabilities.]\n\nthoughts. This point was now taken up by Carneades, who, in attempting\nto establish the conditions and degrees of probability, hoped to obtain\na clue to the kind of conviction which might be still permitted in his\nsystem. However much we may despair of knowledge, some stimulus and\ngroundwork for action is needed. Certain things must therefore be\nassumed, from which the pursuit of happiness must start. [1500] To\nthese so much weight must be attached that they are allowed to decide\nour conduct, but we must be on our guard against considering them to be\ntrue, or to be something really known and conceived. Nor must we forget\nthat even the nature of true ideas is similar to that of false ones,\nand that the truth of ideas can never be known with certainty. Hence we\nshould withhold all assent, not allowing any ideas to be true, but only\nto have the appearance of truth (\u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9) or probability\n(\u1f14\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2). [1501] In every notion two things need to be\nconsidered, the relation to the object represented which makes it\neither true or false, and the relation to the subject who has the\nnotion, which makes it seem either true or false. The former relation\nis, for the reasons already quoted, quite beyond the compass of our\njudgment; the latter, the relation of a notion to ourselves, falls\nwithin the sphere of consciousness. [1502] So long as a notion\nseemingly true is cloudy and indistinct, like an object contemplated\nfrom a distance, it makes no great impression on us. When, on the\ncontrary, the appearance of truth is strong, it produces in us a belief\n[1503] strong enough to determine us to action, although it does not\ncome up to the impregnable certainty of knowledge. [1504]\n\nBelief, however, like probability, is of several degrees. The lowest\ndegree of probability arises when a notion produces by itself an\nimpression of truth, without being taken in connection with other\nnotions. The next higher degree is when that impression is confirmed by\nthe agreement of all notions which are related to it. The third and\nhighest degree is when an investigation of all these notions results in\nproducing the same corroboration for all. In the first case a notion is\ncalled probable (\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03ae); in the second probable and undisputed (\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u1f74\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2); in the third probable, undisputed, and tested\n(\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c9\u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7). [1505] Within each one of\nthese three classes different gradations of probability are again\npossible. [1506] The distinguishing marks, which must be considered in\nthe investigation of probability, appear to have been investigated by\nCarneades in the spirit of the Aristotelian logic. [1507] In proportion\nto the greater or less practical importance of a question, or to the\naccuracy of investigation which the circumstances allow, we must adhere\nto one or the other degree of probability. [1508] Although no one of\nthem is of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of error, this\ncircumstance need not deprive us of certainty in respect to actions,\nprovided we have once convinced ourselves that the absolute certainty\nof our practical premisses is not possible. [1509] Just as little\nshould we hesitate to affirm or deny anything in that conditional way\nwhich is alone possible after what has been stated. Assent will be\ngiven to no notion in the sense of its being absolutely true, but to\nmany notions in the sense that we consider them highly probable. [1510]\n\n\n[(b) Moral and religious view of life.]\n\nAmong questions about which the greatest possible certainty is felt to\nbe desirable, Carneades, true to his whole position, gave a prominent\nplace to principles of morals; [1511] life and action being the\nprincipal things with which the theory of probability has to do. [1512]\nWe hear, therefore, that he thoroughly discussed the fundamental\nquestions of Ethics, the question as to the highest Good. [1513] On\nthis subject he distinguished six, or relatively four, different views.\nIf the primary object of desire can in general only consist of those\nthings which correspond with our nature, and which consequently call\nour emotions into exercise, the object of desire must be either\npleasure, or absence of pain, or conformity with nature. In each of\nthese three cases two opposite results are possible: either the highest\nGood may consist in the attainment of a purpose, or else in the\nactivity which aims at its attainment. The latter is the view of the\nStoics only, and arises from regarding natural activity or virtue as\nthe highest Good. Hence the six possible views are practically reduced\nto four, which taken by themselves, or else in combination, include all\nexisting views respecting the highest Good. [1514] But so ambiguously\ndid Carneades express himself as to his particular preference of any\none view, that even Clitomachus declared he was ignorant as to his real\nopinion. [1515] It was only tentatively and for the purpose of refuting\nthe Stoics, that he propounded the statement that the highest Good\nconsists in the enjoyment of such things as afford satisfaction to the\nprimary impulses of nature. [1516] Nevertheless, the matter has often\nbeen placed in such a light as though Carneades had propounded this\nstatement on his own account; and the statement itself has been quoted\nto prove that he considered the satisfaction of natural impulses apart\nfrom virtue as an end in itself. [1517] It is also asserted that he\napproximated to the view of Callipho, which does not appear to have\nbeen essentially different from that of the older Academy. [1518] The\nsame leaning to the older Academy and its doctrine of moderation\nappears in other recorded parts of the Ethics of Carneades. The pain\ncaused by misfortune he wished to lessen by thinking beforehand of its\npossibility; [1519] and after the destruction of Carthage he\ndeliberately asserted before Clitomachus that the wise man would never\nallow himself to be disturbed, not even by the downfall of his country.\n[1520]\n\nPutting all these statements together, we obtain a view not unworthy of\nCarneades, and certainly quite in harmony with his position. That\nphilosopher could not, consistently with his sceptical principles,\nallow scientific certainty to any of the various opinions respecting\nthe nature and aim of moral action; and in this point he attacked the\nStoics with steady home-thrusts. Their inconsistency in calling the\nchoice of what is natural the highest business of morality, and yet not\nallowing to that which is according to nature a place among goods,\n[1521] was so trenchantly exposed by him that Antipater is said to have\nbeen brought to admit that not the objects to which choice is directed,\nbut the actual choice itself is a good. [1522] He even asserted that\nthe Stoic theory of Goods only differed in words from that of the\nPeripatetics; to this assertion he was probably led by the fact that\nthe Stoic morality appeals to nature only, or perhaps by the theory\ntherewith connected of things to be desired and things to be eschewed.\n[1523] If there were any difference between the two, Stoicism, he\nthought, ignored the real wants of nature. The Stoics, for instance,\ncalled a good name a thing indifferent; Carneades, however, drove them\nso much into a corner because of this statement that they ever after\n(so Cicero assures us) qualified their assertion, attributing to a good\nname at least a secondary value among things to be desired (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1).\n[1524] Chrysippus, again, thought to find some consolation for the ills\nof life in the reflection that no man is free from them. Carneades was,\nhowever, of opinion that this thought could only afford consolation to\na lover of ill; it being rather a matter for sorrow that all should be\nexposed to so hard a fate. [1525] Believing, too, that man\u2019s happiness\ndoes not depend on any theory of ethics, [1526] he could avow without\nhesitation that all other views of morality do not go beyond\nprobability; and thus the statement of Clitomachus, as far as it refers\nto a definite decision as to the highest good, is without doubt\ncorrect. But just as the denial of knowledge does not, according to the\nview of Carneades, exclude conviction in general on grounds of\nprobability, no more does it in the province of ethics. Here, then, is\nthe intermediate position which was attributed to him\u2014a position not\nonly suggested by the traditions of the Academic School, but remaining\nas a last resource to the sceptical destroyer of systems so opposite as\nStoicism and the theory of pleasure. The inconsistency of at one time\nidentifying the satisfaction of natural instincts with virtue, and at\nanother time distinguishing it from virtue, which is attributed to\nCarneades, is an inconsistency for which probably Cicero is alone\nresponsible. The real meaning of Carneades can only be that virtue\nconsists in an activity directed towards the possession of what is\naccording to nature, and hence that it cannot as the highest Good be\nseparated from accordance with nature. [1527] For the same reason,\nvirtue supplies all that is requisite for happiness. [1528] Hence, when\nit is stated that, notwithstanding his scepticism on moral subjects,\nCarneades was a thoroughly upright man, [1529] we have not only no\nreason to doubt this statement as to his personal character, but we can\neven discern that it was a practical and legitimate consequence of his\nphilosophy. It may appear to us inconsistent to build on a foundation\nof absolute doubt the certainty of practical conduct; nevertheless, it\nis an inconsistency deeply rooted in all the scepticism of\npost-Aristotelian times. That scepticism Carneades brought to\ncompleteness, and in logically developing his theory, even its\nscientific defects came to light.\n\nFor the same reason we may also give credit to the statement that\nCarneades, like the later Sceptics, notwithstanding his severe\ncriticisms on the popular and philosophic theology of his age, never\nintended to deny the existence of divine agencies. [1530] On this point\nhe acted like a true Sceptic. He expressed doubts as to whether\nanything could be known about God, but for practical purposes he\naccepted the belief in God as an opinion more or less probable and\nuseful.\n\nTaking all things into account, the philosophic importance of Carneades\nand the School of which he was the head cannot be estimated at so low a\nvalue as would be the case were the New Academy merely credited with\nentertaining shallow doubts, and Carneades\u2019 theory of probabilities\ndeduced from rhetorical rather than from philosophical considerations.\n[1531] For the last assertion there is no ground whatever; Carneades\ndistinctly avowed that a conviction resting on probabilities seemed\nindispensable for practical needs and actions. On this point he is\nwholly in accord with all the forms of Scepticism, not only with the\nNew Academy, but also with Pyrrho and the later Sceptics. He differs\nfrom them in the degree of accuracy with which he investigates the\nvarieties and conditions of probability; but a question of degree can\nleast of all be urged against a philosopher. Nor should doubts be\ncalled shallow which the ancients even in later times could only very\ninadequately dissipate, and which throw light on several of the deepest\nproblems of life by the critical investigations they occasioned. No\ndoubt, in the despair of attaining to knowledge at all, and in the\nattempt to reduce everything to opinion more or less certain,\nindications may be seen of the exhaustion of the intellect, and of the\nextinction of philosophic originality. Nevertheless it must never be\nforgotten that the scepticism of the New Academy was not only in\nharmony with the course naturally taken by Greek philosophy as a whole,\nbut that it was pursued with an acuteness and a scientific vigour\nleaving no doubt that it was a really important link in the chain of\nphilosophic development.\n\n\n\n\n[C. School of Carneades.]\n\nIn Carneades this Scepticism attained its highest growth. The successor\nof Carneades, Clitomachus, [1532] is known as the literary exponent of\nthe views taught by Carneades. [1533] At the same time we hear of his\nbeing accurately acquainted with the teaching of the Peripatetics and\nStoics; and although it was no doubt his first aim to refute the\ndogmatism of these Schools, it would appear that Clitomachus entered\ninto the connection of their doctrines more fully than is usually the\ncase with opponents. [1534] As to his fellow-pupil, Charmidas (or\nCharmadas), [1535] one wholly unimportant utterance is our only guide\nfor determining his views. [1536] For ascertaining the philosophy of\nthe other pupils of Carneades, [1537] nothing but the scantiest\nfragments have been preserved. The statement of Polybius that the\nAcademic School degenerated into empty subtleties, and thereby became\nan object of contempt, [1538] may deserve no great amount of belief;\nbut it does seem probable that the School made no important advance on\nthe path marked out by himself and Arcesilaus. It did not even continue\ntrue to that path for very long. Not a generation after the death of\nits most celebrated teacher, and even among his own pupils, [1539] that\neclecticism began to appear, the general and simultaneous spread of\nwhich ushered in a new period in the history of the post-Aristotelian\nphilosophy.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\n\n[1] Zeller\u2019s Philosophie der Griechen. Part I. 96.\n\n[2] Conf. Arist. Metaph. I. 2, 282 b, 19.\n\n[3] For the life of Zeno, Diogenes is the chief authority, who appears\nto be indebted for his information chiefly to Antigonus of Carystus,\nwho lived about 250 B.C. In proof of this, compare the account of\nDiogenes with the extracts given by Athen\u00e6us (viii. 345, d; xiii. 563,\ne; 565, d; 603, e; 607, e; and, in particular, ii. 55, f) from\nAntigonus\u2019 life of Zeno. Of modern authorities, consult Wagenmann, in\nPauly\u2019s Realencyclop.\n\n[4] Diog. vii. 1. Suid. \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd. Plut. Plac. i. 3, 29. Pausan. ii. 8, 4.\nHe is called by others Demeas.\n\n[5] Citium, which the ancients unanimously call the native city of\nZeno, was, according to Diog. vii. 1, a \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f19\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03a6\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c7\u03b7\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2, i.e. Ph\u0153nician immigrants had settled there by the\nside of the old Greek population, whence its inhabitants are sometimes\ncalled \u2018e Ph\u0153nicia profecti\u2019 (Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56), and Zeno is\nhimself called a Ph\u0153nician (Diog. vii. 3; 15; 25; 30; ii. 114. Suid.\n\u0396\u03ae\u03bd. Athen. xiii. 563, e. Cic. l.c.). A continuous connection between\nCitium and Ph\u0153nicia is implied in Diog. vii. 6; \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f10\u03bd \u03a3\u03b9\u03b4\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b9 \u039a\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2.\n\n[6] The details are differently given by Diog. 2\u20135; 31; Plut. Inimic.\nUtil. 2, p. 87; and Sen. Tranq. An. 14, 3. Most accounts say that he\ncame to Athens for trading purposes, and accidentally became acquainted\nwith Crates and philosophy after being shipwrecked. According to other\naccounts, he remained at Athens, after disposing of his merchandise,\nand devoted himself to philosophy. Demetrius of Magnesia (Themist. Or.\nxxiii. 295, D) further relates that he had already occupied himself\nwith philosophy at home, and repaired to Athens to study it more\nfully\u2014a view which seems most likely, because the least sensational.\n\n[7] The dates in Zeno\u2019s life are very uncertain. He is said to have\nbeen thirty when he first came to Athens (Diog. 2). Pers\u00e6us, however\n(Ibid. 28), his pupil and countryman, says twenty-two. These statements\nare of little use, since the date of his coming to Athens is unknown.\nIf it is true that after reading with Crates he was for ten years a\npupil of Xenocrates, who died 314 B.C. (Timocrates in Diog. 2), he must\nhave come to Athens not later than 328 B.C. But this fact may be\ndoubted. For his whole line of thought resembles that of Crates and\nStilpo. How then can he have been for ten years a pupil in the Academy,\nand in addition have enjoyed Polemo\u2019s teaching? Altogether he is said\nto have frequented the schools of different philosophers for twenty\nyears before opening his own (Diog. 4). According to Apollon. in Diog.\n28, he presided over his own school for fifty-eight years, which is\nhardly reconcileable with the above data, even if he attained the age\nof ninety-eight (Diog. 28; Lucian, Macrob. 19). According to Pers\u00e6us\n(Diog. 28), he only attained the age of seventy-two (Clinton, Fast.\nHell. II. 368 capriciously suggests 92), and was altogether only fifty\nyears in Athens. On the other hand, in his own letter to Antigonus\n(Diog. 9), he distinctly calls himself an octogenarian, but the\ngenuineness of this letter, borrowed by Diogenes from Apollonius the\nTyrian about 50 B.C., may perhaps be doubted. The year of Zeno\u2019s death\nis likewise unknown. His relations to Antigonus Gonatas prove at least\nthat he was not dead before the beginning of his reign in 278 B.C., and\nprobably not till long afterwards. It would appear from the calculation\nof his age, that his death did not take place till 260 B.C. He may,\nthen, have lived circa 350 to 260 B.C.; but these dates are quite\nuncertain.\n\n[8] Diog. vii. 2; vi. 105.\n\n[9] Diog. 3: \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f24\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u039a\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03b1\u1f30\u03b4\u03ae\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c7\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd.\n\n[10] Conf., besides what immediately follows, Diog. 25 and 15: \u1f26\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[11] Diog. vii. 2; 4; 16; 20; 24; ii. 114; 120. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev.\nxiv. 5, 9; 6, 6. Polemo is called his teacher by Cic. Fin. iv. 16, 45;\nAcad. i. 9, 35. Strabo, xiii. 1. 67, p. 614. On Xenocrates compare p.\n37, 1. How ready he was to learn from others is proved by the saying in\nDiog. 25; Plut. Fragm. in Hesiod. ix. T. V. 511. W.\n\n[12] Diog. 5, according to whom he gave instruction walking to and fro,\nlike Aristotle, but never to more than two or three at a time (Diog.\n14). It is not probable that he gave any formal lectures.\n\n[13] Which, however, must be judged by the standard of that time and of\nGreek customs. Conf. Diog. 13; and the quotations in Athen. xiii. 607,\ne; 563, e, from Antigonus of Carystus.\n\n[14] See Musonius in Stob. Serm. 17, 43. His outward circumstances also\nappear to have been very simple. According to one account (Diog. 13),\nhe brought to Athens the fabulous sum of 1000 talents, and put it out\nto interest. Themist. Or. xxi., p. 252, says that he forgave a debtor\nhis debt. He is said to have paid a logician 200 drachmas, instead of\nthe 100 which he asked for (Diog. 25). Nor is there any mention of a\nCynical life or of poverty. But, according to Diog. 5, Plut. and Sen.,\nhe had lost his property almost entirely. According to Sen. Consol. ad\nHelv. 12, 5 (contradicted by Diog. 23), he owned no slave. Had he been\nwell to do, he would hardly have accepted the presents of Antigonus.\nThat Zeno was unmarried appears from Diog. 13.\n\n[15] Conf. Diog. 13; 16; 24; 26; Athen. in the passage quoted p. 36, 2;\nSuid.; Clem. Strom. 413, A. It is mentioned as a peculiarity of Zeno,\nthat he avoided all noise and popular display (Diog. 14); that, though\ngenerally grave, he relaxed over his wine, and that too much; that he\ncould not tolerate many words, and was very fond of epigrams. See Diog.\n16; 20; 24; Athen. l.c. Stob. Serm. 34; 10; 36; 19; 23. He is said to\nhave carried his parsimoniousness too far. In this respect he was a\nthorough Ph\u0153nician (Diog. 16). The presents of Antigonus he never\nsought, and broke with an acquaintance who asked for his interest with\nthe king. Still he did not despise them, without abating from his\ndignity. The loss of his property he bore with the greatest composure\n(Diog. 3; Plut. and Sen.).\n\n[16] Antigonus (conf. Athen. xiii. 603, e; Arrian, Diss. Epict. ii. 13,\n14; Simpl. in Epict. Enchir. 283, c; \u00c6l. V. H. ix. 26) was fond of his\nsociety, attended his lectures, and wished to have him at court\u2014but\nZeno declined the offer, sending two of his pupils instead. The\nAthenians, to whom, according to \u00c6lian\u2019s untrustworthy account V. H.\nvii. 14, he had rendered political services, honoured him with a public\npanegyric, a golden crown, a statue, and burial in the Ceramicus. That\nthe keys of the city were left in his keeping is not probable. The\noffer of Athenian citizenship he declined (Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 1, p.\n1034). Nor did his countrymen in Citium fail to show their appreciation\n(Diog. 6; Plin. H. N. xxxiv. 19, 32) of him, and Zeno always insisted\non being a Citian (Diog. 12; Plut. l.c.).\n\n[17] He himself (Diog. vii. 18) compares the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 of the\n\u1f00\u03c3\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9 to the elegant Alexandrian coins, which, instead of being\nbetter, were often lighter than those of Athens. He is charged in\nparticular with using words in a wrong sense, and with inventing new\nwords, whence Cic. Tusc. v. 11, 34, calls him \u2018ignobilis verborum\nopifex,\u2019 and Chrysippus, in a treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, disparages this \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 (Galen.\nDiff. Puls. III. 1., vol. viii. 642, K.). He is also charged with\nmaintaining that nothing ought to be concealed, but that even the most\nindelicate things should be called by their proper names. He is further\ncharged with having propounded no new system, but with having\nappropriated the thoughts of his predecessors, and having concealed his\nplagiarism by the use of new terms. In Diog. vii. 25, Polemo says:\n\u03ba\u03bb\u03ad\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03a6\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03c6\u03b9\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03cd\u03c2; and Cicero frequently repeats\nthe charge (Fin. v. 25, 74; iii. 2, 5; iv. 2, 3; 3, 7; 26; 72; v. 8,\n22; 29, 88. Acad. ii. 5, 15. Legg. 1, 13, 38; 20; 53. Tusc. ii. 12,\n29).\n\n[18] Diog. 28, 1. The statement that he was \u1f04\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c2 must be taken with\nsome limitation, according to Diog. vii. 162; Stob. Floril. 17, 43.\n\n[19] Diog. 28; 31. Lucian, Macrob. 19. Lactant. Inst. iii. 18. Stob.\nFloril. 7, 45. Suid.\n\n[20] The list of them in Diog. 4, to which additions are made Diog. 34;\n39; 134. The \u0394\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03b1\u1f76 (Diog. 34; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 205; 245; Math. xi.\n90) may perhaps be identical with the \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u039a\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 (Diog.\n4), the \u03a4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7 \u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 (Diog. 34) with \u03a4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7 (Diog. 4). An exposition of\nHesiod, which had been inferred to exist, from Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36,\nKrische, Forsch. 367, rightly identifies with the treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5, and this with the treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 (Stob. Ecl. i. 178).\nOther authorities are given by Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 580.\n\n[21] This appears at least probable from Diog. 4: \u1f15\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2\n\u1f24\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u039a\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c8\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f72\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03c5\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[22] Mohnike, Cleanthes d. Sto.: Greifsw. 1814. Cleanthis Hymn. in\nJovem, ed. Sturz, ed. nov. cur. Merzdorf.: Lips. 1835.\n\n[23] Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, p. 610. Diog. vii. 168. \u00c6lian, Hist. Anim.\nvi. 50. How Clemens, Protrept. 47, A, comes to call him \u03a0\u03b9\u03c3\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2, it is\nhard to say, nor is it of any moment. Mohnike, p. 67, offers\nconjectures. Mohnike also rightly maintains, p. 77, that Cleanthes \u1f41\n\u03a0\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 in Diog. ix. 15 must be the same as this Cleanthes, and Cobet\nstrikes out the words \u1f41 \u03a0\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 after \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2.\n\n[24] According to Antisthenes (the Rhodian), in Diog. l.c., Cleanthes\nwas a pugilist, who came to Athens with four drachm\u00e6, and entered the\nschool of Zeno (according to Hesych. v. Suid., that of Crates, which is\nimpossible for chronological reasons. Conversely, Valer. Max. viii. 7,\next. 11, makes him a pupil of Chrysippus, confounding the relations of\npupil and teacher, as we have met with elsewhere), in which he studied\nfor nineteen years (Diog. 176), gaining a maintenance by working as a\nlabourer (Diog. 168; 174; Plut. Vit. \u00c6r. Al. 7, 5, p. 830; Sen. Ep. 44,\n3; Krische, Forsch.). A public maintenance, which was offered him, Zeno\ninduced him to refuse, and, in other ways, tried his power of will by\nthe severest tests. It is, therefore, all the more improbable that\nAntigonus gave him 3000 min\u00e6 (Diog. 169). On the simplicity of his\nlife, his constant application, his adherence to Zeno, &c., see Diog.\n168; 170; 37; Plut. De Audi. 18, p. 47; Cic. Tusc. ii. 25, 60. He also\nrefused to become an Athenian citizen (Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, p. 1034). He\ndied of self-imposed starvation (Diog. 176; Lucian, Macrob. 19; Stob.\nFloril. 7, 54). His age is stated by Diog. 176, at eighty; by Lucian\nand Valer. Max. viii. 7, ext. 11, at ninety-nine. Diog. 174, gives a\nlist of his somewhat numerous writings, mostly on moral subjects, which\nis supplemented by Fabric. Bibl. iii. 551, Harl. and Mohnike, p. 90.\nCleanthes was held in great esteem in the Stoic School, even in the\ntime of Chrysippus (Diog. vii. 179; 182; Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126). At a\nlater time, the Roman Senate erected a statue to him at Assos (Simpl.\nin Epict. Enchir. c. 53, 329, b).\n\n[25] Aristo, son of Miltiades, a Chian, discussed most fully by\nKrische, Forsch. 405, known as the Siren, because of his persuasive\npowers, and also as the Baldhead, was a pupil of Zeno (Diog. 37; 160;\nCic. N. D. i. 14, 37; Acad. ii. 42, 130; Sen. Ep. 94, 2), but is said,\nduring Zeno\u2019s illness, to have joined Polemo (Diocl. in Diog. 162).\nAlthough it may be objected that his teaching does not diverge in the\ndirection of Platonism, but rather in the opposite direction, still\nPolemo\u2019s contempt (Diog. iv. 18) for dialectic may at one time have had\nits attractions for him. It is a better established fact that his\nattitude towards pleasure was less indifferent than it ought to have\nbeen, according to his principles (Eratos and Apollophanes in Athen.\nvii. 281, c); but the charge of flattery towards his fellow-pupil\nPers\u00e6us appears not to be substantiated (Athen. vi. 251, c). His\nletters show that he was on intimate terms with Cleanthes (Themist. Or.\nxxi. p. 255, b). His loquacity is said to have been displeasing to Zeno\n(Diog. vii. 18). He appeared as a teacher in the Cynosarges,\nAntisthenes\u2019 old locality (Diog. 161), thus claiming descent from\nCynicism. Of his numerous pupils (Diog. 182; Plut. C. Princ. Philos. i.\n4. p. 776), two are mentioned by Diogenes, 161; Miltiades and Diphilus.\nAthen\u00e6us names two more: Apollophanes, and the celebrated Alexandrian\nsage, Eratosthenes, both of whom wrote an \u2018Aristo.\u2019 The latter is also\nnamed by Strabo, i. 2, 2, p. 15, Suid. \u1f18\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b8. Apollophanes, whilst\nadopting Aristo\u2019s views of virtue in Diog. vii. 92, did not otherwise\nadopt his ethics. His natural science is mentioned by Diog. vii. 140,\nhis psychology by Tertull. De An. 14. Since Eratosthenes was born 276\nB.C., Aristo must have been alive in 250 B.C., which agrees with his\nbeing called a cotemporary and opponent of Arcesilaus (Strabo, l.c.;\nDiog. vii. 162; iv. 40, and 33). According to Diog. vii. 164, he died\nof sunstroke. Not only had his School disappeared in the time of Strabo\nand Cicero (Cic. Legg. i. 13, 38; Fin. ii. 11, 35; v. 8, 23; Tusc. v.\n30, 85; Off. i. 2, 6; Strabo, l.c.), but no traces of it are found\nbeyond the first generation. The writings enumerated by Diog. vii. 163,\nwith the single exception of the letter to Cleanthes, are said to have\nbeen attributed by Pan\u00e6tius and Sosicrates to the Peripatetic; but\nKrische\u2019s remarks, p. 408, particularly after Sauppe\u2019s demurrer\n(Philodemi de Vit. Lib. X. Weimar, 1853, p. 7), raise a partial doubt\nas to the accuracy of this statement. The fragments, at least, of\n\u1f49\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 preserved by Stob\u00e6us seem to belong to a Stoic. Perhaps from\nthe \u1f4d\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 come the statements in Sen. Ep. 36, 3; 115, 8; Plut. De Aud.\n8, p. 42; De Sanit. 20, p. 133; De Exil. 5, p. 600; Pr\u00e6c. Ger. Reip. 9,\n4, p. 804; Aqua an Ign. Util. 12, 2, p. 958.\n\n[26] Herillus\u2019s native place was Carthage (Diog. vii. 37; 165). If\n\u03a7\u03b1\u03bb\u03c7\u03b7\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 is read by Cobet in the last passage, we have again the\nsame confusion between \u039a\u03b1\u03bb\u03c7\u03b7\u03b4\u1f7c\u03bd and \u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03b4\u1f7c\u03bd, which made Xenocrates a\n\u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2. He came as a boy under Zeno (Diog. 166; Cic. Acad. ii. 42,\n129). Diog. l.c. enumerates the writings of Herillus, calling them,\nhowever, \u1f40\u03bb\u03b9\u03b3\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c7\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac. Cic. De Orat. iii. 17. 62,\nspeaks of a School bearing his name, but no pupil belonging to it is\nknown.\n\n[27] Citium was his birthplace. His father\u2019s name was Demetrius (Diog.\n6; 36), and his own nickname Dorotheus (Suid. \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03c3.). According to\nDiog. 36; Sotion and Nicias in Athen. iv. 162, d; Gell. ii. 18, 8;\nOrig. C. Cels. iii. 483, d; he was first a slave of Zeno\u2019s, which\nagrees with his being a pupil and inmate of his house (Diog. 36; 13;\nCic. N. D. i. 15, 38; Athen. xiii. 607, e; Pausan. ii. 8, 4). It is\nless probable that he was presented by Antigonus to Zeno as a copyist\n(Diog. 36). He subsequently lived at the court of Antigonus (Athen. vi.\n251, c; xiii. 607, a; Themist. Or. xxxii., p. 358), whose son\nHalcyoneus (\u00c6lian, V. H. iii. 17, says falsely himself) he is said to\nhave instructed (Diog. 36), and with whom he stood in high favour\n(Plut. Arat. 18; Athen. vi. 251, c). He, however, allowed the\nMacedonian garrison in Corinth to be surprised by Aratus, in 243 B.C.,\nand, according to Pausan. ii. 8, 4; vii. 8, 1, perished on that\noccasion. The contrary is asserted by Plut. Arat. 23, and Athen. iv.\n162, c. In his teaching and manner of life, he appears to have taken a\nvery easy view of the Stoic principles (Diog. 13; 36; Athen. iv. 162,\nb; xiii. 607, a). It is therefore probable that he did not agree with\nAristo\u2019s Cynicism (Diog. vii. 162), and his pupil Hermagoras wrote\nagainst the Cynics (Suid. \u1f19\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03b3.). Political reasons were at the bottom\nof Menedemus\u2019 hatred for him (Diog. ii. 143). Otherwise, he appears as\na genuine Stoic (Diog. vii. 120; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38; Minuc. Felix\nOctav. 21, 3; Philodem. De Mus., Vol. Herc. i. col. 14). Compare p. 39,\n2. The treatises mentioned by Diog. 36 are chiefly ethical and\npolitical. In addition to these, there was a treatise on Ethics (Diog.\n28); the \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, or \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9, from which\nAthen. (iv. 162, b; xiii. 607, a) gives some extracts; and the \u1f39\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\n(in Suid.). Whether Cicero\u2019s statement is taken from a treatise omitted\nby Diogenes, or from that \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, it is hard to say.\n\n[28] According to the sketch of his life in Buhle (Arat. Opp. i. 3),\nAratus was a pupil of Pers\u00e6us at Athens, in company with whom he\nrepaired to Antigonus in Macedonia, which can only mean that he was,\ntogether with Pers\u00e6us, a pupil of Zeno. Another writer in Buhle (ii.\n445) calls him so, mentioning one of his letters addressed to Zeno.\nOther accounts (Ibid. ii. 431; 442; 446) describe him as a pupil of\nDionysius of Heraclea, or of Timon and Menedemus. A memorial of his\nStoicism is the introduction to his \u2018Ph\u00e6nomena,\u2019 a poem resembling the\nhymn of Cleanthes. Asclepiades (Vita in Buhle, ii. 429), in calling him\na native of Tarsus, is only preferring a better-known Cilician town to\none less known.\n\n[29] Hence his name \u1f41 \u039c\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. On his writings, consult Diog. vii.\n166; 37; 23; v. 92; Athen. vii. 281, d; x. 437, e; Cic. Acad. ii. 22,\n71; Tusc. ii. 25, 60; Fin. v. 31, 94. Previously to Zeno, he is said to\nhave studied under Heraclides \u1f41 \u03a0\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2, Alexinus, and Menedemus.\n\n[30] Diog. 177; Plut. Cleomen. 2; 11; Athen. viii. 354, e. Sph\u00e6rus\u2019\npresence in Egypt seems to belong to the time before he became\nconnected with Cleomenes. He was a pupil of Cleanthes (Diog. vii. 185;\nAthen. l.c.) when he went to Egypt, and resided there at the court of\nPtolemy for several years. He had left Egypt by 221 B.C., but was then\nhimself no longer a member of the Stoic School at Athens. It is\npossible that Sph\u00e6rus may first have come to Cleomenes on a commission\nfrom the Egyptian king. In that case, the Ptolemy referred to must have\nbeen either Ptolemy Euergetes or Ptolemy Philadelphus\u2014certainly not\nPhilopator, as Diog. 177 says. If, however, the view is taken that it\nwas Ptolemy Philopator, it may be supposed that Sph\u00e6rus repaired to\nEgypt with Cleomenes in 221 B.C. Sph\u00e6rus\u2019 numerous writings (Diog. 178:\n\u039b\u03b1\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 also in Athen. iv. 141, 6) refer to all parts of\nphilosophy, and to some of the older philosophers. According to Cic.\nTusc. iv. 24, 53, his definitions were in great esteem in the Stoic\nSchool.\n\n[31] Athenodorus, a native of Soli (Diog. vii. 38; 100); Callippus of\nCorinth (Diog. 38); Philonides of Thebes, who went with Pers\u00e6us to\nAntigonus (Diog. 9; 38); Posidonius of Alexandria (Diog. 38); Zeno of\nSidon, a pupil of Diodorus Cronus, who joined Zeno (Diog. 38; 16;\nSuid.).\n\n[32] Baguet, De Chrysippo. Annal. Lovan. vol. iv. Lovan. 1822.\n\n[33] \u0395\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f26\u03bd \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f02\u03bd \u1f26\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03ac (Diog. 183). Cic. Acad. ii.\n24, 75: Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum, Athen.\nviii. 335, b.: \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1. See Baguet, p. 16.\n\n[34] It is recorded (Diog. 179) that he was brought up in early life as\na racer, which is an exceedingly suspicious statement, (confer D, 168);\nand that his paternal property was confiscated (Hecato in Diog. 181).\nSubsequently, his domestic establishment was scanty, consisting of one\nold servant (Diog. 185; 181; 183); but whether this was the result of\nStoicism or of poverty is not known. The Floril. Monac. (in Stob.\nFloril. ed. Mein. iv. 289) 262 calls him \u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2, \u1f14\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac.\n\n[35] According to Apollodorus in Diog. 184, he died c. 205 B.C., in his\n73rd year, which would make 281 to 276 the year of his birth. According\nto Lucian, Macrob. 20, he attained the age of 81, and, according to\nValer. Max. viii. 7 ext. 10, completed the 39th book of his logic in\nhis eightieth year.\n\n[36] This is the view of Diog. 179; Plut. De Exil. 14, p. 605; Strabo,\nxiii. 1. 57, p. 610; xiv. 4, 8, p. 671, and most writers. Alexander\nPolyhistor, however, in Diog. and Suid. \u0396\u03ae\u03bd. call him a native of\nTarsus; and since his father Apollonius migrated from Tarsus to Soli\n(Strabo, p. 671), it is possible that Chrysippus may have been born in\nTarsus.\n\n[37] On this point all authorities are agreed. When and how he came to\nAthens is not recorded. He subsequently obtained the rights of\ncitizenship there (Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 2, p. 1034).\n\n[38] Diog. 179. This statement cannot be tested by chronology.\nAuthorities, however, do not look promising.\n\n[39] Diog. Pro. 15. Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, 610.\n\n[40] Diog. vii. 183. It is possible, as Ritter, iii. 524, supposes,\nthat he was for some time doubtful about Stoicism, whilst he was under\nthe influence of the Academic Scepticism, and that during this time he\nwrote the treatise against \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1. This is possible, but not\nprobable. But that he should have separated from Cleanthes, and have\nset up a school in the Lyceum in opposition to him, is unlikely, and\ndoes not follow from the words of Diog. 179; 185.\n\n[41] Diog. 184; iv. 62. Cic. Acad. ii. 27, 87. Plut. Sto. Rep. p. 10,\n3, 1036. These passages refer particularly to Chrysippus\u2019 six books\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. On the other hand, his pupil Aristocreon, in Plut.\nl.c. 2, 5, commends him as being \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03af\u03b4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03af\u03b4\u03b1.\n(Conf. Plut. Comm. Not. i. 4, p. 1059).\n\n[42] When a learner, he is said to have used these words to Cleanthes:\n\u2018Give me the principles; the proofs I can find myself.\u2019 Subsequently it\nwas said of him: \u2018If the Gods have any logic, it is that of Chrysippus\u2019\n(Diog. 179). See Cic. N. D. i. 15, 30, where the Epicurean calls him\nStoicorum somniorum vaferrimus interpres: ii. 6, 16; iii. 10, 25:\nDivin. i. 3, 6: Chrysippus acerrimo vir ingenio. Senec. Benefic. i. 3,\n8; 4, 1, complains of his captiousness. Dionys. Hal. Comp. Verb. 68,\ncalls him the most practical logician, but the most careless writer.\nKrische, Forsch. i. 445.\n\n[43] Diog. 180. Athen. xiii. 565, a. Damasc. V. Isid. 36. Cic. Tusc. i.\n45, 108.\n\n[44] Diog. 179; 183.\n\n[45] Diog. 185, mentions it as deserving of especial notice, that he\nrefused the invitation of Ptolemy to court, and dedicated none of his\nnumerous writings to a prince.\n\n[46] Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 143. Diog. 179. Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 1, p. 1034.\nAccording to the latter passage, Antipater had written a special\ntreatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c2.\n\n[47] Quid enim est a Chrysippo pr\u00e6termissum in Stoicis? Cic. Fin. i. 2,\n6.\n\n[48] According to Diog. 180, there were not fewer than 750. Conf.\nValer. Max. viii. 7, ext. 10; Lucian, Hermotim. 48.\n\n[49] This appeared to the Epicureans disparaging to the honour of their\nmaster. Hence the charge that Chrysippus had written against Epicurus\nin rivalry (Diog. x. 26, and the criticism of Apollodorus in Diog. vii.\n181).\n\n[50] Baguet, pp. 114\u2013357, discusses the subject very fully, but omits\nseveral fragments. As to his logical treatises, of which alone there\nwere 311 (Diog. 198), see Nicolai, De logicis Chrysippi libris:\nQuedlinb. 1859. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 404. Petersen (Philosoph.\nChrysip. Fundamenta: Hamburg, 1827, 321) attempts a systematic\narrangement of all the known books.\n\n[51] See Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 50; Dionys. Hal. See above 46, 3; Diog.\nvii. 180; x. 27. Galen, Differ. Puls. ii. 10; vol. viii. 631 K;\nHippocr. et Plat. Plac. ii. 2; iii. 2; vol. v. 213, 295, 308, 312, 314,\nand Baguet, 26. See also Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 2; and Bergk, Commentat.\nde Chrys. lib. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd: Cassel, 1841.\n\n[52] The circumstances of his death are related differently in Diog.\n184; but both stories are untrustworthy. The story of the ass is also\ntold in Lucian, Macrob. 25 of Philemon; the other version in Diog. iv.\n44; 61 of Arcesilaus and Lacydes. On the statue of Chrysippus in the\nCeramicus see Diog. vii. 182; Cic. Fin. i. 11, 39; Pausan. i. 17, 2;\nPlut. Sto. Rep. 2, 5.\n\n[53] In Stob. Floril. 40, 8, mention is made of the honourable position\nenjoyed by the Athenian Chremonides, who had been banished from his\ncountry. The banishment of Chremonides being placed in the year 263\nB.C., Teles\u2019 treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c5\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 must have been written between 260 and\n250 B.C. This is further proved by the fact that there is no reference\nin the fragments preserved to persons or circumstances later than this\ndate. The philosophers to whom reference is made are the Cynics\nDiogenes, Crates, Metrocles, Stilpo, Bio the Borysthenite, Zeno, and\nCleanthes (95, 21), the latter being called \u1f41 \u1f0c\u03c3\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[54] Floril. 5, 67; 40, 8; 91, 33; 93, 31; 98, 72; 108, 82 and 83.\n\n[55] According to Suid., he was born c. 275 B.C., and died in his 80th\nyear.\n\n[56] See p. 41, 2.\n\n[57] Conf. Diog. 54: \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd ...\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd. That he was junior to\nAratus appears by his commentary on Aratus\u2019 poem. See Appendix to\nGeminus, Elem. Astron. (Petavii Doctr. Temp. III. 147). The Vita Arati\n(Von Buhle\u2019s Aratus, vol. ii. 443), probably confounding him with the\nPeripatetic Bo\u00ebthus, calls him a native of Sidon.\n\n[58] We shall have occasion to prove this in speaking of his views of a\ncriterion, and of his denial of a conflagration and destruction of the\nworld. Nevertheless, he is frequently appealed to as an authority among\nthe Stoics. Philo, Incorruptib. M. 947, C, classes him among \u1f04\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c5\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2.\n\n[59] This follows from the great importance of Chrysippus, and the\nesteem in which he was held from the very first, and is confirmed by\nthe number of persons to whom he wrote treatises. See the list from\nDiog. 189 in Fabric. Bibl. iii. 549. It is, however, ambiguous whether\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 means to or against.\n\n[60] Aristocreon, the nephew of Chrysippus, is the only pupil who can\nbe definitely mentioned by name. See Diog. vii. 185; Plut. Sto. Rep. 2,\n5, p. 1033.\n\n[61] What is known of this philosopher is limited to the statements in\nDiog. 35; Suid. \u0396\u03ae\u03bd. \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03ba.; Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 13, 7; Arius Didymus,\nIbid. xv. 17, 2; that he was a native of Tarsus (in Suid. \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f72\u03c2 say of\nSidon, evidently confounding him with the Zeno mentioned p. 44, 3);\nthat he was the son of Dioscorides, the pupil and follower of\nChrysippus; that he left many pupils, but few writings; and that he\ndoubted a conflagration of the world.\n\n[62] According to Diog. vi. 81; Lucian, Macrob. 20, he was a native of\nSeleucia on the Tigris; but he is sometimes called a native of Babylon\n(Diog. vii. 39; 55; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 41; Divin. i. 3, 6; Plut. De\nExil. 14, p. 605). Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, calls him a pupil of\nChrysippus; and Acad. ii. 30, 98, the instructor of Carneades in\ndialectic. Plut. Alex. Virt. 5, p. 328, calls him a pupil of Zeno (of\nTarsus). Zeno, he says, \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0392\u03b1\u03b2\u03c5\u03bb\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. Diog.\nvii. 71, mentions a \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7 of his; and, vii. 55 and 57, a\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2. Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, speaks of a treatise on\ndivination. Athen. iv. 168, e, of a treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, xii. 526.\nd, of a work \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd\u2014the same work probably which, according to Cic.\nLegg. iii. 5, 14, was written \u2018a Dione Stoico.\u2019 Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51,\ncalls him \u2018magnus et gravis Stoicus;\u2019 Seneca, De Ira, iii. 38, 1,\nmentions a trait showing great presence of mind. Diogenes was, without\ndoubt, aged in 156 B.C. (Cic. De Senec. 7, 23). According to Lucian, he\nattained the age of 88, and may therefore have died 150 B.C.\n\n[63] It was often supposed, on the strength of Cic. N. D. i. 15, 41,\nDivin. i. 3, 6, that Diogenes was the immediate successor of\nChrysippus. The words, however, consequens or subsequens, by no means\nnecessarily imply it. On the authority of Arius, Eusebius, and Suidas,\nit would seem that Zeno was the successor of Chrysippus, and that\nDiogenes followed Zeno.\n\n[64] Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51, only calls him his pupil; but it is clear\nthat he taught in Athens from Plut. Ti. Gracch. c. 8, as Zumpt, Ueber\ndie philos. Schulen in Athen. Abh. d. Berl. Acad. 1842, Hist. phil. kl.\np. 103, already remarks; and Plut. Tranq. An. 9, p. 469, seems to imply\nthat he continued to live at Athens after leaving Cilicia. The same\nfact is conveyed by the mention of Diogenists and Pan\u00e6tiasts at Athens\n(Athen. v. c. 2, p. 186, a); by the charge brought against Antipater\n(Plut. Garrul. c. 23, p. 514; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 6; Cic.\nAcad ii. 6, 17, and the fragment from Acad. Post. I. in Non. p. 65),\nthat he never ventured to dispute with Carneades; and by Diog. iv. 65;\nStob. Floril. 119, 19. According to these two authorities, he\nvoluntarily put an end to his own life. In Acad. ii. 47, 143, Cicero\ncalls him and Archedemus \u2018duo vel principes dialecticorum,\nopiniosissimi homines.\u2019 It appears from Off. iii. 12, 51, where he is\nalso called \u2018homo acutissimus,\u2019 that he pronounced a severer judgment\non several moral questions than Diogenes. Sen. Ep. 92, 5, reckons him\namong the magnos Stoic\u00e6 sect\u00e6 auctores. Epictet. Diss. iii. 21, 7,\nspeaks of the \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70 \u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b4\u03ae\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5. See Van Lynden, De\nPan\u00e6tio, 33; and Fabric. Biblioth. iii. 538 for his numerous lost\ntreatises.\n\n[65] Cic. l.c.; Strabo xiv. 4, 14, p. 674, Epictet. l.c.; Diog. vii.\n55. It does not follow that they were cotemporaries, but only that\ntheir writings and philosophy were the same. We have otherwise no\naccurate information as to the date of Archedemus. Passages where he is\nmentioned may be found in Fabric. Bibl. III. 540. He also appears to be\nmeant in Simpl. De C\u0153lo, Schol. in Arist. 505, a, 45. In Diog. 134, he\nappears to be placed between Chrysippus and Posidonius. In Plut. De\nExil. 14, 605, he follows Antipater. According to this authority he\nestablished a school in Babylon, and because he came there from Athens,\nPlutarch appears to have considered him an Athenian.\n\n[66] Apollodorus of Athens, the compiler of the \u0392\u03b9\u03b2\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03b7, a\nwell-known grammarian, is also mentioned as a pupil of Diogenes\n(Scymnus, Chius Perieges. v. 20). His chronicle, dedicated to Attalus\nII., Philadelphus of Pergamum (158\u2013138 B.C.), and probably drawn up 144\nB.C., would seem to corroborate this assertion. Pan\u00e6tius, whose pupil\nhe is elsewhere called (Suid. \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4.), was himself a pupil of\nDiogenes\u2019 successor, Antipater (Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6), and can hardly\nhave been older than Apollodorus.\n\nAnother grammarian belonging to the School of Diogenes is Zenodotus\n(Diog. vii. 30), supposing him to be identical with the Alexandrian\nZenodotus (Suid. \u0396\u03b7\u03bd\u03cc\u03b4.). A third is perhaps the celebrated\nAristarchus, whom Scymnus calls a fellow-disciple of Apollodorus. A\nfourth, Crates of Mallos, called by Strabo, xiv. 5, 16, p. 676, the\ninstructor of Pan\u00e6tius, by Suid. a Stoic philosopher, who in Varro,\nLat. ix. 1, appeals to Chrysippus against Aristarchus.\n\nAntipater\u2019s pupils are Heraclides of Tarsus (Diog. vii. 121); Sosigenes\n(Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142); C. Blossius of Cum\u00e6 (Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8,\n17 and 20; Val. Max. iv. 7, 1; Cic. L\u00e6l. 11, 37). Eudromus, mentioned\nby Diog. vii. 39, appears to belong to the time between Chrysippus and\nPan\u00e6tius. Between Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes, Diog. vii. 84, names a\ncertain Apollodorus, the author, probably, of the fragments in Stob.\nEcl. i. 408 and 520. Possibly, however, he may be identical with the\nApollodorus mentioned by Cic. N. D. i. 34, 93, and consequently a\ncotemporary of Zeno. In Diog. vii. 39, he is called \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41\n\u1f1c\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, instead of which Cobet reads \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a3\u03cd\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2.\nApollodorus the Athenian, mentioned by Diog. vii. 181, is without doubt\nthe Epicurean, known to us also from Diog. x. 2 and 25. Krische,\nForsch. 26, thinks even that the passages in Cicero refer to him.\n\nThe age of Diogenes of Ptolemais (Diog. vii. 41), of \u0152nopides mentioned\nby Stob. Ecl. i. 58; Macrob. Sat. i. 17, together with Diogenes and\nCleanthes, and of Nicostratus, mentioned by Philodemus \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 Tab. I. 2 and perhaps by Artemidorus Oneirocrit. I. 2 Sch. is\nquite unknown. Nicostratus, however, must have written before the\nmiddle of the first century before Christ. He is probably distinct from\nthe Nicostratus who wrote on the Aristotelian categories in an adverse\nspirit, and is referred to by Simpl. in Categ. Schol. in Arist. 40, a;\n24, b, 16; 41, b, 27; 47, b, 23; 49, b, 43; 72, b, 6; 74, b, 4; 81, b,\n12; 83, a, 37; 84, a, 28; 86, b, 20; 87, b, 30; 88, b, 3 and 11; 89, a,\n1; 91, a, 25; b, 21. For this Nicostratus used the treatise of a\ncertain Roman Lucius, whereas Roman treatises on the Categories can\nhardly have existed before the time of Philodemus, a cotemporary of\nCicero. However, both Lucius and Nicostratus appear to have been\nStoics.\n\n[67] Already Simpl. in Cat. Schol. in Arist. 49, a, 16, says: \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2, \u1f67\u03bd \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bb\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03bd.\n\n[68] Plut. Plac. Pro. 2: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f14\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u00b7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd\u00b7\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd, \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd, \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. See\nalso Diog. vii. 92.\n\n[69] In Seneca, Ep. 89, 4, wisdom is the highest good for the human\nmind, and philosophy is a striving after wisdom: wisdom is defined to\nbe the knowledge of things human and divine; philosophy to be studium\nvirtutis, or studium corrigend\u00e6 mentis. This striving after virtue\ncannot be distinguished from virtue itself: Philosophia studium\nvirtutis est, sed per ipsam virtutem. Seneca further observes (Fr. 17,\nin Lactant. Inst. iii. 15): Philosophia nihil aliud est quam recta\nvivendi ratio, vel honeste vivendi scientia, vel ars rect\u00e6 vit\u00e6 agend\u00e6.\nNon errabimus, si dixerimus philosophiam esse legem bene honesteque\nvivendi, et qui dixerit illam regulam vit\u00e6, suum illi [nomen] reddidit.\nPlut. see previous note.\n\n[70] See Diog. vii. 46: \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[71] Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 6: \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 [sc. \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2] \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03c8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[72] Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 3, 2: \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03af \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f22\n\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03bf\u03c5, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03bb\u03ba\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u2019 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f02\u03bd \u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc7, \u1f21\u03b4\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2. \u0394\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f74 had, it is true, been\ntreated by Aristotle, whose school is here referred to, as an end in\nitself; but Aristotle had carefully distinguished \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f74 from \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae.\n\n[73] p. 19.\n\n[74] Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129: Herillum, qui in cognitione et scientia\nsummum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo\ndissenserit, et quam non multum a Platone. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Herillus\nautem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit. iv. 14, 36:\nIn determining the highest good, the Stoics act as one-sidedly, as if\nipsius animi, ut fecit Herillus, cognitionem amplexarentur, actionem\nrelinquerent. v. 25, 73: S\u00e6pe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter\nest laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia. Hoc uno captus Herillus\nscientiam summum bonum esse defendit, nec rem ullam aliam per se\nexpetendam. Diog. vii. 165: \u1f2d\u03c1\u03b9\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 ... \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd. Ibid.\nvii. 37. With less accuracy, it is asserted by Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i.\n918, that we are raised to the society of the gods, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f2d\u03c1\u03b9\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u1fc3.\n\n[75] Sen. Ep. 89, 8: Nam nec philosophia sine virtute est nec sine\nphilosophia virtus. Ibid. 53, 8: We all lie in the slumber of error:\nsola autem nos philosophia excitabit ... illi te totum dedica.\n\n[76] Lact. Inst. vii. 7: Ad virtutem capessendam nasci homines, Ariston\ndisseruit. See Stob. Ecl. 4, 111.\n\n[77] Plut. De Audiendo, c. 8, p. 42: \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f41\n\u1f08\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f44\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[78] Stob. Floril. 82, 15. Diog. vii. 161.\n\n[79] Stob. Floril. 82, 11.\n\n[80] Ibid. 7.\n\n[81] Diog. vii. 162: \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c7\u03b5 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff7 \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[82] See Diog. vii. 163.\n\n[83] Aristo (in the \u1f49\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1) in Stob. Floril. 82, 16: \u1f41 \u1f10\u03bb\u03bb\u03ad\u03b2\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f41\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bb\u03b7\u03c6\u03b8\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c5 \u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c6\u03b8\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03bd\u03af\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1.\n\n[84] Stob. l.c. 4, 110.\n\n[85] See following note and Cic. Acad. ii. 39, 123: Aristo Chius, qui\nnihil istorum (sc. physicorum) sciri putat posse.\n\n[86] Diog. vii. 160: \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c3\u03b5 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u1fc4\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9, \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2. Stob. Floril. 80, 7: \u1f08\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u2019\n\u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2. \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70, \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\u00b7 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u00b7 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\u00b7 \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. Minuc. Fel. Octav. 13, and\nLactant. Ins. iii. 20, attribute this utterance to Socrates. According\nto Cic. De Nat. De. I. 14, 37, Aristo expressed doubts about the\nexistence of a God.\n\n[87] Sext. Math. vii. 13: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u03a7\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9,\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1fc3\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c9\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u1f72\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c8\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af\u03c4\u03b8\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7\u2014(almost a literal\ntranslation is given of these words by Seneca, Ep. 89, 13)\u2014\u1f00\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b2\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u1f7a \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f03 \u03bf\u1f31\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Seneca, Ep. 94, 1: Eam partem\nphilosophi\u00e6, qu\u00e6 dat propria cuique person\u00e6 pr\u00e6cepta ... quidam solam\nreceperunt ... sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario hanc partem levem\nexistimat et qu\u00e6 non descendat in pectus usque; at illam habentem\npr\u00e6cepta [? ad vitam beatam] plurimum ait proficere ipsa decreta\nphilosophi\u00e6 constitutionemque summi boni, quam qui bene intellexit ac\ndidicit, quid in quaque re faciendum sit, sibi ipse pr\u00e6cepit. This is\nthen further expanded following Aristo.\n\n[88] Seneca, \u00a7 12, asks for whom should such exhortations be\nnecessary\u2014for him who has right views of good and evil, or for him who\nhas them not? Qui non habet, nihil a te adjuvabitur; aures ejus\ncontraria monitionibus tuis fama possedit; qui habet exactum judicium\nde fugiendis petendisque, scit, quid sibi faciendum sit, etiam te\ntacente; tota ergo pars ista philosophi\u00e6 submoveri potest. In \u00a7 17, he\ncontinues: A madman must be cured, and not exhorted; nor is there any\ndifference between general madness and the madness which is treated\nmedically.\n\n[89] Diog. vii. 39.\n\n[90] Logical treatises, those \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bb\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03c7\u03bf\u03b9, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u2014and if there were a rhetoric (see p. 40, 3) the \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7\u2014physical\ntreatises, those \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 and \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. Diog. 4, 39.\n\n[91] Plut. Sto. Rep. 8, 2: \u1f14\u03bb\u03c5\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f10\u03ba\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2. That he\noccasionally not only solved but propounded sophisms is proved by the\nfallacy quoted Ibid. i. Conf. Diog. vii. 25\n\n[92] See above p. 36.\n\n[93] According to Diog. 32, he declared at the beginning of his Polity\nthe \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03cd\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 to be useless\u2014a testimony worth very little; for\nit is a moot point, in what sense Zeno made this statement. Perhaps he\nwas only anxious to exclude those studies from the narrower sphere of\nphilosophy (as Sen. Ep. 88). Perhaps his Polity was nearer Cynicism\nthan any other of his writings.\n\n[94] Proofs will be given later.\n\n[95] The Catalogue in Diog. 174, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 3 B. (Mohnike Cleanth. 102,\nbelieves this work was a treatise on life according to reason. The\ntitle is against this view, and it is also improbable, inasmuch as\ntreatises by Sph\u00e6rus and Chrysippus bearing the same title, are\nexclusively logical), mentions logical treatises \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. To these may be added, from Athen. 467, d; 471, b, the\nrhetorical treatises \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd and \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. Of greater\nimportance were the physical and theological treatises: \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 (2 B.); \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f29\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f10\u03be\u03b7\u03b3\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 (4 B.); \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u0394\u03b7\u03bc\u03cc\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 (Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6); \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd (in Plut. De Flum. 5, 3); and the \u03bc\u03c5\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 (Athen. xiii. 572,\ne), which is probably identical with the \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1 of Diogenes.\n\n[96] Diog. 41.\n\n[97] Diog. vii. 178, mentions (1) logical and rhetorical writings: \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f18\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd (3 B.), \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae (2 B.), \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd; (2) treatises on science: \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n(2 B.), \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bb\u03b1\u03c7\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd,\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03c9\u03bb\u03b1, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f29\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 (5\nB.), \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2. That Sph\u00e6rus\u2019 definitions were particularly valued,\nhas been already seen, 44, 2.\n\n[98] Chrys. in the 3rd B., \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 4); \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f51\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd. The same\nwriter, in \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 (Ibid. 5): \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019\n\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f22 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. Further details above p. 47, 2.\n\n[99] Sext. Math. vii. 17; Diog. 40.\n\n[100] The chief divisions of the logic of the Stoics (Diog. 42, 46) are\nconsidered important for special purposes. The doctrine \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd is of use, helping us to truth, by making us examine our\nnotions; \u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, because it leads to the knowledge of things by means\nof conceptions; \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 (which includes the whole of formal logic),\nbecause it produces \u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 (= \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74), \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 (= \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7), \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03be\u03af\u03b1 (= \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd), \u1f00\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 (= \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd). Its value is therefore chiefly negative, as a\npreservative from error. See Seneca, Ep. 89, 9: Proprietates verborum\nexigit et structuram et argumentationes, ne pro vero falsa subrepant.\nSext. Math. vii. 23: \u1f40\u03c7\u03c5\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd; Pyrrh. ii. 247: \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f61\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 (the Stoics), \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[101] This may be seen in Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 134\u2013203, 229; Math. viii.\n300; as well as from the catalogue of the writings of Chrysippus in\nDiogenes.\n\n[102] The only part which is censured by Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep.\n10, 1) is the sceptical logic, which leaves contradictions unsolved:\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u1f04\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9, \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f43 \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f23\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b2\u03b9\u03c9\u03c3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd.\n\n[103] Cic. Parad. Pro\u0153m.: Cato autem perfectus mea sententia Stoicus\n... in ea est h\u00e6resi, qu\u00e6 nullum sequitur florem orationis neque\ndilatat argumentum: minutis interrogatiunculis, quasi punctis, quod\nproposuit efficit. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7: Pungunt quasi aculeis\ninterrogatiunculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil\ncommutantur animo. See also Diog. vii. 18, 20.\n\n[104] In Sextus Empiricus, \u0394\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 is their ordinary name. It is\nalso found in Plut. Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2, p. 1008. Cic. Top. 2, 6; Fin.\niv. 3, 6.\n\n[105] After the example of the Megarians, the Stoics were in the habit\nof putting their arguments in the form of questions. Hence the terms\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u1fb6\u03bd (Diog. vii. 186), interrogatio (Sen. Ep. 82, 9; 85, 1; 87,\n11), interrogatiuncula (Cic.), which are employed even when the\narguments were not in this form.\n\n[106] See p. 48, 1.\n\n[107] Called \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7, according to Diog. 39 also \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9, \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7, \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7.\n\n[108] Diog. 39: \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1fc6 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bb\u03b5 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41 \u039a\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b1\u02b9\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b1\u02b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u1f1c\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f54\u03b4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc7\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f41 \u0392\u03b1\u03b2\u03c5\u03bb\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2. Sext. Math.\nvii. 16. Sen. Ep. 89, 9; 14. The six divisions enumerated by Cleanthes\n(Diog. 41)\u2014Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology\n(Diog. 41) may be easily reduced to three.\n\n[109] According to Diog. 40, the first place was assigned to Logic, the\nsecond to Science, the third to Ethics, by Zeno, Chrysippus,\nArchedemus, Eudemus, and others. The same order, but inverted, is found\nin Diogenes of Ptolemais, and in Seneca, Ep. 89, 9. The latter,\nhowever, observes (Nat. Qu. Prol. 1) that the difference between that\npart of philosophy which treats about God, and that which treats about\nman, is as great as the difference between philosophy and other\ndepartments, or even as between God and man. On the other hand,\nApollodorus places Ethics in the middle, as also Cleanthes does, and\nlikewise Pan\u00e6tius and Posidonius, if it is certain that they began with\nscience. This appears, however, only to have reference to their order\nin discussion (see Sext. Math. vii. 22, probably on the authority of\nPosidonius). A few (Diog. 40) asserted that the parts could be so\nlittle separated, that they must be always treated together. The\nstatement of Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 1), that Logic must come\nfirst, and be followed by Ethics and Science, so that the theological\npart may form the conclusion, only refers to the order in which they\nought to be taught.\n\n[110] In Diog. 39; Sext. Math. vii. 17; Philo, Mut. Nom. p. 1055, E.\nH\u00f6sch. (589 M); De Agricul. 189, D (302), philosophy is compared to an\norchard, Logic represents the fence, Science the trees. Ethics the\nfruit; so that Ethics are the end and object of the whole. Philosophy\nis also compared to a fortified town, in which the walls are\nrepresented by Logic, but in which the position of the other two is not\nclear; to an egg, Logic being the shell, and, according to Sextus,\nScience being the white and Ethics the yolk, but the reverse according\nto Diogenes. Dissatisfied with this comparison, Posidonius preferred to\ncompare philosophy to a living creature, in which Logic constitutes the\nbones and muscles, Science the flesh and blood, and Ethics the soul.\nBut Diogenes has another version of this simile, according to which\nScience represents the soul; and Ritter iii. 432, considers the version\nof Diogenes to be the older of the two.\n\n[111] See Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 13.\n\n[112] Diog. 41: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f14\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd ... \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b5\u1f56 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03be\u03cc\u03b4\u1ff3 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd. Sen. Ep.\n89, 17: Superest ut rationalem partem philosophi\u00e6 dividam: omnis oratio\naut continua est aut inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa; hanc\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd, illam \u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd placuit vocari. Cic. Fin. ii. 6, 17; Orat.\n32, 113. Quintil. Inst. ii. 20, 7. According to these passages,\nRhetoric was by Zeno compared to the palm of the hand, and Dialectic to\nthe fist: quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem\ncompressius. The Stoics agree with Aristotle in calling rhetoric\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc7 (Sop. in Hermog. v. 15, Walz.). See Prantl,\nGesch. der Log. i. 413.\n\n[113] Diog. 41: Some divide logic into rhetoric and dialectic: \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f72\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9. (We have no reason to read as M\u00e9nage does\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9, or to conjecture, as Meibom and Nicolai, De Log. Chrys.,\nLib. 23, do, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9.) According to this passage, \u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd must be\nidentical with the doctrine of a criterium. In a subsequent passage,\nhowever, the two are distinguished; the doctrine of a criterium is said\nto be useful for the discovery of truth: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. We\nmay therefore suppose that in the passage first quoted the words should\nbe \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. In this case, we may\nunderstand by \u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd not only the theory of definition\u2014a theory to\nwhich Aristotle devoted a separate section at the end of his Analytics\n(Anal. Post. ii.)\u2014but besides a theoretical disquisition on the\nformation of definitions, a collection of definitions of various\nobjects. Such collections are found in the treatises of Chrysippus\n(Diog. 199, 189): \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03b6\u02b9. \u1f45\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u02b9. \u1f45\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b6\u02b9. \u1f45\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b2\u02b9. \u1f45\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b2\u02b9.\n\u1f45\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b2\u02b9. \u1f45\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03c9\u03bd \u03b2\u02b9; besides the further\ntreatises \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b6\u02b9. \u03a0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b2\u02b9. The treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b2\u02b9 may also be\nincluded here; perhaps also that \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u039c\u03b7\u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b9\u02b9. \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03a0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u02b9, Diog. 191.\n\n[114] No description of their system can dispense with this fundamental\nenquiry, which had been already instituted by Zeno. It appears,\nhowever, to have been treated by several writers as a branch of\ndialectic. Diog. 43 says that the branch of dialectic which treats of\n\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 may be divided \u03b5\u1f34\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd. (See Nicolai p. 23.) Compare with this\nthe words of Diocles, in Diog. 49: \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1fa7 \u1f21 \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ac\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. According to this passage, the branch of\ndialectic which treated of \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 included the theory of knowledge.\nDiog. 53, Petersen\u2019s conjecture is singular (Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 25)\nthat the theory of knowledge may have been understood by Chrysippus\nunder the name rhetoric.\n\n[115] Our information on this head is very small. In the words:\n\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 verba curat et sensus et ordinem, a division of rhetoric is\nimplied by Seneca, which differs in little, except in the position of\nthe chief parts, from that of Aristotle. A fourth part is added to the\nthree others by Diog. 43\u2014on Delivery\u2014\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f55\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\nDiogenes also claims for the Stoics the Aristotelian distinction\nbetween three ways of speaking\u2014\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2,\n\u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c9\u03bc\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2\u2014and four parts in a speech: \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bf\u03af\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03b3\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2. Definitions of \u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03b3\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 are\ngiven from Zeno by the anonymous author in Spengel, Rhet. Gr. i. 434,\n23; 447, 11. The same author (Ibid. 454, 4) says that, according to\nChrysippus, the \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 must be \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae\u03c2. The Stoic definition of\nrhetoric has been already given, p. 70, 1. Another\u2014\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b9\u03bd\u2014is attributed to Chrysippus by Plut. Sto.\nRep. 28, 1. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7, observes, in reference to the Stoic\nrhetoric, and in particular to that of Chrysippus, that such was its\nnature that si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere\ndebeat\u2014that it dealt in nothing but words, being withal scanty in\nexpressions, and confined to subtleties. This neglect of the truly\nrhetorical element appears already in the quotations from Plut. Sto.\nRep. 28, 2. We have not the slightest reason to complain, as Prantl\ndoes, p. 413, of the purely rhetorical value of dialectic with the\nStoics.\n\n[116] See p. 70, 1, Alex. Aphr. Top. 3: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b5\u1f56 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f56 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f21\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2. Aristotle had\nused the term dialectic in another sense, but with Plato it expressed\nthe mode of procedure peculiar to a philosopher.\n\n[117] See Anon. Prolegg. ad Hermog. Rhet. Gr. vii. 8, W.: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f56 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[118] Diog. 42: \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd [\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd] \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd. (The same, p. 62, quoted\nfrom Posidonius, and in Sext. Math. xi. 187, and Suid. \u0394\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae.)\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd being probably used, because dialectic deals not only with\njudgments, but with conceptions and interrogations. Conf. Diog. 68.\n\n[119] This is the meaning of the Stoic distinction between \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 and \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2, a distinction subsequently employed by Philo\nand the Fathers, and really identical with that of Aristotle (Anal.\nPost i. 10, 76 b, 24): \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03be\u03c9 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7.\nOn this distinction see Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 72, p. 142: \u03b4\u03b9\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f41\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9 (the Stoics are meant) \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f14\u03bd\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03be\u03ac\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f41 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd. Sext. Math. viii. 275 (conf. Pyrrh. i. 76): \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u0394\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76\n... \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff4\u03c9\u03bd\n... \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c4\u1ff3. The Stoics alone can be meant by the \u03bd\u03b5\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9 in\nTheo. Smyrn. Mus. c. 18, who are contrasted with the Peripatetics for\nusing the terms \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 and \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2. They are also referred\nto by Plut. C. Prin. Phil. 2, 1, p. 777: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd, \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f19\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1ff6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f41 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1fb7,\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f15\u03c9\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9. The double form of Hermes is\nexplained by Heraclitus as referring to the twofold \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\u2014\u1f19\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03a7\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2\nrepresents \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, and the heavenly Hermes (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2)\nrepresents the \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. The distinction passed from the Stoics to\nothers, like Plut. Solert. An. 19, 1, p. 973; Galen, Protrept. i. 1.\n\n[120] Diog. 43: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f34\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd. Ibid. 62: \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f55\u03c4\u03b7, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f41\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1. Seneca l.c.:\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 in duas partes dividitur, in verba et significationes, i.e.\nin res, qu\u00e6 dicuntur, et vocabula, quibus dicuntur. The distinction\nbetween \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, to which \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd (the real\nobject) must be added as a third, will be hereafter discussed in\nanother place. A much narrower conception of dialectic, and more nearly\napproaching to that of the Peripatetics, is to be found in the\ndefinition given by Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213. The division there given is\nalso found in the Platonist Alcinous, Isag. c. 3, as Fabricius has\npointed out. It appears, therefore, not to belong to the Stoic School,\nbut, at most, to a few of its later members.\n\n[121] Seneca continues: Ingens deinde sequitur utriusque divisio,\nwithout, however, giving it.\n\n[122] There is much which is open to doubt in Petersen\u2019s attempt (Phil.\nChrys. Fund. 221) to settle these divisions. At the very beginning, his\nreference of the words in Sext. Math. viii. 11 to the parts of logic is\nunhappy. Nicolai (De Logic. Chrys. Lib. 21) has acted with greater\ncaution, but even much of what he says is doubtful.\n\n[123] Diog. 55.\n\n[124] Diog. 44: \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2, \u1f10\u03bd \u1fa7 \u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03ba\u03bd\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f21 \u1f10\u03b3\u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1f74\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c1\u03b2\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd. The theory of the\ndetermination and division of conceptions occupies such an important\nplace in the section \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2, that we might feel disposed to suppose\nsome mistake in the authority. Still, from the later authorities, pp.\n60\u201362, it is seen that by many it is usually so represented.\n\n[125] Further particulars may be obtained in Schmidt\u2019s Stoicorum\nGrammatica (Halle, 1839); Lersch, Sprachphilosophie der Alten;\nSteinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft, i. 265\u2013363; Nicolai, De Log.\nChrys. Lib. 31. This part of dialectic began with enquiries into the\nvoice and speech. Voice is defined to be sound and speech, to be air in\nmotion, or something hearable\u2014\u1f00\u1f74\u03c1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u1fc6\u03c2; the human voice as \u1f14\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03b5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, is\ndistinguished from the sounds of other animals, which are \u1f00\u1f74\u03c1 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 (Diog. 55; Simpl. Phys. 97; Sext. Math. vi. 39; Gell. N. A.\nvi. 15, 6). That the voice is something material is proved in various\nways (Diog. 55; Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2; Galen, Hist. Phil. 27). The\nvoice, in as far as it is \u1f14\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, or composed of letters, is called\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b9\u03c2; in as far as it expresses certain notions, it is \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (Diog.\n56; Sext. Math. i. 155). A peculiar national mode of expression (\u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u1f10\u03b8\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f19\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03c0\u1f74) was called\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 (Diog. 56). The elements of \u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 are the 24 letters, divided\ninto 7 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03ae\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, 6 \u1f04\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1, and 11 semivowels (Diog. 57); the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 has 5\nparts, called \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 by Chrysippus\u2014\u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, \u1fe5\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1,\n\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f04\u03c1\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u2014to which Antipater added the \u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, or adverb\n(Diog. 57; Galen, De Hippocrat. et Plat. viii. 3; Lersch, ii. 28;\nSteinthal, 291). Words were not formed by caprice, but certain\npeculiarities of things have been imitated in the chief sounds of which\nthey are composed. These peculiarities can therefore be discovered by\netymological analysis (Orig. c. Cels. i. 24; Augustin. Dialect. c. 6;\nOpp. T. I. Ap. 17, c.). (Chrysippus, however, observes (in Varro, L.\nLat. ix. 1) that the same things bear different names, and vice vers\u00e2,\nand (in Gell. N. A. xi. 12, 1) that every word has several meanings.)\nSee Simpl. Cat. 8, \u03b6. Five advantages and two disadvantages of speech\nare enumerated Diog. 59; Sext. Math. i. 210; and poetry (Diog. 60),\nvarious kinds of amphibolia (Diog. 62; Galen, De Soph. P. Dict. c. 4),\nthe formation of conceptions, and division, are treated of.\n\n[126] Diog. vii. 54.\n\n[127] The statements of Zeno and Cleanthes, for instance, in reference\nto \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, prove that these Stoics deduced their theory of knowledge\nfrom general principles respecting notions. They therefore started from\nthe data supplied by the senses. A passage in Zeno, explaining the\nrelations of various forms of knowledge, shows that even Zeno required\nprogress to be from perception to conception and knowledge, and that he\ndistinguished these states only by the varying strength of conviction\nwhich they produced.\n\n[128] Plut. Plac. iv. 12. Diog. vii. 50. Nemes. Nat. Hom. 76. \u03a6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\nis \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2,\nin the same way, it is added, that light shows other things as well as\nitself; \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd is \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, and therefore \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f45 \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f02\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd. \u03a6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 is distinguished from \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd,\nbecause no \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd corresponds to \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 it is \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f11\u03bb\u03ba\u03c5\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2, \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7 \u1f00\u03c0\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 and the\nobject of such an empty perception is a \u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1. Compare also Sext.\nMath. vii. 241: \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f11\u03bb\u03ba\u03c5\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 is called \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd.\nImpressions wholly unfounded, which give the impression of being actual\nperceptions, are called by Diog. 51, \u1f10\u03bc\u03c6\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31 \u1f61\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. In a wider sense, \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 means any kind of notion.\n\n[129] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc7 \u1f41 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 (\u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd as Galen, H.\nPhil. 24, vol. xix. reads), \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd. \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41\n\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd. See p. 79, 2. Orig. c. Cels. vii. 37, 720, b, says\nthat they taught \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u1f20\u03c1\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[130] Plut. Comm. Not. 47: \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7. The same in Diog.\nvii. 45 and 50. That this was also the view of Diogenes appears from\nwhat follows.\n\n[131] Sext. Math. vii. 228: \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f24\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03c5\u03bb\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Conf. Ibid. vii. 372; viii. 400.\n\n[132] Sext. vii. 229, continues: \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7\u2014according to this view, it would be necessary for the soul to\nreceive at once many different forms, if it had to retain different\nnotions at the same time\u2014\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f11\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2. Objection had, however, been raised to this\ndefinition, on the ground that not every change of the soul gives rise\nto a perception, and therefore the Stoics had defined a perception more\naccurately: \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7, which was\nequivalent to saying \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff7\u00b7 or else in\nZeno\u2019s definition of \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 as \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7 they had taken \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 in\na restricted sense for \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, which really comes to the same\nthing. Even this definition had, however, been found too wide, and\nhence \u1f11\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 was limited to change in feeling (\u1f11\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd). But the definition is still too wide, as Sextus already\nremarked; for a perception is not the only feeling of change in the\nsoul. A more accurate definition has already been quoted, 77, 1. The\nstatements in Sext. Math. vii. 372; viii. 400; Diog. vii. 45 and 50;\nAlex. Aphro. De Anim. 135, b; Bo\u00ebth. De Interpret, ii. 292 (Schol. in\nArist. 100), are in agreement with the above remarks.\n\n[133] Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 19, 2: \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f70\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f70, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u1f7a\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cc\u03b2\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03bb\u03bf\u03c0\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\n\u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f40\u03bb\u03af\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd. This passage must not be understood to\nmean that the conceptions of good and evil, as such, are objects of\nsensation (Ritter, iii. 558). The only objects of that kind are\nindividual moral states and activities. The general conceptions derived\nfrom them are, according to the Stoic theory of knowledge, only\nobtained by a process of abstraction.\n\n[134] Plut. Plac. iv. 11, 2: \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd.\n\n[135] Diog. vii. 52: \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd,\n\u1f61\u03c2 \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (immediate contact) \u1f10\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd ... \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n(transition from the sensuous to the super-sensuous) \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 42: Comprehensio [= \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2] facta\nsensibus et vera illi [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur: non quod omnia,\nqu\u00e6 essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam\nposset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scienti\u00e6 et principium\nsui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur. Ibid.\nFin. iii. 10, 33: Cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu\n(experience) aliquid cognitum sit, aut conjunctione, aut similitudine,\naut collatione rationis: hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni notitia\nfacta est. Sext. (Math. iii. 40; ix. 393) also agrees with the Stoic\ndoctrine of the origin of conceptions, in saying that all our ideas\narise either \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03ad\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u1ff6\u03bd or \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (cf. Diog. vii. 53), and in the latter case either by\ncomparison, or actual combination, or analogy.\n\n[136] Diog. l.c. Compare the passage quoted from Seneca, 81, 2.\n\n[137] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 (according to the context, this must mean by\nmemory and experience, but perhaps the author of the Placita has been\ncareless in his extracts here) \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f24\u03b4\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019\n\u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b1\u1f57\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Diog. vii. 51: [\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd] \u03b1\u1f31 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76, \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9.\n\n[138] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f11\u03b2\u03b4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b4\u03b1 (the first\nseven years of life). Comm. Not. 3, 1, says that to the Stoics belonged\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c6\u2019 \u1f67\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Sen.\nEpist. 117, 6: multum dare solemus pr\u00e6sumtioni (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2) omnium\nhominum; apud nos argumentum veritatis est, aliquid omnibus videri.\nFrequent instances will occur of appeals to communes notiti\u00e6 and\nconsensus gentium.\n\n[139] Diog. vii. 53: \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd. 54: \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03b4\u2019 \u1f21 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5. In the same strain Chrysippus\n(in Plut. Sto. Rep. 17) speaks of \u1f14\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 of good and evil.\nIn Plut. Frag. De Anim. vii. 6, T. V. 487 Wytt., the question is asked,\nHow is it possible to learn what is not already known? The Stoics\nreply, By means of \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[140] Compare Cic. Fin. iii. 10: hoc quarto [collatione rationis] boni\nnotitia facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, qu\u00e6 sunt secundum naturam,\nadscendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notitiam boni pervenit.\nSimilarly Sen. Ep. 120, 4, replying to the question, Quomodo ad nos\nprima boni honestique notitia pervenerit? observes, Hoc nos natura\ndocere non potuit: semina nobis scienti\u00e6 dedit, scientiam non dedit ...\nnobis videtur observatio collegisse [speciem virtutis], et rerum s\u00e6pe\nfactarum inter se collatio: per analogiam nostri intellectum et\nhonestum et bonum judicant. The notion of mental health and strength\nhas grown out of corresponding bodily notions; the contemplation of\nvirtuous actions and persons has given rise to the conception of moral\nperfection, the good points being improved upon, and defects being\npassed over, the experience of certain faults which resemble virtues\nserving to make the distinction plainer. Even belief in a God was\nproduced, according to Diog. vii. 52, by \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03be\u03b9\u03c2. See p. 80, 1. Conf.\nStob. Ecl. i. 792: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c6\u03cd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c4\u03b7.\n\n[141] Stob. Ecl. ii. 128: \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u00b7 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f10\u03be \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u1ff3 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u00b7 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f10\u03be \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u03ad\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03af\u00b7 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 (knowledge in a relative sense) \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5, \u1f25\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03ac \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 (sc.\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2) \u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Diog. vii. 47: \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f22\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u1fc6 \u1f22 \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b4\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5.\n(This explanation, which Herillus used according to Diog. vii. 165,\ncertainly belongs to Zeno.) \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u1f04\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3.\n\n[142] See p. 80, 4.\n\n[143] This was the object of Plutarch\u2019s treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd. In the same way, the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Euseb. Pr.\nEv. vi. 8, 10) throws it in the teeth of Chrysippus that, whilst\nappealing to generally received opinions, he is always going contrary\nto them, and that he considers all men, with one or two exceptions, to\nbe fools and madmen.\n\n[144] Diog. 52: \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd,\n\u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[145] Sext. Math. viii. 10: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03be \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac.\n\n[146] Sext. l.c. continues: \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 (this \u03bc\u1f74 is\nobviously redundant as appears from Math. viii. 85, 88; xi. 220, where\nthe same definition is given without the \u03bc\u1f74) \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9, \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\n\u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1f7c\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 every sentence containing an\nassertion or negative, and therefore being opposed to every other.\nIbid. viii. 70: \u1f20\u03be\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f51\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f23\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9. \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1fc6\n(conceptions and propositions; conf. Diog. vii. 63) ... \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u1f05\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f24\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f22\n\u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1. Ibid. 74; Diog. vii. 65: \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f45 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u1f22\n\u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 (see Cic. Tusc. I. 7, 14) \u1f22 \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 (better \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd as Gell. N. A.\nxvi, 8, 4 reads) \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1f72\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff4\u00b7 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. Aristotle had already observed that\nthe distinction between false and true first appears in judgment. See\nZeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 156, 2; 157, 1.\n\n[147] Sext. Math. vii. 93; \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2, \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f41 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03a4\u03af\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f44\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1f74 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c6\u03b5\u03af\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5. Conf. Plato, Rep. vi. 508,\nB.\n\n[148] See Zeller\u2019s Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 231.\n\n[149] Ibid. ii. a, 211.\n\n[150] Diog. 61: \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 (object of thought) \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2.\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03af \u1f42\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03af \u1f42\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f61\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd. Stob. Ecl. i.\n332: \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70, \u1f61\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f61\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 ... \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 [\u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2] \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c5\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f03\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Although defended by\nPrantl, Gesch. d. Log. I. 420, 63, the last words as they stand do not\nappear capable of any passable meaning and are most probably corrupt.\nPlut. Plac. i. 10, 4: \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd. Simpl. Categ. 26, e: \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f30\n\u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b9 \u1fe5\u03b7\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Syrian. on Met. p. 59. (In Petersen\u2019s\nPhilos. Chrys. Fund. 80): \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7 ... \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1fe5\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ae\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c1\u03c7\u03ad\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31\n\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1fa0\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd ... \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31 \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f61\u03c2 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5. Prantl, l.c. takes\nobjection to what Stob\u00e6us and Plutarch here say; yet this view is not\nthat the Stoics regarded their conception of the \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 as identical\nwith Plato\u2019s conception of ideas, but that they asserted that these\nideas were only \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u2014an assertion which had also been made by\nAntisthenes. Compare what is said on p. 92 respecting the unreality of\nthe \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, likewise what Sext. Math. vii. 246, quotes, as belonging to\nthe Stoics: \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 [\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9]\u00b7\n\u1f67\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03b1 \u1f22 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03b1\u00b7 if\nmankind be divided into Greeks and barbarians, the \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2\nwill be neither one nor the other. The further therefore a conception\nis removed from individual limitations, the further it is removed from\ntruth.\n\n[151] Diog. vii. 54: \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f21 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5. Exc.\ne Joan. Damasc. (Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 236), Nr. 34: \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u1f7a \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f24\u03b4\u03b7 (Petersen, 83\nwithout cause suggests \u1f21\u03b4\u1f7a) \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[152] See p. 82, 1.\n\n[153] Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 145.\n\n[154] Stob. Ecl. ii. 128: Knowledge is defined to be \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5, \u1f25\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03ac \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[155] Here may be noted the objection mentioned by Sext. Math. viii.\n463; Pyrrh. ii. 186: The Sceptics cannot deny the possibility of\narguing without proving their assertion and thereby practically\nadmitting the possibility. Also another one urged by Antipater against\nCarneades (Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28; 34, 109): He who asserts that nothing\ncan be known with certainty must, at least, believe that he can with\ncertainty know this. The replies of the Sceptics to these objections,\nand the way they turned them in their own favour, will be found in\nSext. Math. l.c. and vii. 433.\n\n[156] Chrysippus opposed Arcesilaus, with such success, according to\nthe view of the Stoic School, that Carneades was refuted by\nanticipation; and it was considered a special favour of Providence that\nthe labours of Chrysippus had occupied an intermediate place between\ntwo of the most important Sceptics. Plut. Sto. Rep. i. 4, p. 1059.\nDiog. 198 mentions a treatise against Arcesilaus.\n\n[157] Plut. Sto. Rep. 10 (see p. 66, 1); Ibid. 47, 12: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u1f14\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c0\u03c0\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03c1\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2,\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fb6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f34\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2.\nIbid. adv. Col. 26, 3, p. 1122: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u0393\u03bf\u03c1\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03ac\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd. Epict. (Arrian. Diss. i. 27, 15)\nquietly suppresses a Sceptic by saying: \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03b3\u03c9 \u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1.\nFollowing also the Stoic line, Cic. Acad. ii. 10\u201312, makes Antiochus\nargue that Scepticism makes all action impossible.\n\n[158] In Sext. Math. vii. 244, \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9 are, first of all,\nliterally explained to be \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f67\u03bd \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 then, under the head of true \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9, the \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\nand \u03bf\u1f50 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 are distinguished, i.e., notions which are\naccompanied by a clear impression of being true, and such as are not;\nand, in conclusion, \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 is defined: \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, \u1f41\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f02\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2. This\ndefinition is afterwards more fully explained. The same explanation is\ngiven Ibid. 402 and 426; viii. 85; Pyrrh. ii. 4; iii. 242; Augustin. c.\nAcad. ii. 5, 11; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18. Diog. vii. 46: \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd, \u1f23\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f55\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74\n\u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f22 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd, \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03bc\u1f74 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u1fc6 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03ba\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd. Ibid. 50.\n\n[159] Sext. Math. viii. 397: \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f25\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f14\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f11\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1fb3 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c9\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f26\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f14\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bf\u1f51\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n... \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f14\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. Diog. vii. 51; Cic. Acad. i. 14, 40: [Zeno] ad h\u00e6c qu\u00e6\nvisa sunt, et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adjungit animorum:\nquam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. Ibid. ii. 12, 37; De\nFato, 19, 43, Chrysippus affirms: visum objectum imprimet illud quidem\net quasi signabit in animo suam speciem sed assensio nostra erit in\npotestate. Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 [\u1f41\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2] \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1fc6 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f34\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9\u00b7 \u03b2\u03bb\u03ac\u03c8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u1f02\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Id. 13: \u03b1\u1f56\u03b8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad\n\u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd\n... \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2.\nId. Fragm. De An. 2: \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2. Epictet. in Gell. N. A.\nxix. 1, 15: visa animi, quas \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 philosophi appellant ... non\nvoluntatis sunt neque arbitrari\u00e6, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese\nhominibus noscitand\u00e6; probationes autem, quas \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 vocant,\nquibus eadem visa noscuntur ac dijudicantur voluntari\u00e6 sunt fiuntque\nhominum arbitratu: the difference between a wise man and a fool\nconsists in \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 and \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. The freedom of\napprobation must, of course, be so understood in harmony with Stoic\ndoctrine of the freedom of the will.\n\n[160] On the difference between the conception of \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd and that of\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, the latter alone being unerring, see Athen. viii.\n354, e; Diog. vii. 177.\n\n[161] Compare besides p. 87, 2, Cic. Acad. i. 11, 41: [Zeno] visis (=\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2) non omnibus adjungebat fidem, sed iis solum, qu\u00e6 propriam\nquandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, qu\u00e6 viderentur: id autem\nvisum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehensibile (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1). Ibid. ii. 12, 38: ut enim necesse est lancem in libra\nponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere ... non\npotest objectam rem perspicuam non approbare. Conf. Fin. v. 26, 76:\npercipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quidquam posse\npercipi nisi tale rerum, quale falsum esse non possit. Diog. vii. 54;\nSext. Math. vii. 227: \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. It was a departure from the older\nStoic teaching, to refuse, as the later Stoics did, to allow a\nconceptional notion to be considered a test of truth, except with the\nproviso that no contrary proof could be adduced against its truth.\nSext. 253: \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03b5\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03bd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, since cases could be\nimagined in which a faulty view presented itself with the full force of\ntruth. This was equivalent to overthrowing the whole doctrine of a\ncriterion; for how could it be known in any particular case that there\nwas not a negative instance? But it is quite in harmony with the Stoic\nteaching for a later Stoic (Ibid. 257) to say of conceptional\nperception: \u03b1\u1f55\u03c4\u03b7 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u1f74\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c7\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c7\u1ff6\u03bd,\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9, \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c0\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Hence Simpl. Phys. 20, b:\n\u1f00\u03bd\u1fc4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 ... \u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u1fc6.\n\n[162] Diog. vii. 54: \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b4\u03c9\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2. \u1f41\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u0392\u03bf\u03b7\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9, \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd (this looks like an approximation to the teaching of the\nPeripatetics); \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd ... \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f41\n\u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03bd. See above p. 76.\n\n[163] See above p. 82, 1.\n\n[164] See above p. 89, 2, and Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 101: neque eos (the\nAcademicians) contra sensus aliter dicimus, ac Stoici, qui multa falsa\nesse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.\nChrysippus had enquired into the truth of the perceptions of the\nsenses, and of the notions derived from them, in his treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, without, however, satisfactorily answering the objections\nwhich he quoted against the theory. See p. 46, 2.\n\n[165] See p. 60.\n\n[166] See p. 73, 3.\n\n[167] See Sext. Math. viii. 11: \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c6\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b6\u03c5\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. \u1f67\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd ... \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u2019\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd ... \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd ... \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f13\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd. Sen. Ep. 117, 13, giving it\nexpressly as the teaching of the Stoics, not as his own: Sunt, inquit,\nnatur\u00e6 corporum ... has deinde sequuntur motus animorum enuntiativi\ncorporum\u2014for instance, I see Cato walk\u2014corpus est, quod video.... Dico\ndeinde: Cato ambulat. Non corpus est, inquit, quod nunc loquor, sed\nenuntiativum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum vocant, alii\nenuntiatum, alii edoctum. Compare also on the \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd Sext. Math. viii.\n70 (above p. 83, 2); Pyrrh. iii. 52. Various arguments are used by the\nStoics to prove that the voice as opposed to utterance (\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd) is\nmaterial, as has been said. p. 74, 5. Illustrative of the distinction\nbetween utterance and the process of thought is the assertion (in Sext.\nPyrrh. ii. 81) that certainty as being a definite condition of the soul\nis material, but that truth itself is not material: \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c7\u1ff6\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3, \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd,\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74, \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\n\u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd (Id. Math. vii. 38, a similar statement is\nexpressly attributed to a Stoic); likewise a similar statement which\nSen. Ep. 117, discusses, and at length declares to be a mere quibble,\nbut not till after a lengthy refutation: sapientiam bonum esse, sapere\nbonum non esse. The statement rests on the assertion that nothing can\nbe a good which does not make itself felt, and nothing can make itself\nfelt which is not material; wisdom is material, because it is mens\nperfecta, but sapere is incorporale et accidens alteri, i.e. sapienti\u00e6.\nAccordingly, \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd (as Ammon. De Inter. 15, b, remarks) is a \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 if, however, \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 be taken to express\nthe thought itself, and not the process of thinking, it becomes\nidentical with \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd. Conf. Simpl. Cat. 3, \u03b1, Basil.: \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b4\u03cc\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9. In Plut. Plac.\niv. 11, 4, a definition of \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 or \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 is given similar to that of\n\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd in Sext. Math. viii. 70: \u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b6\u1ff4\u03bf\u03c5. See\nabove p. 84, 4. The statement, however, of Philop. Anal. Pr. lx. a,\nSchol. in Ar. 170, a, 2, cannot be true, that the Stoics called things\n\u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, thoughts \u1f10\u03ba\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70, and sounds \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03ac, whereas \u1f10\u03ba\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd may\nbe used of thoughts in the same sense as \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[168] See p. 84, 4. This question was raised in the Stoic School\nitself. Sextus at least, not hesitating to attack the Stoic teaching\nfrom this side (Math. viii. 262), speaks of an \u1f00\u03bd\u03ae\u03bd\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ac\u03c7\u03b7 in\nreference to the \u1f55\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 of \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70, and he remarks (viii. 258): \u1f41\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03bd\u1fc3\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u03bf\u1f31\n\u1f11\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03bf\u03b9 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0392\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u1f14\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. Probably the question\nwas first raised by later Stoics, when pressed by their opponents.\nBasilides was the teacher of Marcus Aurelius. Otherwise the existence\nof \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70 was spoken of as quite natural.\n\n[169] Sext. Math. viii. 70, see above p. 83, 2: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1fc6. Various kinds of propositions are then\nenumerated as being \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1fc6. Following the same authority, (Diocles?\nsee Diog. 48) Diog. 63, says: \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1fc6 \u03bf\u1f31\n\u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u1fc6. \u1f10\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u1fc6 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u0393\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1, \u03a4\u03af\u03c2; \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1fc6 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u0393\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9 \u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2. Prantl in\nsaying, p. 438, that the Stoics divide judgments (\u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1) into\ncomplete and incomplete, is inaccurate. Only \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70 are so divided, but\n\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd has a wider meaning than that of a logical judgment. \u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\nare only one form of \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1fc6.\n\n[170] Plut. Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2, p. 1008. A judgment (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 or \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1)\n\u1f10\u03be \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1fe5\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f67\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. The terms \u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 belonging to\nthe Stoic terminology, the Stoics must be meant by \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af. In\nthe first class of words they distinguish \u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 and \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1,\nlimiting \u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 to proper names, and understanding by \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 all\ngeneral terms, whether substantives or adjectives (Diog. 58; Bekker\u2019s\nAnecd. ii. 842). According to Stob. Ecl. i. 332, \u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 was only used\nto express \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1. Diog. 192, mentions two books of Chrysippus \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd. For the meaning of \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 or \u1fe5\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1, the verb,\nconsult Diog. 58 and 64; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14; Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 21;\nPorphyr. in Ammon. De Inter. 37, a. According to Apollon. De Construct.\ni. 8, \u1fe5\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1 was used in strict accuracy only for the infinitive, other\nforms being called \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1.\n\n[171] The distinction between \u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 and \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 was somewhat bluntly\nreferred to this logical and metaphysical antithesis by the Stoics, as\nmay be seen in Stob. Ecl. i. 336: \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f41 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f43,\n\u03bf\u1f57 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f57 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1.... \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 ... \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f42\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f57 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f42\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1. Hence for the latter\nthe names \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1 and \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1. See following note.\n\n[172] In nouns the cases were distinguished, the nominative, according\nto Ammon. l.c. being called \u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1, and the other five cases \u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 a\nstatement, however, which does not agree with the common use of those\nterms. In Diog. 65, the cases (\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74, \u03b4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74, \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74) are called\n\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03b3\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Chrysippus wrote a distinct treatise on the five\ncases, Diog. 192. Similar were the divisions of the \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1.\nAccording to Diog. 65, the Stoics distinguished between transitive\nverbs (\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f70), such as \u1f41\u03c1\u1fb7, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 passive verbs (\u1f55\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1), such as\n\u1f41\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 neuter verbs (\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1), such as \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u00b7 and verbs\nwhich, with a passive form, do not express a passive relation\n(\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b8\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1), \u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, &c. Consult on this point Philo,\nDe Cherub. 121, c; Orig. C. Cels. vi. 57. On the \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f70 and \u1f55\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1, also\nDionys. Thrax, \u00a7 15, p. 886, Bekk.; Simpl. Categ. 79, \u03b1, \u03b6; Diog. 191;\nand respecting all three divisions, Lersch, ii. 196; Steinthal, Gesch.\nder Sprachw. i. 294. They also distinguished between \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1 and\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u2014a verb, when used with a nominative, being called \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\nor \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, and \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1 when used with an oblique case;\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6 is a \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 a \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6 requiring a\nnominative (\u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2), \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 requiring a dative (\u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9). If an\noblique case is necessary to complete a sentence, besides the subject,\nthe verb is called \u1f14\u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1 or \u1f14\u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, as in the\nsentence \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6, \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6 is so called; for these words only make a\ncomplete sentence by the addition of an object thus: \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\n\u0394\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1. If this is necessary with a \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1, it is called \u1f14\u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u00b7 such, for instance, is the word \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9, for to complete the\nsentence it is not enough to say \u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9, but the object must be\nadded, as in the sentence: \u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f08\u03bb\u03ba\u03b9\u03b2\u03b9\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. This\ndifference is explained by Porphyr. in Ammon. l.c., 36, b, whom Lersch,\nii. 31, misunderstands and then blames. See Diog. 64 where the text is\nevidently corrupt. Without great temerity we might substitute for the\nmeaningless \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u2014\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, which at\nleast gives a better meaning than the proposals of R. Schmidt, Sto.\nGramm. 66, 91, and Lersch, l.c. 33. Apollon. De Const. iii. 32, p. 299,\nBekk.; Suid. \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1 (very inaccurate); Priscian, xviii. p. 1118, who,\nin his equally inaccurate account, has \u1f00\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1. The example which\nLucian, Vit. Auct. 21 employs to ridicule the Stoic hair-splitting\nanent \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1 and \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1 proves, of course, nothing.\n\n[173] There is nothing whatever on record which serves to show the\nposition held by the categories. By several, definition and division\nwere treated of most improperly under the head of language.\n\n[174] According to Diog. 60, Bekker, Anecd. ii. 647, \u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 was defined\nby Chrysippus as \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 (which must be read in Diog. in place of \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76)\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 by Antipater as \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bb\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (Anecd. \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd)\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, i.e. a proposition in which the subject and\nthe collective predicates may be interchanged. \u1f49\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 gives in detail\nwhat \u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 gives collectively (Simpl. Categ. 16, \u03b2). An imperfect \u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\nis called \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae. Instead of the Aristotelian \u03c4\u03af \u1f26\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, the Stoics\nwere content with the \u03c4\u03af \u1f26\u03bd of Antisthenes (Alex. Top. 24, m). Like\nProdicus, they laid great stress on distinguishing accurately the\nconceptions of words of similar meaning, \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70, \u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74, \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\n(Alex. Top. 96). The relation of \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 to \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 is also explained:\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 is defined to be the summing up of many thoughts (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03ad\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 which might mean thoughts which, as integral parts of a\nconception, cannot be separated from it; only this explanation would\nnot agree with what follows, according to which one would more likely\nthink of the different species included in the genus. Prantl p. 422\nsuggests \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd, which, however, requires explanation); \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 as \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd (Diog. 60). \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd is \u1f43 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f42\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f43 \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f42\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 (Diog. 61; conf. Sext.\nPyrrh. i. 138). As to \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, and \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\n(division into contradictories) nothing new is stated; but \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 has\na special notice (Diog. 61). Lastly, if Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213 (the\nprevious definition of dialectic is found, as was stated on p. 73, 3,\nin Alcinous Isag. 3, and he also mentions c. 5 three of the four kinds\nof division, giving two others instead of the fourth) refers to the\nStoics, four kinds of division are enumerated. The reference of the 8\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 mentioned by Prantl, p. 423, on the authority of Bekker\u2019s\nAnecd. ii. 679 to a Stoic source is much more doubtful. There is little\nthat is new in the Stoic discussion of Opposition, and the same may be\nsaid of what Simpl. (Categ. 100, \u03b2 and \u03b4; 101, \u03b5; 102, \u03b2) quotes from\nChrysippus (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd) on the subject of\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2. Conf. Diog. vii. 190.\n\n[175] Petersen, Philos. Chrysipp. Fund. pp. 36\u2013144, is invaluable for\nits careful collection of authorities, but in its attempt to construct\nthe Stoic system on the categories it indulges in many capricious\ncombinations. Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 217; Prantl, Gesch. der\nLogik, i. 426. Our authorities for the knowledge of the Stoic doctrine\nof the categories are besides a few notices in other writers\nprincipally Simplicius, on the Categories, and Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1,\n25\u201330.\n\n[176] The Stoics attack the Aristotelian categories for being too\nnumerous, and endeavour to show that they do not include every kind of\nexpression (as if, rejoined Simplicius, Categ. 5, \u03b1, this were the\npoint at all). Compare Simpl. Categ. 5, \u03b1; 15, \u03b4; 16, \u03b4, who quotes\nthese as objections raised by Athenodorus and Cornutus, the former of\nwhom lived in the time of Augustus, the latter in the reign of Nero.\nObservations of these writers on some of the Aristotelian categories\nare given, Ibid. 47, \u03b6, 91, \u03b1.\n\n[177] That this was intended by Aristotle to be the position of the\ncategories appears by the way in which he introduced them; and also by\nhis observations (Phys. v. 2) on the various kinds of motion\u2014which are\nbased entirely on the view that the categories are coordinate.\n\n[178] It will thus be understood how the ancients could at one time\nspeak of \u1f42\u03bd, at another of \u03c4\u03af, as being the highest conception of the\nStoics. The former is found in Diog. 61: \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f43 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f42\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd. Sen. Ep. 58, 8: Nunc autem genus illud\nprimum qu\u00e6rimus, ex quo ceter\u00e6 species suspens\u00e6 sunt, a quo nascitur\nomnis divisio, quo universa comprehensa sunt; after noticing the\ndistinction between what is material and what is immaterial, he\nproceeds: quid ergo erit, ex quo h\u00e6c deducantur? illud ... quod est [\u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f42\u03bd] ... quod est aut corporale est aut incorporale. Hoc ergo genus est\nprimum et antiquissimum et, ut ita dicam, generale [\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd]. It\nis, however, more usual to find \u03c4\u03af. Thus Plotin. Enn. vi. 1, 25: \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f13\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9. Alex. Aphrod. Top. 155; Schol.\n278, b, 20: \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03cd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 (\u03c4\u1f76 as the genus, of which \u1f42\u03bd is a species) \u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f76,\n\u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f42\u03bd ... \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f42\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03cd\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f20\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c4\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. Schol. in Arist. 34, b, 11. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 86: \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c4\u1f76, \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. Math. x. 234: The Stoics\naffirm \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1. Sen. l.c. 13:\nStoici volunt superponere huic etiamnunc aliud genus magis principale\n... primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur quid, for in rerum,\ninquiunt, natura qu\u00e6dam sunt, qu\u00e6dam non sunt: examples of the latter\nare centaurs, giants, and similar notions of unreal things. Ritter,\niii. 566, remarks, with justice, that the older teaching must have\nplaced the conception of Being at the head; otherwise the objection\ncould not have been raised, that what has not being is thus made an\nobject of thought. Probably the change was made by Chrysippus, although\nit is not definitely proved by Stob. Ecl. i. 390. Petersen confuses the\ntwo views, in thinking (p. 146) that the Stoics divided Something into\nBeing and Not Being, and subdivided Being again into what is material\nand what is not material. In other respects, too, he confounds the\nStoic teaching with the consequences, whereby Plotinus l.c. and Plut.\nComm. Not. 30, sought to refute it.\n\n[179] See previous note and p. 92, 2.\n\n[180] The Stoics appear to have regarded them as \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 or \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, rather than as categories. Conf. Simpl. Categ. 16, \u03b4 (in other\nplaces as 51, \u03b2; 79, \u03b2, he is speaking for himself and not of the Stoic\ncategories); Marc. Aurel. vi. 14; \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 did not suit them so well\nbecause of their use of \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1. See p. 95, 1.\n\n[181] Simpl. 16, \u03b4: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u03ad \u03b3\u03b5 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd ... \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u00b7\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. Plot.\nEn. vi. 1, 25; Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 6. p. 1083.\n\n[182] Instead of \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, the Aristotelian category of being,\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, was substituted by some, not only without the School, but also\nby Posidonius, who in Stob. Ecl. i. 434 distinguishes \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 and \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2\nthe change of the one and the other. Similarly his fellow-disciple\nMnesarchus.\n\n[183] Porphyr. in Simpl. 12, \u03b4: \u1f25 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 ... \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. Plot. 588, B: \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03b8\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. Galen, Qu. Qual.\nS. Incorp. 6, xix. 478: \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd. Compare following note. It would seem to follow, as a matter of\ncourse, from the Stoic belief in immaterial properties, see p. 106, 4,\nthat the Stoics also believed in immaterial substances (Petersen, 60);\nbut as such a view would be at variance with their belief that reality\nonly belongs to material things, and is nowhere mentioned by any\nauthority, although obviously inviting the criticism of opponents, it\nis safer to suppose that they never went so far as to state the belief\nin words.\n\n[184] Simpl. 44, \u03b4: \u1f14\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c0\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u1f22\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u1f21\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. Diog. 150. Stob. Ecl. i. 322 (see below 101, 2) and 324:\n\u1f14\u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c7\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd [\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd]\u00b7 \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f14\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c7\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3\n\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. Simpl. Phys. 50: \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\nFurther particulars on matter hereafter.\n\n[185] Porphyr. in Simpl. Cat. 12, \u03b4: \u03b4\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b2\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. Dexipp. See\nfollowing note.\n\n[186] Diog. 150: \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd. So\nthought Zeno and Chrysippus: \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f27\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b7\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03c7\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, \u1f25 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2. \u1f21 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. Stob. Ecl. i. 322: (\u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7) \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd, \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03c9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. The same was held by\nChrysippus, according to Stob. Ecl. i. 432, who says: Posidonius held\nthat there were four varieties of change, those \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (water to air), \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (chemical combination), and\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bb\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, the latter also called \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd. \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 (the elements, according\nto the Stoics, changing into each other) \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f54\u03be\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 ... \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd (which may be understood, not of\nindividual properties, but of individually determined things) \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd\n\u0394\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0398\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03be\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. (These words\nare explained by Prantl, 432, thus: qualitative determination admits\nincrease or decrease of intensity; but the use of the terms \u03b1\u1f54\u03be\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, and indeed the whole context no less than the passage quoted\nfrom Diogenes, prove that they refer rather to the increase or\ndiminution of substance in the individual thing.) \u03b4\u03b9\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.... \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1 (individual things\nhave two component parts, which are capable of change), \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03bf\u03c5. \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 [\u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd] \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f54\u03be\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\nPorphyr. See previous note. Dexipp. in Cat. 31, 15, Speng.: \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b2\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u1f13\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f21 \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\n... \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd \u1f43 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f22 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c6\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03c7\u03b1\u03bb\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2. Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 4, p.\n1083 (the Stoics assert) \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 [\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd]. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u1fe5\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03be\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f37\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03be\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u03b8\u1f00\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1ff3 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b1\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f05\u03c8\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. The latter is the individual thing itself, the former\nthe material thereof, in reference to which Plutarch had just said: \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03bb\u03ae\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 [\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd] \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1fe5\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2\u00b7\n\u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2. That it should be said of this perpetually changing\nmaterial \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03be\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd may appear strange; but the\nmeaning is this: it can only be said of an individual thing that it\nincreases and diminishes in so far as it remains one and the same\nsubject, an \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd during the change; but the material itself,\nwhich is ever changing, cannot be regarded as the one identical subject\nof increase and diminution. This idea is expanded by Alex. Aphro.\nQu\u00e6st. Nat. I. 5.\n\n[187] \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd or \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, and also \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 (sc. \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2). According to Simpl.\n55. \u03b1, many Stoics assign a threefold meaning to \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd. The first,\nwhich is also the most extensive meaning, includes every kind of\nquality, whether essential or accidental\u2014the \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd as well as the\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd. In the second meaning \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd is used to express permanent\nqualities, including those which are derivative and non-essential\u2014the\n\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. In the third and narrowest sense it expresses \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd) \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bc\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2,\ni.e. those qualities which faithfully represent essential attributes in\ntheir distinctive features. The substantive \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 is only used in the\nlast sense.\n\n[188] Simpl. 57, \u03b5 (the passage is fully discussed by Petersen, 85, and\nTrendelenburg, 223): \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd (separable,\ni.e., from matter) \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f13\u03bd \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 [sc.\n\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd] \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03cd\u03ca \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f10\u03be\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f22\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f51\u03c6\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. In place of \u1f13\u03bd\n\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 Petersen, 85, with the approval of Trendelenburg and Prantl (438,\n96), reads \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1. To me, Brandis Schol. 69, a, 32, appears to retain\nit with reason, the meaning being that \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 constitutes no\nindependent unity, but only a unity of conception. Non-essential\nqualities are by the Stoics excluded from the category of \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd, and\nreckoned under that of \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd.\n\nThe same distinction between what is essential and what is not\nessential is indicated in the terms \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, or\nessential properties, being called essential forms (\u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 or \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u03ac);\nnon-essential qualities being called features or varieties (\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2).\nSee Simpl. 54, \u03b3; 55, \u03b5. In determining essential attributes, these,\naccording to Simpl. 61, \u03b2 (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 43), are essential,\nnot when they happen to be permanent, but when they spring from the\nnature of the object to which they belong: \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2. A more limited meaning, that of local position, is given to\n\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 in Stob. Ecl. i. 410.\n\nThe distinction between \u1f15\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u1f74 also belongs here. That, the\noneness of which depends on an essential quality, is \u1f21\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7\neverything else is either \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd or \u1f10\u03ba \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. Sext. Math. ix.\n78 (also in vii. 102): \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03ba \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f21\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1\u00b7 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 applies to chains, houses,\nships, &c.; combination \u1f10\u03ba \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd to flocks and armies. Seneca, Ep.\n102, 6, Nat. Qu. ii. 2, says the same. Conf. Alex. De Mixt. 143: \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f13\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f65\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 [l. \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9].\nSimpl. 55, \u03b5: \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 [\u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76] \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f21\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u1f74\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bd\u03b5\u1f7c\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6, \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\n\u03b5\u1f51\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f13\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bb\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.\n\nThose \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 which admit of no increase or diminution (\u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, and\n\u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) are called \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 or permanent forms. Virtues, for instance,\nwhich, according to the Stoics, always exist in a perfect form where\nthey exist at all, are \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, but arts are only \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Simpl.\nCateg. 61, \u03b2; 72, \u03b4; 73, \u03b2; Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28; 76, a, 12, 24;\nStob. Ecl. ii. 98 and 128. Conf. Petersen 91. A different view was\ntaken by Aristotle of the relations of these expressions.\n\n[189] Syrian. on Arist. Metaph. 21, p. 90 in Petersen: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Stob. Ecl. i.\n434; see above p. 101, 2. Simpl. De An. 61, a, explains \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 by\n\u1f00\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03c9\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2. Diog. vii. 138; Plut. C. Not. 36. 3.\n\n[190] Besides the passages already quoted in note 2 on p. 101, from\nPlutarch and Stob\u00e6us, see Sext. Pyrrh. i. 57: \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b9\u03c1\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 (the\nintermingling materials,\u2014the question here is the possibility of\nmingling) \u1f10\u03be \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Porphyry in Simpl.\nCateg. 12, \u03b4 disputes this view himself. The Stoics, therefore, clearly\ndistinguish \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, or essential form, from the subject to which it\nbelongs; and Philo must have been following the Stoics when he said\n(Nom. Mutat. 1063, D): \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. They also distinguish between a thing and its\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1. Stob. Ecl. i. 436: \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f27\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf, \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5 \u03bc\u03ae\u03b4\u2019 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ae\u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Conf. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 170; Math. ix. 336: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 and Seneca,\nEp. 313, 4. Mnesarchus, a fellow disciple of Posidonius, accordingly\ncompares the relation of an individual thing to its \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 with that of\na statue to the material of which it is composed. Since the \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2\ndistinguishes a thing from every other, there follows as a matter of\ncourse, what is asserted circumstantially and in detail by Chrysippus\n(in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 951, B), \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 [= \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2]\n\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bc\u03ae\u03c7\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[191] L.c. 222.\n\n[192] This may be seen from the passages quoted in note 2 on the\nprevious page.\n\n[193] Plut. St. Rep. 43, 4, p. 1054: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b5\u03c1\u03ce\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f10\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c7\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. It is a carrying out of the Stoic\nteaching (as Simpl. 57, \u03b5, remarks) for Plotinus to reduce \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 to\nthe class-conception of \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 (Enn. vi. 1, 10, 574, \u03b2). But the Stoic\ndefinition of \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 (quoted by Simpl. 58, \u03b1\u2014\u1f21 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, with the additional words \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd\u2014does not directly refer to \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2. \u03a0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 may also be\nconnected with the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2. See Plotin. i. 29, 593, A: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u03bd, \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03bd\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u1f10\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u1fc3 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd ... \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9. Diog. vii. 148: \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 [= \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2] \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03be\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[194] Plut. Ibid. \u00a7 2: (\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2) \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03ae\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f43\u03bd \u03c3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03b9\u03b4\u03ae\u03c1\u1ff3, \u03c0\u03c5\u03ba\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bb\u03af\u03b8\u1ff3, \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b3\u03cd\u03c1\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Simpl.\n69. \u03b3: \u1f21 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c7\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ac. Ibid. 67, \u03b5; 56, \u03b4: \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f21 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b8\u03ad\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[195] Alex. Aphr. De An. 143, b: \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03af\u03c7\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9. Ibid.\n144, \u03b1, the saying is quoted against the Stoics: \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03af\u03c7\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f55\u03bb\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[196] Plut. C. Not. 36, 3: \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 (this follows from their hypothesis,\nbut it is distinctly denied by Chrysippus in thesis. See p. 104, 2) \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03c5\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2.\n\n[197] Simpl. 70, \u03b5: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd (? \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd) \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 [l. \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 or \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\nonly]. The context shows that the meaning of these words is that given\nabove. The conception of a property is compounded of several\nattributes, and, therefore, a property of several subordinate\nproperties. If \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd is a \u03c7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, the \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f44\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 is the \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, or\nform of \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd.\n\n[198] This follows of necessity, quite independently of the\nabove-quoted language of Alexander, from the Stoic doctrine of the\nmaterial nature of properties and of the mingling of materials. For if\nthat intermingling of materials in which each one retains its\nproperties (\u03bc\u1fd6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 in contrast to chemical combination\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) is defined to be the complete interpenetration\nof one material by another, without passing into a third (Stob. Ecl. i.\n376; Alex. De Mixt. 142, a; Plut. C. Not. 37, 2); if, moreover,\nproperties are said to be material; and in all cases when they are\ncombined, each property retains its own peculiarity, and yet is\ninherent in the subject-matter and in every other property belonging to\nthe same subject-matter; it follows that this relation can only be\nexplained by supposing a mutual interpenetration of properties with\neach other and with their subject-matter.\n\n[199] The proof of this will be given subsequently. Meantime compare\nthe remarks, p. 92, 2; 94, 1 on the \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[200] Simpl. 56, \u03b4, and 54, \u03b2: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70\u03c2,\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2. Only the\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 are \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, see p. 105, 2; incorporeal properties\nare called \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70, to distinguish them from \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 (essential forms).\nDexipp. in Cat. 61. 17, Speng.: \u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03c9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f70, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u1f96 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. But this use of\nterms appears not to have been universal among the Stoics (Simpl.\nCateg. 54, \u03b3), with whom different views prevailed touching the extent\nof the conception of \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd. According to this passage it was Antipater\nwho wished to include under \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70, the \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[201] Conf. Simpl. 57, \u03b5, who after giving the definition of quality,\nquoted p. 103, 1, continues: \u1f10\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bf\u1f37\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b9\n\u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f55\u03c4\u03b7 \u1f51\u03c6\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5.\n\n[202] Simpl. 44, \u03b4: \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n(including sc. \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd) \u1f14\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd\n\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[203] Dexipp. in Cat. 41, 20, Speng.: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Plotin.\nvi. 1, 30, 594, A: \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f13\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2; \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c0\u03b7\u03c7\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f13\u03bd [\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd], \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2; \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6; \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03bd \u039b\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u1fb3; \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd; ... \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd ... \u1f34\u03c3\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f01\u03c1\u03bc\u03cc\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd. Simpl.\nCateg. 94, \u03b5: The Stoics included \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd under \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd. In saying as\nSimpl. 16, \u03b4, does that the Stoics omitted \u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u1f78\u03bd, time, and place, it\nmust be meant that they did not treat these conceptions as separate\ncategories. What they did with them Simpl. explains l.c. \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Trendelenburg, 229,\nwith justice, observes that, wherever the species-forming difference\nlies in \u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u1f78\u03bd as in mathematical conceptions, there \u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u1f78\u03bd comes under\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[204] Simpl. 42, \u03b5: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u2019 \u1f11\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f70, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac\u03bd. (Ibid. 44, \u03b2: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b7\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03c7\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1.) Sweet and bitter belong to \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u00b7 to the other class\nbelong \u03b4\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u1f74\u03c1, &c., \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1. Every \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78 is also \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd (determined as\nto quality), and every \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd is also a \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9, but not\nconversely. Conf. 43, \u03b2. \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1,\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03ac \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd (or, according to the definition in Sext. Math. viii. 454:\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1ff3 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd), \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ad\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u1fc3, \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u1f61\u03c2 \u1f21 \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c8\u03b9\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f41 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c5\u1f31\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03b4\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f14\u03be\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u2019\n\u1f02\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u1f74\u03c1, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c5\u1f31\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03bb\u03c5\u03ba\u1f7a \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f02\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2. In this sense, therefore, \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03b9 belongs to \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd, being composed (as Simpl. 43, \u03b1, says) of \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd\nand \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9. On the other hand, \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd only expresses, to\nquote Herbart, an accidental relation. Prantl\u2019s quotation (I. 437, 108)\nfrom Simpl. 44, \u03b2, we have no special reason to refer to the Stoics.\n\n[205] Trendelenburg, 220, considers that these genera are in so far\nsubordinate to one another, that the previous one continues in the\nnext, but with the addition of a fresh determination; a better name for\nthe second category would be \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ac\u00b7 for the third, \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ac \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u00b7 for the fourth, \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. In\nsupport of this, he refers to Simpl. 43, \u03b1: \u1f15\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u1f00\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\n\u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9. Plut. C. Not. 44, 6: \u03c4\u03ad\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac \u03b3\u03b5\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd. Plot.\nEnn. vi. 1, 29, 593, A: \u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 ... \u1f10\u03bd \u03b8\u03b1\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b1, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f02\u03bd [\u03b5\u1f34] \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03c4\u03b9\u00b7 if \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70 are to be\n\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70, they are composed of \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 and \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 or \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2. See p. 48, 2.\n\n[206] See p. 103, 1.\n\n[207] See p. 107, 2; Plotin. vi. 1, 30: Why are \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 enumerated\nas a third category, since \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1; the Stoics\nwould probably say that \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70 are \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, whereas the\n\u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, in the strict sense of the term, are \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ac. Yet\nsince the \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70 themselves are nothing more than \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1, all\ncategories must be ultimately reduced to \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7.\n\n[208] Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 440\u2013467.\n\n[209] In Diog. 66; Sext. Math. viii. 70; Ammon. De Interp. 4, a (Schol.\nin Arist. 93, a; 22, b, 20); Simpl. Cat. 103, \u03b1; Bo\u00ebth. De Interp. 315;\nCramer, Anecd. Oxon. iii. 267, conf. I. 104, a distinction is drawn\nbetween \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 (a judgment), \u1f10\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 (a direct question, requiring Yes\nor No), \u03c0\u03cd\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 (an enquiry), \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f41\u03c1\u03ba\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd (wishes),\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd (a prayer), \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd (a supposition), \u1f10\u03ba\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd (as \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03c9\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u1f74), \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd (an address), \u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c8\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd,\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c6\u03b7\u03b3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd (explanatory statements), \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 (a\njudgment with something appended, as: \u1f61\u03c2 \u03a0\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03af\u03b4\u1fc3\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bc\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u1f74\u03c2 \u1f41\n\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2! by Sextus called \u03a0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1). Ammon. in Waitz, Arist.\nOrig. i. 43, speaks of ten forms of sentences held by the Stoics,\nmentioning, however, only two, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 and \u1f10\u03b2\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 (so reads the\nMS. Waitz suggests \u1f10\u03c6\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2, more probably it is \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2). Diog. 191,\nmentions treatises of Chrysippus on interrogatory and hortatory\nsentences. On the relation of an oath to \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 light is thrown by\nSimpl. l.c., also by Chrysippus\u2019 distinction between \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03bf\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd and\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03bf\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03bf\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd and \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bf\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd in Stob. Floril. 28, 15.\n\n[210] Diog. 65: \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f45 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2. Questions and\nother similar sentences are neither true nor false (Ibid. 66 and 68).\nThis definition of a judgment is constantly referred to, see p. 83, 2,\nby Simpl. Cat. 103, \u03b1; Cic. Tusc. i. 7, 14; De Fato, 10, 20; Gell. N.\nA. xvi. 8, 8; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 35. The purport of the expression\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2, \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd (in Diog. 65; Gell. xvi. 8, 4;\nAmmon. De Interp. 4, a; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 20) is the same.\n\n[211] Sext. Math. viii. 93: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f23\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1fb6 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1fb6. Ibid. 95 and 108. Diog. 68 gives the definitions\nof both.\n\n[212] Sext. l.c., by whom Diog. must be corrected, see p. 113, 3.\n\n[213] Diog. 69: \u1f10\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03b9\u1ff6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03b6\u03b5\u03c5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd.\nFurther details presently respecting the \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03b6\u03b5\u03c5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd.\nFor the \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u2014a conditional sentence, the first part of which\nis introduced by \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1f74\u2014see Diog. 71 and 74; for the \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd,\nthe characteristic of which is the \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 and \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76, see Diog. 72; Sext.\nMath. viii. 124; Gell. N. A. xvi. 8 and 9; Ps. Galen, \u0395\u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3. \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb. 13;\nDexipp. in Cat. 27, 3, Speng.; (Schol. in Arist. 44. a, 9\u2014Prantl, 446,\nsays this passage is not quite correct; it only implies that the term\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u1f74 was confined to a copulative judgment); for the \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03b9\u1ff6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2,\nwhich is characterised by a \u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9, and therefore is not identical with\nthe \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, Diog. 72 and 74; for the \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd and\nthe \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, Diog. 72; conf. Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. i. 188;\nApollon. Synt. (Bekker\u2019s Anecd. ii.), 481. These are only some of the\nprincipal forms of composite judgments, their number being really\nindefinite. Chrysippus estimated that a million combinations might be\nformed with ten sentences. The celebrated mathematician, Hipparchus\nhowever, proved that only 103,049 affirmative and 310,952 negative\njudgments could be formed with that material (Plut. Sto. Rep. 29, 5, p.\n1047; Qu. Symp. viii. 9, 3, 11, p. 732).\n\n[214] There is no notice of a division of judgments into general and\nparticular. Instead of that, Sext. (Math. viii. 96) distinguishes\n\u1f61\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 as \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 as \u03c4\u1f76\u03c2 \u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, and \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b1 as \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6. When the subject stood in the nominative,\n\u1f61\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 were called \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 (Diog. 70); the others \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\u00b7 a\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd is \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u00b7 a \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u0394\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6.\n\n[215] An affirmative judgment was called \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, a negative\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, by Chrysippus in the fragment about to be quoted, and\nSimpl. Cat. 102, \u03b4, \u03b6. Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 266, Oud. renders these\nterms by dedicativa and abdicativa. For the manner in which they\nexpressed negative sentences, see Bo\u00ebth. De Interp. 373; Schol. in\nArist. 120.\n\n[216] Diog. 69 gives an example of \u1f00\u03c1\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u00b7 one of\nparticular negation, \u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\u2014\u1f00\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 one of double\nnegation, \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\u2014as, \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\u1f76 \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af.\n\n[217] Sext. Math. viii. 89; Diog. 73: \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 are \u1f67\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd or (according to the outward treatment of these\ndeterminations) \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u2014as, It is day, and It is not day.\nAristotle called such a contradictory \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, a contrary \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2,\nputting both under the class conception of \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1. The Stoics\nreserved \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 for contradictories (Simpl. Cat. 102, \u03b4 and 102,\n\u03b6, a Stoic discussion intended to show that the conception of \u1f10\u03bd\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\nis not applicable to negative sentences and conceptions), which is\nafter all only a difference in terminology. \u1f18\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03bd they also call\n\u03bc\u03b1\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd (Apollon. Synt. 484, Bekk.). Otherwise, following Aristotle,\nthey distinguished between \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03bd and \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 are\nconceptions which are in plain and immediate contrast, such as \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\nand \u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 are those which are only contrasted by\nmeans of the \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, such as \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 and \u1f04\u03c6\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd (Simpl. Categ. 98, \u03b3).\nThe former, therefore, apply to abstract, the latter to concrete\nnotions. That every negative judgment has an affirmative judgment\nopposed to it is elaborately proved by a series of quotations from\npoets, each one of which is four times repeated in the fragment \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd first edited by Letronne (Fragments in\u00e9dits, Paris, 1838),\nand subsequently emended, explained, and with a great degree of\nprobability referred to Chrysippus by Bergk (De Chrysippi libro \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, Cassel, 1841, Gymn. progr.). In explaining the fragment\nPrantl, Gesch. d. Log. I. 451 appears to have hit the truth in one\npoint, where Bergk is not satisfied.\n\n[218] Simpl. Categ. 103, \u03b2; Cic. De Fato, 16, 37; N. D. i. 25, 70.\nFurther particulars above p. 83, 2; 110, 3.\n\n[219] Viz. that the members of a disjunction, as well as their\ncontradictory opposites, must also be contraries (adversa or\npugnantia), and that from the truth of the one the falsehood of the\nother follows. A disjunction which does not satisfy one or the other of\nthese conditions is false (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03b6\u03b5\u03c5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd). Gell. N. A. xvi. 8, 12;\nSext. Pyrrh. ii. 191; Alex. Anal. Pr. 7, b.\n\n[220] Diog. 71; Sext. Math. 109; Galen, De Simpl. Medicamen. ii. 16,\nvol. xi. 499; Ps. Galen, \u0395\u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3. \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb. p. 15. The Stoics distinguish\nmost unnecessarily, but quite in harmony with their ordinary formal\npunctiliousness, the case in which the leading clause is identical with\nthe inferential clause (\u03b5\u1f30 \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd, \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd) and the case in\nwhich it is different (\u03b5\u1f30 \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd, \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd). Conditional\nsentences of the first kind are called \u03b4\u03b9\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1. Sext.\nviii. 281; 294; and 466; Pyrrh. ii. 112; conf. viii. 95; Diog. 68. That\nin all these passages \u03b4\u03b9\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd must be read, and not \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd,\nappears according to Prantl\u2019s (p. 445, 122) very true observation from\nthe remarks of Alex. Top. 7, a; Anal. Pr. 7, b, on \u03b4\u03b9\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03af.\n\n[221] Sext. Math. viii. 112; \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31\n\u0394\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u1f72\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f21\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u1fc6\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2, \u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1. Cic. Acad.\nii. 47, 143: In hoc ipso, quod in elementis dialectici docent, quomodo\njudicare oporteat, rerum falsumne sit, si quid ita connexum est, ut\nhoc: Si dies est, lucet; quanta contentio est! aliter Diodoro aliter\nPhiloni, Chrysippo aliter placet. (The further remarks on the points of\ndifference between Chrysippus and Cleanthes have no reference to\nhypothetical judgments.) The Philo here alluded to\u2014the same Philo\nagainst whom Chrysippus wrote his treatises (Diog. vii. 191 and 194)\u2014is\nthe well-known dialectician and pupil of Diodorus, who declared all\nconditional sentences to be right in which a false inferential clause\nis not drawn from a true leading clause. According to this view,\nconditional sentences would be right, with both clauses true, or both\nfalse, or with a false leading clause and true inferential clause\n(Sext. l.c. viii. 245 and 449; Pyrrh. ii. 110). According to Sext.\nPyrrh. ii. 104, the view of Philo appears to have gained acceptance\namong the Stoics, perhaps through Zeno, for whose connection with Philo\nsee Diog. vii. 16. But, in any case, the meaning appears to have been\n(Diog. vii. 81), that, in the cases mentioned, conditional sentences\nmay be right, not that they must be right.\n\nOthers more appropriately judged of the correctness of conditional\nsentences by the connection of the clauses, and either required, for a\nconditional sentence to be right, that the contradictory opposite\n(\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) of the inferential clause should be irreconcileable with\nthe leading clause, or that the inferential clause should be\npotentially (\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9) contained in the leading clause (Sext. Pyrrh. ii.\n111). The first of these requirements, which is mentioned by Diog. 73\nas the only criterion of the Stoic School, was due to Chrysippus, who\naccordingly refused to allow sentences in which this was not the case\nto be expressed hypothetically (Cic. De Fato, 6, 12; 8, 15): it was not\nright to say, Si quis natus est oriente canicula, is in mari non\nmorietur; but, Non et natus est quis oriente canicula et is in mari\nmorietur.\n\nIt may be observed, in connection with the enquiry into the accuracy of\nconditional sentences, that a true conditional sentence may become\nfalse in time. The sentence, If Dion is alive now, he will continue to\nlive, is true at the present moment; but in the last moment of Dion\u2019s\nlife it will cease to be true. Such sentences were called \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, because the time could not be previously fixed when they\nwould become false (Simpl. Phys. 305, a). Chrysippus also wrote on the\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, according to Dionys. Comp. Verb. p. 72 Sch\u00e4fer. Diog.\nvii. 105, mentions two treatises of his on the subject, but\ncharacterises them as spurious.\n\n[222] According to Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 100, Math. viii. 143 and 156, the\nStoics distinguished between \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 and \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac.\nThe definition of the latter was \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd (or \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03ae\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 the \u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u1f72\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd was a sentence with both the leading and inferential clauses\ntrue. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 101; 106; 115; Math. viii. 249.\n\n[223] Diodorus had said that Only what is, or what will be, is\npossible. The Stoics, and in particular Chrysippus, define \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd as\nwhat is capable of being true (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9), if\ncircumstances do not prevent; \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd as \u1f43 \u03bc\u03ae \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. From the \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd they distinguish the \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd,\nwhich is defined as \u1f43 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f37\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd (Plut. Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055; Diog. 76;\nBo\u00ebth. De Interp. 374, Bas. The same thing is also stated in Alex.\nAphr. De Fato, c. 10, p. 30. \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u2019\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c9\u03bb\u03cd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.) On the other hand, \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd\nis, what is both true and incapable of being false, either in itself or\nowing to other circumstances. Diog. and Bo\u00ebth. There was probably\nanother definition of \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, as \u1f43 \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f37\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 so that it might be said (Bo\u00ebth. 429) that the\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd was partly possible and partly impossible, without\ncontradicting (as Bo\u00ebth. and Prantl, p. 463, believe) their other\nstatement, that the \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd was partly necessary and partly not\nnecessary. The conceptions of the Possible and the Not-necessary are\nthus made to overlap, the former including the Necessary and\nNot-necessary, the latter the Possible and the Not-possible.\n\nTo defend his definition of the Possible against the \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd of\nDiodorus, Chrysippus denied the statement, \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, without exposing the confusion contained in it between\nsequence in time and causal relation (Alex. Anal. Pr. 57, b; Philop.\nAnal. Pr. xlii. b; Schol. in Arist. 163, a; Cic. De Fato, 7, 13; Ep. ad\nDiv. ix. 4). Cleanthes, Antipater, and Panthoides preferred to attack\nanother leading clause of Diodorus, the clause that Every past\noccurrence must necessarily be true (Epictet. Diss. ii. 19, 2 and 5).\nThe Aristotelian position in reference to a disjunction, that When the\ndisjunction refers to something future, the disjunction itself is true,\nwithout either clause being necessarily true, was not accepted by the\nStoics (Simpl. Cat. 103, \u03b2).\n\n[224] Plut. Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055, justly insists on this point.\n\n[225] Prantl, pp. 467\u2013496.\n\n[226] Diog. 45; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 194, see above p. 65.\n\n[227] Both were included by the Peripatetics under the term\nhypothetical. In the same way the Stoics include both among the five\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9. See below p. 119, 2.\n\n[228] Chain-argument seems to have been also treated of in the\ncategorical form. See p. 120, 3.\n\n[229] As shown by Prantl, 468, 171; on Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 135;\nApul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 279, Oud. The latter rightly refers to the fact,\nthat Chrysippus discussed the main forms of hypothetical inference at\nthe very beginning of his doctrine of inference, Sext. Math. viii. 223.\n\n[230] Anal. Pr. 87, b: \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03b5\u03bd (Arist. Anal.\nPr. i. 23, 41, a, 37) \u03b5\u1f36\u03b5\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bd\u03b5\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f22 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 (conditional) \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f22\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03b6\u03b5\u03c5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 (disjunctive) \u1f22 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 (a copulative judgment\nsuggesting partly hypothetical judgments like the \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd in\nSext. Math. viii. 235, partly negative categorical judgments which have\nthe force of hypothetical judgments, such as: it is not at the same\ntime A and B. Conf. Diog. 80. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 158; Matt. viii. 226.\nCic. De Fato, vi. 12). By the \u03bd\u03b5\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9, the Stoics must be meant, for\nthe terminology is theirs; and the Peripatetics, to whom it might\notherwise apply, always considered the categorical to be the original\nform of judgment. See Prantl, 468, 172.\n\n[231] Such an inference was called \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 when it was expressed in\ndefinite terms, for instance, If it is day, it is light. The\narrangement of the clauses (which were designated by numbers, and not\nby letters, as the Peripatetics had done), was called \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 for\ninstance, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd. A conclusion composed of both\nforms of expression was a \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03cc\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 for instance, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b6\u1fc7 \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd. The premisses were\ncalled \u03bb\u03ae\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 (in contrast to \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 which expresses a judgment\nindependently of its position in a syllogism); or, more correctly, the\nmajor premiss was \u03bb\u1fc6\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1, the minor \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 (hence the particles \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03b5\nwere \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, Apollon. Synt. p. 518, Bekk.). The\nconclusion was \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac, also \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03af. Ibid. 519. The major\npremiss in a hypothetical syllogism was called \u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, its two\nclauses being called, respectively, \u1f21\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd (as by the Peripatetics)\nand \u03bb\u1fc6\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd (by the Peripatetics \u1f11\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd). Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii.\n135; Math. viii. 301, 227; Alex. l.c. and p. 88, a; 109, a; 7, b;\nPhilop. Anal. Pr. lx. a; Schol. in Arist. 170, a, 2; Ammon. on Anal.\nPr. 24, b, 19; Arist. Orig. ed. Waitz, i. 45; Apul. Dog. Plat. iii.\n279, Oud.; Ps. Galen, \u0395\u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3. \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb. p. 19.\n\n[232] Alex. Anal. Pr. 116, b, after mentioning \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1f76, or inferences incomplete in point of form, such as: A = B,\nB = C, \u2234 A = C, which is said to want as its major premiss: Two things\nwhich are equal to a third are equal to one another. On these \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 of the Stoics see l.c. 8, a; 22, b; Alex. Top. 10, Ps.\nGalen, \u0395\u1f30\u03c2. \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb. 59. He then continues: \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 [\u03bf\u1f31 \u03bd\u03b5\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9] ... \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 ... \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[233] \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 or \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, and \u1f00\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 or \u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9, or\n\u1f00\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 137; Math. viii. 303 and 428; Diog. 77.\n\n[234] Syllogisms which are conclusive in point of fact, but wanting in\nprecision of form, were called \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af in the narrower sense; those\ncomplete also in form, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af. Diog. 78; Ps. Galen, \u0395\u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3. \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb.\n58.\n\n[235] An inference is true (\u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f74\u03c2) when not only the illation is\ncorrect (\u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u1f74\u03c2), but when the individual propositions, the premisses as\nwell as the conclusion, are materially true. The \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 may\ntherefore be divided into true and false. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 138; Math.\nviii. 310 and 412; Diog. 79.\n\n[236] Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 140 and 135; Math. viii. 305; 313; and 411: True\nforms of inference are divided into \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 and \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76.\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 = \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f04\u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76\nwhen this is not the case, as in the inference: If it is day, it is\nlight\u2014It is day, \u2234 It is light; for the conclusion, It is light, is\nknown as well as it is known that It is day. The \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 may\nproceed either \u1f10\u03c6\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 from the premisses to the conclusions, or\n\u1f10\u03c6\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f05\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f10\u03c6\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 when the premisses rest\nupon belief (\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7); \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 when they are based on a\nscientific necessity.\n\n[237] According to Diog. 79, Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 157, others added other\nforms of \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9. Cic., in adding a sixth and seventh (Top. 14,\n57), must have been following these authorities.\n\n[238] Consult, on these five \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 of Chrysippus (which need not\nbe given here more at length, and are absolutely identical with those\nof Theophrastus) Diog. 79\u201381 (on p. 79 we must read \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd for\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f7c\u03bd. See p. 118, 2); Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 156\u2013159; 201; Math. viii.\n223\u2013227; Cic. Top. 13; Simpl. Phys. 123, b; Ps. Galen, \u0395\u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3. \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb. 17;\nPrantl, 473, 182; on the \u03c0\u03ad\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd Sext. Pyrrh.\ni. 69; Cleomed. Meteora, pp. 41 and 47; Prantl, p. 475.\n\n[239] Two such cases are distinguished, one in which all three clauses,\nthe other in which the conclusion and minor premiss are identical. The\nfirst class are called \u03b4\u03b9\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u00b7 If it is day, it is day; It is\nday, \u2234 It is day. The second class, \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\u00b7 It is either\nday or night; It is day, \u2234 It is day. The latter term is, however,\napplied to both kinds. See Alex. Anal. Pr. 7, a; 53, b; Top. 7; Schol.\nin Arist. 294, b, 25; Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 96; Prantl, 476, 185.\n\n[240] Cic. Top. 15, 57: ex his modis conclusiones innumerabiles\nnascuntur. Sext. Math. viii. 228, in which passage it is striking that\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 should be divided into \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6 and \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6. It has been\nsuggested that \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd should be substituted for \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03ba\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, but\nit is also possible that the latter word may be used in a narrow as\nwell as in a wider sense.\n\n[241] Diog. 78: \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 [\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9] \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f24\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f22 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03ac. According to Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ii. 3, p. 224,\nChrysippus had taken great pains in resolving the composite forms of\ninference (Diog. 190 and 194). Antipater suggested still simpler modes.\n\n[242] Sext. 229\u2013243, borrowing the example used by \u00c6nesidemus, but no\ndoubt following the Stoic treatment. Prantl, 479. Such a composite\ninference is that mentioned by Sextus l.c. 281.\n\n[243] Sext.; Prantl, p. 478.\n\n[244] Alex. on Anal. Pr. i. 25, 42, b, 5, after speaking of the\nSorites, continues (p. 94, b): \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c4\u03cc\n\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03ce\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bd\u03b5\u03c9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03ad\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9. The \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03ce\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 (or\nchain-argument), the meaning of which is next investigated, must be a\nPeripatetic expression. The same meaning must attach to \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03ad\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9, which are to be found \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 for instance, A is a property of B,\nB of C, C of D; \u2234 A is a property of D. \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 means the\ninference, the conclusion of which is omitted; \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, the one with\nthe omitted premiss. These inferences may be in either of the three\nAristotelian figures \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03b4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03ce\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1. \u1f43 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\n\u1f00\u03c0\u1fc7\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 [\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2] \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03ad\u03bc\u03b1\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f41\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u1fb3 \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u1f04\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f96, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03be\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b6\u03b7\u03bb\u03ce\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. Reference is made to the same thing in Simpl. De C\u0153lo;\nSchol. in Arist. 483, b, 26: \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bb\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5, \u1f21 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03ad\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, the rule of which is,\nthat when a third proposition can be drawn from the conclusion of an\ninference and a second proposition, that third proposition can be drawn\nalso from the premisses of the inference and the second proposition.\nBoth these passages appear to have escaped the notice of Prantl in his\nsumming up, otherwise so accurate. Or else the \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\nand \u03c4\u03ad\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03ad\u03bc\u03b1 mentioned by Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ii. 3, vol. v.\n224; Alex. Anal. Pr. 53, b, would hardly suggest to him the various\nforms of the \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 instead of the formul\u00e6 for the resolution of\ncomposite conclusions. The expressions \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, and the title of a treatise of Chrysippus \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd\n(sc. \u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd or \u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd conf. p. 117, 3) in Diog. vii. 191; (Galen,\nl.c.; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2), appear to refer to such composite\ninferences.\n\n[245] Called \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03af. Such were \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1\n\u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 and \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03b6\u1fc7\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1. See Alex. Top. 6, 274; Anal. Pr. 7, a, 8,\na: Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 167; Math. viii. 443; Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 272,\nOud.; Prantl, 477, 186.\n\n[246] Compare the remarks of Prantl, 481, on Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2; Alex.\nAnal. Pr. 53, b; Galen, l.c.; Ps. Galen, \u0395\u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3. \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb. 57. If\nPosidonius, according to the latter passage, calls analogical\nconclusions \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, and the Stoics also,\naccording to Schol. in Hermog. Rhet. Gr. ed. Walz, vii. 6, 764, spoke\nof a \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, we have already met with the same thing, p.\n119, 1, where an analogical conclusion was included in the \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, which, by the addition of an \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, can be changed into\nregular conclusions. In the doctrine of proof the \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03bf\u03c2 was\nalso treated of, according to Procl. in Euclid, 103, being probably\nsuggested by the ethical paradoxes of the Stoics.\n\n[247] Conf. Alex. Anal. Pr. 95, a; Galen. See above p. 120, 3.\nAccording to Ps. Galen, l.c. p. 58, Chrysippus wrote these treatises on\n\u03a3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9.\n\n[248] Diog. 186, mentions fallacies due to Chrysippus, which can only\nhave been raised for the purpose of being refuted.\n\n[249] The list of his writings contains a number of treatises on\nfallacies, among them no less than five on the \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[250] Cic. Acad. ii. 29, 93: Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim\ninterrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint, anne multa, aliquanto\nprius, quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere, id est, quod ab iis dicitur\n\u1f21\u03c3\u03c5\u03c7\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. The same remark is made by Sext. Math. vii. 416; Pyrrh. ii.\n253. The same argument was employed against other fallacies (Simpl.\nCat. 6, \u03b3). With this \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f21\u03c3\u03c5\u03c7\u03ac\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd (Diog. 198), Prantl, p. 489,\nconnects \u1f00\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (Cic. De Fato, 12, 28), regarding the one as the\npractical application of the other, but apparently without reason. The\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, by means of which the Stoic fatalism was reduced ad\nabsurdum, could not of course commend itself to Chrysippus, nor is it\nattributed to him.\n\n[251] Prantl, pp. 485\u2013496.\n\n[252] Sext. Math. viii. 367: \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6, \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76, \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03be\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03be \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f41 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b4\u03bf\u03b8\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd.\nIbid. 375: \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03b5\u1f30\u03ce\u03b8\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f10\u03c1\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f51\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03b7\u03c6\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u1f72\u03c2,\n\u03ba\u1f00\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd.\n\n[253] Natural Science was divided by the Stoics themselves (Diog. 132):\n(1) \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 into \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u00b7 (2) \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 into three divisions,\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd, and the \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2. The first of these\ndivisions covers ground which is partly peculiar to natural science and\nis partly shared by the mathematician (astronomy. Posidonius in Simpl.\nPhys. 64, b, discusses at length the difference between astronomy and\nnatural science); and the third, ground which is shared by both the\nphysician and the mathematician. The precise allotment of the subject\ninto these divisions is not known. At best, it would be a very\nuncomfortable division.\n\n[254] Soph. 247, D.\n\n[255] Plut. Com. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073: \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1f74 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Plac. i. 11, 4: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\u00b7 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1. iv. 20: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03ae\u03bd\u00b7\n\u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1\u00b7 \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03c1\u1fb7 ... \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd\u03bf\u03c7\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd ... \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39: [Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam\neffici posse ab ea [natura] qu\u00e6 expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut\nquod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur (more accurately: in quo\nefficeretur aliquid. Conf. Ritter, iii. 577) posse esse non corpus.\nSeneca, see below p. 128, 1; 129, 1; Stob. Ecl. i. 336 (see p. 95, 2)\nand 338: \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f42\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2. \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f43 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf, \u1f22\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03b3\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f42\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f57 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\n\u1f42\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1. See p. 95, 1 and 2. Diog.\nvii. 56: According to Chrysippus, Diogenes (see Simpl. Phys. 97, a),\nand others, the voice is material, \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9. Ibid.\n150: \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03be \u1f27\u03c2\n\u1f41\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b7\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 ... \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1. Hippolyt.\nRefut. H\u00e6r. i. 21: \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[256] As do Ritter, iii. 577, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. der Philos.\n129.\n\n[257] Diog. vii. 135: \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 (\u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc7) \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c7\u1fc7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[258] See p. 98. The corporeal nature of deity and the soul will be\nsubsequently discussed.\n\n[259] See p. 105. Sen. Ep. 102, 7, remarks, in reference to the\ndifference of \u1f21\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u00b7 (see p. 103, 1): nullum bonum putamus esse, quod\nex distantibus constat: uno enim spiritu unum bonum contineri ac regi\ndebet, unum esse unius boni principale. Hence the objection raised in\nPlut. Com. Not. 50, 1, p. 1085: \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, and Ibid. 44, 4, the statement discussed on p. 101, 2.\n\n[260] Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. p. 298, D (the same in the spurious\ntreatise De Mundo, p. 1154, E): \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 [\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 = \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2] \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc. \u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c8\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f04\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c6\u2019 \u03bf\u1f57 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f61\u03c1\u03bc\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7. \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u1f74\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Qu. Mund. S. Incorr. 960, D [De Mundo,\n1169, A]: \u1f21 \u03b4\u2019 [\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2] \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. There can be no doubt\nthat Philo is describing the Stoic teaching in these passages.\n\nThe same idea is also used to explain the connection between the soul\nand the body. The unity of the universe is proved by the fact that the\nDivine Spirit pervades it. Further particulars hereafter. Conf. Alex.\nAphr. De Mixt. 142, a: \u1f21\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 [\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f51\u03c6\u2019 \u03bf\u1f57 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b5\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd. (That must be the reading,\nthe next sentence containing \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Conf. 143, b). Alex. 143,\nb, carefully denies the statement, that the all-penetrating Breath\nkeeps things together.\n\n[261] Plut. Com. Not. 45. See p. 129, 3. Sen. Ep. 117, 2: Placet\nnostris, quod bonum est, esse corpus, quia quod bonum est, facit:\nquidquid facit corpus est ... sapientiam bonum esse dicunt: sequitur,\nut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere. Conf. p. 129, 1.\n\n[262] This is the conception of \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, upon which the strength of the\nsoul depends, as well as the strength of the body. Cleanthes, in Plut.\nSto. Rep. 7, 4, p. 1034: \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03b3\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\nStob. Ecl. ii. 110: \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ae. All properties may be classed under the same\nconception of tension. See p. 127, 5 and Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2, p.\n1085: \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f34\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1,\n\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u1fc7, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03ce\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f11\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03c5\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7\n\u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2. Ps.\nCensorin. Fragm. c. 1, p. 75, Jahn: Initia rerum eadem elementa et\nprincipia dicuntur. Ea Stoici credunt tenorem atque materiam; tenorem,\nqui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente\nrursus a summo referatur ad medium. Here tenor or \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 is made\nequivalent to \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1. Seneca, however, Nat. Qu. ii. 8, conf. vi. 21,\nendeavours to show that intentio belongs to spiritus more than to any\nother body.\n\n[263] Sen. Ep. 106, 4: Bonum facit, prodest enim: quod facit corpus\nest: bonum agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet, qu\u00e6 propria\nsunt corporis. Qu\u00e6 corporis bona sunt, corpora sunt: ergo et qu\u00e6 animi\nsunt. Nam et hoc corpus. Bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, cum ipse\nsit corporalis.... Si adfectus corpora sunt et morbi animorum et\navaritia, crudelitas, indurata vitia ... ergo et malitia et species\nejus omnes ... ergo et bona. It is then specially remarked that the\nGood, i.e. virtue, works upon the body, governing it and representing\nitself therein. Conf. p. 128, 1.\n\n[264] Sext. Math. vii. 38: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f34\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 ... \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1fc6\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2, \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03af. \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21 \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd ... \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1fc6\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5.\nSimilarly Pyrrh. ii. 81. See p. 92, 2.\n\n[265] Plut. Com. Not. 45, 2, p. 1084: \u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f56 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f76 \u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. ... \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03ba\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c7\u03b1\u03bb\u03ba\u03bf\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f44\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. Plutarch\nis here speaking as an opponent. Seneca, however (Ep. 106, 5).\nobserves: Non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint ... tanquam\nira, amor, tristitia: si dubitas, vide an vultum nobis mutent:... Quid\nergo? tam manifestas corpori notas credis imprimi, nisi a corpore? See\np. 129, 1; Stob. Ecl. ii. 114: The Stoics consider virtues to be\nsubstantially identical (\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd) with the leading\npart of the soul (\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd), and consequently to be, like it, \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\nand \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1. Seneca, Ep. 113, 1, speaks still more plainly: Desideras tibi\nscribi a me, quid sentiam de hac qu\u00e6stione jactata apud nostros: an\njustitia, an fortitudo, prudentia ceter\u00e6que virtutes animalia sint....\nMe in alia sententia profiteor esse.... Qu\u00e6 sint ergo qu\u00e6 antiquos\nmoverint, dicam. Animum constat animal esse.... Virtus autem nihil\naliud est, quam animus quodammodo se habens: ergo animal est. Deinde:\nvirtus agit aliquid: agi autem nihil sine impetu (\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74) potest. If it\nis urged: Each individual will thus consist of an innumerable number of\nliving beings, the reply is that these animalia are only parts of one\nanimal, the soul; they are accordingly not many (multa), but one and\nthe same viewed from different sides: idem est animus et justus et\nprudens et fortis ad singulas virtutes quodammodo se habens. From the\nsame letter, 23, we gather that Cleanthes explained ambulatio as\nspiritus a principali usque in pedes permissus, Chrysippus as\nprincipale itself.\n\n[266] See p. 92, 2, the extract from Sen. Ep. 117.\n\n[267] Plut. Com. Not. 45, 5, p. 1084: \u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ac\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f21 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bd\u1f7a\u03be \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u1f21 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f11\u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bd\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f21 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c6\u03b8\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c0\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2.\n\n[268] Diog. 151: \u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c8\u03c5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f21\u03bb\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c9 \u1f04\u03c6\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f14\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\nStob. Ecl. i. 260: Chrysippus defines \u1f14\u03b1\u03c1 \u1f14\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f65\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 ... \u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f65\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u2019\n\u1f00\u03c6\u2019 \u1f21\u03bb\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f65\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\n\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f65\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c8\u03c5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd,\n\u1f22 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c8\u03c5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd. Ibid.: According to Empedocles and\nthe Stoics, the cause of winter is the preponderance of air, the cause\nof summer the preponderance of fire. Ibid. 556: \u03bc\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76, \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\n[\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2, \u1f22 \u03c3\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd\u03b7 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2. Cleomedes, Meteora, 112, distinguishes four\nmeanings of \u03bc\u03ae\u03bd. In the two first it means something material; in the\nothers, as a definition of time, something immaterial.\n\n[269] Diog. vii. 140; Stob. Ecl. i. 392; Sext. Math. x. 218 and 237;\nviii. 11; vii. 38; Pyrrh. ii. 81; iii. 52. See p. 92, 2.\n\n[270] See p. 94, 1.\n\n[271] See p. 66, 1.\n\n[272] See p. 93; 132, 1.\n\n[273] See p. 84, 4.\n\n[274] See p. 105, 3.\n\n[275] Let a piece of red-hot iron be taken, every part of which is\nheavy, hard, hot, &c. Not one of these attributes can be confounded\nwith another, or with the iron itself, but each one runs through the\nwhole iron. Now, if each attribute is due to the presence of some\nmaterial producing it, there is no avoiding the conclusion that there\nmust exist in the iron, and in each part of it, as many various\nmaterials as there are attributes, without any one of them losing its\nown identity.\n\n[276] Diog. vii. 151: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ad\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bb\u03af\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f36\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f36\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. According to Stob. Ecl. i. 374,\nthe Stoics more accurately distinguish \u03bc\u1fd6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,\n\u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. \u03a0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 is \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2; for\ninstance, the combination of various kinds of grain. \u039c\u1fd6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 is \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd; for instance, the union of fire and iron, of soul and\nbody. Such a union is called \u03bc\u1fd6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 in the case of solid bodies, \u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\nin the case of fluids. \u03a3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 is \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, as in\nthe making up salves and medicines. Very much in the same way according\nto Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a, Chrysippus distinguished three kinds of\n\u03bc\u1fd6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2: \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, or union of substances, in which each retains its\n\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 or \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd; \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, in which both\nsubstances, as well as attributes, are destroyed (\u03c6\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9), giving\nrise to a third body; \u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 = \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c3\u03ce\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03bc\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2.\nMaterials thus united can be again separated, but yet are they so\nunited: \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03bc\u03af\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9.\n\nFor such a union to be possible, (1) it must be possible for one body\nto penetrate every part of another, without being fused into a\nhomogeneous mass. Hence the expression \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bb\u03ae\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03c5\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 (Plut. C. Not.\n37, 2, p. 1077; Alex. 142, b; Themist. Phys. 37; Simpl. Phys. 123, b;\nHippolyt. Refut. H\u00e6r. i. 21); (2) it must be possible for the smaller\nbody to extend over the whole size of the greater. This is affirmed by\nChrysippus: \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c6\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f34\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b8\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd, or even \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\n(Plut. 10; Alex. 142, b; Diog.). The greater body is said to help the\nsmaller, by giving to it an extension of which it would not otherwise\nbe capable. Nevertheless, the bodies so united need not necessarily\noccupy more space than was previously occupied by one of them (Alex.\n142, b; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, C. Fic. 860, 14, Cr.). The\nabsurdities which this theory involves were already exposed by\nArcesilaus (Plut. 7), and in detail by Alexander, Plutarch, Sextus, and\nPlotinus, by the latter in a whole treatise (Enn. ii. 7) \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019\n\u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n[277] \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03ae\u03bd\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c3\u03ba\u03ad\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u0394\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Sext. Pyrrh.\niii. 56. See previous note.\n\n[278] According to Alex. 142, a, the following arguments were used by\nChrysippus:\u2014(1) The argument from \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u2014our notion of \u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\nis different from that of \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 or \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. (2) Many bodies are\ncapable of extension, whilst retaining their own properties;\nfrankincense, for instance, when burnt, and gold. (3) The soul\npenetrates every part of the body, without losing its properties. So\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 does in plants, and \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 does in all which it connects. (4) The\nsame holds good of fire in red-hot metal, of fire and air in water and\nearth, of poisons and perfumes in things with which they are mixed, and\nof light, which penetrates air.\n\nThe first of these arguments clearly does not embody the real reason in\nthe mind of Chrysippus; it might, with equal justice, have been used to\nprove anything else. Just as little does the second; for the phenomena\nto which it refers would be equally well explained on the theory of\nsimple intermingling (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) or complete (\u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) mixing. Nor\ndoes the fourth argument, taken independently of the theory of the\ncorporeal nature of properties, necessarily lead to the idea of \u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\nas distinct from \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. For heat, according to the\nPeripatetic view, might be regarded as a property of what is hot, light\nas a definite property of a transparent body (conf. Alex. 143, a),\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 sufficing for other things. Even the fact,\ngreatly insisted upon by the Stoics, that things so mixed can be again\nseparated into their component materials (Alex. 143, a; Stob. i. 378),\nwas not conclusive. As long as the knowledge of the actual composition\ndepended on isolated cases and crude experiments, like the one named by\nStob\u00e6us (into a mixture of wine and water, put an oiled sponge, it will\nabsorb the water and not the wine), and as long as the substantial\nchange of elements, advocated by the Stoics as well as by the\nPeripatetics, was clung to, it was no difficult matter for an opponent\nto reply. On the other hand, the relation of the soul to the body, of\nproperty to subject-matter, of \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 to \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd, of God to the world, can\nhardly be otherwise explained than it was by Chrysippus, if once\nmaterial existence be assigned to the soul, to \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, to \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, and to\nGod. We have, therefore, here the real ground on which this theory of\n\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 was based; and Simplicius rightly deduces it herefrom (Phys.\n123, b): \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u1f72\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bb\u03ac\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ae\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c6\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd ... \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70\n\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd.\n\n[279] See p. 95, 2; 126, 1.\n\n[280] On \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, as the universal \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd or \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74, see\np. 100. Sext. Math. x. 312: \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f11\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u03af. \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1f74, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1, \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Plut. C. Not. 48, 2, p. 1085: \u1f21 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2. M. Aurel. xii. 30: \u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74,\n\u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. Diog. 137: \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd.\n\n[281] See p. 141, 2.\n\n[282] Plut. Sto. Rep. 43. See p. 105, 1.\n\n[283] See p. 105, 1 and 2; 127, 5; 128, 2.\n\n[284] Simpl. Cat. 67, \u03b5 (Schol. 74, a, 10): \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03c3\u03c7\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u1f7a \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\u03b4\u03b9\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f04\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd.\n\n[285] Simpl. Cat. 68, \u03b5: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f22 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c5\u03ba\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f14\u03be\u03c9\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd.\nNemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2, p. 29: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76,\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c9 \u1f05\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f14\u03be\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03be\u03c9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c9 \u1f11\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. This remark\nis confirmed by what is quoted, p. 128, 2 from Censorinus, and by the\nlanguage of Plutarch (Def. Orac. c. 28. Schl. p. 425), in reference to\nChrysippus: \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u1f7c\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9.\n\n[286] Diog. vii. 134: \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf, \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd. \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03bd. \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1. Such is the teaching of Zeno,\nCleanthes, Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Posidonius. Sext. Math. ix. 11:\n\u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2, \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Similarly\nAlex. Aph. De Mixt. 144; Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 3, 124, E; Plut. Pl.\nPhil. i. 3, 39; Stob. Ecl. i. 306; 322, according to the passage\nquoted, p. 101, 2, from Zeno respecting \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7: \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f43\u03bd \u1f14\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03cc\u03bd\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1. Sen. Ep. 65, 2: Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in\nrerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant: causam et materiam. Materia jacet\niners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat. Causa autem, i.e.\nratio, materiam format et quocunque vult versat, ex illa varia opera\nproducit. Esse ergo debet, unde fit aliquid, deinde a quo fiat. Hoc\ncausa est, illud materia. Ibid. 23: Universa ex materia et ex Deo\nconstant ... potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est\nDeus, quam materia patiens Dei.\n\n[287] Sen. Ep. 65, 11: Nam si, quocumque remoto quid effici non potest,\nid causam judicant esse faciendi, &c. Sext. Math. ix. 228: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f57 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1. This appears to be the most\ngeneral Stoic definition. That given by Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14\u2014\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf, \u03b4\u03b9\u2019\n\u1f43 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u2014and by him said to express the views\nof several schools, expresses a narrower conception\u2014the conception of\nefficient cause, which, however, for a Stoic, is the only essential\none.\n\n[288] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 15, distinguishes between \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1,\nand \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1, all of which are, however, subordinated to the \u03b4\u03b9\u2019\n\u1f43, which he is there alone discussing. Seneca l.c. maintains that,\naccording to the definition given above, time, place, and motion ought\nto be reckoned as causes, since nothing can be produced without these.\nHe allows, however, that a distinction must be made between causa\nefficiens and causa superveniens. This agrees with what Cicero (De\nFato, 18, 41) quotes from Chrysippus relative to caus\u00e6 perfect\u00e6 et\nprincipales, and caus\u00e6 adjuvantes et proxim\u00e6, and with the Platonic and\nAristotelian distinction of \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f43 and \u03bf\u1f57 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5. See Zeller\u2019s\nPhilosophie der Griechen. In the same way, Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 4, p.\n1056 distinguishes between \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1f74\u03c2 and \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae. Alex.\nAph. De Fato, 72, blames the Stoics: \u03c3\u03bc\u1fc6\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03c4\u03b9. Conf. Orelli ad locum.\n\n[289] Seneca, l.c., after enumerating the four causes of Aristotle, to\nwhich the Platonic idea is added as a fifth, continues: This turba\ncausarum embraces either too much or too little. Sed nos nunc primam et\ngeneralem qu\u00e6rimus causam. H\u00e6c simplex esse debet, nam et materia\nsimplex est. Qu\u00e6rimus qu\u00e6 sit causa, ratio scilicet faciens, id est\nDeus. Ita enim, qu\u00e6cumque retulistis, non sunt mult\u00e6 et singul\u00e6 caus\u00e6,\nsed ex una pendent, ex ea, qu\u00e6 faciet. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 336: \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b4\u2019 \u1f41 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f43 ... \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f43 ...\n\u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f43 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf, \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03b3\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n[290] Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19, after speaking of the consentiens,\nconspirans, continuata cognatio rerum (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd), continues:\nH\u00e6c ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto\nnon possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur.\nSee Sext. Math. ix. 78. The same view is further expanded in Sext.\nMath. ix. 78. Conf. the quotation on p. 127, 5, from Alexander.\n\n[291] According to the remarks, p. 105 and 126, this requires no proof.\n\n[292] Cic. N. D. ii. 9, 23 (conf. iii. 14, 35), gives it apparently as\nthe view of Cleanthes, who alone is mentioned, 9, 24. All living\nthings, plants, and animals, exist by heat: nam omne quod est calidum\net igneum cietur et agitur motu suo. Digestion and circulation are the\nresult of heat: ex quo intelligi debet, eam caloris naturam vim habere\nin se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem. Moreover: omnes partes\nmundi ... calore fult\u00e6 sustinentur. There must be fire in earth and\nstones, else it could not be extracted therefrom. Water, especially\nfresh spring water, is warm, more particularly in winter, and as motion\nwarms us, so the roll of the waves does the sea. From water likewise as\nit evaporates, air derives its heat.... Jam vero reliqua quarta pars\nmundi, ea et ipsa tota natura fervida est, et c\u00e6teris naturis omnibus\nsalutarem impertit et vitalem calorem. Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes\nmundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili parique\nnatura in tanta diuturnitate servari: eoque magis quod intelligi debet,\ncalidum illum atque igneum ita in omni fusum esse natura, ut in eo\ninsit procreandi vis, &c.\n\n[293] On the argument, ex consensu gentium, consult Plut. Sto. Rep. 38.\n3; Com. Not. 32, 1; Cic. N. D. ii. 2, 5; Seneca, Benef. iv. 4; Sext.\nMath. ix. 123 and 131, where different varieties of it are given, even\na particular one from Zeno.\n\n[294] Sext. Math. ix. 75.\n\n[295] Cic. N. D. iii. 9, 22: Zeno enim ita concludit: quod ratione\nutitur, melius est, quam id, quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo\nmelius. Ratione igitur mundus utitur. The same, ibid. ii. 8, 21, and\n12, 34. Sext. Math. ix. 104: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03b3\u03b5 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 ... \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bc\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c8\u03cd\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03b3\u03b5 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bc\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2.\nLikewise Diog. 142, says that Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius\nagree that the world is \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bc\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f41\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[296] Cic. N. D. ii. 8, 22: Zeno affirms: Nullius sensu carentis pars\naliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non\nigitur caret sensu mundus.\n\n[297] Diog. 143: \u1f14\u03bc\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd], \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2. Sext. Math. ix. 101: \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41\n\u039a\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u03b9\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u039e\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c6\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u1f7c\u03bd \u03bf\u1f51\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u1fb7\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ca\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u0390\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6, \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2. The same proof in Sext.\nMath. ix. 77 and 84; Cic. l.c. Conf. ibid. ii. 31, 79; 6, 18, where\nalso the passage in Xenophon, Mem. i. 4, 8, quoted by Sext. ix. 94, is\nreferred to.\n\n[298] Cic. l.c. iii. 10, 25: Is [Chrysippus] igitur: si aliquid est,\ninquit, quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est\nhomine. Homo autem h\u00e6c, qu\u00e6 in mundo sunt, efficere non potest. Qui\npotuit igitur, is pr\u00e6stat homini. Homini autem pr\u00e6stare quis possit,\nnisi Deus? Est igitur Deus. The same, only a little more fully, ibid.\nii. 6, 16. To this argument, another favourite one of the Stoics, based\non the fulfilment of prophecy, belongs.\n\n[299] Cleanthes made use of arguments from final causes to prove the\nexistence of God. Of this nature are all the four arguments which he\nemploys in Cic. N. D. ii. 6, but particularly the fourth, based on the\nregular order and beauty of heaven. A building cannot exist without a\nbuilder; no more can the building of the world exist without a ruling\nspirit. Therewith Cicero connects the above-named argument of\nChrysippus. The same writer, N. D. ii. 32\u201366, gives very fully the\nphysical theological argument for the existence of providence, which is\ngiven in a shorter form by Cleomedes, Meteora, 1; Seneca, De Provid. i.\n1, 2\u20134; Nat. Qu. i.; Sext. Math. ix. 111; conf. Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i.\n2, p. 75, Jahn; Plut. Plac. i. 6, 8: belief in gods grows out of\nconsidering the world and its beauty, an argument also quoted by Sext.\nMath. ix. 26.\n\n[300] See the expansion of this thought by Cleanthes (in Sext. Math.\nix. 88\u201391) and the Stoics (in Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33). Cicero\ndistinguishes four kinds of beings\u2014Plants, Animals, Men, and that being\nwhich is altogether reasonable and perfect deity.\n\n[301] See p. 143, 2; 144, 1\u20134; 145, 1 and 2.\n\n[302] Sext. Math. ix. 102, expanding Zeno\u2019s argument given, p. 145, 2:\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78\n\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f31 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f61\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b7\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Cic. N. D. ii. 29:\naccording to Cleanthes, omnem enim naturam necesse est, qu\u00e6 non\nsolitaria sit, neque simplex, sed cum alio juncta atque connexa, habere\naliquem in se principatum [= \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd] ut in homine mentem, &c....\nItaque necesse est illud etiam, in quo sit totius natur\u00e6 principatus,\nesse omnium optimum. See following note.\n\n[303] Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis \u00e6ther\nvidetur summus Deus, mente pr\u00e6ditus, qua omnia regantur. N. D. i. 14,\n36: (Zeno) \u00e6thera Deum dicit. 15, 39: ignem pr\u00e6terea et eum, quem antea\ndixi, \u00e6thera (Chrysippus Deum dicit esse). Diog. vii. 138: \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c7\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f10\u03bd \u1f97 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f35\u03b4\u03c1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd. Ibid. 139: \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bc\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 ... \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 ...\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5. He continues: \u1f41 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 [= \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff7] \u1f43 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03bd. Arius Didymus, in Eus. Pr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 15, 4: \u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c0\u03c0\u1ff3 \u03b4\u1f72\n[\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f24\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b5] \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f05\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ac\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Ibid. xv. 20, 2: According to the Stoics, the air\nsurrounding sea and earth is the soul of the world. Cornut. Nat. De. 8:\nZeus dwells in heaven, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2. Tertullian (Apol. 47; Ad Nat. ii. 2, 4) inaccurately\nattributes to the Stoics the belief in a God external to nature.\n\n[304] Cic. Acad. l.c.: Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri =\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd putat. He speaks with less accuracy (Krische, Forsch.\n428) in N. D. i. 14, 37: either he considers the original deity; for\nthis does not exclude the other. No doubt he identified \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u1f74\u03c1 with\ncalor (see p. 144, 1), believing that it emanated from the sun. Diog.\n139: \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 [\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9] \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f25\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd. Ar. Didymus, l.c.\n\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f24\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f25\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Stob. Ecl. i. 452; Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i. 4.\nAccording to Epiphan. Exp. Fidei, 1090, C, he called the sun the\n\u03b4\u1fb3\u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c7\u03bf\u03c2 to the universe.\n\n[305] Stob. l.c.: \u1f08\u03c1\u03c7\u03af\u03b4\u03b1\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 (leg. with Cod. A \u1f08\u03c1\u03c7\u03ad\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2) \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b3\u1fc7 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf: the same statement without\nmentioning the name in Ar. Didymus, l.c. This reminds one somewhat of\nthe Pythagorean doctrine of a central fire, and the view of Speusippus.\nThe resemblance to the Pythagoreans is greater, if Simpl. De C\u0153lo,\nSchol. in Ar. 505, a, 45, is correct in saying Archedemus denied with\nthe Pythagoreans that the earth was in the centre of the world.\n\n[306] See p. 141, 2; 143, 1. Aristocles, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 14:\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 [\u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76] \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f29\u03c1\u03ac\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[307] Fuller particulars p. 144, 1; 146. Hippolytus, Refut. H\u00e6r. i. 21:\nChrysippus and Zeno suppose \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd (\u00e6ther). Diog. 148: Antipater calls the \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f00\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ae\u03c2. Stob. Ecl. i. 60: Mnesarchus (a pupil of Pan\u00e6tius) defines\nGod to be \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2. Sext.\nPyrrh. iii. 218: \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 [\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd] \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03b5\u03c7\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd (the adverse). Alex. Aphr. on Metaph. 995, b, 31 (Schol. in\nAr. 607, a, 19): \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b5\u03bd \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f55\u03b3\u1fc3 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. Ibid. De Mixt. 144, gives them credit: \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\n\u1f61\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03ce\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Compare the quotations p. 127, 5 and De An. 145: [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd]\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b5\u03bd.\nLucian, Hermot. 81: \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03bf\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03be\u03cd\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03af\u03b8\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b6\u1ff4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f04\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. Tertullian, Ad Nation. ii. 4: Zeno makes\nGod penetrate the materia mundialis, as honey does the honeycombs. See\np. 105, 3.\n\nClemens, Strom. v. 591, A: \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f00\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd. Ibid. i. 295, C: (\u03bf\u1f31\n\u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76) \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2. Protrept. 44, A: \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2. Orig. c. Cels. vi.\n71: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03bb\u03c5\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bd. Opponents like Origen, l.c. and i. 21,\nAlexander, De Mixt. l.c., and Plutarch, Com. Not. 48, naturally attack\nthem for their materialistic views.\n\n[308] Stob. Ecl. i. 58. See following note. Diog. 138 (according to\nChrysippus and Posidonius): \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd ... \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2. \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f24\u03b4\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f67\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f67\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. More popularly,\nibid. 147: \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u1fb3, \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03c0\u03af\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3, \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd. \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f43 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Ph\u00e6d.\nNat. De. (Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2) Col. 1 and Cic. Nat. De. i. 15, 39,\nquoting from him: According to Chrysippus, Zeus is \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c7\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,\n\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Ibid. Col. 3: He considered \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 to be\ndeity. Cic. l.c.: legis perpetu\u00e6 et \u00e6tern\u00e6 vim ... Jovem dicit esse.\nThemist. De An. 72, b: \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 ... \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd, \u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd,\n\u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03bd. Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 119: No Stoic can doubt\nhunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, qu\u00e6 se et ipsum fabricata\nsit, et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Id. N. D. ii. 22, 58: ipsius\nvero mundi ... natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem\nZenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque\nomnium.... As every nature develops from its stock, sic Natura mundi\nomnes motus habet voluntarios conatusque et appetitiones, quas \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f70\u03c2\nGr\u00e6ci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmet ipsi,\nqui animis movemur et sensibus, on which account the mens mundi is\ncalled \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1. M. Aurel. iv. 40: \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f13\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc7 \u03bc\u03b9\u1fb7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9. Heraclit. Alleg. Hom.\n72. Tertullian, Apol. 21: Hunc enim (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd) Zeno determinat\nfactitatorem, qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit, eundem et fatum\nvocari et Deum et animum Jovis et necessitatem omnium rerum. H\u00e6c\nCleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis\naffirmat. Similarly Lactant. Inst. iv. 9, 1, 5. Epiphan. H\u00e6r. v. 1, p.\n12: According to the Stoics, God is \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, residing in the world as its\nsoul, and permeating the \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9. Zeus is also spoken of as\nbeing the soul of the world by Cornutus, Nat. De. 2; by Plut. Sto. Rep.\n39, 2, p. 1052; and by Chrysippus, ibid. 34, 5, p. 1050: \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f21 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0396\u03b5\u03cd\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u00b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c7\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b8\u03c1\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u2019\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd. Stob. Ecl. i. 178: \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd ... [\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd] \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f61\u03c3\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2, \u1f25\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 2: God cares for man; He\nis kind, beneficent, and loves men. Zeus is called \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 as \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, because \u03b5\u1f31\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 all things, \u1f00\u03b4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1,\n\u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1. Aristocles (Ibid. xv. 14): Primary fire contains the\ncauses and \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 of all things; the unchangeable law and destiny of the\nworld supplies their connection. Sen. Benef. iv. 7, 1: Quid enim aliud\nest natura, quam Deus et divina ratio toti mundo et partibus ejus\ninserta?... Hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris non mentieris. (Similarly\nFrag. 122 in Lact. Inst. ii. 8, 23). Id. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 2: God or\nJupiter may be equally well spoken of as Destiny, Providence, Nature,\nthe World. Stob. Ecl. i. 178: \u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd. Zeus is called \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 by Diog. vii. 88; by Cleanthes\nat the end of his hymn (Stob. Ecl. i. 34); likewise Cic. N. D. i. 14,\n36 says of Zeno: Naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim\nobtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. Plut. C. Not. 32,\n1; Sto. Rep. 38, 3 and 7 (here following Antipater): God must be\nconceived of as \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2, \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2,\n\u1f60\u03c6\u03ad\u03bb\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2. Muson. (in Stob. Floril. 117, 8): God is the type of every\nvirtue, \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03c6\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f50\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2, \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Sen. Ep. 95, 48:\nQu\u00e6 causa est Dis benefaciendi? Natura. Errat, si quis illos putat\nnocere nolle: non possunt. Further details respecting the beneficent\nnature of the Gods in Sen. Benef. i. 9; iv. 3\u20139 and 26\u201328; Clement. i.\n5, 7; Nat. Qu. v. 18, 13. On the divine omniscience; Ep. 83, 1; V.\nBeat. 20, 5.\n\n[309] According to Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 75, the Stoics divided the\nargument as to God\u2019s providential care of the world into three parts.\nThe first part went to establish that if there existed Gods, there must\nalso be a care of the world; for Gods could not exist without having\nsomething to do, and to care for the world is the noblest thing that\ncan be done. If, moreover, deity is the highest being, the world must\nbe governed by deity. The same conclusion is arrived at from the wisdom\nand power of deity, which must always busy itself with what is best and\nhighest. Lastly, it is stated, that inasmuch as the stars, heaven, the\nuniverse, and all powers in the world are divine, it is clear that\neverything must be governed by divine reason. The second part proved\nthat the force and skill of nature produced and sustains all things.\nAll the more reason that a universe so skilfully formed and so\nharmoniously arranged must be directed by a natura sentiens. And since,\nin its parts, it could not be more beautiful or adapted to its purpose,\nit must be true of it more than of any human work of art, that it owes\nits origin to a forming reason. The third part aims at proving, on\nphysico-theological grounds, quanta sit admirabilitas c\u0153lestium rerum\natque terrestrium.\n\n[310] Stob. Ecl. i. 58: \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u039f\u1f30\u03bd\u03bf\u03c0\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd [\u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9] ... \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2,\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f43 \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03be\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd ... \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. Ib. 64; Plut. Plac. i.\n8, 17: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd (Plut. \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd) \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f41\u03b4\u1ff7 \u03b2\u03b1\u03b4\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 (a similar definition of nature\nis given by Zeno in Cic. Nat. De. ii. 22, 57) \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03c6\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 (Pl. \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1) \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f45\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f27\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Following\nthe same source, Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. c. 5, Schl.: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. (the same down to \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9) \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u00b7 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f37\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2, \u0396\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b6\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f2d\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019\n\u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f27\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5, \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. The latter passage\nis explained by Diog. 147, who thus continues: \u0394\u03af\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u00b7 \u0396\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd. (This, too, in Stob. Ecl. i. 48.) \u1f08\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6. \u1f2d\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f2d\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f51\u03b3\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0394\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd. Plut. C. Not. 48, 2, p.\n1085: \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd ... \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u1fc3 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. M. Aurel. 5,\n32: \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Porphyr. in Eus. Pr. Ev.\nxv. 16, 1: \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd ... \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. Orig. c. Cels. vi. 71:\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f41 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bb\u03b1\u03c7\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. The same combination of nature and mind in the conceptions\nof God is found in the hymn of Cleanthes (in Stob. Ecl. i. 30), Zeus\nbeing described as the \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, who directs the \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f43\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u1fb7, by means of \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f00\u03b5\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[311] Stob. Ecl. i. 374: Chrysippus teaches \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f42\u03bd \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\n\u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6, \u1f22 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f40\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c9\u00b7\n\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f34\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f14\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1 [? perhaps: \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78, or: \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f22] \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac. Diog. vii. 137: \u1f00\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f43\u03bd \u03b4\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[312] Stob. Ecl. i. 538, on the authority of Zeno; Cic. N. D. ii. 15,\n40, on that of Cleanthes. Both state that the difference consists in\nthis: Ordinary (\u1f04\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) fire consumes things; but the \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd,\nwhich constitutes \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74, preserves things. Heraclitus, too, in\nmaking primary fire the basis of things, did not mean flame, but\nwarmth, which may be equally well described as atmospheric substance or\nas \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae.\n\n[313] Seneca, De Benefic. iv. 7, 2: God may also be called fatum: nam\ncum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series implexa causarum, ille est prima\nomnium causa, ex qua ceter\u00e6 pendent. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1: Vis illum\nfatum vocare? Non errabis. Hic est, ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa\ncausarum. The same applies to the name of providence and nature. See p.\n162, 2.\n\n[314] Stob. Ecl. i. 178 (Plut. Plac. i. 28, 5): \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 [\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd] \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u0394\u03b9\u03cc\u03c2. \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0394\u03af\u03b1, \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd. Conf. Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125,\nwhere prophecy is deduced, according to Posidonius, (1) a Deo, (2) a\nfato, (3) a natura. Plut. C. Not. 36, 5, p. 1077: \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u1f10\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0394\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd (instead of which Heine,\nStoic. De Fat. Doct. p. 25, apparently without reason, conjectures: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd), \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0394\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f36\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. To this maxim of Chrysippus, reference is made by\nPhilo, Incorrup. M. 951, B, where, too, \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 is equivalent to \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5.\n\n[315] According to Chrysippus. A different view is taken by Posidonius.\nWith him Zeus stands for the original force, \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 for its first, and\n\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 for its second production.\n\n[316] Plut. l.c. Sen. Ep. 9, 16: [Jupiter] resoluto mundo et Diis in\nunum confusis, paullisper cessante natura, acquiescit sibi,\ncogitationibus suis traditus.\n\n[317] Compare, besides what has been already quoted, Cic. Acad. i. 11,\n39: (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse ipsam naturam. Diog. vii. 156: \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f41\u03b4\u1ff7 \u03b2\u03b1\u03b4\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1f72\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ad\u03c2. Stob. Ecl. i. 180: \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd; or, according to another definition: \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f41 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f22 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\nInstead of \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, he also used \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7, &c.\n\n[318] See p. 143.\n\n[319] Cic. N. D. ii. 11, 30: Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior,\nperlucidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus\ncommovendos quam hic noster calor, quo h\u00e6c qu\u00e6 nota nobis sunt,\nretinentur et vigent. Absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines besti\u00e6que\nhoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ac sentiant, mundum esse\nsine sensu, qui integro et puro et libero eodemque acerrimo et\nmobilissimo ardore teneatur. Conf. Ar. Didymus, in the passage quoted,\np. 146, 4, p. 105, 127.\n\n[320] Consol. ad Helviam, 8, 3: Id actum est, mihi crede, ab illo,\nquisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive\nincorporalis ratio, ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus per\nomnia maxima ac minima \u00e6quali intentione [= \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2] diffusus, sive fatum\net immutabilis causarum inter se coh\u00e6rentium series. Conf. p. 153, 1.\n\n[321] Cic. N. D. i. 14: Zeno calls natural law divine, but he also\ncalls the Ether and the all-pervading Reason deity. (We shall come back\npresently to what he says as to the divinity of the stars.) Cleanthes\ngives the name of deity to the world, reason, the soul of the world,\nand ether; Chrysippus to reason, to the soul of the world, to ruling\nreason, to communis natura, destiny, fire, ether, the universe, and\neternal law.\n\n[322] Krische, Forsch. i. 365.\n\n[323] See pp. 153, 2; 153, 4.\n\n[324] Chrysippus. See p. 152, note 1.\n\n[325] Aristocles. See p. 147, note 3.\n\n[326] Mnesarchus, in Stob. i. 60. See p. 148, 1.\n\n[327] Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, p. 497, A: \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. Ibid. iv. 14: \u1f41 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f96\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u1f96 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[328] Besides the quotations already given from Chrysippus on p. 153,\n2, and Cleanthes on p. 155, 1, compare Ph\u00e6dr. Nat. De. (Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2), Col. 5: \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f41 \u0392\u03b1\u03b2\u03c5\u03bb\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f08\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u0394\u03b9\u1fd2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f22 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0394\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\n\u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd. Cic. N. De. ii. 17, 45: Nothing corresponds better to\nthe idea of God, quam ut primum hunc mundum, quo nihil fieri\nexcellentius potest, animantem esse et Deum judicem. Ibid. 13, 34:\nPerfect reason Deo tribuenda, id est mundo. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 3;\nVis illum vocare mundum? Non falleris. Ipse enim est hoc quod vides\ntotum, suis partibus inditus et se sustinens et sua. Ibid. Prolog. 13:\nQuid est Deus? Mens universi. Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum et quod\nnon vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus\nexcogitari potest, si solus est omnia, opus suum et extra et intra\ntenet. Diog. vii. 148: \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd. Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1 and 3: \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u1f7a\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03bd.... \u03b4\u03b9\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u0396\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2. Orig. c. Cels. v. 7: \u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. The arguments given, p. 144,\nfor the existence of God are based on the supposition that God is the\nsame as the World. The existence of God is proved by showing the\nreasonableness of the world. Aratus gives a poet\u2019s description of the\nStoic pantheism at the beginning of the Ph\u00e6nomena: Zeus is the being of\nwhom streets and markets, sea and land, are full, whose offspring is\nman, and who, out of regard for man, has appointed signs in the heavens\nto regulate the year. The same idea is contained in the well-known\nlines of Virgil, Georg. iv. 220; \u00c6n. vi. 724. The round figure of the\nStoic deity, Sen. Ep. 113, 22; De M. Claud. 8, 1, has also reference to\nthe world as God. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 46.\n\n[329] Stob. Ecl. i. 444: \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f10\u03be\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03ba \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41\n\u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd \u1f21 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Diog. vii. 137:\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c7\u1ff6\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f43\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f74 \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f62\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03af\u03c3\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bd.\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f22 (according to the first meaning of the word) \u1f41 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, (universal substance in its definite\nquality) \u1f22 (second meaning) \u1f65\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 ... \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f10\u03be \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f22 (third meaning) \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f10\u03ba \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev.\nxv. 15, 1: \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 is the name for \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd, and for\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd. In the former\nsense, the world is eternal, and the same as God; in the latter,\ncreated, and subject to change. Compare also the quotations from the\nmathematician Diodorus, in Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 6. p. 129, b.\n\n[330] See p. 148. The two ideas blend. Thus Seneca, Nat. Qu. Prol. 13,\nsays God must be the Reason of the world and must also be the universe\nitself; and he continues: Quid ergo interest, inter naturam Dei et\nnostram? Nostri melior pars animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum\nest. Totus est ratio, &c.\n\n[331] The connection of the two, like the connection between soul and\nbody, and the argument quoted by Tertullian from Zeno on p. 148, 1, is\n\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd. See p. 135.\n\n[332] Stob. Ecl. i. 60: \u0392\u03cc\u03b7\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf.\n\n[333] Diog. 143: \u0392\u03cc\u03b7\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd. The words\nof Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, C\u2014\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2\u2014imply the same, but these words evidently are not\ntaken from Bo\u00ebthus.\n\n[334] Diog. 148: \u0392\u03cc\u03b7\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 which must be understood in the same sense as the\ncorresponding statements of other Stoics: the \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd of the world\nresides in the purest part of the ether. Yet, inasmuch as the world is\nno living being, nor is deity the soul of the world, it must, according\nto the view of Bo\u00ebthus, act upon it from without. This is expressly\nstated in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, B, God is described as the\ncharioteer guiding the world, and \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 the stars and elements.\nBut this passage, beginning at \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2, is evidently Philo\u2019s\nown expansion of what he has just quoted from Bo\u00ebthus.\n\n[335] Diog. vii. 136: \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd]\n\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03b4\u03b5 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f51\u03b3\u03c1\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f11\u03be\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Seneca, Nat. Qu\u00e6st. iii. 13, 1: Fire will\nconsume the world: hunc evanidum considere, et nihil relinqui aliud in\nrerum natura, igne restincto, quam humorem. In hoc futuri mundi spem\nlatere. Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414, 5. See pp. 161, 2; 164, 2.\n\n[336] Stob. i. 370: \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c1\u03c1\u03ae\u03b4\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03b4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c6\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1, \u1f10\u03ba \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f00\u03c4\u03bc\u03b9\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f10\u03be\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Diog.\nvii. 142: \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u1fc7 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f51\u03b3\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1, \u03b5\u1f36\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c7\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1f72\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u1f70\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u1fc7 \u03b3\u1fc6 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1f72\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03b5\u03c1\u03c9\u03b8\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u1fc3; \u03b5\u1f36\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03af\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7. Chrys. in Plut. St.\nRep. 41, 3, p. 1053: \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba\u1f00\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f00\u1f74\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03c5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u1f74\u03c1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03cd\u03ba\u03bb\u1ff3. The same writer observes, in the\nScholia on Hesiod\u2019s Theogony, v. 459, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cd\u03b3\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f44\u03bc\u03b2\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f14\u03ba\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u039a\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f60\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Conf.\nClemens, Strom. v. 599, C, and Stob. i. 312.\n\n[337] Stob. Ecl. i. 442, also affirms that the creation of the universe\nbegins with earth.\n\n[338] Stob. l.c.: \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c0\u03ce\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c6\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f36\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b2\u03ad\u03bd\u03bd\u03c5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5.\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be\u03c5\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c7\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f50\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03bd (the probable meaning is,\nthat the last remains of the original fire begin a motion in the\nopposite direction) \u03b5\u1f36\u03b8\u2019 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03b1\u1f54\u03be\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 (for this favourite\nexpression of Cleanthes, see p. 127, 5; 128, 2) \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03b1\u03cd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n[\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd]. \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f11\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03cd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7, \u1f67\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9, \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f72\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bc\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f56\u03b8\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f13\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, (conf. Heraclit. in vol. i. 467, 1), \u1f41\u03b4\u1ff7\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03ce\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5. A few further details are\nsupplied by Macrob. Sat. i. 17. The myth respecting the birth of Apollo\nand Artemis is referred to the formation of the sun and moon. Namque\npost chaos, ubi primum c\u0153pit confusa deformitas in rerum formas et\nelementa nitescere, terr\u00e6que adhuc humida substantia in molli atque\ninstabili sede nutaret: convalescente paullatim \u00e6thereo calore atque\ninde seminibus in eam igneis defluentibus (the connection of Zeus,\ni.e., of Ether, with Leto, the Earth) h\u00e6c sidera edita esse creduntur;\net solem maxima caloris vi in superna raptum; lunam vero humidiore et\nvelut femineo sexu naturali quodam pressam tepore inferiora tenuisse,\ntanquam ille magis substantia patris constet, h\u00e6c matris. The statement\nthat besides other things plants and animals had their origin in the\nintermingling of elements (Stob. and Diog.) must be understood in the\nsense of generatio \u00e6quivoca. Lactant. Inst. vii. 4, says the Stoics\nmake men grow like sponges out of the earth, and Sext. Math. ix. 28\nsays the Stoics speak of the earth-born men of prehistoric ages.\n\n[339] There must always be some remainder of heat or fire, as Cleanthes\nand Chrysippus avowed, or else there would be no active life-power from\nwhich a new creation could emanate. Philo, Incorrupt. M. 964, C,\nobserves that, if the world were entirely consumed by fire at the\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, the fire itself would be extinguished, and no new world\nwould be possible. \u03b4\u03b9\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 ... \u1f14\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1f70\u03bd \u1f41 \u03bd\u03ad\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u1fc3 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c3\u03b2\u03ad\u03bd\u03bd\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u1f74 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[340] Chrys. in Plut. l.c. 41, 6: \u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f62\u03bd \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03ce\u03b4\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. \u1f45\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u1f7c\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f51\u03b3\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c6\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03bd \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[341] Nemes. Nat. Hom. C. 2, p. 72: \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\u00b7 \u03b4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1, \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1. Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2. See above p. 127,\n5. From this passage a further insight is obtained into two points\nconnected with the Stoic philosophy, which have been already discussed.\nIt can no longer appear strange that the active power, or deity (and\nlikewise the human soul), should at one time be called Fire, at another\nAir-Current, for both represent equally the acting force; and the\nstatement that properties are atmospheric currents\u2014as, indeed, the\nwhole distinction of subject-matter and property\u2014follows from this view\nof things.\n\n[342] The Stoics, according to Diog. 141, where, however, there is\napparently a lacuna in the text, prove that the world (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, not\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, in the absolute sense, see p. 158, 1) will come to an end,\npartly because it has come into being, and partly by two not very\nlogical inferences: \u03bf\u1f57 \u03c4\u1f70 [vulgo \u03bf\u1f57 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f70, Cobet: \u03bf\u1f57 \u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5] \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ac\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u1f70, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bb\u03b1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 and \u03b5\u1f34 \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76\n\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1\u00b7 \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03c5\u03c7\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03be\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Conf. Alex. Meteora, 90. In Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 2, p.\n1054, Chrysippus asserts that the \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 is immortal, but to \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2\nbelongs a \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f00\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1.\n\n[343] Plut. Sto. Rep. 39, 2, p. 1052: [\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2] \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0394\u03af\u03b1, \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd, \u03b1\u1f54\u03be\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03ce\u03c3\u1fc3. \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd, \u03b1\u1f54\u03be\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03ce\u03c3\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50 \u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd. Stob. Ecl.\ni. 414 (according to Numenius: see Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1): \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c0\u03c0\u1ff3 \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 (Philo, Incorrupt. M. 956, B, expresses himself against this\ndescription) \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f37\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f26\u03bd. Seneca, Consol. ad Marciam, gives a graphic\ndescription of the end of the world, which recalls the language of the\nRevelation. Compare, on the subject of \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, Diog. vii. 142, 137\n(see above p. 158, 1); Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1; Plut. Com.\nNot. 36 (see p. 153, 2); Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 25, p. 53; Cic. Acad.\nii. 37, 119; N. D. ii. 46, 118; Sen. Consol. ad Polyb. i. 2; Alex.\nAphr. in Meteor. 90, a. In the last-named passage, it is urged by the\nStoics, in support of their view, that even now large tracts of water\nare dried up or else take the place of dry land. Simpl. Phys. iii. b;\nDe C\u0153lo; Schol. in Arist. 487, b, 35 and 489, a, 13; Justin. Apol. i.\n20; ii. 7; Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, 497, a; vi. 71. Since at the\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 everything is resolved into deity, Plut. C. Not. 17, 3, p.\n1067, says: \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03ce\u03c3\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u1f41\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[344] Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1: \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b2\u03c5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03c5\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. According to Philo,\nIncorrupt. M. 954, E, Cleanthes called this fire \u03c6\u03bb\u03cc\u03be, Chrysippus \u03b1\u1f50\u03b3\u03ae.\nRespecting \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03b1\u03be, \u03c6\u03bb\u03cc\u03be, \u03b1\u1f50\u03b3\u03ae, see ibid. 953, E. The observations on p.\n151 respecting the identity of \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1, \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1, \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u1f74\u03c1 apply here.\n\n[345] This is, at least, the import of the general principle (assigned\nto Chrysippus by Stob. Ecl. i. 314) expressed by Heraclitus, that, in\nthe resolution of earth and water into fire, the same steps intervene,\nin a retrograde order, as in their generation.\n\n[346] See p. 147, 1.\n\n[347] Plut. Com. Not. 31, 10: \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u1f70 \u1f04\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f25\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 [leg. -\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd]\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[348] It is expressly asserted that everything, without exception, is\nliable to this destiny; neither the soul nor the Gods are exempt. Conf.\nSen. Cons. ad Marc. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices anim\u00e6 et \u00e6terna sortit\u00e6\n(the words are put in the mouth of a dead man) cum Deo visum sit iterum\nista moliri, labentibus cunctis, et ips\u00e6 parva ruin\u00e6 ingentis accessio,\nin antiqua elementa vertemur. Chrysippus says of the Gods, in Plut.\nSto. Rep. 38, 5: Some of the Gods have come into being and are\nperishable, others are eternal: Helios and Selene, and other similar\ndeities, have come into being; Zeus is eternal. In Philo, Incorrupt. M.\n950, A, Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68, Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420, Com. Not.\n31, 5, p. 1075, it is objected that, at the general conflagration, the\nGods will melt away, as though they were made of wax or tin. According\nto Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2, Tab. i. 1, Vol. Hercul. vi. 1, even\nZeno restricted the happy life of the Gods to certain lengthy periods\nof time.\n\n[349] Arius, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 19: \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u1f7c\u03bd \u1f41 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03be\u03b7\u03c1\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u1fc3 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 (it occupies\nthe room of the whole substance) \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1fe5\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd [? \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd] \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f21\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (the same in Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70),\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u2019 \u03bf\u1f35\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f61\u03c3\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f24\u03c1\u03be\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. See p. 161. According to Nemes.\nNat. Hom. c, 38, p. 147, conf. Censorin. Di. Nat. 18, 11, the \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\ntakes place when all the planets have got back to the identical places\nwhich they occupied at the beginning of the world, or, in other words,\nwhen a periodic year is complete. The length of a periodic year was\nestimated by Diogenes (Plut. Pl. i. 32, 2; Stob. Ecl. i. 264) at 365\nperiods, or 365 \u00d7 18,000 ordinary years. Plut. De Ei ap. D. 9, g, E, p.\n389 mentions the opinion, \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f13\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. Inasmuch as it had been previously said\nthat the duration of \u03ba\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 (i.e. \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) was longer, and that\ntherefore Apollo, who represents the state of perfect unity, was\nhonoured nine months with the p\u00e6an, whilst Dionysus, torn to pieces by\nthe Titans, the emblem of the present world of contraries, was only\nhonoured for three with the dithyramb, some mistake seems to have crept\nin. Probably we ought either to read \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u1f15\u03bd, or to transpose\nthe passage from \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd to \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[350] The belief in changing cycles is a common one in the older Greek\nphilosophy. In particular, the Stoics found it in Heraclitus. The\nbelief, however, that each new world exactly represents the preceding\none is first met with among the Pythagoreans, and is closely connected\nwith the theory of the migration of souls and a periodic year. Eudemus,\nin a passage which has generally been lost sight of in describing\nPythagorean teaching, had taught (in Simpl. Phys. 173): \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03a0\u03c5\u03b8\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1ff7 \u03ba\u1f00\u03b3\u1f7c \u03bc\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03ae\u03c3\u03c9\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u1fe5\u03b1\u03b2\u03b4\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u1f51\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 (in that case the time must be\nthe same as the present time). The Stoics appear to have borrowed this\nview from the Pythagoreans (unless with other Orphic-Pythagorean views\nit was known to Heraclitus), and it commended itself to them as being\nin harmony with their theory of necessity. Hence they taught: \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u1ff3\n\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3 (Alex. Anal. Pr. 58, b). \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f43\u03bd \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c7\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1 (Chrysippus,\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03a0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, in Lactant. Inst. vii. 23. Conf. Seneca, Ep. 36, 10:\nVeniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies). This applies to every\nfact and to every occurrence in the new world, at the \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 or\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (as the return of a former age is called): thus there\nwill be another Socrates, who will marry another Xanthippe, and be\naccused by another Anytus and Meletus. Hence M. Aurel. vii. 19, xi. 1,\ndeduces his adage, that nothing new happens under the sun. Simpl. Phys.\n207, b; Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70; Tatian. c. Gr\u00e6c. c,\n3, 245, d; Clemens, Strom. v. 549, D; Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68; v. 20 and\n23; Nemes. l.c.; Plut. Def. Or. 29, p. 425. Amongst other things, the\nStoics raised the question, Whether the Socrates who would appear in\nthe future world would be numerically identical (\u03b5\u1f37\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1ff7) with the\npresent Socrates or not? (Simpl. l.c.)\u2014the answer being, that they\ncould not be numerically identical, since this would involve\nuninterrupted existence, but that they would be alike without a\ndifference (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9). Others, however, chiefly among the younger\nStoics, appear to have held that there might be noticeable differences\nbetween the two. (Orig. v. 20, 592, c.) This remark appears to have\ngiven rise to the false notion (Hippolyt. Refut. H\u00e6r. i. 21; Epiphan.\nH\u00e6r. v. p. 12, b) that the Stoics believed in the transmigration of\nsouls. The remark made by Nemes., that the Gods know the whole course\nof the present world, from having survived the end of the former one,\ncan only apply to one highest God, who, however, does not require such\nempirical knowledge. The other deities will not have survived the\ngeneral conflagration.\n\n[351] Ar. Didym. l.c. continues: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03ca\u03b4\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2. \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 [del.] \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f37\u03cc\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac. \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f51\u03c6\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u03c5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Conf. Philop.: \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b5 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f08\u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f08\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7. \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f21 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u1f21 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74 \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9,\n\u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9; \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03ad\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03bd \u1fa7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. See M. Aurel. v. 32.\n\n[352] According to Philo (Incorrupt. M. 947, C), besides Posidonius and\nPan\u00e6tius, his instructor (Diog. vii. 142; Stob. Ecl. i. 414), Bo\u00ebthus\nasserted, in opposition to the ordinary Stoic teaching, the eternity of\nthe world. Philo adds that this was also the view of Diogenes of\nSeleucia in his later years. Moreover, Zeno of Tarsus, on the authority\nof Numenius (in Euseb. Pr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 19, 2), considered that the\ndestruction of the world by fire could not be proved (\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd). But these statements are elsewhere\ncontradicted. Diogenes mentions Posidonius as one who held the\ndestruction of the world by fire. The testimony of Diogenes is\nconfirmed by Plut. Pl. Phil. ii. 9, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 380; Eus. Pr. Ev.\nxv. 40. See Achill. Tatian, Isag. 131, C), who says that Posidonius\nonly allowed so much empty space outside the world as was necessary for\nthe world to be dissolved in at the \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. The difference between\nhis view and the older Stoical view which Bake (Posidon. Rel. 58)\ndeduces from Stob. i. 432, is purely imaginary. Antipater, according to\nDiogenes, also believed in a future conflagration. Little importance\ncan be attached to the statement in Cic. N. D. ii. 46, 118, respecting\nPan\u00e6tius, addubitare dicebant; whereas the words of Stob. are:\n\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03ca\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5; and those of Diog.:\n\u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd.\n\nBo\u00ebthus emphatically denied the destruction of the world, his chief\nreasons (in Philo, l.c. 952, C) being the following:\u2014(1) If the world\nwere destroyed, it would be a destruction without a cause, for there is\nno cause, either within or without, which could produce such an effect.\n(2) Of the three modes of destruction, those \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03c7\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 (as in the crushing of a statue),\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (as in chemical resolution), not one can apply to the\nworld. (3) If the world ceased to exist, the action of God on the\nworld, in fact, His activity would altogether cease. (4) If everything\nwere consumed by fire, the fire must go out for want of fuel. With\nthat, the possibility of a new world is at an end.\n\nThe resolution of the world into indefinite vacuum, attributed by Plut.\nPlac. ii. 9, 2, to the Stoics in general, is no doubt the same as the\ncondensation and expansion of matter. Ritter, iii. 599 and 703,\nsupposes it to be a misapprehension of the real Stoic teaching. How\nHegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 391, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. d. Philos.\np. 129, in view of the passages quoted, can absolutely deny that the\nStoics held a periodic destruction of the world, is hard to comprehend.\n\n[353] The flood and its causes are fully discussed by Sen. Nat. Qu.\niii. 27\u201330. Rain, inroads of the sea, earthquakes, are all supposed to\ncontribute. The chief thing, however, is, that such a destruction has\nbeen ordained in the course of the world. It comes cum fatalis dies\nvenerit, cum adfuerit illa necessitas temporum (27, 1), cum Deo visum\nordiri meliora, vetera finiri (28, 7); it has been fore-ordained from\nthe beginning (29, 2; 30, 1), and is due, not only to the pressure of\nthe existing waters, but also to their increase, and to a changing of\nearth into water (29, 4). The object of this flood is to purge away the\nsins of mankind, ut de integro tot\u00e6 rudes innoxi\u00e6que generentur [res\nhuman\u00e6] nec supersit in deteriora pr\u00e6ceptor (29, 5); peracto judicio\ngeneris humani exstructisque pariter feris ... antiquus ordo\nrevocabitur. Omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris, homo\ninscius scelerum: but this state of innocence will not last long.\nSeneca (29, 1) appeals to Berosus, according to whom the destruction of\nthe world by fire will take place when all the planets are in the sign\nof the Crab, its destruction by water when they are in the sign of the\nCapricorn. Since these signs correspond with the summer and winter\nturns of the sun, the language of Seneca agrees with that of Censorin.\nDi. Nat. 18, 11, evidently quoted from Varro, conf. Jahn, p. viii:\nCujus anni hiems summa est cataclysmus ... \u00e6stas autem ecpyrosis. Conf.\nHeraclit. Alleg. Hom. c, 25, p. 53: When one element gains the\nsupremacy over the others, the course of the world will come to an end,\nby \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, if the element is fire; \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f04\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03b7,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u03c5\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[354] For the former view, the language of Heraclitus and Censorinus\ntells, for the latter that of Seneca.\n\n[355] Diog. vii. 149: \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u1f22 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03be\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. A. Gell. vi. 2, 3: (Chrysippus) in libro\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 quarto \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd esse dicit \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03ca\u03b4\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2. Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125\n(according to Posidonius): Fatum, or \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, was called ordinem\nseriemque causarum, cum causa caus\u00e6 nexa rem ex se gignat. Sen. Nat.\nQu. ii. 36: Quid enim intelligis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum\nomnium actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat. De Prov. 5, 8: Irrevocabilis\nhumana pariter ac divina cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor et\nrector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semper jussit.\n\n[356] Conf. p. 152 and Stob. Ecl. i. 180 (Plut. Plac. i. 28), \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd.\n\n[357] Hence Chrysippus\u2019 definition (Plut. and Stob.): \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f41\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (Plut. \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2) \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f22 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\n\u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Instead of \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, Chrysippus also\nused \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7. Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, p.\n87: Chrysippus assigns the same meaning to \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, explaining \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 to be \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u1f74\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7; Zeno defines it (as Stob. i. 178, also says) as \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2; also as \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 or \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1; his successors as \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, or as \u03b5\u1f31\u03c1\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03bd. (The same in\nPlut. Plac. i. 28, 4. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 36, p. 143.) Even \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7, he\ncontinues, is explained as a deity (or as Simpl. Phys. 74, b, has it as\na \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd); but this supposes it to be essentially\nidentical with \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7. Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 34, 8, p. 1050:\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b5\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f41\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f45\u03bb\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41\u03c4\u1ff3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f11\u03be\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03c9\u03bb\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u2019 \u1f14\u03be\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u1fb3 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f45\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f22\n\u03c3\u03c7\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 [\u1f22] \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Cleanthes, Hymn. (in Stob. Ecl.\ni. 30) v. 12, 18; M. Aurel. ii. 3. See p. 151, 1.\n\n[358] It has been already demonstrated that all these ideas pass into\none another.\n\n[359] Plut. Com. Not. 34, 5, p. 1076: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72, \u1f65\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f50\u03bb\u03ac\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Conf. Sto. Rep. 34, 2: \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u2019 \u1f14\u03c7\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f34\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f34\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9, \u03b5\u1f34\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 ... \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7\u03bd ... \u03bf\u1f50\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f50\u03bb\u03ac\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd. Ibid. 47, 4 and 8. Cleanth. Hymn. v. 15:\n\n \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c7\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\u1f76 \u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u03af\u03c7\u03b1, \u03b4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd,\n \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd\u1f76 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u1ff3,\n \u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u1f41\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03b1 \u1fe5\u03ad\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c6\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1fc3\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[360] See the quotations on p. 161, 1; 161, 2; 164, 2; 144, 1; 148;\n145, 2, from Diog. vii. 136; Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414; Cic. N. D. ii.\n10, 28; 22, 58; Sext. Math. ix. 101: M. Aurel. iv. 14: \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9, \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c6\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u1fc3 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd. Ibid. 21: \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u1f76 ... \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[361] See on p. 151, 1, the definition of deity from Stob.; Plut.\nAthenag.; M. Aurel. ix. 1: \u1f65\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd [\u1f21 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2] \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c6\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1,\n\u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Ibid. vi. 24: Alexander and his groom \u1f10\u03bb\u03ae\u03c6\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. Diog. vii. 148: \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be\n\u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Ibid. 157: \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u1f7c, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[362] As the primary fire or ether is called the seed of the world (p.\n161, 1), so, according to Chrysippus (in Diog. 159), the \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 in the\nseed of plants and animals is a \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd.\n\n[363] \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 is also used to express the seed or the egg\nitself. Thus, in Plut. Qu\u00e6st. Conviv. ii. 3, 3 and 4, it is defined as\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u1f74\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n[364] See p. 101, 2.\n\n[365] This is particularly manifest, not only in the history of the\nworld, but also in the doctrine of the constant change of the elements.\n\n[366] Heine, Stoicorum de Fato Doctrina (Naumb. 1859), p. 29.\n\n[367] Compare what the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8,\n7) and Stob. (Ecl. i. 180) observe on the derivations of \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7,\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, \u03a7\u03c1\u03b5\u1f7c\u03bd (Heine, p. 32, 1, suggests on the strength of\nTheodoret, Cur. Gr. Affect. vi. 11, p. 87, 4, who transcribes the\nquotation from Eusebius, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u03ce\u03bd. We ought rather to\nread, according to Theod. Gaisf., \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u1f7c\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ad\u03bf\u03c2), \u039c\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u039a\u03bb\u03c9\u03b8\u03ce: and the quotations p. 170, 1; 171, 1; also Ps. Arist. De Mundo,\nc. 7. The argument for Providence, drawn from the consensus gentium in\nSen. Benef. iv. 4, follows another tack.\n\n[368] Homeric passages, which he was in the habit of quoting in Eus.\nl.c. 8, 1.\n\n[369] See Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 76.\n\n[370] The two are generally taken together. Compare the quotations on\np. 145, 4.\n\n[371] See p. 83, 2; 110, 3; Aristotle and the Peripatetics thought\ndifferently. See Simpl. Cat. 103, \u03b2.\n\n[372] Cic. De Fato, 10, 20.\n\n[373] Alex. De Fato, p. 92, Orel.: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03c3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[374] Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 162; De Fato, 3, 5 (unfortunately the previous\nexposition is wanting); Diogenian (in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 1):\nChrysippus proves, by the existence of divination, that all things\nhappen \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd; for divination would be impossible, unless\nthings were foreordained. Alex. De Fato, c. 21, p. 96: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f51\u03bc\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03ce\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[375] Plut. De Fato, 11, p. 374: \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03bd [\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd] \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c0\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. Then come the considerations\nconfirmatory of that view\u2014divination, the wise man\u2019s acquiescence in\nthe course of the world, the maxim that every judgment is either true\nor false. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 139: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76, \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[376] Alex. De Fato, c. 22, p. 72: \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03ba \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[377] Alex. l.c. p. 70: \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f31\u03c1\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ca\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd; so that\neverything is connected as cause and effect, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3\n\u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u1f20\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03c0\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03c5, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6, \u1fa7 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u1ff3 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f30 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03ac\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. See Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125; De Fato, 4, 7; M. Aurel.\nx. 5.\n\n[378] In Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 164, the Stoic says: Nec vero universo\ngeneri hominum solum, sed etiam singulis a Diis immortalibus consuli et\nprovideri solet.\n\n[379] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 46: Singulis non adest [Jupiter], et tamen vim\net causam et manum omnibus dedit. Cic. N. D. 66, 167: Magna Dii curant,\nparva negligunt. Ibid. iii. 35, 86: At tamen minora Dii negligunt ...\nne in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant. Sic enim dicitis.\n\n[380] Cicero uses the following argument to show that the providential\ncare of God extends to individuals:\u2014If the Gods care for all men, they\nmust care for those in our hemisphere, and, consequently, for the\ncities in our hemisphere, and for the men in each city. The argument\nmay be superfluous, but it serves to show that the care of individuals\nwas the result of God\u2019s care of the whole world. M. Aurel. vi. 44: \u03b5\u1f30\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bc\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f40\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f76, \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf ... \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f10\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03b3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf, \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c0\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f40\u03c6\u03b5\u03af\u03bb\u03c9. Similarly, iv.\n28. It will be seen that the Stoics consider that the existence of\ndivination, which served as a proof of special providence, was caused\nby the connection of nature.\n\n[381] As Alex. c. 28, p. 88, fitly observes.\n\n[382] The great majority of the Stoic answers to \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\n\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac, which (according to Plut. De Fato, c. 3)\nwere called forth by the theory of destiny, in all probability belong\nto him.\n\n[383] See p. 171, 3, Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 23, 2, p. 1045. He\nassigned as a general reason \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03cd\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. Hence the Stoic definition of \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7 is \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff7 in Plut. De Fato. c. 7, p. 572; Plac. i.\n29, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 218); Alex. De Fato, p. 24; Simpl. Phys. 74, 6.\nSee p. 171, 1.\n\n[384] Alex. l.c. The Stoics assert that things are possible which do\nnot take place, if in themselves they can take place, and \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, \u1f10\u03be\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. Cic. Top. 15, 59: Ex hoc genere causarum ex \u00e6ternitate\npendentium fatum a Stoicis nectitur.\n\n[385] Alex. De Fato, c. 10, p. 32; Cic. De Fato, 17, 39); 18, 41, and\nabove, p. 115, 2. Hence Plut. Plac. (similarly Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 39,\np. 149): \u1f03 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f03 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f03 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f03 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f03 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, which is evidently\nmore explicit than the language used by Stob. Ecl. i. 176, and the\nstatement of Theodoret on p. 171, 1.\n\n[386] See p. 115, 2. Opponents such as Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 46, and\nAlex., pointed out how illusory this attempt was. According to the\nlatter, he fell back on the simple result, maintaining that, in the\ncase of things happening \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, there is nothing to prevent\nthe opposite from coming about, so far as the causes which prevent this\nfrom happening are unknown to us.\n\n[387] See above, p. 171, 3.\n\n[388] Chrysipp. in Gell. N. A. vii. 2, 6; Alex. De Fato, c. 36, p. 112.\n\n[389] Gell. l.c.; Alex. c. 13; Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 138, 140.\nAlex. c. 33 (on which see Heine, p. 43) gives a long argument,\nconcluding with the words: \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. Nemes. appeals to Chrysippus, and also to Philopator,\na Stoic of the second century A.D. Of him he remarks, that he has\nconsistently attributed \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd to lifeless objects.\n\n[390] Cic. De Fato, 18, 41: In order to avoid necessitas, or to uphold\nfate, Chrysippus distinguishes caus\u00e6 principales et perfect\u00e6 from caus\u00e6\nadjuvantes, his meaning being that everything happens according to\nfate, not causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adjuvantibus.\nConf. Cic. Top. 15, 59. Although these causes may not be in our power,\nstill it is our will which assents to the impressions received. \u0152nomaus\n(in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 3, and 10) charges Chrysippus with making a\n\u1f21\u03bc\u03af\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd of the will, because he laid so great a stress on its\nfreedom.\n\n[391] Gell. vii. 2, 13: Cic. l.c.\n\n[392] Alex. c. 34, p. 106, puts in the mouth of the Stoics: \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b6\u1ff4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9. \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd, \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[393] Alex. c. 26, p. 82.\n\n[394] Alex. c. 32, p. 102.\n\n[395] The arguments usual among the Stoics in after times may, with\ngreat probability, be referred to Chrysippus.\n\n[396] Alex. c. 35: \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f21 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u00b7 (It never happens that there is a \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 but not\na \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7) \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f36\u03c3\u03b1\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f36\u03c3\u03b1,\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba [\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72] \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bd\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f67\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f67\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\n\u1f21 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03b5\u1f30 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1, \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03c8\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f21 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd.\nWhat is praiseworthy deserves \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u1f74 or \u03b3\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, and what is\nblameworthy merits \u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 or \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[397] Alex. c. 37, p. 118: A second argument \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2\nis the following:\u2014\u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03ce\u03bb\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03bc\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03af\u00b7 (for\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, according to the definitions of Chrysippus, is the whole,\nincluding gods and men. See p. 158, 1) \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u03ad \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f76, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03af\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf, \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03b5\u1f30 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74, \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd.\n\n[398] Cic. De Fato, 12, 28; Diogenian. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 16);\nSen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37. Things which were determined by the co-operation\nof destiny alone Chrysippus called \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 (confatalia). The\nargument by which he was confuted, which Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 489,\nerroneously attributes to the Stoics themselves, went by the name of\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (ignava ratio). Besides the \u1f00\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, Plut. De Fato, c.\n11, p. 574, mentions the \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd and the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd as\nfallacies which could only be refuted on the ground of the freedom of\nthe will. The last-named one, perhaps, turned on the idea (\u0152nomaus, in\nEus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 12) that man might frustrate destiny if he\nneglected to do what was necessary to produce the foreordained results.\nAccording to Ammon. De Inter. 106, a, Lucian, Vit. Auct. 22, the\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd was as follows:\u2014Either you will reap or you will not reap: it\nis therefore incorrect to say, perhaps you will reap.\n\n[399] Sen. (after Cleanthes, whose verses in Epictet. Man. 52) Ep. 107,\n11: Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. Hippolyt. Refut. H\u00e6r. i.\n21, has put it very plainly: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b7\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03ce\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f40\u03c7\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd\n\u1f96 \u1f10\u03be\u03b7\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f15\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f15\u03bb\u03ba\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f15\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f11\u03ba\u1f7c\u03bd ... \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f15\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b4\u03ae\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. The same idea is\nexpanded by M. Aurel. vi. 42: All must work for the whole, \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03c6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f14\u03c7\u03c1\u1fc3\u03b6\u03b5\u03bd \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2. It is\nman\u2019s business to take care that he acts a dignified part in the common\nlabour.\n\n[400] After all that has been said, this needs no further confirmation.\nConversely, the unity of the forming power is concluded from the unity\nof the world. See p. 143, 1, 2. Conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 29, p. 425. M.\nAurel. vi. 38: \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03ad\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03b1\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af ... \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c0\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f15\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. Ibid. vii. 9.\n\n[401] Sext. Math. ix. 78: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03ba \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd ... \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u1f24\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f21\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f22 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f22 \u1f10\u03ba \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03ba \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03ba\u03bd\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03be\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b8\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b8\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f54\u03be\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bc\u03c0\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2 (ebb and flood), \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. In\nthe same way, atmospheric changes coincide with the setting and rising\nof the stars: \u1f10\u03be \u1f67\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u1f72\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f21\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. Diog. vii. 140: \u1f10\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f21\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c0\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. Ibid. 143: \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f37\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2. Alex. De Mixt.\n142, a, see p. 127, 5; Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19; Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 2:\n\u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c3\u03bf\u03b9, \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7, \u1f21\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1; \u0394\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6, \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7\u00b7 \u03c4\u03af \u03b4\u03ad; \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c3\u03bf\u03b9; \u0394\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6, \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7. Cicero mentions the\nchanges in animals and plants corresponding with the changes of\nseasons, the phases of the moon, and the greater or less nearness of\nthe sun. M. Aurel. iv. 40. From all these passages we gather what the\nquestion really was. It was not only whether other worlds were\npossible, besides the one which we know from observation, but whether\nthe heavenly bodies visible were in any essential way connected with\nthe earth, so as to form an organic whole (\u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd, Diog. vii. 143).\n\nThe Stoic conception of \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 was not used to denote the magic\nconnection which it expresses in ordinary parlance, but the natural\ncoincidence between phenomena belonging to the different parts of the\nworld, the consensus, concentus, cognatio, conjunctio, or continuatio\nnatur\u00e6 (Cic. N. D. iii. 11, 28; Divin. ii. 15, 34; 69, 142). In this\nsense, M. Aurel. ix. 9, observes that like is attracted by like; fire\nis attracted upwards, earth downwards; beasts and men seek out each\nother\u2019s society; even amongst the highest existences, the stars, there\nexists a \u1f15\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, a \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9. Even the last\nremark does not go beyond the conception of a natural connection;\nnevertheless, it paves the way for the later Neoplatonic idea of\nsympathy, as no longer a physical connection, but as an influence felt\nat a distance by virtue of a connection of soul.\n\n[402] M. Aurel. vi. 1: \u1f21 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 (the matter of the world)\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b8\u1f74\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03ae\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6,\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b2\u03bb\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5. \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[403] Diog. 149: \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 [\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd] \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[404] Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 3, p. 1044: \u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u1f7c\u03bd [\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2] \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 ...\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd ... \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f70\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u00b7 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u2019 \u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f14\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03ad\u03c1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c4\u03b1\u03ce. Conf. the Stoic in Cic. Fin. ii. 5, 18: Jam membrorum ... alia\nvidentur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata ... alia autem nullam\nob utilitatem, quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plum\u00e6\nversicolores columbis, viris mamm\u00e6 atque barba.\n\n[405] M. Aurel. iii. 2: It is there proved by examples, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f54\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f78\u03bd ...\n\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[406] Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 85; Sen. Ep. 113, 16. The latter includes this\nvariety of natural objects among the facts, which must fill us with\nadmiration for the divine artificer.\n\n[407] Plut. Plac. i. 6, 2: \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03c7\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ad\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03c2; the world has the most perfect form, that of a globe, with a\nsky the most perfect in colour, &c.\n\n[408] See the passages quoted p. 145, 4, particularly Cic. N. D. ii.\n32.\n\n[409] Plut. (in Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 32): \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf \u03bd\u1f74 \u0394\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u1f26\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf, \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f35\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bd\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\nCic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Scite enim Chrysippus: ut clypei causa\ninvolucrum, vaginam autem gladii, sic pr\u00e6ter mundum cetera omnia\naliorum causa esse generata, ut eas fruges et fructus, quas terra\ngignit, animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut equum vehendi\ncausa, arandi bovem, venandi et custodiendi canem. Id. Off. i. 7, 22:\nPlacet Stoicis, qu\u00e6 in terris gignantur ad usum hominum omnia creari.\n\n[410] Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67: Pr\u00e6clare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse\nhominum causa et Deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis su\u00e6. N.\nD. ii. 53, 133, in describing the Stoic teaching: Why has the universe\nbeen made? Not for the sake of plants or animals, but for the sake of\nrational beings, Gods and men. It is then shown (c. 54\u201361), by an\nappeal to the structure of man\u2019s body, and his mental qualities, how\nGod has provided for the wants of man; and the argument concludes with\nthe words, Omnia, qu\u00e6 sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines,\nhominum causa facta esse et parata. Just as a city, and what is\ntherein, exists for the use of the inhabitants, so the world is\nintended for the use of Gods and men. Even the stars quanquam etiam ad\nmundi coh\u00e6rentiam pertinent, tamen et spectaculum hominibus pr\u00e6bent.\nThe earth with its plants and animals was created for the service of\nman. In Orig. c. Cels. iv. 74, p. 559, the Stoics assert that\nProvidence created all things for the sake of rational beings; M.\nAurel. v. 16 and 30; Gell. vii. 1, 1. Hence the definition of \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2\nquoted on p. 158, 1.\n\n[411] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 32, 1, p. 1049) shows how useful\nfowls are; the horse is intended for riding, the ox for ploughing, the\ndog for hunting. The pig, Cleanthes thought (Clemens, Strom. vii. 718,\nB), was made to sustain man, and endowed with a soul, in place of salt,\nto prevent its corrupting (Cic. N. D. ii, 64, 160; Fin. v. 13, 38;\nPlut. Qu. Conviv. v. 10, 3 and 6, p. 685; Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 20);\noysters and birds for the same purpose also (Porphyr. l.c.). In the\nsame way, he spoke of the value of mice and bugs, see p. 189, 1. The\nStoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 63, 158, following in the same track, declares\nthat sheep only exist for the purpose of clothing, dogs for guarding\nand helping man, fishes for eating, and birds of prey for divers uses.\nEpictet. Diss. ii. 8, 7, in the same spirit, speaks of asses being\nintended to carry burdens; for this purpose they must be able to walk,\nand, in order to walk, must possess the power of imagination.\n\n[412] See p. 186, 1.\n\n[413] Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum\ncontemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo perfectus, sed est qu\u00e6dam\nparticula perfecti. Sed mundus quoniam omnia complexus est, nec est\nquidquam, quod non insit in eo, perfectus undique est.\n\n[414] We gather this from the comparatively full accounts of the Stoic\ntheory of the moral government of the world. Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 1, p.\n1051, says that Chrysippus wrote several treatises \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3.\n\n[415] See p. 187, 2, and Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6): \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. Compare also the statement in Plut.\nSolert. An. c. 2, 9, p. 960, that animals must be irrational, because\nthe irrational must be contrasted with the rational.\n\n[416] Gell. vii. [vi.] 1, 7: Chrysippus in his treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2,\ndiscussed, amongst other things, the question, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03bd\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale natur\u00e6\nconsilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios ... sed cum multa inquit\natque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque\nsimul agnata sunt incommoda iis ipsis, qu\u00e6 faciebat coh\u00e6rentia: eaque\nnon per naturam sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod\nipse appellat \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.... Proinde morbi quoque et\n\u00e6gritudines part\u00e6 sunt dum salus paritur. M. Aurel. vi. 36: All evils\nare \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd. Plut. An. Procr. c. 6 and 9, p.\n1015: \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 (the Stoics) \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd ... \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 3, 1.\n\n[417] Sen. Nat. Qu. v. 18, 4 and 13: Non ideo non sunt ista natura\nbona, si vitio male utentium nocent.... Si beneficia natur\u00e6 utentium\npravitate perpendimus, nihil non nostro malo accepimus.\n\n[418] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 4) remarks that bugs do us\ngood service by preventing us from sleeping too long, and mice warn us\nnot to leave things about. He also observes (Ibid. 32, 2) that wars are\nas useful as colonies, by preventing over-population. See the\nquotations, p. 185, 4; 186, 2. M. Aurel. viii. 50, makes a similar\nremark in regard to weeds. In the house of nature all the waste has its\nuses.\n\n[419] A circumstance which Plut. Com. Not. 19, p. 1067, dexterously\nuses against the Stoics.\n\n[420] Cleanthes, Hymn. v. 17 (see p. 171, 3); Plut. Sto. Rep. 33, 2:\nChrysippus affirms, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, law is innocent of crime, God of impiety. Id. (in Gell.\nvii. 2, 7): Quanquam ita sit, ut ratione quadam necessaria et\nprincipali coacta atque connexa sint fato omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa\nmentium nostrarum perinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est\nipsa et qualitas ... sua s\u00e6vitate et voluntario impetu in assidua\ndelicta, et in errores se ruunt. Hence Cleanthes continues, in a\npassage quoted in Greek by Gellius: \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b2\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03bb\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. In Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 13, p. 1057,\nChrysippus says that, even if the Gods make false representations to\nman, it is man\u2019s fault if he follows those representations. Conf.\nEpictet. Ench. c. 27: \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (evil in itself) \u1f10\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Id. Diss. i. 6, 40.\nSuch observations bear out in some degree the statement of Plut. Plac.\nii. 27, 3, that, according to the Stoics, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03ac\u03c1\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c1\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. See above, p. 179, 3, 4.\n\n[421] Chrysippus felt this. Hence he says (in Gell.): It has been also\ndecreed by destiny that the bad should do wrong.\n\n[422] Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 36, 1: \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f06\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u2019 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. Id. (in Gell. vii. 1, 10): As\ndiseases spring from human nature, sic hercle inquit dum virtus\nhominibus per consilium natur\u00e6 gignitur vitia ibidem per affinitatem\ncontrariam nata sunt.\n\n[423] Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 3 (C. Not. 13, 2): \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ae \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 [\u1f21 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1] \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03c9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u1f00\u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f45\u03bb\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f02\u03bd \u03c4\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f26\u03bd. C. Not. 14, 1: As\nin a comedy, what is absurd contributes to the effect of the whole,\n\u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c8\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u1f04\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd. Similarly M. Aurel. vi. 42. Gell. viii. 1, 2:\n(Chrysippus) nihil est prorsus istis, inquit, insubidius, qui\nopinantur, bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala: nam cum bona\nmalis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter se et quasi\nmutuo adverso qu\u00e6que fulta nixu (Heraclitus\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03be\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd)\nconsistere: nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero. Without\ninjustice, cowardice, &c., we could not know what justice and valour\nare. If there were no evil, \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 as \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd would\nbe impossible (Plut. C. Not. 16, 2, p. 1066).\n\n[424] Cleanthes, Hymn. 18:\n\n \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c3\u1f7a \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c3\u1f70 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c3\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u00b7\n \u1f67\u03b4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f13\u03bd \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03b8\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n \u1f65\u03c3\u03b8\u2019 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1.\n\n[425] Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 1: \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd ... \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cd\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd ... [\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f70] \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f24\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03ac\u03bd \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f45\u03bb\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. Id. 15, 2: \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f45\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. At the beginning of the same chapter,\nthe ordinary views of divine punishment had been treated with ridicule.\nConf. Qu\u00e6st. Rom. 51, p. 277.\n\n[426] Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2) in answer to the\nquestion, How the misfortune of the virtuous is to be explained, says:\n\u03c0\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03af\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f56 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f22 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b1\u1fe6\u03bb\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9; Similarly the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 66: Magna Dii\ncurant, parva negligunt,\u2014hardly satisfactory explanations for any\ntheory of necessity. It is still more unsatisfactory to hear Seneca\n(Benef. iv. 32) justifying the unmerited good fortune of the wicked as\ndue to the nobility of their ancestors. The reason assigned by\nChrysippus (in Plut.)\u2014\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u1fd6\u03c7\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u2014does not quite\nharmonise with Plut. C. Not. 34, 2: \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f25 \u03b3\u03b5 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03c7\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c7\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03bd. Just as little does\nSeneca\u2019s\u2014Non potest artifex mutare materiam (De Prov. 5, 9)\u2014agree with\nhis lavish encomia on the arrangement and perfection of the world. For,\naccording to the Stoics, matter is ultimately identical with reason and\ndeity. These contradictions do not, however, justify the doubt\nexpressed by Heine, Stoic. de Fato Doct. 46, that Seneca is here not\nspeaking as a Stoic. For Chrysippus says very much the same thing. See\np. 190, 1, 2.\n\n[427] M. Aurel. ix. 16: \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03b6\u1ff4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9,\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3.\n\n[428] M. Aurel. viii. 35: \u1f43\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b7 [\u1f21 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2] \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b2\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03ba\u03ce\u03bb\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f45\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\n\u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f65\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd.\n\n[429] Seneca\u2019s treatise, De Providentia, is occupied with expanding\nthis thought. In it, the arguments by which the outward misfortunes of\ngood men are harmonised with the divine government of the world are:\n(1) The wise man cannot really meet with misfortune: he cannot receive\nat the hands of fortune what he does not, on moral grounds, assign to\nhimself (c. 2, 6). (2) Misfortune, therefore, is an unlooked-for\nexercise of his powers, a divine instrument of training; a hero in\nconflict with fortune is a spectaculum Deo dignum (c. 1, 2\u20134. Conf. Ep.\n85, 39). (3) The misfortunes of the righteous show that external\nconditions are neither a good nor an evil (c. 5). (4) Everything is a\nnatural consequence of natural causes (c. 5). Similar explanations in\nEpictet. Diss. iii. 17; i. 6, 37; i. 24, 1; Stob. Ed. i. 132; M. Aurel.\niv. 49: vii. 68 and 64; x. 33.\n\n[430] Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2, col. 8, Vol. Herc. vi. 53:\n\u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 [\u03b8\u03b5\u1ff7] \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b9\u03ad\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03cd\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c6\u03ac\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\n(what is suitable) \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[431] See above, p. 126; 101, 2; Diog. 135. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 410.\n\n[432] In Diog. 150, there is no difference made between Apollodorus and\nChrysippus. Stob. Ecl. i. 344; Plut. C. Not. 38, 3, p. 1079; Sext.\nMath. x. 142. Similarly Aristotle.\n\n[433] Plut. Plac. i. 9, 2: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1fe5\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd. Diog. 150. Sen. Nat. Qu.\niii. 101, 3: Fiunt omnia ex omnibus, ex aqua a\u00ebr, ex a\u00ebre aqua, ignis\nex a\u00ebre, ex igne a\u00ebr ... ex aqua terra fit, cur non aqua fiat e terra?\n... omnium elementorum in alternum recursus sunt. Similarly Epictet. in\nStob. Floril. 108, 60. Conf. p. 101, 2; 198, 3. This is borrowed not\nonly from Heraclitus, but also from Aristotle.\n\n[434] They only called the first kind \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Aristotle understood by\n\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 every form of change.\n\n[435] Stob. Ecl. i. 404, 408, gives definitions of \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, of \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac,\nand of \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae, taken from Chrysippus and Apollodorus. Simpl. Categ. 110,\n\u03b2 (Schol. in Arist. 92, 6, 30. Respecting the kinds of \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae see the\nextracts from Posidonius on p. 101, 2) distinguishes between \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u1f20\u03c1\u03b5\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u1f21\u03c3\u03c5\u03c7\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, but this is rather a matter of language.\nSimpl. Cat. 78, \u03b2, relates that the Stoics differed from the\nPeripatetics in explaining Motion as an incomplete energy, and\ndiscusses their assertion that \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 is a wider, \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd a narrower,\nidea.\n\n[436] Simpl. Phys. 310, b: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd, \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f51\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd.\n\n[437] Simpl. Categ. 78, \u03b2 (Schol. 78, a, 23): Plotinus and others\nintroduce into the Aristotelian doctrine the Stoic view: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[438] Simpl. l.c. 77, \u03b2; Schol. 77, b, 33. Simplicius himself\ncontradicts this statement. It had, however, been already advanced by\nAristotle.\n\n[439] Simpl. l.c. 78, \u03b2 (Schol. 78, a, 28): The Stoics who, according\nto p. 84, \u03b5, Schol. 79, a, 16, very fully discussed the categories,\nmade the following \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd: \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03bc\u03ac\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b1\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bc\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u1fc6\u03c2\u2014\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f31 \u1f30\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9; for instance, the seed, in developing into a plant\u2014\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c6\u2019\n\u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, or \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, one species of which is \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2\u2014\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. It is, in short, the\napplication to a particular case of the distinction which will be\nsubsequently met with of \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74, and \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae. The\ncelebrated grammatical distinction of \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f70 and \u1f55\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1 mentioned p. 95, 3\nis connected with the distinction between \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd and \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Conf.\nSimpl. p. 79, \u03b1, \u03b6; Schol. 78, b, 17 and 30.\n\n[440] See page 135.\n\n[441] Stob. Ecl. i. 382: \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03be\u03c9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd (conf. Themist. Phys. 40, b;\nPlut. Plac. i. 18, 4; ibid. c. 20, beginning \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2).\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03ba \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd (Plut. adds, like a half-empty vessel). Stob. i. 390:\nChrysippus defined \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 = \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd. If, however, only one portion of the \u03bf\u1f37\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78\n\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 is really filled, the whole is neither \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd nor \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, but\n\u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f60\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, which may possibly be called \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1. Hence\n\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 corresponds to a full, \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd to an empty, \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1 to a half-empty,\nvessel. Sext. Math. x. 3, Pyrrh. iii. 124, speaks to the same effect.\nCleomed. Meteor. p. 2, 4; Simpl. Categ. 91, \u03b4. According to the Stoics,\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c5\u03c6\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03b4\u03b5, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 [-\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9] \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[442] The Stoic idea of space is so understood by Themist. Phys. 38, b;\nSimpl. Phys. 133, a.\n\n[443] See previous note and in Diog. 140 (where, however, instead of\n\u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72, we should read \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72) definitions of \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[444] Stob. Ecl. i. 392, quoting Chrysippus.\n\n[445] See p. 131, 2.\n\n[446] Simpl. Categ. 88, \u03b6. Schol. 80, a, 6: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03b5 (conf. Plut. Plat. Qu\u00e6st.\nviii. 4, 3) \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. Conf. Ibid.\n89, \u03b1, \u03b2; Simpl. Phys. 165, a. More full is Stob. Ecl. i. 260: \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f45 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03ac\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9. The passages quoted by Stob. Ibid. 250 (Plut. Plac. i. 22, 2),\n254, 256, 258, and Diog. 141, from Zeno, Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and\nPosidonius, are in agreement with this. In the same places occur\nseveral other observations on Time, which are, however, of no\nimportance, such as that Time as a whole, and likewise the past and the\nfuture, are unlimited, the present is limited; the present cannot be\naccurately determined, it is the boundary between the past and the\nfuture (Archedemus in Plut. C. Not. 38, 6, p. 1081), lying partly in\nthe one, partly in the other (Chrysippus, ibid. 38, 8).\n\n[447] Sext. Math. x. 142; Plut. Com. Not. 41, p. 1081; Stob. i. 260.\n\n[448] For the conception of \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, which is also that of Aristotle\n(Metaph. i. 3, 938, b, 8), and its difference from that of \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74, see\nDiog. 134; 136. The difference, however, is not always observed.\nChrysippus (in Stob. Ecl. i. 312) distinguishes three meanings of\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd. In one sense, it is fire; in another, the four elements; in\nthe third, any material out of which something is made.\n\n[449] Lassalle, Heraclitus, ii. 84.\n\n[450] See p. 161. As is there stated, primary fire first goes over into\nwater \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 (i.e. after first going over into air, not passing\nthrough air as an already existing medium, as Lassalle, Heracl. ii. 86,\ninaccurately says), and water goes over into the three other elements.\nIn this process there is, however, a difficulty. Fire is said to derive\nits origin from water, and yet a portion of primary fire must have\nexisted from the beginning, as the soul of the world. Nor is it correct\nto say, that actual fire is never obtained from water in the formation\nof the upper elements (as Lassalle, p. 88, does).\n\n[451] Chrysippus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 312: \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1, \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f55\u03b4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd, \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03c5\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c7\u03b5\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c7\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1, \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03be \u1f55\u03b4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1, \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03b7 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c7\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1. On account of this constant change, primary matter is called\n(Ibid. 316, where, however, the text is obviously corrupt, and\ntherefore only partially intelligible) \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 ... \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03af\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 [\u1f10\u03be] \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03b4\u1ff7. Epictet. in Stob. Floril. 108, 60: Not\nonly mankind and animals are undergoing perpetual changes, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u1f74 \u0394\u03af\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1fc6 \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 \u1f00\u1f74\u03c1, \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9. On the\nflux of things, see also M. Aurel. ii. 3; vii. 19; ix. 19; 28. Cic. N.\nD. ii. 33, 84: Et cum quatuor sint genera corporum, vicissitudine eorum\nmundi continuata (= \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u03ae\u03c2; conf. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 2, 2, continuatio\nest partium inter se non intermissa conjunctio) natura est. Nam ex\nterra aqua, ex aqua oritur a\u00ebr, ex a\u00ebre \u00e6ther: deinde retrorsum\nvicissim ex \u00e6there a\u00ebr, ex a\u00ebre aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sic naturis\nhis, ex quibus omnia constant, sursum deorsum, ultro citroque\ncommeantibus, mundi partium conjunctio continetur. See p. 194, 3.\n\n[452] Diog. 137: \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03b3\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd,\n\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03be\u03b7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd. Plut. Sto. Rep. 43, 1, p.\n1053. The air is, according to Chrysippus, \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b6\u03bf\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 and \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2. Id. De Primo Frig. 9, 1; 17, 1, p. 948, 952; Galen, Simpl.\nMedic. ii. 20, vol. xi. 510. Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10; i. 4: A\u00ebr ...\nfrigidus per se et obscurus ... natura enim a\u00ebris gelida est. Conf.\nCic. N. D. ii. 10, 26. Of the four properties by the pairing of which\nelements arise, even Aristotle had attributed one to each element as\nits distinguishing feature, assigning cold to water, moisture to air.\n\n[453] Thus the upper portion of the air, owing to its proximity to the\nregion of fire and the stars (Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10), is the warmest,\nthe driest, and the rarest; but yet, owing to the evaporation of the\nearth and the radiation of heat, warmer than the middle, which in point\nof dryness and density is between the two, but exceeds both in cold.\nSee p. 146, 4.\n\n[454] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 314: \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u03ac. Thus Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, E,\nwho is clearly following the Stoics, distinguishes three kinds of fire:\n\u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03b1\u03be, \u03c6\u03bb\u1f78\u03be, \u03b1\u1f50\u03b3\u03ae. He seems, however, only to refer to terrestrial\nfire, which, after all, forms only one small portion of fire.\n\n[455] Pp. 128, 2; 148, 2; 151, 1; 163, 2.\n\n[456] This statement must be taken with such modification as the unity\nof the world renders necessary. If the upper elements were to move\naltogether away from the centre, the world would go to pieces. Hence\nthe meaning can only be this: that the difference of natural motions\ncan only take place within the enclosure holding the elements together,\nand so far a natural motion towards the centre can be attributed to all\nbodies as a distinctive feature, anterior to the contrast between\nheaviness and lightness. Conf. Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6, p.\n1054: The striving of all the parts of the world is to keep together,\nnot to go asunder. \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c7\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2,\n\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03bf\u1f51\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Achill. Tat. Isag. 132, A: The Stoics\nmaintain that the world continues in empty space, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03bd\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5. The same reason is assigned by Cleomedes,\nMeteor. p. 5.\n\n[457] Stob. Ecl. i. 346 (Plut. Pl. i. 12, 4). Zeno, Ibid. 406: \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b2\u03ac\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f00\u03b2\u03b1\u03c1\u1fc6 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 ... \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03ce\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b2\u03ac\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. Plut. Sto. Rep.\n42, p. 1053: In the treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, Chrysippus calls fire\n\u1f00\u03b2\u03b1\u03c1\u1f72\u03c2 and \u1f00\u03bd\u03c9\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u1f72\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f55\u03b4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03b3\u1fc7 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bd\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03af. (So too in Ach. Tat.\nIsag. i. 4 in Pet. Doctr. Temp. iii. 75.) On the other hand, in his\n\u03a6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, he inclines to the view that air in itself is neither\nheavy nor light, which however can only mean that it is neither\nabsolutely, being heavy compared with fire, and light compared with\nwater and earth.\n\n[458] Diog. 137: \u1f00\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f43 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f10\u03bd\n\u1fa7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b5\u1f36\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd.\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u2019 \u1f23\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1, \u03b5\u1f36\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1, \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd, \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b7\u03bd\n\u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd. Ibid. 156; see p. 202, 3. To these main masses, all\nother smaller masses of the same element in different parts of the\nworld are attracted, because all seek to reach their natural place.\nConf. M. Aurel. ix. 9.\n\n[459] Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, 2 (totum hoc c\u0153lum, quod igneus \u00e6ther,\nmundi summa pars, claudit), and p. 198, 3, where the same thing is\ncalled \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 by Stob\u00e6us, \u00e6ther by Cicero. See p. 146, 4. The same thing\nis meant by Zeno, where he says (Stob. Ecl. i. 538, 554, and Cleanthes\nsays the same in Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40. Ach. Tat. Isag. 133, C) that\nthe stars are made of fire; not, however, of \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f04\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, but of \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, which appears in plants as \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, in animals as \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae. See p.\n201, 5.\n\n[460] In Ach. Tat. Isag. 130, A, he defines \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 as \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f14\u03c3\u03c7\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f10\u03be \u03bf\u1f57 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u1fa7 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2. Similarly Diog. 138;\nCleomed. Met. p. 7. Otherwise the term is used in a wider sense.\n\n[461] See p. 146, 4.\n\n[462] Stob. i. 346: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. See p. 202, 3. It is only of terrestrial fire that\nZeno can (Stob. Ecl. i. 356) say, it moves in a straight line.\nCleanthes even attributed to the stars the spherical shape, which on\nthe strength of this passage he attributes to it. See Plut. Plac. ii.\n14, 2; Stob. i. 516; Ach. Tat. Isag. 133, B.\n\n[463] They denied it, according to Orig. c. Cels. iv. 56. Cic. Acad. i.\n11, 39, says: Zeno dispensed with a quinta natura, being satisfied with\nfour elements: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, qu\u00e6 qu\u00e6que\ngigneret, et mentem atque sensus.\n\n[464] The spherical shape of the earth is a matter of course, and is\nmentioned by Ach. Tat. Isag. 126, C; Plut. Plac. iii. 10, 1; 9, 3.\nCleom. Met. p. 40, gives an elaborate proof of it, for the most part\ntaken from Posidonius.\n\n[465] Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 36, and Diog. 145, also affirm that the\nearth is in the centre, unmoved. The reason for this fact is stated by\nStob. i. 408, to be its weight. Further proofs in Cleomed. Met. p. 47.\n\n[466] Stob. Ecl. i. 446: \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 ... \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f76 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1, \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f51\u03b3\u03c1\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1. The earth is the natural\nframework, and, as it were, the skeleton of the world. Around it water\nhas been poured, out of which the more exalted spots project as\nislands. For what is called continent is also an island: \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u1f55\u03b4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f10\u03be\u1fc6\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03c4\u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03cd\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f10\u03ba \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. It moves in circular form round the world. Then\nfollows what is given in the text as to the stars, next to which comes\nthe stratum of air, then that of water, and lastly, in the centre, the\nearth. Conf. Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, B, see p. 200, 3. The language of\nCleomed. Met. c. 3, p. 6, is somewhat divergent. He places the sun\namongst the planets, between Mars and Venus. That Archedemus also\nrefused to allow the earth a place in the centre has been already\nstated, p. 147, 2. The language of Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 7, 131, B, is\nambiguous: As the circumference originates from the centre, so\naccording to the Stoics the outer circle originates from the earth;\nwhen compared with the quotations on p. 161, 2; 162, 1.\n\n[467] Stob. i. 356; Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1; i. 6, 3; Diog. 140; Cleomed.\nMet. pp. 39 and 46; Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 46. Ibid. on the\nperfection of this form and its adaptation for motion. Comparing Achil.\nTat. Isag. 130, C, Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1 (Galen. Hist. Phil. c. 11),\nwith the passages on p. 201, note 4, it appears probable that Cleanthes\nbelieved in a spherical form of the earth. According to Ach. Tat. Isag.\n152, A, who probably has the Stoics in view, the axis of the world\nconsists of a current of air passing through the centre. On the\ndivision of the heaven into five parallel circles, and that of the\nearth into five zones, conf. Diog. 155; Strabo, ii. 2, 3, p. 95.\n\n[468] Stob. i. 392; Simpl. Phys. iii. 6; Diog. 143 and 150.\n\n[469] Diog. 140; Stob. i. 382; Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4; Sext. Math. vii.\n214; Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Aff. iv. 14, p. 58; Hippolyt. Refut. H\u00e6r. i.\n21. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 7, observes that motion is possible by means of\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, without supposing the existence of empty space. A\nnumber of arguments against the existence of empty space may be found\nin Cleomed. Met. p. 4.\n\n[470] See p. 168, 1; Cleomed. Met. 2 and 5.\n\n[471] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 392: The Empty and the Non-Material is\nunlimited. \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2,\n\u03bf\u1f37\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd. The Empty could only be bounded by being filled. To\nthe same effect, Cleomed. p. 6. On the unlimited beyond the world, see\nDiog. 140 and 143; Stob. i. 260 and 382; Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 1, p.\n1054; C. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073; Plac. i. 18, 4; ii. 9, 2; Theodoret, l.c.\nand p. 196, 2. That Posidonius denied the infinity of the Empty has\nbeen already stated, p. 168, 1. Chrysippus, in affirming that the world\noccupies the centre of space, was therefore contradicting himself, as\nPlut. Def. Or. 28, p. 425, Sto. Rep. 44, 2, observes.\n\n[472] Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, A; 132, A, see p. 200, 1; Stob. i. 408.\nAccording to Stob. i. 442, Plut. C. Not. 30, 2 and 10, p. 1073, Plac.\nii. 1, 6; i. 5, 1, Diog. 143, Sext. Math. ix. 332, Ach. Tat. 129, D,\nthe Stoics had various names for the world, according as the Empty was\nincluded or excluded in the conception. Including the Empty, it is\ncalled \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd; without it, \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f45\u03bb\u03b1, frequently occurs\nwith the Stoics). The \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd, it was said, is neither material nor\nimmaterial, since it consists of both. Plut. C. Not. l.c.\n\n[473] Diog. 145; Plut. Plac. ii. 14, 1; 22, 3; 27, 1; Stob. i. 516;\n540; 554; Ach. Tat. 133, D. Compare the reference to Cleanthes on p.\n201, 4, with which, however, the statement in Stob. i. 554, that he\nconsidered the moon \u03c0\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1f74\u03c2 (ball-like\u2014the MSS. have \u03c0\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1fc6) does\nnot agree.\n\n[474] According to Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40, Diog. 144, Stob. Ecl. i. 314;\n519; 538; 554; 565, Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 1; 21, 13, p. 921, 935, Plac.\nii. 25, 3; 30, 3, Galen, Hist. Phil. 15, Philo, De Somn. 587, B, Achil.\nTat. Isag. 124, D; 133, C, and above p. 200, 3; 162, 2, the stars\ngenerally consist of fire, or, more accurately, of \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, or\nEther. The purest fire is in the sun. The moon is a compound of dull\nfire and air, or, as it is said, is more earth-like, since (as Plin.\nHist. Nat. ii. 9, 46, without doubt after Stoic teaching, observes)\nowing to its proximity to the earth, it takes up earthy particles in\nvapour. Perhaps it was owing to this fact that it was said to receive\nits light from the sun (Diog. 145), which, according to Posidonius in\nPlut. Fac. Lun. 16, 12, p. 929, Cleomed. Met. p. 106, not only\nilluminates its surface, but penetrates some depth. Cleomed. 100,\nbelieves that, besides the light of the sun, it has also a light of its\nown.\n\n[475] Diog. 145; Stob. i. 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut. De Is.\n41, p. 367; Sto. Rep. 39, 1; Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 2, 4; Plac. ii. 17, 2;\n20, 3; 23, 5; Galen, Hist. Phil. 14; Porphyr. Antr. Nymph, c. 11; Cic.\nN. D. iii. 14, 37; ii. 15, 40; 46, 118; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16. 2;\nHeraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 36, p. 74 and 56, p. 117; most of whom affirm\nthat the sun is sustained by vapours from the sea, the moon by those of\nfresh water, and the other stars by vapours from the earth. The stars\nare also said to owe their origin to such vapours. Chrysippus, in Plut.\nSto. Rep. 41, 3, adds to the passage quoted p. 161, 2: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f21\u03bb\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Plut. Ibid. 2: \u1f14\u03bc\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f25\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2. Id. C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084: \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f25\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03bc\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f51\u03b3\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[476] Stob. i. 532; Cic. l.c.; Macrob. Sat. i. 23, quoting Cleanthes\nand Macrobius; Plut. Plac. ii. 23, 5. Diogenes of Apollonia had already\nexpressed similar views. Further particulars as to the courses of the\nstars without anything very peculiar in Stob. i. 448; 538; Plut. Pl.\nii. 15, 2; 16, 1; Diog. 144; Cleomed. Meteor. i. 3. Eclipses are also\ndiscussed by Diog. 145; Stob. i. 538; 560; Plut. Fac. Lun. 19, 12, p.\n932; Plac. ii. 29, 5; Cleomed. pp. 106 and 115, nor is there anything\nremarkable. Quite in the ordinary way are some observations of\nPosidonius and Chrysippus given in Stob. i. 518; Achil Tat. Isag. 132,\nB; 165, C. The information\u2014quoted from Posidonius by Cleomed. Meteor.\n51; Procl. in Tim. 277, E; Strabo, ii. 5, 14, p. 119\u2014respecting\nobservations of Canobus have no bearing on our present enquiry.\n\n[477] Stob. i. 554 (Plut. Pl. ii. 26, 1). This statement, however,\nappears only to be true of the sun, to which, indeed, it is confined by\nDiog. 144. That the sun is much larger than the earth, Posidonius\nproved; not only because its light extends over the whole heaven, but\nalso because of the spherical form of the earth\u2019s shadow in eclipses of\nthe moon. Diog. l.c.; Macrob. Somn. i. 20; Heracl. Alleg. Hom. c. 46;\nCleomed. Met. ii. 2. According to Cleomed. p. 79, he allowed to it an\norbit 10,000 times as large as the circumference of the earth, with a\ndiameter of four million stadia. The Stoic, in Cic. N. D. ii. 40, 103,\nonly calls the moon half that size; and Cleomed. p. 97, probably\nfollowing Posidonius, calls it considerably smaller than the earth. The\nother stars, according to Cleomed. p. 96, are some of them as large as,\nand others larger than, the sun. Posidonius, according to Plin. Hist.\nN. ii. 23, 85, estimated the moon\u2019s distance from the earth at two\nmillion, and the sun\u2019s distance from the moon at 500 million stadia. He\nestimated the earth\u2019s circumference at 240,000, according to Cleomed.;\nat 180,000 according to Strabo, ii. 2, 2, p. 95.\n\n[478] Conf. Stob. i. 66; 441; 518; 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut.\nSto. Rep 39, 1; 41, 2; C. Not. 46, 2; Plac. ii. 20, 3; Diog. 145;\nPh\u00e6dr. Nat. De. (Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2) Col. 3; Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36\nand 50; ii. 15, 39 and 42; 16, 43; 21, 54; Acad. ii. 37, 110; Porphyr.\nl.c.; Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 13, p. 134, A. Hence, in several of these\npassages, the sun is called after Cleanthes and Chrysippus a \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f04\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1 (or \u1f14\u03be\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1) \u1f10\u03ba \u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2.\n\n[479] Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, discusses the point at length. See also the\nquotations on p. 144, 1, from Cic. N. D. ii. 9, and on p. 151, 1, from\nDiog. 147.\n\n[480] Diog. vii. 152 and 138, mentions a treatise of his, called\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 or \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2; also, vii. 135, a treatise\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03ce\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd, in several books. Alexander, in Simpl. Phys. 64, 6,\nspeaks of an \u1f10\u03be\u03ae\u03b3\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, which, judging by the title, may\nbe a commentary on Aristotle\u2019s meteorology. Geminus had made an extract\nfrom this book, a long portion of which on the relation of astronomy\nand natural science is there given. Whether these various titles really\nbelong to these different treatises is not clear. Posidonius is\nprobably the author of most of the later statements about the Stoic\nmeteorology. He appears also to be the chief authority for Seneca\u2019s\nNaturales Qu\u00e6stiones, in which he is frequently named (i. 5, 10; 13;\nii. 26, 4; 54, 1; iv. 3, 2; vi. 21, 2; 24, 6; vii. 20, 2; 4),\nparticularly in his meteorological treatises.\n\n[481] On the Milky Way, which Posidonius, agreeing with Aristotle,\nlooked upon as a collection of fiery vapours, see Stob. i. 576; Plut.\nPlac. iii. 1, 10; Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 15. On the comets, which are\nexplained in a similar way, Stob. i. 580 (Plac. iii. 2, 8.\u2014Whether the\nDiogenes mentioned here who looked upon comets as real stars is\nDiogenes the Stoic, or Diogenes of Apollonia, is not clear. The former\nis more probable, Bo\u00ebthus having been just before mentioned); Arrian,\nin Stob. i. 584; Diog. vii. 152; and, particularly, Sen. Nat. Qu. vii.\nWe learn from the latter that Zeno held (vii. 19\u201321; 30, 2), with\nAnaxagoras and Democritus, that comets are formed by several stars\nuniting; whereas the majority of the Stoics\u2014and, amongst their number,\nPan\u00e6tius and Posidonius (further particulars in Schol. in Arat. v.\n1091)\u2014considered them passing phenomena. Even Seneca declared for the\nopinion that they are stars. On the phenomena of light and fire, called\n\u03c0\u03c9\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, etc., see Arrian in Stob. i. 584; Sen. Nat. Qu. i. 1,\n14; 15, 4. On \u03c3\u03ad\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2, consult Diog. 153; Sen. i. 15; on halo (\u1f05\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2),\nSen. i. 2; Alex. Aphr. Meteorol. 116; on the rainbow, Diog. 152; Sen.\ni. 3\u20138; on virg\u00e6 and parhelia, Sen. i. 9\u201313; Schol. in Arat. v. 880\n(Posidonius); on storms, lightning, thunder, summer lightning,\ncyclones, and siroccos, Stob. i. 596; 598 (Plac. iii. 3, 4); Arrian,\nIbid. 602; Sen. ii. 12\u201331; 51\u201358 (c. 54, the view of Posidonius); ii.\n1, 3; Diog. 153; on rain, sleet, hail, snow, Diog. 153; Sen. iv. 3\u201312;\non earthquakes, Diog. 154; Plac. iii. 15, 2; Sen. vi. 4\u201331\n(particularly c. 16; 21, 2); also Strabo, ii. 3, 6, p. 102; on winds,\nPlac. iii. 7, 2; Sen. v. 1\u201317; Strabo, i. 2, 21, p. 29; iii. 2, 5, p.\n144; on waterspouts, Sen. iii. 1\u201326; the Nile floods, Ibid. iv. 1;\nStrabo, xvii. 1, 5, p. 790; Cleomed. Meteor, p. 32; on tides, Strabo,\ni. 3, 12, p. 55; iii. 3, 3, p. 153; 5, 8, p. 73; on seasons, p. 111, 2.\n\n[482] Thus colours are explained as \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c7\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 (Stob.\ni. 364; Plac. i. 15, 5); and sounds are spoken of as undulations in the\nair by Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 5; Diog. 158.\n\n[483] Conf. Bake, Posidonii Rhod. Reliqui\u00e6, pp. 87\u2013184; M\u00fcller, Fragm.\nHist. Gr\u00e6c. iii. 245.\n\n[484] Sext. Math. ix. 81: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f21\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd (on \u1f15\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 see p. 103, 1)\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c8\u03b9\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bb\u03af\u03b8\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03be\u03cd\u03bb\u03b1, \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u1f70,\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 12, p. 451: \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9,\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c7\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u1fc3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd. Themist. De An.\n72, b; M. Aurel. vi. 14; Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. 298, D; De Mundo,\n1154, E; Leg. Alleg. 1091, D; Incorrupt. M. 947, A; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7,\n8, p. 463, C, Bas. 861, Cr. (Otherwise Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33. See p.\n146, 1). Respecting the difference of \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74, \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 is said to\nconsist of a moister, colder, and denser \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 than \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae; but, on this\npoint, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1; Com. Not. 46, 2; Galen, Hipp. et\nPlat. v. 3. Vol. v. 521. Qu. Animi Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783. In Diog.\n139, \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, as the highest and lowest links in the series, are\ncontrasted. Ibid. 156, there is a definition of \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 = \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f41\u03b4\u1ff7 \u03b2\u03b1\u03b4\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd; and (148) another = \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u1f61\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f00\u03c6\u2019 \u03bf\u1f35\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03b8\u03b7. It hardly need\nbe repeated that the force is one and the same, which at one time\nappears as \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, at another as \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Conf. Diog. 138; Themist. l.c.;\nSext. Math. ix. 84.\n\n[485] The belief that blood circulates in the veins, spiritus in the\narteries (Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1), which was shared by the\nPeripatetics, deserves to be mentioned here, Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1;\nalso the explanations of sleep, death, and age in Plut. Plac. v. 23, 4;\n30, 5; the assertion that animals are not only deficient in reason (on\nthis point see Plut. Solert. An. 2, 9; 6, 1; 11, 2, pp. 960, 963, 967),\nbut also (according to Chrysippus in Galen, Hippoc. et Plat. iii. 3; v.\n1, 6. Vol. v., 309, 429, 431, 476) in emotions (or as Galen also says\nin \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 and \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1), even in man the emotions being connected with\nthe rational soul. Posidonius, however, denied this statement (Galen,\np. 476), and Chrysippus believed that animals had a \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd.\n(Chalcid. in Tim. p. 148, b.) He even discovered in the scent of dogs\ntraces of an unconscious inference. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 69. See also p.\n225, 2.\n\n[486] Cleanthes, in Nemes. Nat. Hom. p. 33, and Tert. De An. c. 5:\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u00b7\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7\u00b7 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c1\u03c5\u03b8\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03bf\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f60\u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd. \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1\n\u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae. Chrysippus in Nemes. p. 34: \u1f41 \u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78\n\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c6\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c6\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7\n\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae. The same is said by Tertullian.\n\n[487] Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2, p. 30.\n\n[488] Diog. 157; Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 36.\n\n[489] Zeno, in Tertull. l.c., and very nearly the same in Chalcid. in\nTim. p. 306 Meurs.: Quo digresso animal emoritur: consito autem spiritu\ndigresso animal emoritur: ergo consitus spiritus corpus est, consitus\nautem spiritus anima est: ergo corpus est anima. Chrysippus in Chalcid.\nl.c.\n\n[490] Cleanthes, in Nemes. l.c. 32: \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u1f24\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae. The same in Tertullian, l.c.\n\n[491] Chrysippus in Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iii. 1. Vol. v. 287: \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\n\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u1f72\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd. Zeno. Macrob.\nSomn. i. 14: Zenon [dixit animam] concretum corpori spiritum ...\nBo\u00ebthos (probably the Stoic, not the Peripatetic of the first century,\nis meant) ex a\u00ebre et igne [sc. constare]. Diog. in Galen, ii. 8, p.\n282: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae \u03c4\u03af\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Cic. Nat. D. iii. 14, 36; Tusc. i. 9, 19; 18, 42:\nZeno considers the soul to be fire; Pan\u00e6tius believes that it is\nburning air. Diog. L. vii. 156, on the authority of Zeno, Antipater,\nPosidonius, says that it is \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd. Stob.\nEcl. i. 796 (Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 3). Cornut. N. D. p. 8: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f31\n\u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1: Zeno\ncalls the soul \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (should be \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, conf. \u00a7 2 and Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. c. 127: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31\n\u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u1f72\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f51\u03b3\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd). Longin. in Eus. Ibid. 21, 1 and 3. Alex. De\nAn. 127. b: \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03ba \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2. Since, however, every \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 is not a soul,\na soul is stated to be \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd (Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 4, p. 458,\nE); and the distinctive quality of the soul-element is its greater\nwarmth and rarity. See Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 2, p. 1052: Chrysippus\nconsiders the \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 to be \u1f00\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd. Similarly, Galen, Qu. An. Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783:\nThe Stoics say that both \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 is \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1, but that the \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1\nis thick and cold in \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, dry and warm in \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae.\n\n[492] Chrysippus. See previous note. This diffusion is further\nexplained by Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 870 and 874, Themist. De Anim. f.\n68, a. Plotin. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c, as being \u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, i.e. an\nintermingling of elements. That the soul forms the bond of union for\nthe body, and not vice vers\u00e2, was a point vindicated by the Stoics\nagainst the Epicureans. Posid. in Achil. Tat. Isag. c. 13, p. 133, E;\nSext. Math. ix. 72.\n\n[493] Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. ii. 8, p. 282, on the authority of Zeno,\nCleanthes, Chrysippus, and Diogenes; Longin. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 21, 3;\nM. Aurel. v. 33; vi. 15; Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 127.\n\n[494] Zeno described the seed as \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u2019 \u1f51\u03b3\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 ... \u03bc\u1fd6\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd (Arius Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev.\nxv. 20, 1), or as \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03bc\u03b9\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd (Plut.\nCoh. Ir. 15). Similarly Chrysip., in Diog. 159. Conf. Tertullian, De\nAn. c. 27. According to Sph\u00e6rus, in Diog. 159, the seed is formed by\nseparation from all parts of the body and can consequently produce all,\nas Democritus had already said. Pan\u00e6tius (in Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 79)\nproves, from the mental similarity, between parents and children, that\nthe soul comes into existence by generation. For the mother\u2019s share in\nproducing the soul, see Ar. Did. l.c. See above p. 127, 5.\n\n[495] Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1 and 8, p. 1052; C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084. De\nPrimo Frig. 2, 5, p. 946: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b2\u03c1\u03b5\u03c6\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c8\u03cd\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd. Similarly, Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c. Conf.\nHippolyt. Refut. H\u00e6r. c. 21, p. 40; Tertull. De An. c. 25. Plutarch\n(Plac. v. 16, 2; 17, 1; 24, 1) draws attention to the inconsistency of\nsaying that the animal soul, which is warmer and rarer than the\nvegetable soul, has been developed of it there by cooling and\ncondensation.\n\n[496] On this point, the Stoics were not altogether agreed. Some (not\nall, as Plut. Pl. Phil. iv. 21, 5, asserts) made the brain the seat of\nthe soul, in proof of which they appealed to the story of the birth of\nPallas. Sext. Math. ix. 119; Diog. in Ph\u00e6dr. Fragm. De Nat. De. col. 6.\nConf. Krische, Forschungen, i. 488, and Chrysipp. in Galen, l.c. iii.\n8, p. 349. It appears, however, from Galen, l.c. i. 6, ii. 2 and 5,\niii. 1, pp. 185, 214, 241, 287, Tertull. De An. c. 15, that the most\ndistinguished Stoics\u2014Zeno, Chrysippus, Diogenes, and\nApollodorus\u2014decided in favour of the heart. The chief proof is, that\nthe voice does not come from the hollow of the skull, but from the\nbreast. Chrysippus was aware of the weakness of this proof, but still\ndid not shrink from using it. Galen, l.c. p. 254, 261. At the same\ntime, he also appealed to the fact (ii. 7, 268; iii. 1, 290, c. 5, 321,\nc. 7, 335, 343; iv. 1, 362) that, by universal assent, supported by\nnumerous passages from the poets, the motions of the will and the\nfeelings proceed from the heart.\n\n[497] Aristotle had assigned no particular organ of the body to reason.\n\n[498] Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2. Ibid, c. 21: The Stoics consider the\n\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd to be the highest part of the soul; it begets the \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, and \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u1f76, and is by them called \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2;\nfrom it the seven divisions of the soul reach to the body, like the\narms of a cuttle-fish, and are therefore collectively defined as \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 (\u03bc\u03ad\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd, \u1f64\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bc\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd, \u03b3\u03bb\u03ce\u03c4\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2,\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c6\u03ac\u03c1\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03bb\u03ce\u03c4\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd).\nGalen, l.c. iii. 1, 287. See p. 215, 2; Diog. 110 and 157; Porphyr. and\nIamblich. in Stob. i. 836, 874, and 878; Chalcid. in Tim. 307;\nNicomachus, in Iambl. Theol. Arith. p. 50. But there was no universal\nagreement among the Stoics on this subject. According to Tertull. De\nAn. 14, Zeno only admitted three divisions of the soul, whilst some\namong the later Stoics enumerated as many as ten; Pan\u00e6tius only held\nsix, and Posidonius went still further away from the view current among\nthe Stoics. The remarks of Stob. i. 828, probably refer to the\nPeripatetic Aristo.\n\n[499] See p. 73, 2.\n\n[500] Conf. Cleanth. Hymn 4:\n\n \u1f10\u03ba \u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f30\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03af\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b1\u03c7\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\n \u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9, \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u03b6\u03ce\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f15\u03c1\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b8\u03bd\u03ae\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b1\u1fd6\u03b1\u03bd.\n\n[501] See p. 214, 2 and Chrys. in Galen, l.c. iii. 1, p. 287. Conf. p.\n211, 5: \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd [\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2] \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd [\u03c9\u03bd]\n\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u1ff3, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u1f40\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03bc\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f44\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f44\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u2019 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f43 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1, \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u1fb3 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f42\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2: \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03c6\u2019\n\u03bf\u1f57 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 [= \u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9] \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2. Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 102. Alex. Aphr.\n(De An. 146) therefore denies the Stoical assertion, that the \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 is only one, and that every activity of the soul is only the\naction of the \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. Conversely Tertullian, De An. 14,\nspeaking quite after the manner of a Stoic, says: Hujusmodi autem non\ntam partes anim\u00e6 habebuntur, quam vires et efficaci\u00e6 et oper\u00e6 ... non\nenim membra sunt substanti\u00e6 animalis, sed ingenia (capacities). Iambl.\nin Stob. i. 874: The powers of the soul bear, according to the Stoics,\nthe same relation to the soul that qualities bear to the substance;\ntheir difference is partly owing to the diffusion of the \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, of\nwhich they consist, in different parts of the body, partly to the union\nof several qualities in one subject-matter, the latter being necessary,\nfor \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd to include \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74, and \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[502] Plut. Virt. Mort. c. 3, p. 441, speaking of Zeno, Aristo, and\nChrysippus: \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1fb7 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f43 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7. Plac.\nPhil. iv. 21, 1. Galen, l.c. iv. 1, p. 364: Chrysippus sometimes speaks\nas if he admitted a distinct \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 or \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ae\u03c2; at other\ntimes, as if he denied it. The latter is clearly his meaning. Ibid. v.\n6, 476: \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b8\u2019 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7. See p. 209, 1.\nIambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 890; Diog. vii. 159. Orig. c. Cels. v. 47: \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1f72\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2. Posidonius (in Galen,\nl.c. 6, 476) endeavours to prove that Cleanthes held a different view,\nby a passage in which he contrasts \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 with \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\u2014but this is making\na rhetorical flourish do duty for a philosophic statement.\n\n[503] Chrys. (in Galen, ii. 2, 215): \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03b3\u1f7c \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf (the primary power in the breast) \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[504] Cleanthes, v. 4, p. 215, 1. Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 6: \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff7 \u1f05\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1. Id. ii. 8, 11.\nM. Aurel. ii. 4, v. 27, calls the soul \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c1\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6;\nand, xii. 26, even calls the human \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2. Sen. Ep. 41, 2: Sacer\nintra nos spiritus sedet ... in unoquoque virorum bonorum, quis Deus\nincertum est, habitat Deus. Id. Ep. 66, 12. Ratio autem nihil aliud est\nquam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa. Consequently,\nreason, thought, and virtue are of the same nature in the human soul as\nin the soul of the universe, as Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 886, states as\na Stoic view. From this relationship to God, Posidonius deduces in a\nwell-known simile (see p. 84, 1) the soul\u2019s capacity for studying\nnature, and Cicero (De Leg. 1. 8, 24) the universality of a belief in\nGod. All souls, as being parts of the divine mind, may be collectively\nregarded as one soul or reason. Marc. Aurel. ix. 8: \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b1\n\u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03b4\u03b9\u1fc4\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\nxii. 30: \u1f13\u03bd \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bb\u03af\u03bf\u03c5, \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03c7\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7\n\u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74, \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74,\n\u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2. This oneness,\nhowever, must, as the comparison shows, be understood in the sense of\nthe Stoic realism: the universal soul, in the sense of ethereal\nsubstance, is the element of which individual souls consist. See also\nMarc. Aurel. viii. 54.\n\n[505] In this sense, Sen. Ep. 31, 11, calls the animus rectus, bonus,\nmagnus, a Deus in corpore humano hospitans.\n\n[506] Further particulars, p. 174, 180, 189.\n\n[507] See p. 179.\n\n[508] See p. 88, 1.\n\n[509] Diog. 156; Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 31. 2, p. 1107; Plac. iv. 7, 2;\nAr. Didymus, in Eus. Pr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 20, 3; Sen. Consol. ad Marc. c. 26,\n7; Ep. 102, 22; 117, 6; Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 77. Seneca (ad Polyb. 9, 2;\nEp. 65, 24; 71, 16; 36, 9, and in Tertull. De An. c. 42; Resurr. Carn.\n3. 1) and M. Aurelius (iii. 3; vii. 32; viii. 25, 58) are only speaking\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, in seeming to doubt a future life after death, in order\nto dispel the fear of death in every case. It is, however, a mistake of\nTiedemann (Sto. Phil. ii. 155) to suppose that they, in many passages\n(Sen. Ep. 71, 102, M. Aur. ii. 17; v. 4, 13), supposed the immediate\ndissolution of the soul after death. It is, on the contrary, clear,\nfrom M. Aurel. iv. 14, 21, that the soul lives some time after death,\nand is not resolved into the world-soul till the general conflagration.\nBut even this is a variation from the ordinary view of the Stoics.\nAccording to Seneca (Consol. ad Marciam) the souls of the good, as in\nthe doctrine of purgatory, undergo a purification, before they are\nadmitted to the ranks of the blessed; and here this purification is no\ndoubt required on physical grounds. When the soul is purified, both in\nsubstance and morals, it rises up to the ether, and there, according to\nM. Aurelius, united to the \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, it lives,\naccording to the common view, until the end of the world. The ether is\nalso allotted to the blessed, for their residence, by Cic. Tusc. i. 18,\n42; Lactant. Inst. vii. 20; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi. 31, 2, p. 1107. The\nsouls, as Cicero remarks, penetrating the thick lower air, mount to\nheaven, until they reach an atmosphere (the juncti ex anima tenui et\nardore solis temperato ignes) congenial with their own nature. Here\nthey naturally stop, and are fed by the same elements as the stars.\nAccording to Chrysippus (in Eustath. on Il. xxiii. 65), they there\nassume the spherical shape of the stars. According to Tertull. De An.\n54, conf. Lucan. Phars. ix. 5, their place is under the moon. Zeno, in\nspeaking of the islands of the blest (Lact. Inst. vii. 7, 20), probably\nonly desired to enlist popular opinion in his own favour. The souls of\nthe foolish and bad also last some time after death; only, as being\nweaker, they do not last until the end of the world (Ar. Did.;\nTheodoret. Cur. Gr. Affec. v. 23, p. 73); and meantime, as it is\ndistinctly asserted by Sen. Ep. 117, 6, Tertullian, and Lactantius,\nthey are punished in the nether world. Tertullian in placing a portion\nof the souls of the foolish in the region of the earth, and there\nallowing them to be instructed by the wise, is probably referring to\nthe purification mentioned by Seneca. For the supposed transmigration\nof souls see p. 166, 2.\n\n[510] The peculiar notion mentioned by Seneca (Ep. 57, 7) as belonging\nto the Stoics\u2014animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non posse\net statim spargi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber\u2014was not required by\ntheir principles, as Seneca already observed. It belongs, in fact, only\nto individual members of that School.\n\n[511] Conf. Baur, Seneca und Paulus, in Hilgenfeld\u2019s Zeitschrift f\u00fcr\nwissensch. Theol. i. 2, 221.\n\n[512] Ep. 102, 22: Cum venerit dies ille, qui mixtum hoc divini\nhumanique secernat, corpus hic, ubi inveni, relinquam, ipse me Dis\nreddam ... per has mortalis vit\u00e6 moras illi meliori vit\u00e6 longiorique\nproluditur. As a child in its mother\u2019s womb, sic per hoc spatium, quod\nab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium maturescimus partum. All we\npossess, and the body itself, is only the baggage, which we neither\nbrought into the world, nor can carry away with us. Dies iste, quem\ntanquam extremum reformidas, \u00e6terni natalis est. Ep. 120, 14: The body\nis breve hospitium, which a noble soul does not fear to lose. Scit\nenim, quo exiturus sit, qui, unde venerit, meminit. Conf. Ep. 65, 16.\n\n[513] Consol. ad Marc. 24, 3: Imago dumtaxat filii tui periit ... ipse\nquidem \u00e6ternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus\nalienis et sibi relictus. The body is only a vessel, enveloping the\nsoul in darkness: nititur illo, unde dimissus est; ibi illum \u00e6terna\nrequies manet. Ibid. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices anim\u00e6 et \u00e6terna sortit\u00e6.\nIbid. 19, 6: Excessit filius tuus terminos intra quos servitur: excepit\nillum magna et \u00e6terna pax. No fear or care, no desire, envy, or\ncompassion disturbs him. Ibid. 26, 5. Consol. ad Polyb. 9, 3, 8: Nunc\nanimus fratris mei velut ex diutino carcere emissus, tandem sui juris\net arbitrii, gestit et rerum natur\u00e6 spectaculo fruitur ... fruitur nunc\naperto et libero c\u0153lo ... et nunc illic libere vagatur omniaque rerum\nnatur\u00e6 bona cum summa voluptate perspicit. Ep. 79, 12: Tunc animus\nnoster habebit, quod gratuletur sibi, cum emissus his tenebris ...\ntotum diem admiserit, et c\u0153lo redditus suo fuerit. Ep. 102, 28:\nAliquando natur\u00e6 tibi arcana retegentur, discutietur ista caligo et lax\nundique clara percutiet, which Seneca then further expands.\n\n[514] In Consol. ad Marc. 26, 1, Seneca describes how, the time of\npurification ended, the deceased one inter felices currit animas (the\naddition: excepit illum c\u0153tus sacer Hanse rightly treats as a gloss)\nand how his grandfather shows him the hall of heaven. Ibid. 26, 3.\n\n[515] Ep. 26, 4: Velut adpropinquet experimentum et ille laturus\nsententiam de omnibus annis meis dies ... quo, remotis strophis ac\nfucis, de me judicaturus sum. Compare the hora decretoria, Ep. 102, 24.\n\n[516] Ep. 102, 29: H\u00e6c cogitatio (that of heaven and a future life)\nnihil sordidum animo subsidere sinit, nihil humile, nihil crudele. Deos\nrerum omnium esse testes ait: illis nos adprobari, illis in futurum\nparari jubet et \u00e6ternitatem menti proponere.\n\n[517] Ep. 36, 10: Mors ... intermittit vitam, non eripit: veniet iterum\nqui nos in lucem reponat dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos\nreduceret. Sed postea diligentius docebo omnia, qu\u00e6 videntur perire,\nmutari. \u00c6quo animo debet rediturus exire. The souls cannot return,\naccording to the Stoic teaching, until after the general conflagration,\npresuming that the same persons will be found in the future world as in\nthe present. See p. 166, 2. As long as the world lasts, the better\nsouls will continue to exist, and only the particles of the body are\nemployed for fresh bodies. Accordingly, the passage just quoted, and\nalso Ep. 71, 13, must refer to the physical side of death, or else to\nthe return of personality after the conflagration of the world.\n\n[518] Besides the definitions of \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 in Diog. 52, and the remark\nthat impressions are made on the organs of sense, but that the seat of\nfeeling is in the \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd (Plut. Plac. iv. 23, 1), the following\nstatements may be mentioned: In the process of seeing, the \u1f41\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1, coming into the eyes from the \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, gives a spherical\nform to the air before the eye, by virtue of its \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (on\n\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, see p. 128, 2), and, by means of the sphere of air, comes in\ncontact with things; and since by this process rays of light emanate\nfrom the eye, darkness must be visible. Diog. 158; Alex. Aph. De Anim.\n149; Plut. Plac. iv. 15. The process of hearing is due to the spherical\nundulations of the air, which communicate their motion to the ear.\nDiog. 158; Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 5. On the voice, called also \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1fb6\u03b5\u03bd, see\nPlut. Plac. iv. 20, 2; 21, 4; Diog. 55, and above p. 214, 2; 74, 6.\nDisease is caused by changes in the \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1, Diog. 158; sleep \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03c5\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, Diog. 158; Tertull. De An. 43;\nand in a similar way, death \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03c5\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 Iambl.\n(in Stob. Ecl. i. 922), who, however, does not mention the Stoics by\nname. In the case of man, the extinguishing of the power of life is\nonly a liberation of rational souls.\n\n[519] Page 77.\n\n[520] The chief passage in Diog. vii. 84, is as follows: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u1ff6\u03bd. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c1\u03c7\u03ad\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03a4\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03ad\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u039a\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u03b9\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2\n\u1f02\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ad\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bd. There may be\ndoubts as to the punctuation, and, consequently, as to the sense, of\nthe first sentence; but the form of expression seems to imply that the\nfive first portions contain main divisions, and the six following\nsubdivisions. The ethics of Chrysippus and his followers would\ntherefore fall into the following main divisions: \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd; but it would be hard to assign to these\ndivisions their respective subdivisions. The statement of Epictetus,\nDiss. iii. 2, agrees in part with this division. He distinguishes in\nhis introduction to virtue three \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9: \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c1\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, called also \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7; \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd; and, lastly, \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03be\u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. The first of these\ndivisions would correspond with the third of Diogenes, the second with\nhis first; but the division \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd does not harmonise\nwith the third of Epictetus (which, according to what follows, rather\nrefers to the critical confirmation of moral principles not specially\nmentioned by Diogenes), but rather with his first division treating of\n\u1f40\u03c1\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 and \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Stob\u00e6us again differs from either. In his survey\nof the Stoic ethics (Ecl. ii. c. 5), he first, p. 90, treats of what is\ngood, evil, and indifferent, of what is desirable and detestable, of\nthe end-in-chief, and of happiness, in this section discussing at\nlength the doctrine of virtue. He then goes on, p. 158, to consider the\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, the impulses, p. 166, and the emotions (\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7, as being one\nkind of impulse), appending thereto, p. 186, a discussion on\nfriendship; and concluding, p. 192 to 242, with a long treatise on\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1), the greater portion of\nwhich is devoted to describing the wise man and the fool. Turning to\nSen. Ep. 95, 65, it is stated, on the authority of Posidonius, that not\nonly pr\u00e6ceptio, but also suasio, consolatio, and exhortatio, and,\nmoreover, causarum inquisitio (which, however, can hardly have been\ncalled etymologia by Posidonius, as Hanse reads but \u00e6tiologia) and\nethologia, description of moral states, are necessary. In Ep. 89, 14,\nthe parts of moral science are more accurately given as three; the\nfirst determining the value of things, the second treating de\nactionibus, the third de impetu, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2. Two of these parts\ncoincide indeed with those of Diogenes, but this is not the case with\nthe third, which is only one of the subdivisions in Diogenes (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd); and even Seneca\u2019s first part more nearly agrees with one of\nthese (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03c2). Unfortunately, Seneca does not mention\nhis authorities; and, accordingly, we are not sure whether his division\nis a genuine Stoic division. A similar division will be subsequently\nmet with in the eclectic Academician Eudorus (living under Augustus).\nNone of the divisions quoted agree with the three problems proposed by\nCic. Off. ii. 5, 18, or the three sections enumerated by Epict. Enchir.\nc. 51 (76), in which Petersen (Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 260) recognises\nSeneca\u2019s three main divisions of Ethics. In the midst of such\ncontending authorities, it seems impossible to establish the main\ndivision of the Stoic Ethics. One thing alone is clear, that they were\nthemselves not agreed on the subject. Petersen\u2019s attempt, l.c. p. 258,\nappears to me a failure.\n\n[521] Stob. Ecl. ii. 138: \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f57 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1.\n\n[522] Diog. vii. 85; Cic. Fin. iii. 5; Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7. That the\ntwo latter writers follow one and the same authority appears partly\nfrom their literal agreement with each other, and partly from their\nadopting a uniform method in refuting the Epicurean statement, that the\ndesire for pleasure is the primary impulse. That authority is probably\nthe treatise of Chrysippus \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, since it is distinctly referred\nto by Diogenes. Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 4, quotes from it: \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f14\u03ba\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd. The\ndifference mentioned by Alex. Aphr. De An. 154\u2014that at one time\nself-love, at another the preservation of one\u2019s own nature, is the\nimpulse\u2014is unimportant.\n\n[523] Diog. vii 85: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f34\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78, \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff6 [\u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff7] \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03b6\u1ff4\u1ff3\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f26\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 [Cobet incorrectly \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f02\u03bd [l.\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd sc. \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd] \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba [must evidently\nbe struck out] \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9. \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\n\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b2\u03bb\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03af\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Similarly, Cic. l.c. 5, 16. Antisthenes had already reduced\nthe conception of the good to that of \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, without the fuller\nexplanation. Here the Academic theory of life according to nature,\nwhich had been enunciated by Polemo, Zeno\u2019s teacher, is combined\ntherewith. Some difficulty was nevertheless caused by the question\nwhether all living creatures possess a consciousness (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,\nsensus) of their own nature; without such a consciousness, natural\nself-love seemed to the Stoics impossible. They thought, however, that\nthis question (according to Sen. Ep. 121, 5, conf. Cic. l.c.) could be\nanswered in the affirmative without hesitation, and appealed for\nevidence to the instinctive activities by which children and animals\ngovern their bodily motions, guard themselves from dangers, and pursue\nwhat is to their interest, without denying that the ideas which\nchildren and animals have of themselves are very indistinct, that they\nonly know their own constitution, but not its true conception\n(constitutionis finitio, Sen. p. 11). Constitutio, or \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, was\ndefined by the Stoics, Sen., p. 10. as principale animi quodam modo se\nhabens erga corpus.\n\n[524] Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17; 6, 20.\n\n[525] The terms are here treated as synonymous, without regard to the\nhair-splitting with which the Stoics distinguished (Stob. Ecl. ii. 136)\nthree meanings of \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, between \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 and \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2.\n\n[526] Stob. ii. 134 and 138; Diog. vii. 88; 94; Plut. C. Not. 27, 9;\nCic. Fin. iii. 7, 26; 10, 33; Sen. V. Beat. 3, 3; conf. Ep. 118, 8;\nSext. Pyrrh. iii. 171; Math. xi. 30. In Stob. ii. 78 and 96, formal\ndefinitions are given of \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, and \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1. The latter is\ngenerally paraphrased by \u03b5\u1f54\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5, as Zeno had defined it. Various\nformul\u00e6 for the conception of a life according to nature are given by\nCleanthes, Antipater, Archedemus, Diogenes, Pan\u00e6tius, Posidonius, and\nothers in Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 416; Stob. 134; and Diog., all\napparently taken from the same source.\n\n[527] Diog. vii. 88: \u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd\u00b7\n\u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f67\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f41 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f41 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c1\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f62\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u0394\u03b9\u0390 ... \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f54\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[528] Stob. ii. 160 (conf. 158): \u03b4\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. Diog. 86:\nPlants are moved by nature without impulse, animals by means of\nimpulse. In the case of animals, therefore, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd is the\nsame as \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae\u03bd. In rational creatures, reason controls\nimpulse; and accordance with nature means accordance with reason. In\nGalen. Hippoc. et Plat. v. 2, p. 460, Chrysippus says: \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd. M. Aurel. vii. 11: \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff7 \u03b6\u1ff4\u1ff3 \u1f21 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd. Hence the definition of a virtuous\nlife, or a life according to nature: \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd (Chrysippus, in Stob. 134; Diog. 87; Clem. l.c.; also\nDiogenes, Antipater, Archedemus, Posidonius); and that of the good: \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 (Diog. 94).\n\n[529] Sen. Ep. 121, 14: Omne animal primum constitutioni su\u00e6\nconciliari: hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse: et ideo\nconciliari hominem sibi non tanquam animali sed tanquam rationali. Ea\nenim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo est. Id. Ep. 92, 1: The body\nis subservient to the soul, and the irrational part of the soul to the\nrational part. Hence it follows: In hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam.\nut in nobis ratio perfecta sit. Similarly. Ep. 76, 8. M. Aurel. vi. 44:\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03bc\u1f74\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae. Conf. viii. 7 and 12.\n\n[530] According to Stob. ii. 132, Diog. vii. 89, the ancient Stoics\nwere not altogether agreed as to the terms in which they would express\ntheir theory. Zeno, for instance, is said by Stob\u00e6us to have defined\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 = \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd; Cleanthes first added the words \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9,\nand Chrysippus and his followers augmented the formula by several\nadditions. Diog. 87 attributes the words \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 to Zeno, adding,\nhowever, 89, that Chrysippus understood by \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, whereas Cleanthes understood \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. These differences are, however, not\nimportant. The simple expression \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd means, without\ndoubt, \u1f00\u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u1ff3, the \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd (Stob. ii.\n132 and 158), the \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 (Diog. vii. 89), the vita\nsibi concors, the concordia animi (Sen. Ep. 89, 15; V. Be. 8, 6), the\nunum hominem agere, which, according to Sen. Ep. 120, 22, is only found\nin a wise man\u2014in a word, the even tenour of life and consistency.\nNevertheless, this consistency is only possible when individual actions\naccord with the requirements of the character of the agent.\nAccordingly, Stob. ii. 158, places \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 by the\nside of \u1f00\u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u1ff3. Cleanthes, therefore, in adding to the\nexpression \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 the words \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, which, however, according\nto Diog. 87, Zeno had done before him, was only going back to the next\ncondition of \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd. We can, however, hardly believe with\nDiogenes that Cleanthes understood by \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 only nature in general, but\nnot human nature. He may have alluded in express terms to \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\nor \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 only, with the praise of which his well-known hymn\nends, but it cannot have been his intention to exclude human nature,\nwhich is only a particular form of nature in general. Chrysippus\ntherefore only expanded, but did not contradict, the teaching of his\nmaster.\n\n[531] Diog. vii. 30; 94; 101; Stob. ii. 200; 138; Sext. Pyrrh. iii.\n169; Math. xi. 184; Cic. Tusc. ii. 25, 61; Fin. iv. 16, 45; Acad. i.\n10; Parad. 1; Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1; Ep. 71, 4; 74, 1; 76, 11; 85, 17;\n120, 3; 118, 10, where the relation of the conceptions honestum bonum,\nsecundum naturam is specially considered. To prove their position, the\nStoics make use of the chain-argument, of which they are generally\nfond. Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 11): \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd.\n(The same in Cic. Fin. iii. 8, 27, and iv. 18, 50, where I would\nsuggest the reading validius instead of vitiosius.). Again: \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd (The same somewhat\nexpanded in Cic. Tusc. v. 15, 43.) Stob. ii. 126: \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c6\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd. Another sorites of the same kind in Sen. Ep. 85, 2.\n\n[532] Stob. ii. 78; 94; Diog. vii. 94 and 98; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169;\nMath. xi. 22, 25, and 30. According to Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33, Diogenes\nreconciled this definition with the definition of the good and the\nperfect quoted on p. 227, 4, by observing that the useful is a motus\naut status natura absoluti.\n\n[533] Sext. l.c. Stob. ii. 188: \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b1\u1fe6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5\n\u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f34\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd. Ibid. ii. 202; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12; Com. Not. 20,\n1; Cic. Off. ii. 3, 10; iii. 3, 11; 7, 34.\n\n[534] M. Aurel. ix. 16.\n\n[535] See Diog. 94; Stob. ii. 96; 124; 130; 136; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169;\nMath. xi. 22; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 55; Sen. Ep. 66, 5. Good is here\ndefined to be either \u1f60\u03c6\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 or \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 (inseparably\nconnected with \u1f60\u03c6\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, the good in itself, just as the virtuous man is\nconnected with virtue, which is a part of himself. See Sextus l.c. and\nabove p. 104, 2), or, what is the same thing, \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74 \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2. (Sext. Math. xi. 184.) A distinction is drawn between three\nkinds of good: \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c6\u2019 \u03bf\u1f57 \u1f22 \u1f00\u03c6\u2019 \u03bf\u1f57 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\n\u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bf\u1f37\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. Under the first head comes virtue,\nunder the second virtuous actions, under the third, besides the two\nothers, virtuous subjects\u2014men, Gods, and demons. A second division of\ngoods (Diog., Sext. iii. 181, Stob.) is into goods of the soul,\nexternal goods, the possession of virtuous friends and a virtuous\ncountry, and such as are neither (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1, virtue and happiness considered as the relation of the\nindividual to himself, as his own possessions). Goods of the soul are\nthen divided into \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 (virtues), \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 (or \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, as\ninstances of which Stob. ii. 100, 128, quotes \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 and\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, &c.; these are not so unchangeable as peculiarities of\ncharacter, and are therefore only \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, p. 103, 1), and those which\nare neither \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 nor \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\u2014actions themselves. A third division of\ngoods (Diog., Cic. l.c., Stob. 80, 100, 114) distinguishes \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 or\n\u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 (moral actions), \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 (friends and the services\nthey render), \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 and \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 (virtues themselves); fourthly and\nfifthly, \u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u1f70 (as \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03b5\u03ba\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 and \u03b5\u1f50\u03b3\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03b1), and \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1fb6 or \u1f04\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1 (such as\nscience), and the \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 (virtues), and \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 (\u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). The corresponding divisions of evil are given by\nDiogenes and Stob\u00e6us. The latter (ii. 126 and 136) enumerates, in\naddition, the \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70, &c.) and \u1f10\u03bd \u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 (\u03b5\u1f54\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f21\u03c3\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1, &c.), the latter being partially \u1f10\u03bd \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9; the \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f70\n(virtues) and \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 (honour, benevolence, friendship); the\ngoods which are necessary for happiness (virtues), and those which are\nnot necessary (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1). Seneca\u2019s list is far more limited,\nalthough it professes to be more general. He mentions, prima bona,\ntanquam gaudium, pax, salus patri\u00e6; secunda, in materia infelici\nexpressa, tanquam tormentorum patientia; tertia, tanquam modestus\nincessus.\n\n[536] Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33: Ego assentior Diogeni, qui bonum\ndefinierit id quod esset natura absolutum [\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1f72\u03c2] ... hoc autem\nipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando\nsed propria vi et sentimus et appellamus bonum. Ut enim mel, etsi\ndulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum\naliis, dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc de quo agimus est illud\nquidem plurimi \u00e6stimandum, sed ea \u00e6stimatio genere valet non\nmagnitudine, &c.\n\n[537] Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1: Nec malum esse ullum nisi turpe, nec bonum\nnisi honestum. Alex. Aph. De Fat. c. 28, p. 88: \u1f21 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. See p. 229; 233, 1.\n\n[538] Sext. Math. xi. 61, after giving two irrelevant definitions of\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd: \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. To this\ncategory belong external goods, health, &c. \u1fa7 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f56 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2\n\u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u2019 \u1f02\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03b7 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u1fb3\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2, \u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f56 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1f72 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Similarly, Pyrrh. iii. 177, and Diog. 102, who defines\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 as \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u2019 \u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b2\u03bb\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9. Stob. ii. 142: \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd = \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd. Plut. Sto.\nRep. 31, 1: \u1fa7 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f56 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03cc \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[539] Zeno (in Sen. Ep. 82, 9) proves this of death by a process of\nreasoning, the accuracy of which he appears to have mistrusted: Nullum\nmalum gloriosum est: mors autem gloriosa est (there is a glorious\ndeath): ergo mors non est malum. In general, two considerations are\nprominent in the Stoic treatment of this subject: that what is\naccording to nature cannot be an evil, and that life taken by itself is\nnot a good. Other arguments, however, for diminishing the fear of death\nare not despised. See Sen. Ep. 30, 4; 77, 11, 82, 8; Cons. ad. Marc.\n19, 3; M. Aurel. ix. 3; viii. 58. And other passages quoted in\nBaumhauer\u2019s Vet. Philosoph. Doctr. De Morte Voluntaria, p. 211.\n\n[540] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, 4): All virtue is done away\nwith, \u1f02\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03b3\u03af\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f24 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f43 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c0\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd. Id. (in Plut. C. Not. 5, 2): \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. Similarly, Sto. Rep. 17, 2. Sen. Vit. Be. 4, 3: The\nonly good is honestas, the only evil turpitudo, cetera vilis turba\nrerum, nec detrahens quicquam beat\u00e6 vit\u00e6 nec adjiciens. Id. Ep. 66, 14:\nThere is no difference between the wise man\u2019s joy and the firmness with\nwhich he endures pains, quantum ad ipsas virtutes, plurimum inter illa,\nin quibus virtus utraque ostenditur ... virtutem materia non mutat. Ep.\n71, 21: Bona ista aut mala non efficit materia, sed virtus. Ep. 85, 39:\nTu illum [sapientem] premi putas malis? Utitur. Id. Ep. 44; 120, 3;\nPlut. C. Not. 4, 1; Sto. Rep. 18, 5; 31, 1; Chrysippus, in Ps. Plut. De\nNobil. 12, 2; Diog. 102; Stob. ii. 90; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 181; Alex.\nAphr. Top. 43 and 107.\n\n[541] Sext. Math. xi. 61. See above, p. 232, 3. Diog. 103: The good can\nonly do good, and never do harm; \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f22 \u03b2\u03bb\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f41\n\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u1f51\u03b3\u03af\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03c1\u2019 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03b8\u2019 \u1f51\u03b3\u03af\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1. Again: \u1fa7\n\u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f56 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f56 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. In Sen. Ep. 87, 11, instead\nof the proposition, that nothing is a good except virtue, the following\narguments are given as traditional among the Stoics (interrogationes\nnostrorum), apparently taken from Posidonius (see p. 31, 35, 38): (1)\nQuod bonum est, bonos facit: fortuita bonum non faciunt: ergo non sunt\nbona. (Similarly in M. Aurel. ii. 11, iv. 8: Whatever does no moral\nharm, does no harm to human life.) (2) Quod contemptissimo cuique\ncontingere ac turpissimo potest, bonum non est; opes autem et lenoni et\nlanist\u00e6 contingunt: ergo, &c. (So, too, Marc. Aurelius, v. 10.) (3)\nBonum ex malo non fit: diviti\u00e6 fiunt, fiunt autem ex avaritia: ergo,\n&c. (Conf. Alex. Aphr. Top. 107: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b2\u03bf\u03c3\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.)\n(4) Quod dum consequi volumus in multa mala incidimus, id bonum non\nest: dum divitias autem consequi volumus, in multa mala incidimus, &c.\n(5) Qu\u00e6 neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem,\ncontra autem insolentiam, tumorem, arrogantiam creant, mala sunt: a\nfortuitis autem (previously, not only riches but health had been\nincluded in this class) in h\u00e6c impellimur: ergo non sunt bona. That\nriches are not a good is proved by Diogenes (in Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 49);\nthat poverty and pain are no evils is proved by the argument, quoted in\nSen. Ep. 85, 30: Quod malum est nocet: quod nocet deteriorem facit.\nDolor et paupertas deteriorem non faciunt: ergo mala non sunt. The\nStoic proposition is also established from a theological point of view.\nNature, says M. Aurel. ii. 11, ix. 1, could never have allowed that\ngood and evil should equally fall to the lot of the good and the bad;\nconsequently, what both enjoy equally\u2014life and death, honour and\ndishonour, pleasure and trouble, riches and poverty\u2014can neither be good\nnor evil. On the value of fame, see id. iv. 19.\n\n[542] This view is compared with the Academician in Cic. Tusc. v. 13,\n39; 18, 51; Sen. Ep. 85, 18; 71, 18; 92, 14. In the last passage, the\nnotion that happiness can be increased by external goods, and is\nconsequently capable of degrees, is refuted by arguments such as 4, 24:\nQuid potest desiderare is, cui omnia honesta contingunt?... et quid\nstultius turpiusve, quam bonum rationalis animi ex irrationalibus\nnectere?... non intenditur virtus, ergo ne beata quidem vita, qu\u00e6 ex\nvirtute est. Conf. Ep. 72, 7: Cui aliquid accedere potent, id\nimperfectum est.\n\n[543] Cleanthes expands this notion, in rhetorical language, in Cic.\nFin. ii. 21, 69. Conf. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 2: [Virtus] non est virtus si\nsequi potest. Prim\u00e6 partes ejus sunt: ducere debet, imperare, summo\nloco stare: tu illam jubes signum petere. Id. Vit. Be. 11, 2; 13, 5;\n14, 1.\n\n[544] Compare on this subject the words of Chrysippus on p. 233, 1,\nquoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, and, for their explanation, Sen. Benef.\niv. 2, 4: Non indignor, quod post voluptatem ponitur virtus, sed quod\nomnino cum voluptate conferatur contemptrix ejus et hostis et\nlongissime ab illa resiliens. Id. Vit. Be. 15, 1: Pars honesti non\npotest esse nisi honestum, nee summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam,\nsi aliquid in se viderit dissimile meliori. According to Plut. 15, 3;\n13, 3, Com. Not. 25, 2, this statement of Chrysippus is at variance\nwith another statement of his, in which he says: If pleasure be\ndeclared to be a good, but not the highest good, justice (the\nPeripatetic view) might perhaps still be safe, since, in comparison\nwith pleasure, it may be regarded as the higher good. Still, this was\nonly a preliminary and tentative concession, which Chrysippus\nsubsequently proved could not be admitted, inasmuch as it was out of\nharmony with the true conception of the good, and changed the\ndifference in kind (on which see p. 232, 1) between virtue and other\nthings into a simple difference in degree. Plutarch (Sto. Rep. 15, 6),\nwith more reason, blames Chrysippus for asserting against Aristotle\nthat, if pleasure be regarded as the highest good, justice becomes\nimpossible, but not other virtues; for how could a Stoic, of all\nphilosophers, make such a distinction between virtues? Evidently the\nzeal of controversy has here carried away the philosopher beyond the\npoint at which his own principles would bear him out.\n\n[545] M. Aurel. vi. 15: \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03be\u03b9\u03bd. Conf. ix. 16: \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b6\u1ff4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[546] Sen. Ep. 92, 6\u201310; Vit. Beat. 5, 4; 9, 4; Posidonius, in Sen. Ep.\n92, 10.\n\n[547] Taking the expression in its strict meaning, it is hardly allowed\nby the Stoics, when they speak accurately. Understanding by \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74 an\nemotion, i.e. something contrary to nature and blameworthy, they assert\nthat the wise man feels delight (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70, gaudium), but not pleasure\n(\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74, l\u00e6titia, voluptas). See Sen. Ep. 59, 2; Diog. 116; Alex. Aphr.\nTop. 96; the last-named giving definitions of \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70, \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74, \u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2,\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7.\n\n[548] Sen. Ep. 23, 2; 27, 3; 59, 2; 14; 72, 8; Vit. Be. 3, 4; 4, 4; De\nIra, ii. 6, 2.\n\n[549] Diog. 94: Virtue is a good; \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 3: It is a question\nutrum virtus summi boni causa sit, an ipsa summum bonum. Seneca, of\ncourse, says the latter. Conf. De Vit. Be. 4, 5: The wise man takes\npleasure in peace of mind and cheerfulness, non ut bonis, sed ut ex\nbono suo ortis. Ibid. 9, 1: Non, si voluptatem pr\u00e6statura virtus est,\nideo propter hanc petitur ... voluptas non est merces nec causa\nvirtutis, sed accessio, nec quia delectat placet, sed si placet et\ndelectat. The highest good consists only in mental perfection and\nhealth, in ipso judicio et habitu optim\u00e6 mentis, in the sanitas et\nlibertas animi, which desires nothing but virtue; ipsa pretium sui.\nIbid. 15, 2: Ne gaudium quidem, quod ex virtute oritur, quamvis bonum\nsit, absoluti tamen boni pars est, non magis quam l\u00e6titia et\ntranquillitas ... sunt enim ista bona, sed consequentia summum bonum,\nnon consummantia. Here, too, belongs the statement in Stob. ii. 184,\n188 (conf. M. Aurel. vii. 74): \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f41\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f34\u03c3\u03b7\u03bd\n\u1f60\u03c6\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf, for the reasons stated, p. 230,\n1.\n\n[550] Sen. Vit. Be. c. 7 and 10\u201312; M. Aurel. viii. 10. Among the Stoic\narguments against identifying pleasure and pain with good and evil, may\nbe placed the inference in Clem. Strom. iv. 483, C, which bears great\nsimilarity to the third argument, quoted on p. 233, 2: If thirst be\npainful, and it be pleasant to quench thirst, thirst must be the cause\nof this pleasure: \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f02\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[551] Diog. 85: \u1f43 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2, \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\n\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f30 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd, \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03cc\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03b7.\n\n[552] Taking pleasure in its widest sense. In its more restricted\nsense, they reject \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae, understanding thereby a particular emotion.\nSee p. 236. 2.\n\n[553] Sext. Math. xi. 73: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\n\u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u1f7c\u03bd \u2018\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b7\u03bd \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f21\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b7\u03bd\u2019 (Antisthenes) \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b2\u03af\u1ff3, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f08\u03c1\u03c7\u03ad\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f61\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bb\u1fc3 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c7\u03b1\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. \u03a0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[554] Accordingly, it is also defined to be \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae.\nAlex. Aphr. De An. 156, b.\n\n[555] Diog. 89: \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c6\u03cc\u03b2\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f10\u03bb\u03c0\u03af\u03b4\u03b1 \u1f24 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f14\u03be\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f05\u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u1fc3 [-\u03b7\u03c2] \u03c8\u03cd\u03c7\u1fc3 [-\u03b7\u03c2] \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1fc3\n[-\u03b7\u03c2] \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5. Sen. De Clem. i. 1, 1: Quamvis\nenim recte factorum verus fructus sit fecisse, nec ullum virtutum\npretium dignum illis extra ipsas sit. Id. Ep. 81, 19. Ep. 94, 19:\n\u00c6quitatem per se expetendam nec metu nos ad illam cogi nec mercede\nconduci. Non esse justum cui quicquam in hac virtute placet pr\u00e6ter\nipsam. Id. Ep. 87, 24: Maximum scelerum supplicium in ipsis est. Benef.\niv 12: Quid reddat beneficium? dic tu mihi, quid reddat justitia, &c.;\nsi quicquam pr\u00e6ter ipsas, ipsas non expetis. M. Aurel. ix. 42: \u03c4\u03af \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03c0\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f56 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd; \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03c1\u03ba\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f14\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2; When man does good, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f43 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03cd\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6. Id. vii. 73; viii. 2. See pp.\n230, 1; 236, 4.\n\n[556] Diog. vii. 127: \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. Cic.\nParad. 2; Sen. Ep. 74, 1: Qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit, intra\nse felix est. This \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 is even asserted of individual virtues, by\nvirtue of the connection between them all. Of \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, for instance,\nin Sen. Ep. 85, 2. it is said: Qui prudens est, et temperans est. Qui\ntemperans, est et constans. Qui constans est, imperturbatus est. Qui\nimperturbatus est, sine tristitia est. Qui sine tristitia est, beatus\nest. Ergo prudens est beatus, et prudentia ad vitam beatam satis est.\nSimilarly in respect of bravery (ibid. 24). This \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 of virtue\nwas naturally a chief point of attack for an opponent. It is assailed\nby Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, on the ground that neither the things which\nthe Stoics declare to be natural and desirable (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1), nor, on the\nother hand, the natural conditions of virtuous action, can be without\neffect on happiness, and that it will not do to speak of the latter as\nonly negative conditions (\u1f67\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5). See Plut. C. Not. 4, and 11, 1.\n\n[557] Plut. Sto. Rep. 26; C. Not. 8, 4, where Chrysippus is charged\nwith at one time denying that happiness is augmented by length of time,\nand at another declaring momentary wisdom and happiness to be\nworthless. Cic. Fin. iii. 14, 45; Sen. Ep. 74, 27; 93, 6; Benef. v. 17,\n6; M. Aurel. xii. 35. The Stoics are, on this point, at variance with\nAristotle.\n\n[558] This view is frequently expressed by the Stoics of the Roman\nperiod, Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius. Proofs will be found\nsubsequently.\n\n[559] Tusc. v. 15, 43; 14, 42.\n\n[560] Parad. 2.\n\n[561] De Const. 13, 5; 75, 18: Expectant nos, si ex hac aliquando f\u00e6ce\nin illud evadimus sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi et expulsis\nerroribus absoluta libertas. Qu\u00e6ris, qu\u00e6 sit ista? Non homines timere,\nnon Deos. Nec turpia velle nec nimia. In se ipsum habere maximam\npotestatem: in\u00e6stimabile bonum est, suum fieri.\n\n[562] Ep. 29, 12: Quid ergo ... philosophia pr\u00e6stabit? Scilicet ut\nmalis tibi placere, quam populo, ... ut sine metu Deorum hominumque\nvivas, ut aut vincas mala aut finias.\n\n[563] See Krische, Forschungen, 368 and 475.\n\n[564] See p. 148, 2.\n\n[565] \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, according to the Stoic definition (Stob. Ecl. ii. 190,\n204; Floril. 44, 12, and in the fragment of Chrysippus quoted by\nMarcian in Digest. i. 3, 2, and the Scholiast of Hermogenes in Spengel\n\u03a3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3. \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd. 177, Krische, Forsch. 475) = \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd. It is therefore\n\u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 or \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, something of moral value, imposing duties on\nman. The ultimate source of this \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 must be looked for in the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2, the divine or world reason. The general law is, according to\nDiog. vii. 88 (who here, according to the passage quoted from Cic. N.\nD. i. 15, 40 on p. 148, 2, is apparently following Chrysippus) = \u1f41\n\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c1\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f41 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f66\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u0394\u03b9\u0390. It is the ratio\nsumma insita in natura, qu\u00e6 jubet ea qu\u00e6 facienda sunt, prohibetque\ncontraria (Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18, conf. the quotation from Cic. N. D. i.\n14, 30, respecting Zeus, on p. 150). According to Cic. Legg. ii. 4, 8\nand 10, it is no human creation sed \u00e6ternum quiddam, quod universum\nmundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia, the mens omnia\nratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei, the ratio recta summi Jovis\n(conf. Fin. iv. 5, II, in the fragment in Lact. Inst. v. 8). It is\naccordingly, as Chrysippus l.c. says in the words of Pindar (Plato,\nGorg. 484, B), \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[566] Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18; ii. 4, 8; 5, 11.\n\n[567] Or as Stob. ii. 184, expresses it, \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd is \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n[568] This is proved by Cic. Legg. i. 12, 33, in a chain-argument\nclearly borrowed from the Stoics: Quibus ratio a natura data est,\niisdem etiam recta ratio data est. Ergo et lex, qu\u00e6 est recta ratio in\njubendo et vetando. Si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus igitur\ndatum est omnibus. Upon this conception of law is based the Stoic\ndefinition of \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 as \u03b5\u1f50\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, that of \u1f01\u03bc\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 as \u1f00\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1.\n\n[569] The good alone, or virtue, is \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd; evil is \u03c6\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd. See p.\n229, 1; 238, 3, and Stob. Ecl. ii. 202. \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd is, however, Ibid. 126,\n132, \u1f43 \u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6, or, more accurately, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd; and \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd is accordingly distinguished from \u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u2014\u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\nbeing what is morally good, \u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd being everything which has value,\nincluding external goods. The Stoics make a further distinction\n(according to Stob. ii. 140 and 194) with unnecessary subtlety between\n\u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd and \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd, and similarly between \u1f40\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd and \u1f40\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd and \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd, using the first form to express the good in\nitself (for instance, \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), the latter to express the possession\nof the good (for instance, \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd).\n\n[570] \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 is defined by Stob. ii. 160, as \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74,\nwhich is contrasted therewith in Epict. Enchirid. 2, 2 Diss. iii. 2, 2,\n22, 36, as (according to the most probable correction of the text) \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. See p. 243, 3. A further distinction (connecting\nherewith what may be otherwise gathered from the statements of Stob\u00e6us\nrespecting the Stoic doctrine of impulses) is made between the impulses\nof reasonable beings and beings devoid of reason. It is only in the\ncase of reasonable beings that it can be said that impulse is called\nforth by the idea of a thing as something which has to be done\n(\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2); that every impulse contains an\naffirmative judgment in itself (\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), to which has been\nsuperadded a \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 applying to particular\npropositions (those in which truth and falsehood consist. See p. 110,\n3; 83, 2), whereas \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 applies to \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 (i.e. activities\nexpressed by verbs. See p. 95, 1 and 2), since every impulse and every\ndesire aims at the possession of a good. \u1f49\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 is defined to be\n\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, and is also called \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 (only a rational being being capable of \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2). If the \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 refers to something future, the \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 becomes an \u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, for\nwhich the text twice reads \u1f44\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Among the varieties of \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74, Stob. enumerates \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u1f74, \u1f10\u03b3\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,\n\u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, the definitions of which he\ngives, passing then to the doctrine of emotions, these being also a\nkind of \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae. It appears, therefore, that activities of feeling and\nwill are included in the conception of \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae, as will be subsequently\nseen more fully in the doctrine of emotions, the conception of which\nlikewise includes both.\n\n[571] Stob. ii. 116, similarly 108: \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03ba \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 [l. \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd] \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f00\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2,\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c9\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. Diog. 89, see p. 238, 3: The soul rests on\nthe harmony of life with itself (virtue); extraneous influences corrupt\nit, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. Sen. Ep. 108, 8: Facile\nest auditorem concitare ad cupiditatem recti: omnibus enim natura\nfundamenta dedit semenque virtutis.\n\n[572] The one point, according to Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 34, which\ndistinguishes man from God is, that God is absolutely rational and by\nnature good and wise.\n\n[573] Chrysippus (in Galen. De Hippocr. et Plat. iv. 2, vol. v. 368\nK\u00fchn): \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd (for so we must punctuate, the reference being to\n\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 and \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74, according to the definition, p. 242, 2) \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u1f60\u03b8\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. From this, it appears that\nChrysippus\u2019 definition of \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 6 = \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd) must not be understood (as in\nBaumhauer\u2019s Vet. Philos. Doct. De morte voluntaria, p. 74) to imply\nthat man has only rational, and no irrational impulses. Chrysippus, in\nthe passage quoted, must either be referring to that impulse which is\npeculiar to man, and is according to his nature; or else \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 must be\ntaken in its more extended meaning of notion or idea, for all impulses\nare based on judgments, see p. 242, 2; and it is clear, from Cic. Fin.\niii. 7, 23 (\u2018as our limbs are given to us for a definite purpose, so\n\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 is given for some definite object, and not for every kind of\nuse\u2019), that \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 is not in itself rational, but first becomes rational\nby the direction given to it by man.\n\n[574] The term emotion is used to express \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2, although the terms of\nmodern psychology are more or less inadequate to express the ancient\nideas, as Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 35, already observed.\n\n[575] Diog. vii. 110: \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f21 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1. The same definitions are\nfound in Stob. ii. 36, 166, with this difference, that \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b8\u1f74\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 stands in place of \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, as in Marc. Aurel. ii. 5. Cic.\nTusc. iii. 11, 24; iv. 6, 11; 21, 47; Chrysippus in Galen. De Hipp. et\nPlat. iv. 2, 4; v. 2, 4, vol. v. 368, 385, 432, 458 K\u00fchn, and Id. in\nPlut. Virt. Mor. 10, Schl. p. 450; Sen. Ep. 75, 12. A similar\ndefinition is attributed to Aristotle by Stob. ii. 36, but it is no\nlonger to be found in his extant writings. If it was in one of the lost\nbooks (Heeren suggests in the treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 Diog. v. 23),\nwas that book genuine?\n\n[576] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Cumque eas perturbationes [\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7] antiqui\nnaturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi\ncupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur\n[Zeno]. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat, opinionisque\njudicio suscipi, et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur esse matrem\nimmoderatam quandam intemperantiam. Fin. iii. 10, 35: Nec vero\nperturbationes animorum ... vi aliqua naturali moventur. Tusc. iv. 28,\n60: Ipsas perturbationes per se esse vitiosas nec habere quidquam aut\nnaturale aut necessarium.\n\n[577] See p. 215, 3; 242, 2.\n\n[578] Chrysippus, in Galen. iii. 7, p. 335; v. 1 and 6, p. 476, and\nabove, p. 215, 3.\n\n[579] Plut. Virt. Mor. 3, p. 441 (the first part of this passage has\nbeen already quoted, p. 215, 3, the continuation being) \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 [\u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd] \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c1\u1ff7 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. See below, note 3.\n\n[580] See p. 242, 2.\n\n[581] Diog. vii. 111: \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 3, p. 441: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c6\u03bf\u03b4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1fe5\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. Stob. ii. 168: \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 [instead of which read \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n... \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3. \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd.], \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 [add \u03b4\u1f72] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. Conf. Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Sed omnes\nperturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione ... opinationem autem\nvolunt esse imbecillam assensionem. Id. iii. 11, 24: Est ergo causa\nomnis in opinione, nec vero \u00e6gritudinis solum sed etiam reliquarum\nomnium perturbationum? Fin. iii. 10, 35: Perturbationes autem nulla\nnatur\u00e6 vi commoventur; omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac judicia levitatis.\nAcad. i. 10. See p. 244, 3.\n\n[582] Diog. l.c.\n\n[583] Cic. Tusc. iii. 11, 26; iv. 7, 14. Posidon. (in Galen. iv. 7, p.\n416): Chrysippus defined apprehension (\u1f04\u03c3\u03b7) as \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[584] See p. 242, 1.\n\n[585] Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 15: Sed qu\u00e6 judicia quasque opiniones\nperturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse\ndicunt, verum illa etiam, qu\u00e6 efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut \u00e6gritudo\nquasi morsum quendam doloris efficiat: metus recessum quendam animi et\nfugam: l\u00e6titia profusam hilaritatem; libido effrenatam appetentiam.\nGalen. Hipp. et Plat. iv. 3, p. 377: (\u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd) \u03bf\u1f33 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 [should perhaps be\nstruck out], \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 [both for \u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, and for \u03bb\u03ae\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 in the passage about to be\nquoted from Plutarch, Thurot, Etudes sur Aristote, p. 249, suggests\n\u03b4\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b4\u03ae\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 is more probable, confirmed too by Cicero\u2019s morsus\ndoloris] \u1f10\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c7\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7. Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, p. 449: \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c6\u03bf\u03b4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03bd \u1f97 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ae\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 [\u03b4\u03ae\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2] \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03b4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2.\nThe same results are involved in the definitions of emotion already\ngiven, p. 244, 2. In reference to this pathological action of\nrepresentations, one kind of emotions was defined (Stob. ii. 170; Cic.\nTusc. iv. 7, 14) as \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, or opinio recens boni (or mali)\npr\u00e6sentis, \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd being \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f22 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n[586] De Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 429): \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1ff3\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7, \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f10\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b9\u03b6\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7. Conf. iv. 2, p. 367, and 3, p. 377.\n\n[587] Diog. 111 (see above, p. 245, 3, and the definition quoted on p.\n245, 5) confirms the view that, in the passage referred to by Galenus,\nChrysippus explained the emotions to be \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Elsewhere Galenus\nasserts (iv. 2, p. 367) that he called \u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7 a \u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9; \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74, an \u1f14\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd; and charges\nhim (iv. 6, p. 403), quoting passages in support of the charge, with\ndeducing emotions from \u1f00\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 and \u1f00\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2. That Chrysippus\nagreed with Zeno in his definition of emotion, has already been stated\n(p. 244, 2). No doubt, too, with an eye to Chrysippus, Stob\u00e6us also\n(ii. 166) defines emotion as \u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03b1 (violent mental motion), the words\nused being \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 and, in\nGalenus (iv. 5, p. 392), Chrysippus says: \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03bd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03bf\u03b2\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u1fc6.\nChrysippus even repeatedly insists on the difference between emotion\nand error\u2014error being due to deficient knowledge, emotion to opposition\nto the claims of reason, to a disturbance of the natural relation of\nthe impulses (\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd). He shows\nthat both Zeno\u2019s definitions come to this (Galen. iv. 2, p. 368, and\niv. 4, p. 385; Stob. ii. 170), and elsewhere explains (Plut. Vir. Mor.\n10, p. 450) how emotion takes away consideration, and impels to\nirrational conduct. The quotations on p. 246, 1 from Cicero and Stob\u00e6us\nare an explanation of positions of Chrysippus, of which Chrysippus is\nhimself the source. And were he not directly the source, Galenus (iv.\n4, p. 390) observes that the view of Chrysippus on the emotions was\ngenerally held in the Stoic School after his time. In designating the\nemotions \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, Chrysippus cannot therefore have intended thereby to\nexclude the emotions of impulse and feeling. All that he meant was,\nthat emotions, as they arise in the individual soul (we should say as\nconditions of consciousness), are called forth by imagination. This is\nclear from the fact that the modes in which the pathological character\nof emotions displays itself are appealed to as evidence. See his words\nin Galen. iv. 6, p. 409. \u03c4\u1ff7 [l. \u03c4\u03cc] \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u1ff7 \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03be\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u2019 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc7 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. On the other hand,\nZeno never denied the influence of imagination on emotion, as is\nperfectly clear from the expression of Galenus, quoted pp. 246, 2; 246,\n1.\n\n[588] Stob. Ecl. ii. 190 (Floril. 46, 50): The wise man, according to\nthe Stoic teaching, exercises no indulgence; for indulgence would\nsuppose \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03bd.\n\n[589] Epictet. Diss. i. 18, 1\u20137; 28, 1\u201310; ii. 26; M. Aurel. ii. 1; iv.\n3; viii. 14; xi. 18; xii. 12.\n\n[590] This motive can be best gathered from the passages in Cicero\nalready quoted, p. 244, 3, and from Sen. De Ira, ii. 2, 1: Anger can do\nnothing by itself, but only animo adprobante ... nam si invitis nobis\nnascitur, nunquam rationi succumbet. Omnes enim motus qui non voluntate\nnostra fiunt invicti et inevitabiles sunt, &c.\n\n[591] See p. 179, 3, 4.\n\n[592] See p. 88, 1.\n\n[593] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Perturbationes voluntarias esse. Tusc. iv.\n7, 14: Emotions proceed from judgment; itaque eas definiunt pressius,\nut intelligatur non modo quam vitios\u00e6, sed etiam quam in nostra sunt\npotestate, upon which follow the definitions quoted, p. 246, 1.\n\n[594] Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 22: Omnium autem affectionum fontem esse dicunt\nintemperantiam (\u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1), qu\u00e6 est a tota mente et a recta ratione\ndefectio sic aversa a pr\u00e6scriptione rationis ut nullo modo adpetitiones\nanima nec regi nec contineri queant.\n\n[595] Stob. Ecl. ii. 170, probably from Chrysippus, of whom similar\nremarks were quoted, p. 246, 3: \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b2\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c6\u03bf\u03b4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 ... \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 ...\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be\u03b7\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f41\u03c4\u03c9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b6\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2. \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f20\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 ... \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 ... \u1f00\u03c6\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u03ac\u03b8\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c7\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f22 \u03c6\u03bf\u03b2\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f22 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2, \u1f45\u03bc\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03c6\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f04\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bd\u03af\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2. A different view is taken by Epictet. Diss. i. 28, 8, who \u00e0\npropos of Medea remarks: \u1f10\u03be\u03b7\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03be\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u1ff6\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9\n\u1f10\u03be\u03b7\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n[596] See p. 242, 2. The same idea is expressed in applying the terms\n\u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd and \u03c6\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd to good and evil (Stob. ii. 126 and 142; see p.\n229, 1, and 232, 3).\n\n[597] Stob. ii. 166; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11; iv. 7, 14; 15, 43; Fin. iii.\n10, 35.\n\n[598] According to Diog. 110, this distinction was found in the\ntreatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd.\n\n[599] In Clem. Strom. ii. 407, A, the words being \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c7\u03bf\u03c1\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd, \u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7\u03bd, \u03c6\u03cc\u03b2\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ba\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ac\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2.\n\n[600] The definition of \u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7 or \u1f04\u03c3\u03b7 (Cicero \u00e6gritudo) as \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 is explicitly referred to Chrysippus (more at length in\nCic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Opinio recens mali pr\u00e6sentis, in quo demitti\ncontrahique animo rectum esse videatur), as also the definition of\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 = \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b3\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. See p. 254, 4, 5. In\nlike manner \u03bc\u03ad\u03b8\u03b7, \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, and the other passions, were, according to\nDiog. 110, defined. To Chrysippus also belong the definitions\u2014quoted\nTusc. iv. 7, 14; iii. 11, 25\u2014of \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74 (l\u00e6titia, voluptas gestiens) =\nopinio recens boni pr\u00e6sentis, in quo efferri rectum videatur; of fear =\nopinio impendentis mali quod intolerabile esse videatur, agreeing with\nthe \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 of Diog. 112; of desire (cupiditas, libido,\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1) = opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu jam pr\u00e6sens esse atque\nadesse. It is, however, more common to hear \u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7 (Diog. 111; Stob. 172;\nCic. Tusc. iii. 11) described as \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b8\u1f74\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3, more\nbriefly \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, fear as \u1f14\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b8\u1f74\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3, \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74 even\naccording to Alex. Aphr. top. 96, as \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03ad\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, two different translations of which are given by Cic. l.c.\nand Fin. ii. 4, 13, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1 as \u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b8\u1f74\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3, or immoderata\nappetitio opinati magni boni. The latter definitions appear to belong\nto Zeno. They were probably appropriated by Chrysippus, and the\nadditions made which are found in Stob\u00e6us.\n\n[601] Further particulars may be gathered from Diog. vii. 111; Stob. ii\n174. Both include under \u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7 subdivisions as \u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c6\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u03b6\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03af\u03b1, \u1f04\u03c7\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, \u1f40\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7. Diogenes adds \u1f10\u03bd\u03cc\u03c7\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2;\nStob\u00e6us \u03c0\u03ad\u03bd\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f04\u03c7\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f04\u03c3\u03b7. Both include under \u03c6\u03cc\u03b2\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bc\u03b1, \u1f44\u03ba\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, \u1f14\u03ba\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b8\u03cc\u03c1\u03c5\u03b2\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f00\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1; Stob\u00e6us adds \u03b4\u03ad\u03bf\u03c2 and\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1. Under \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74, Diogenes includes \u03ba\u03ae\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1,\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2; Stob\u00e6us, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1f76, \u03b3\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1. Under \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, Diogenes places \u03c3\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03b9\u03c2, \u03bc\u1fd6\u03c3\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03af\u03b1, \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u1f74,\n\u1f14\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2, \u03bc\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2; Stob\u00e6us, \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 (\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2, \u03c7\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u03bc\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.), \u1f14\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c6\u03bf\u03b4\u03c1\u03bf\u1f76, \u03c0\u03cc\u03b8\u03bf\u03b9, \u1f35\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9,\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03b9. Definitions for all these\nterms\u2014which, without doubt, belong to Chrysippus\u2014may be found in the\nwriters named. Greek lexicographers may obtain many useful hints from\nStoic definitions.\n\n[602] Plut. Vir. Mor. 10, p. 449: \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03c6\u03bf\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f22 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9. The\nStoics are therefore anxious to make a marked distinction in the\nexpressions for emotions and the permitted mental affections, between\npleasure and joy, see p. 236, 2, fear and precaution (\u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1), desire\nand will (\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, Diog. 116; cupere et velle, Sen. Ep. 116, 1),\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7 and \u03b1\u1f30\u03b4\u1f7c\u03c2 (Plut. Vit. Pud. c. 2, p. 529).\n\n[603] On this favourite proposition of the Stoics, consult Diog. 115;\nStob. ii. 182; Cic. Tusc. iv. 10; whose remarkable agreement with\nStob\u00e6us seems to point to a common source of information directly or\nindirectly drawn upon by both; iii. 10, 23; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 2;\nSen. Ep. 75, 11. According to these passages, the Stoics distinguish\nbetween simple emotions and diseases of the soul. Emotions, in the\nlanguage of Seneca, are motus animi improbabiles soluti et concitati.\nIf they are frequently repeated and neglected, then inveterata vitia et\ndura, or diseases, ensue. Disease of the soul is therefore defined as\n\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c5\u03b7\u03ba\u03c5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03ba\u03b9\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f23\u03bd\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c6\u03cc\u03b4\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 (Stob. translations of\nthe definition in Cicero and Seneca). The opposite of such a \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1, or a\nconfusion arising from false fear, is an opinio vehemens inh\u00e6rens atque\ninsita de re non fugienda tanquam fugienda\u2014such as hatred of womankind,\nhatred of mankind, &c. If the fault is caused by some weakness which\nprevent our acting up to our better knowledge, the diseased states of\nthe soul are called \u1f00\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u00e6grotationes (Diog.; Stob.; Cic. Tusc.\niv. 13, 29); but this distinction is, of course, very uncertain. The\nsame fault is at one time classed among \u03bd\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9, at another among\n\u1f00\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1; and Cicero (11, 24; 13, 29) repeatedly observes that the\ntwo can only be distinguished in thought. Moreover, just as there are\ncertain predispositions (\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9) for bodily diseases, so within\nthe sphere of mind there are \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2. Diog., Stob., Cic.\n12. The distinction between vitia and morbi (Cic. 13) naturally\ncoincides with the distinction between emotions and diseases. The\nformer are caused by conduct at variance with principles, by\ninconstantia et repugnantia, likewise vitiositas in a habitus in tota\nvita inconstans; the latter consist in corruptio opinionum. It is not\nconsistent with this view to call \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2; and \u03bd\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9, as well\nas \u1f00\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 and \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 (Stob. ii. 100, on the\ndifference between \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, see 102, 1); and, accordingly,\nHeine suggests (De Font. Tuscul. Dis.: Weimar, 1863, p. 18) that, on\nthis point, Cicero may have given inaccurate information. The unwise\nwho are near wisdom are free from disease of the soul, but not from\nemotions (Sen., Cic.). The points of comparison between diseases of the\nbody and those of the soul were investigated by Chrysippus with\nexcessive care. Posidonius contradicted him, however, in part (Galen,\nl.c., Cic. 10, 23; 12, 27); but their differences are not of interest\nto us.\n\n[604] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque perturbationem animi illi\n[superiores] ex homine non tollerent ... sed eam contraherent in\nangustumque deducerent: hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere\nsapientem. Ibid. ii. 43, 135. We shall find subsequently that the\nmental affections, which cause emotions, are allowed to be unavoidable.\n\n[605] Cic. Tusc. iv. 17, 37.\n\n[606] Cic. Tusc. iii. 10, 22: Omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, magnum\nest. Nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. Ibid.\niv. 17, 39: Modum tu adhibes vitio? An vitium nullum est non parere\nrationi? Ibid. 18, 42: Nihil interest, utrum moderatas perturbationes\napprobent, an moderatam injustitiam, &c. Qui enim vitiis modum apponit,\nis partem suscipit vitiorum. Sen. Ep. 85, 5, says that moderation of\nemotions is equivalent to modice insaniendum, modice \u00e6grotandum. Ep.\n116, 1: Ego non video, quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla\nmediocritas morbi.\n\n[607] Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 2; particularly with reference to anger, conf.\nEp. 85, 10.\n\n[608] Full details are given by Cic. Tusc. iv. 19\u201326; Off. i. 25, 88;\nSen. De Ira, i. 5, 21; ii. 12; particularly with regard to the use of\nanger.\n\n[609] In the same spirit Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 1; 10, 2, meets the\nassertion that valour cannot dispense with anger by saying: Nunquam\nvirtus vitio adjuvanda est, se contenta ... absit hoc a virtute malum,\nut unquam ratio ad vitia confugiat.\n\n[610] Diog. vii. 117: \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03ad\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd (faultless) \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. From the apathy of the wise man, absence\nof feeling and severity, which are faults, must be distinguished.\n\n[611] Chrysippus (in Stob. Floril. vii. 21): \u1f00\u03bb\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03ad\u00b7 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7. Sen. De Prov. 6, 6; Ep. 85,\n29; Cic. Tusc. ii. 12, 29; 25, 61; iii. 11, 25.\n\n[612] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 12; Musonius (in Stob. Floril. 19, 16); Sen.\nDe Const. 2; 3; 5; 7; 12. The second title of this treatise is: nec\ninjuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem.\n\n[613] See 253, 2 and 3 and Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 19.\n\n[614] Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 20; Sen. De Clem. ii. 5; Diog. vii. 123.\n\n[615] Stob. Ecl. ii. 190; Floril. 46, 60; Sen. l.c. 5, 2; 7; Diog.\nl.c.; Gell. N. A. xiv. 4, 4.\n\n[616] Ps. Plut. Hom. 134: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3.\n\n[617] See p. 193. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b. Virtue consists in \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u1f74\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Diog. vii. 89 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. c. 6, p. 24): \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd\n\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd.\n\n[618] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque superiores (Aristotle and others)\nnon omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes\nnatura aut more perfectas: hic [Zeno] omnes in ratione ponebat.\n\n[619] Cic. Tusc. iv. 15, 34: Ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici\npotest. Conf. Sen. Ep. 113, 2: Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus\nquodammodo se habens, and the remarks, p. 128, 1; 129, 3.\n\n[620] The proof of this will be found subsequently in the Stoic\ndefinitions of various virtues and vices. Compare preliminarily 254, 6\nand Diog. vii. 93: \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f67\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9.\nStob. Ecl ii. 108: \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1fe5\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03ba \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. It is not opposed\nto these statements for Stob. ii. 92 and 110, to distinguish other\nvirtues besides those which are \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 and \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9; nor for Hecato\n(in Diog. vii. 90) to divide virtues into \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n(\u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd) and \u1f00\u03b8\u03b5\u03ce\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9; for by the latter must\nbe understood not the virtuous actions themselves, but only the states\nresulting from them\u2014health of soul, strength of will, and the like. On\nthe health of the soul, in its relation to virtue, see Cic. Tusc. iv.\n13, 30.\n\n[621] Diog. vii. 91 (following Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and others); Ps.\nPlut. V. Hom. 144.\n\n[622] See p. 260, 3.\n\n[623] Plut. Sto. Rep. 7; Diog. vii. 161; Galen, vii. 2, p. 595.\n\n[624] See p. 56.\n\n[625] See p. 58, 2. Diog. vii. 165, conf. 37: \u1f2d\u03c1\u03b9\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f00\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b4\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5. On the\ndefinition, see p. 82, 1.\n\n[626] Cleanthes (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 7): When \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, on which see p.\n128, 2, is found in the soul in a proper decree, \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f21 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f55\u03c4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. In the same way,\nChrysippus (according to Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iv. 6, p. 403) deduced\nwhat is good in our conduct from \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 and \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03cd\u03c2; what is bad, from\n\u1f00\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2; and (ibid. vii. 1, p. 590) he referred\nthe differences of individual virtues to changes in quality within the\nsoul. By Aristo, p. 220, 1, virtue is defined as health; by Stob. ii.\n104, as \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7; by Diog. 89, as \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7.\n\n[627] Sen. De Otio, i. (28) 4: Stoici nostri dicunt; usque ad ultimum\nvit\u00e6 finem in actu erimus, non desinemus communi bono operam dare, &c.\nNos sumus, apud quos usque eo nihil ante mortem otiosum est, ut, si res\npatitur, non sit ipsa mors otiosa.\n\n[628] This will appear from the definitions of virtue about to follow.\n\n[629] See pp. 59, 1; 56, 2.\n\n[630] See p. 254, 7. Sen. Ep. 65, 6, after describing a great and noble\nsoul, adds: Talis animus virtus est.\n\n[631] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: \u1f08\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u03a7\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f51\u03b3\u03af\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f60\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03b6\u03b5, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Id. on Zeno, see p. 260, 3,\nand Cleanthes, p. 236, 3. According to Galenus, Aristo defined the one\nvirtue to be the knowledge of good and evil (Hipp. et Plat. v. 5, p.\n468): \u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f08\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03a7\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b7\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f23\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\n\u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. vii. 2, p. 595. \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f41 \u1f08\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f97 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd. The statement that Aristo made health of soul consist\nin a right view of good and evil agrees with the language of Plutarch.\nPerhaps Zeno had already defined \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 as \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd.\n\n[632] Conf. p. 255. 1. Cic. De Off. i. 43, 153: Princepsque omnium\nvirtutum est illa sapientia, quam \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd Gr\u00e6ci vocant: prudentiam enim,\nquam Gr\u00e6ci \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd dicunt, aliam quandam intelligimus: qu\u00e6 est rerum\nexpetendarum fugiendarumque scientia. Illa autem scientia, quam\nprincipem dixi, rerum est divinarum atque humanarum scientia. A similar\ndefinition of wisdom, amplified by the words, nosse divina et humana et\nhorum causas, is found Ibid. ii. 2, 5. Sen. Ep. 85, 5; Plut. Plac.\nPro\u0153m. 2; Strabo, i. 1, 1. It may probably be referred to Chrysippus;\nand it was no doubt Chrysippus who settled the distinction between\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1 and \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, in the Stoic school, although Aristo had preceded\nhim in distinguishing them. Explaining particular virtues as springing\nfrom the essence of virtue, with the addition of a differential\nquality, he needed separate terms to express generic and specific\nvirtue. In Zeno\u2019s definition too, as later writers would have it (Plut.\nVir. Mat. 2), to \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 was given the meaning of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7.\n\n[633] \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Diog. 92; Stob. ii. 104. In stating that\nPosidonius counted four\u2014Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater more than\nfour\u2014virtues, Diogenes can only mean that the latter enumerated the\nsubdivisions, whereas Posidonius confined himself to the four main\nheads of the four cardinal virtues. Besides this division of virtues,\nanother, threefold, division is also met with, see p. 56, 2; 57, 1,\nthat into logical, physical, and ethical virtues. In other words, the\nwhole of philosophy and likewise its parts are brought under the notion\nof virtue; but it is not stated how this threefold division is to\nharmonise with the previous fourfold one. A twofold division, made by\nPan\u00e6tius and referred to by Seneca (Ep. 94, 45)\u2014that into theoretical\nand practical virtues\u2014is an approximation to the ethics of the\nPeripatetics.\n\n[634] The scheme was in vogue before Zeno\u2019s time. See Plut. Sto. Rep.\n7, 1, and the quotations, p. 260, 3.\n\n[635] \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd, or \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f67\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd. Stob. 102. Stob\u00e6us adds, that the\ndefinition needs to be completed by the words, occurring in the\ndefinition of every virtue, \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b6\u1ff4\u03bf\u03c5. But this is\nsuperfluous, for only in the case of such a being can the terms good\nand evil apply. Diog. 92; Sext. Math. xi. 170 and 246; Cic. l.c.\n\n[636] \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd (Stob. 104); \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\n\u1f67\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f67\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd (Diog.); \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u1f67\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u1f74\n\u03b8\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f22 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b8\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd (Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2, 597). Cic. Tusc.\niv. 24, 53, conf. v. 14, 41: (Chrysippus) fortitudo est, inquit,\nscientia perferendarum rerum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac\nperferendo, summ\u00e6 legi parens sine timore. The last-named\ncharacteristic appears still more strongly in the definition attributed\nto the Stoics by Cic. Off. i. 19, 62: Virtus propugnans pro \u00e6quitate.\n\n[637] \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd. Stob. 102. The\ndefinition of \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 in Cicero is the same, word for word. See p.\n258, 1; that of valour in Diogenes is not very different. Since all\nduties refer to \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1 and \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1, the definitions of the\nremaining virtues must necessarily agree with those of \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[638] \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3, in Stob. Id. p. 104,\nfurther enumerates the points of difference between the four virtues:\nintelligence refers to \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, self-control to impulses, valour to\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76, justice to \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03bc\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. See also the distinctive\npeculiarities of the four virtues in Stob. 112. Below, p. 263.\n\n[639] Diog. 93; Stob. 104. The \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03b9 are: \u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1,\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03af\u03b1. The definition of \u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7 is \u1f04\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd. See p. 255, 1.\n\n[640] This follows from the fact that the conception of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 is the\nbasis in all. See p. 258, 1.\n\n[641] Of Zeno, Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, says: \u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b4\u2019\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. The like in regard to justice in Sto. Rep. 7, 2.\nOn the other hand valour is here termed \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. He\nalso says, p. 440, that, according to Aristo, \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1 \u03ba\u03ad\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f54\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1, \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u00b7 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f41\u03bc\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7. Further\nparticulars as to Aristo may be found in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2,\np. 595: Since the soul has only one power, the power of thought, it can\nonly have one virtue, the \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd. \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03ad\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b5\u03cd\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f70, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5 \u03bb\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f70, \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f70,\n\u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b8\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u1fc7, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03b5\u03cd\u03b3\u1fc3\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019\n\u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03bd\u03ad\u03bc\u1fc3, \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f11\u03bd\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3, \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\n\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f70 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7, \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c6\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9 \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1. We know, from Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 4, see p. 256, 3, that,\naccording to Cleanthes, strength of mind, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2,\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u00b7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72, \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u00b7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7. With him, too, if Plutarch\u2019s account is accurate,\n\u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, or perseverance, takes the place of \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Cic. Tusc. iv.\n24, 53, quotes no less than three definitions of bravery given by\nSph\u00e6rus. See p. 259, 3.\n\n[642] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, charges him with creating a \u03c3\u03bc\u1fc6\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u1fc6\u03b8\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd, and forming a \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u1f10\u03c3\u03b8\u03bb\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2,\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f50\u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03bb\u03af\u03b1, after the\nanalogy of \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb3\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, &c. In Stob. ii. 118, among the Stoic\nvirtues, is found an \u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 as \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03bd\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u03b8\u03ae\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c5\u1ff6\u03bd, &c., and a\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 as \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f10\u03be\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. An \u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 and \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74 are also mentioned by\nPhilodem. De Mus. col. 15. According to Athen. 162, b (Vol. Herc. i.),\nPers\u00e6us, in his \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9, had discussed \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 at length;\nand since, according to the Stoics (Sen. Ep. 123, 15: Stob. l.c.),\nnone but the wise know how to live aright and how to drink aright,\nthese arts belong to a complete treatment of wisdom.\n\n[643] Stob. 106, includes under \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f50\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03af\u03b1, \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03b1,\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03c7\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u03b5\u1f50\u03bc\u03b7\u03c7\u03b1\u03bd\u03af\u03b1; under \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1, \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2,\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1; under \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, \u03b8\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2,\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1, \u03b5\u1f50\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1, \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1; under \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03ad\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 (on which\nDiog. 119), \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1. Diog. 126, is\nslightly different. Stob\u00e6us gives the definitions of all these virtues,\nand Diogenes of some. By Stob\u00e6us, they are generally described as\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9; by Diogenes, as \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 or \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Otherwise, the\ndefinitions are the same. A definition of \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1 is given by Cic. Off.\ni. 40, 142.\n\n[644] Diog. 93; Stob. 104.\n\n[645] Sto. Rep. 7.\n\n[646] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: \u1f08\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u03a7\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f51\u03b3\u03af\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f60\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03b6\u03b5\u00b7 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f45\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03ad\u03b1\u03bd \u1f24 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f21\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. See p. 260, 3. \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b1\u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f13\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b9\u1fb7 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[647] Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 1, p. 590: \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f41 \u1f00\u03bd\u1f74\u03c1 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\n\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Conf. note 5 and Diog. vii. 161: \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2 \u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1fc6\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd,\n\u1f61\u03c2 \u1f41 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u039c\u03b5\u03b3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 [l. \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd (scil. \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd).\n\n[648] See p. 260, 3.\n\n[649] Their distinguishing features fall under the category of \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd,\nto use Stoic terms, not under that of \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, as Aristo\nmaintained.\n\n[650] Galenus l.c. continues: \u1f41 \u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03ba\u03bd\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bb\u1fc6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2. Plut. Sto.\nRep. 7, 3: \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f08\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. Id. Vir. Mor. 2: \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[651] Stob. ii. 110: \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1\u03af \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 (compare on this additions p. 255, 1) \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 (p. 108\u2014the same is more fully set forth by\nPan\u00e6tius, p. 112), \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd.\nDiog. 125: \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70, as Chrysippus,\nApollodorus, and Hecato assert. \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ac\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd. \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1, knowledge and action including all the four\nprincipal instincts.\n\n[652] Cic. Parad. 3, 1: Una virtus est, consentiens cum ratione et\nperpetua constantia. Nihil huic addi potent, quo magis virtus sit;\nnihil demi, ut virtus nomen relinquatur. Conf. Sen. Ep. 66, 9. See p.\n267.\n\n[653] Stob. 112 (conf. Diog. 126): \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c6\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f43\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f03 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f43 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2\n\u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b5\u03c6\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2,\n\u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Similarly of\nbravery, which has for its basis \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f43 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd; and of justice,\nwhich has \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3. Plut. Alex. Virt. 11: The Stoics teach\nthat \u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[654] Stob. 116: \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. Plut. Sto. Rep. 27, 1,\nconf. Alex. Virt. l.c.: \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 [\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2] \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f41\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f25\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2. If Chrysippus allowed, as Plutarch states,\nthat the brave man does not always act bravely, nor the bad man always\nlike a coward, it was a confession to which he was driven by\nexperience, contrary to Stoic principles.\n\n[655] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Nec virtutis usum modo [Zeno dicebat] ut\nsuperiores (whom the Stoic evidently wrongs), sed ipsum habitum per se\nesse pr\u00e6clarum. Id. Parad. 3, 1: Nec enim peccata rerum eventu sed\nvitiis hominum metienda sunt. Sen. Benef. vi. 11, 3: Voluntas est, qu\u00e6\napud nos ponit officium, which Cleanthes then proceeds to illustrate by\na parable of two slaves, one of whom diligently seeks for the man whom\nhe is sent to find but without success, whilst the other taking it easy\naccidentally comes across him. Ibid. i. 5, 2: A benefaction is only\nipsa tribuentis voluntas. 6, 1: Non quid fiat aut quid detur refert,\nsed qua mente.\n\n[656] Compare also the paradoxical statement\u2014Qui libenter beneficium\naccepit, reddidit\u2014which Sen. l.c. ii. 31, 1, justifies by saying: Cum\nomnia ad animum referamus, fecit quisque quantum voluit.\n\n[657] Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 6, 19:\n\n \u1f45\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\n \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u1fc3.\n\n[658] On the notions of \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 and \u1f01\u03bc\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 11,\n1: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f01\u03bc\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1. To a bad man, law only gives prohibitions, and not\ncommands: \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd. Chrysippus, Ibid. 15, 10: \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9. Stob. ii. 192: \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u2019\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 (examples of the latter are speaking, giving, &c.) ... \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1,\n\u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1.\n\n[659] It is to this view that the distinction between \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 and\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd refers from the one side. A \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd (the conceptions of which\nwill be subsequently more fully discussed) is, in general, any\ndischarge of duty, or rational action; \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 only refers to a\nperfect discharge of duty, or to a virtuous course of conduct. Conf.\nStob. 158: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f03 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n... \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c9\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Similarly, 184: A\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 is a \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2. Cic. Fin. iii. 18,\n59: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id\nautem est perfectum officium; erit autem etiam inchoatum; ut, si juste\ndepositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1) ponatur\ndepositum reddere. Off. i. 3, 8: Et medium quoddam officium dicitur et\nperfectum; the former is called \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, the latter \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd. A\nvirtuous action can only be done by one who has a virtuous intention,\ni.e. by a wise man. Cic. Fin. iv. 6, 15: If we understand by a life\naccording to nature, what is rational, rectum est, quod \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\ndicebas, contingitque sapienti soli. Off. iii. 3, 14: Illud autem\nofficium, quod rectum iidem [Stoici] appellant, perfectum atque\nabsolutum est, et, ut iidem dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nec pr\u00e6ter\nsapientem, cadere in quenquam potest. Off. iii. 4, 16: When the Decii\nand Scipios are called brave, Fabricius and Aristides just, Cato and\nL\u00e6lius wise, the wisdom and virtue of the wise man are not attributed\nto them in the strict sense of the term: sed ex mediorum officiorum\nfrequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientum.\n\n[660] See p. 263, 2.\n\n[661] In Simpl. Categ. 61, \u03b2 (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28), the Stoics\nsay: \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03af\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ad\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. Thus straightness is, for instance, a\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, and no mere \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2. \u03bf\u1f51\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u03bf\u1f50 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03c0\u03af\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03c0\u03af\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f24\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03c5\u03c3\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03bc\u1f74 (add \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba) \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Conf. p. 103, 1. Ibid. 72, \u03b4 (Schol. 76, a, 12): \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f35\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03bd\u03af\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03bd. Simpl. (73, \u03b1. Schol. 76, a,\n24) replies: This would be true, if virtue consisted only in\ntheoretical conviction: such a conviction must be either true or false,\nand does not admit of more or less truth (for the same line of\nargument, see p. 267, 1); but it is otherwise where it is a matter for\nexercise. It may be remarked, in passing, that a further distinction\nwas made between \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74 and \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7\u2014the one being preceded by an \u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u1f74, the other by a simple \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 (Simpl. Categ. 62, \u03b2;\nSchol. 71, a, 38). There is also a definition of \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7 attributed by\nOlympiodorus, in Gorg. 53 (Jahrb. f\u00fcr Philol. See Supplementb. xiv.\n239), to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus; to Zeno in Sext. Pyrrh. iii.\n241; Math. vii. 109 and 373; more fully in Lucian, Paras. c. 4, Conf.\nCic. Acad. ii. 7, 22.\n\n[662] Diog. vii. 127: \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u1f7a \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03ae\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f22 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03be\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03b2\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f22\n\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f04\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2. Similarly, Sen. Ep. 71, 18: Quod summum bonum est, supra\nse gradum non habet ... hoc nec remitti nec intendi posse, non magis,\nquam regulam, qua rectum probari solet, flectes. Quicquid ex illa\nmutaveris injuria est recti. Stob. ii. 116: \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03cd.\n\n[663] The much-discussed paradox (Cic. Parad. 3; Fin. iv. 27; Diog. 101\nand 120; Stob. 218; Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 1; Sext. Math. vii. 422; Sen.\nEp. 66, 5) is this: \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f34\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1. It was,\naccording to Diog., supported, on the one hand, by the proposition, \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u1f04\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9;\non the other hand, by the remark, to which Sext. and Simpl. in Categ.,\nSchol. in Arist. 76, a, 30, refer: If truth and falsehood admit of no\ndifference of degree, the same must be true of the errors of our\nconduct. A man is not at the mark, no matter whether he is one or a\nhundred stadia away. Similarly, Stob\u00e6us: The Stoics declare all errors\nto be \u1f34\u03c3\u03b1, although not \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u00b7 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03ad\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u00b7 (a statement quoted as Stoical by Alex. in Metaph. p. 258,\n3 Bon. 667, a, 19 Brand) every \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 is the result of a \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. It\nis, however, impossible for \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 not to be equal to one another,\nif vices are equal; \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03b8\u2019\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u2019 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd. Cicero and Seneca devoted particular\nattention to this enquiry. The investigations of Cicero in the Paradoxa\nresult in bringing him to the passage quoted p. 263, 2, from which it\nfollows that nothing can be recto rectius, nor bono melius. The\nequality of faults is a corollary from the equality of virtues; it also\nfollows from the consideration that whatever is forbidden at all is\nequally forbidden. De Fin.: It is said, all faults are equal, quia nec\nhonesto quidquam honestius nec turpi turpius. Seneca (Ep. 66, 5) raises\nthe question, How, notwithstanding the difference between goods (see p.\n230, 3 end), can all be equal in value? and at once replies: Is\nvirtue\u2014or, what is the same thing, a rightly moulded soul\u2014the only\nprimary good? Virtue, indeed, admits of various forms, according to the\nactivities imposed on it, but can neither be increased nor diminished;\nDecrescere enim summum bonum non potest, nec virtuti ire retro licet.\nIt cannot increase, quando incrementum maximo non est: nihil invenies\nrectius recto, non magis quam verius vero, quam temperato temperatius.\nAll virtue consists in modo, in certa mensura. Quid accedere perfecto\npotest? Nihil, aut perfectum non erat, cui accessit: ergo ne virtuti\nquidem, cui si quid adjici potest, defuit ... ergo virtutes inter se\npares sunt et opera virtutis et omnes homines, quibus ill\u00e6 contigere\n... una inducitur humanis virtutibus regula. Una enim est ratio recta\nsimplexque. Nihil est divino divinius, c\u0153lesti c\u0153lestius. Mortalia\nminuuntur ... crescunt, &c.; divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem\nnihil aliud est, quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa ...\nnullum porro inter divina discrimen est: ergo nec inter bona. Ibid. 32:\nOmnes virtutes rationes sunt: rationes sunt rect\u00e6: si rect\u00e6 sunt, et\npares sunt. Qualis ratio est, tales et actiones sunt: ergo omnes pares\nsunt: ceterum magna habebunt discrimina variante materia, etc. On the\nsame ground, Seneca, Ep. 71, defended the equality of all goods and of\nall good actions, in particular p. 18, where to the quotation given, p.\n266, 3, the words are added: Si rectior ipsa [virtus] non potest fieri,\nnec qu\u00e6 ab illa quidem fiunt, alia aliis rectiora sunt.\n\n[664] Plut. C. Not. 10, 4: \u03bd\u03b1\u1f76, \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f41 \u03c0\u1fc6\u03c7\u03c5\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bd\u03af\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03b4\u03c5\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u03c5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b5\u03bb\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u1fb3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c4\u03c5\u03c6\u03bb\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c5\u03c6\u03bb\u03bf\u03af \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u1f40\u03bb\u03af\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03cc\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f57 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c7\u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Diog. 127 (see p. 266, 3).\nStob. ii. 236: \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f34\u03c3\u03c9\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f34\u03c3\u03b7\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Cic. Fin. iii. 14, 48: Consentaneum est his qu\u00e6\ndicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem quod appellamus\nextremum quod ultimum crescere putent posse, iisdem placere, esse alium\nalio etiam sapientiorem, itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte\nfacere. Quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non\nputamus. Then follow the same comparisons as in Plutarch. Sen. Ep. 66,\n10: As all virtues are equal, so are omnes homines quibus ill\u00e6\ncontigere. Ep. 79, 8: What is perfect admits of no increase; quicunque\nfuerint sapientes pares erunt et \u00e6quales.\n\n[665] Stob. ii. 198: \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u03b5 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[666] Plut. Aud. Poet. 7, p. 25: \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u1fe6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f56 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[667] Stob. Ecl. ii. 116; 120; 196; 198; 220; 232; Diog. vii. 117; 125;\nCic. Acad. i. 10, 38; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 1; Sen. Benef.\niv. 26; Sext. Math. vii. 434.\n\n[668] Compare the collection of expressions respecting the wise and\nunwise in Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. p. 169.\n\n[669] Diog. 121; 32; Cic. Acad. ii. 44. 136. Parad. 5: \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c6\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[670] Plut. C. Not. 28, 1; Cic. Acad. l.c.: Sext. Math xi. 170.\n\n[671] Cic. Parad. 6; Acad. l.c.; Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 94, 28;\nSext. l.c.; Alex. Aphr. Top. 79.\n\n[672] Sen. Benef. vii. 3, 2; 6, 3; 8, 1.\n\n[673] Cic. Acad. l.c.; Diog. vii. 125.\n\n[674] Cic. l.c.; Diog. vii. 122; Stob. ii. 206; Plut. Arat. 23. On all\nthe points discussed, Plut. C. Not. 3, 2; De Adul. 16, p. 58; Tran. An.\n12, p. 472; Ps. Plut. De Nobil. 17, 2; Cic. Fin. iii. 22, 75; Hor. Ep.\ni. 1, 106; Sat. i. 3, 124.\n\n[675] Plut. Tran. An. 12; Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 129: Stob. ii. 122; conf.\nPs. Plut. Vit. Hom. 143.\n\n[676] Stob. ii. 122 and 216; Diog. 119; Sen. Provid. i. 5. Philodemus,\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 (Vol. Hercul. vi. 29), quotes a Stoic saying that\nthe wise are the friends of heaven, and heaven of the wise.\n\n[677] Sen. Ep. 81, 11; Stob. ii. 118.\n\n[678] Sen. Benef. v. 12, 3; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 1: C. Not. 20, 1; and\nabove, p. 230, 1.\n\n[679] Stob. ii. 196; Plut. Stoic. Abs. Po\u00ebt. Dic. 1, 4.\n\n[680] Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 2; Com. Not. 33, 2; Stob. ii.\n198. Seneca, Prov. i. 5: Bonus ipse tempore tantum a Deo differt. Ibid.\n6, 4: Jupiter says to the virtuous: Hoc est, quo Deum antecedatis: ille\nextra patientiam malorum est, vos supra patientiam. Ep. 73, 11; De\nConst. 8, 2; Cic. N. D. ii. 61, 153; Epictet. Diss. i. 12, 26; Man. 15;\nHorat. Ep. i. l. 106.\n\n[681] See p. 239, 1; Sen. Ep. 53, 11: Non multo te Di antecedent ...\ndiutius erunt. At mehercules magni artificis est clusisse totum in\nexiguo. Tantum sapienti sua, quantum Deo omnis \u00e6tas patet. 73, 13:\nJupiter quo antecedit virum bonum? Diutius bonus est: sapiens nihilo se\nminoris \u00e6stimat, quod virtutes ejus spatio breviore cluduntur.\n\n[682] \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c6\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Cic. Parad. 4; Tusc. iii. 5, 10; Diog. vii.\n124; Stob. Ecl. ii. 124; Horat. Sat. ii. 3, 43.\n\n[683] The Peripatetic Diogenianus raises the objection (in Eus. Pr\u00e6p.\nEv. vi. 8, 10): \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c6\u1fc2\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f43\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c3\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f34\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f48\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03bb\u03ba\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9, \u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6; \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f22 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf\n\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c6\u1fc2\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. Similarly Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5.\n\n[684] Sext. Math. ix. 90 in the argument quoted, p. 146, 1: Man can be\nthe most perfect being, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03ae \u03b3\u03b5, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f34 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2,\n\u1f40\u03c8\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03c5\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[685] This point will be again considered in the next chapter. Compare\nat present Sext. Math. ix. 133, who says: \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03af\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u1f24\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c7\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6. Alex. Aphrod. De Fat. 28, p. 90: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f37\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03bc\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03bf\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03a6\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 ... \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5, \u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2. Philodem. De Mus.\n(Vol. Herc. i.), col. 11, 18: The Stoic cannot take his stand upon the\nopinion of the majority (consensus gentium), since he has declared it\nto be profane and impious.\n\n[686] Benef. i. 10, 1\u20133.\n\n[687] De Ira, iii. 26, 4; Benef. v. 17, 3.\n\n[688] De Clemen. i. 6, 3; De Ira, ii. 28, 1; iii. 27, 3.\n\n[689] Ep. 41, 9; Vit. Be. i. 4.\n\n[690] See the pathetic description, De Ira, ii. 8\u201310, amongst other\npassages the following: Ferarum iste conventus est: ... certatur\ningenti quidem nequiti\u00e6 certamine: major quotidie peccandi cupiditas,\nminor verecundia est, &c.\n\n[691] Diog. vii. 91: \u03c4\u03b5\u03ba\u03bc\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f51\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41\n\u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd, \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd. The limitation likewise\ncontained herein will be presently discussed. Epictet. Man. 15,\nmentions Heraclitus as well as Diogenes as \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03b9.\n\n[692] See the immoderate language of praise of his admirer Sen. De\nConst. 7, 1: The wise man is no unreal ideal, although, like everything\nelse that is great, he is seldom met with; ceteram hic ipse M. Cato\nvereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit. Ibid. 2, 1: Catonem autem certius\nexemplar sapientis viri nobis Deos immortales dedisse quam Ulixen et\nHerculem prioribus s\u00e6culis.\n\n[693] Plutarch, Prof. in Virt. 2, p. 76; Cic. Off. iii. 4, 16, p. 265,\n2.\n\n[694] Sen. Benef. iv. 27, 2: Itaque errant illi, qui interrogant\nStoicos: quid ergo? Achilles timidus est? quid ergo? Aristides, cui\njustitia nomen dedit, injustus est? &c. Non hoc dicimus, sic omnia\nvitia esse in omnibus, quomodo in quibusdam singula eminent: sed malum\nac stultum nullo vitio vacare ... omnia in omnibus vitia sunt, sed non\nomnia in singulis extant (i.e., all points are not equally prominent in\neach one). It hardly requires to be pointed out how nearly this view\ncoincides with that of Augustine on the virtues of the heathen, how\nclose a resemblance the Stoic doctrine of folly bears to the Christian\ndoctrine of the unregenerate, and how the contrast between wisdom and\nfolly corresponds to that between the faithful and unbelievers.\n\n[695] Plut. C. N. 10, 1; Prof. in Virt. 12, p. 82; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.\n\n[696] Plut. C. Not. 9; Stoic. Abs. Po\u00ebt. Dic. 2. The Stoics are here\nridiculed because, according to their view, a man may go to bed ugly,\npoor, vicious, miserable, and rise the next morning wise, virtuous,\nrich, happy, and a king. In Prof. in Virt. 1, p. 75, a saying of Zeno\u2019s\nis given, that it is possible to tell by a dream whether we are\nadvancing in virtue.\n\n[697] See p. 266, 3; Plut. Prof. in Virt. 1; Com. Not. 10, 2; see p.\n269, 1; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.\n\n[698] Plut. C. Not. 9, 1: \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f34\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f00\u03b8\u03bb\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f62\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd. So Sto. Rep. 19, 3. In explanation of these words,\nRitter, iii. 657, aptly refers to Stob. ii. 234 (\u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2), and Philo,\nDe Agric. p. 325: Those yet inexperienced in wisdom \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03af\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f04\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u1f04\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bb\u03b7\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f01\u03c8\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bc\u03ae\u03c7\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c6\u03b9\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c6\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Sen. Ep. 75, 9, likewise\ninvestigates the same point, but ranges those who have not yet attained\nthe consciousness of perfection among advancers, but not among the\nwise. Prantl\u2019s conjecture (Gesch. d. Logik, i. 490, 210), that the\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f7c\u03c2 is connected with the fallacy known as \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd,\nappears to be questionable.\n\n[699] See p. 230, 3.\n\n[700] Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17. Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7: The primary objects\nof natural self-love are the \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd; and self-love consists\nmainly in this: Ut omnibus corporis sui commodis gauderet\n[unusquisque], ab incommodis omnibus abhorreret. Stob. Ecl. ii. 142:\nSome things are according to nature, others contrary to nature, others\nneither one nor the other. Health, strength, and such like, are among\nthings according to nature. Ibid. p. 148: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd. \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7,\n\u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u1f7c \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03cd\u03bd. \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b4\u1f72 ... \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03b5\u1f76\u03c1 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd. Conf. Ibid. p. 60, where\nthe enumeration of the \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd is also in the Stoic sense, and\nabove, p. 225.\n\n[701] Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 50: Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum:\nquam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab\nAristone: nec ullum sapientis munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res\neas, qu\u00e6 ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset neque\nullum delectum adhiberi oporteret. The same argument was used by the\nStoa against the theoretical \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 of the Sceptics (see above, p.\n37, 1), with which the practical \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 of Aristo is most closely\nconnected. It differs only in name from the \u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1 of the sceptics,\nAristo having a leaning towards Scepticism. See p. 61, 1.\n\n[702] Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 21: Prima est enim conciliatio [\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2]\nhominis ad ea qu\u00e6 sunt secundum naturam, simul autem cepit\nintelligentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd illi,\nviditque rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam, multo eam\npluris \u00e6stimavit quam omnia ilia qu\u00e6 primum dilexerat: atque ita\ncognitione et ratione collegit ut statueret in eo collocatum summum\nillud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum ... cum igitur in eo\nsit id bonum, quo referenda sint omnia ... quamquam post oritur, tamen\nid solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est, eorum autem qu\u00e6 sunt prima\nnatur\u00e6 propter se nihil expetendum, &c. Similarly Gell. l.c.\n\n[703] Plut. Com. Not. 4; Cic. Fin. iv. 17; v. 24, 72; 29, 89.\n\n[704] Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 22: Ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo\nreferri, ut adipiscamur principia natur\u00e6: nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum\nultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis natur\u00e6 conciliationibus\nhonesta actio. Consequens enim est et post oritur.\n\n[705] Plut. C. Not. 26, 2: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd [\u03c4\u1f70] \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f70\n\u03bc\u03ae \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f21 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u1fc6\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019\n\u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f34\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u03b1\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ae\u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c6\u03b9\u03b5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03bf\u1f57 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u1f74\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bc\u1f74 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1. \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03c2\u00b7\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1. Cic. See p. 279, 3.\n\n[706] Cic. l.c. 6, 20; Plut. l.c.; Stob. ii. 142: Diog. vii. 105.\n\n[707] See p. 232. Stob. ii. 132: \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[708] Diog. vii. 165: Herillus taught \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03af\u03b4\u03b1\u00b7\n(On this expression compare Stob. ii. 60) \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03bd. Hence Cic. Fin. iv. 15, 40,\nraises the objection, Facit enim ille duo sejuncta ultima bonorum,\nbecause he neither despises external things, nor connects them with the\nultimate aim. Diog. l.c., however, says that he taught \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u1f7a \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9; and Cic. Off. i. 2, 6, mentions him,\ntogether with Pyrrho and Aristo, as upholders of \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1. It would\nappear from these passages that Herillus was not far removed from true\nStoicism. According to Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43 (conf. Offic.), he had no\nfollowers after the time of Chrysippus.\n\n[709] Cic. Legg. i. 21, 55: Si, ut Chius Aristo dixit, solum bonum esse\ndiceret quod honestum esset malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnes\nplane pares ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse.\nIbid. 13, 38. Fin. iv. 17, 47: Ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia\ndicentis, nihil differre aliud ab alio nec esse res ullas pr\u00e6ter\nvirtutes et vitia intra quas quidquam omnino interesset. Ibid. ii. 13,\n43; iii. 3, 11; 15, 50; iv. 16, 43; 25, 68; v. 25, 73; Acad. ii. 42,\n130; Offic. Fragm. Hortens. (in Nonn. Pr\u00e6fract.); Diog. vii. 160; Sext.\nMath. xi. 64. Cic. usually places Aristo together with Pyrrho.\n\n[710] Diog. l.c.: \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u1f7a \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. Cic. Acad. l.c.: Huic summum bonum est\nin his rebus (the morally adiaphora) neutram in partem moveri; qu\u00e6\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 ab ipso dicitur. Chrysippus, in Plut. C. Not. 27, 2:\nIndifference to that which is neither good nor bad presupposes the idea\nof the good, and yet, according to Aristo, the good only consists in\nthat state of indifference. Stob. i. 920; Clem. Strom. ii. 416, C. See\nCic. Fin. iv. 25, 68, for Chrysippus\u2019 attack on this \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1.\n\n[711] Diog. vii. 105: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1. \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. By \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1, the three meanings of which are discussed, they\nunderstand here \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd. 107: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u1fc6\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019\n\u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1.... \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af. \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f40\u03bb\u03af\u03b3\u03b1\u03c2. \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd. Essentially the same account,\nonly somewhat fuller, in Stob. Ecl. ii. 142. Conf. Cic. Acad. i. 10,\n36; Fin. iii. 15, 50; iv. 26, 72; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 191; Math. xi. 60;\nAlex. Aphr. De An. 157. Zeno (in Stob. 156; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 52)\nexplains the conception \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, and its distinction from \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd:\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f43 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f42\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd ... \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03b3\u03b3\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03bb\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03ad\u03b1, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[712] Stob. ii. 142: \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u1f7a \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u03c7\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u2014\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b1\u03be \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1. Similarly\nDiog. vii. 104. Sext. M. vi. 60, distinguishes a third meaning. It is,\nhowever, only a subdivision of the second.\n\n[713] Stob. ii. 144, 156; Sext. P. iii. 191; M. xi. 62.\n\n[714] Diog. xii. 106; Stob. ii. 142; Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 51; Sext. l.c.;\nPlut. Sto. Rep. 30. The Stoics were not altogether agreed as to whether\nfame after death belongs to things to be desired. According to Cic.\nFin. iii. 17, 57, Chrysippus and Diogenes denied it; whereas the\nyounger Stoics, pressed by the Academician Carneades, allowed it. Sen.\nEp. 102, 3, even quotes it as a Stoic maxim that posthumous fame is a\ngood. But probably bonum is here inaccurately used for \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[715] Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 34; 16, 52; Sext. M. xi. 62. See p. 232, 3 and\n283, 2.\n\n[716] Sen. Ep. 9, 14: Sapientem nulla re egere [\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9], et tamen\nmultis illi rebus opus esse [\u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9].\n\n[717] Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 4: \u1f10\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f70\n\u03c4\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03b5\u1f34 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u1f70\u03c2 (with reference to the greatness of the difference between\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n... \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u03b1\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. See p. 284, 1; Cic. Fin.\niv. 25, 68, and the previous remarks on the division of goods, p. 230,\n3. Diog. 103, says that Posidonius included bodily and external\nadvantages among the \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac. In Sen. Ep. 87, 35, he, however, expressly\nproves that they are not goods.\n\n[718] Sen. Ep. 95, 5: Antipater quoque inter magnos sect\u00e6 hujus\nauctores aliquid se tribuere dicit externis (namely for the perfection\nof the highest good), sed exiguum admodum. Seneca here declaims, in the\nspirit of strict Stoicism, against such a heresy, but he himself says\n(De Vit. Be. 22, 5): Apud me diviti\u00e6 aliquem locum habent, only not\nsummum et postremum. But what philosopher would have said they had\nthis?\n\n[719] De Vit. Bea. 21.\n\n[720] Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51; 13, 55; 23, 91; 15, 63; 23, 89. Diogenes\nof Seleucia says that it is permitted to circulate base money,\nknowingly to conceal defects in a purchase from the purchaser, and such\nlike. Hecato of Rhodes, a pupil of Pan\u00e6tius, thinks that not only will\na wise man look after his property by means lawful and right, but he\nbelieves that in a famine he will prefer letting his slaves starve, to\nmaintaining them at too great a sacrifice.\n\n[721] According to Cic. Off. ii. 14, 51, he would allow an attorney to\nignore truth, provided his assertions were at least probable.\n\n[722] Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 2.\n\n[723] Ibid. 5.\n\n[724] According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3 and 7 and 10; 30, 3, Diog.\nvii. 188, Stob. ii. 224, the Stoics, following Chrysippus, admit three\nways of earning an honest livelihood\u2014by teaching, by courting the rich,\nby serving states and princes. The first and the last were no longer\ncondemned in the Alexandrian period, as they had been before, but still\nthey were in bad repute, and the second was particularly so. Still more\nat variance with Greek customs was the course advocated by Chrysippus\n(in Plut. Sto. Rep. 30): \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c5\u03b2\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. Chrysippus himself (in Diog.) enumerates the objections to\nthe modes of life just named, and, in general, to all trading for\nmoney, but his objections cannot have appeared to him conclusive.\n\n[725] Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 1 and 3. Com. Not. 12, 4: \u03bb\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd\n\u1f04\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u1fc3 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd; or, as it is\nexpressed, 11, 8: Heraclitus and Pherecydes would have done well to\nrenounce their wisdom, if they could thereby have got rid of their\nsickness. A prudent man would rather be a fool in human shape than a\nwise man in the shape of a beast.\n\n[726] \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, an expression introduced by Zeno, according to Diog.\n108.\n\n[727] See p. 265.\n\n[728] Diog. 107: \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f43 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u2019 \u1f34\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b6\u03c9\u1fc7 (the same in Cicero), \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f41\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u1f00\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. Stob.\n158: \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b6\u03c9\u1fc7, \u1f43 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2. \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u1f00\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u1ff3. \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd is,\nin general, what is according to nature, with which \u1f00\u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\ncoincides. (See p. 228, 2.) See Diog. 108: \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 [\u03c4\u1f78\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd] \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[729] Diog. vii. 109: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03b5\u03af\u00b7\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u1fb7\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1. Cic. Fin. iii. 17, 58: Eat\nautem officium quod ita factum est, ut ejus facti probabilis ratio\nreddi possit. Ex quo intelligitur, officium medium quoddam esse, quod\nneque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis ... quoniam enim videmus,\n&c. (see p. 265, 2) ... quoniamque non dubium est, quin in iis qu\u00e6\nmedia dicimus sit aliud sumendum aliud rejiciendum, quidquid ita fit\naut dicitur communi officio continetur. Also Off. i. 3, 8. Acad. i. 10,\n37. Corresponding to \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, Zeno placed officium\nand contra officium, as media qu\u00e6dam between recte factum and peccatum.\nStob. ii. 158: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f03 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 ... \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, \u1f03\n\u03b4\u1f74 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd,\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b2\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1.\n\n[730] Stob. 160. Diog. l.c.: \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2,\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5, \u1f51\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b9\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd. This\ndistinction, of course, only applies to \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd. The\nunconditional duty of virtuous life cannot be abrogated by any\ncircumstances.\n\n[731] Compare, on this point, besides the quotations on p. 265, 2,\nDiog. 108: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd.\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f41 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6 (demands; see p. 244, 2, the\n\u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u1fb7\u03bd, \u1f00\u03b4\u03b5\u03bb\u03c6\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b4\u03b1,\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, e.g.\nneglect of parents; \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f54\u03b8\u2019\n\u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\nCombining with this the passage previously quoted, it appears that\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd includes not only actions which aim at a moral good, but those\nwhich aim at a simple \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd; and, in view of the latter, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\nis included among things intermediate, or \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1 in its more extended\nmeaning. Cic.; see p. 288, 2. Stob. 158, says that those \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\nwhich are at the same time \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, are \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b1 ...\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c5\u0390\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f22 \u03b4\u03b9\u03c9\u03b8\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 (if, without particular\noccasion, or as Diog. 109 observes, \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\u2014see previous\nnote\u2014we despise or reject them) \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd.\n\n[732] In the latter sense \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd and \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 have been already\ndiscussed, p. 264.\n\n[733] Sen. De Ira, i. 16, 7: When the wise man sees anything revolting,\nnon ... tangetur animus ejus eritque solito commotior? Fateor, sentiet\nlevem quendam tenuemque motum. Nam, ut dixit Zeno, in sapientis quoque\nanimo etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. Id. ii. 2; Ep. 57,\n3; De Const. 10, 4; Stob. Floril. 7, 21; Plut. C. Not. 25, 5; Epictet.\nin Gell. N. A. xix. 1, 17. Conf. p. 253, 5, 6.\n\n[734] Sen. Brevit. Vit. c. 14, 2: Hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere,\ncum Cynicis excedere. Similarly Ep. 9, 3: Hoc inter nos et illos\n(Stilpo and the Cynics in general) interest: noster sapiens vincit\nquidem incommodum omne, sed sentit: illorum ne sentit quidem.\n\n[735] Conf. Sen. De Ira, ii. 2\u20134, particularly the quotation in Gell.\nfrom Epictetus: Even the wise man is apt, at terrible occurrences,\npaulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere, non opinione alicujus mali\npercepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis, officium mentis\natque rationis pr\u00e6vertentibus. But what distinguishes him from the\nfoolish man is that only the foolish man and not the wise man assents\n(\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9) to such impressions (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9).\n\n[736] Diog. vii. 115: \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd,\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1fc7\n\u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c6\u03cc\u03b2\u1ff3 \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7\n\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u1fb3 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03bd.\nSubdivisions of \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 are: \u03b5\u1f54\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, \u03b5\u1f50\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f00\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2, \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2; of\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1: \u03b1\u1f30\u03b4\u1f7c\u03c2, \u1f01\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1; of \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac: \u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1. The same\nthree \u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9 are mentioned by Cic. Tusc. iv. 6, 12, with the remark\nthat they only belong to the wise. See Stob. 92, and Sen. Ep. 59, 14;\n72, 4 and 8, respecting the wise man\u2019s cheerfulness.\n\n[737] Besides the quotations, p. 271, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f41 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd. Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 145; Quintil. Inst. xii. 1.\n18.\n\n[738] Sen. Tranq. An. 7, 4: Ubi enim istum invenies, quem tot seculis\nqu\u00e6rimus? (the wise man.) Ep. 42, 1: Scis quem nunc virum bonum dicam?\nHujus secund\u00e6 not\u00e6. Nam ille alter fortasse tanquam ph\u0153nix semel anno\nquingentesimo nascitur, see p. 273, 1, just as everything great is\nrare. But compare p. 274, 3.\n\n[739] Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and p. 274, 2.\n\n[740] Hos enim (says Sen. De Const. 2, 1, of the two named) Stoici\nnostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, etc. Further\nparticulars in Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 33 and 70.\n\n[741] Sen. Ep. 90, 5. To these wise men of the old world Posidonius\ntraced back all kinds of useful discoveries. Posidonius is probably\nmeant by the \u2018younger Stoics\u2019 (Sext. Math. ix. 28), who say that they\nintroduced belief in the Gods.\n\n[742] Sen. l.c. 44: Non dat natura virtutem, ars est bonum fieri ...\nignorantia rerum innocentes erant ... virtus non contingit animo nisi\ninstituto et edocto et ad summum adsidua exercitatione perducto. Ad hoc\nquidem, sed sine hoc nascimur, &c.\n\n[743] Stob. Ecl. ii. 236: \u1f34\u03c3\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f52. (See p. 251, 2, for the difference\nbetween emotion and disease of the soul.) \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03c7\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bd, i.e., virtuous men are not all equally secure. These\ndifferences of degree do not, however, apply to wisdom (nor on the\nother hand to folly), which admits of no increase, but only to such\nproperties as are included in the whole moral state, but are not\nthemselves of moral nature. See Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and p. 275, 1.\n\n[744] Stob. Serm. 7, 21: \u1f41 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u1f04\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76 [\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2] \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03cc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c0\u03c9 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f57\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u03ad\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u1fc6\u03be\u03af\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Chrysippus was probably the\nauthor of the division of progressers into three classes, which is\ndiscussed by Sen. Ep. 75, 8. Of those who have reached the highest\nstage it is said, omnes jam affectus et vitia posuerunt, qu\u00e6 erant\ncomplectenda didicerunt, sed illis adhuc inexperta fiducia est. Bonum\nsuum nondum in usu habent. Jam tamen in illa qu\u00e6 fugerunt recidere non\npossunt, jam ibi sunt unde non est retro lapsus, sed hoc illis de se\nnondum liquet et ... scire se nesciunt.\n\n[745] See pp. 239, 1; 271, 7.\n\n[746] Sen. Ep. 75, 10: Quidam hoc proficientium genus de quo locutus\nsum ita complectuntur, ut illos dicant jam effugisse morbos animi,\naffectus nondum (on this distinction, see p. 251, 2), et adhuc in\nlubrico stare, quia nemo sit extra periculum maliti\u00e6 nisi qui totam eam\nexcussit. The same view is upheld by Sen. Ep. 72, 6.\n\n[747] Diog. vii. 127: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd, \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03cc\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72,\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03cc\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. The latter view was that of the\nCynics. Although departed from by Chrysippus, it belongs to those\npoints in which the original relation of Stoicism to Cynicism was\nweakened by him. Sen. Ep. 72, 6, speaking in the spirit of Cleanthes,\nsays that he considered a candidate of the first class secure against\nrelapses. On the other hand, Simpl. Categ. 102, \u03b1, \u03b2 (Schol. in Arist.\n86, a, 48; b, 30), says first that the Stoics declared virtue to be\nindefectible, but subsequently limits this assertion by saying that, \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 (the reading \u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 is better) \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2, virtue,\ntogether with the whole rational life (\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2), is lost, and\nsucceeded, not indeed by vice, but by a \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b7. A similar question\nis, Whether the wise man can become mad? which is answered in the\nnegative by Diog. vii. 118, though not without some modifying clauses.\nAlex. Aphr. De An. 156, b, also combats the view that the wise man will\nact virtuously when in a frenzy.\n\n[748] Further particulars have been already given, p. 61. Seneca (Ep.\n95, 1) calls the subject of applied ethics, which Aristo rejected,\npar\u00e6netice, or pars pr\u00e6ceptiva. Sextus speaks of two \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u2014a\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 and a \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2. Both terms, however, appear to denote\nthe same thing; for \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 is defined by Muson. in Stob. Floril.\n117, 8, as \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2. He who is himself insufficiently educated will\ndo well \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b2\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f60\u03c6\u03ad\u03bb\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 is\ntherefore identical with the suasio of Posidonius (in Sen. Ep. 95, 65).\nSee p. 223, note 1.\n\n[749] Sen. Ep. 94, 4: Cleanthes utilem quidem judicat et hanc partem,\nsed imbecillam nisi ab universo fluit, nisi decreta ipsa philosophi\u00e6 et\ncapita cognovit.\n\n[750] See p. 223, 1.\n\n[751] See Cic. Off. i. 2, 7; 3, 9; iii. 2, 7. Cicero himself said that\nhe chiefly followed Pan\u00e6tius (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd), not as a mere\ntranslator, but correctione quadam adhibita. See p. 300, 2.\n\n[752] Cic. Off. i. 3, 7: Omnis de officio duplex est qu\u00e6stio: unum\ngenus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum: alterum, quod positum est in\npr\u00e6ceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vit\u00e6 conformari possit. He would\ndevote his attention to officia, quorum pr\u00e6cepta traduntur. Cicero then\ngoes fully into particulars. He treats of amusement and occupation (i.\n29, 103); of the peculiar duties of the young and the old, of\nofficials, citizens, foreigners (i. 34); of outward appearance, gait,\nconversation (i. 36); of the means of winning others (ii. 6, 21).\nPan\u00e6tius must have given a similar treatment to the subject.\n\n[753] See p. 223, 1.\n\n[754] Particularly in the portions treating \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd and\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u1ff6\u03bd.\n\n[755] See p. 260, 4.\n\n[756] See p. 260, 4, and 261, 1.\n\n[757] According to Cic. Off. i. 2; 7, Add Att. xvi. 11, Pan\u00e6tius, in\nthe third chief division of his treatise on duties, intended to discuss\ncases of collision between apparent interest and duty, but his\nintentions were never carried out. It appears, however, from Off. i.\n45, 159; iii. 12, 50; 13, 55; 23, 89, that these cases were frequently\ndiscussed, not only by the pupils of Pan\u00e6tius, Posidonius, and Hecato,\nbut by Diogenes of Seleucia and Antipater of Tarsus.\n\n[758] The Treatise of Pan\u00e6tius appears to have been used as a chief\nauthority, not only by Cicero, but by others. Antipater of Tyre, a\ncotemporary of Cicero, had added discussions on the care of health and\nwealth (Cic. Off. ii. 24, 86); and Hecato, in his treatise on duties,\nhad added further casuistical investigations (Cic. iii. 28, 89).\nBrutus, too, who, like his teacher Antiochus, was devoted to a moderate\nStoicism, and of whom Sen. Ep. 95, 45, reports that he had laid down\nrules for the relations of parents, children, and brothers in his\ntreatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, may have followed Pan\u00e6tius.\n\n[759] Sen. Ep. 94, 1; 95, 1.\n\n[760] Stob. ii. 128: \u1f10\u03bd \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 (not only \u1f10\u03bd \u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, see p. 230) \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u1ff3 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u1f76,\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f31\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[761] The treatise of Pan\u00e6tius\u2014we learn from Cic. Off. i. 3, 9; iii. 2,\n7; 7, 33\u2014discussed its subject first from the platform of duty, and\nthen from that of interest. The third part, which Pan\u00e6tius proposed to\nhimself\u2014the collision between duty and interest\u2014was never fully carried\nout. Cicero adds discussions on two questions, which of two conflicting\nduties and which of two conflicting interests must be preferred (i. 3,\n10, c. 43; ii. 25). Otherwise he appears in his two first books to\nfollow the order of Pan\u00e6tius.\n\n[762] See pp. 260, 298. Amongst other things, as we learn from the\nfragment in Athen. xiii. 555, a, Chrysippus discussed the question of\nshaving; and Alex. Aphr. Top. 26, quotes, in illustration of the\nuseless enquiries of the Stoics, \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, an enquiry\nwhether it is proper to take the largest portion before one\u2019s father at\ntable, and whether it is proper to cross the legs in the school of a\nphilosopher.\n\n[763] \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1, \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, talis ordo actionum ut in vita omnia sint apta\ninter se et convenientia. i. 40, 142; 144.\n\n[764] i. 43. We omit Cicero\u2019s treatise, this section not being found in\nPan\u00e6tius.\n\n[765] Pan\u00e6tius still more diffusively, 5, 16.\n\n[766] Such, for instance, as the prohibition against being angry with\nenemies (i. 25, 88), which recalls at once the difference of the Stoics\nand Peripatetics on the admissibility of emotions. See p. 252.\n\n[767] Diog. 117 says: The \u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2 or \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 is free from vanity\n(\u1f04\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2), is earnest (\u03b1\u1f50\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2), frank (\u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03b2\u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2), and with no\ninclination to pretence. He stands aloof from the affairs of life\n(\u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd), lest he should do anything contrary to duty. See p. 323, 1.\nStob. ii. 240, says: The wise man is gentle (\u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03bf\u03c2), quiet (\u1f21\u03c3\u03cd\u03c7\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2),\nand considerate (\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2), never exciting angry feelings against\nothers, never putting off what he has to do.\n\n[768] Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1: \u03b2\u03bb\u03ac\u03c8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u1f02\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2. Stob. ii.\n230: \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03bf\u03bd. \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n[l. -\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9] \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\u00b7\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (which, however, may not be translated as Ritter\niii. 662 does \u2018for the sake of advantage\u2019; it rather refers to such\ncases as those mentioned by Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 17, and Plato, Rep. ii.\n382, C, 389, B; iv. 459, C, in which the interests of another or of the\ncommunity require deception) \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03c2.\nIn accordance with this passage, too, the statement of Procl. in Alcib.\n(Op. ed. Cous. iii. 64)\u2014that the Stoics differ from their predecessors\nin that they reject all lies\u2014must be explained: \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u1fb7\u03bd \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b2\u03b9\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c7\u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd. The point\nhere in dispute is simply verbal; the Stoics were, in reality, at one\nwith Plato, in not calling permitted falsehood untruth or deceit only\nfor the reasons quoted by Chrysippus and Stob\u00e6us.\n\n[769] Cic. Fin. iii. 20. 68: Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii\ncadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis ejusmodi forte casus inciderit, ut\nid faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. The latter must, however, have been\nin a minority.\n\n[770] Diog. 121: \u03ba\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03bd]\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f41\u03b4\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 [on whom, see p. 51, 1] \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc7. Stob. 238: \u03ba\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f34\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03ba\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff7, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u2019 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u03be\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6.\n\n[771] See p. 274, 2. According to the epigrams of Timon, in Diog. vii.\n16, Athen. iv. 158, a, Sext. Math. xi. 172, Zeno\u2019s School must have\npresented a very Cynical appearance. Probably, the description is\npartially true of the earlier history of that School; still I would\nattach no great value to it as illustrating the system.\n\n[772] Ep. 5, 1; 103, 5; Fr. 19, in Lactant. Inst. iii. 15.\n\n[773] See, on this point, Tranq. An. 8, 4; Benef. v. 4, 3; 6, 1; Ep.\n90, 14. Sen. Ep. 29, 1, does not, however, agree with the Stoic custom\nof sowing exhortations broadcast.\n\n[774] As may be seen in Musonius and Epictetus.\n\n[775] Plut. Sto. Rep. 22 (the question being as to the pollution of the\ntemples by the contact with the dead or lying-in women or unclean\nfoods); in other cases indeed, as Plutarch objects, he would not allow\nthese considerations.\n\n[776] Besides Diog. vii. 188, and Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 207, see\nChrysippus\u2019s own words, in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 247 (Math. xi. 193). The\nmajority of the Stoics appear to have limited cannibalism to cases of\nextreme necessity. See Diog. 121. Chrysippus had probably been\nspeaking, in the context, of the different modes of treating the dead\namong various nations (Cic. Tusc. i. 45, 108), intending to prove that\nno uniformity of practice prevailed.\n\n[777] Cic. Off. i. 35, 128, with the limitation: Cynici aut si qui\nfuerunt Stoici p\u00e6ne Cynici.\n\n[778] Diog. vii. 33: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c3\u03b8\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u1fd6\u03ba\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03c1\u03cd\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. The latter act is only\nconditional, and allowed in certain cases, such as for purposes of\ngymnastics.\n\n[779] Diog. 33; 131.\n\n[780] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 201.\n\n[781] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 200; 245; Math. xi. 190; Clement. Homil. v. 18.\n\n[782] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 160; iii. 205; 246; Math. xi. 191; Plut. Sto.\nRep. 22; Clement. Homil. v. 18.\n\n[783] Plut. l.c. 21, 1.\n\n[784] Sextus, however (Pyrrh. iii. 206), attributes to him, as the\nrepresentative of the School, what properly only belongs to Chrysippus:\n\u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd ... \u1f41 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n[785] His words (Sext. Math. xi. 190; Pyrrh. iii. 245; Plut. Qu. Con.\niii. 6, 1, 6) are as follows: \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f27\u03c3\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u1f22 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b8\u03ae\u03bb\u03b5\u03b1 \u1f22 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b8\u03b7\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u1f04\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9; and: \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd; \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b5\u00b7 \u03c0\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03b8\u03cd\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9; \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1. \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03b8\u03cd\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f22\n\u1f10\u03c6\u03bf\u03b2\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9; \u03bc\u1f70 \u0394\u03af\u2019. \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2; \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1. \u03b5\u1f36\u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f51\u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03ad\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03ad\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9; \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1. The form of expression is certainly very Cynic-like, but\nthe meaning is not what Sextus supposes. Zeno\u2019s object is not to\njustify unnatural vice, but to show that those who allow any form of\nunchastity cannot forbid this form, and that the wish and the attempt\nare morally on a par with the deed.\n\n[786] See the following note.\n\n[787] Musonius, in Stob. Serm. 6, 61 (conf. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68): Ne\namores quidem sanctos alienos a sapiente esse volunt. According to\nDiog. vii. 129, Stob. ii. 238, love is only directed to beauty of soul.\nBy Diog., Stob., Alex. Aphr. Top. 75, and Cic. Tusc. iv. 34, 72, it is\ndefined to be \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u0390\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd; and,\naccording to Plut. C. Not. 28, \u1f14\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 is an incentive to love;\nbut these statements are guarded by adding that the bad and irrational\nare ugly, and the wise are beautiful. It was probably in imitation of\nPlat. Sym. 203, E, that the Stoics nevertheless stated \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03cd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd. Love is excited by a sensation of\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c5\u03af\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd, its object is to develop this capacity into real\nvirtue. Until this end has been attained, the loved one is still\nfoolish, and therefore ugly. When it has been attained, the striving,\nin which Eros consists, has reached its object, and the love of the\nteacher to his pupil goes over into friendship between equals.\n\n[788] Conf. Orig. c. Cels. iv. 45: The Stoics made good and evil depend\non the intention alone, and declared external actions, independent of\nintentions, to be indifferent: \u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u1ff3 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u1ff3 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 (the action taken by itself) \u03b8\u03c5\u03b3\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03c5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c7\u03c1\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd.\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd ... \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03c5\u03b3\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u1f74\u03c1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b8\u03c5\u03b3\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 ... \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[789] How strictly he respected chastity and modesty in women is proved\nby the fragment, preserved by Clem. P\u00e6dag. iii. 253, C, respecting the\ndress and conduct of maidens.\n\n[790] Cic. Fin. iii. 19, 64: Mundum autem censent regi numine Deorum\neumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et Deorum; et\nunumquemque nostrum ejus mundi esse partem, ex quo illud consequi, ut\ncommunem utilitatem nostr\u00e6 anteponamus.\n\n[791] M. Aurel. ix. 9; xii. 30. Sen. Ep. 95, 52: The whole world is a\nunit; membra sumus corporis magni. Natura nos cognatos edidit. Hence\nmutual love, love of society, justice, and fairness. Ep. 48, 2: Alteri\nvivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere. H\u00e6c societas ... nos homines\nhominibus miscet et judicat aliquod esse commune jus generis humani.\n\n[792] Cic. Legg. 12, 33: Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, iisdem\netiam recta ratio data est: ergo et lex, qu\u00e6 est recta ratio in jubendo\net vetando (see p. 241, 2): si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus\nigitur datum est omnibus. Ibid. 7, 23: Est igitur ... prima homini cum\nDeo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta\nratio communis est. Qu\u00e6 cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum\nDiis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos\ncommunio juris est. Quibus autem h\u00e6c sunt inter eos communio, et\ncivitatis ejusdem habendi sunt. Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 119: The Stoics teach\n\u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n[793] Cic. Tusc. iv. 23, 51.\n\n[794] Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67; Off. i. 7, 22; Sen. Clement. i. 3, 2;\nBenef. vii. 1, 7; M. Aurel. v. 16, 30; vii. 55; viii. 59; ix. 1; xi.\n18; Diog. vii. 129; Sext. Math. ix. 131.\n\n[795] Hence, according to Cic. Fin. iii. 21, 69, not only \u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 and\n\u03b2\u03bb\u03ac\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 (moral good and evil), but \u03b5\u1f50\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 and \u03b4\u03c5\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n(other advantages and disadvantages) are common to all men.\n\n[796] According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 16, Chrysippus denied that a man\ncould wrong himself. If, in other passages, he seems to assert the\ncontrary, this apparent inconsistency is probably due to the double\nmeaning of \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, which sometimes means \u2018to wrong,\u2019 sometimes simply\n\u2018to harm.\u2019 Strictly speaking, a relation involving justice can only\nexist towards another. See Cic. on p. 315, 2.\n\n[797] Towards the Gods, man stands, according to the above passages, in\na relation involving justice. There is, therefore (Sext. ix. 131), a\njustice towards the Gods, of which piety (see p. 261, 1) is only a\npart.\n\n[798] Sen. Benef. iv. 18.\n\n[799] M. Aurel. vii. 13: If you only consider yourself a part, and not\na member, of human society, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c0\u03c9 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\u00b7\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03c0\u03c9 \u03c3\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c8\u03b9\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c0\u03c9 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f56 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd.\n\n[800] See p. 298, 3.\n\n[801] Off. i. 7, 20: De tribus autem reliquis [virtutibus, the three\nothers besides understanding] latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas\nhominum inter ipsos et vit\u00e6 quasi communitas continetur, cujus partes\ndu\u00e6 sunt: justitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri\nboni nominantur, et huic conjuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel\nbenignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.\n\n[802] Off. i. 7\u201313; ii. 14\u201317.\n\n[803] See p. 254, 2, 3.\n\n[804] We shall subsequently have occasion to prove this in detail. It\nmay here suffice to refer to the treatises of Seneca, De Beneficiis, De\nClementia, and De Ira. On the value of mercy, he remarks (De Clem. i.\n3, 2): Nullam ex omnibus virtutibus magis homini convenire, cum sit\nnulla humanior.\n\n[805] Conf. Pan\u00e6tius, in Cic. Off. i. 25, 88.\n\n[806] De Clem. ii. 5\u20138.\n\n[807] Among the points characteristic of Stoicism, the censure deserves\nnotice which Sen. (Ep. 7, 3; 95, 33; Tranq. An. 2, 13) passes on\ngladiatorial shows and the Roman thirst for war. (Ep. 95, 30.) The\nattitude of the Stoics to slavery and the demand for love of enemies\nwill be considered hereafter.\n\n[808] Stob. ii. 184: \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f41\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f78\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd. Cic. N. D. i. 44, 121: Censent autem [Stoici] sapientes\nsapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos, nihil est enim virtute\namabilius. Quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis\ndiligetur. See Off. i. 17, 55. Conf. p. 309, 3.\n\n[809] Plut. C. Not. 22, 2. The same thought is expressed in the\nstatement (ibid. 33, 2) that the wise man is as useful to deity (the\nuniverse) as deity is to him.\n\n[810] Sen. Benef. vii. 12, 2; Ep. 81, 11; 123, 15; 9, 5; Stob. ii. 118;\nsee p. 271, 3. Diog. 124. According to Diog. 32, Zeno, like Socrates,\nwas blamed for asserting that only the good (\u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03b9) among\nthemselves are fellow-citizens, friends, and relations; whilst all the\nbad are enemies and strangers.\n\n[811] He is, as Sen. Ep. 9, 5, puts it, faciendarum amicitiarum\nartifex.\n\n[812] Si vis amari, ama, says Hecato, in Sen. Ep. 9, 6.\n\n[813] We have already encountered friendship in the Stoic list of\ngoods. See p. 230, 3. Stob. 186 says, more accurately, that friendship,\nfor the sake of the commonwealth, is not a good, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9; on the other hand, friendship, in the sense\nof friendly relations to others, belongs to external goods; in the\nsense of a friendly disposition merely, it belongs to intellectual\ngoods. On the value of friendship, Sen. 99, 3. Friendship is defined as\n\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 (Stob. 130); \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c7\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 (Diog. 124). Similar definitions are given by\nStob. of varieties of friendship: \u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. On the\nabsolute community of goods among friends, see Sen. Ep. 47, 2; 3, 2;\nBenef. vii. 4, 1; 12, 1.\n\n[814] Ep. 109, 3 and 11.\n\n[815] Ep. 9, 13: Se contentus est sapiens, ad beate vivendum, non ad\nvivendum. Ad hoc enim multis illi rebus opus est, ad illud tantum animo\nsano et erecto et despiciente fortunam.\n\n[816] Ep. 9, 5.\n\n[817] Sen. Ep. 109, 5.\n\n[818] Ep. 109, 13; 9, 8; 10, 12; 18.\n\n[819] See p. 318, 2.\n\n[820] Stob. ii. 208: \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd. \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f20\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30 (wrongly struck out by\nMeineke) \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03cd\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f43 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03cd\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd; Floril. 44, 12. See pp.\n223; 241, 3.\n\n[821] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 3: Chrysippus recommends political life,\nplacing \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 on the same footing with \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2. Diog.\nvii. 121: \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03c9\u03bb\u03cd\u1fc3, \u1f65\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03c6\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Sen. De Ot. 3, 2: Epicurus ait: non accedet ad rempublicam\nsapiens, nisi si quid intervenerit. Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam,\nnisi si quid impedierit. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68: Since man exists for\nthe sake of other men, consentaneum est huic natur\u00e6, ut sapiens velit\ngerere et administrare rempublicam: atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem\nadjungere et velle ex ea liberos procreare. Stob. ii. 184: \u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5\n\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9. \u1f11\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[822] Cic. Legg. ii. 5, 11.\n\n[823] Diog. Ibid.: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b1\u03bc\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f41 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Ibid. 120: The Stoics consider love of children,\nparents, and kindred to be according to nature. Chrysippus (in Hieron.\nAd. Jovin. i. 191): The wise man will marry, lest he offend Zeus\n\u0393\u03b1\u03bc\u03ae\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 and \u0393\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03b8\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2. Antipater (whether the well-known pupil of\nDiogenes of Seleucia, or the younger Stoic Antipater of Tyre mentioned\nby Cic. Off. ii. 24, 86, is not stated) in Stob. Floril. 67, 25: Wife\nand child are necessary to give completeness to civil and domestic\nlife; a citizen owes children to his country, and family love is the\npurest. Musonius (Ibid. 67, 20, Conf. 75, 15): A philosopher ought to\nbe a pattern in married life, as in every other natural relation, and\ndischarge his duties as a citizen by founding a family; love for wife\nand children is the deepest love.\n\n[824] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1: \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7\n\u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9, \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9, \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c0\u03c0\u1ff3 \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd.\nConf. the titles in Diog. vii. 4; 166; 175; 178. Diogenes\u2019s list\ncontains no political writings of Chrysippus. It is, however, known to\nbe incomplete; for Diog. vii. 34; 131, quotes Chrysippus\u2019s treatise\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, a treatise also quoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 21 (1, 3, 5).\nAccording to Cic. Legg. iii. 6, 14, Diogenes and Pan\u00e6tius were the only\nStoics before his time who had entered into particulars respecting\nlegislation, though others might have written much on politics.\n\n[825] Conf. the fragment of Sen. De Matrimonio, in Hieron. Ad. Jovin.\ni. 191, Fr. 81 Haase, which, like the Essenes, requires absolute\nabstinence from pregnant women. A few unimportant fragments are also\npreserved of Chrysippus\u2019s treatise on the education of children. See\nQuintil. Inst. i. 11, 17; 1, 4 and 16; 3, 14; 10, 32; Baguet, De Chrys.\n(Annal. Lovan. iv. p. 335). He is reproached by Posidonius (Galen.\nHipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 465) for neglecting the first germs of\neducation, particularly those previous to birth.\n\n[826] Diog. vii. 131.\n\n[827] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3\u20135; 7; 30, 3; C. Not. 7, 6.\n\n[828] Diog. vii. 4.\n\n[829] Diog. vii. 131.\n\n[830] Diog. 33: \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03ac\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u1fd6\u03ba\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03bc\u03ae\u03b8\u2019 \u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\n\u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bd\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 ... \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u1f34\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. Ibid. 131.\n\n[831] Plut. Alex. Virt. i. 6, p. 329.\n\n[832] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 1: \u03bf\u1f36\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f14\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f40\u03bb\u03b9\u03b3\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f40\u03bb\u03b9\u03b3\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd ... \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f41 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f21\u03c3\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u1f72\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[833] Stob. Ecl. ii. 186: \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[834] Stob. Floril. 45, 29: In answer to the question, why he withdrew\nfrom public life, he replied: \u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 [-\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9],\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u1f70, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[835] Sen. Ep. 29, 11: Quis enim placere potest populo, cui placet\nvirtus? Malis artibus popularis favor qu\u00e6ritur. Similem te illis facias\noportet ... conciliari nisi turpi ratione amor turpium non potest.\n\n[836] Sen. De Ot. 3, 3, p. 320, 3: It needs a special cause for\ndevoting oneself to private life. Causa autem illa late patet: si\nrespublica corruptior est quam ut adjuvari possit, si occupata est\nmalis ... si parum habebit [sc. sapiens] auctoritatis aut virium nec\nillum admissura erit respublica, si valetudo illum impediet. Ibid. 8,\n1: Negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum: quid\nautem interest, quomodo sapiens ad otium veniat, utrum quia respublica\nilli deest, an quia ipse reipublic\u00e6, si omnibus defutura respublica\nest? (So we ought to punctuate.) Semper autem deerit fastidiose\nqu\u00e6rentibus. Interrogo ad quam rempublicam sapiens sit accessurus. Ad\nAtheniensium, etc.? Si percensere singulas voluero, nullam inveniam,\nqu\u00e6 sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit. Similarly Athenodorus, in\nSen. Tranq. An. 3, 2.\n\n[837] Athenodor. l.c. 3, 3.\n\n[838] Diss. iii. 22, 67.\n\n[839] Sen. De Otio, 4, 1: Duas respublicas animo complectamur, alteram\nmagnam et vere publicam, qua Di atque homines continentur, in qua non\nad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum, sed terminos civitatis nostr\u00e6\ncum sole metimur: alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi. Does it\nnot seem like reading Augustin\u2019s De Civitate Dei? Some serve the great,\nothers the small state; some serve both. Majori reipublic\u00e6 et in otio\ndeservire possumus, immo vero nescio an in otio melius. Ep. 68, 2: Cum\nsapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra\nrempublicam etiamsi recesserit: immo fortasse relicto uno angulo in\nmajora atque ampliora transit, &c. Epict. Diss. iii. 22, 83: Do you ask\nwhether a wise man will busy himself with the state? What state could\nbe greater than the one about which he does busy himself, not\nconsulting the citizens of one city alone for the purpose of obtaining\ninformation about the revenues of a state, and such like, but the\ncitizens of the world, that with them he may converse of happiness and\nunhappiness, of freedom and slavery? \u03c4\u03b7\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c3\u03cd \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c5\u03bd\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u1fc3, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9; \u03c0\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76, \u03b5\u1f30 \u1f04\u03c1\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c1\u1ff6 \u03c3\u03bf\u03b9\u00b7 \u03bc\u03c9\u03c1\u1f72, \u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f27\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9;\n\n[840] Sen. De Otio, 5, 1; 7; 6, 4.\n\n[841] Marcus Aurelius, vi. 44: \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u1ff3 \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f21\n\u1fec\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u1ff3 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2. \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f60\u03c6\u03ad\u03bb\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac. ii. 5: \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f65\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b6\u03b5 \u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b2\u03b1\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1fec\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f04\u03c1\u03c1\u03b7\u03bd.\n\n[842] Ibid. ix. 29: \u1f45\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u1f34 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f34\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03bb\u03c0\u03b9\u03b6\u03b5, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9.\n\n[843] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1.\n\n[844] De Otio, 6, 5; Tranq. An. 1, 10.\n\n[845] See Socrates and Socratic Schools, p. 324.\n\n[846] This connection is already indicated by Plutarch\u2019s grouping the\nStoics and Alexander together.\n\n[847] Sen. Ep. 95, 52; M. Aurel. See p. 312, 2; 313.\n\n[848] Diss. i. 13, 3. See p. 331, 2.\n\n[849] Sen. Ep. 95, 52, continues after the quotation in p. 312, 2: Ex\nillius [natur\u00e6] constitutione miserius est nocere quam l\u00e6di. Ex illius\nimperio parat\u00e6 sint juvantis manus. Ille versus et in pectore et in ore\nsit: homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto. V. Be. 24, 3: Hominibus\nprodesse natura me jubet, et servi liberine sint hi, ingenui an\nlibertini, just\u00e6 libertatis an inter amicos dat\u00e6 quid refert? Ubicumque\nhomo est, ibi beneficii locus est. De Clem. i. 1, 3: Nemo non, cui alia\ndesint, hominis nomine apud me gratiosus est. De Ira, i. 5.\n\n[850] Sen. De Otio, i. 4: see p. 256, 4: Stoici nostri dicunt ... non\ndesinemus communi bono operam dare, adjuvare singulos, opem ferre etiam\ninimicis. We shall subsequently meet with similar explanations from\nMusonius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. In particular, Seneca\u2019s\ntreatise, De Ira, deserves to be mentioned here, and especially i. 5,\n2: Quid homine aliorum amantius? quid ira infestius? Homo in adjutorium\nmutuum genitus est, ira in exitium. Hic congregari vult, illa\ndiscedere. Hic prodesse, illa nocere. Hic etiam ignotis succurrere,\nilla etiam carissimos perdere. Ibid. ii. 32, 1: It is not so\npraiseworthy to return injury for injury, as benefit for benefit. Illic\nvinci turpe est, hic vincere. Inhumanum verbum est ... ultio et talio.\nMagni animi est injurias despicere. Conf. Cic. Off. i. 25, 88: Violent\nanger towards enemies must be blamed: nihil enim laudabilius, nihil\nmagno et pr\u00e6claro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. Even when\nseverity is necessary, punishment ought not to be administered in\nanger, since such an emotion cannot be allowed at all. See p. 254, 1.\n\n[851] Sen. Ep. 95, 52. See p. 328, 3. Cic. Off. i. 13, 41.\n\n[852] Cic. l.c.: Even towards slaves, justice must be observed. Here,\ntoo, belongs the question, discussed in full by Sen. Benef. iii. 18\u201328,\nWhether a slave can do a kindness to his master? He who denies that he\ncan, says Seneca (18, 2), is ignarus juris humani. Refert enim cujus\nanimi sit, qui pr\u00e6stat, non cujus status: nulli pr\u00e6clusa virtus est,\nomnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat, ingenuos, libertinos,\nservos, reges, exules. Non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine\ncontenta est. Slavery, he continues, does not affect the whole man.\nOnly the body belongs to his lord; his heart belongs to himself, c. 20.\nThe duties of the slave have limits, and over against them stand\ncertain definite rights (c. 21. Conf. De Clement. i. 18, 2). He\nenumerates many instances of self-sacrifice and magnanimity in slaves,\nand concludes by saying: Eadem omnibus principia eademque origo, nemo\naltero nobilior, nisi cui rectius ingenium ... unus omnium parens\nmundus est ... neminem despexeris ... sive libertini ante vos habentur\nsive servi sive exterarum gentium homines: erigite audacter animos, et\nquicquid in medio sordidi est transilite: expectat vos in summo magna\nnobilitas, &c. So Ep. 31, 11; V. Be. 24, 3. See p. 328, 3. Conf. Ep.\n44: Rank and birth are of no consequence, and p. 270, 3.\n\n[853] Only the wise man is really free; all who are not wise are fools.\n\n[854] Diog. 122, at least, calls \u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, the possession and\ngovernment of slaves, something bad.\n\n[855] According to Sen. Benef. iii. 22, 1, Cic. l.c., Chrysippus had\ndefined a slave, perpetuus mercenarius; and hence inferred that he\nought to be treated as such: operam exigendam, justa pr\u00e6benda. Sen. Ep.\n47, expresses a very humane view of treating slaves, contrasting a man\nwith a slave: servi sunt; immo homines. He regards a slave as a friend\nof lower rank, and, since all men stand under the same higher power,\nspeaks of himself as conservus.\n\n[856] M. Aurel. iv. 4: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2. \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf, \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf, \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf, \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af.\n\n[857] See pp. 312, 1, 3; 325, 3, and Plut. Com. Not. 34, 6, who makes\nthe Stoics assert: \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2. M.\nAurel. x. 15: \u03b6\u1fc6\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd ... \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3. iv. 3: \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[858] M. Aurel. iv. 4, and ii. 16. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67: Chrysippus\nasserts that men exist for the sake of each other; quoniamque ea natura\nesset hominis ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile jus intercederet,\nqui id conservaret, eum justum, qui migraret, injustum fore. Therefore,\nin the sequel: in urbe mundove communi. See p. 331, 2 and p. 312, 2.\nSen. De Ira, ii. 31, 7: Nefas est nocere patri\u00e6: ergo civi quoque ...\nergo et homini, nam hic in majore tibi urbe civis est. Musonius (in\nStob. Floril. 40, 9): \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9 [\u1f41 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03c2] \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f23 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd. Epict. Diss. iii. 5, 26;\nAr. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 4.\n\n[859] M. Aurel. iii. 11: \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f27\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f31 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03af\u03bd.\n\n[860] Sen. De Ot. 4; Ep. 68, 2. See p. 325, 1. Vit. B. 20, 3 and 5:\nUnum me donavit omnibus [natura rerum] et uni mihi omnis ... patriam\nmeam esse mundum sciam et pr\u00e6sides Deos. Tranq. An. 4, 4: Ideo magno\nanimo nos non unius urbis m\u0153nibus clusimus, sed in totius orbis\ncommercium emisimus patriamque nobis mundum professi sumus, ut liceret\nlatiorem virtuti campum dare. Epict. Diss. iii. 22, 83. Ibid. i. 9: If\nthe doctrine that man is related to God is true, man is neither an\nAthenian nor a Corinthian, but simply \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 and \u03c5\u1f31\u1f78\u03c2 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6. Muson.\nl.c.: Banishment is no evil, since \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd. It is, says Cic. Parad. 2, no evil for those qui omnem\norbem terrarum unam urbem esse ducunt.\n\n[861] Plut. Alex. M. Virt. i. 6, p. 329: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a \u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f13\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c6\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03ae\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd,\n\u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1\n\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f37\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f26 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c6\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2.\n\n[862] In Epictet. Man. c. 53: more fully, Ibid. Diss. iv. 1, 131; 4,\n34; and translated by Sen. Ep. 107, 11. See p. 182, 1. The verses are:\n\n \u1f04\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03ad \u03bc\u2019 \u1f66 \u0396\u03b5\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u2019 \u1f21 \u03a0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\n \u1f45\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u2019 \u1f51\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03bc\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7\n \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f11\u03c8\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03af \u03b3\u2019 \u1f04\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f22\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03c9\n \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f15\u03c8\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[863] Sen. Prov. 5, 4 and 8: Boni viri laborant, impendunt,\nimpenduntur, et volentes quidem, non trahuntur a fortuna, etc.... Quid\nest boni viri? Pr\u00e6bere se fato. Vit. Be. 15, 5: Deum sequere.... Qu\u00e6\nautem dementia est, potius trahi quam sequi?... Quicquid ex universi\nconstitutione patiendum est, magno excipiatur animo. Ad hoc sacramentum\nadacti sumus, ferre mortalia.... In regno nati sumus: Deo parere\nlibertas est. Ep. 97, 2: Non pareo Deo, sed adsentior. Ex animo illum,\nnon quia necesse est, sequor, etc. Ep. 74, 20; 76, 23; 107, 9. Epictet.\nDiss. ii. 16, 42: \u03c4\u03cc\u03bb\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c8\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u1ff6 \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f43 \u1f02\u03bd \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u1fc3\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u1ff6 \u03c3\u03bf\u03b9, \u03c3\u03cc\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03bc\u03b9. \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f04\u03b3\u03b5. i. 12, 7: The virtuous man submits his\nwill to that of God, as a good citizen obeys the law. iv. 7. 20:\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f21\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f43 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9, \u1f22 [\u1f43] \u1f10\u03b3\u03ce. iv. 1, 131, in\nreference to the verses of Cleanthes: \u03b1\u1f55\u03c4\u03b7 \u1f21 \u1f41\u03b4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f04\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9,\n\u03b1\u1f55\u03c4\u03b7 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u1f74 \u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. Man. 8: \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f61\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c1\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Similarly Fragm. 134, in Stob. Floril. 108, 60.\nM. Aurel. x. 28: \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff7 \u03b6\u1ff4\u1ff3 \u03b4\u03ad\u03b4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f11\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f15\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f15\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c8\u03b9\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd. Ibid. viii. 45; x. 14.\n\n[864] Sen. Ep. 120, 11, investigates the question, How does mankind\narrive at the conception of virtue? and replies, By the sight of\nvirtuous men. Ostendit illam nobis ordo ejus et decor et constantia et\nomnium inter se actionum concordia et magnitudo super omnia efferens\nsese. Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita, secundo defluens cursu,\narbitrii sui tota. Quomodo ergo hoc ipsum nobis adparuit? Dicam:\nNunquam vir ille perfectus adeptusque virtutem fortun\u00e6 maledixit.\nNunquam accidentia tristis excepit. Civem esse se universi et militem\ncredens labores velut imperatos subiit. Quicquid inciderat, non tanquam\nmalum aspernatus est, et in se casu delatum, sed quasi delegatum\nsibi.... Necessario itaque magnus adparuit, qui nunquam malis ingemuit,\nnunquam de fato suo questus est: fecit multis intellectum sui et non\naliter quam in tenebris lumen effulsit, advertitque in se omnium\nanimos, cum esset placidus et lenis, humanis divinisque rebus pariter\n\u00e6quus, &c.\n\n[865] Conf. Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. pr\u00e6cipue Stoicorum Doct. de Mor.\nVolunt.: Ut. 1842, p. 220.\n\n[866] Diog. vii. 130: \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd (\u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f74 is the standing expression with the Stoics for suicide.\nFull references for this and other expressions are given by Baumhauer,\np. 243). \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1fb3 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03b3\u03b7\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9 \u1f22 \u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03bd\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b9\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. Stob. Ecl. ii. 226. Conf. the\ncom\u0153dian Sopater, in Athen. iv. 160, who makes a master threaten to\nsell his slave to Zeno \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc7.\n\n[867] Ep. 12, 10: Malum est in necessitate vivere. Sed in necessitate\nvivere necessitas nulla est. Quidni nulla sit? Patent undique ad\nlibertatem vi\u00e6 mult\u00e6, breves, faciles. Agamus Deo gratias, quod nemo in\nvita teneri potest. Calcare ipsas necessitates licet. Id. Prov. c. 5,\n6, makes the deity say: Contemnite mortem qu\u00e6 vos aut finit aut\ntransfert.... Ante omnia cavi, ne quis vos teneret invitos. Patet\nexitus.... Nihil feci facilius, quam mori. Prono animam loco posui.\nTrahitur. Attendite modo et videbitis, quam brevis ad libertatem et\nquam expedita ducat via, &c. Conf. Ep. 70, 14: He who denies the right\nof committing suicide non videt se libertatis viam eludere. Nil melius\n\u00e6terna lex fecit, quam quod unum introitum nobis ad vitam dedit, exitus\nmultos. Ep. 65, 22; 117, 21; 120, 14; M. Aurel. v. 29; viii. 47; x. 8\nand 32; iii. 1; Epictet. Diss. i. 24, 20; iii. 24, 95.\n\n[868] De Prov. 2, 9; Ep. 71, 16.\n\n[869] In the passages already quoted, pp. 40, 2; 41, 1; 50, 2.\n\n[870] See Epictetus\u2019s discussion of suicide committed simply in\ncontempt of life (Diss. i. 9, 10), against which he brings to bear the\nrule (in Plato, Ph\u00e6d. 61, E.) to resign oneself to the will of God. ii.\n15, 4. Conf. M. Aurel. v. 10.\n\n[871] Muson. in Stob. Floril. 7, 24, says: \u1f05\u03c1\u03c0\u03b1\u03b6\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f45\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f14\u03be\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1fc7, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03be\u1fc7; and, again: He who by living is of use to many, ought not\nto choose to die, unless by death he can be of use to more.\n\n[872] M. Aurel. v. 29: Even here you may live as though you were free\nfrom the body: \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u1f14\u03be\u03b9\u03b8\u03b9\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[873] Ep. 70. See p. 338, 3. Clem. Strom. iv. 485, A, likewise calls\nthe restriction of rational action sufficiently decisive reason: \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\n\u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u1ff3 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9 (i.e. the\nStoics), \u03b5\u1f34 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b5\u03bd [l. \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b5\u03bd], \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03bb\u03c0\u03af\u03b4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n[874] Ep. 58, 33; 98, 16; 17, 9; De Ira, iii. 15, 3.\n\n[875] See Ep. 58, 36, and 70, 11.\n\n[876] See p. 335, 2.\n\n[877] Olympiod. in Ph\u00e6dr. 3 (Schol. in Arist. 7, b, 25). The favourite\ncomparison of life to a banquet is here so carried out, that the five\noccasions for suicide are compared with five occasions for leaving a\nbanquet.\n\n[878] Plut. C. Not. 11, 1: \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u1fa7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c4\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, \u1fa7 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u2019 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03c5\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03c1\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae \u03c4\u03b9 \u03bd\u1f74 \u0394\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Ibid. 22, 7; 33, 3; Sto. Rep. 14, 3; Alex.\nAphr. De An. 156, b; 158, b.\n\n[879] Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 5: \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2, \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f34\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b2\u03af\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. \u03b4\u03b9\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f56\u03b8\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Ibid. 14, 3. Sen. Ep. 70, 5: Simul atque occurrunt\nmolesta et tranquillitatem turbantia, emittet se. Nec hoc tantum in\nnecessitate ultima facit, sed cum primum illi c\u0153pit suspecta esse\nfortuna, diligenter circumspicit, numquid illo die desinendum sit.\nNihil existimat sua referre, faciat finem an accipiat, tardius fiat an\ncitius. Non tanquam de magno detrimento timet: nemo multum ex\nstillicidio potest perdere. Conf. 77, 6.\n\n[880] Cic. Fin. iii. 18, 60: Sed cum ab his [the media] omnia\nproficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur, ad ea referri omnes\nnostras cogitationes; in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem.\nIn quo enim plura sunt, qu\u00e6 secundum naturam sunt, hujus officium est\nin vita manere: in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore\nvidentur, hujus officium est e vita excedere. E quo apparet, et\nsapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et\nstulti manere in vita, cum sit miser.... Et quoniam excedens e vita et\nmanens \u00e6que miser est [stultus], nec diuturnitas magis ei vitam\nfugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur, iis qui pluribus naturalibus\nfrui possint esse in vita manendum. Stob. 226: The good may have\nreasons for leaving life, the bad for continuing in life, even though\nthey never should become wise: \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd,\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b6\u03c9\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[881] Ep. 70, 11.\n\n[882] Teles. in Stob. Floril. 5, 67, p. 127 Mein.\n\n[883] The well-known hymn to Zeus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 30, and the verses\nquoted p. 333, 1. Nor is the poetic form used by Cleanthes without\nimportance. He asserted, at least according to Philodem. De Mus. Vol.\nHerc. i. col. 28: \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac \u03b3\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1, \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1fe5\u03c5\u03b8\u03bc\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[884] Compare the celebrated dictum of the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 28,\n71: Cultus autem Deorum est optimus idemque castissimus plenissimusque\npietatis, ut eos semper pura integra incorrupta et mente et voce\nveneremur; and more particularly Epict. Man. 31, 1: \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03cc \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c7\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f34\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Id. Diss. ii. 18, 19. Further\nparticulars on p. 345, 2.\n\n[885] M. Aurel. ix. 40: We ought not to pray the Gods to give us\nsomething, or to protect us from something, but only to pray: \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c6\u03bf\u03b2\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. Diog.\nvii. 124: We ought, in fact, only to pray for what is good.\n\n[886] See p. 144, 2. Sext. Math. ix. 28, says that Rome of the younger\nStoics (perhaps Posidonius, whose views on the primitive condition have\nbeen already mentioned, p. 293, 1) traced the belief in Gods back to\nthe golden age.\n\n[887] In this spirit, Epict. Diss. ii. 20, 32, blames those who throw\ndoubts on the popular Gods, not considering that by so doing they\ndeprive many of the preservatives from evil, the very same argumentum\nab utili which is now frequently urged against free criticism.\n\n[888] Characteristic are the utterances of the sceptic pontifex Cotta,\nin Cic. N. D. i. 22, 61; iii. 2.\n\n[889] Plut. Sto. Rep. 6, 1; Diog. vii. 33. See p. 322, 5.\n\n[890] Ep. 41, 1: Non sunt ad c\u0153lum elevand\u00e6 manus nec exorandus\n\u00e6dituus, ut nos ad aures simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possimus,\nadmittat: prope est a te Deus, tecum est, intus est. Nat. Qu. ii. 35,\n1: What is the meaning of expiations, if fate is unchangeable? They are\nonly \u00e6gr\u00e6 mentis solatia. See p. 343, 2.\n\n[891] Benef. iv. 19, 1: Deos nemo sanus timet. Furor est enim metuere\nsalutaria nee quisquam amat quos timet. Not only do the Gods not wish\nto do harm, but such is their nature that they cannot do harm. De Ira,\nii. 27, 1; Benef. vii. 1, 7; Ep. 95, 49. It hardly needs remark, how\ngreatly these statements are at variance with the Roman religion, in\nwhich fear holds such a prominent place.\n\n[892] Ep. 95, 47: Quomodo sint Di colendi, solet pr\u00e6cipi: accendere\naliquem lucernas sabbatis prohibeamus, quoniam nec lumine Di egent et\nne homines quidem delectantur fuligine. Vetemus salutationibus\nmatutinis fungi et foribus adsidere templorum: humana ambitio istis\nofficiis capitur: Deum colit, qui novit. Vetemus lintea et strigiles\nferre et speculum tenere Junoni: non qu\u00e6rit ministros Deus. Quidni?\nIpse humano generi ministrat, ubique et omnibus pr\u00e6sto est.... Primus\nest Deorum cultus Deos credere. Deinde reddere illis majestatem suam,\nreddere bonitatem, &c. Vis Deos propitiare? Bonus esto. Satis illos\ncoluit, quisquis imitatus est. Fr. 123 (in Lactant. Inst. vi. 25, 3):\nVultisne vos Deum cogitare magnum et placidum ... non immolationibus et\nsanguine multo colendum\u2014qu\u00e6 enim ex trucidatione immerentium voluptas\nest?\u2014sed mente pura, bono honestoque proposito. Non templa illi\ncongestis in altitudinem saxis extruenda sunt: in suo cuique\nconsecrandus est pectore. Conf. Benef. vii. 7, 3: The only worthy\ntemple of God is the universe.\n\n[893] In Fr. 120 (in Lact. ii. 2, 14), Seneca shows how absurd it is to\npray and kneel before images, the makers of which are thought little of\nin their own profession. On this point he expressed his opinion with\ngreat severity in the treatise, De Superstitione, fragments of which\nAugustin. Civ. D. vi. 10, communicates (Fr. 31 Haase). The immortal\nGods, he there says, are transformed into lifeless elements. They are\nclothed in the shape of men and beasts, and other most extraordinary\nappearances; and are honoured as Gods, though, were they alive, they\nwould be designated monsters. The manner, too, in which these Gods are\nhonoured is most foolish and absurd; such as by mortification and\nmutilation, stupid and immoral plays, &c. The wise man can only take\npart in such acts tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam Diis grata. This\nview of worship had been previously set forth by Heraclitus, who\notherwise was so much admired by the Stoics.\n\n[894] Fr. 119 (in Lact. i. 16, 10): Quid ergo est, quare apud poetas\nsalacissimus Jupiter desierit liberos tollere? Utrum sexagenarius\nfactus est, et illi lex Papia fibulam imposuit? An impetravit jus trium\nliberorum? An ... timet, ne quis sibi faciat, quod ipse Saturno?\nSimilarly Fr. 39 (in Augustin. l.c.); Brevit. Vit. 16, 5; Vit. Be. 26,\n6, the inepti\u00e6 poetarum which, as in the stories of Jupiter\u2019s many\nadulteries, give free rein to sins.\n\n[895] Augustin. l.c. Fr. 33: Quid ergo tandem? Veriora tibi videntur T.\nTatii aut Romuli aut Tulli Hostilii somnia? Cloacinam Tatius dedicavit\nDeam, Picum Tiberinumque Romulus, Hostilius Pavorem atque Pallorem,\nteterrimos hominum adfectus.... H\u00e6c numina potius credes et c\u0153lo\nrecipies? Fr. 39: Omnem istam ignobilem Deorum turbam, quam longo \u00e6vo\nlonga superstitio congessit, sic adorabimus ut meminerimus cultum ejus\nmagis ad morem quam ad rem pertinere.\n\n[896] N. D. ii. 24, 63: Alia quoque ex ratione et quidem physica fluxit\nmultitudo Deorum; qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis\nsuppeditaverunt hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referserunt.\nAtque hic locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo\npluribus verbis explicatus est ... physica ratio non inelegans inclusa\nest in impias fabulas. Still stronger language is used by the Stoic, c.\n28, 70, respecting the commentitii et ficti Dei, the superstitiones\np\u00e6ne aniles, the futilitas summaque levitas of their anthropomorphic\nlegends.\n\n[897] Ph\u00e6drus (Philodemus), col. 2 of his fragment, according to\nPetersen\u2019s restoration. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 45; Diog. vii. 147;\nboth of whom assert that the Stoics do not think of the Gods as human\nin form; and Lactant. De Ir. D. c. 18: Stoici negant habere ullam\nformam Deum.\n\n[898] The Epicurean in Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.\n\n[899] Cic. l.c. 37. Conf. Krische, Forschung. i. 406 and 415.\n\n[900] Clem., indeed, says (Strom. vii. 720, D): \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 [\u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03b8\u03b5\u1ff7] \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f24\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u1fd1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f44\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. But, according to all accounts,\nthis must be a misapprehension. Clement confounds what Stoic writers\nhave conditionally asserted, for the purpose of disproving it, with\ntheir real opinion. Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 139.\n\n[901] Plut. Plac. i. 6, 16, in a description of the Stoic theology,\nevidently borrowed from a good source: The Gods have been represented\nas being like men: \u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03b6\u1ff4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u2014probably these words should be struck out),\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd.\n\n[902] Plut. Sto. Rep. 38, 5; C. Not. 31, 5; Def. Orac. 19, p. 420.\n\n[903] The numina, qu\u00e6 singula adoramus et colimus, which are dependent\non the Deus omnium Deorum, and whom ministros regni sui genuit. Sen.\nFr. 26, 16 (in Lact. Inst. i. 5, 26).\n\n[904] Diog. vii. 147.\n\n[905] See p. 206, 1.\n\n[906] Plut. De Fac. Lun. 6, 3.\n\n[907] Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.\n\n[908] See p. 131.\n\n[909] Cic. N. D. i. 15, 39; ii. 26; Diog. vii. 147.\n\n[910] Plut. De Is. c. 66; Cic. l.c. ii. 23, 60; i. 15, 38, where this\nview is attributed, in particular, to Zeno\u2019s pupil Pers\u00e6us. Krische\n(Forschung. i. 442) reminds, with justice, of the assertion of\nProdicus, that the ancients deified everything which was of use to man.\n\n[911] Ph\u00e6dr. (Philodemus), Nat. De. col. 3, and Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38,\nattribute this assertion specially to Pers\u00e6us and Chrysippus. Id. ii.\n24, 64, after speaking of the deification of Hercules, Bacchus,\nRomulus, &c., continues: Quorum cum remanerent animi atque \u00e6ternitate\nfruerentur, Dii rite sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent et \u00e6terni. Diog.\nvii. 151. See p. 351, 1.\n\n[912] This is done in Plut. Plac. i. 6, 9. Belief in the Gods, it is\nthere said, is held in three forms\u2014the physical, the mythical, and the\nform established by law (theologia civilis). All the gods belong to\nseven classes, \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7: (1) \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03ce\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd: the\nobservation of the stars, and their regularity of movement, the changes\nof season, &c., has conducted many to faith; and, accordingly, heaven\nand earth, sun and moon, have been honoured. (2 and 3) \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u03bb\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd: beneficent Beings are Zeus, Here, Hermes, Demeter: baleful\nBeings are the Erinnyes, Ares, &c. (4 and 5) \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, such as \u1f18\u03bb\u03c0\u1f76\u03c2,\n\u0394\u03af\u03ba\u03b7, \u0395\u1f50\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1; and \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7, such as \u1f1c\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2, \u1f08\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03af\u03c4\u03b7, \u03a0\u03cc\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2. (6) \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03c5\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd), such as the Gods invented by Hesiod\nfor the purpose of his genealogies\u2014Coios, Hyperion, &c. (7) Men who are\nhonoured for their services to mankind\u2014Hercules, the Dioscuri,\nDionysus. This list includes not only things which deserve divine\nhonours, but all things to which they have been actually given: hence\nit includes, besides the purely mythical Gods, things which the Stoics\ncan never have regarded as Gods, such as the baleful Gods and emotions,\non which see p. 345, 1; 346, 2. On the other hand, they could raise no\nobjection to the worship of personified virtues. In the above list the\nelementary Gods, such as Here, are grouped, together with the Gods of\nfruits, under the category of useful. Another grouping was that\nfollowed by Dionysius (whether the well-known pupil of Zeno\u2014see p. 44,\n1\u2014or some later Stoic, is unknown), who, according to Tertullian (Ad\nNat. ii. 2, conf. c. 14), divided Gods into three classes: the\nvisible\u2014the sun and moon, for instance; the invisible, or powers of\nnature, such as Neptune (that is, natural forces as they make\nthemselves felt in the elements and in planets); and those facti, or\ndeified men.\n\n[913] Plut. Com. Not. 31, 5: \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2, \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2,\n\u1f61\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b8\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03af\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f43\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03af\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2.\n\n[914] Conf. Wachsmuth, Die Ansichten der Stoiker \u00fcber Mantik und\nD\u00e4monen (Berl. 1860), pp. 29\u201339.\n\n[915] Tim. 90, A.\n\n[916] Posid. in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 6, p. 469: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f15\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9, \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b6\u1ff3\u03ce\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Sen. Ep. 41, 2, according to the\nquotation, p. 344, 4: Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum\nbonorumque nostrorum observator et custos. Hic prout a nobis tractatus\nest, ita nos ipse tractat. Ep. 31, 11: Quid aliud voces hunc [animus\nrectus, bonus, magnus] quam Deum in corpore humano hospitantem? Just as\nKant calls the moral idea, a primary notion which mankind has embraced,\nthe moral tone a good spirit governing us. Epict. Diss. i. 14, 12:\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd [\u1f41 \u0396\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2] \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03b4\u03c9\u03ba\u03b5\n\u03c6\u03c5\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03af\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. He who\nretires within himself is not alone, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\n\u1f51\u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af. To him each one has taken an oath of allegiance,\nas a soldier has to his sovereign, but \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f40\u03bc\u03bd\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03b8\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd; so that the demon is\nlost in the \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 within. M. Aurel. v. 27: \u1f41 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f43\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f41 \u0396\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f14\u03b4\u03c9\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6. \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41\n\u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2. See ii. 13 and 17; iii. 3; Schl. 5, 6, 7, 12,\n16; v. 10; viii. 45.\n\n[917] See the passage quoted from Diog. vii. 88, on p. 227, 3.\n(Diogenes had only just before named Chrysippus \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, as\nsource), which receives its explanation (if it needs one) from the\nabove words of Posidonius.\n\n[918] In this sense, the words of Sen. Ep. 110, 1, must be understood:\nSepone in pr\u00e6sentia qu\u00e6 quibusdam placent, unicuique nostrum p\u00e6dagogum\ndari Deum, non quidem ordinarium, sed hunc inferioris not\u00e6 ... ita\ntamen hoc seponas volo, ut memineris, majores nostros, qui crediderunt,\nStoicos fuisse: singulis enim et Genium et Junonem dederunt, i.e., the\nold Romans, not the Stoics.\n\n[919] Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 86. Amongst other things, quoted p. 146, 1,\nit is there said: If living beings exist on the earth and in the sea,\nthere must be \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1 in the air, which is so much purer; and these\nare the demons.\n\n[920] Diog. vii. 151: \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f10\u03c0\u03cc\u03c0\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f25\u03c1\u03c9\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ac\u03c2. Plut. De Is. 25, p. 360: Plato,\nPythagoras, Xenocrates, and Chrysippus hold, with the old theologians\n(amongst whom Wachsmuth, p. 32, 40, rightly thinks of the Orphics),\nthat the demons are stronger than men, from which the language used of\nthem by Chrysippus does not follow. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: The Stoics\nbelieve demons to be mortal. Plac. i. 8, 2: \u0398\u03b1\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03a0\u03c5\u03b8\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2, \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd,\n\u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\u03c2. A special treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u1f21\u03c1\u03ce\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd proceeded from the pen of Posidonius, probably, as\nwas his wont, containing more learned than dogmatic statements, an\nextract from which is given by Macrob. Sat. i. 23, containing the\netymology of \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[921] Plut. Qu\u00e6st. Rom. 51, p. 277: \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f34\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u1fe6\u03bb\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. Id. Def. Orac. 17,\np. 419: \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 ... \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f18\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd ... \u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u039e\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2\u2014a statement which, particularly\nas it is extended to Plato, would prove little. The baleful Gods of\nmythology (p. 350, 2) were explained as being evil demons by those who\ndid not deny their existence altogether. Those demons, however, which\npurify the soul in another world (Sallust. De Mund. c. 19, p. 266, and\nwhom Villoisin on Cornutus, p. 553, reminds of), are not borrowed from\nStoicism, but from Plato (Rep. x. 615, E) and the Neoplatonists.\n\n[922] Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2. See p. 191, 2.\n\n[923] Tertull. Test. An. 3, after speaking of demons, adds: Aliqui\nChrysippi sectator illudit ea.\n\n[924] The Stoics are not the first who resorted to allegorical\nexplanations of myths. Just as, before philosophy had broken away from\nmythology, a Pherecydes, an Empedocles, the Pythagoreans had, whether\nconsciously or unconsciously, veiled their thoughts in the language of\nlegend, and even subsequently Plato had used a veil of poetry; so, now\nthat the breach between the two was open, many attempts were made to\nconceal its breadth, and individual beliefs were represented as the\nreal meaning of popular beliefs, it being always supposed that the\noriginal framers had an eye to this meaning. Thus a twofold method of\ntreating the myths resulted\u2014that by natural explanation, and that by\nallegorical interpretation. The former method referred them to facts of\nhistory, the latter to general truths, whether moral or scientific.\nBoth methods agreed in looking for a hidden meaning besides the literal\none. This method of treating myths had been already met with among the\nolder teachers, such as Democritus, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, and other\nfollowers of Anaxagoras (according to Hesych. even Agamemnon was\nexplained to be the ether). It appears to have been a favourite one in\nthe time of the Sophists (Plato, The\u00e6t. 153, C; Rep. ii. 378, D; Ph\u00e6dr.\n229, C; Crat. 407, A, to 530, C; Gorg. 493, A; Xen. Sym. 3, 6), as\nappears from Euripides and Herodotus. It follows naturally from the\nview of Prodicus on the origin of belief in the Gods. Plato disapproved\nof it. Aristotle occasionally appealed to it to note glimmers of truth\nin popular notions without attributing to it any higher value. The\nfounder of Cynicism and his followers pursued it zealously. From the\nCynics the Stoics appear to have taken it. They carried it much further\nthan any of their predecessors, and they, too, exercised a greater\ninfluence on posterity than the Cynics.\n\n[925] Cic. N. D. 24, 63; iii. 24, 63, see p. 346, 3.\n\n[926] The definition of allegory: \u1f41 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f67\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\u03cd\u03bc\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 (Heraclit. Alleg.\nHom. c. 5, p. 6). Accordingly, it includes every kind of symbolical\nexpression. In earlier times, according to Plut. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19,\nit was termed \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, which term is found in Plato, Rep. ii. 378, D,\nconf. Io. 530, D; Xen. Symp. 3, 6.\n\n[927] In this way Zeno treated all the poems of Homer and Hesiod (Dio\nChrysost. Or. 53, p. 275; Diog. vii. 4; Krische, Forsch. 393), and so\ndid Cleanthes (Diog. vii. 175; Ph\u00e6dr. [Philodem.] De Nat. De. col. 3;\nPlut. Aud. Po. 11, p. 31; De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003; Krische, 433) and\nPers\u00e6us. Chrysippus explained the stories in Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus,\nand Mus\u00e6us (Ph\u00e6d. col. 3; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8, vol. v. 349,\nKrische, 391 and 479), and was followed by Diogenes (Ph\u00e6d. col. 5; Cic.\nN. D. i. 15, 41). Compare also Plut. Def. Orac. 12, p. 415, and\nrespecting the theological literature of the Stoics Villoisin on\nCornutus, p. xxxix. Among the Romans, the same method was followed by\nVarro (Preller, R\u00f6m. Myth. 29), and from his writings Heraclitus\n(living under Augustus) derived the material for his Homeric Allegories\n(edited by Mehler), and Cornutus for his work on the nature of the Gods\nedited by Osann from Villoisin\u2019s papers.\n\n[928] Cic. N. D. iii. 24, 63.\n\n[929] Corn. c. 17, p. 80: \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cd\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03bc\u03ae\u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f34 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f03 \u03b1\u1f30\u03bd\u03af\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[930] Proofs may be found in abundance in Heraclitus and Cornutus.\nConf. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1: The ancients did not believe that\nJupiter hurled his thunderbolts broadcast; sed eundem, quem nos Jovem\nintelligunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi,\n&c.\n\n[931] Dio Chrysost. Or. 53, p. 276, R. speaking of Zeno\u2019s commentaries\non Homer, says: \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f49\u03bc\u03ae\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03ac\u03c3\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03bd.... \u1f41\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd ... \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u1f10\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03b3\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b4\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd.\n\n[932] Special references are hardly necessary after those already\nquoted, p. 148, 1; 153, 2; 164, 2: 165, 5. Conf. the hymn of Cleanthes;\nChrysippus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 48; Arat. Ph\u00e6n. Begin.; Plut. Aud. Po\u00ebt.\nc. 11, p. 31; Varro, in August. Civ. D. vii. 5; 6; 9; 28; Servius, in\nGeorg. i. 5; Heraclit. c. 15, p. 31; c. 23, 49; c. 24, 50; Corn. pp. 7;\n26; 35; 38, where \u0396\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 is derived from \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd or \u03b6\u03ad\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd and \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 from \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70,\n\u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1; conf. Villoisin and Osann on the passage of\nCornutus, who give further authorities in their notes on the respective\npassages. The same on Cornutus, p. 6, discuss the derivation of \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2\nfrom \u03b8\u03ad\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd or \u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9; of \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u1f74\u03c1 from \u03b1\u1f34\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd or \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b8\u03ad\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. A portion of\nthese etymologies is well known to be Platonic.\n\n[933] \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03ce\u03bd\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, as he is called by Cleanthes, v. 1. Conf. Diog. 147;\nCorn. c. 9 and 26. The further expansion of this idea may be found in\nthe Neoplatonic doctrine.\n\n[934] See Diog. l.c.; Cic. N. D. ii. 26, 66; Ph\u00e6d. (Philodem.), Fragm.\ncol. 2\u20135; Heracl. c. 25, p. 53. On Here, consult Heracl. c. 15 and 41,\np. 85; Corn. c. 3; on Heph\u00e6stus, Heracl. c. 26, 55; 43, 91; Corn. c.\n19, p. 98; Plut. De Is. c. 66, p. 377 (Diog. l.c. perhaps confounds as\nKrische, p. 399, supposes, common fire with \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, but it is\nalso possible that the artificial God of mythology may have been\nexplained now one way now another in the Stoic School, which is not\nalways uniform in its interpretations); on Poseidon, Heracl. c. 7, 15;\nc. 18, 77; c. 46, 117; Corn. c. 12; Plut. De Is. c. 40, Schl. p. 367;\non Hades, whom Cicero l.c. makes the representative of terrena vis;\nHeracl. c. 23, p. 50; c. 41, 87; Corn. 5; on Demeter and Hestia, Corn.\nc. 28, p. 156; Plut. l.c.; on Athene, Heracl. c. 19, 39; c. 28, 59; c.\n61, 123; Corn. c. 20, 103. It is only by a forced interpretation of a\npassage in Homer, that (Heraclit. 25, 53) Athene is made to be earth.\nThat even Zeno treated individual Gods in this way, as parts of one\ngeneral divine power or Zeus, is rendered probable by Krische, Forsch.\n399, by a comparison of Ph\u00e6dr. col. 5, with the passages quoted from\nCicero and Diogenes.\n\n[935] Sen. Benef. iv. 8, 1: Hunc [Jovem] et Liberum patrem et Herculem\net Mercurium nostri putant. Liberum patrem, quia omnium parens sit....\nHerculem, quia vis ejus invicta sit, quandoque lassata fuerit operibus\neditis, in ignem recessura. Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est\nnumerusque et ordo et scientia. The solution of Helios into Zeus\n(Macrob. Sat. i. 23) appears also to be of Stoic origin.\n\n[936] Heracl. c. 25, 52. Conf. Il. i. 395.\n\n[937] Heracl. c. 40, 83; Il. xv. 18.\n\n[938] Ibid. c. 37, 73; Il. viii. 18.\n\n[939] Heracl. c. 26, 54, who applies the same method of interpretation\nto the legend of Prometheus (otherwise interpreted by Corn. c. 18, 96),\nCorn. c. 19, 98. On the lameness of Heph\u00e6stus, Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 3, p.\n922.\n\n[940] According to Eustath. in Il. p. 93, 46, probably following a\nStoic interpretation, Here is the spouse of Zeus, because the air is\nsurrounded by the ether; but does not agree with him, because the two\nelements are opposed to each other.\n\n[941] Heracl. c. 39, 78 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. p. 19), where this\nexplanation is given very fully. The occurrence on Mount Ida is said to\nrepresent the passage of winter into spring. Here\u2019s tresses are the\nfoliage of trees, &c.\n\n[942] See Diog. vii. 187; Pro\u0153m. 5; Orig. con. Cels. iv. 48; Theophil.\nad Autol. iii. 8, p. 122, C; Clement. Homil. v. 18.\n\n[943] c. 64. Proteus, according to this explanation, denotes unformed\nmatter; the forms which he assumes denote the four elements\n\n[944] See the description. Alleg. Hom. 43\u201351, p. 90, of which the above\nis a meagre abstract.\n\n[945] According to Heraclit. 53, 112.\n\n[946] We learn from Ps. Plut. De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003, that Cleanthes\nwrote a \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03c7\u03af\u03b1, a small fragment of which, containing a portion or\nthe Prometheus legend in a later and evidently apologetically moulded\nform, is there preserved. The theomachy described by Cleanthes (the\nStoic Cleanthes seems to be meant) is, however, not the Homeric\ntheomachy, but the struggle of the Gods with the Giants and Titans,\ndescribed in the book \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd (Diog. vii. 175). Perhaps on this\noccasion he may have discussed the other. At any rate the moral\ninterpretation given by Heraclitus to Homer\u2019s \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03c7\u03af\u03b1 is quite in the\nstyle of the interpretation of the legend of Hercules, and was probably\nborrowed from Cleanthes.\n\n[947] Further particulars on Hermes, Alleg. Hom. c. 72, 141.\n\n[948] Alleg. Hom. c. 54.\n\n[949] Conf. Heracl. c. 6, p. 11; Corn. 32, p. 191; 34, 206; Cic. N. D.\nii. 27, 68; Ph\u00e6dr. (Philodem.) Nat. De. col. 5 and 2. In Ph\u00e6drus, too,\ncol. 2 (\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f08\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9), if \u1f25\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd seems too wild, perhaps \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2\nshould be substituted for \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2, for Apollo cannot well symbolise the\nearth.\n\n[950] Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 2, p. 922. The Stoics address the moon as\nArtemis and Athene.\n\n[951] See p. 147, 1.\n\n[952] The name Apollo is explained by Cleanthes, in Macrob. Sat. i. 17,\n\u1f61\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5; by Chrysippus, as\nderived from \u03b1 privative and \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. The latter explanation is quoted by Plotin. v.\n5, 6, p. 525, as Pythagorean, and Chrysippus may have taken it from\nPythagoras, or the later Pythagoreans from Chrysippus. Cicero, in\nimitation, makes his Stoic derive sol from solus. The epithet of\nApollo, Loxias, is referred by Cleanthes to the \u1f15\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bb\u03bf\u03be\u03b1\u1f76 of the\nsun\u2019s course, or the \u1f00\u03ba\u03c4\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bb\u03bf\u03be\u03b1\u1f76 of the sun; and by \u0152nopides, to the\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03be\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03cd\u03ba\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 (the ecliptic). The epithet \u039b\u03cd\u03ba\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 is explained by\nCleanthes, quod veluti lupi pecora rapiunt, ita ipse quoque humorem\neripit radiis; Antipater, \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bb\u03af\u03bf\u03c5.\nIn the same author Macrobius found the derivation of \u03c0\u03cd\u03b8\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 from \u03c0\u03cd\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n(because the sun\u2019s heat produces decay). Other explanations of these as\nwell as of other epithets of Apollo, of the name of Artemis and her\nepithets, of the attributes and symbols of these Gods, are to be found\nin abundance in Cornutus, c. 32, 34, and in Macrobius, l.c., who\nprobably got most of them from Stoic sources.\n\n[953] The first of these stories is explained by Macrob. Sat. i. 17,\ndown to the most minute details, in the sense of the cosmical views\nalready given, p. 162, 2, and likewise the story of the slaying of the\nPytho, the dragon being taken to represent the heavy vapours of the\nmarshy earth, which were overcome by the sun\u2019s heat (the arrows of\nApollo). This interpretation being expressly attributed to Antipater by\nMacrobius, it appears probable that the first one came from the same\nsource. Another likewise quoted by him, according to which the dragon\nrepresents the sun\u2019s course, is perhaps also Stoical.\n\n[954] Cornutus, c. 2, p. 10, points to this in explaining Leto as \u039b\u03b7\u03b8\u1f7c,\nand referring it to night, because everything is forgotten in sleep at\nnight.\n\n[955] c. 8, especially p. 16, 22, 28. Ibid. c. 12, p. 24, 28, the clang\nof Apollo\u2019s arrows is explained to be the harmony of the spheres.\n\n[956] c. 15, p. 31.\n\n[957] Ibid. c. 19, 72, p. 39, 141.\n\n[958] See Corn. c. 20, 105, and Villoisin\u2019s notes on the passage. The\nmost varied derivations of Athene are given: from \u1f00\u03b8\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd by Heracl. c.\n19, 40; Tzetz. in Hesiod. \u1f18\u03c1. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f29\u03bc\u03b5. 70; Etymol. Mag. \u1f08\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd\u1fb6\u2014from\n\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bb\u03c5\u03c2 or \u03b8\u03b7\u03bb\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd (\u1f08\u03b8\u03ae\u03bd\u03b7 = \u1f00\u03b8\u03ae\u03bb\u03b7 or \u1f00\u03b8\u03b7\u03bb\u1fb6 = \u1f21 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b8\u03b7\u03bb\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1), by Ph\u00e6dr.\nNat. D. col. 6; Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. c. 17, p. 78\u2014from \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03c9,\nbecause virtue never allows itself to be beaten\u2014from \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u1f74\u03c1 + \u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c9, so\nthat \u1f08\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03b1 = \u0391\u1f30\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u1fd6\u03b1.\n\n[959] This explanation had been already given by Diogenes, according to\nPh\u00e6dr. col. 6. Cornutus also mentions it (20, 108), but he prefers the\nderivation from \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd.\n\n[960] c. 33, p. 69.\n\n[961] It is to be found in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8, pp. 349\u2013353,\nbut, according to Ph\u00e6dr. (Philodem.) l.c., conf. Cic. N. D. I. 15, 41,\nwas already put forward by Diogenes. For himself, he prefers the other\nexplanation, according to which Athene comes forth from the head of\nJupiter, because the air which she represents occupies the highest\nplace in the universe. Cornut. c. 20, 103, leaves us to choose between\nthis explanation and the assumption that the ancients regarded the head\nas the seat of the \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. Heracl. c. 19, 40, states the latter,\nEustath. in Il. 93, 40, the former, as the reason.\n\n[962] p. 349, 4, Corn. 30, p. 172.\n\n[963] See p. 359, 1, Plut. De Is. c. 40, Schl. p. 367: Demeter and Core\nare \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1. Ph\u00e6dr. col. 2: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u0394\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1 [\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1]. On Demeter as \u03b3\u1fc6\n\u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1 or \u0394\u03b7\u1f7c \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1, see Corn. c. 28, p. 156, and Villoisin on the\npassage.\n\n[964] Plut. l.c.: Dionysus is \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c6\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[965] Macrob. Sat. i. 18: Cleanthes derived the name Dionysus from\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9, because the sun daily completes his course round the world.\nIt is well known that, before and after his time, the identification of\nApollo with Dionysus was common, and it is elaborately proved by\nMacrobius. Servius, too, on Georg. i. 5, says that the Stoics believed\nthe sun, Apollo, and Bacchus\u2014and likewise the moon, Diana, Ceres, Juno,\nand Proserpine\u2014to be identical. Other etymologies of \u0394\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03c5\u03c3\u03bf\u03c2 are given\nby Corn. c. 30, 173.\n\n[966] Corn. 30, discusses the point at large, referring both the story\nand the attributes of Dionysus to wine. He, and also Heracl. c. 35, p.\n71, refer the story of Dionysus and Lycurgus to the vintage.\n\n[967] Corn. c. 28, p. 163, who also refers the legend and worship of\nDemeter, in all particulars, to agriculture; and the rape of\nPersephone, to the sowing of fruits. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 26, 66.\nAccording to Plut. De Is. 66, p. 377, Cleanthes had already called\n\u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03c3\u03b5\u03c6\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c0\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1. A\nsomewhat different explanation of the rape of Persephone is given in a\npassage of Mai\u2019s Mythograph, vii. 4, p. 216, quoted by Osann. on\nCornutus, p. 343.\n\n[968] The legend of Triptolemus is explained by Cornutus, l.c. p. 161,\nas referring to the discovery of agriculture by Triptolemus.\n\n[969] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 180; Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7 (Theodoret.\nCur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, p. 87), see p. 171, 1. Conf. Plut. Sto. Rep. 47,\n5; Corn. c. 13, p. 38; and Plato, Rep. x. 617, C.\n\n[970] According to Sen. Benef. i. 3, 8; 4, 4, he had filled a whole\nbook, probably of a treatise not otherwise mentioned on kind deeds,\nwith these inepti\u00e6\u2014ita ut de ratione dandi accipiendi reddendique\nbeneficii pauca admodum dicat, nee his fabulas, sed h\u00e6c fabulis\ninserit. A portion of these was made use of by Hecato in his work on\nthis subject.\n\n[971] Chrysippus, in Ph\u00e6dr. (Philodemus), col. 4. Further particulars\nin Sen. l.c., and Corn. 15, 55. Somewhat similar is the explanation of\n\u039b\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1\u03af (Corn. 12, 37; Heracl. 37, 75), which at best are only casual\npersonifications.\n\n[972] Corn. 14, 43, who, at the same time, mentions their names and\nnumber; Philodem. De Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 15; Erato indicates the\nimportance of music for \u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae. Ibid. 10, 33, on the Erinnyes;\n29, 171, on the Horoi.\n\n[973] Heracl. 31, 63; Plut. Am. 13, 15, p. 757.\n\n[974] Heracl. 28, 60; 30, 62, and above, p. 360.\n\n[975] Ibid. 69, 136. In this sense, Aphrodite might be identified with\nZeus, which was really done by Ph\u00e6dr. Nat. De. col. 1: \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03bd ...\n\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 [Petersen suggests \u03b5\u1f50\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, but probably it should be\n\u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9] \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0394\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0394\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f49\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u0395\u1f30\u03c1\u03ae\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd.\n\n[976] The story of Ares, \u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b1, means, according to\nHeracl. 31, 64, that Diomedes, \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u1f7c\u03bd, defeated the enemy; that of Aphrodite (\u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, ibid. 30,\n62), that, by his experience in war, he overcame the inexperienced\ntroops of barbarians.\n\n[977] In Plut. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19, the connection of Ares and\nAphrodite is explained as meaning a conjunction of the two planets.\nHeracl. 69, 136, gives the alternative of referring this connection to\nthe union of \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1 and \u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2, which produces harmony, or to the fact\nthat brass (Ares) is moulded in the fire (Heph\u00e6stus) into objects of\nbeauty (Aphrodite). The latter interpretation is given by Corn. 19,\n102, who also explains the relation of Ares to Aphrodite to mean the\nunion of strength and beauty.\n\n[978] Corn. 27, 148; Plut. Krat. 408, C.\n\n[979] His lewdness was said to indicate the fulness of the \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 in nature; his sojourn in the wilderness, the solitariness of the\nworld.\n\n[980] Corn. 17, 91. Conf. Osann ad locum, who points out similar\ninterpretations, probably of Stoic origin, in the Scholia to the\ntheogony, and also in Etymol. M.\n\n[981] Besides the etymologies of \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 in Corn. c. 1, and the\nobservation of Plut. Pl. i. 6, 9, that heaven is the father of all\nthings, because of its fertilising rains, and earth the mother, because\nshe brings forth everything, the words in Cic. N. D. ii. 24, 63, on\nwhich Krische, Forsch. 397, comments, deserve notice. It is there said,\nprobably after Zeno: Uranos is the Ether, and was deprived of his\nvitality, because he did not need it for the work of begetting things.\nCronos is Time (the same is said by Heraclit. c. 41, 86, who sees in\nRhea the ever flowing motions), and consumes his children, just as Time\ndoes portions of time. Cronos was bound by Zeus, the unmeasured course\nof time having been bound by the courses of the stars. A second\nexplanation is given by Corn. 7, 21, after making (c. 3, 10) vain\nattempts at etymological interpretations of Cronos and Rhea. Cronos\n(from \u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd) stands for the order of nature, putting an end to the\nall too-violent atmospheric currents on earth, by diminishing the\nvapour-masses (compare the quotation from Chrysippus on p. 161, 2), and\nhe is bound by Zeus, to represent that change in nature is limited.\nMacrob. Sat. i. 8 (who betrays that he is following a Stoic example by\nquoting Chrysippus\u2019s definition of time: certa dimensio qu\u00e6 ex c\u0153li\nconversione colligitur, conf. p. 197, 2), gives another explanation:\nBefore the separation of elements, time was not; after the seeds of all\nthings had flowed from heaven down to the earth in sufficient quantity,\nand the elements had come into being, the process came to an end, and\nthe different sexes were left to propagate animal life.\n\n[982] See p. 292, 4, and Sen. Benef. i. 13, 3.\n\n[983] C. 31, 187.\n\n[984] Plut. De Is. 44, Schl. p. 367: He is \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1. Sen. Benef. iv. 8, 1. See above, p. 359, 2, and what Villoisin\nquotes on Cornutus, p. 366. from Schol. Apollon. Among the natural\nphilosophers, i.e. the Stoics, Hercules symbolises strength and\nintelligence.\n\n[985] Pers. Sat. v. 63.\n\n[986] Heraclit. c. 33, p. 67, who, in the introduction, expressly\nrefers to \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd.\n\n[987] C. 70\u201375.\n\n[988] C. 70\u201373, p. 137.\n\n[989] Conf. the way in which Heraclitus, 74, 146, expresses himself as\nto Plato\u2019s and Epicurus\u2019s attacks upon Homer.\n\n[990] Conf. Wachsmuth\u2019s treatise mentioned above, p. 351, 2.\n\n[991] Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6. He there mentions two books of Chrysippus on\ndivination, which are also referred to (as Wachsmuth, p. 12, shows) by\nDiog. vii. 149; Varro (in Lactant. Inst. i. 6, 9); Phot. Amphiloch.\nQu\u00e6st. (Montfaucon, Bibl. Coisl. p. 347); Philodemus, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2, Vol. Herc. vi. 49, col. 7, 33; and from which Cicero has\nborrowed Divin. i. 38, 82; ii. 17, 41; 49, 101; 15, 35; 63, 130; and\nperhaps De Fato, 7. Chrysippus also wrote a book, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd (Cic.\nDivin. i. 19, 37; ii. 56, 115; 65, 134; Suid. \u03bd\u03b5\u03bf\u03c4\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2); and one \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u1f40\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd (Cic. Divin. i. 20, 39; ii. 70, 144; 61, 126; 63, 130; i. 27,\n66: Suid. \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2). In the former, he collected oracular responses;\nin the latter, prophetic dreams.\n\n[992] Diog. vii. 178, mentions a treatise of Sph\u00e6rus \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2.\nCic. (Divin. i. 3, 6; i. 38, 83; ii. 17, 41; 43, 90; 49, 101) mentions\na treatise having the same title as that of Diogenes of Seleucia, and\ntwo books of Antipater \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2, in which many interpretations of\ndreams were given. The same writer (Divin. i. 3, 6; 20, 39; 38, 83; 54,\n123; ii. 70, 144; 15, 35; 49, 101) mentions a treatise of Posidonius\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 in five books, Diog. vii. 149; Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6; 30,\n64; 55, 125; 57, 130; ii. 15, 35; 21, 47; De Fato, 3; Bo\u00ebth. De Diis et\nPr\u00e6sens (in Orelli\u2019s Cicero, v. 1) p. 395.\n\n[993] Bo\u00ebthus, in his commentary on Aratus, attempted to determine and\nexplain the indications of a storm. Cic. Divin. i. 8, 14; ii. 21, 47.\nOn Pan\u00e6tius\u2019s objections to \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 a word will be presently said.\n\n[994] Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118: Non placet Stoicis, singulis jecorum\nfissis aut avium cautibus interesse Deum; neque enim decorum est, nec\nDiis dignum, nec fieri ullo pacto potest. Ibid. 58, 132: Nunc illa\ntestabor, non me sortilegos, neque eos, qui qu\u00e6stus causa hariolentur,\nne psychomantia quidem ... agnoscere. Similarly in Sen. Nat. Qu. ii.\n32, 2 (see p. 374, 3), the difference between the Stoic view and the\nordinary one is stated to be this, that, according to the Stoics,\nauguries non quia significatura sunt fiant, but quia facta sunt\nsignificent. In c. 42, it is said to be an absurd belief that Jupiter\nshould hurl bolts which as often hit the innocent as the guilty, an\nopinion invented ad coercendos animos imperitorum.\n\n[995] Conf. Diogenian, in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u1ff6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n(divination) \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03b9\u03c9\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u1f72\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f43 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f51\u03bc\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd; and M. Aurel. ix. 27; God shows his care for the wicked by\nmeans of prophecies and by dreams.\n\n[996] Cic. N. D. ii. 5, 13, where among the four reasons from which\nCleanthes deduced belief in Gods, the first is pr\u00e6sensio rerum\nfuturarum, extraordinary natural phenomena\u2014pestilence, earthquakes,\nmonsters, meteors, &c., being the third. Ibid. 65, 105: The Stoic says\nof divination: Mihi videtur vel maxime confirmare, Deorum providentia\nconsuli rebus humanis, Sext. Math. ix. 132: If there were no Gods, all\nthe varieties of divination would be unmeaning; these are nevertheless\nuniversally admitted. Cic. Divin. i. 6, and the quotations on p. 175,\n3, 4.\n\n[997] Cic. Divin. i. 5, 9: Ego enim sic existimo: si sint ea genera\ndivinandi vera, de quibus accepimus qu\u00e6que colimus, esse Deos,\nvicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent. Arcem tu quidem Stoicorum,\ninquam, Quinte, defendis. Ibid. 38, 82: Stoic proof of divination: Si\nsunt Dii neque ante declarant hominibus qu\u00e6 futura sunt, aut non\ndiligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existimant nihil\ninteresse hominum, scire quid futurum sit, aut non censent esse su\u00e6\nmajestatis pr\u00e6significare hominibus qu\u00e6 sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi\nquidem Dii pr\u00e6significare possunt. At neque non diligunt nos, &c. Non\nigitur sunt Dii nee significant futura (\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72\u2014the well-known expression of Chrysippus for \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03af\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9, conf. p. 114, 1); sunt autem Dii: significant\nergo: et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis\nscientiam, frustra enim significarent: nec, si dant vias, non est\ndivinatio. Est igitur divinatio. This proof, says Cicero, was used by\nChrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater. It may be easily recognised as\nbelonging to Chrysippus. Cic. ii. 17, 41; 49, 101, again reverts to the\nsame proof. Conf. id. i. 46, 104: Id ipsum est Deos non putare, qu\u00e6 ab\niis significantur, contemnere. Diog. vii. 149: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f51\u03c6\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03ac\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. Some read \u1f97 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, in which case the argument would be reversed, not from\nprovidence to divination, but from divination to providence.\n\n[998] Cic. Div. i. 55, 125: Primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a\nDeo ... deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis divinandi ratioque\nrepetenda.\n\n[999] Cic. l.c. 55, 126.\n\n[1000] Ibid. 57, 129.\n\n[1001] See p. 370, 3; 371, 1.\n\n[1002] Cic. Divin. i. 27, 56 (Suid. \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2), ii. 65, 135 (Suid.\n\u03bd\u03b5\u03bf\u03c4\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2), ii. 70, 144, quoting from Chrysippus; i. 54, 123, quoting\nfrom Antipater; i. 30, 64, De Fat. 3, 5, from Posidonius\u2014gives\ninstances of stories to which the Stoics attached great value, whilst\ntheir opponents either pronounced the stories to be false, or the\nprophecies to be deceptive, or their fulfilment to be accidental (Cic.\nDivin. i. 19, 37; ii. 11, 27; 56, 115; De Fato, 3, 5).\n\n[1003] Aristotle, in a somewhat different sense, had explained the\nmarvellous by a reference to natural causes, even allowing the\nexistence of presentiments within certain limits.\n\n[1004] Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, after the passage quoted: Sed a Stoicis vel\nprinceps ejus disciplin\u00e6 Posidonii doctor discipulus Antipatri\ndegeneravit Pan\u00e6tius, nec tamen ausus est negate vim esse divinandi,\nsed dubitare se dixit. Ibid. i. 7, 12; ii. 42, 88; Acad. ii. 33, 107;\nDiog. vii. 149; Epiphan. Adv. H\u00e6r. Cicero appears to have borrowed from\nPan\u00e6tius, as Wachsmuth rightly observes, this denial of Astrology\n(Divin. ii. 42\u201346), and he allows, c. 42, 88; 47, 97, that Pan\u00e6tius was\nthe only Stoic who rejected it.\n\n[1005] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 3: Nimis illum [Deum] otiosum et pusill\u00e6\nrei ministrum facis, si aliis somnia aliis exta, disponit. Ista\nnihilominus divina ope geruntur. Sed non a Deo penn\u00e6 avium reguntur nec\npecudum viscera sub securi formantur. Alia ratione fatorum series\nexplicatur ... quicquid fit alicujus rei futur\u00e6 signum est ... cujus\nrei ordo est etiam pr\u00e6dictio est, &c. Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118, after the\npassage quoted, p. 371, 3: Sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum,\nut certis rebus certa signa pr\u00e6currerent, alia in extis, alia in\navibus, &c. Posidonius, ibid. 55, 125 (see p. 373, 2). Nor was the\nmeaning otherwise, when portents (according to Cic. Divin. ii. 15, 33;\n69, 142) were based on a \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 (on which see p. 183, 2),\nan opponent not without reason doubting whether it existed, for\ninstance, between a rent in the liver of a victim and an advantageous\nbusiness, or between an egg in a dream and treasure trove.\n\n[1006] As in the passage quoted from Bo\u00ebthus on p. 371, 2.\n\n[1007] Conf. p. 374, 2; 379, 1, and Cic. Div. ii. 43, 90, according to\nwhom Diogenes of Seleucia conceded so much to astrology as to allow\nthat, from the condition of the stars at birth, it might be known quali\nquisque natura et ad quam quisque maxime rem aptus futurus sit. More he\nwould not allow, because twins often differ widely in their course of\nlife and destiny.\n\n[1008] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 5.\n\n[1009] Cic. l.c. ii. 15, 35: Chrysippus, Antipater, and Posidonius\nassert: Ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim quandam sentientem atque\ndivinam, qu\u00e6 tota confusa mundo sit, as was explained i. 52, 118.\n\n[1010] Cic. ii. 15, 35: Illud vero multum etiam melius, quod ...\ndicitur ab illis (conf. i. 52, 118): cum immolare quispiam velit, tum\nfieri extorum mutationem, ut aut absit aliquid, aut supersit: Deorum\nenim numini parere omnia. See p. 374, 3.\n\n[1011] Cic. i. 53, 120, defends auguries somewhat similarly by arguing:\nIf an animal can move its limbs at pleasure, must not God have greater\npower over His? (his body according to them being the whole world).\n\n[1012] See p. 181.\n\n[1013] Cic. Divin. ii. 8, 20; Diogenian, in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5;\nAlex. Aph. De Fat. 31, p. 96.\n\n[1014] Upon the use of divination depends the whole argument for its\nreality, based on the divine kindness. Cic. i. 38, 83, and above, p.\n372, 1.\n\n[1015] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37, 2; 38, 2: Effugiet pericula si expiaverit\npr\u00e6dictas divinitus minas. At hoc quoque in fato est, ut expiet, &c.\nThis answer probably came from Chrysippus, who, as it appears from Cic.\nDivin. ii. 63, 130, and Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2, Vol. Herc. vi.\ncol. 7, 33, defended the use of expiation. In the above-quoted and more\ngeneral form it is found in Alexander and Eusebius, probably also taken\nfrom Chrysippus, see p. 181.\n\n[1016] According to the definition in Sext. Math. ix. 132, which Cic.\nDivin. ii. 63, 130, attributes to Chrysippus, it is an \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 (Cic.\nmore accurately: a vis = \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2, since besides scientific there is\nalso natural divination), \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03be\u03b7\u03b3\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd. Stob. Ecl. ii. 122 and 238; Eus. Pr. Ev.\niv. 3, 5.\n\n[1017] Plut. Vit. Hom. 212, p. 1238: [\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u03af. \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f30\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1, \u1f05\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03b2\u03b4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f04\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03cd\u03c0\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2. To the same\neffect, Cic. Divin. i. 18, 34; ii. 11, 26.\n\n[1018] Conf. the fragment quoted in \u2018Aristotle and the Peripatetics,\u2019\np. 300, which throws light on old and well-known views in the spirit of\nthe Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, without, however, defending them.\n\n[1019] Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64; ii. 10, 26: The naturale genus divinandi\nis, quod animos arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus a divinitate, unde\nomnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. Plut. Plac. v.\n1; where, however, the words \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 are only a gloss\non the preceding words \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Galen. Hist. Phil. p.\n320.\n\n[1020] Cic. Divin. i. 50, 115, and Plut. Compare the many Stoic stories\nof dreams and presentiments in Cic. i. 27, 56; 30, 64; ii. 65, 134; 70,\n144.\n\n[1021] See besides the passages just quoted, Cic. Divin. i. 49, 110;\n50, 113; 51, 115; and in particular i. 57, 129. Hence the prophecies of\nthe dying (ibid. 30, 63, according to Posidonius; conf. Arist. l.c.),\nand the statement (ibid. 53, 121; see p. 380, 1) that true dreams come\nof innocent sleep.\n\n[1022] Conf. the quotations on p. 375, 4, from Cic. Divin. ii. 10, 26;\n15, 35; and his remarks on the instinct us afflatusque divinus. Cic. i.\n18, 34.\n\n[1023] According to Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64, Posidonius thought prophetic\ndreams were realised in one of three ways: uno, quod pr\u00e6videat animus\nipse per sese, quippe qui Deorum cognitione teneatur; altero, quod\nplenus a\u00ebr sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tanquam insignit\u00e6 not\u00e6\nveritatis appareant; tertio, quod ipsi Dii cum dormientibus\ncolloquantur. Of these three modes, not the first only, but also the\nsecond, corresponds with the Stoic hypotheses. Indeed, in Stob. Ecl.\nii. 122, 238, \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 is defined = \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78\n\u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f22 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. Posidonius can only\nhave spoken of Gods in condescension to popular views; as a Stoic, he\nwould only know of that connection with the soul of the universe which\nis referred to in the first mode.\n\n[1024] Amongst such external helps, the Stoic in Cic. Divin. i. 50,\n114; 36, 79, enumerates the impression derived from music, natural\nscenery, mountains, woods, rivers, seas and vapours arising from the\nearth. But it is difficult to understand how, on Stoic principles, he\ncan have attached value to oracles (ibid. 18, 34) by lot, or justified\nthem otherwise than in the way mentioned on p. 375, 4.\n\n[1025] Cic. i. 18, 34; 33, 72.\n\n[1026] Ibid. i. 56, 127.\n\n[1027] Cicero, ii. 11, 26, enumerates the above-named varieties, after\nhaving previously (i. 33) treated them separately. Similarly, Ps. Plut.\nV. Hom. 212. See above, p. 377, 2, Stob. Ecl. ii. 238, mentions\ntentatively, as varieties of \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f40\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03bf\u1f30\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. Sext. Math. ix. 132, says: If there were no\nGods, there would be neither \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 nor \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74, \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 nor\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f40\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd. Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 3, gives a theory\nof dreams; but in how far it represents the views of the Stoics, it is\nimpossible to say. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 39, i. 41, clearly distinguishes\nthe discussion of natural omens from the doctrines of philosophy.\n\n[1028] Cic. i. 55, 124; 56, 128.\n\n[1029] Ibid. i. 56, 127.\n\n[1030] Cic. i. 53, 121: Ut igitur qui se tradet quieti pr\u00e6parato animo\ncum bonis cogitationibus tunc rebus (for instance, nourishment; conf.\nc. 29, 60; 51, 115) ad tranquillitatem accommodatis, certa et vera\ncernit in somnis; sic castus animus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum\net ad avium reliquorumque signorum et ad extorum veritatem est\nparatior.\n\n[1031] See p. 46.\n\n[1032] See p. 139.\n\n[1033] See p. 132.\n\n[1034] Whether Diogenes, in connecting the Stoics with the Cynics, was\nfollowing a Stoic authority or not (vii.), is a moot point;\nnevertheless, the view comes to us from a time in which the relations\nof the two must have been well known, and the quotation from Posidonius\non p. 274, 2, quite accords herewith. Not to mention others, Diog. vi.\n14, speaking of Antisthenes, says: \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03c9\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03be\u03b1\u03b9 ... \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b3\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u039a\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b9\u03b1: and Juvenal, xiii. 121, calls the Stoic dogmas a\nCynicis tunica (the common dress in distinction to the tribon)\ndistantia.\n\n[1035] Krische, Forschungen, i. 363, and above, p. 145, 2.\n\n[1036] On Aristo see p. 59; 260; 281.\n\n[1037] Aristo cannot, therefore, be considered (as he is by Krische,\nForsch. 411) the best representative of the original Stoic theory. On\nthe contrary, he only represents a reaction of the Cynic element in\nStoicism against the other component parts of this philosophy.\n\n[1038] See p. 290.\n\n[1039] Apart from the testimony of Numenius (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5,\n10), to which no great value can be attached, the acquaintance of Zeno\nwith Heraclitus is established by the fact that not only the ethics,\nbut also the natural science of the Stoic School owes its origin to\nhim. See pp. 40, 3; 62, 2, 3; 126, 2; 141, 2; 144, 4; 145, 1, 2; 146,\n4; 148, 2; 151, 1. Diog. mentions treatises of Cleanthes, vii. 174; ix.\n15, of Aristo, ix. 5, of Sph\u00e6rus (vii. 178; ix. 15) treating of\nHeraclitus; and Ph\u00e6drus (Philodem.), Fragm. col. 4, says that\nChrysippus explained the old myths after the manner of Heraclitus.\n\n[1040] Instances have often occurred. See p. 144, 4; 145, 1, 2; 232, 4.\nConf. Sen. Ep. 83, 9.\n\n[1041] Besides meteorological and other points of natural science,\nwhich the Stoics may have borrowed from Heraclitus, Heraclitus\u2019\nattitude towards the popular faith also belongs here.\n\n[1042] See p. 101, 2.\n\n[1043] See p. 100, 4, 5; 101, 2; 140, 1.\n\n[1044] As an illustration of the difference, take Heraclitus\u2019 statement\nof the daily extinction of the sun, which every one must admit would\nnot have been possible in the Stoic School.\n\n[1045] \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 as with the Stoics.\n\n[1046] See particularly Antiochus and also Cicero in many passages. See\nabove, p. 39, 2.\n\n[1047] See p. 46, 1, 2.\n\n[1048] The story in Diog. vii. 3 bears out this view, that Zeno was\nfirst won for philosophy by Xenophon\u2019s Memorabilia, and that on asking\nwho was the representative of this line of thought, he was referred to\nCrates. According to the quotations on pp. 274, 2; 387, 1, the Cynics\nwere regarded in the Stoic School as genuine followers of Socrates.\n\n[1049] Consult, on this subject, the valuable treatise of Steinhart, in\nErsch and Gruber\u2019s Encyclop\u00e6dia, sect. i. vol. 35, pp. 459\u2013477.\n\n[1050] Diog. x. i. He is frequently mentioned as an Athenian, belonging\nto the \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 Gargettos. Diog. l.c.; Lucret. Nat. Rer. vi. 1; Cic. Ad\nFam. xv. 16; \u00c6lian, V. H. iv. 13.\n\n[1051] Diog. i.; Strabo, xiv. 1, 18, p. 638. According to these\nauthorities, and Cic. N. D. i. 26, 72, his father had gone thither as a\n\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c7\u03bf\u03c2. That this happened before his birth has been demonstrated by\nSteinhart, p. 461.\n\n[1052] Apollodorus (in Diog. x. 14) mentions 7 Gamelion, Ol. 109, 3, as\nthe birthday of Epicurus. It was observed (Epicurus\u2019 will, Diog. 18) \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1fb3 \u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0393\u03b1\u03bc\u03b7\u03bb\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. Gamelion being the seventh month of the\nAttic year, the time of his birth must have been either early in 341\nB.C., or the last days of 342 B.C.\n\n[1053] His father, according to Strabo, was a schoolmaster, and\nEpicurus had assisted him in teaching (Hermippus and Timon, in Diog. 2;\nAthen. xiii. 588, a). His mother is said to have earned money by\nrepeating charms (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03af), and Epicurus to have assisted in this\noccupation (Diog. 4). Although the latter statement evidently comes\nfrom some hostile authority, it would seem that his circumstances in\nearly life were not favourable to a thoroughly scientific education.\nHis language in disparagement of culture would lead us to the same\nconclusion, even were the express testimony of Sext. Math. i. 1\nwanting: \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u1f74\u03c2 \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03bc\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 (in common expressions, conf. the censure passed on\nhim by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Aristophanes in Diog. 4, 13)\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd. Cic. Fin. i. 7, 26: Vellem equidem, aut ipse doctrinis\nfuisset instructor\u2014est enim ... non satis politus in artibus, quas qui\ntenent eruditi appellantur\u2014aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. Athen.\nxiii. 588, a: \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c5\u03ba\u03bb\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bc\u03cd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f64\u03bd.\n\n[1054] According to his own statement (Diog. 2), he was not more than\nfourteen (Suid. \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba. has twelve) years of age when he began to\nphilosophise, i.e. to think about philosophical subjects; probably\nabout chaos, following the suggestion of Hesiod\u2019s verses. He\nsubsequently boasted that he had made himself what he was without a\nteacher, and refused to own his obligations to those shown to be his\nteachers. Cic. N. D. i. 26, 72; 33, 93; Sext. Math. i. 2, who mentions\nhis disparagement of Nausiphanes; Diog. 8, 13; Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 18,\n4; conf. Sen. Ep. 52, 3. It is, however, established that in his youth\nhe enjoyed the instruction of Pamphilus and of that Nausiphanes, who is\nsometimes called a follower of Democritus, sometimes of Pyrrho (Cic.;\nSext.; Diog. x. 8; 13; 14; ix. 64; 69; Pro\u0153m. 15; Suid. \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba.; Clem.\nStrom. i. 301, D). The names of two other supposed instructors are also\nmentioned, Nausicydes and Praxiphanes (Diog. Pro\u0153m. 15; x. 13), but\nthey almost seem to be corruptions for Pamphilus and Nausiphanes.\n\n[1055] According to Cic. l.c., he denied the fact. Others, however,\nasserted it, and, among them, Demetrius of Magnesia. Diog. 13.\n\n[1056] Whither he came, in his eighteenth year, according to Heraclides\nLembus, in Diog. 1. Conf. Strabo, l.c.: \u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b8\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5 (in\nSamos) \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u03a4\u03ad\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c6\u03b7\u03b2\u03b5\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f08\u03b8\u03ae\u03bd\u1fc3\u03c3\u03b9.\n\n[1057] According to Hermippus (Diog. 2) Democritus first gave him the\nimpulse to pursue philosophy; but this is only a conjecture. Besides\nDemocritus, Aristippus is also mentioned as a philosopher whose\ndoctrines he followed (Diog. 4). Epicurus is even said to have\nexpressed a disparaging opinion of Democritus (Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93;\nDiog. 8). Nor is this denied by Diog. 9: but it probably refers to\nparticular points only, or it may have reference to the attitude of\nlater Epicureans, such as Colotes (Plut. Adv. Col. 3, 3, p. 1108).\nPlut. l.c., says, not only that Epicurus for a long time called himself\na follower of Democritus, but he also quotes passages from Leonteus and\nMetrodorus, attesting Epicurus\u2019 respect for Democritus. Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, Vol. Herc. v. 2, col. 20, seems to refer to expressions of\nEpicurus which excuse certain mistakes of Democritus. Lucret. iii. 370,\nv. 620, also speaks of Democritus with great respect; and Philodem. De\nMus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 36, calls him \u1f00\u03bd\u1f74\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f31\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[1058] Diog. 1, 15 mentions Colophon, Mytilene, and Lampsacus. Strabo,\nxiii. 1, 19, p. 589, also affirms that Epicurus resided for some time\nat Lampsacus, and there made the acquaintance of Idomeneus and\nLeonteus.\n\n[1059] Diog. 2, on the authority of Heraclides and Sotion. According to\nhim, Epicurus returned to Athens in the archonship of Anaxicrates,\n307\u20136 B.C. In that case the numbers must be slightly reduced in the\nstatement (Diog. 15) that he came to Mytilene when 32, and taught there\nand in Lampsacus for five years.\n\n[1060] Not immediately, however, since Diog. 2 says, on the authority\nof Heraclides: \u03bc\u03ad\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03b9\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd,\n\u1f14\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u2019 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[1061] On this celebrated garden, after which the Epicureans were\ncalled \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03ae\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd, see Diog. 10, 17; Plin. H. N. xix. 4, 51; Cic.\nFin. i. 20, 65; v. 1, 3; Ad Fam. xiii. 1; Sen. Ep. 21, 10; Steinhart,\np. 462, 45; 463, 72. Epicurus had purchased it for 80 min\u00e6.\n\n[1062] This subject will be discussed at a later period.\n\n[1063] Such as Themista or Themisto, the wife of Leonteus (Diog. 5; 25;\n26; Clem. Strom. iv. 522, D).\n\n[1064] Diog. 4; 6; 7; Cleomed. Meteor. p. 92, Balfor.; Plut. N. P.\nSuav. Vivi, 4, 8; 16, 1 and 6; Lat. Viv. 4, 2. The best-known among\nthese \u1f11\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9 is Leontion, who lived with Metrodorus, a pupil of\nEpicurus (Diog. 6; 23), and wrote with spirit against Theophrastus\n(Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93; Plut. Hist. Nat. Pr\u00e6f. 29). Conf. Diog. 5;\nPhilodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, Vol. Herc. v. 2, Fr. 9. Athen. xiii. 593, b,\ntells a fine story of self-sacrifice of her daughter Dana\u00eb.\n\n[1065] Ol. 127, 2, in the archonship of Pytharatus, and in his\nseventy-second year. Diog. 15; Cic. De Fat. 9, 19.\n\n[1066] Diog. 15; 22; Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 26; Fin. ii. 30, 96; Sen. Ep.\n66, 47; 92, 25. That he put an end to his own life (Baumhauer, Vet.\nPhilo. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. 322), Hermippus (Diog. 15) by no means\nimplies.\n\n[1067] According to Diog. Pro. 16, x. 26, he was, next to Chrysippus,\nthe most voluminous writer of the ancient philosophers, his writings\nfilling 300 rolls. The titles of his most esteemed works are given by\nDiog. 27. Conf. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 595, Harl.\n\n[1068] Three epistles in Diog. 35; 84; 122; and the \u03ba\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03b9, an\nepitome of his ethics, mentioned by Cic. N. D. i. 30, 85, and 139. Of\nhis 37 books \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, fragments of books 2 and 11 have been edited\n(Vol. Hercul. ii.).\n\n[1069] Fragments in Diog. 5; 7. Besides the testament and the letter to\nIdomeneus (Diog. 16\u201322), many individual expressions of Epicurus have\nbeen preserved by Seneca.\n\n[1070] Aristophanes (in Diog. 13) calls his style \u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7.\nCleomed. Meteor. p. 91, complains of his awkward and barbarous\nexpressions, instancing: \u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bb\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u00b7 \u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f40\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c5\u03b3\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u00b7 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2. In this respect, Chrysippus may be compared with him. See\nabove, p. 48, 1.\n\n[1071] See Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 598, Harl. They were, no doubt, very\nnumerous. Diog. x. 9, probably exaggerates their number in saying the\nfriends of Epicurus would fill towns. Cic. Fin. i. 20, 65, speaks of\nmagni greges amicorum. Plut. Lat. Viv. 3, 1, also mentions his friends\nin Asia and Egypt. In Greece, however, on his own testimony, and that\nof Metrodorus (Sen. Ep. 79, 15), they attracted little notice.\n\n[1072] A native of Lampsacus (Strabo, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589), and, next\nto Epicurus, the most celebrated teacher of the School. Cicero, Fin.\nii. 28, 92, calls him p\u00e6ne alter Epicurus, and states (Fin. ii. 3, 7)\nthat Epicurus gave him the name of a wise man (Diog. 18; Sen. Ep. 52,\n3). Further particulars respecting him and his writings in Diog. x. 6;\n18; 21\u201324; Philodem. De Vitiis, ix. (Vol. Herc. iii.), col. 12; 21; 27;\nAthen. vii. 279; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 7, 1; 12, 2; 16, 6 and 9; Adv.\nCol. 33, 2 and 6; Sen. Ep. 98, 9; 99, 25. Fragments of the letters are\nto be found in Plutarch, Seneca, and Philodemus. Whether the fragments\nof a treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd in vol. vi. of Vol. Hercul. belong to him,\nis very uncertain. According to Diog. 23, he died seven years before\nEpicurus, in his fifty-third year, and must therefore have been born\n330 or 329 B.C. For the education of his children probably by Leontion,\nwhom Diog. 23 calls \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u1f74, and Sen. Fr. 45 in Hieron. Adv. Jovin. i.\n191 calls his wife, provision is made by Epicurus in his will (Diog.\n19, 21).\n\n[1073] Son of Athenodorus, likewise a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 24), a\ncapital mathematician, according to Cic. Acad. ii. 33, 106; Fin. i. 6,\n20. Diog. l.c. calls him \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bf\u03c2; Metrodorus, in\nPhilodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 (Vol. Herc. v. a), col. 6, \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b8\u03b5\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. Sen.\nEp. 6, 6, calls him, Metrodorus, and Hermarchus, viros magnos.\nPhilodemus (vol. v. b), Fr. 49. praises his frankness towards his\nteacher. A son of his is also mentioned in Epicurus\u2019 will (Diog. 19),\nwhose mother would appear to have been a courtesan, according to Plut.\nN. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 6.\n\n[1074] This individual\u2019s name, formerly written Hermachus, appears as\nHermarchus in the modern editions of Diogenes, Cicero, and Seneca. The\nlatter form is now established beyond doubt by the Herculanean\nfragments from Philodemus (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2, vol. vi. col. 13, 20; De\nVitiis, ix. vol. iii. col. 25, 1), and the inscription on a monument to\nhim (Antiquitat. Hercul. V. 17). His birthplace was Mytilene,\nAgemarchus being his father. (Diog. 17, 15, 24.) Diog. 24 gives a list\nof his books. Epicurus (Diog. 20) describes him as one of his oldest\nand most faithful friends, in the words: \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03b7\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u1fb3. On his character, see Sen. Ep. 6, 6.\n\n[1075] According to what is stated in the testament of Epicurus. Diog.\n16.\n\n[1076] Colotes, a native of Lampsacus. Diog. 25. Further particulars\nabout him may be obtained from Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 5; 1, 1; N. P. Suav.\nVivi, 1, 1; Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 2. Vol. Hercul. iv. Introd. in\nPolystr. p. iii.\n\n[1077] In particular, Neocles, Chairedemus, and Aristobulus, the\nbrothers of Epicurus (Diog. 3, 28; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 5, 3; where\n\u1f08\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 is evidently a copyist\u2019s error; 16, 3; De Lat. Viv. 3, 2);\nIdomeneus, a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 25; 22; 23; 5; Plut. Adv. Col.\n18, 3; Strabo, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589; Athen. vii. 279; Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. Fr. 72, Vol. Herc. v. 2; Sen. Ep. 21, 3 and 7; 22, 5; Phot.\nLex.; and Suid. \u03a0\u03cd\u03b8\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0394\u03ae\u03bb\u03b9\u03b1), from whose historical writings many\nfragments are quoted by M\u00fcller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 489; Leonteus,\nlikewise a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 5; 25; Plut. Adv. Col. 3, 3;\nStrabo, l.c.); Herodotus (Diog. 4 and 34); Pythocles (Diog. 5 and 83;\nPlut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 12, 1; Adv. Col. 29, 2; Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, Fr. 6); Apelles (Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 12, 1); Men\u0153ceus\n(Diog. 121); Nicanor (Diog. 20); Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus,\nwho afterwards fell out with Epicurus (Diog. 4 and 6; 23 and 28; Cic.\nN. D. i. 33, 93: Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Adv. Col. 32, 7;\nComment. in Hesiod. Fr. 7, 1; Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, Vol. Herc. v.\na, col. 20). This Timocrates must not be confounded with the Athenian\nTimocrates, whom Epicurus appointed his heir, jointly with Amynomachus\n(Diog. 16; Cic. Fin. ii. 31, 101). The two last named were probably\npupils of Epicurus. Other pupils were: Mithras, a Syrian, an official\nunder Lysimachus (Diog. 4 and 28; Plut. Adv. Col. 33, 2; N. P. Suav.\nViv. 15, 5); Mys, a slave of Epicurus, on whom he bestowed liberty\n(Diog. 21; 3; 10; Gell. ii. 18, 8; Macrob. Sat. i. 11; the ladies\nmentioned on p. 407, 2, 3; likewise Anaxarchus, to whom Epicurus\naddressed a letter, and Timarchus, to whom Metrodorus addressed one\n(Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 3); Hegesianax, who died early (Plut. N. P. Suav.\nVivi, 20, 5); the poet Menander, whose wondrous epigram on Epicurus is\nto be found in the anthology; and probably Dionysius \u1f41 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2.\n(See above, p. 44, 1.)\n\n[1078] Diog. 16. In Cicero\u2019s time, the plot of ground, together with\nthe tenement standing thereupon, and at that time in ruins (parietin\u00e6),\nwas in the hands of C. Memmius, a distinguished Roman, to whom Cicero\nwrote (Ad Fam. xiii. 1), conf. Ad Att. v. 11, begging him to restore it\nto the School. Whether he was successful is not known from Sen. Ep. 21,\n10.\n\n[1079] Diog. 25. does not say that Polystratus was a personal disciple\nof Epicurus, but it seems probable. Fragments of a treatise of his \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 in the fourth volume of Vol. Hercul.\n\n[1080] According to Valer. Max. i. 8, ext. 17, both these individuals\nwere born on the same day, and passed their whole lives together with a\ncommon purse. Lysias, according to the older text of Diog. x. 25, was a\ncotemporary, at whose house Hermarchus died, as Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii.\n606 believes, and who is styled in Athen. v. 215, b, tyrant of Tarsus,\nCobet, however, reads \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 instead of \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u039b\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3.\n\n[1081] Diog. 25. The Dionysius referred to can hardly be Dionysius \u1f41\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 (see p. 44, 1), or Diogenes would have said so. Besides the\nchronology forbids such an assumption.\n\n[1082] Strabo, xiv. 2, 20, p. 658. He is probably the Protarchus whose\nsayings are quoted by Simpl. Phys. 78, a; Themist. Phys. 27, a.\n\n[1083] According to Strabo, l.c., Diog. 26, Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. iii.\n137, Math. viii. 348, x. 219, Erotian, Lex. Hippocr. \u039a\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03ce\u03b4\u03b7,\nDemetrius was one of the most distinguished Epicureans. Whether a\ntreatise on mathematics, illegible fragments of which are found in\nHerculaneum (Vol. Herc. iv. Introd. in Polystr. iii. 2), is his, or\nbelongs to another Demetrius mentioned by Strabo, xii. 3, 16, page 548,\nit is impossible to say.\n\n[1084] Both the Ptolemies of Alexandria (Diog. 25); Diogenes of Tarsus\n(Diog. vi. 81; x. 26; 97; 118; 136; 138); Orion (Diog. 26); Timagoras\n(Cic. Acad. ii. 25, 80); and also Metrodorus of Stratonice, who went\nover from Epicurus to Carneades (Diog. 9)\u2014a very rare thing for an\nEpicurean to do\u2014may be named among his pupils.\n\n[1085] According to Athen. xii. 547, a, \u00c6lian, V. H. ix. 12, two\nEpicureans, Alcius and Philiscus, were banished from Rome, in the\nconsulate of L. Postumius (173 or 155 B.C.; see Clinton\u2019s Fasti),\nbecause of their evil influence on youth. Although the story is\nobviously taken from a hostile authority and in Suid. (\u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, vol.\ni. b, 419 Bern.), it is told with such exaggerations as to inspire\ngrave mistrust, it can hardly be altogether without some foundation.\nPlut. N. P. Suav. V. 19, 4, says, that in some cities severe laws were\npassed against the Epicureans, and just at that time there was a strong\nfeeling in Rome against innovations, witness the well-known enquiry\ninto the Bacchanalia instituted 186 B.C.\n\n[1086] According to Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 6, Amafinius seems to have come\nforward not long after the philosophic embassy of 156 B.C.; nor is this\nat variance with Lucr. v. 336, who claims primus cum primis to have set\nforth the Epicurean teaching in Latin. His works made a great\nimpression at the time, according to Cic. l.c. (cujus libris editis\ncommota multitudo contulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam). According\nto Acad. i. 2, 5, he pursued natural science, carefully following the\nviews of Epicurus. Cicero then complains of him and Rabirius, we know\nnot which one is meant, nor whether he was an Epicurean, qui nulla arte\nadhibita de rebus ante oculos positis vulgari sermone disputant: nihil\ndefiniunt, nihil partiuntur, &c. Conf. Tusc. ii. 3, 7. Cassius, too\n(Cic. Ad Fam. xv. 12), calls him and Catius (see p. 414, 3) mali\nverborum interpretes.\n\n[1087] Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 7: Post Amafinium autem multi ejusdem \u00e6muli\nrationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt, quodque\nmaxumum argumentum est non dici illa subtiliter, quod et tam facile\nediscantur et ab indoctis probentur, id illi firmamentum esse discipli\u00e6\nputant. Conf. in Fin. i. 7, 25, the question: Cur tam multi sint\nEpicurei?\n\n[1088] Surnamed \u1f41 \u03ba\u03b7\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03cd\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, the writer of more than 400 books.\nDiog. 25; 2; 13; vii. 181.\n\n[1089] Diog. vii. 35, x. 25, and Procl. in Euclid. 55, says that Zeno\nwas a native of Sidon, and a pupil of Apollodorus; nor can these\nstatements be referred to an older Zeno, as some previous writers\nmaintained, believing Apollodorus to be called in error a pupil of\nEpicurus by Diog. x. 25, instead of to the one mentioned by Cicero. For\nno trace of such a one exists; and Diogenes vii. 35 would then have\npassed over the teacher of Cicero without notice, although the latter\ncannot possibly have been unknown to him. According to Cic. Acad. i.\n12, 46, Zeno attended the lectures of Carneades and admired them; and\nsince Carneades died not later than 129 B.C., Zeno cannot have been\nborn much later than 150 B.C. If, therefore, Zeno was really the\nsuccessor of Apollodorus, the latter must be placed entirely in the\nsecond century. But this fact is not sufficiently established. Cicero,\nin company with Atticus, attended his lectures (Cic. l.c.; Fin. i. 5,\n16; Tusc. iii. 17, 38. In Cic. N. D. i. 21, 58, Cotta says the same of\nhimself), on his first visit to Athens, 78 or 79 B.C.; conf. N. D. i.\n34, 93; but this cannot possibly be the same Zeno or Xeno (as Krische,\nForsch. 26, maintains) whom Cic. Ad Att. v. 10, 11; xvi. 3 mentions as\nliving in 50 and 43 B.C. Cic. N. D. i. 21, calls him princeps\nEpicureorum (and Philo of Larissa, coryph\u00e6us Epicureorum); Tusc. l.c.,\nacriculus senex, istorum (Epicureans) acutissimus. Diog. x. 25, calls\nhim \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03cd\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ae\u03c1. From Procl. in Euclid. 55; 59; 60, we hear of a\ntreatise of Zeno, in which he attacked the validity of mathematical\nproofs. Philodemus\u2019 treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 (Vol. Herc. v. a) seems,\nfrom the title, to have been an abstract from Zeno. Cotemporary with\nZeno was that Aristio, or Athenio, who played a part in Athens during\nthe Mithridatic war, and is sometimes called a Peripatetic, and\nsometimes an Epicurean (Plut. Sulla, 12; 14; 23). See Zeller\u2019s\nPhilosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 759, 2. Perhaps to the time of\nhis despotism the statement may be referred (Demetrius Magnes in Athen.\nxiii. 611, b) that the Stoic Theotimus, who wrote against Epicurus, was\nkilled at the instance of Zeno.\n\n[1090] Cicero (N. D. i. 33, 93; Fin. i. 5, 16; v. 1, 3; Legg. i. 20,\n53) had also studied under him in Athens, and previously in Rome, where\nPh\u00e6drus must then have been residing (Ad Fam. xiii. 1). He was old when\nCicero for the second time was brought into relations with him.\nAccording to Phlegon, in Phot. Bibl. Cod. 97, p. 84, a, 17, he was\nsucceeded by Patro (Ol. 177, 3, or 70 B.C.) in the headship of the\nSchool, after holding it only for a very short time; but this is not a\nwell-ascertained fact. Cicero l.c. praises the character of Ph\u00e6drus. He\ncalls him nobilis philosophus (Philip, v. 5, 13). It is supposed that\nCicero\u2019s description (N. D. i. 10, 25; 15, 41), and that the fragments\nfirst published by Drummond (Herculanensia: London, 1810), and then by\nPetersen (Ph\u00e6dri ... de Nat. De. Fragm.: Hamb. 1833), and illustrated\nby Krische (Forschungen), were from a treatise of Ph\u00e6drus on the Gods,\nto which perhaps Cic. Ad Att. xiii. 39 refers. But Spengel (from the\nHerculanean rolls, Philodemus \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. Abh. d. M\u00fcnch. Akad.\nPhilos-philol. Kl. x. 1, 127) and Sauppe (De Philodemi libro ... de\npietate. G\u00f6tt. Lectionsverz. f\u00fcr Sommer, 1864) have shown that the\nNeapolitan (Vol. Herc. Coll. Alt. i. ii. 1862) editors are right in\nregarding these fragments as the remains of a treatise of Philodemus\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[1091] Philodemus (see Vol. Herc. i. 1; Gros, Philod. Rhet. cxii.;\nPreller, Allg. Encycl. Sect. III. Bd. xxiii. 345) was a native of\nGadara. in C\u0153le-Syria (Strabo, xvi. 2, 29, p. 759). He lived at Rome in\nCicero\u2019s time, and is mentioned by Cicero as a learned and amiable man\n(Fin. ii. 35, 119; Or. in Pison. 28). Besides philosophic works, he\nalso wrote poems (Cic. In Pis.; Hor. Sat. i. 2, 121). A number of the\nlatter, in the shape of epigrams, are preserved. Of his philosophical\nworks mentioned by Diog. x. 3; 24, no fewer than thirty-six books were\ndiscovered in Herculaneum, which have, for the most part, been\npublished (Vol. Herc. iv. Introd. in Polystr. iii.) so far as they were\nlegible. Spengel and Gros have separately edited Rhet. IV.; Sauppe, De\nVitiis X.; and Petersen and Sauppe, the fragments \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[1092] Cic. Acad. ii. 33, 106; Fin. ii. 35, 110; Ad Fam. vi. 11.\nAccording to Virgil, Catal. 7, 9; 10, 1, Donat. Vita Virg. 79, Serv. Ad\nEcl. vi. 13, \u00c6n. vi. 264, he was the teacher of Virgil. The name is\nvariously written as Syro, Siro, Sciro, Scyro. Somewhat earlier is the\ngrammarian Pompilius Andronicus, from Syria, who, according to Sueton.\nIllust. Gram. c. 8, lived at Rome at the same time as Gnipho, the\nteacher of C\u00e6sar (Ibid. c. 7), and gave up his profession for the\nEpicurean philosophy, and afterwards lived at Cum\u00e6.\n\n[1093] Cic. Ad Fam. xiii. 1; Ad Att. v. 11; vii. 2; Ad Quint. Fratr. i.\n2, 4, where besides him an Epicurean Plato of Sardes is mentioned, and\nabove, pp. 410, 1; 413, 1.\n\n[1094] Besides Lucretius, the most important among them are T.\nAlbutius, called by Cic. Brut. 35, 131, perfectus Epicureus (Cic. Brut.\n26, 102; Tusc. v. 37, 108; N. D. i. 33, 93; Fin. i. 3, 8 [De Orat. iii.\n43, 171]; In Pison. 38, 92; Offic. ii. 14, 50; Orator, 44, 149; In\nC\u00e6cil. 19, 63; Provin. Cons. 7, 15; De Orat. ii. 70, 281), and\nVelleius, who, as Krische (Forsch. 20) proves, by a gloss on Nat. De.\ni. 29, 82 and Cic. De N. D. i. 28, 79 (conf. Divin. i. 36, 79), was a\nnative of Lanuvium, and was considered the most distinguished Epicurean\nof his time (Cic. N. D. i. 6, 15; 21, 58; conf. De Orat. iii. 21, 78).\nOther Epicureans were: C. Catius, a native of Gaul, spoken of by Cicero\n(Ad Fam. xv. 16) as one long ago dead. By Quintilian, x. 1, 124, he is\ncalled levis quidem sed non injucundus tamen auctor; and the Comment.\nCruqu. in Hor. Sat. ii. 4, 1, says that he wrote four books De Rerum\nNatura et De Summo Bono;\u2014C. Cassius, the well-known leader of the\nconspiracy against C\u00e6sar (Cic. Ad Fam. xv. 16, 19; Plut. Brut. 37); C.\nVibius Pansa, who died as consul at Mutina in 43 B.C. (Cic. Ad Fam.\nvii. 12; xv. 19); Gallus (Ad Fam. vii. 26); L. Piso, the patron of\nPhilodemus (Cic. in Pis. 28, see above, p. 413, 2; l.c. 9, 20; 16, 37;\n18, 42; 25, 59; Post Red. 6, 14); Statilius (Plut. Brut. 12); a second\nStatilius appears to be meant (Cat. Min. 65); L. Manlius Torquatus, to\nwhom Cic. Fin. i. 5, 13 delegates the representation of the Epicurean\nteaching. T. Pomponius Atticus, the well-known friend of Cicero,\napproached nearest to the Epicurean School, calling its adherents\nnostri familiares (Cic. Fin. v. 1, 3) and condiscipuli (Legg. i. 7,\n21). He was a pupil of Zeno and Ph\u00e6drus and a friend of Patro\u2019s; but\nhis relations to philosophy were too free to entitle him properly to be\nranked in any one school (Cic. Fam. xiii. 1). The same observation\napplies also to his friend, L. Saufeius (Nepos, Att. 12; Cic. Ad Att.\niv. 6). Still less can C. Sergius Orata (Cic. Fin. ii. 22, 70; Off.\niii. 16, 67; De Orat. i. 39, 178), L. Thorius Balbus (Fin. l.c.), and\nPostumius (Ibid.) be called Epicureans. Nor can anything be stated with\ncertainty respecting L. Papirius P\u00e6tus (Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 17 to 26),\nnot even from the chief passage Ep. 25, or respecting C. Trebatius from\nCic. Ad Fam. vii. 12. C. Memmius (from the way in which he is spoken of\nby Cic. Ad Fam. xiii. 1) cannot be regarded as a member of the\nEpicurean School, although Lucret. De Rer. Nat. i. 24; v. 9, expressed\nthe hope of winning him.\n\n[1095] Born, according to Hieron, (in Eus. Chron.), 95 B.C., he died in\nhis 44th year, or 51 B.C. In Vita Virgilii, 659 ought therefore to be\nsubstituted for 699 A.U.C. It is clear, from Nepos, Att. 12, that he\nwas dead before the assassination of C\u00e6sar. Teuffel (in Pauly\u2019s\nRealencycl. iv. 1195) justly disputes the statement of Hieronymus, that\nhe committed suicide in a fit of madness.\n\n[1096] According to Sext. Math. vii. 201, a cotemporary of Antiochus of\nAscalon, whose language towards him is there quoted, and reckoned by\nGalen. Isag. c. 4, vol. xiv. 683 among the leaders of the logical\nSchool of Physicians. His medical treatises are often referred to by\nGalen. Plutarch in his Placita often names him.\n\n[1097] Known for three things\u2014his theory of atoms, his theory of the\nacquisition of knowledge, and his resolution of the soul into matter.\n\nAll bodies, he held, consist of atoms, which differ from the atoms of\nDemocritus in that they owe their origin to the meeting and breaking up\nof greater masses, and are not in quality alike and unchangeable\n(\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2). Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 32; Math. ix. 363; x. 318; viii. 220; iii.\n5; Galen. l.c. 9, p. 698; Dionys.; Alex. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 23, 4);\nC\u0153l. Aurelian. De Pass. Acut. i. 14. See Fabric. on Pyrrh. iii. 32. The\nlatter is probably in error in describing the primary atoms of\nAsclepiades as without quality, differing only in size, form, number,\nand arrangement. Although in this respect he resembled Heraclides, with\nwhom he is generally classed, and applied, like him, the name \u1f44\u03b3\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9 to\natoms, still it is probable that his knowledge of Heraclides was\ntraditionally derived from the Epicureans.\n\nHe also asserted, with Epicurus (Antiochus, in Sext. Math. vii. 201):\n\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2\n\u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. At the same time he maintained that our senses\ncannot distinguish the component parts of things, but even Epicurus and\nDemocritus admitted as much in respect of atoms.\n\nHe differs entirely from Epicurus in denying the existence of a soul\napart from body, and in referring every kind of notion, including the\nsoul itself, to the action of the senses (Sext. Math. vii. 380; Plut.\nPlac. iv. 2, 6; C\u0153l. Aurelian. l.c. in Fabric. on the passage of Sext.;\nTertullian, De An. 15). What is elsewhere stated of Asclepiades,\nleaving alone his medical views, for instance, that with Heraclitus he\nbelieved in a perpetual flux of things, is not at variance with\nEpicurean principles.\n\n[1098] Quint Inst. vi. 3, 78, names L. Varus as an Epicurean, a friend\nof Augustus, perhaps the individual who according to Donat. V. Virg.\n79, Serv. on Ecl. vi. 13. attended the lectures of Syro in company with\nVirgil. Horace, notwithstanding Ep. i. 4, 15, was no Epicurean, but\nonly a man who gathered everywhere what he could make use of (Sat. i.\n5, 101). In Caligula\u2019s time, a senator Pompedius was an Epicurean\n(Joseph. Antiquit. ix. 1, 5); under Nero, Aufidius Bassus, a friend of\nSeneca (Sen. Ep. 30, 1 and 3 and 5; 14), the elder Celsus (Orig. c.\nCels. i. 8), and Diodorus, who committed suicide (Sen. Vi. Be. 19, 1);\nunder Vespasian or his sons, Pollius (Stat. Silv. ii. 2, 113). In the\nfirst half of the second century, Cleomedes, Met. p. 87, complained of\nthe honours paid to Epicurus. In the second half of the same century\nlived Antonius, mentioned by Galen. De Prop. An. Affect. v. 1, and\nZenobius, who, according to Simpl. Phys. 113, b, was an opponent of\nAlexander of Aphrodisias. In the first half of the third century lived\nDiogenes La\u00ebrtius, who, if not a perfect Epicurean himself, was at\nleast a friend of the Epicureans. Amongst other Epicureans, the names\nof Athen\u00e6us (whose epigram on Epicurus is quoted by Diog. x. 12).\nAutodorus (Diog. v. 92), and Hermodorus (Lucian, Icaromen. 16) may be\nmentioned; but Diog. x. 11 does not justify us calling Diocles of\nMagnesia an Epicurean.\n\n[1099] Diog. x. 9, in the first half of the third century, writes: \u1f25 \u03c4\u03b5\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c7\u1f74 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03b1\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03b8\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd. The testimony of\nLactantius, Inst. iii. 17, to the wide extension of Epicureanism is not\nso trustworthy, although he treats it as an existing fact. It may be\nthat he is only following older writers, as Cicero does. See above, p.\n412, 1.\n\n[1100] Cic. Fin. ii. 7, 20: Quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri\n\u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03c2? Diog. 12 (according to Diocles). Epicurus often exhorted\nhis scholars (Ibid. 83; 85; 35) to commit to memory what they had\nheard. His last exhortation to his friends was (Diog. 16): \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[1101] He speaks of himself and Metrodorus in Cic. Fin. ii. 3, 7, as\nwise men. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 18, 5, quotes, as coming from him: \u1f61\u03c2\n\u039a\u03bf\u03bb\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ba\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f01\u03c8\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u039d\u03b5\u03bf\u03ba\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b5\u03bb\u03c6\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03b1\u03af\u03b4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1 \u1f00\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f37\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u1f10\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd. Conf. Id. Frat. Am. 16, p. 487; Adv.\nCol. 17, 5; Cleomed. Meteor. p. 89. Not only was Epicurus\u2019 birthday\nobserved by the Epicurean School during his lifetime, but the 20th of\nevery month was celebrated as a festival in honour of him and\nMetrodorus. In his testament Epicurus especially ordered this twofold\nobservance for the future. Diog. 18; Cic. Fin. ii. 31, 101; Plut. N. P.\nSuav. Viv. 4, 8; Plin. H. N. xxxv. 5. Athen. vii. 298 d: \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2. Epicurus\u2019 picture is constantly referred to (Cic. Fin.\nv. 1, 3; Plin. l.c.). The extravagant importance attached to Epicurus\nin his School is proved by the high eulogies in Lucret. i 62; iii. 1\nand 1040; v. 1; vi. 1. Metrodorus, in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 4, praises \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f44\u03c1\u03b3\u03b9\u03b1.\n\n[1102] Cic. Tusc. ii. 3, 8.\n\n[1103] Sen. Ep. 33, 4, compares the scientific independence of the\nStoics with the Epicurean\u2019s dependence on the founder: Non sumus sub\nrege: sibi quisque se vindicat. Apud istos quicquid dicit Hermarchus,\nquicquid Metrodorus, ad unum refertur. Omnia qu\u00e6 quisquam in illo\ncontubernio locutus est, unius ductu et auspiciis dicta sunt. On the\nother hand, Numenius (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 3), little as he can\nagree with their tenets, commends the Epicureans for faithfully\nadhering to their master\u2019s teaching, a point in which only the\nPythagoreans are their equals. Of the Epicureans, it may be said: \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u2019\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c9 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u1ff3 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd [\u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1]\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f04\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1,\n\u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ad\u03b2\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ad\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd. Thus the Epicurean\nSchool resembles a state animated by one spirit, in which there are no\ndivisions of party.\n\n[1104] It has been already observed, p. 405, 1; 406, 1, that Epicurus\nignored his obligations to his teachers Pamphilus and Nausicydes, and\nonly confessed his debt to Democritus. All other philosophers provoked\nnot only his contempt, but likewise his abuse. Diog. 8, probably on the\nauthority of Timocrates, communicates his remarks on Plato, Aristotle,\nand others. Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93: Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit\ncontumeliosissime, Ph\u00e6doni Socratico turpissime maledixerit. Plut. N.\nP. Suav. Vivi, 2, 2: Compared with Epicurus and Metrodorus, Colotes is\npolite; \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u1fe5\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03b2\u03c9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03bb\u03b7\u03ba\u03c5\u03b8\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2,\n\u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f08\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a0\u03c5\u03b8\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03a0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u03c6\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f29\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f39\u03c0\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c3\u03ba\u03ad\u03b4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd.\n\n[1105] Cic. N. D. ii. 29, 73: Nam vobis, Vellei, minus notum est, quem\nad modum quidque dicatur; vestra enim solum legitis, vestra amatis,\nceteros causa incognita condemnatis. Ibid. i. 34, 93: Zeno not only\ndespised cotemporary philosophers, but he even called Socrates a scurra\nAtticus, Macrob. Somn. i. 2 (Colotes ridiculing Plato\u2019s Republic).\n\n[1106] Sext. Math. xi. 169: \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd. Conf.\nEpic. in Diog. 122: The demand to study philosophy in youth, as well as\nin age, is supported on the ground that it is never too early nor too\nlate to be happy.\n\n[1107] It was mentioned, p. 408, 3, that Epicurus\u2019 own education was\ndefective. Not content therewith, he upholds this defectiveness on\nprinciple. Nullam eruditionem, says the Epicurean in Cic. Fin. i. 21,\n71, esse duxit, nisi qu\u00e6 beat\u00e6 vit\u00e6 disciplinam adjuvaret. In poets,\nnulla solida utilitas omnisque puerilis est delectatio. Music,\ngeometry, arithmetic, astronomy et a falsis initiis profecta vera esse\nnon possunt, et si essent vera nihil afferrent, quo jucundius, i.e. quo\nmelius viveremus.\n\n[1108] Cic. Fin. ii. 4, 12: Vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil\nopus esse eum, philosophus qui futurus sit, scire literas. They fetch\ntheir philosophers, like Cincinnatus, from the plough. In this spirit,\nEpicurus (Diog. 6; Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 12, 1) wrote to Pythocles:\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd (the \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03cd\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, the learned culture),\n\u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5, \u03c6\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2; and to Apelles (Plut. l.c.; Athen.\nxiii. 588, a): \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03c9 \u03c3\u03b5, \u1f66 \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 (Plut.\nexplains it: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2) \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f65\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2.\nMetrodorus asserted (Plut. l.c.) that it need not be a source of\ntrouble to anyone, if he had never read a line of Homer, and did not\nknow whether Hector were a Trojan or a Greek. The art of reading and\nwriting, \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 in the limited sense, was the only art recognised\nby Epicurus. Sext. Math. i. 49.\n\n[1109] Sext. Math. i. 1; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 20.\n\n[1110] Cic. Fin. i. 21 (see p. 421, 1), which probably only means, that\nmathematical ideas cannot be applied to phenomena. Hence Acad. ii. 33,\n106 (conf. Fin. i. 6, 20): Poly\u00e6nus ... Epicuro adsentiens totam\ngeometriam falsam esse credidit. Conf. Procl. in Eucl. p. 85.\n\n[1111] See p. 421, 1; Sext. Math. i. 1: Epicurus rejects mathematics \u1f61\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. According to\nDiog. 93, Epicurus calls astronomy \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03ce\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. Conf. Diog. 79.\n\n[1112] Plut. l.c. 13, 1. Philodemus, in his treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2, had\ndiscussed at length the value of music, as we gather from the fragments\nof the 4th Book, Vol. Herc. i.; in particular rejecting the notion that\nit has a moral effect, see col. i. 24, 28. He was even opposed to music\nat table (Col. 38, as Epicurus was in Plut., l.c.). The statement of\nDiog. 121, that only the wise man can give a right opinion on poetry\nand music, is not at variance with these passages.\n\n[1113] Philodemus, De Rhet. Vol. Herc. iv. col. 3; 12. The same polemic\nis continued in the further fragments of this treatise. Ibid. V. Col.\n6.\n\n[1114] Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22: In logic iste vester plane, ut mihi quidem\nvidetur, inermis ac nudus est. Tollit definitiones: nihil de dividendo\nac partiendo docet. Non quomodo efficiatur concludaturque ratio,\ntradit, non qua via captiosa solvantur, ambigua distinguantur,\nostendit. Ibid. 19, 63: In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit\n[Epic.] esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum viam.\nAcad. ii. 30, 97: Ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et\ninridet. Diog. 31: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03bb\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b8\u03cc\u03b3\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2.\n\n[1115] See p. 424.\n\n[1116] Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63: In physicis plurimum posuit [Epic.]. Ibid.\n6, 17: In physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus.\n\n[1117] Epic. in Diog. x. 82 and 85: \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03ce\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 ... \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f24\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03b2\u03ad\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u1ff6\u03bd. Ibid. 112: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03ce\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c8\u03af\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f20\u03bd\u03ce\u03c7\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 ... \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f02\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b4\u03b5\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2; but this becomes necessary, since, without\nknowledge of nature, we cannot he perfectly free from fear. The same in\nPlut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 8, 7; conf. Diog. 79 and 143; Cic. Fin. iv. 5,\n11; Lucret. i. 62; iii. 14; vi. 9.\n\n[1118] In Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63, the Epicurean speaks of a fivefold, or,\nexcluding Canonic, of a fourfold use of natural science: fortitudo\ncontra mortis timorem; constantia contra metum religionis; sedatio\nanimi omnium rerum occultarum ignoratione sublata; moderatio natura\ncupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis.\n\n[1119] Diog. 29: \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd [\u1f21 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1] \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, \u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. Canonic was also called \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd; natural science, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2; ethics, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03b2\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2.\n\n[1120] Diog. 30: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03c6\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n[1121] Diog. l.c.: \u03b5\u1f30\u03ce\u03b8\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff7\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Cic. Fin. i. 19. See p. 423, 4. Hence Sext. Math. vii. 14:\nSome reckon Epicurus amongst those who only divide philosophy into\nnatural and moral science; whilst, according to others, he adhered to a\nthreefold division, at the same time rejecting the Stoic logic. Sen.\nEp. 89, 11: Epicurei duas partes philosophi\u00e6 putaverunt esse, naturalem\natque moralem: rationalem removerunt, deinde cum ipsis rebus\ncogerentur, ambigua secernere, falsa sub specie veri latentia\ncoarguere, ipsi quoque locum, quem de judicio et regula appellant, alio\nnomine rationalem induxerunt: sed eum accessionem esse naturalis partis\nexistimant.\n\n[1122] Ritter, iii. 463; Schleiermacher, Gesch. d. Phil. p. 123.\n\n[1123] Steinhart in the treatise often referred to.\n\n[1124] Diog. 29; Sext. Math. vii. 22.\n\n[1125] Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22. See p. 422, 4.\n\n[1126] Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22; Sext. Math. vii. 203. If, according to Diog.\n31, and Cic. Acad. ii. 46, 142, Epicurus named three criteria\u2014\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2,\n\u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, and \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7\u2014instead of the above two, it must be an inaccuracy\nof expression; \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2, as we have seen, is derived from sensation.\n\n[1127] Epicurus, in Diog. x. 146; Lucr. iv. 467\u2013519; Cic. Fin. i. 19,\n54. Colotes (in Plut. Adv. Col. 24, 3) replies to the Cyrenaic\nscepticism by saying: \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. In\nthis case, as in the case of the Stoics, the dogmatism in favour of the\nsenses is based on a practical postulate, the need of a firm basis of\nconviction for human life.\n\n[1128] Epic. in Diog. x. 50, and 147; Sext. Math. vii. 203\u2013210; viii.\n9; 63; 185; Plut. Adv. Col. 4, 3; 5, 2; 25, 2; Plac. iv. 9, 2: Lucr.\niv. 377\u2013519; Cic. Acad. ii. 25, 79; 32, 101; Fin. i. 7, 22; N. D. i.\n25, 70; Tertull. De An. 17. Further particulars below respecting\nsense-perception.\n\n[1129] Diog. x. 31; Lucr. iv. 480.\n\n[1130] Sext. Math. vii. 203 and 216. In Diog. x. 52, instead of\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, we should read with Cobet \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. Besides this peculiar\nexpression, Epicurus uses sometimes \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, sometimes \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 (Sext.\nl.c.), for sensation. An impression on the senses, he calls \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae. Diog. 50.\n\n[1131] Diog. 32.\n\n[1132] Diog. 33: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f74\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03be\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2. By the help of this passage, Cicero\u2019s\ndescription, N. D. i. 16, 43, must be corrected.\n\n[1133] Diog. l.c.: \u1f05\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1fe5\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f41 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd. \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03ad\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f02\u03bd \u1f10\u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 ... \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f60\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. Hence the exhortation in\nEpicurus\u2019 letter to Herodotus (in Diog. x. 37): \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b8\u03cc\u03b3\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b5\u1f30\u03bb\u03b7\u03c6\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f22\n\u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f22 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c7\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f43 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Every\nimpression must be referred to definite perceptions; apart from\nperceptions, no reality belongs to our impressions; or, as it is\nexpressed Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 107, Math. viii. 13, 258: The Epicureans\ndeny the existence of a \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd, and between a thing and its name there\nexists a third intermediate something\u2014a conception. See also Sext. vii.\n267.\n\n[1134] Diog. 33. Sext. Math. i. 57 (xi. 21): \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. Ibid. viii. 337, p. 521;\nPlut. De An. 6: The difficulty, that all learning presupposes\nknowledge, the Stoics met by \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9, the Epicureans by\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, which accordingly are the natural test of truth.\n\n[1135] See p. 426, 1. Diog. l.c.: \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f24\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f43 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd.\n\n[1136] See previous note and Epic. in Diog. 38: \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03b8\u03cc\u03b3\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f15\u03be\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f43 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03be\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd.\n\n[1137] Diog. 33 (conf. 38, 104): \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u1f74\n\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[1138] See p. 422, 4. Steinhart, p. 466, goes too far in saying that\nEpicurus defied all law and rule in thought.\n\n[1139] Diog. 32: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (probably: the coincidence of several sensations\nwhich must be distinguished from their \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 or free combination)\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6. Conf. p. 422, 4; 429, 1, and the corresponding doctrine of\nthe Stoics, p. 80, with the teaching of Epicurus, on the genesis of\nthoughts from sensations.\n\n[1140] Diog. 33: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f24\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n... \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03c4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u1fc6\u00b7 \u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f22 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f22 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u1fc6 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Sext. Math. vii. 211:\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2\u00b7\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f35 \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f35 \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. Ritter, iii. 486, observes that these statements\nare contradictory. According to Sextus, an opinion is only then true\nwhen it can be proved and not refuted; according to Diogenes, when it\ncan be proved or not refuted. The latter is, however, clearly meant by\nSextus, and is affirmed by Epicurus in Diog. 50 and 51.\n\n[1141] Epicur. in Diog. 50; Ibid. 33; Sext. vii. 212. The object of a\nfuture sensation is called by Diog. 38, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. Diog. x. 34,\nhimself gives a perverted explanation of this term, which probably\nmisled Steinhart, p. 466.\n\n[1142] Sext. l.c. 213.\n\n[1143] The two tests of truth, proof and absence of refutation, do not,\ntherefore, as Sextus expressly says, refer to the same cases. Our\nassumptions in respect of external appearances must be proved, before\nthey can be allowed to be true; our impressions of the secret causes of\nthese appearances must not be refuted. The former test applies to\nopinions regarding \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd; the latter, to opinions regarding \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f04\u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd. Diog. 38.\n\n[1144] Compare the passages in Sext. vii. 206, quoted p. 427, 1.\n\n[1145] Cic. Acad. ii. 14, 45: Nam qui voluit subvenire erroribus\nEpicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem, dixitque\nsapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate sejungere, nihil profecit,\nipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.\n\n[1146] Plut. Adv. Col. 7, 2 (Stob. Ecl. i. 366; Lucr. ii. 795): \u1f41\n\u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u1fc6 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ac\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f44\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd. For says\nEpicurus, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03bf\u1f36\u03b4\u03b1 \u1f45\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c3\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Often some see colour where others do not; \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22\n\u03bc\u1f74 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1fe5\u03b7\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[1147] Simpl. Categ. 109, \u03b2 (Schol. in Arist. 92, a, 10): Since\nDemocritus and Epicurus attribute all qualities, to atoms except those\nof form and mode of combination, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c4\u03ac\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1fb6\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2. Lucret. l.c.\n\n[1148] Compare the passages already quoted, on the truth of the\nimpressions of the senses, and the words of Epicurus, in Diog. 68: \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c7\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ad\u03b8\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b2\u03ac\u03c1\u03b5\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1\n\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f22 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b8\u2019 \u1f61\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd (\u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf),\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03b8\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f54\u03b8\u2019 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c5\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03b8\u2019 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[1149] Epic. in Diog. 143: \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f26\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c6\u03bf\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03af\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03c5\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cd\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f26\u03bd \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. For further particulars, p. 422.\n\n[1150] \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b4\u1f74 \u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03b8\u03bf\u03c1\u03cd\u03b2\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd. Epic. in Diog. 87.\n\n[1151] Diog. 27, mentions 37 books of his \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, besides smaller\nworks.\n\n[1152] Epic. in Diog. 78: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03ce\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03b8\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7, \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c9\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f76, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u1fc6 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c7\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 [evidently\n\u03bc\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 must be read], \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019\n\u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u03b8\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f22 \u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f31\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u1fc6 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd (how very different from Aristotle! See Zeller,\nPhilosophie der Griechen, ii. b, 113, 3; 114, 3; 359, 2), \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cc\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30 (as if) \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u1fc4\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1,\n\u03c4\u03ac\u03c7\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03ac\u03bc\u03b2\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bb\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd.\n(Conf. Lucr. vi. 50; v. 82.) \u03b4\u03b9\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f51\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03c6\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\nIbid. 104: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c5\u03bd\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f41 \u03bc\u1fe6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9.\n\n[1153] Ibid. 87: \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c3\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c7\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03ce\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03af\u03c0\u1fc3. \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c0\u1fc3, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u1fc3 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f42\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1fe6\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b5\u1fd6. Ibid. 98: \u03bf\u1f31\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f13\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 (those who allow only one explanation for every\nphenomenon) \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ac\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03af \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u1ff3\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. In investigating nature, they proceed on\nsuppositions chosen at random (\u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9, Epic. l.c.\n86). Conf. 94; 104; 113. Lucret. vi. 703.\n\n[1154] Epic. in Diog. 88; 92\u201395. Many other similar instances might be\nquoted. In support of the view that the sun was extinguished at\nsetting, Epicurus, according to Cleomed. Meteora, p. 89, is said to\nhave appealed to the story (respecting which Posidonius in Strabo, iii.\n1, 5, p. 138) that, as it sets, the hissing of the ocean may be heard\non the sea-shore.\n\n[1155] The principle is thus expanded by Lucret. i. 1021:\u2014\n\n Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum\n Ordine se suo qu\u00e6que sagaci mente locarunt,\n Nec quos qu\u00e6que darent motuspepigere profecto;\n Sed quia multa modis multis mutata per omne\n Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis,\n Omne genus motus et c\u0153tus experiundo,\n Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras,\n Qualibus h\u00e6c rebus consistit summa creata.\n\nv. 156:\n\n Dicere porro hominum causa voluisse [scil. Deos] parare\n Pr\u00e6claram mundi naturam, &c.\n Desipere est. Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis\n Gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti,\n Ut nostra quidquam causa gerere adgrediantur?\n Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos\n Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?...\n Exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa\n Notities hominum, Dis unde est insita primum; ...\n Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?\n\nConf. iv. 820; v. 78; 195; 419. In these views, he is only following\nEpicurus. Heavenly phenomena, says the latter, in Diog. 76, \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f22\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f05\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f00\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cc\u03b2\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b4\u03b5\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Ibid. 97: \u1f21 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b1\u03bc\u1fc6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03c9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u1fc3 \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9. Ibid. 113. With\nthese passages Cic. N. D. i. 20, 52, and Plut. Plac. i. 7, 7 (likewise\nii. 3, 2; Stob. i. 442), are quite in agreement.\n\n[1156] Lucr. i. 440:\u2014\n\n Pr\u00e6terea per se quodcumque erit aut faciet quid\n Aut aliis fungi [\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd] debebit agentibus ipsum,\n Aut erit, ut possint in eo res esse gerique.\n At facere et fungi sine corpore nulla potest res,\n Nec pr\u00e6bere locum porro nisi inane vacansque.\n Ergo pr\u00e6ter inane et corpora tertia per se\n Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui.\n\nEpic. in Diog. 67: \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6. \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. \u1f65\u03c3\u03b8\u2019 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. \u03bf\u1f50\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f10\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30 \u1f26\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7.\n\n[1157] Diog. 68; 40. Lucr. i. 449, who expresses \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1 by\nconjuncta, and \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 by eventa. Among the latter Lucretius, 459,\nreckons time, because in itself it is nothing, and only comes to our\nknowledge through motion and rest. Likewise Epicurus, in Diog. 72\n(conf. Stob. i. 252), shows that time is composed of days and nights,\nand their portions, of states of feeling or unconsciousness, of motion\nor rest, and hence that it is only a product (\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1) of these\nphenomena; and these being again \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, time is defined by the\nEpicurean Demetrius (Sext. Math. x. 219; Pyrrh. iii. 137): \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03c5\u03be\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f65\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2. The distinction between abstract and\nsensuous or undivided time (Steinhart, l.c. 466) does not appear to\nexist in Diogenes. His \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76 (Diog. 47) are\nimperceptibly small divisions of time, tempora multa, ratio qu\u00e6\ncomperit esse, which, according to Lucret. iv. 792, are contained in\nevery given time.\n\n[1158] Lucret. i. 358.\n\n[1159] Lucret. l.c. and i. 329; Diog. 40 and 67; Sext. Math. vii. 213;\nviii. 329. Most of the remarks in Lucret. i. 346 and 532 point to the\nsame fundamental idea: Without vacant interstices, nourishment cannot\nbe diffused over the whole bodies of plants or animals, nor can noise,\ncold, fire and water penetrate through solid bodies, or any body be\nbroken up into parts. The same in Themist. 40, b; Simpl. De C\u0153lo,\nSchol. in Arist. 484, a, 26.\n\n[1160] Lucr. i. 440; Diog. 39; Plut. Adv. Col 11, 5.\n\n[1161] Body is defined by Epicurus (Sext. Math. i. 21; x. 240; 257; xi.\n226) as \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c7\u1fc6 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, or as \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f00\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ad\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c7\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03ac\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. Emptiness is\n(according to Sext. x. 2) \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u1f74\u03c2 or \u1f14\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2. When\noccupied by a body, it is called \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2; when bodies pass through it, it\nis \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1; so that all three expressions, as Stob. Ecl. i. 388 rightly\nobserves, are only different names for the same thing. To the same\neffect is the statement in Plut. Plac. i. 20.\n\n[1162] Hence, in Diog. 69, \u1f04\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 and \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd are used of\nbodies; in Diog. 71, all bodies are called \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1; and according to\nEpicurus (Sext. Math. x. 42), all changes in bodies are due to local\ndisplacement of the atoms. Plut. Amator. 24, 3, p. 769, observes that\nEpicurus deals with \u1f01\u03c6\u1f74 and \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u1f74, but never with \u1f11\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2.\n\n[1163] Epic. in Diog. 40: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03be\n\u1f67\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\n\u03bc\u1f74 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f42\u03bd \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03cd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd ... \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2. Ibid. 56; Lucr. i. 147; ii. 551; 751; 790.\nFurther arguments for the belief in atoms in Lucret. i. 498: Since a\nbody and the space in which it is are entirely different, both must\noriginally have existed without any intermingling. If things exist\ncomposed of the full and the empty, the full by itself must exist, and\nlikewise the empty. Bodies in which there is no empty space cannot be\ndivided. They may be eternal, and must be so, unless things have been\nproduced out of nothing. Without empty space, soft bodies could not\nexist, nor hard bodies without something full. If there were no\nindivisible parts, everything must have been long since destroyed. The\nregularity of phenomena presupposes unchangeable primary elements. All\nthat is composite must ultimately consist of simple indivisible parts.\nIf there were no indivisible parts, every body would consist of\ninnumerable parts, as many in the smaller as in the greater body (conf.\nEpic. in Diog. 56). If nature did not reduce things to their smallest\nparts, it could not make new things. These arguments, very unequal in\nvalue, were borrowed by Lucretius from Epicurus. Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev.\n1, 8, 9, quotes, as an Epicurean principle, that unchangeable Being\nmust be at the bottom of everything.\n\n[1164] Epicurus and Lucretius, l.c. Lucr. i. 529; Sext. Math. ix. 219;\nx. 318; Stob. Ecl. i. 306; Plut. Pl. Phil. i. 3, 29.\n\n[1165] Epic. in Diog. 41; Lucret. i. 528; Simpl. De C\u0153lo, Schol. in\nArist. 484, a, 23.\n\n[1166] Diog. 44 and 55; Lucret. i. 266, where it is proved, by many\nanalogies, that there may be invisible bodies; Stob. l.c.; Plut. l.c.;\nSimpl. Phys. 216, a.\n\n[1167] Diog. 44; 54; Lucr. ii. 736 and 841; Plut. l.c. See page 433, 2.\n\n[1168] Lucret. v. 235.\n\n[1169] Diog.; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 29. The statement there made, that\nDemocritus only allowed to atoms size and shape, and that Epicurus\nadded weight, is not correct.\n\n[1170] Diog. 42; Lucr. ii. 333 and 478; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 30 (where,\nhowever, it would be against the sense to substitute \u1f22 for \u03bc\u1f74 as\nSteinhart l.c. p. 473 note 94 does); Alex. Aphr. in Philop. Gen. et\nCorr. 3, b; Cic. N. D. i. 24, 66. It does not, however, appear that\nLucret. ii. 333, made the variety of figures as great as the number of\natoms. (Ritter, iv. 101.)\n\n[1171] Lucret. i. 500.\n\n[1172] Diog. x. 55; Lucr. ii. 381.\n\n[1173] See the passages quoted, p. 442, 6, and 445, 5. The text of\nStob\u00e6us, Ecl. i. 346, must be corrected by the aid of these passages.\nPlut. Plac. i. 12, 5.\n\n[1174] Epic. in Diog. 41: \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f04\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9, \u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. The same argument is used by Lucret. i. 951; 1008\u20131020.\nHe continues 984, 1021: If space were limited, all bodies would collect\ntowards its lower part by reason of their weight, and their motion\nwould cease. Unless the quantity of matter were unlimited, the amount\nlost by bodies in their mutual contact could not be supplied. Conf.\nalso Plut. Adv. Col. 13, 3; in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9; Plac. i. 3, 28;\nAlex. in Simpl. Phys. 107, b, who mentions the above-quoted argument of\nEpicurus as the chief argument of the Epicureans.\n\n[1175] We have but little information; but it has been already shown p.\n433, 2, and follows too as a matter of course, that he referred all the\nproperties of bodies to the shape and arrangement of the atoms.\nWhenever he found in the same body different qualities combined, he\nassumed that it was composed of different kinds of atoms. For instance,\nhe asserted of wine: \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f36\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70\u03c2, \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f56 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\nAccording to the difference of constitution, it has on some a cooling,\non others a heating effect. Plut. Qu. Conviv. iii. 5, 1, 4; Adv. Col.\n6. This agrees with the remarks made on Democritus in vol. i. 597.\n\n[1176] Diog. 43; 47; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54. What idea Epicurus formed to\nhimself of motion we are not told. We learn, however, from Themist.\nPhys. 52, b, that he replied to Aristotle\u2019s proof of motion, that no\nconstant quantities can be composed of indivisible particles (Phys. vi.\n1), by saying: Whatever moves in a given line moves in the whole line,\nbut not in the individual indivisible portions of which the line\nconsists. With reference to the same question, the Epicureans,\naccording to Simpl. Phys. 219, b, asserted that everything moves\nequally quickly through indivisible spaces.\n\n[1177] Cic. Fin. i. 6, 18; Lucret. i. 1074.\n\n[1178] Lucr. ii. 1052 (the text being faulty); Simpl. De C\u0153lo, Schol.\nin Arist. 510, b, 30; 486, a, 7. The latter writer inaccurately groups\nEpicurus together with others (Democritus and Strato). The same point,\naccording to Simpl. Phys. 113, b, was a subject of contention between\nAlexander of Aphrodisias and the Epicurean Zenobius, at the close of\nthe second century after Christ.\n\n[1179] As Aristotle had already done.\n\n[1180] Diog. 60; conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 28, p. 425.\n\n[1181] Epic. in Diog. 43; 61; Lucr. ii. 225; Plut. C. Not. 43, i. p.\n1082. This objection was borrowed from Aristotle by Epicurus.\n\n[1182] Lucr. ii. 216; 261; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 18; N. D. i. 25, 69; De\nFato, 10, 22; Plut. An. Procr. 6, 9, p. 1015; Solert. Anim. 7, 2, p.\n964; Plac. i. 12, 5; 23, 4; Stob\u00e6us, Ecl. i. 346, 394.\n\n[1183] Diog. 44; conf. 62; 90; Plut. Plac. i. 12, 5; Fac. Lun. 4, 5, p.\n921; Stob. i. 346; Lucret. v. 432.\n\n[1184] Diog. 73; Lucr. i. 1021. See above, p. 437, 1; Plut. Def. Or.\n19, p. 420.\n\n[1185] Cic. Fin. i. 6, 17. See p. 444, 3.\n\n[1186] Diog. 45; 73; Lucret. ii. 1048; Plut. Plac. ii. 1, 3. It need\nhardly be remarked that by worlds world-bodies are not meant. In Diog.\n88, Epicurus defines the world as a part of the heaven, surrounding the\nearth and stars, having a definite shape, and, towards other parts of\nthe heaven, bounded.\n\n[1187] Diog. 45; 74; 88; Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 2; 7, 3; Stob. i. 490; Cic.\nN. D. ii. 18, 48; Acad. ii. 40, 125.\n\n[1188] Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9: Epicurus says, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03be\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f24\u03b4\u03b7 \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[1189] Diog. 73; 89; Lucret. ii. 1105; v. 91 and 235, where the\ntransitory character of the world is elaborately proved; Cic. Fin. i.\n6, 21. Stob. i. 418; Epicurus makes the world decay in the greatest\nvariety of ways. Plut. Plac. ii. 4, 2.\n\n[1190] Diog. x. 89.\n\n[1191] v. 324, arguing that historical memory would otherwise go much\nfurther back, and arts and sciences be of much greater antiquity.\n\n[1192] On this point see Lucret. ii. 1112. The principle that similar\nelements naturally congregate is there explained in this way.\n\n[1193] Lucr. v. 416\u2013508; Plut. Plac. i. 4. The latter view has been\nreferred, in vol. i. 604, to the Atomists. It would now appear that it\nmust be deduced from Epicureanism, and its agreement with the views\nattributed to Leucippus in other places explained by the well-known\nconnection between Epicurus and Democritus. The views of Epicurus on\nthe formation of the world do not entirely agree with those of\nDemocritus. It was probably with an eye to Democritus (compare the\nextracts in vol. i. 608 from Orig. Philosoph. p. 17) that Epicurus, in\nDiog. 90, denied that the world could be increased from without, or\nthat sun and moon could be possibly absorbed in our world. Lucret. ii.\n1105, however, supposes an increase of the world from without to be\npossible.\n\n[1194] On these m\u0153nia mundi, which, according to Lucretius, coincide\nwith the ether or fire-belt, see Epic. in Diog. 88; Id. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2,\nxi. (Vol. Herc. ii.) col. 2; Plut. Plac. ii. 7, 3; Lucr. i. 73; ii.\n1144; v. 454.\n\n[1195] On this point see page 434.\n\n[1196] See p. 437, 1.\n\n[1197] In Diog. 77; 81; Lucret. v. 78 and 114, where the contrast is\nmore fully brought out. By \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03ac\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1, in Plut. Plac. v. 20, 2, we\nmust by no means think of the stars.\n\n[1198] Examples have already been met with, p. 436. A complete review\nof the Epicurean astronomy is not worth our while. It may be studied in\nthe following passages: For the substance of the stars, consult Plut.\nPlac. ii. 13, 9; for their rising and setting, Diog. 92; Lucr. v. 648;\nCleomed. Met. p. 87; for their revolution and deviation, Diog. 92;\n112\u2013114; Lucr. v. 509; 612; for the appearance of the moon, Diog. 94,\nand Lucr. v. 574, 703; for eclipses of sun and moon, Diog. 96; Lucr. v.\n749; for changes in the length of day, Diog. 98; Lucr. v. 678.\n\n[1199] Diog. 91; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 82; Fin. i. 6, 20; Sen. Qu. Nat. i.\n3, 10; Cleomed. Met. ii. 1; Plut. Plac. ii. 21, 4; 22, 4; Lucr. v. 564.\nThe body of the sun was considered by Epicurus (Plut. Plac. ii. 20, 9;\nStob. i. 530) to consist of earth-like and spongy matter, saturated\nwith fire. According to Lucret. v. 471, sun and moon stand midway\nbetween ether and earth in point of density.\n\n[1200] It is still more difficult to imagine the world as stationary,\nwhich is tacitly assumed. It would then be bounded by endless space,\nand soon come into collision with other masses.\n\n[1201] Lucr. v. 534. Conf. Epic. in Diog. 74, and \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, xi. col.\n1. In the latter passage, Epicurus appeals to the fact that the earth\nis equidistant from the bounds of the world.\n\n[1202] Further particulars: on clouds, Diog. 99: Lucr. vi. 451; Plut.\nPlac. iii. 4, 3; on rain, Diog. 100; Lucret. vi. 495; on thunder, Diog.\n100; 103; Lucret. vi. 96; on lightning, Diog. 101; Lucr. vi. 160; on\nsirocco, Diog. 104; Lucr. vi. 423; Plac. iii. 3, 2; on earthquakes,\nDiog. 105; Lucr. vi. 535; Plac. iii. 15, 11; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 20, 5;\non winds, Diog. 106; on hail, Diog. 106; Plac. iii. 4, 3; on snow,\nthaw, ice, frost, Diog. 107\u2013109; on the rainbow, Diog. 109; on the halo\nof the moon, Diog. 110; on comets, Diog. 111; on shooting-stars, Diog.\n114. Explanations are given by Lucretius of volcanoes (vi. 639), of the\noverflow of the Nile (vi. 712), of Lake Avernus (vi. 738\u2013839), of the\nmagnet (vi. 906\u20131087), of the reputed chilling of the springs in summer\n(vi. 840).\n\n[1203] Lucret. ii. 1157; v. 780. Otherwise, we learn that the\nEpicureans were as far as the Stoics from attributing to plants a soul.\nPlut. Plac. v. 26, 3.\n\n[1204] Lucr. ii. 1155; v. 787, giving further particulars as to the\norigin and maintenance of living beings, and the subsequent abatement\nof the productive powers of earth.\n\n[1205] Epic. in Diog. 74.\n\n[1206] Anaximander, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and\nDemocritus, all taught the procreation of living beings from earth.\n\n[1207] Lucr. v. 834\u2013921.\n\n[1208] v. 922\u20131008. Conf. Plato, Polit. 274, B; Arist. Polit. ii. 8,\n1269, a, 4; Horace, Serm. i. 3, 99, appears to have had an eye to\nLucretius.\n\n[1209] Lucr. v. 1009\u20131025.\n\n[1210] Epicurus, in Diog. 75, thus sums up his views on the origin of\nlanguage: \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f14\u03b8\u03bd\u03b7 \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03ad\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd ... \u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f14\u03b8\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b5\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03b9\u03b2\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03c9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2. He who invents any new thing\nputs, at the same time, new words into circulation. Lucret. v.\n1026\u20131088, explains more fully that language is of natural origin. On\nthe voice, Ibid. iv. 522; Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 2.\n\n[1211] Epic. in Diog. 75: \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03b1 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c7\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\n\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03b3\u03b3\u03c5\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03be\u03b5\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b8\u1fb6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03b2\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd.\n\nLucr. v. 1450:\u2014all arts\n\n Usus et impigr\u00e6 simul experientia mentis\n Paulatim docuit.\n\nIbid. 1103:\u2014\n\n Inque dies magis hi victum vitamque priorem\n Commutare novis monstrabant rebu\u2019 benigni\n Ingenio qui pr\u00e6stabant et corde vigebant.\n\nIn harmony with these premises, Lucretius then tries to explain various\ninventions. The first fire was obtained by lightning, or the friction\nof branches in a storm. The sun taught cooking (v. 1089). Forests on\nfire, melting brass, first taught men how to work in metal (v.\n1239\u20131294). Horses and elephants were used for help in war, after\nattempts had been previously made with oxen and wild beasts (v. 1295).\nMen first dressed themselves in skins; afterwards they wore twisted,\nand then woven materials (v. 1009; 1348; 1416). The first ideas of\nplanting and agriculture were from the natural spread of plants (v.\n1359). The first music was in imitation of birds; the first musical\ninstrument was the pipe, through which the wind was heard to whistle;\nfrom this natural music, artificial music only gradually grew (v.\n1377). The measure and arrangement of time was taught by the stars (v.\n1434); and, comparatively late, came the arts of poetry and writing (v.\n1438).\n\n[1212] Lucr. v. 1106.\n\n[1213] Lucr. iii. 161; Diog. 67. See p. 439, 1.\n\n[1214] Lucr. iii. 177; Diog. 63.\n\n[1215] Diog. 63: \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1f72\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f04\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 (the\nbody), \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03bc\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9. 66: \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03b3\u03b3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff7 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2.\n\n[1216] Lucr. iii. 231; 269; Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 5 (Stob. i. 798), conf.\nAlex. Aphr. De An. 127, b.\n\n[1217] Lucr. iii. 288.\n\n[1218] According to Plut. Plac. v. 3, 5, he considered the seed an\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2; and, since he believed in a feminine\n\u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1, he must have regarded the soul of the child as formed by the\nintermingling of the soul-atoms of both parents. Ibid. v. 16, 1.\n\n[1219] Diog. 63; Lucret. iii. 216; 276; 323; 370.\n\n[1220] Metrodor. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd (Vol. Herc. vi.), col. 7.\n\n[1221] Lucr. iii. 98, contradicts the assertion that the soul is the\nharmony of the body; Epicurus having already replied (in Philop. De An.\nE. 1) to one of the objections urged against it by Plato.\n\n[1222] Diog. 66; Lucr. iii. 94; 136; 396; 612; Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 3.\nLucretius calls the rational part animus or mens, and the irrational\npart anima. The statement, Pl. Phil. iv. 23, 2, that Epicurus made\nfeeling reside in the organs of sense, because the \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd was\nfeelingless, can hardly be correct.\n\n[1223] Diog. and Lucr. In sleep, a portion of the soul is supposed to\nleave the body (Lucr. iv. 913, conf. Tertull. De An. 43), whilst\nanother part is forcibly confined within the body. Probably this is all\nthat is meant by Diog. 66.\n\n[1224] Epic. in Diog. 64. Lucr. iii. 417\u2013827, gives an elaborate proof\nof the mortality of the soul. Other passages, Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi,\n27, 1 and 3; 30, 5; Sext. Math. ix. 72, hardly need to be referred to.\nObserve the contrast between Epicureanism and Stoicism. In Stoicism,\nthe soul keeps the body together; in Epicureanism, the body the soul.\nIn Stoicism, the soul survives the body; in Epicureanism, this is\nimpossible. In Stoicism, the mind is a power over the world, and hence\nover the body; in Epicureanism, it is on a level with the body, and\ndependent on it.\n\n[1225] Epic. in Diog. 124\u2013127, for instance: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03b4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f41 \u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ae\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f66\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f41\n\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03cc\u03b8\u2019 \u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd. Id.\nin Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 229 (Alex. Aphr. Anal. Pri. 117, Top. 9. Gell. N.\nA. ii. 8, 1; Stob. Serm. 118, 30): \u1f41 \u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u03b1\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03c5\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2. Lucr. iii.\n828\u2013975.\n\n[1226] Lucr. iii. 830.\n\n[1227] Diog. 81; 142; Lucr. iii. 37.\n\n[1228] Lucr. ii. 991:\u2014\n\n Denique c\u0153lesti sumus omnes semine oriundi, &c.\n\n999:\u2014\n\n Cedit item retro de terra quod fuit ante\n In terras: et quod missum est ex \u00e6theris oris\n Id rursum c\u0153li rellatum templa receptant.\n\n[1229] Democritus, from whom Epicurus has borrowed the rest of this\ntheory, makes them mould the air.\n\n[1230] Epic. in Diog. 46\u201350; 52; and in the fragments of the second\nbook \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2; Lucr. iv. 26\u2013266; 722; vi. 921 Cic. Ad Famil. xv. 16;\nPlut. Qu. Conviv. viii. 10, 2, 2; Plac. iv. 3, 1; 19, 2; Sext. Math.\nvii. 206; Gell. N. A. v. 16; Macrob. Sat. vii. 14; the remarks of Lucr.\niv. 267; 568; Plut. Plac. iv. 14, 2, on reflected images and the echo\nbelong likewise to the doctrine of idola.\n\n[1231] For instance, the impressions in the minds of dreamers and\nmadmen. Diog. 32; Lucr. iv. 730.\n\n[1232] Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03c1\u1f74 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u1fb7\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03c9\u03bb\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03c9\u03c6\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c5\u03c6\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1, \u1f03 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd [sc. \u03bf\u1f31\n\u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9] \u1f00\u03c0\u03bb\u03ad\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b6\u03ce\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03c0\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c5\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1.\n\n[1233] Lucr. l.c.\n\n[1234] Sext. l.c.; Lucr. iv. 351.\n\n[1235] Lucr. iv. 766\u2013819; and on the incessant streaming forth of\nimages, v. 141; Diog. 48.\n\n[1236] Epic. in Diog. x. 52: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f02\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1fc6\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u1f10\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd,\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd [al. \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd] \u03b4\u02b9 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc7 [impression on the senses], \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc7 \u1f22 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc7 \u1f22 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03c2.\n\n[1237] As to terminology, Epicurus, according to Plut. Plac. iv. 8, 2,\nDiog. 32, called the faculty of sensation \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, and sensation\nitself, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1.\n\n[1238] Lucr. iv. 874; conf. Galen, De Hipp. et Plat. v. 2, vol. v. 367,\nK.\n\n[1239] Diog. 133: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1fa7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ad\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd. \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f26\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03cd\u03b8\u1ff3\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1fc3 \u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[1240] Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: [Epicurus] pertimuit, ne si concessum\nesset hujusmodi aliquid: aut vivet cras aut non vivet Epicurus,\nalterutrum fieret necessarium; totum hoc; aut etiam aut non negavit\nesse necessarium. Acad. ii. 30, 97; De Fat. 10, 21.\n\n[1241] Steinhart, p. 466.\n\n[1242] Cic. De Fato, 16, 37, at least says, referring to the above\nquestion: Nisi forte voluimus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales\npropositiones nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt, aut cum id pudet illud\ntamen dicunt, quod est impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis\ndisjunctiones, sed qu\u00e6 in his enuntiata essent eorum neutrum esse\nverum. Cicero indeed adds: O admirabilem licentiam et miserabilem\ninscientiam dicendi! but he has no reason for this exclamation; for the\nproposition: Either A or B must follow is not identical with the\nproposition: It may be stated either of A or of B that it will follow.\nEpicurus could, therefore, justly allow the former and deny the latter.\nIn so doing he is really following Aristotle.\n\n[1243] Diog. x. 123: \u03bf\u1f35\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 [\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03af\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f35\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. \u1f00\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u1f74\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f41\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f41 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 16, 42.\n\n[1244] iii. 14; vi. 49; and, specially, the celebrated passage i. 62:\u2014\n\n Humana ante oculos f\u0153de cum vita jaceret\n In terris oppressa gravi sub relligione,\n Qu\u00e6 caput a c\u0153li regionibus ostendebat\n Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, &c.\n\nas far as to 101:\u2014\n\n Tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum.\n\nConf. Epic. in Diog. 81, and above p. 423, 3; 437, 1.\n\n[1245] Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 4: [\u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2] \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f40\u03bb\u03ad\u03b8\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03cd\u03b8\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b1\u03c1 \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. Ibid. c. 75.\n\n[1246] Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03c9\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03bf\u03b2\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u03bc\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u1fe6\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 2: \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f1c\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f22 \u03a0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03b9\u03ce\u03b4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd.\nIn Cic. N. D. i. 8, 18, the Epicurean calls \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 anus fatidica, to\nwhich it was often reduced, no doubt, by the Stoics.\n\n[1247] See p. 460, 1.\n\n[1248] Lucr. v. 196; ii. 1090; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 10. Conf. the\ndisputation of the Stoic and Epicurean in Lucian, Jup. Trag. c. 35, and\nespecially c. 46.\n\n[1249] Lucr. v. 165; conf. p. 437, 1; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 8.\n\n[1250] Diog. 76; 97; 113; see p. 437, 1; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 52; Plut.\nPlac. i. 7, 7.\n\n[1251] Cic. l.c. 54.\n\n[1252] Plut. Def. Orac. 19; Plac. i. 83.\n\n[1253] Conf. the captious argument of Hermarchus, in Procl. in Tim. 66,\nE: If prayer is necessary for everything, it is necessary for prayer,\nand so on, ad infin.\n\n[1254] Diog. 135; Lucr. v. 379; Plut. Plac. v. 1, 2; Cic. N. D. i. 20,\n55; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Tertull. De An. 46.\n\n[1255] Lucr. v. 1159\u20131238; conf. iv. 33; vi. 49; Sext. Math. ix. 25;\nvi. 19; Diog. 98; 115.\n\n[1256] This view is especially prominent in Lucretius. See p. 462, 2.\nConf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 10; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54.\n\n[1257] He drew up separate treatises \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd and \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03c3\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\nDiog. 27; Cic. N. D. i. 41, 115; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 11.\n\n[1258] Posidonius, in Cic. N. D. i. 44, 123; Conf. 30, 85; iii. 1, 3;\nPlut. l.c.\n\n[1259] Epic. in Diog. 123: \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u1f74\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f21 \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. The Epicurean in Cic. N. D. i. 16, 43: Solus enim\n[Epicurus] vidit, primum esse Deos, quod in omnium animis eorum\nnotionem impressisset ipsa natura. Qu\u00e6 est enim gens aut quod genus\nhominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam Deorum?\nquam appellat \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd Epicurus, &c. These statements must, however, be\nreceived with some caution, since Cicero appears to give up his own\nviews as to innate ideas. Inasmuch, however, as he expressly refers to\nEpicurus\u2019 treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, we may assume that belief in Gods with\nEpicurus rests on a general \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[1260] In support of this view, see Cic. N. D. i. 18, 46. It is there\nsaid of the form of the Gods: A natura habemus omnes omnium gentium\nspeciem nullam aliam nisi humanam Deorum. Qu\u00e6 enim alia forma occurrit\numquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 is here\nreferred to sensations derived from \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03c9\u03bb\u03b1. Ibid. 19, 49; and Lucr. vi.\n76:\n\n de corpore qu\u00e6 sancto simulacra feruntur\n In mentis hominum divin\u00e6 nuntia form\u00e6.\n\n[1261] Diog. 121. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 45: Si nihil aliud qu\u00e6reremus, nisi\nut Deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat\ndictum: nam et pr\u00e6stans Deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et\n\u00e6terna esset et beatissima ... et metus omnis a vi atque ira Deorum\npulsus esset. Ibid. 20, 56: We do not fear the Gods, et pie sancteque\ncolimus naturam excellentem atque pr\u00e6stantem. Ibid. 41, 115. Sen.\nBenef. iv. 19, 3: Epicurus denied all connection of God with the world,\nbut, at the same time, would have him honoured as a father, propter\nmajestatem ejus eximiam singularemque naturam.\n\n[1262] Cic. N. D. i. 18, 46; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 218;\nPlut. Pl. Phil. i. 7, 18 (Stob. i. 66); Ph\u00e6dr. (Philodem.) Fragm. col.\n7; Metrodorus, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd (Vol. Herc. vi.), col. 10; col. 16, 21.\n\n[1263] Cic. N. D. i. 34, 95.\n\n[1264] Epic. in Diog. 123: \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd ... \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Ibid. 139. Cic. N. D. i.\n17, 45; 19, 51; Lucr. ii. 646; v. 165.\n\n[1265] Cic. N. D. ii. 23, 59; i. 18, 49; 25, 71; 26, 74; Divin. ii. 17,\n40; Lucr. v. 148; Metrodor. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd, col. 7; Plut. l.c. Epicurus\nhas, as Cicero remarks, monogrammos Deos; his Gods have only quasi\ncorpus and quasi sanguinem. They are perlucidi and perflabiles, or,\naccording to Lucretius, tenues, so that they cannot be touched, and are\nindestructible.\n\n[1266] Cic. Divin. ii. 17, 40; Lucr. ii. 646; iii. 18; v. 146; Sen.\nBenef. iv. 19, 2.\n\n[1267] Epic. in Diog. 77; 97; 139; Cic. N. D. i. 19, 51 (amongst other\nthings: nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium\nvacatione munerum ponimus, both of which features must therefore be\nattributed to the Gods); Legg. i. 7, 21; Lucr. ii. 646; iii. 1092; iv.\n83; vi. 57; Sen. Benef. iv. 4, 1; 19, 2. Conf. p. 436; 464, 1; 466, 1.\n\n[1268] In the fragments of his treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1, col. 12.\n\n[1269] The \u03ba\u03bb\u03af\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 discussed by Hermarchus and Pythocles, col. 13, 20,\nhad reference to these, and not to ordinary feasts.\n\n[1270] Col. 14: The reason being assigned that \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f34\u03b4\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f19\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u03af\u03b4\u03b9 \u03b3\u03bb\u03ce\u03c4\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c7\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. The first statement seems to\nrefer to the words of the divine language quoted by Homer; the second\nstatement, to stories of appearances of the Gods. For the whole tone of\nthe system militates against our thinking of men who have afterwards\nbecome Gods. The sceptical question, Whether the Gods possess speech?\nraised by Carneades in Sext. Math. ix. 178, appears to refer to this\n\u03bc\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5.\n\n[1271] Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54; Sen. Benef. iv. 19, 1.\n\n[1272] Philodem. De Mus. iv. (V. Herc. i.) col. 4, says that the Gods\ndo not need this worship, but it is natural for us to show it: \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f41\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f14\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03b4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[1273] Cic. l.c. i. 19, 50, the sentence, et si qu\u00e6 interimant,\nbelonging, however, to Cicero only. For Epicurus cannot have described\nhis ease-taking Gods as sustainers of the universe.\n\n[1274] Cic. N. D. i. 19, 49: (Epicurus) docet eam esse vim et naturam\nDeorum ut primum non sensu sed mente cernatur: nec soliditate quadam\nnec ad numerum, ut ea, qu\u00e6 ille propter firmitatem \u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03bc\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1 appellat,\nsed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis: cum infinita\nsimillimarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis exsistat et\nad Deos (probably instead of Deos, which gives no sense, we should read\nnos. See the commentators in the editions of Moser and Kreuzer)\naffluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam\ninfixamque nostram intelligentiam capere qu\u00e6 sit et beata natura et\n\u00e6terna. The meaning of these words appears to be, that ideas of the\nGods are not formed in the same way as the ideas of other solid bodies,\nby a number of similar pictures from the same object striking our\nsenses (nec soliditate nec ad numerum, Diog. x. 95), but by single\npictures emanating from innumerable divine individuals, all so much\nalike that they leave behind them the impressions of perfect happiness\nand immortality. The passage of Diog. x. 139, ought probably to be\ncorrected by that in Cicero. It runs: \u1f10\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u1f51\u03c6\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03ce\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1ff6\u03c2. The similarity of most of the\nexpressions leaves no doubt that Diogenes followed the same authority\nas Cicero (probably the same as Plut. Plac. i. 7, 18 followed), but in\nthe words \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb., it asserts the very opposite of this and the\nEpicurean teaching. There must, therefore, be some error here, either\ndue to Diogenes or a copyist. This error does not apparently belong to\nthe words \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd, which Cicero renders ad numerum, so that\nSteinhart\u2019s suggestion, p. 477, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f01\u03c1\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd or \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f01\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2, is clearly\nwrong. It is more probably to be found in the words \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\u2014\u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72. We\nmight suggest for \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9.\n\n[1275] In Ph\u00e6drus (Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2), Fragm. col. 7 (10) it is\nsaid in answer to the Stoics: \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03cd\u03c3\u03b8\u03c9\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n[\u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd] \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c6\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03b4\u03c9\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a0\u03b1\u03bd\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b8\u2019 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03ae\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f35\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ad\u03b2\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd. \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u2019 \u1f14\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u0394\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. It is then shown how little the\nnatural substances of the Stoics resemble Gods (col. 9): \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f03 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ca\u03b4\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u1f00\u03c6\u03b8\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd. Here we have a\nphenomenon witnessed in modern times, Deists and Pantheists mutually\naccusing one another of atheism, the former missing personality, the\nlatter missing activity in the deity of their opponents.\n\n[1276] See p. 469, 1.\n\n[1277] Lucr. ii. 598, explains the Mother of the Gods as meaning the\nearth. ii. 655, he allows the expressions, Neptune, Ceres, Bacchus, for\nthe sea, corn, and wine. iii. 976, he interprets the pains of the\nnether-world as the qualms now brought on by superstition and folly.\n\n[1278] Epic. in Diog. 128: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd ... \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd ... \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\n... \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd.... \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b3\u03b7\u03b4\u1f7c\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. Ibid. 141. Cic. Fin. i.\n9, 29; Tusc. v. 26, 73: Cum pr\u00e6sertim omne malum dolore definiat, bonum\nvoluptate.\n\n[1279] Diog. 129: \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c5\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. Plut. Adv. Col. 27,\n1.\n\n[1280] Diog. 137; Cic. Fin. i. 7, 23; 9, 30; ii. 10, 31; Sext. Pyrrh.\niii. 194; Math. xi. 96.\n\n[1281] Stob. Ecl. ii. 58: \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u2019 [the \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1\u00b7 \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2. Alex. Aphr. De An. 154, a: \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ca\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c1\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9.\n\n[1282] Diog. 129; Cic. Fin. i. 14, 48; Tusc. v. 33, 95; Sen. De Otio,\n7, 3.\n\n[1283] Epic. in Diog. 139 (Gell. N. A. ii. 9, 2): \u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ad\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03be\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Id. in Diog. 128: \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n[\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd] \u1f00\u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u1f74\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c5\u03b3\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f36\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f51\u03b3\u03af\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2. \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\n\u1f45\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b2\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03be \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03bb\u03cd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u1f7c\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b6\u1ff4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b2\u03b1\u03b4\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 ... \u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1. Ibid.\n131; 144; conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 3, 10; Stob. Serm. 17, 35;\nLucr. ii. 14; Cic. Fin. i. 11, 37.\n\n[1284] Epicurus and Metrodorus, in Plut. l.c. 7, 1.\n\n[1285] Diog. 136, quotes the words of Epicurus: \u1f21 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76, \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Ritter, iii. 469, suggests instead of\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3, but \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 gives a very fair meaning: they appear\nactually in motion. Sen. Ep. 66, 45: Apud Epicurum duo bona sunt, ex\nquibus summum illud beatumque componitur, ut corpus sine dolore sit,\nanimus sine perturbatione.\n\n[1286] Hence Sen. Brevit. Vit. 14, 2: Cum Epicuro quiescere. Benef. iv.\n4, 1: Qu\u00e6 maxima Epicuro felicitas videtur, nihil agit.\n\n[1287] Diog. 131. Similar views are expressed by Metrodorus, in\nClement, Strom. v. 614, B, in praise of philosophers who escape all\nevils by rising to the contemplation of the eternal \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c3\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5, \u1f43 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd. Id. in Plut. Adv.\nCol. 17, 4: \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c7\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f61\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f44\u03c1\u03b3\u03b9\u03b1.\n\n[1288] Epic. in Diog. 122: \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bd\u03ad\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f62\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03bb\u03ad\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1ff6\u03bd. \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f04\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. He who says it is too early or too\nlate to study philosophy means \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f22 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c0\u03c9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f65\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u1f22 \u03bc\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. Id. in Sen. Ep. 8, 7: Philosophi\u00e6 servias oportet,\nut tibi contingat vera libertas.\n\n[1289] Epic. in Diog. 127: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bf\u03c7\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd. Ibid. 149, further\nparticulars are given as to the classes. Ibid. 144; Lucr. ii. 20; Cic.\nFin. i. 13, 45; Tusc. v. 33, 94; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 3, 10;\nEustrat. Eth. N. 48, b; Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1.\n\n[1290] Sen. Benef. iii. 4, 1: Epicuro ... qui adsidue queritur, quod\nadversus pr\u00e6terita simus ingrati. Epic. in Sen. Ep. 15, 10: Stulta vita\ningrata est et trepida, tota in futurum fertur; and Lucr. iii. 929.\n\n[1291] Diog. 11; 130; 144; 146; Stob. Floril. 17; 23; 30; 34; Sen. Ep.\n2, 5; 16, 7; 25, 4.\n\n[1292] Diog. 144: \u03b2\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1ff7 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03bc\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f41 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1ff4\u03ba\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5. The like in Stob. Ecl. ii. 354; Cic. Fin.\ni. 19, 63; Sen. De Const. 15, 4; Epicurus and Metrodorus in Cic. Tusc.\nv. 9, 26, and Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p. 37.\n\n[1293] Diog. 135: \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd.\n\n[1294] Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 20, 4.\n\n[1295] Diog. 118; Plut. l.c. 3, 9; Sen. Ep. 66, 18; 67, 15; Cic. Tusc.\nv. 26, 73.\n\n[1296] Diog. 22; Cic. Fin. ii. 30, 96; Tusc. ii. 7, 17; M. Aurel. ix.\n41; Sen. Ep. 66, 47; 92, 25; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 18, 1, the latter\nperverting Epicurus\u2019 words to a terrible extent.\n\n[1297] Diog. 137: \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u039a\u03c5\u03c1\u03b7\u03bd\u03b1\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b3\u03b7\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd ... \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\u03c2. \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c3\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd. \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2\n\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2. Further particulars in Plut. l.c. 3, 10: Cic.\nTusc. v. 33, 96. The Epicureans spoke of bodily pleasure by \u1f25\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9,\nmental by \u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Plut. l.c. 5, 1.\n\n[1298] Diog. 145. Epicurus appears to have first used \u03c3\u1f70\u03c1\u03be to express\nthe body in contrast to the soul: \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, in his system, includes the\nsoul. See Diog. 137; 140; 144; Metrodor. in Plut. Colot. 31, 2. (Plut.\nin N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Plut. has \u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u1f76 instead of \u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03af.)\n\n[1299] Diog. x. 6, from Epicurus \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2: \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f14\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b5 \u1f14\u03c7\u03c9 \u03c4\u03af \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03c9\n\u03c4\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c7\u03c5\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2, \u1f00\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019\n\u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1fb6\u03c2 (-\u1fc6\u03c2). The like,\nin a more expanded form, in Cic. Tusc. iii. 18, 41.\n\n[1300] Plut. l.c. 16, 9: \u1f61\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03b8\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f14\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019\n\u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u1f76 (see previous note) \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9; and: \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1, \u1f66 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b5 \u03a4\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd. Conf. ibid. 3, 1.\n\n[1301] See p. 478, 1, and Epic. in Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 4, 10: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03bb\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2.\nIbid. 5, 1: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u03b1\u1f56\u03b8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f10\u03bb\u03c0\u03af\u03b4\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[1302] Conf., besides the extracts on p. 478, 1 and 2, Cic. Fin. i. 17,\n55: Animi autem voluptates et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis\nvoluptatibus et doloribus; it is only a misapprehension on the part of\nseveral Epicureans to deny this fact. Mental pleasures and pains may\ntherefore be the stronger ones for the reasons assigned above.\n\n[1303] In his last letter (Diog. 22), after describing his painful\nillness, Epicurus continues: \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03c7\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u1fc3.\n\n[1304] Diog. 142; Cic. Fin. ii. 7, 21.\n\n[1305] Diog. 140; 133; Cic. Fin. i. 15, 49; Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p. 36;\nM. Aurel. vii. 33, 64.\n\n[1306] Diog. 140: \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f21\u03b4\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2. The same p. 132,\n138. Cic. Tusc. v. 9, 26; Fin. i. 16, 50; 19, 62; Sen. Ep. 85, 18.\n\n[1307] Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1 (conf. 12, 4): In ea quidem ipse sententia\nsum (invitis nec nostris popularibus\u2014the Stoics\u2014dicam), sancta Epicurum\net recta pr\u00e6cipere, et si propius accesseris tristia: voluptas enim\nilla ad parvum et exile revocatur, et quam nos virtuti legem dicimus\neam ille dicit voluptati ... itaque non dico, quod plerique nostrorum,\nsectam Epicuri flagitiorum magistram esse, sed illud dico: male audit,\ninfamis est, et immerito. Ep. 33, 2: Apud me vero Epicurus est et\nfortis, licet manuleatus sit. Seneca not infrequently quotes sayings of\nEpicurus, and calls (Ep. 6, 6) Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Poly\u00e6nus,\nmagnos viros. Conf. Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 81.\n\n[1308] Epic. in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 3: \u1f10\u03b3\u1f7c \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03ce\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c7\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bb\u03c0\u03af\u03b4\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[1309] Diog. 138: \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f30\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03b3\u03af\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2.\nCic. Fin. i. 13, 42 (conf. ad Att. vii. 2): Ist\u00e6 enim vestr\u00e6 eximi\u00e6\npulchr\u00e6que virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabiles\naut expetendas arbitraretur? ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius\nartis sed bon\u00e6 valetudinis causa probamus, &c. ...; sic sapientia, qu\u00e6\nars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur si nihil efficeret; nunc\nexpetitur quod est tanquam artifex conquirend\u00e6 et comparand\u00e6\nvoluptatis. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b: [\u1f21 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74] \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03ae\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[1310] Sen. Ep. 85, 18: Epicurus quoque judicat, cum virtutem habeat\nbeatum esse, sed ipsam virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia\nbeatum efficiat voluptas qu\u00e6 ex virtute est, non ipsa virtus.\n\n[1311] Diog. 132; Cic. Fin. i. 13, 43; 19, 62.\n\n[1312] Cic. Fin. i. 13, 47.\n\n[1313] Cic. l.c. 13, 49. Diog. 120: \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff7 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[1314] Cic. Fin. i. 16, 50; Diog. 144; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 6, 1;\nSen. Ep. 97, 13 and 15. Lucr. v. 1152: The criminal can never rest, and\noften in delirium or sleep betrays himself. Epicurus, however, refused\nto answer the question, Whether the wise man would do what is\nforbidden, if he could be certain of not being discovered? Plut. col.\n34, 1.\n\n[1315] Philodemus, De Rhet. Vol. Herc. v. a, col. 25: The laws ought to\nbe kept \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03c5\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u1f00\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03be\u03ac\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u2019 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03c3\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n[1316] Diog. 117; 118; 119.\n\n[1317] Plut. Adv. Col. 19, 2.\n\n[1318] Diog. 118; Sen. Ep. 81, 11. The Stoic assertion of the equality\nof virtues and vices was, however, denied by the Epicureans. Diog. 120.\n\n[1319] Diog. 135; conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 7, 3; Lucr. iii. 323.\n\n[1320] Cic. Fin. i. 19, 61; v. 27 80: Semper beatum esse sapientem.\nTusc. v. 9, 26; Stob. Serm. 17, 30. See p. 477.\n\n[1321] Diog. 117.\n\n[1322] Diog. 117: \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03be \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. The latter words appear to\nadmit the possibility of an involuntary loss of wisdom, perhaps through\nmadness.\n\n[1323] Diog. 126; 145; Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63.\n\n[1324] See also page 476, 2.\n\n[1325] We gather this from the fragments of Philodemus\u2019 treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f05. The\n10th book of this treatise gives a portrait of the \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, and\nkindred faults, after the manner of Theophrastus; the 9th, a mild\ncriticism of Xenophon\u2019s and Aristotle\u2019s \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2. It is objected to\nthe latter that the master of the house is there made (col. ii. 30) to\nrise earlier than his servants, and to go to bed later than they do,\nsuch conduct being \u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03af\u03c0\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5.\n\n[1326] Diog. 144; 146; 130; Stob. Floril. 17, 23; Sen. Ep. 16, 7; Lucr.\nii. 20; iii. 59; v. 1115; Philod. De Vit. ix. col. 12: \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u1ff3 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f43 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03b4\u03ce\u03ba\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03c9\u03c2 [for thus and not by \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2\nmust the defective -\u03c9\u03c2 be represented] \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03cc\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. Conf. p. 476, 3; 477.\n\n[1327] Diog. 130.\n\n[1328] Stob. Floril. 17, 24 and 37; Sen. Ep. 21, 7; 14, 17; 2, 5:\nHonesta, inquit, res est l\u00e6ta paupertas. Ep. 17, 11: Multis parasse\ndivitias non finis miseriarum fuit, sed mutatio.\n\n[1329] Stob. Flor. 17, 30. Conf. Sen. Ep. 9, 20: Si cui sua non\nvidentur amplissima, licet totius mundi dominus sit tamen miser est.\n\n[1330] Diog. 11; Stob. Floril. 17, 34; Cic. Tusc. v. 31, 89; Sen. Ep.\n25, 4. Epicurus lived very abstemiously. The charge of luxury brought\nagainst him was fully disposed of by Gassendi, De Vit. et Mor. Epic.\n153. Timocrates, on the strength of one of his letters, asserts that he\nspent a mina every day on his table. If this statement be not a pure\ninvention, it must refer to the whole circle of his friends. It could\notherwise only have happened at such a time as the siege of Athens by\nDemetrius Poliorcetes, when a modius of wheat cost 300 drachm\u00e6, and\nwhen Epicurus counted out to his friends the beans on which they lived.\nPlut. Demetr. 33. The further statement of Timocrates\u2014(Diog. 6: \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b4\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03c1\u03c5\u03c6\u1fc6\u03c2)\u2014is certainly an unfounded calumny. The\nmoderation of Epicurus is admitted by Sen. Vit. B. 12, 4; 13, 1; and\nEpicurus flatters himself, in Sen. Ep. 18, 9: Non toto asse pasci,\nMetrodorum, qui nondum tantum profecerit, toto; and, in Diog. 11,\nbecause he was satisfied with bread and water. Ibid. he writes: \u03c0\u03ad\u03bc\u03c8\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6 \u039a\u03c5\u03b8\u03bd\u03af\u03bf\u03c5, \u1f35\u03bd\u2019 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9. Still\nless have we any reason to connect the diseases of which Epicurus and\nsome of his scholars died (as Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 5, 3 does, herein\nfollowing Timocrates in Diog. 7) with their presumed luxuriousness.\n\n[1331] Stob. Floril. 17, 30. See p. 477, 2.\n\n[1332] Epicurus and Metrodorus, in Stob. Floril. 16, 28; 20, Conf.\nPlut. Tran. An. 16, p. 474: \u1f41 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f54\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f25\u03ba\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b5\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f25\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f54\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[1333] Serious charges on this head, against which Gassendi defends\nhim, are preferred against Epicurus by Timocrates, in Diog. 6; but\nneither the testimony of Timocrates, nor the fact that a woman of loose\nmorality (see above p. 406) was in his society, can be considered\nconclusive. Chrysippus in Stob. Floril. 63, 31, calls Epicurus\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2. Epicurus is, however, far below our standard of morality.\nThus, in the quotation on p. 479, 1, he reckons \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\namong the necessary ingredients of the good. By Eustrat. in Eth. N. 48,\nsuch pleasures are included among \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 (see p. 476, 3), not among\n\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03b1\u03b9. They are treated in the same light by Lucr. v. 1050;\nand Plut. Qu. Conviv. iii. 6, 1, 1, not only discusses the most\nsuitable time for the enjoyment of love, but quotes as the words of\nEpicurus: \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b3\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f62\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f01\u03c6\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03b7\u03bb\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (N. P. Suav. V. 12, 3). These\nenjoyments, according to Epicurus, are only then allowed when they do\nnot entail any bad consequences (Diog. 118), or produce passionate\nstates of feeling. Hence he not only forbids unlawful commerce (Diog.\n118), but declares \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03bd. Diog. 118; Stob. Floril.\n63, 31. Eros is defined (Alex. Aphr. Top. 75) = \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03bd. Conf. Plut. Amat. 19, 16, p. 765. It is consequently a\npassionate and disturbing state, which the wise man must avoid. The\nStoics, on the contrary, allowed Eros to their wise man. The same view\nis taken of Eros by Lucretius, who cannot find words strong enough to\nexpress the restlessness and confusion entailed by love, the state of\ndependence in which it places man, and the loss to his fortune and good\nname. His advice is to allay passion as quickly as possible by means of\nVenus volgivaga, and to gratify it in a calm way.\n\n[1334] Diog. 120; 140; Cic. Tusc. ii. 12, 28; Lucr. iii. 59; 993.\n\n[1335] Sen. De Const. 16, 1.\n\n[1336] Diog. 118: \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd.\n\n[1337] Lucr. iii. 74.\n\n[1338] See pp. 479, 455. A further argument may, however, be here\nquoted. In Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 16, 3, he says: \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bd\u03cc\u03c3\u1ff3 \u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03ba\u03af\u03c4\u1fc3\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f11\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u1fc6\u03b3\u03b5, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03c6\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f51\u03b3\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c7\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u039d\u03b5\u03bf\u03ba\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c4\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1fc7. It is true that a certain mawkishness and self-conceit\nmay be detected in this language.\n\n[1339] Diog. 119; Philodem. De Vit. ix. 12; 27, 40.\n\n[1340] Diog. 120: \u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2. 121:\n\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. The limitation implied in\nthe text would, however, seem to require \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2. Philodem. in the same\nsense l.c. 23, 23, says that Epicurus received presents from his\nscholars, Conf. Plut. Adv. Col. 18, 3, also 15, 31.\n\n[1341] Diog. 121: \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03af\u03b7 (Cobet, not intelligibly: \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c2).\n\n[1342] Epic. in Diog. 130: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bb\u03af\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f45\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f14\u03c7\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bb\u03af\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b3\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f25\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f25\u03ba\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9.\n\n[1343] The Epicurean in Cic. Fin. i. 15, 49: Si tolerabiles sint\n[dolores] feramus, sin minus, \u00e6quo animo e vita, cum ea non placeat,\ntanquam e theatro exeamus. Epic. in Sen. Ep. 12, 10: Malum est in\nnecessitate vivere, sed in necessitate vivere necessitas nulla est. On\nthe other hand, Ep. 24, 22: Objurgat Epicurus non minus eos qui mortem\nconcupiscunt, quam eos, qui timent, et ait: ridiculum est currere ad\nmortem t\u00e6dio vit\u00e6, cum genere vit\u00e6 ut currendum esset ad mortem\neffeceris. Diog. 119, the older editions read: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f44\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5. Cobet: \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5. Instead of\n\u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03c9\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 is read, or, as we might prefer, instead of \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9. Suicide was only allowed by Epicurus in extreme cases. In\nSeneca\u2019s time, when an Epicurean, Diodorus, committed suicide, his\nfellow-scholars were unwilling to allow that suicide was permitted by\nthe precepts of Epicurus (Sen. Vit. B. 19, 1).\n\n[1344] Epict. Diss. ii. 20, 6: \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[1345] Diog. 150; 154. From this point of view, Lucr. v. 1106, gives a\nlong description of the rise of a state.\n\n[1346] Stob. Floril. 43, 139.\n\n[1347] Diog. 150; Lucr. v. 1149; Sen. Ep. 97, 13, and 15; Plut. Adv.\nCol. 35. See p. 482, 4.\n\n[1348] Diog. 150\u2013153.\n\n[1349] Diog. 140.\n\n[1350] Plut. Adv. Col. 31; 33, 4; N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Epictet.\nDiss. i. 23, 6; Lucr. v. 1125; Cic. pro Sext. 10, 23. Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 (Vol. Herc. iv.) col. 14: \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, when\ncombined with uprightness, it benefits the community, and is sometimes\nuseful; at other times, harmful to statesmen themselves.\n\n[1351] Plut. De Latenter Vivendo, c. 4. In this respect, T. Pomponius\nAtticus is the true type of an Epicurean, on whose conduct during the\ncivil war and withdrawal from public life, see Nepos, Att. 6.\n\n[1352] Metrodorus, in Stob. Floril. 45, 26: \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03ba\u03ce\u03bd\u03c9\u03c8\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03c5\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[1353] Seneca well expresses the difference on this point between\nEpicureans and Stoics in the passage quoted, p. 320, 3.\n\n[1354] Plut. Tranq. An. c. 2, p. 465.\n\n[1355] Epic. in Sen. Ep. 29, 10: Nunquam volui populo placere; nam qu\u00e6\nego scio non probat populus, qu\u00e6 probat populos ego nescio. Similar\nexpressions from Stoics have been previously quoted.\n\n[1356] Diog. 121: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u1ff7 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03bd]. Lucr.\nv. 1125:\u2014\n\n Ut satius multo jam sit parere quietum,\n Quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere.\n\n[1357] Epict. Diss. i. 23, 3 (against Epicurus): \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1ff7 \u03c4\u03b5\u03ba\u03bd\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd; \u03c4\u03af \u03c6\u03bf\u03b2\u1fc7 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03ad\u03c3\u1fc3; ii. 20,\n20: \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03ba\u03cc\u03c8\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03c0\u03cc\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5. The last words prove with what caution these statements must be\ntaken.\n\n[1358] Diog. 119. The passage is, however, involved in much obscurity,\nowing to a difference of reading. The earlier text was: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b3\u03b1\u03bc\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b5\u03ba\u03bd\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u03b1\u03bc\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd.\nCobet reads instead: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03b1\u03bc\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b5\u03ba\u03bd\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03bd ...\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b3\u03b1\u03bc\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. What the MS. authority for this\nreading is, we are not told. In sense it agrees with Hieron. Adv.\nJovin. i. 191, quoting from Seneca, De Matrimonio: Epicurus ... raro\ndicit sapienti ineunda conjugia, quia multa incommoda admixta sunt\nnuptiis. Like riches, honours, health, ita et uxores sitas in bonorum\nmalorumque confinio, grave autem esse viro sapienti venire in dubium,\nutrum bonam an malam ducturus sit.\n\n[1359] Plut. Adv. Col. 27, 6; De Am. Prol. 2, p. 495; Epictet. Diss. i.\n23, 3.\n\n[1360] Diog. 10: \u1f25 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03b5\u03bb\u03c6\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u0390\u03b1. Diogenes himself appeals to Epicurus\u2019 testament,\nibid. 18.\n\n[1361] Diog. 120: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 [\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9] ...\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2. Epic. Ibid. 148\n(also in Cic. Fin. i. 20, 68): \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c3\u03c6\u03ac\u03bb\u03b5\u03b1\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd. (Cobet,\nhowever, reads: \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, in which\ncase \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u1fb3 should be substituted for \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 or else \u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 for\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd.) Sen. Ep. 9, 8: The wise man needs a friend, non ad hoc quod\nEpicurus dicebat in hac ipsa epistola (a letter in which Stilpo\u2019s\ncynical self-contentment is blamed), ut habeat, qui sibi \u00e6gro adsideat,\nsuccurrat in vincula conjecto vel inopi; sed ut habeat aliquem, cui\nipse \u00e6gro adsideat, quem ipse circumventum hostili custodia liberet.\nCic. Fin. i. 20, 66: Cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et\nmetus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis\nconfirmatur animus et a spe pariendarum voluptatum sejungi non potest,\netc. On the same grounds, Philodem. De Vit. ix. (V. Herc. iii.) col.\n24, argues that it is much better to cultivate friendship than to\nwithdraw from it.\n\n[1362] Cic. Fin. i. 20, 69.\n\n[1363] Ibid. 70.\n\n[1364] Ibid. 67.\n\n[1365] The same need finds expression in the advice given by Epicurus\n(Sen. Ep. 11, 8; 25, 5): Let every one choose some distinguished man as\nhis pattern, that so he may live, as it were, perpetually under his\neye. Man requires a stranger to give him moral support.\n\n[1366] As illustrations in modern times, the reunions of the French\nfreethinkers, or the societies of Rousseau, Mendelssohn, Jacobi, may be\nmentioned. It deserves notice that in these societies, as amongst the\nEpicureans, an important part was played by women. This is quite\nnatural, when philosophy is confined to cultivated intercourse and\nconversation.\n\n[1367] Diog. 148: \u1f67\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Cic. Fin. ii. 25,\n80: Epicurus exalts friendship to heaven. In Diog. 120, Cobet reads\ninstead of the usual \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd], which is\naltogether untrustworthy, \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[1368] Sen. Ep. 19, 10, with the addition: Nam sine amico visceratio\nleonis ac lupi vita est.\n\n[1369] Plut. Adv. Col. 8, 7; Diog. 121. We have no reason to suppose,\nwith Ritter, iii. 474, that this was not the expression of a real\nsentiment. That it is inconsistent we can well allow.\n\n[1370] The Epicureans in Cic. Fin. i. 20, 65: At vero Epicurus una in\ndomo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione\nconsentientes tenuit amicorum greges! quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis.\nIbid. ii. 25, 80.\n\n[1371] Instances have already been quoted, p. 418, 2, of the\nextravagant honours required by Epicurus; nor did he fail to eulogise\nhis friends, as the fragments of his letters to Leontion, Themista, and\nPythocles (Diog. 5) prove. When Metrodorus had tried to obtain the\nrelease of a captive friend, Epicurus applauded him (Plut. N. P. Sua.\nVivi, 15, 5, Adv. Col. 33, 2): \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f56 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03b5\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u1f04\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f05\u03bb\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ad\u03b2\u03b7 \u039c\u03af\u03b8\u03c1\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03a3\u03cd\u03c1\u1ff3 \u03b2\u03bf\u03b7\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03c9\u03bd. Ibid. 15, 8, he expresses his thanks for\na present: \u03b4\u03b1\u0390\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c3\u03af\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03b4\u1f74\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ae\u03ba\u03b7 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03ad\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c7\u03b8\u03b5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2.\nHe wrote of Pythocles before he was 18: \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u1f19\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03b4\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03c9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f56 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f56 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f50\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03c0\u03af\u03c6\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03b5\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 (Plut. Adv. Col. 29, 2); and he also said\n(Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, Fr. 6, V. Herc. v. 2, 11): \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03a0\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u03ba\u03bb\u03ad\u03b1\n\u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. Compare the remarks on p. 488, 3.\n\n[1372] Diog. 11: \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f18\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03a0\u03c5\u03b8\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1,\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[1373] Philodem. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 (V. Herc. v. 2), Fr. 15; 72; 73,\nmentions Epicurus and Metrodorus as patterns of genial frankness\ntowards friends. Probably the words in Sen. Ep. 28, 9\u2014initium salutis\nest notitia peccati\u2014are taken from a moral exhortation addressed to a\nfriend.\n\n[1374] Not only does Diogenes 9, praise his unequalled benevolence, his\nkindness to his slaves, and his general geniality, but Cicero calls him\n(Tusc. ii. 19, 44) vir optimus, and (Fin. ii. 25, 30) bonum virum et\ncomem et humanum.\n\n[1375] Diog. 118: \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f76 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd. 121. \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9.\n\n[1376] Plut. N. P. Suav. Vi. 15, 4 (similarly C. Princ. Philos. 3, 2,\np. 778): \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03ae\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f56 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f25\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Conf. Alex. Aphr. Top. 123. A similar maxim is attributed by\n\u00c6lian, V. H. xiii. 13, to Ptolemy Lagi. Conf. Acts xx. 35.\n\n[1377] Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 81: Et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei\nfuerunt et hodie sunt, et in amicitiis fideles et in omni vita\nconstantes et graves nec voluptate sed officio consilia moderantes.\nAtticus is a well-known example of genuine human kindness and ready\nself-sacrifice, and Horace may be also quoted as an illustration of the\nsame character. See Steinhart\u2019s remarks, l.c. p. 470.\n\n[1378] See p. 445.\n\n[1379] Conf. p. 126, 2, with 439, 1.\n\n[1380] It has been already stated, p. 405, 1, 4, that Epicurus admitted\nhis debt to Democritus, but not without some reserve; otherwise he\nclaimed to be entirely self-taught, and to have learned nothing from\nthe ancient teachers, and expressed himself with such conceit and scorn\nas to spare neither them nor their writings. Diog. 8, besides\nmentioning his abuse of Nausiphanes (sup. 342, 1), refers also to his\ncalling the Platonists \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\u03c5\u03c3\u03bf\u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c2, Plato himself in irony the\ngolden Plato, Heraclitus \u03ba\u03c5\u03ba\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd, Democritus \u039b\u03b7\u03c1\u03cc\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, Antidorus\n\u03a3\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03af\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, the Cynics \u1f10\u03c7\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f19\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, the Dialecticians\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03c6\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, Pyrrho \u1f00\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd and \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03af\u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, and charging Aristotle and\nProtagoras with vices in their youth. Diogenes refuses to allow that\nany of these statements are true, Epicurus\u2019 friendliness being well\nknown. But the devotion of Epicurus to his friends and admirers does\nnot exclude hatred and injustice towards his predecessors (see p. 418,\n2), of whom a fair estimate was rendered impossible by the superficial\nnature of his knowledge and the onesidedness of his point of view.\nSext. Math. i. 2, attests \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd; Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 1, mentions a false\nobjection to Arcesilaus; and Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93, says: Cum Epicurus\nAristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Ph\u00e6doni Socratico turpissime\nmaledixerit, etc. The rude jokes mentioned by Diogenes are in harmony\nwith a man whom Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 46, calls homo non aptissimus ad\njocandum minimeque resipiens patriam. On these jokes he apparently\nprided himself as well as on a certain bombastic elegance. See p. 496,\n6. In this Epicurus was followed by his pupils. Cic. N. D. i. 34, 93,\nsays of Zeno: Non eos solum, qui tunc erant, Apollodorum, Silum,\nceteros figebat maledictis, sed Socratem ipsum ... scurram Atticum\nfuisse dicebat (according to Cic. Brut. 85, 292, Epicurus had already\nexpressed a disparaging opinion of the Socratic irony), Chrysippum\nnunquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat.\n\n[1381] Compare in this connection the quotations from Metrodorus on p.\n476, 1.\n\n[1382] Democritus had denied all truth to sensuous impressions. The\nsame sceptical tone was more strongly apparent in Metrodorus (Aristocl.\nin Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, 5; Sext. Math. vii. 88; Epiphan. Exp. Fid.\n1088, A, although he cannot be considered a full Sceptic,\nnotwithstanding his usual agreement with the physical views of\nDemocritus (Plut. in Eus. l.c. i. 8, 11; id. Fac. Lun. 15, 3, p. 928;\nSen. Nat. Qu. vi. 19). Scepticism appears to have passed from him to\nPyrrho, Anaxarchus being the middleman (see p. 518, 2, 3), and herewith\nmay be connected the Sceptical imperturbability. This doctrine of\nimperturbability being held by Epicurus, the pupil of Nansiphanes, it\nmight be supposed that before Pyrrho\u2019s time a doctrine not unlike that\nof Pyrrho had been developed in the School of Democritus, from whom it\nwas borrowed by Epicurus. The connection is, however, uncertain. We\nhave seen that the doubts of Democritus extended only to\nsense-impressions, not to intellectual knowledge. The case of\nMetrodorus was similar. His sceptical expressions refer only to the\nordinary conditions of human knowledge, that of ideas derived from the\nsenses: greater dependence is, however, placed on thought. We must\ntherefore take the statement \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f43 \u1f04\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 subject to\nthis limitation. Anaxarchus is said (Sext. Math. vii. 87) to have\ncompared the world to a stage-scene, which involves no greater\nscepticism than the similar expressions used by Plato as to the\nphenomenal world. However much, therefore, these individuals may have\ncontributed to Pyrrhonism, a simple transference of Scepticism from\nDemocritus to Pyrrho is not to be thought of. And as regards\nimperturbability, Epicurus may have borrowed the expression from\nPyrrho, whom, according to Diog. ix. 64 and 69, he both knew and\nesteemed.\n\n[1383] Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1; Diog. ix. 61. We are\nindebted almost exclusively to Diogenes for our information respecting\nPyrrho. Besides Antigonus the Carystian, Apollodorus, Alexander\nPolyhistor, Diocles, &c., are the chief authorities drawn upon by\nDiogenes.\n\n[1384] Attention has been drawn to the chronological difficulties in\n\u2018Socrates and the Socratic Schools,\u2019 p. 255, note 1 (2nd edition).\nEither Pyrrho is falsely called a pupil of Bryso, or Bryso is falsely\ncalled the son of Stilpo. The former seems more probable, Diog. ix. 61,\nhaving derived his statement from Alexander\u2019s \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u03c7\u03b1\u03af, and it is quite\nin the style of the compilers of the \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u03c7\u03b1\u1f76 to assign a Megarian\nteacher to a Sceptic whose connection with that School was sufficiently\nobvious.\n\n[1385] Diog. ix. 61; Aristocl. l.c. 18, 20; 17, 8. We gather from them\nthat Pyrrho was originally a painter. Suidas, \u03a0\u03cd\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c9\u03bd, only copies the\npresent text of Diogenes with a few mistakes.\n\n[1386] Besides the passage quoted from Sextus, p. 515, 1, which is\nlittle known, we have no proof of the sceptical tone in Anaxarchus\nwhich Sextus, Math. vii. 48, attributes to him, and since the latter\nquotes no proofs, it may be assumed that he had none. Anaxarchus\nappears to have been unjustly included among the Sceptics, like so many\nothers who were called Sceptics by later writers on the strength of a\nsingle word or expression. According to other accounts, he belonged to\nthe School of Democritus. Plut. Tranq. An. 4, p. 466. In Valer. Max.\nviii. 14, ext. 2, he propounds to Alexander the doctrine of an infinite\nnumber of worlds; and Clemens, Strom. i. 287, B, quotes a fragment, in\nwhich, agreeing with Democritus, he observes that \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03af\u03b1 is only\nuseful when it is properly made use of. Like Epicurus, Anaxarchus\nfollowed Democritus, calling happiness the highest object of our\ndesire; and this assertion probably gained for him the epithet \u1f41\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 (Clemens, l.c.; Athen. vi. 250; xii. 548, b; \u00c6l. V. H. ix.\n37). In other respects, he differed from Democritus. For first he is\ncharged by Clearchus in Athen. xii. 548, b, with a luxurious indulgence\nfar removed from the earnest and pure spirit of Democritus; and\naccording to Plut. Alex. 52, he had, when in Asia, renounced the\nindependence of a philosopher for a life of pleasure; Timon also in\nPlut. Virt. Mor. 6, p. 446, says he was led away by \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03be\ncontrary to his better knowledge. Again, he is said to have commended\nin Pyrrho (Diog. ix. 63) an indifference which went a good deal beyond\nthe imperturbability of Democritus; and Timon commends him for his\n\u03ba\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. He meets external pain with the haughty pride expressed\nin his much-admired dictum under the blows of Nitocreon\u2019s club\u2014Diog.\nix. 59; Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 10, p. 449; Clemens, Strom. iv. 496, D;\nValer. Max. iii. 3, ext. 4; Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 87; Tertull. Apol.\n50; Dio Chrysos. Or. 37, p. 126, B. But he treats men with the same\ncontempt; and whilst meeting the Macedonian conqueror with an air of\nindependence, he spoils the whole by adroit flattery. Conf. Plut. Alex.\n52; Ad Princ. Iner. 4, p. 781; Qu. Conv. ix. 1, 2, 5; \u00c6l. V. H. ix. 37;\nAthen. vi. 250. His indifference was, at any rate, very much lacking in\nnobility. Respecting Anaxarchus see Lusac. Lect. Att. 181.\n\n[1387] Diog. ix. 64; 109.\n\n[1388] According to Diog. 64, they made him head-priest, and, on his\naccount, allowed to philosophers immunity from taxation. According to\nDiocles (Diog. 65), the Athenians presented him with citizenship for\nhis services in putting a Thracian prince Cotys to death.\n\n[1389] Diog. 66; 62.\n\n[1390] Examples in Diog. 67. It sounds, however, highly improbable; and\ndoubts were expressed by \u00c6nesidemus whether his indifference ever went\nto the extent described by Antigonus, Ibid. 62, of not getting out of\nthe way of carriages and precipices, so that he had to be preserved\nfrom danger by his friends. He must, moreover, have enjoyed a special\ngood fortune to attain the age of 90, notwithstanding such senseless\nconduct.\n\n[1391] All the dates here are very uncertain. Neither the date of his\ndeath nor of his birth is given, and the notice in Suidas that he lived\nafter the 111 Olympiad (336\u2013332 B.C.) is indefinite. If, however, as\nDiog. 62 says, he attained the age of 90, and if he joined Anaxarchus\nat Alexander\u2019s first invasion of Asia, being then between 24 and 30,\nthe statements above given are true.\n\n[1392] Diog. Pro. 16; 102; Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1 are\nbetter authorities than Sext. Math. i. 282, or Plut. Alex. Fort. i. 10,\np. 331. Neither does Sextus say that the supposed poem on Alexander was\nextant. The whole statement is evidently untrustworthy.\n\n[1393] Timon (see Wachsmuth, De Timone Phliasio, Leipzig, 1859) was a\nnative of Phlius (Diog. ix. 109). A public dancer at first (Diog. 109;\nAristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 12), when tired of this mode of life\nhe repaired to Megara, to hear Stilpo (Diog. 109). Stilpo being alive\nin the third century, and Timon\u2019s birth having happened approximately\nbetween 325\u2013315 B.C., the connection is not so impossible as Wachsmuth,\np. 5, and Preller, Hist. Phil. Gr. et Rom. 398, suppose, though in the\nuncertainty of chronological data it cannot be positively stated.\nSubsequently Timon became acquainted with Pyrrho, and leaving his\nstaunch admirers (Diog. 109, 69; Aristocl. l.c. 11, 14, 21), removed\nwith his wife to Elis. He then appeared as a teacher in Chalcis, and,\nhaving amassed a fortune, concluded his life in Athens (Diog. 110;\n115). It appears from Diog. 112 and 115, that he survived Arcesilaus\n(who died 241 B.C.), having nearly attained the age of 90. His death\nmay therefore be approximately fixed in 230, his birth in 320 B.C. For\nhis life and character, see Diog. 110; 112\u2013115; Athen. x. 438, a; \u00c6l.\nV. H. ii. 41. Of his numerous writings, the best known is a witty and\npungent satire on previous and cotemporary philosophers. Respecting\nthis satire (Diog. 110) consult Wachsmuth, p. 9 and 3. The latter, p.\n51, has collected the fragments.\n\n[1394] Diog. 67\u201369, mentions, besides Timon, a certain Eurylochus as\nhis pupil, who, however, was not very successful in the way of keeping\nhis temper; also Philo, an Athenian, Hecat\u00e6us of Abdera, the well-known\nhistorian (on whom see M\u00fcller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 384); and\nNausiphanes, the teacher of Epicurus. The last assertion is only\ntenable on the supposition that Nausiphanes appeared as a teacher only\na few years after Pyrrho, for Pyrrho cannot have returned to Elis\nbefore 322 B.C., and Epicurus must have left the School of Nausiphanes\nbefore 310 B.C. See p. 406, 3. According to Diog. 64, Epicurus must\nhave become acquainted with Pyrrho whilst a pupil of Nausiphanes.\nNausiphanes is said not to have agreed with Pyrrho, but only to have\nadmired his character (Diog. l.c.), so that he cannot properly be\ncalled his pupil. The mention of Numenius, by Diog. 102 (conf. 68),\namong Pyrrho\u2019s \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, is suspicious, because \u00c6nesidemus is named at\nthe same time. It may be questioned whether he as well as \u00c6nesidemus\ndoes not belong to a later period of Scepticism.\n\n[1395] According to Diog. 115, Menodotus (a Sceptic belonging to the\nlatter half of the second century after Christ) asserted that Timon\nleft no successor, and that the School was in abeyance from Timon to\nPtolem\u00e6us, i.e. until the second half of the first century B.C. Sotion\nand Hippobotus, however, asserted that his pupils were Dioscurides,\nNicolochus, Euphranor, and Pra\u00fflus. His son, too, the physician\nXanthus, followed the father. (Diog. 109.) That Timon was himself a\nphysician, as Wachsmuth, p. 5, supposes, cannot be concluded with\ncertainty from the words \u1f30\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03b1\u03be\u03b5, since these words only imply\nthat he had received instruction in medicine. On the other hand,\naccording to Suid. \u03a0\u03cd\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c9\u03bd, the second Pyrrho, called Timon\u2019s pupil, was\na changeling. If Aratus of Soli was a pupil (Suid. \u1f0c\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2; conf. Diog.\nix. 113), he was certainly not a follower of his views. See p. 43, 2.\n\n[1396] In Diog. 116, Eubulus is called a pupil of Euphranor, also on\nthe authority of Sotion and Hippobotus. If Ptolem\u00e6us was the next one\nwho is said to have come after him, no philosopher of Pyrrho\u2019s \u1f00\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f74\ncan have been known for 150 years.\n\n[1397] Diog. 114.\n\n[1398] Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 2: \u1f41 \u03b4\u03ad \u03b3\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1f74\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03a4\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f41\u03c0\u03bf\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ad\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72, \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c7\u03c1\u1f74 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[1399] Aristocl. l.c.: \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd (Pyrrho)\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03c0\u03af\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf [\u03c4\u1f78]\n\u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Diog. ix.\n61: \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u1f22 \u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. Gell. xi. 5, 4: Pyrrho is\nsaid to have stated \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u1f22 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n[1400] See the above-quoted passage of Aristocles and Diog. ix. 114.\n\n[1401] Timon, in Diog. ix. 105: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03b3\u03bb\u03c5\u03ba\u1f7a \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u2019\n\u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u1ff6.\n\n[1402] Diog. ix. 61: \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f14\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f04\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3,\n\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u1f22\n\u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. Sext. Math. xi. 140: \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bd\u03cc\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03ad\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03a4\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1.\n\n[1403] In this sense the words of \u00c6nesidemus, in Diog. ix. 106, must be\nunderstood: \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03a0\u03cd\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. See note 1.\n\n[1404] Diog. ix. 114, on Timon: \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u03ad\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03ce\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u1fc6\u03bb\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\n\u1f08\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u039d\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ae\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2. The meaning of this proverb has been already\nexplained.\n\n[1405] Diog. ix. 79 refers these \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 to Pyrrho, but inasmuch as he\nwas there describing Sceptic views, the author of which to his mind was\nPyrrho, nothing follows from his statement. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 36\ngenerally attributes them to the ancient Sceptics, by whom, according\nto Math. vii. 345, he understood \u00c6nesidemus and his followers.\nAristocles, l.c. 18, 11, refers them to \u00c6nesidemus, and they may easily\nhave been referred to Pyrrho by mistake, since \u00c6nesidemus himself\n(Diog. ix. 106) and subsequent writers (Favorin. in Gell. xi. 5, 5;\nPhilostr. Vit. Soph. i. 491) call every kind of sceptical statement\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 or \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03a0\u03c5\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03ce\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9. That they cannot belong to Pyrrho in the\nform in which they are presented by Sextus and Diogenes is clear, since\nthey obviously refer to later views.\n\n[1406] Sext. Math. vi. 66; x. 197 quotes an argument of Timon against\nthe reality of time, and further states (Math. iv. 2) that Timon, in\nhis conflict with the philosophers of nature, maintained that no\nassertion should be made without proof: in other words, he denied\ndogmatism; for every proof supposes something established, i.e. another\nproof, and so on for ever.\n\n[1407] Aristocl. l.c. 18, 3: \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f00\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f11\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f22\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd. Diog. ix. 61. Ibid. 76: \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd means,\naccording to Timon, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd.\n\n[1408] \u00c6nesidem. in Diog. ix. 106: \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03a0\u03cd\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. Timon. Ibid. 105.\nSee p. 522, 3.\n\n[1409] Diog. ix. 103: \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f67\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd ...\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f67\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03c6\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b4\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd. \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f41\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019\n\u1f41\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b7\u03b3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd, \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd.\n\n[1410] Diog. l.c.: \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u039f\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03c9 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ae\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03af\u03bd. \u1f10\u03bd \u1fa7\n\u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1. Diog. gives this\nview in its later form, probably following Sext. Pyrrh. i. 197, but\nagreeing in substance with the quotations from Timon and Pyrrho.\n\n[1411] Diog. ix. 61 and 107; Aristocl. l.c. The expressions \u1f00\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1,\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03af\u03b1, \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74, invariably mean the same thing. Later writers use\ninstead of them, \u1f00\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b5\u03c8\u03af\u03b1, \u1f00\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. If, according to\nAristocles and Diog. 107, Timon first mentioned \u1f00\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 in dealing with\nthe third of his questions, this statement is obviously inaccurate.\n\n[1412] \u03a0\u03c5\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03ce\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9, \u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, \u1f10\u03c6\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af. Conf.\nDiog. 69.\n\n[1413] Aristocl. l.c. 2: \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03a4\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. Diog. 107: \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03bf\u1f31 \u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd, \u1f97 \u03c3\u03ba\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1, \u1f65\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f35 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03a4\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0391\u1f30\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd. Apathy is substituted for\nataraxy in Diog. 108; Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 130.\n\n[1414] Timon, in Aristocl. l.c. 18, 14, speaking of Pyrrho:\u2014\n\n \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f04\u03c4\u03c5\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03b3\u1f7c \u1f34\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f20\u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03b4\u03ac\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ac\u03bc\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f41\u03bc\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03af \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03af \u03c4\u03b5\n (conf. Wachsmuth, p. 62)\n \u03bb\u03b1\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f14\u03b8\u03bd\u03b5\u03b1 \u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c6\u03b1, \u03b2\u03b1\u03c1\u03c5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u2019 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b8\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b8\u03b1\n \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2.\n\nId. in Sext. Math. xi. 1: The Sceptic lives\u2014\n\n \u1fe5\u1fc7\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u2019 \u1f21\u03c3\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b7\u03c2\n \u03b1\u1f30\u03b5\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70\n \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ad\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b4\u03c5\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b7\u03c2.\n\nId. in Diog. 65.\n\n[1415] Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Qu\u00e6 (externals) quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni\nomnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime\n\u00e6grotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse. iii. 3, 11: Cum Pyrrhone et\nAristone qui omnia ex\u00e6quent. Acad. ii. 42, 130: Pyrrho autem ea ne\nsentire quidem sapientem, qu\u00e6 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 nominatur. Epictet. Fragm. 93 (in\nStob. Serm. 121, 28): \u03a0\u03cd\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c9\u03bd \u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b6\u1fc7\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c4\u03b5\u03b8\u03bd\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[1416] Cic. Fin. iv. 16, 43: Pyrrho ... qui virtute constituta nihil\nomnino quod appetendum sit relinquat. The same Ibid. ii. 13, 43; iii.\n4, 12.\n\n[1417] See p. 521, 3; 525, 3.\n\n[1418] Diog. 105: \u1f41 \u03a4\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03a0\u03cd\u03b8\u03c9\u03bd\u03af \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03a0\u03cd\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f30\u03bd\u03b4\u03b1\u03bb\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f57\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f14\u03bb\u03b8\u1fc3. (Conf. Sext. Math. vii. 30.)\nIbid. 106, of Pyrrho: \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. See p. 519, 4.\n\n[1419] See p. 524, 1, 2.\n\n[1420] Sext. Math. xi. 20: \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03a4\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f30\u03bd\u03b4\u03b1\u03bb\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03c6\u1fc7\n\n \u1f26 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03b3\u1f7c\u03bd \u1f10\u03c1\u03ad\u03c9 \u1f65\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n \u03bc\u1fe6\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u00b7\n \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b5\u1f76,\n \u1f10\u03be \u1f67\u03bd \u1f30\u03c3\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[1421] According to an anecdote preserved by Antigonus of Carystus\n(Aristocl. l.c. 18, 19; Diog. ix. 66), Pyrrho apologised for being\nagitated by saving: It is difficult to lay aside humanity altogether.\nThis language only proves what his aim was, and that he had found no\nmediating principle between the apathy required by his system and\npractical needs. Neither do the remarks of Ritter, iii. 451, prove that\nthe doctrine of moderation belongs to Pyrrho and his school.\n\n[1422] Conf. Diog. ix. 114. Tennemann\u2019s view (Gesch. d. Phil. iv. 190),\nthat Arcesilaus arrived at his conclusions independently of Pyrrho,\ndoes not appear to be tenable.\n\n[1423] Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 10; 6, 5, says that Zeno and\nArcesilaus were fellow-pupils under Polemo, and that their rivalry\nwhilst at school was the origin of the later quarrels between the Stoa\nand the Academy. The same may have been stated by Antiochus, since Cic.\nAcad. i. 9, 35, ii. 24, 76, appeals to him to prove that they were\ntogether at school. Still the assertion is valueless. There can be no\ndoubt that both Zeno and Arcesilaus were pupils of Polemo, but it is\nhardly possible that they can have been under him at the same time; nor\nif they were, could the intellectual differences of the two schools be\nreferred simply to their personal relation.\n\n[1424] Cic. De Orat. ii. 18, 68; Diog. iv. 28; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16;\nSext. Pyrrh. i. 220. Clemens, Strom. i. 301, C, calls Arcesilaus the\nfounder of the New (second or middle) Academy.\n\n[1425] Arcesilaus (see Geffers, De Arcesila, G\u00f6tt. 1842, Gymn. Progr.)\nwas born at Pitane, in \u00c6olia (Strabo, xiii. 1, 67, p. 614; Diog. iv.\n28). His birth-year is not stated; but as Lacydes (Diog. iv. 61) was\nhis successor in 240 B.C., and he was then 75 years of age (Diog. 44),\nit must have been about 315 B.C. Having enjoyed the instruction of the\nmathematician Autolycus in his native town, he repaired to Athens,\nwhere he was first a pupil of Theophrastus, but was won for the Academy\nby Crantor (Diog. 29; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2). With Crantor he lived\non the most intimate terms; but as Polemo was the president of the\nAcademy, he is usually called a pupil of Polemo (Cic. De Orat. iii. 18,\n67; Fin. v. 31, 94; Strabo). On the death of Polemo, he was probably a\npupil of Crates; but it is not stated by Diog. 33, or Numen. in Eus.\nl.c. xiv. 5, 10, that he was a pupil of either Pyrrho, Menedemus, or\nDiodorus. If Eusebius seems to imply it, he may have misunderstood the\nstatement that he made use of their teaching. Fortified with\nextraordinary acuteness, penetrating wit, and ready speech (Diog. 30;\n34; 37; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2; Plut. De Sanit.\n7, p. 126; Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7; ii. 1, 10, 4; Stob. Floril. ed.\nMein. iv. 193, 28), learned, especially in mathematics (Diog. 32), and\nwell acquainted with native poets (Diog. 30, who mentions his own\nattempts at poetry, quoting some of his epigrams), he appears to have\nearly distinguished himself. From Plut. Adv. Col. 26, p. 1121, it\nappears that in Epicurus\u2019 lifetime, consequently before 270 B.C., he\nhad propounded his sceptical views with great success. Apollodorus,\nhowever, appears to have placed his career too early (Diog. 45), in\nmaking his \u1f00\u03ba\u03bc\u1f74 between 300 and 296 B.C. On the death of Crates, the\nconduct of the School devolved upon Arcesilaus (Diog. 32), through whom\nit attained no small note (Strabo, i. 2, 2, p. 15; Diog. 37; Numen. in\nEus. xiv. 6, 14). From public matters he held aloof, and lived in\nretirement (Diog. 39), esteemed even by opponents for his pure, gentle,\nand genial character (Diog. 37; quoting many individual traits, 44;\nvii. 171; ix. 115; Cic. Fin. v. 31, 94; Plut. De Adulat. 22, p. 63;\nCoh. Ira, 13, p. 461. \u00c6lian, V. H. xiv. 96). On his relations to\nCleanthes, conf. Diog. vii. 171; Plut. De Adulat. 11, p. 55. He left no\nwritings (Diog. 32; Plut. Alex. Virt. 4, p. 328).\n\n[1426] Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67: Arcesilas primum ... ex variis\nPlatonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil\nesse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit: quem ferunt ...\naspernatum esse omne animi sensusque judicium, primumque instituisse\n... non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se\nsentire dixisset, disputare. This is, in fact, the calumniandi licentia\nwith which Augustin, herein doubtless following Cicero, c. Acad. iii.\n17, 39, charges him, contra omnia velle dicere quasi ostentationis\ncausa.\n\n[1427] Conf. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv, 6, 12, and above, p. 86, 4.\n\n[1428] Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 2; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 44. Ritter\u2019s view of\nthe latter passage, that Arcesilaus quoted the diversities of\nphilosophic teaching by way of refuting it (iii. 478), appears to be\nentirely without foundation. He rather quoted its uniform resemblance\nby way of overcoming doubt.\n\n[1429] Cic. De Orat. iii. 18. See p. 530, 1.\n\n[1430] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 234; Diocles of Cnidus, in Numen. in Eus. Pr.\nEv. xiv. 6, 5; Augustin, c. Acad. iii. 17, 38. Geffers regards\nArcesilaus as a true follower of the older Academy.\n\n[1431] Sext. Math. vii. 153.\n\n[1432] Sext. Math. l.c. 154.\n\n[1433] Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 27. Zeno asserted: An irresistible or\nconceptional perception is such an impression of a real object as\ncannot possibly come from an unreal one. Arcesilaus endeavoured to\nprove nullum tale visum esse a vero, ut non ejusdem modi etiam a falso\nposset esse. The same view in Sext. l.c. To these may be added\ndiscussions on deceptions of the senses and contradictions in the\nstatements of the senses in Sext. vii. 408, and others attributed to\nthe Academicians. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: Urgebat Arcesilas\nZenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret, qu\u00e6 sensibus viderentur, Zenon\nautem nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia. To these attacks on Zeno\nPlut. De An. (Fr. vii.) 1, probably refers: \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f08\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03bb\u03b1\u03bf\u03c2. \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. All that is here attributed to Arcesilaus is the\nassertion that \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd is the cause of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7, and that it is so\nwhen it produces a \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae. The connection in which these\nstatements were made by Arcesilaus was probably this: If there is such\na thing as knowledge, there must be objects which produce it. These\nobjects, however, do not exist, there being no object which does not\nadmit a false opinion equally well with a true one.\n\n[1434] Sext. 155: \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f26\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc7 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b1.\n\n[1435] Sext. l.c.; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Adv. Col.\n24, 2; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16; 6, 4. By Sext. Pyrrh. i. 233, it is\nthus expressed: Arcesilaus regards \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74 as being a good in every case,\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 as an evil.\n\n[1436] Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45.\n\n[1437] Cic. Fin. ii. 1, 2; v. 4, 11; De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Diog. iv.\n28; conf. Plut. C. Not. 37, 7.\n\n[1438] Stob. Floril. 82, 4: \u1f08\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03bb\u03b1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03b7\u03c6\u03bf\u03c0\u03b1\u03af\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 (jugglers), \u03bf\u1f35\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9; and, Ibid. 10 (under the heading: \u1f08\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03ac\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03a3\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd): \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b3\u03b5, \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03c5\u03ba\u1fb7 \u03c4\u1f04\u03bd\u03c9 \u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9.\n\n[1439] The authority is a very uncertain one, particularly as\nArcesilaus left nothing in writing, and the remarks quoted would seem\nto be more appropriate to the Chian Aristo (see p. 59) than to\nArcesilaus. Still, if Chrysippus condemned the dialectic of the\nSceptics (according to p. 66, 1), Arcesilaus may very well have\ncondemned that of the Stoics and Megarians. Does not even Cic. Acad.\nii. 28, 91, probably following Carneades (see p. 541, 4), object to\ndialectic, because it furnishes no knowledge?\n\n[1440] This fact is recognised not only by Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv.\n6, 4, but by Sext. Pyrrh. i. 232. The difference which the later\nSceptics draw between themselves and the Academicians, viz. that they\nassert the principle of doubt tentatively, whereas the Academicians\nassert it absolutely, does not apply to Arcesilaus (see p. 533, 1).\nEven Sextus says the same, but with some diffidence (\u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.). On account of this connection with Pyrrho, the Stoic\nAristo called Arcesilaus (following Il. vi. 181): \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5 \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f44\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03a0\u03cd\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03c2 \u0394\u03b9\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2. Sext. l.c.; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 11;\nDiog. iv. 33.\n\n[1441] It has been already seen that this was the key to the position\nwhich the Stoics and Epicureans took up against the Sceptics.\n\n[1442] Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 3, defending Arcesilaus against the attacks\nof Colotes, says: The opponents of Scepticism cannot show that \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74\nleads to inactivity, for \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1fe5\u03bf\u03c0\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03b4\u03ad\u03be\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03b7 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b4\u03b5\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Perception arises and influences the will without\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Since this statement was controverted by Chrysippus\n(Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 12. See above 87, 1), there can be no doubt that\nit was propounded by Arcesilaus.\n\n[1443] Sext. Math. vii 158: \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f14\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u0392\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f25 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03ad\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u1f00\u03c6\u2019 \u03bf\u1f57 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f20\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f41 \u1f08\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03bb\u03b1\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u1fb6\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c5\u03b3\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 (according to the Stoic definition)\n\u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. \u1f41 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ad\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9. It is a mistake to suppose, with Numen. in\nEus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, that, Arcesilaus denied probabilities.\n\n[1444] In Plut. Tran. An. 9, sub fin. p. 470, he gives the advice\nrather to devote attention to oneself and ones own life than to works\nof art and other external things. In Stob. Floril. 95, 17, he says:\nPoverty is burdensome, but educates for virtue. Ibid. 43, 91: Where\nthere are most laws, there are most transgressions of law. Plut. Cons.\nad Apoll. 15, p. 110, has a saying of his as to the folly of the fear\nof death. Id. De Sanit. 7, p. 126, Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7, records a\nsomewhat severe judgment on adulterers and prodigals. Quite unique is\nthe statement in Tertull. Ad. Nation. ii. 2: Arcesilaus held that there\nwere three kinds of Gods (in other words he divided the popular Gods\ninto three classes): the Olympian, the stars, and the Titans. It\nimplies that he criticised the belief in the Gods. It also appears by\nthe language used in Plut. C. Not. 37, 7, respecting the Stoic theory\nof a \u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5, that his criticism of dogmatism extended to\nnatural science.\n\n[1445] Conf. p. 529, 3 sub fin.\n\n[1446] Geffers, De Arcesil\u00e6 Successoribus (including Carneades): G\u00f6tt.\n1845. Arcesilaus was succeeded by Lacydes of Cyrene, who died 240 B.C.,\nafter presiding over the School for 26 years. In his lifetime (probably\nshortly before his death) he entrusted it to the care of the Phoc\u00e6ans\nTelecles and Euandros (Diog. iv. 59\u201361). The statements made in Diog.\nl.c., Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, Plut. De Adul. 22, p. 63, \u00c6lian,\nV. H. ii. 41, Athen. x. 438, a. xiii. 606, C, Plin. H. N. x. 22, 51,\nrefer to individual peculiarities which he appears to have had. They\nmust be received with caution, particularly the gossip which Diog. 59\nmentions casually and Numenius dwells upon with intolerable garrulity.\nDiog. calls him \u1f00\u03bd\u1f74\u03c1 \u03c3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f40\u03bb\u03af\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c7\u03b7\u03ba\u1f7c\u03c2 \u03b6\u03b7\u03bb\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2\u00b7\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03ba \u03bd\u03ad\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f54\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03cc\u03bc\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2. To\nhis admirers belongs Attalus I. of Pergamum. A visit to his court was\nhowever declined in skilful language (Diog. 60, which Geffers, p. 5,\nclearly misunderstands). In doctrine, he deviated little from\nArcesilaus, and, having been the first to commit to writing the\nteaching of the New Academy (Suid. \u039b\u03b1\u03ba.: \u1f14\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c8\u03b5 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\u2014the latter is somewhat extraordinary for a Sceptic), he was by\nsome mistake called its founder (Diog. 59). According to Diog. vii.\n183, see p. 46, 1, he appears to have taught in the Academy during\nArcesilaus\u2019 lifetime. Panaretus (Athen. xii. 552, d; \u00c6l. V. H. x. 6),\nDemophanes, and Ecdemus or Ecdelus (Plutarch. Philopon. 1; Arat. 5, 7)\nare also called pupils of Arcesilaus. The most distinguished pupil of\nLacydes, according to Eus. xiv. 7, 12, was Aristippus of Cyrene, also\nmentioned by Diog. ii. 83. Another, Paulus, is mentioned by Timotheus,\nin Clemens, Strom. 496, D. His successors were Telecles and Euander,\nwho jointly presided over the School. Euander, however, according to\nCic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Diog. 60, Eus. l.c., survived his colleague, and\nwas followed by Hegesinus (Diog. 60; Cic. l.c.) or Hegesilaus (as he is\ncalled by Clemens, Strom. p. 301, C). who was the immediate predecessor\nof Carneades. Respecting these individuals nothing is known beyond the\nnames.\n\n[1447] Carneades, the son of Epicomus or Philocomus, was born at Cyrene\n(Diog. iv. 62; Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p. 838; Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 5), and\ndied, according to Apollodorus (Diog. 65), 129 B.C., in his 85th year.\nLucian, Macrob. 20, assigns to him the same age. With less probability\nCic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Valer. Max. viii. 7, 5, extend his age to 90,\nmaking his birth-year 213 B.C. Later admirers find it remarkable that\nhis birthday, like Plato\u2019s, occurred on the Carnean festival (Plut. Qu.\nConv. viii. 1, 2, 1). Little is known of his life. He was a disciple\nand follower of Hegesinus, but at the same time received instruction in\ndialectic (Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 98) from the Stoic Diogenes, and studied\nphilosophic literature with indefatigable zeal (Diog. 62), more\nparticularly the writings of Chrysippus (Diog. 62; Plut. Sto. Rep. 10,\n44; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 13). In 156 B.C. he took part in the\nwell-known association of philosophers, and produced the greatest\nimpression on his Roman hearers by the force of his language and the\nboldness with which he attacked the current principles of morals.\nShortly before his death, probably also at an earlier period, he became\nblind (Diog. 66). He left no writings, the preservation of his\ndoctrines being the work of his pupils, in particular of Clitomachus\n(Diog. 66, 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 98; 32, 102). Respecting his\ncharacter, we may gather from a few expressions that, whilst vigorous\nin disputation (Diog. 63; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10), he was not wanting\nin a repose of mind which was in harmony with his principles (Diog.\n66). That he was a just man, notwithstanding his speech against\njustice, we can well believe (Quintil. xii. 1, 35).\n\nThe quotation in Diog. 64 (\u1f21 \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9) does not\nindicate fear of death, but simple resignation to the course of nature.\nStill less does his language on Antipater\u2019s suicide, and also what is\nquoted in Stob. (Floril. 119, 19) that he made a faint-hearted attempt\nto imitate him which he afterwards abandoned. It was only a not very\nclever way of ridiculing an action which appeared to Carneades\neminently mad.\n\n[1448] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12; Lucian, Macrob.\n20.\n\n[1449] His School held him in such esteem, that it considered him,\ntogether with Plato, because of his birthday (unless the idea grew out\nof his name), to be a special favourite of Apollo. Tradition says that\nan eclipse of the moon (Suid. \u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03bd. adds an eclipse of the sun)\ncommemorated his death; \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b1\u1f30\u03bd\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u2019 \u1f25\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd (Diog. 64). Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p.\n838, says of him: \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. There was only one opinion among the ancients as to the\nforce of his logic, and the power and attraction of his eloquence.\nThese gifts were aided by unusually powerful organs (see the anecdotes\nin Plut. Garrul. 21, p. 513; Diog. 63). Conf. Diog. 62; Cic. Fin. iii.\n12, 41; De Orat. ii. 38, 161; iii. 18, 68; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10;\nNumen. in Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 2 and 5; Lactant. Inst. v. 14;\nPlut. Cato Maj. 22. The latter, speaking of his success at Rome, says:\n\u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f21 \u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03bd\u03b5\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f27\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03af\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03ad\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 ... \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u1f20\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c7\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u1f74\u03c1 \u1f1d\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f14\u03ba\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03c6\u03c5\u1f74\u03c2, \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b7\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f14\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bc\u03b2\u03ad\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bd\u03ad\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f51\u03c6\u2019 \u03bf\u1f57 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd.\n\n[1450] Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16.\n\n[1451] See p. 536, note.\n\n[1452] Sext. Math. vii. 159: \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u1f08\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03bb\u03b1\u03bf\u03c2. \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03bd\u03b5\u03ac\u03b4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5. In Math. ix. 1, Sextus charges the School of Carneades\nwith unnecessary diffuseness in discussing the fundamental principles\nor every system. The Stoics were, however, the chief object of his\nattack. Cic. Tusc. v. 29, 82; N. D. ii. 65, 162; Plut. Garrul. 23, p.\n514; Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 17, 39.\n\n[1453] Sext. l.c.: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03b2\u03b4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2.\n\n[1454] Sext. l.c. 160\u2013163.\n\n[1455] Conf. Sext. vii. 403; Cic. Acad. ii. 15, 47; 28, 89\u2014where\nCarneades is undoubtedly meant, although he is not mentioned by name.\nFor the other sceptical arguments which Cicero mentions tally with\nthose which Sextus attributes to Carneades, and Cicero makes Antiochus\nrefute them, who was the immediate adversary of Carneades.\n\n[1456] According to Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 40; 26, 83, the Academic system\nof proof rests on the four following propositions: (1) that there are\nfalse notions; (2) that these cannot be known, i.e. be recognised as\ntrue; (3) that of two indistinguishable notions, it is impossible to\nknow the one and not the other; (4) that there is no true notion by the\nside of which a false one cannot be placed indistinguishable from it.\nThe second and third of these propositions are not denied at all, and\nthe first is only denied by Epicurus in regard to impressions on the\nsenses. Hence all importance attaches to the fourth proposition, to\nwhich Sextus, vii. 164 and 402, and Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 4,\nlook as the most important argument.\n\n[1457] Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 42: Dividunt enim in partes et eas quidem\nmagnas: primum in sensus, deinde in ea, qu\u00e6 ducuntur a sensibus et ab\nomni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt (the \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 against which\nChrysippus already directed severe attacks. See p. 46, 2; 91, 2). Tum\nperveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne ratione quidem et conjectura ulla res\npercipi possit. H\u00e6c autem universa etiam concidunt minutius.\n\n[1458] Sext. vii. 409; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 84; 7, 19; 25, 79; Numen. in\nEus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 5. Therewith is probably connected the statement\nin Galen, De Opt. Doct. c. 2, vol. i. 45, K, that Carneades\npersistently denied the axiom that two things that are equal to a third\nare equal to one another. His assertion probably comes to this, that it\nmay be possible to distinguish two things as unequal, which cannot be\ndistinguished from a third, that therefore two things may appear equal\nto a third without being or appearing equal to one another.\n\n[1459] Sext. 402 and 408.\n\n[1460] The fallacy called \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 is carefully investigated in Cic.\nAcad. ii. 30, 95 (by Carneades as he says, 98), as an instance in\npoint.\n\n[1461] Sext. 416; Cic. l.c. 29, 92. Since Chrysippus tried to meet the\nchain-argument, it may be supposed that this fallacy had been used by\nArcesilaus against the Stoics.\n\n[1462] Sext. vii. 164; Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 5, 11.\n\n[1463] Sext. 165.\n\n[1464] Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 91, who here appears to be following Philo,\nand, subsequently, Carneades as well. Carneades also gives utterance to\na similar view of dialectic in Stob. Floril. 93, 13 (conf. Plut. C.\nNot. 2, 4), comparing it to a polypus consuming its own tentacles. It\nis able, he conceives, to expose fallacies, but not to discover truth.\n\n[1465] Cic. Acad. ii. 36, 117. Carneades is not mentioned by name, but\nthere can be no doubt that the reference is to some Academician, and it\nis probable that it was the work of Carneades.\n\n[1466] Diog. iv. 62.\n\n[1467] Cic. N. D. i. 2, 5, after a brief description of the Stoical\nviews of Gods: Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret\nhomines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem.\n\n[1468] Cic. N. D. i. 23, 62; iii. 4, 11. Here, too, Carneades is not\nmentioned by name, but the reference to him is made clear by Cicero\u2019s\nremark that he is quoting the Academic view.\n\n[1469] Conf. Cic. N. D. iii. 5, 11.\n\n[1470] The Academician in Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120. That these arguments\nwere used by Carneades is clear from Plut. in Porphyr. De Abst. iii.\n20, where, traversing the arguments of the Stoics, he justifies the\nexistence of vermin, poisonous plants, and beasts of prey. In answer to\nChrysippus\u2019 assertion, that the final cause of a pig is to be killed,\nCarneades argues: A pig, therefore, by being killed, must attain the\nobject for which it was destined; it is always beneficial for a thing\nto attain its object\u2014therefore it must be beneficial to a pig to be\nkilled and eaten.\n\n[1471] Cic. N. D. iii. 25, 65\u201370. It is here presumed that the leading\nthoughts in Cicero\u2019s description belong to the School of Carneades.\n\n[1472] Ibid. 31, 76.\n\n[1473] Ibid. 32, 79.\n\n[1474] Cic. N. D. iii. 32, 80.\n\n[1475] Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120; N. D. iii. 11, 28.\n\n[1476] Cic. N. D. iii. 8, 21; 10, 26; 11, 27.\n\n[1477] Ibid. 10, 25.\n\n[1478] L.c.\n\n[1479] Cic. N. D. iii. 12, 29; 14, 34.\n\n[1480] Cic. N. D. iii. 13, 32. More fully Sext. Math. ix. 139\u2013147. Here\ntoo Carneades is expressly mentioned. But were he not mentioned the\nagreement of the argument with that given by Cicero would show that the\nsame person was being referred to.\n\n[1481] Cic.; Ibid. Further proofs of the transient nature of all\nearthly beings are there given.\n\n[1482] Sext. Math. ix. 152\u2013175, quotes the same argument for \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7,\nand so does Cic. N. D. iii. 15, 38. Neither mentions Carneades by name,\nbut since both writers introduce these proofs in the same position in a\nlonger argument, in which Carneades is expressly mentioned both before\nand after, there can be no doubt that to him they refer.\n\n[1483] Sext. ix. 176. The argument has a look of sophistry about it. It\nalludes to the important question which engaged so much attention in\nthe middle ages, viz. How is the universal related in Deity to the\nindividual? Are goodness and reason a law for God independent of His\nwill or not?\n\n[1484] As Epicurus did. See p. 468, 3.\n\n[1485] Sext. 178.\n\n[1486] Sext. l.c. 148\u2013151; 180. That Sextus here refers to Carneades is\nclear from his agreement with Cic. N. D. 12, 29\u201331; 14, 34. Cicero\nintroduces his remarks with the words: Illa autem, qu\u00e6 Carneades\nafferebat, quemadmodum dissolvitis? Sextus himself seems to refer not\nonly individual arguments, but the whole series of them, to Carneades,\nwhen he continues, 182: \u1f20\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03bd\u03b5\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[1487] Sext. 182\u2013190. More fully in Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 43. Sextus also\nobserves, 190: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03bd\u03b5\u03ac\u03b4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2.\n\n[1488] To him, or probably to his School, belongs the learned argument\ngiven by Cic. N. D. iii. 21, 53, to 23, 60, in which he proves the want\nof unity in traditional myths by the multiplicity of Gods of the same\nname. The whole drift of this argument shows that it was borrowed from\nsome Greek treatise.\n\n[1489] See Cic. Divin. i. 4, 7; 7, 12.\n\n[1490] Ibid. ii. 3, 9.\n\n[1491] Ibid. v. 13; but Carneades is not here mentioned by name.\n\n[1492] Ibid. i. 13, 23; 49, 109.\n\n[1493] Cic. l.c. and Divin. ii. 21, 48.\n\n[1494] Cic. l.c. ii. 11, 27.\n\n[1495] Cic. De Fato, 11, 23; 14, 31. The freedom of the will, he there\nsays, may be asserted even granting that every motion is referred to a\ncause, for it is not necessary that this law should hold good of the\nwill. He will therefore confine it to bodily motion, and not allow to\nit unconditional validity.\n\n[1496] Lact. Instit. v. 14, following Cic. De Rep. iii. 4; Plut. Cato\nMaj. c. 22; Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35.\n\n[1497] Lactant. l.c. 16; Cic. De Rep. iii. 8\u201312; 14; 17; Fin. ii. 18,\n59. On the above casuistical cases see De Off. iii. 13; 23, 89, and\nabove, p. 299, 2. Probably Carneades was the cause of the study of\ncasuistry among the later Stoics.\n\n[1498] Cic. Acad. ii. 34, 108; conf. 31, 98. In Id. Att. xiii. 21, he\ncompares this \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74 to the drawing up of a charioteer, or to the guard\nof a pugilist. No doubt it is with reference to \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74 that Alex. Aphr.\nDe An. 154 a, says: The Academicians consider \u1f00\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 the \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c0\u03c4\u03b1\u03af\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. \u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 or \u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 is, according to the Stoic\ndefinition (Diog. vii. 46) = \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03ae. It consists, therefore, in not giving a hasty assent to any\nproposition. According to the Sceptics, this is only possible, and you\nare only then safe from error, when you give assent to none whatever.\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 becomes then identical with \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74 or \u1f04\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, which Max.\nTyr. Diss. 35, 7, speaks of as the ultimate end of Carneades. Hence\nCarneades, as Arcesilaus had done before him, spoke for and against\nevery subject without expressing a decided opinion. Cic. N. D. i. 5,\n11; Acad. ii. 18, 60; Divin. ii. 72, 150; Rep. iii. 5, 8; Tusc. v. 4,\n11; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12.\n\n[1499] Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28.\n\n[1500] Sext. Math. vii. 166: \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 [\u1f41 \u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03bd\u03b5\u03ac\u03b4\u03b7\u03c2] \u03c4\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03ba\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99 (of Clitomachus): Etenim\ncontra naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset, et sequitur omnis vit\u00e6\n... eversio. Ibid. 101; 32, 104: Nam cum placeat, eum qui de omnibus\nrebus contineat se de assentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid,\nreliquit ejusmodi visa, quibus ad actionem excitemur, etc. Hence the\nassurance (Ibid. 103; Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 234) that the\nAcademicians do not wish to go into the question of perception. They\naccept it as a phenomenon of consciousness and a basis of action, but\nthey deny that it strictly furnishes knowledge. The senses are \u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2,\nbut not \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2.\n\n[1501] Sext. and Cic. l.c.\n\n[1502] Sext. l.c. 167\u2013170.\n\n[1503] Ibid. 171\u2013173; or, as it is expressed by Cicero, Acad. ii. 24,\n78: It is possible nihil percipere et tamen opinari. It is of no\nimportance that Philo and Metrodorus said Carneades had proved this\nstatement, whereas Clitomachus had stated, hoc magis ab eo disputatum\nquam probatum. Acad. ii. 48, 148; 21, 67, attributes the statement to\nCarneades, without any qualification, adding only: Adsensurum\n(aliquando, as the latter passage adds) non percepto, i.e. opinaturum\nsapientem.\n\n[1504] Conf. Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 11, 26 (undoubtedly in point of\nmatter and probably in terms following Cicero): Id probabile vel\nverisimile Academici vocant, quod nos ad addendum sine adsensione\npotest invitare. Sine adsensione autem dico, ut id quod agimus non\nopinemur verum esse aut non id scire arbitremur, agamus tamen. To the\nsame effect, Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12: Carneades declared it\nimpossible to withhold judgment on all points, and asserted \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03b1. Conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 17, 54, where\nthe objection is raised to the new Academicians: Ne hoc quidem cernunt,\nomnia se reddere incerta, quod nolunt; ea dico incerta, qu\u00e6 \u1f04\u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03b1\nGr\u00e6ci.\n\n[1505] Sext. l.c. 173; 175\u2013182; Pyrrh. i. 227; conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 11,\n33; 31, 99; 32, 104.\n\n[1506] Sext. l.c. 173; 181.\n\n[1507] Ibid. 176; 183.\n\n[1508] Ibid. 184.\n\n[1509] Sext. l.c. 174; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99.\n\n[1510] Cic. l.c. 32, 103; 48, 148. This explanation does away with the\ncharge of inconsistency which is brought against Carneades in Cic.\nAcad. ii. 18, 59; 21, 67; 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3), on the ground that he\nallowed, in contradistinction to Arcesilaus, that the wise man will\nsometimes follow opinion, and will give his assent to certain\nstatements. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7, even asserts that he\nexpressed his own convictions to his friends in private; but this\nassertion is no more true of him than of Arcesilaus (see p. 531, 3), as\nmay be seen from the passage on p. 557, 2.\n\n[1511] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 226: \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03c4\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f43 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03bd; \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n[1512] See p. 553, 2; 554, 4.\n\n[1513] Here the question arises, Whence does the Sceptic derive his\nconviction as to probabilities in morals? and as perception is not\navailable for the purpose, Geffers concludes (De Arc. Successor. 20)\nthat Carneades assumed a peculiar source of conviction in the mind. For\nsuch an assumption, however, our authorities give no proof. It cannot\nbe gathered from the hypothetical language respecting the freedom of\nthe will in Cic. De Fato, ii. 23. See p. 551, 2. Nor is it, indeed,\nnecessary that Carneades, who never pretended to hold any psychological\ntheory, should have had any opinion on the subject. Supposing he did\nhave it, he might have appealed to experience quite as readily or more\nso than the Stoics, and have been content with the fact that certain\nthings are far more agreeable or disagreeable, and either promote or\ndisturb happiness.\n\n[1514] Cic. Fin. v. 6, 16, to 8, 23; conf. Tusc. v. 29, 84; Ritter,\niii. 686, has hardly expressed with accuracy Carneades\u2019 division, or he\nwould not have accused it of being inaccurate and superficial.\n\n[1515] Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139.\n\n[1516] Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 131: Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo\nprobaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui iis rebus,\nquas primas natura conciliavisset (\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd). Similarly Fin. v. 7, 20;\nTusc. v. 30, 84. This view differs from that of the Stoics, because it\nmakes the highest Good consist not in natural activity as such, but in\nthe enjoyment of natural goods.\n\n[1517] Cic. Fin. ii. 11, 35: Ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis,\nunus Aristippi vel Epicuri (pleasure), alter Hieronymi (freedom from\npain), Carneadis tertius (the satisfaction of natural instincts). Conf.\nIbid. v. 7, 20; 8, 22.\n\n[1518] Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139: Ut Calliphontem sequar, cujus quidem\nsententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam\nvideretur. Callipho is reckoned among those who consider honestas cum\naliqua accessione\u2014or, as it is said, Fin. v. 8, 21; 25, 73; Tusc. v.\n30, 85, voluptas cum honestate\u2014the highest Good.\n\n[1519] Plut. Tranq. An. 16, p. 475.\n\n[1520] Cic. Tusc. iii. 22, 54. Let it be observed that this view of\nCarneades is specially placed under the head of conviction on\nprobabilities. It is said, he attacked the proposition, videri fore in\n\u00e6gritudine sapientem patria capta. The other statements of Carneades on\nethics, such as that in Plut. De Adulat. 16, p. 51, have nothing\ncharacteristic about them.\n\n[1521] See p. 279.\n\n[1522] Plut. C. Not. 27, 14; Stob. Ecl. ii. 134. Plutarch, however,\nonly quotes it as the opinion of individuals. It appears more probable\nthat it was an opinion of Chrysippus which Antipater defended against\nCarneades. Carneades even practically attributes it to the Stoics.\n\n[1523] Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41: Carneades tuus ... rem in summum\ndiscrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit, in omni hac\nqu\u00e6stione, qu\u00e6 de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum\nPeripateticis controversiam, sed nominum.\n\n[1524] Fin. iii. 17, 57.\n\n[1525] Cic. Tusc. iii. 25, 59.\n\n[1526] Ibid. v. 29, 83: Et quoniam videris hoc velle, ut, qu\u00e6cumque\ndissentientium philosophorum sententia sit de finibus, tamen virtus\nsatis habeat ad vitam beatam pr\u00e6sidii, quod quidem Carneadem disputare\nsolitum accepimus, etc.\n\n[1527] He explicitly says, Fin. v. 7, 18, that as each one defines the\nhighest good, so he determines the honestum (the \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd, virtue). The\nview of the Stoics, he says, places the honestum and bonum in activity\naiming at what is according to nature; adding that, according to the\nview which places it in the possession of what is according to nature,\nthe prima secundum naturam are also prima in animis quasi virtutum\nigniculi et semina.\n\n[1528] See p. 560, 3, and Plut. Tranq. An. 19, p. 477, where, however,\nthe greater part seems to belong to Plutarch.\n\n[1529] Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35. See above 536, 1, end.\n\n[1530] Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 44: H\u00e6c Carneades aiebat, non ut Deos\ntolleret\u2014quid enim philosopho minus conveniens?\u2014sed ut Stoicos nihil de\nDiis explicare convinceret. In this sense the Academician in Cicero (i.\n22, 62) frequently asserts, that he would not destroy belief in God,\nbut that he finds the arguments unsatisfactory. Likewise Sextus, Pyrrh.\niii. 2: \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c3\u03ad\u03b2\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd.\n\n[1531] Ritter, iii. 730, 694.\n\n[1532] Clitomachus was a native of Carthage. Hence he is called by Max\nTyr. Diss. 10, 3, \u1f41 \u039b\u03af\u03b2\u03c5\u03c2. He originally bore the name of Hasdrubal. At\nhome he devoted himself to study, and wrote several treatises in his\nmother tongue (\u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1fc7 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9). When 40 years of\nage (according to Steph. Byz. De urbe \u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03b4\u1f7c\u03bd; 28), he came to Athens,\nwas initiated by Carneades into Greek philosophy, and devoted himself\nto it with such zeal and success (Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; 31, 98; Athen.\nix. 402, c) that he became esteemed as a philosopher and voluminous\nwriter (Diog. iv. 67). Treatises of his are mentioned by Cic. Acad. ii.\n31, 98; 32, 102; Diog. ii. 92. He died (according to Stob. Floril. vii.\n55) by suicide, not before 110 B.C. (as Zumpt remarks, Ueber d.\nphilosoph. Schulen in Ath., Abh. d. Berl. Akad., Jahrg. 1842. Hist.\nPhilol. Kl. p. 67), since, according to Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, L.\nCrassus, during his qu\u00e6storship, which falls at the earliest in this\nyear, met him at Athens. He must then have been very old.\n\n[1533] Diog. iv. 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 32, 102.\n\n[1534] As the peculiar observation in Diog. iv. proves: (\u1f00\u03bd\u1f74\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c8\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f14\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03ca\u03ba\u1fc7 \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1fc7).\n\n[1535] According to Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; De Orat. i. 11. 45; Orator,\n16, 51, Charmadas was a pupil of Carneades, whom he followed not only\nin teaching but also in method. He must have survived Clitomachus,\nsince he taught at the same time with Philo. See p. 566, 1. Philo,\nhowever, according to Clitomachus, undertook the presidency of the\nSchool (Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 9). According to Cic. De Orat. ii. 88,\n360. Tusc. i. 24, 59, he was remarkable for a good memory.\n\n[1536] Cic. De Orat. i. 18, 84: Charmadas asserted, eos qui rhetores\nnominabantur et qui dicendi pr\u00e6cepta traderent nihil plane tenere,\nneque posse quenquam facultatem assequi dicendi, nisi qui philosophorum\ninventa didicissent. Sext. Math. ii. 20, also mentions the hostile\nattitude of Clitomachus and Charmadas towards rhetoricians, and says\nthat both he and the School to which he belonged were engaged in\ndisputes with them. His fellow-disciple Agnon drew up a treatise,\naccording to Quintil. ii. 17, 15, entitled \u2018Charges against the\nrhetoricians.\u2019 Ritter\u2019s inferences, that Charmadas recommended\nphilosophy as the only way to eloquence, and thus betrayed the object\nof the philosophical doctrine of probability, iii. 695, make far too\nmuch of a casual expression which means no more than what the Stoics,\nand before them Plato, had said.\n\n[1537] In addition to Clitomachus and Charmadas, Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16,\nmentions Agnon and Melanthius of Rhodes, the former of whom is also\nreferred to by Quintilian. (See Athen. xiii. 602, d.) Cicero adds that\nMetrodorus of Stratonice passed for a friend of Carneades; he had come\nover from among the Epicureans (Diog. x. 9) to join him. This\nMetrodorus must neither be confounded with Metrodorus of Skepsis, the\npupil of Charmadas (see p. 566, 1), nor with the Metrodorus\ndistinguished as a painter, 168 B.C., whom \u00c6milius Paulus brought to\nRome (Plin. H. N. xxxv. 11, 135). The former must have been younger,\nthe latter older, than Metrodorus of Stratonice. A pupil of Melanthius\n(Diog. ii. 64), and also of Carneades in his later years (Plut. An\nSeni. s. ger. Resp. 13, 1, p. 791), was \u00c6schines of Naples, according\nto Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, who was likewise a distinguished teacher in\nthe Academic School towards the close of the second century. Another\npupil, Mentor, was by Carneades forbidden the School, because he was\ncaught with his concubine (Diog. iv. 63; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8,\n7).\n\n[1538] Exc. Vatic. xii 26: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd [\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u1fb3] \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f72\u03c2\n\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f04\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd [l. \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd] \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f08\u03b8\u03ae\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c3\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f11\u03c8\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f60\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f18\u03c6\u03ad\u03c3\u1ff3, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bc\u03ae \u03c0\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u1fb3\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bf\u1f34\u03ba\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f10\u03be \u1f67\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u1f24\u03c7\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f26\u03c7\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03bd\u03ad\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03cc\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f67\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c9\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f51\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. In the time of Carneades, whose\ncotemporary was Polybius, to whom the language as to the enthusiasm of\nyouth for Sceptical teaching refers, such depreciatory remarks could\nnot have been made of the Academy. The historical value, therefore, of\nthe whole passage is suspicious. It bears besides the mark of\nexaggeration so strongly that it is of no greater use for giving a view\nof the Academy than are the caricatures of opponents for conveying an\nidea of modern German philosophy.\n\n[1539] Among these pupils the tendency to lay stress on the doctrine of\nprobabilities in relation to Scepticism was already strong. Proof may\nbe found not only in the accounts already given us of Clitomachus and\n\u00c6schines, but also in the circumstance that many of the older writers\nmade the fourth Academy date from Philo and Charmadas, the fifth from\nAntiochus (Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16). At a still\nearlier date, Metrodorus is said to have departed from the platform of\nCarneades. Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 18, 41, after speaking of Antiochus\nand his renunciation of Scepticism, says: Quamquam et Metrodorus id\nantea facere tentaverat, qui primus dicitur esse confessus, non decreto\nplacuisse Academicis, nihil posse comprehendi, sed necessario contra\nStoicos hujus modi eos arma sumsisse. Probably Augustin borrowed this\npassage from a lost treatise of Cicero; hence it may be relied upon.\nThe Metrodorus referred to is probably Metrodorus of Stratonice (see p.\n564, 5), mentioned by Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16. Metrodorus of Skepsis might\nalso be suggested (Strabo, xiii. 155, p. 609; xvi. 4, 16, p. 775; Plut.\nLucull. 22; Diog. v. 84; Cic. De Orat. ii. 88, 360; 90, 365; iii. 20,\n75; Tusc. i. 24, 59; Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 24, 89; Quintil. x. 6, 1;\nxi. 2, 22; M\u00fcller, Hist. Gr. iii. 203), who first learned rhetoric at\nChalcedon, afterwards entered the service of Mithridates, and was put\nto death by his orders, B.C. 70, at an advanced age. Cic. De Orat. iii.\n20, 75, calls him an Academician; and he is mentioned, Ibid. i. 11, 45,\nas a pupil of Charmadas. The language quoted by Augustin may have come\nfrom the treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 (Strabo, p. 775). He is otherwise only\nknown as a rhetorician and politician. The same uncertainty prevails as\nto the Metrodorus referred to in Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3).\nWe do not know who he is, but it may be inferred that it is the same\nMetrodorus who is mentioned by Augustin.","title":"The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":197273}