{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_8438/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_8438","id":"gutenberg_8438","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/8438","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical Antiquity","Ethics","Philosophy"],"text":"The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle\n\nBy Aristotle\n\nIntroduction by J. A. Smith\n\n\nContents\n\n INTRODUCTION\n\n ARISTOTLE\u2019S ETHICS\n BOOK I\n BOOK II\n BOOK III\n BOOK IV\n BOOK V\n BOOK VI\n BOOK VII\n BOOK VIII\n BOOK IX\n BOOK X\n NOTES\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe _Ethics_ of Aristotle is one half of a single treatise of which his\n_Politics_ is the other half. Both deal with one and the same subject.\nThis subject is what Aristotle calls in one place the \u201cphilosophy of\nhuman affairs;\u201d but more frequently Political or Social Science. In the\ntwo works taken together we have their author\u2019s whole theory of human\nconduct or practical activity, that is, of all human activity which is\nnot directed merely to knowledge or truth. The two parts of this\ntreatise are mutually complementary, but in a literary sense each is\nindependent and self-contained. The proem to the _Ethics_ is an\nintroduction to the whole subject, not merely to the first part; the\nlast chapter of the _Ethics_ points forward to the _Politics_, and\nsketches for that part of the treatise the order of enquiry to be\npursued (an order which in the actual treatise is not adhered to).\n\nThe principle of distribution of the subject-matter between the two\nworks is far from obvious, and has been much debated. Not much can be\ngathered from their titles, which in any case were not given to them by\ntheir author. Nor do these titles suggest any very compact unity in the\nworks to which they are applied: the plural forms, which survive so\noddly in English (Ethic_s_, Politic_s_), were intended to indicate the\ntreatment within a single work of a _group_ of connected questions. The\nunity of the first group arises from their centring round the topic of\ncharacter, that of the second from their connection with the existence\nand life of the city or state. We have thus to regard the _Ethics_ as\ndealing with one group of problems and the _Politics_ with a second,\nboth falling within the wide compass of Political Science. Each of\nthese groups falls into sub-groups which roughly correspond to the\nseveral books in each work. The tendency to take up one by one the\nvarious problems which had suggested themselves in the wide field\nobscures both the unity of the subject-matter and its proper\narticulation. But it is to be remembered that what is offered us is\navowedly rather an enquiry than an exposition of hard and fast\ndoctrine.\n\nNevertheless each work aims at a relative completeness, and it is\nimportant to observe the relation of each to the other. The distinction\nis not that the one treats of Moral and the other of Political\nPhilosophy, nor again that the one deals with the moral activity of the\nindividual and the other with that of the State, nor once more that the\none gives us the theory of human conduct, while the other discusses its\napplication in practice, though not all of these misinterpretations are\nequally erroneous. The clue to the right interpretation is given by\nAristotle himself, where in the last chapter of the _Ethics_ he is\npaving the way for the _Politics_. In the _Ethics_ he has not confined\nhimself to the abstract or isolated individual, but has always thought\nof him, or we might say, in his social and political context, with a\ngiven nature due to race and heredity and in certain surroundings. So\nviewing him he has studied the nature and formation of his\ncharacter\u2014all that he can make himself or be made by others to be.\nEspecially he has investigated the various admirable forms of human\ncharacter and the mode of their production. But all this, though it\nbrings more clearly before us what goodness or virtue is, and how it is\nto be reached, remains mere theory or talk. By itself it does not\nenable us to become, or to help others to become, good. For this it is\nnecessary to bring into play the great force of the Political Community\nor State, of which the main instrument is Law. Hence arises the demand\nfor the necessary complement to the _Ethics, i.e._, a treatise devoted\nto the questions which centre round the enquiry; by what organisation\nof social or political forces, by what laws or institutions can we best\nsecure the greatest amount of good character?\n\nWe must, however, remember that the production of good character is not\nthe end of either individual or state action: that is the aim of the\none and the other because good character is the indispensable condition\nand chief determinant of happiness, itself the goal of all human doing.\nThe end of all action, individual or collective, is the greatest\nhappiness of the greatest number. There is, Aristotle insists, no\ndifference of kind between the good of one and the good of many or all.\nThe sole difference is one of amount or scale. This does not mean\nsimply that the State exists to secure in larger measure the objects of\ndegree which the isolated individual attempts, but is too feeble, to\nsecure without it. On the contrary, it rather insists that whatever\ngoods society alone enables a man to secure have always had to the\nindividual\u2014whether he realised it or not\u2014the value which, when so\nsecured, he recognises them to possess. The best and happiest life for\nthe individual is that which the State renders possible, and this it\ndoes mainly by revealing to him the value of new objects of desire and\neducating him to appreciate them. To Aristotle or to Plato the State\nis, above all, a large and powerful educative agency which gives the\nindividual increased opportunities of self-development and greater\ncapacities for the enjoyment of life.\n\nLooking forward, then, to the life of the State as that which aids\nsupport, and combines the efforts of the individual to obtain\nhappiness, Aristotle draws no hard and fast distinction between the\nspheres of action of Man as individual and Man as citizen. Nor does the\ndivision of his discussion into the _Ethics_ and the _Politics_ rest\nupon any such distinction. The distinction implied is rather between\ntwo stages in the life of the civilised man\u2014the stage of preparation\nfor the full life of the adult citizen, and the stage of the actual\nexercise or enjoyment of citizenship. Hence the _Ethics_, where his\nattention is directed upon the formation of character, is largely and\ncentrally a treatise on Moral Education. It discusses especially those\nadmirable human qualities which fit a man for life in an organised\ncivic community, which makes him \u201ca good citizen,\u201d and considers how\nthey can be fostered or created and their opposites prevented.\n\nThis is the kernel of the _Ethics_, and all the rest is subordinate to\nthis main interest and purpose. Yet \u201cthe rest\u201d is not irrelevant; the\nwhole situation in which character grows and operates is concretely\nconceived. There is a basis of what we should call Psychology, sketched\nin firm outlines, the deeper presuppositions and the wider issues of\nhuman character and conduct are not ignored, and there is no little of\nwhat we should call Metaphysics. But neither the Psychology nor the\nMetaphysics is elaborated, and only so much is brought forward as\nappears necessary to put the main facts in their proper perspective and\nsetting. It is this combination of width of outlook with close\nobservation of the concrete facts of conduct which gives its abiding\nvalue to the work, and justifies the view of it as containing\nAristotle\u2019s Moral Philosophy. Nor is it important merely as summing up\nthe moral judgments and speculations of an age now long past. It seizes\nand dwells upon those elements and features in human practice which are\nmost essential and permanent, and it is small wonder that so much in it\nsurvives in our own ways of regarding conduct and speaking of it. Thus\nit still remains one of the classics of Moral Philosophy, nor is its\nvalue likely soon to be exhausted.\n\nAs was pointed out above, the proem (Book I., cc. i-iii.) is a prelude\nto the treatment of the whole subject covered by the _Ethics_ and the\n_Politics_ together. It sets forth the purpose of the enquiry,\ndescribes the spirit in which it is to be undertaken and what ought to\nbe the expectation of the reader, and lastly states the necessary\nconditions of studying it with profit. The aim of it is the acquisition\nand propagation of a certain kind of knowledge (science), but this\nknowledge and the thinking which brings it about are subsidiary to a\npractical end. The knowledge aimed at is of what is best for man and of\nthe conditions of its realisation. Such knowledge is that which in its\nconsumate form we find in great statesmen, enabling them to organise\nand administer their states and regulate by law the life of the\ncitizens to their advantage and happiness, but it is the same kind of\nknowledge which on a smaller scale secures success in the management of\nthe family or of private life.\n\nIt is characteristic of such knowledge that it should be deficient in\n\u201cexactness,\u201d in precision of statement, and closeness of logical\nconcatenation. We must not look for a mathematics of conduct. The\nsubject-matter of Human Conduct is not governed by necessary and\nuniform laws. But this does not mean that it is subject to no laws.\nThere are general principles at work in it, and these can be formulated\nin \u201crules,\u201d which rules can be systematised or unified. It is\nall-important to remember that practical or moral rules are only\ngeneral and always admit of exceptions, and that they arise not from\nthe mere complexity of the facts, but from the liability of the facts\nto a certain unpredictable variation. At their very best, practical\nrules state probabilities, not certainties; a relative constancy of\nconnection is all that exists, but it is enough to serve as a guide in\nlife. Aristotle here holds the balance between a misleading hope of\nreducing the subject-matter of conduct to a few simple rigorous\nabstract principles, with conclusions necessarily issuing from them,\nand the view that it is the field of operation of inscrutable forces\nacting without predictable regularity. He does not pretend to find in\nit absolute uniformities, or to deduce the details from his principles.\nHence, too, he insists on the necessity of experience as the source or\ntest of all that he has to say. Moral experience\u2014the actual possession\nand exercise of good character\u2014is necessary truly to understand moral\nprinciples and profitably to apply them. The mere intellectual\napprehension of them is not possible, or if possible, profitless.\n\nThe _Ethics_ is addressed to students who are presumed both to have\nenough general education to appreciate these points, and also to have a\nsolid foundation of good habits. More than that is not required for the\nprofitable study of it.\n\nIf the discussion of the nature and formation of character be regarded\nas the central topic of the _Ethics_, the contents of Book I., cc.\niv.-xii. may be considered as still belonging to the introduction and\nsetting, but these chapters contain matter of profound importance and\nhave exercised an enormous influence upon subsequent thought. They lay\ndown a principle which governs all Greek thought about human life, viz.\nthat it is only intelligible when viewed as directed towards some end\nor good. This is the Greek way of expressing that all human life\ninvolves an ideal element\u2014something which it is not yet and which under\ncertain conditions it is to be. In that sense Greek Moral Philosophy is\nessentially idealistic. Further it is always assumed that all human\npractical activity is directed or \u201coriented\u201d to a _single_ end, and\nthat that end is knowable or definable in advance of its realisation.\nTo know it is not merely a matter of speculative interest, it is of the\nhighest practical moment for only in the light of it can life be duly\nguided, and particularly only so can the state be properly organised\nand administered. This explains the stress laid throughout by Greek\nMoral Philosophy upon the necessity of knowledge as a condition of the\nbest life. This knowledge is not, though it includes knowledge of the\nnature of man and his circumstances, it is knowledge of what is best\u2014of\nman\u2019s supreme end or good.\n\nBut this end is not conceived as presented to him by a superior power\nnor even as something which _ought_ to be. The presentation of the\nMoral Ideal as Duty is almost absent. From the outset it is identified\nwith the object of desire, of what we not merely judge desirable but\nactually do desire, or that which would, if realised, satisfy human\ndesire. In fact it is what we all, wise and simple, agree in naming\n\u201cHappiness\u201d (Welfare or Well-being)\n\nIn what then does happiness consist? Aristotle summarily sets aside the\nmore or less popular identifications of it with abundance of physical\npleasures, with political power and honour, with the mere possession of\nsuch superior gifts or attainments as normally entitle men to these,\nwith wealth. None of these can constitute the end or good of man as\nsuch. On the other hand, he rejects his master Plato\u2019s conception of a\ngood which is the end of the whole universe, or at least dismisses it\nas irrelevant to his present enquiry. The good towards which all human\ndesires and practical activities are directed must be one conformable\nto man\u2019s special nature and circumstances and attainable by his\nefforts. There is in Aristotle\u2019s theory of human conduct no trace of\nPlato\u2019s \u201cother worldliness\u201d, he brings the moral ideal in Bacon\u2019s\nphrase down to \u201cright earth\u201d\u2014and so closer to the facts and problems of\nactual human living. Turning from criticism of others he states his own\npositive view of Happiness, and, though he avowedly states it merely in\noutline his account is pregnant with significance. Human Happiness lies\nin activity or energising, and that in a way peculiar to man with his\ngiven nature and his given circumstances, it is not theoretical, but\npractical: it is the activity not of reason but still of a being who\npossesses reason and applies it, and it presupposes in that being the\ndevelopment, and not merely the natural possession, of certain relevant\npowers and capacities. The last is the prime condition of successful\nliving and therefore of satisfaction, but Aristotle does not ignore\nother conditions, such as length of life, wealth and good luck, the\nabsence or diminution of which render happiness not impossible, but\ndifficult of attainment.\n\nIt is interesting to compare this account of Happiness with Mill\u2019s in\n_Utilitarianism_. Mill\u2019s is much the less consistent: at times he\ndistinguishes and at times he identifies, happiness, pleasure,\ncontentment, and satisfaction. He wavers between belief in its general\nattainability and an absence of hopefulness. He mixes up in an\narbitrary way such ingredients as \u201cnot expecting more from life than it\nis capable of bestowing,\u201d \u201cmental cultivation,\u201d \u201cimproved laws,\u201d etc.,\nand in fact leaves the whole conception vague, blurred, and uncertain.\nAristotle draws the outline with a firmer hand and presents a more\ndefinite ideal. He allows for the influence on happiness of conditions\nonly partly, if at all, within the control of man, but he clearly makes\nthe man positive determinant of man\u2019s happiness he in himself, and more\nparticularly in what he makes directly of his own nature, and so\nindirectly of his circumstances. \u201c\u2018Tis in ourselves that we are thus or\nthus\u201d But once more this does not involve an artificial or abstract\nisolation of the individual moral agent from his relation to other\npersons or things from his context in society and nature, nor ignore\nthe relative dependence of his life upon a favourable environment.\n\nThe main factor which determines success or failure in human life is\nthe acquisition of certain powers, for Happiness is just the exercise\nor putting forth of these in actual living, everything else is\nsecondary and subordinate. These powers arise from the due development\nof certain natural aptitudes which belong (in various degrees) to human\nnature as such and therefore to all normal human beings. In their\ndeveloped form they are known as virtues (the Greek means simply\n\u201cgoodnesses,\u201d \u201cperfections,\u201d \u201cexcellences,\u201d or \u201cfitnesses\u201d), some of\nthem are physical, but others are psychical, and among the latter some,\nand these distinctively or peculiarly human, are \u201crational,\u201d _i e_,\npresuppose the possession and exercise of mind or intelligence. These\nlast fall into two groups, which Aristotle distinguishes as Goodnesses\nof Intellect and Goodnesses of Character. They have in common that they\nall excite in us admiration and praise of their possessors, and that\nthey are not natural endowments, but acquired characteristics But they\ndiffer in important ways. (1) the former are excellences or developed\npowers of the reason as such\u2014of that in us which sees and formulates\nlaws, rules, regularities systems, and is content in the vision of\nthem, while the latter involve a submission or obedience to such rules\nof something in us which is in itself capricious and irregular, but\ncapable of regulation, viz our instincts and feelings, (2) the former\nare acquired by study and instruction, the latter by discipline. The\nlatter constitute \u201ccharacter,\u201d each of them as a \u201cmoral virtue\u201d\n(literally \u201ca goodness of character\u201d), and upon them primarily depends\nthe realisation of happiness. This is the case at least for the great\nmajority of men, and for all men their possession is an indispensable\nbasis of the best, _i e_, the most desirable life. They form the chief\nor central subject-matter of the _Ethics_.\n\nPerhaps the truest way of conceiving Aristotle\u2019s meaning here is to\nregard a moral virtue as a form of obedience to a maxim or rule of\nconduct accepted by the agent as valid for a class of recurrent\nsituations in human life. Such obedience requires knowledge of the rule\nand acceptance of it _as the rule_ of the agent\u2019s own actions, but not\nnecessarily knowledge of its ground or of its systematic connexion with\nother similarly known and similarly accepted rules (It may be remarked\nthat the Greek word usually translated \u201creason,\u201d means in almost all\ncases in the _Ethics_ such a rule, and not the faculty which\napprehends, formulates, considers them).\n\nThe \u201cmoral virtues and vices\u201d make up what we call character, and the\nimportant questions arise: (1) What is character? and (2) How is it\nformed? (for character in this sense is not a natural endowment; it is\nformed or produced). Aristotle deals with these questions in the\nreverse order. His answers are peculiar and distinctive\u2014not that they\nare absolutely novel (for they are anticipated in Plato), but that by\nhim they are for the first time distinctly and clearly formulated.\n\n(1.) Character, good or bad, is produced by what Aristotle calls\n\u201chabituation,\u201d that is, it is the result of the repeated doing of acts\nwhich have a similar or common quality. Such repetition acting upon\nnatural aptitudes or propensities gradually fixes them in one or other\nof two opposite directions, giving them a bias towards good or evil.\nHence the several acts which determine goodness or badness of character\nmust be done in a certain way, and thus the formation of good character\nrequires discipline and direction from without. Not that the agent\nhimself contributes nothing to the formation of his character, but that\nat first he needs guidance. The point is not so much that the process\ncannot be safely left to Nature, but that it cannot be entrusted to\nmerely intellectual instruction. The process is one of assimilation,\nlargely by imitation and under direction and control. The result is a\ngrowing understanding of what is done, a choice of it for its own sake,\na fixity and steadiness of purpose. Right acts and feelings become,\nthrough habit, easier and more pleasant, and the doing of them a\n\u201csecond nature.\u201d The agent acquires the power of doing them freely,\nwillingly, more and more \u201cof himself.\u201d\n\nBut what are \u201cright\u201d acts? In the first place, they are those that\nconform to a rule\u2014to the right rule, and ultimately to reason. The\nGreeks never waver from the conviction that in the end moral conduct is\nessentially reasonable conduct. But there is a more significant way of\ndescribing their \u201crightness,\u201d and here for the first time Aristotle\nintroduces his famous \u201cDoctrine of the Mean.\u201d Reasoning from the\nanalogy of \u201cright\u201d physical acts, he pronounces that rightness always\nmeans adaptation or adjustment to the special requirements of a\nsituation. To this adjustment he gives a quantitative interpretation.\nTo do (or to feel) what is right in a given situation is to do or to\nfeel just the amount required\u2014neither more nor less: to do wrong is to\ndo or to feel too much or too little\u2014to fall short of or over-shoot, \u201ca\nmean\u201d determined by the situation. The repetition of acts which lie in\nthe mean is the cause of the formation of each and every \u201cgoodness of\ncharacter,\u201d and for this \u201crules\u201d can be given.\n\n(2) What then is a \u201cmoral virtue,\u201d the result of such a process duly\ndirected? It is no mere mood of feeling, no mere liability to emotion,\nno mere natural aptitude or endowment, it is a permanent _state_ of the\nagent\u2019s self, or, as we might in modern phrase put it, of his will, it\nconsists in a steady self-imposed obedience to a rule of action in\ncertain situations which frequently recur in human life. The rule\nprescribes the control and regulation within limits of the agent\u2019s\nnatural impulses to act and feel thus and thus. The situations fall\ninto groups which constitute the \u201cfields\u201d of the several \u201cmoral\nvirtues\u201d, for each there is a rule, conformity to which secures\nrightness in the individual acts. Thus the moral ideal appears as a\ncode of rules, accepted by the agent, but as yet _to him_ without\nrational justification and without system or unity. But the rules\nprescribe no mechanical uniformity: each within its limits permits\nvariety, and the exactly right amount adopted to the requirements of\nthe individual situation (and every actual situation is individual)\nmust be determined by the intuition of the moment. There is no attempt\nto reduce the rich possibilities of right action to a single monotonous\ntype. On the contrary, there are acknowledged to be many forms of moral\nvirtue, and there is a long list of them, with their correlative vices\nenumerated.\n\nThe Doctrine of the Mean here takes a form in which it has impressed\nsubsequent thinkers, but which has less importance than is usually\nascribed to it. In the \u201cTable of the Virtues and Vices,\u201d each of the\nvirtues is flanked by two opposite vices, which are respectively the\nexcess and defect of that which in due measure constitutes the virtue.\nAristotle tries to show that this is the case in regard to every virtue\nnamed and recognised as such, but his treatment is often forced and the\nendeavour is not very successful. Except as a convenient principle of\narrangement of the various forms of praiseworthy or blameworthy\ncharacters, generally acknowledged as such by Greek opinion, this form\nof the doctrine is of no great significance.\n\nBooks III-V are occupied with a survey of the moral virtues and vices.\nThese seem to have been undertaken in order to verify in detail the\ngeneral account, but this aim is not kept steadily in view. Nor is\nthere any well-considered principle of classification. What we find is\na sort of portrait-gallery of the various types of moral excellence\nwhich the Greeks of the author\u2019s age admired and strove to encourage.\nThe discussion is full of acute, interesting and sometimes profound\nobservations. Some of the types are those which are and will be admired\nat all times, but others are connected with peculiar features of Greek\nlife which have now passed away. The most important is that of Justice\nor the Just Man, to which we may later return. But the discussion is\npreceded by an attempt to elucidate some difficult and obscure points\nin the general account of moral virtue and action (Book III, cc i-v).\nThis section is concerned with the notion of Responsibility. The\ndiscussion designedly excludes what we may call the metaphysical issues\nof the problem, which here present themselves, it moves on the level of\nthought of the practical man, the statesman, and the legislator.\nCoercion and ignorance of relevant circumstances render acts\ninvoluntary and exempt their doer from responsibility, otherwise the\nact is voluntary and the agent responsible, choice or preference of\nwhat is done, and inner consent to the deed, are to be presumed.\nNeither passion nor ignorance of the right rule can extenuate\nresponsibility. But there is a difference between acts done voluntarily\nand acts done of _set_ choice or purpose. The latter imply\nDeliberation. Deliberation involves thinking, thinking out means to\nends: in deliberate acts the whole nature of the agent consents to and\nenters into the act, and in a peculiar sense they are his, they _are_\nhim in action, and the most significant evidence of what he is.\nAristotle is unable wholly to avoid allusion to the metaphysical\ndifficulties and what he does here say upon them is obscure and\nunsatisfactory. But he insists upon the importance in moral action of\nthe agent\u2019s inner consent, and on the reality of his individual\nresponsibility. For his present purpose the metaphysical difficulties\nare irrelevant.\n\nThe treatment of Justice in Book V has always been a source of great\ndifficulty to students of the _Ethics_. Almost more than any other part\nof the work it has exercised influence upon mediaeval and modern\nthought upon the subject. The distinctions and divisions have become\npart of the stock-in-trade of would be philosophic jurists. And yet,\noddly enough, most of these distinctions have been misunderstood and\nthe whole purport of the discussion misconceived. Aristotle is here\ndealing with justice in a restricted sense viz as that special goodness\nof character which is required of every adult citizen and which can be\nproduced by early discipline or habituation. It is the temper or\nhabitual attitude demanded of the citizen for the due exercise of his\nfunctions as taking part in the administration of the civic\ncommunity\u2014as a member of the judicature and executive. The Greek\ncitizen was only exceptionally, and at rare intervals if ever, a\nlaw-maker while at any moment he might be called upon to act as a judge\n(juryman or arbitrator) or as an administrator. For the work of a\nlegislator far more than the moral virtue of justice or fairmindedness\nwas necessary, these were requisite to the rarer and higher\n\u201cintellectual virtue\u201d of practical wisdom. Then here, too, the\ndiscussion moves on a low level, and the raising of fundamental\nproblems is excluded. Hence \u201cdistributive justice\u201d is concerned not\nwith the large question of the distribution of political power and\nprivileges among the constituent members or classes of the state but\nwith the smaller questions of the distribution among those of casual\ngains and even with the division among private claimants of a common\nfund or inheritance, while \u201ccorrective justice\u201d is concerned solely\nwith the management of legal redress. The whole treatment is confused\nby the unhappy attempt to give a precise mathematical form to the\nprinciples of justice in the various fields distinguished. Still it\nremains an interesting first endeavour to give greater exactness to\nsome of the leading conceptions of jurisprudence.\n\nBook VI appears to have in view two aims: (1) to describe goodness of\nintellect and discover its highest form or forms; (2) to show how this\nis related to goodness of character, and so to conduct generally. As\nall thinking is either theoretical or practical, goodness of intellect\nhas _two_ supreme forms\u2014Theoretical and Practical Wisdom. The first,\nwhich apprehends the eternal laws of the universe, has no direct\nrelation to human conduct: the second is identical with that master\nscience of human life of which the whole treatise, consisting of the\n_Ethics_ and the _Politics_, is an exposition. It is this science which\nsupplies the right rules of conduct Taking them as they emerge in and\nfrom practical experience, it formulates them more precisely and\norganises them into a system where they are all seen to converge upon\nhappiness. The mode in which such knowledge manifests itself is in the\npower to show that such and such rules of action follow from the very\nnature of the end or good for man. It presupposes and starts from a\nclear conception of the end and the wish for it as conceived, and it\nproceeds by a deduction which is dehberation writ large. In the man of\npractical wisdom this process has reached its perfect result, and the\ncode of right rules is apprehended as a system with a single principle\nand so as something wholly rational or reasonable He has not on each\noccasion to seek and find the right rule applicable to the situation,\nhe produces it at once from within himself, and can at need justify it\nby exhibiting its rationale, _i.e._ , its connection with the end. This\nis the consummate form of reason applied to conduct, but there are\nminor forms of it, less independent or original, but nevertheless of\ngreat value, such as the power to think out the proper cause of policy\nin novel circumstances or the power to see the proper line of treatment\nto follow in a court of law.\n\nThe form of the thinking which enters into conduct is that which\nterminates in the production of a rule which declares some means to the\nend of life. The process presupposes _(a)_ a clear and just\napprehension of the nature of that end\u2014such as the _Ethics_ itself\nendeavours to supply; _(b)_ a correct perception of the conditions of\naction, _(a)_ at least is impossible except to a man whose character\nhas been duly formed by discipline; it arises only in a man who has\nacquired moral virtue. For such action and feeling as forms bad\ncharacter, blinds the eye of the soul and corrupts the moral principle,\nand the place of practical wisdom is taken by that parody of itself\nwhich Aristotle calls \u201ccleverness\u201d\u2014the \u201cwisdom\u201d of the unscrupulous man\nof the world. Thus true practical wisdom and true goodness of character\nare interdependent; neither is genuinely possible or \u201ccompletely\u201d\npresent without the other. This is Aristotle\u2019s contribution to the\ndiscussion of the question, so central in Greek Moral Philosophy, of\nthe relation of the intellectual and the passionate factors in conduct.\n\nAristotle is not an intuitionist, but he recognises the implication in\nconduct of a direct and immediate apprehension both of the end and of\nthe character of his circumstances under which it is from moment to\nmoment realised. The directness of such apprehension makes it analogous\nto sensation or sense-perception; but it is on his view in the end due\nto the existence or activity in man of that power in him which is the\nhighest thing in his nature, and akin to or identical with the divine\nnature\u2014mind, or intelligence. It is this which reveals to us what is\nbest for us\u2014the ideal of a happiness which is the object of our real\nwish and the goal of all our efforts. But beyond and above the\npractical ideal of what is best _for man_ begins to show itself another\nand still higher ideal\u2014that of a life not distinctively human or in a\nnarrow sense practical, yet capable of being participated in by man\neven under the actual circumstances of this world. For a time, however,\nthis further and higher ideal is ignored.\n\nThe next book (Book VII.), is concerned partly with moral conditions,\nin which the agent seems to rise above the level of moral virtue or\nfall below that of moral vice, but partly and more largely with\nconditions in which the agent occupies a middle position between the\ntwo. Aristotle\u2019s attention is here directed chiefly towards the\nphenomena of \u201cIncontinence,\u201d weakness of will or imperfect\nself-control. This condition was to the Greeks a matter of only too\nfrequent experience, but it appeared to them peculiarly difficult to\nunderstand. How can a man know what is good or best for him, and yet\nchronically fail to act upon his knowledge? Socrates was driven to the\nparadox of denying the possibility, but the facts are too strong for\nhim. Knowledge of the right rule may be present, nay the rightfulness\nof its authority may be acknowledged, and yet time after time it may be\ndisobeyed; the will may be good and yet overmastered by the force of\ndesire, so that the act done is contrary to the agent\u2019s will.\nNevertheless the act may be the agent\u2019s, and the will therefore divided\nagainst itself. Aristotle is aware of the seriousness and difficulty of\nthe problem, but in spite of the vividness with which he pictures, and\nthe acuteness with which he analyses, the situation in which such\naction occurs, it cannot be said that he solves the problem. It is time\nthat he rises above the abstract view of it as a conflict between\nreason and passion, recognising that passion is involved in the\nknowledge which in conduct prevails or is overborne, and that the force\nwhich leads to the wrong act is not blind or ignorant passion, but\nalways has some reason in it. But he tends to lapse back into the\nabstraction, and his final account is perplexed and obscure. He finds\nthe source of the phenomenon in the nature of the desire for bodily\npleasures, which is not irrational but has something rational in it.\nSuch pleasures are not necessarily or inherently bad, as has sometimes\nbeen maintained; on the contrary, they are good, but only in certain\namounts or under certain conditions, so that the will is often misled,\nhesitates, and is lost.\n\nBooks VIII. and IX. (on Friendship) are almost an interruption of the\nargument. The subject-matter of them was a favourite topic of ancient\nwriters, and the treatment is smoother and more orderly than elsewhere\nin the _Ethics_. The argument is clear, and may be left without comment\nto the readers. These books contain a necessary and attractive\ncomplement to the somewhat dry account of Greek morality in the\npreceding books, and there are in them profound reflections on what may\nbe called the metaphysics of friendship or love.\n\nAt the beginning of Book X. we return to the topic of Pleasure, which\nis now regarded from a different point of view. In Book VII. the\nantagonists were those who over-emphasised the irrationality or badness\nof Pleasure: here it is rather those who so exaggerate its value as to\nconfuse or identify it with the good or Happiness. But there is offered\nus in this section much more than criticism of the errors of others.\nAnswers are given both to the psychological question, \u201cWhat is\nPleasure?\u201d and to the ethical question, \u201cWhat is its value?\u201d Pleasure,\nwe are told, is the natural concomitant and index of perfect activity,\ndistinguishable but inseparable from it\u2014\u201cthe activity of a subject at\nits best acting upon an object at its best.\u201d It is therefore always and\nin itself a good, but its value rises and falls with that of the\nactivity with which it is conjoined, and which it intensifies and\nperfects. Hence it follows that the highest and best pleasures are\nthose which accompany the highest and best activity.\n\nPleasure is, therefore, a necessary element in the best life, but it is\nnot the whole of it nor the principal ingredient. The value of a life\ndepends upon the nature and worth of the activity which it involves;\ngiven the maximum of full free action, the maximum of pleasure\nnecessary follows. But on what sort of life is such activity possible?\nThis leads us back to the question, What is happiness? In what life can\nman find the fullest satisfaction for his desires? To this question\nAristotle gives an answer which cannot but surprise us after what has\npreceded. True Happiness, great satisfaction, cannot be found by man in\nany form of \u201cpractical\u201d life, no, not in the fullest and freest\nexercise possible of the \u201cmoral virtues,\u201d not in the life of the\ncitizen or of the great soldier or statesman. To seek it there is to\ncourt failure and disappointment. It is to be found in the life of the\nonlooker, the disinterested spectator; or, to put it more distinctly,\n\u201cin the life of the philosopher, the life of scientific and philosophic\ncontemplation.\u201d The highest and most satisfying form of life possible\nto man is \u201cthe contemplative life\u201d; it is only in a secondary sense and\nfor those incapable of their life, that the practical or moral ideal is\nthe best. It is time that such a life is not distinctively human, but\nit is the privilege of man to partake in it, and such participation, at\nhowever rare intervals and for however short a period, is the highest\nHappiness which human life can offer. All other activities have value\nonly because and in so far as they render _this_ life possible.\n\nBut it must not be forgotten that Aristotle conceives of this life as\none of intense activity or energising: it is just this which gives it\nits supremacy. In spite of the almost religious fervour with which he\nspeaks of it (\u201cthe most orthodox of his disciples\u201d paraphrases his\nmeaning by describing its content as \u201cthe service and vision of God\u201d),\nit is clear that he identified it with the life of the philosopher, as\nhe understood it, a life of ceaseless intellectual activity in which at\nleast at times all the distractions and disturbances inseparable from\npractical life seemed to disappear and become as nothing. This ideal\nwas partly an inheritance from the more ardent idealism of his master\nPlato, but partly it was the expression of personal experience.\n\nThe nobility of this ideal cannot be questioned; the conception of the\nend of man or a life lived for truth\u2014of a life blissfully absorbed in\nthe vision of truth\u2014is a lofty and inspiring one. But we cannot resist\ncertain criticisms upon its presentation by Aristotle: (1) the relation\nof it to the lower ideal of practice is left somewhat obscure; (2) it\nis described in such a way as renders its realisation possible only to\na gifted few, and under exceptional circumstances; (3) it seems in\nvarious ways, as regards its content, to be unnecessarily and\nunjustifiably limited. But it must be borne in mind that this is a\nfirst endeavour to determine its principle, and that similar failures\nhave attended the attempts to describe the \u201creligious\u201d or the\n\u201cspiritual\u201d ideals of life, which have continually been suggested by\nthe apparently inherent limitations of the \u201cpractical\u201d or \u201cmoral\u201d life,\nwhich is the subject of Moral Philosophy.\n\nThe Moral Ideal to those who have most deeply reflected on it leads to\nthe thought of an Ideal beyond and above it, which alone gives it\nmeaning, but which seems to escape from definite conception by man. The\nrichness and variety of this Ideal ceaselessly invite, but as\nceaselessly defy, our attempts to imprison it in a definite formula or\nportray it in detailed imagination. Yet the thought of it is and\nremains inexpungable from our minds.\n\nThis conception of the best life is not forgotten in the _Politics_ The\nend of life in the state is itself well-living and well-doing\u2014a life\nwhich helps to produce the best life The great agency in the production\nof such life is the State operating through Law, which is Reason backed\nby Force. For its greatest efficiency there is required the development\nof a science of legislation. The main drift of what he says here is\nthat the most desirable thing would be that the best reason of the\ncommunity should be embodied in its laws. But so far as that is not\npossible, it still is true that anyone who would make himself and\nothers better must become a miniature legislator\u2014must study the general\nprinciples of law, morality, and education. The conception of \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \nwith which he opened the _Ethics_ would serve as a guide to a father\neducating his children as well as to the legislator legislating for the\nstate. Finding in his predecessors no developed doctrine on this\nsubject, Aristotle proposes himself to undertake the construction of\nit, and sketches in advance the programme of the _Politics_ in the\nconcluding sentence of the _Ethics_ His ultimate object is to answer\nthe questions, What is the best form of Polity, how should each be\nconstituted, and what laws and customs should it adopt and employ? Not\ntill this answer is given will \u201cthe philosophy of human affairs\u201d be\ncomplete.\n\nOn looking back it will be seen that the discussion of the central\ntopic of the nature and formation of character has expanded into a\nPhilosophy of Human Conduct, merging at its beginning and end into\nmetaphysics The result is a Moral Philosophy set against a background\nof Political Theory and general Philosophy. The most characteristic\nfeatures of this Moral Philosophy are due to the fact of its\nessentially teleological view of human life and action: (1) Every human\nactivity, but especially every human practical activity, is directed\ntowards a simple End discoverable by reflection, and this End is\nconceived of as the object of universal human desire, as something to\nbe enjoyed, not as something which ought to be done or enacted.\nAnstotle\u2019s Moral Philosophy is not hedonistic but it is eud\u00e6momstic,\nthe end is the enjoyment of Happiness, not the fulfilment of Duty. (2)\nEvery human practical activity derives its value from its efficiency as\na means to that end, it is good or bad, right or wrong, as it conduces\nor fails to conduce to Happiness Thus his Moral Philosophy is\nessentially utilitarian or prudential Right action presupposes Thought\nor Thinking, partly on the development of a clearer and distincter\nconception of the end of desire, partly as the deduction from that of\nrules which state the normally effective conditions of its realisation.\nThe thinking involved in right conduct is calculation\u2014calculation of\nmeans to an end fixed by nature and foreknowable Action itself is at\nits best just the realisation of a scheme preconceived and thought out\nbeforehand, commending itself by its inherent attractiveness or promise\nof enjoyment.\n\nThis view has the great advantage of exhibiting morality as essentially\nreasonable, but the accompanying disadvantage of lowering it into a\nsomewhat prosaic and unideal Prudentialism, nor is it saved from this\nby the tacking on to it, by a sort of after-thought, of the second and\nhigher Ideal\u2014an addition which ruins the coherence of the account\nwithout really transmuting its substance The source of our\ndissatisfaction with the whole theory lies deeper than in its tendency\nto identify the end with the maximum of enjoyment or satisfaction, or\nto regard the goodness or badness of acts and feelings as lying solely\nin their efficacy to produce such a result It arises from the\napplication to morality of the distinction of means and end For this\ndistinction, for all its plausibility and usefulness in ordinary\nthought and speech, cannot finally be maintained In morality\u2014and this\nis vital to its character\u2014everything is both means and end, and so\nneither in distinction or separation, and all thinking about it which\npresupposes the finality of this distinction wanders into misconception\nand error. The thinking which really matters in conduct is not a\nthinking which imaginatively forecasts ideals which promise to fulfil\ndesire, or calculates means to their attainment\u2014that is sometimes\nuseful, sometimes harmful, and always subordinate, but thinking which\nreveals to the agent the situation in which he is to act, both, that\nis, the universal situation on which as man he always and everywhere\nstands, and the ever-varying and ever-novel situation in which he as\nthis individual, here and now, finds himself. In such knowledge of\ngiven or historic fact lie the natural determinants of his conduct, in\nsuch knowledge alone lies the condition of his freedom and his good.\n\nBut this does not mean that Moral Philosophy has not still much to\nlearn from Aristotle\u2019s _Ethics_. The work still remains one of the best\nintroductions to a study of its important subject-matter, it spreads\nbefore us a view of the relevant facts, it reduces them to manageable\ncompass and order, it raises some of the central problems, and makes\nacute and valuable suggestions towards their solution. Above all, it\nperpetually incites to renewed and independent reflection upon them.\n\nJ. A. SMITH\n\n The following is a list of the works of Aristotle:\u2014\n\nFirst edition of works (with omission of Rhetorica, Poetica, and second\nbook of Economica), 5 vols by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1495 8, re\nimpression supervised by Erasmus and with certain corrections by\nGrynaeus (including Rhetorica and Poetica), 1531, 1539, revised 1550,\nlater editions were followed by that of Immanuel Bekker and Brandis\n(Greek and Latin), 5 vols. The 5th vol contains the Index by Bomtz,\n1831-70, Didot edition (Greek and Latin), 5 vols 1848 74\n\nENGLISH TRANSLATIONS Edited by T Taylor, with Porphyry\u2019s Introduction,\n9 vols, 1812, under editorship of J A Smith and W D Ross, II vols,\n1908-31, Loeb editions Ethica, Rhetorica, Poetica, Physica, Politica,\nMetaphysica, 1926-33\n\nLater editions of separate works _De Anima_ Torstrik, 1862,\nTrendelenburg, 2nd edition, 1877, with English translation, L Wallace,\n1882, Biehl, 1884, 1896, with English, R D Hicks, 1907 _Ethica_ J S\nBrewer (Nicomachean), 1836, W E Jelf, 1856, J F T Rogers, 1865, A\nGrant, 1857 8, 1866, 1874, 1885, E Moore, 1871, 1878, 4th edition,\n1890, Ramsauer (Nicomachean), 1878, Susemihl, 1878, 1880, revised by O\nApelt, 1903, A Grant, 1885, I Bywater (Nicomachean), 1890, J Burnet,\n1900\n\n_Historia Animalium_ Schneider, 1812, Aubert and Wimmer, 1860;\nDittmeyer, 1907\n\n_Metaphysica_ Schwegler, 1848, W Christ, 1899\n\n_Organon_ Waitz, 1844 6\n\n_Poetica_ Vahlen, 1867, 1874, with Notes by E Moore, 1875, with English\ntranslation by E R Wharton, 1883, 1885, Uberweg, 1870, 1875, with\nGerman translation, Susemihl, 1874, Schmidt, 1875, Christ, 1878, I\nBywater, 1898, T G Tucker, 1899\n\n_De Republica Athenientium_ Text and facsimile of Papyrus, F G Kenyon,\n1891, 3rd edition, 1892, Kaibel and Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, 1891, 3rd\nedition, 1898, Van Herwerden and Leeuwen (from Kenyon\u2019s text), 1891,\nBlass, 1892, 1895, 1898, 1903, J E Sandys, 1893\n\n_Politica_ Susemihl, 1872, with German, 1878, 3rd edition, 1882,\nSusemihl and Hicks, 1894, etc, O Immisch, 1909\n\n_Physica_ C Prantl, 1879\n\n_Rhetorica_ Stahr, 1862, Sprengel (with Latin text), 1867, Cope and\nSandys, 1877, Roemer, 1885, 1898\n\nENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF ONE OR MORE WORKS De Anima (with Parva\nNaturalia), by W A Hammond, 1902 Ethica Of Morals to Nicomachus, by E\nPargiter, 1745, with Politica by J Gillies, 1797, 1804, 1813, with\nRhetorica and Poetica, by T Taylor, 1818, and later editions\nNicomachean Ethics, 1819, mainly from text of Bekker by D P Chase,\n1847, revised 1861, and later editions, with an introductory essay by G\nH Lewes (Camelot Classics) 1890, re-edited by J M Mitchell (New\nUniversal Library), 1906, 1910, by R W Browne (Bohn\u2019s Classical\nLibrary), 1848, etc, by R Williams, 1869, 1876, by W M Hatch and others\n(with translation of paraphrase attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes),\nedited by E Hatch, 1879 by F H Peters, 1881, J E C Welldon, 1892, J\nGillies (Lubbock\u2019s Hundred Books) 1893 Historia Animalium, by R\nCreswell (Bonn\u2019s Classical Library) 1848, with Treatise on Physiognomy,\nby T Taylor, 1809 Metaphysica, by T Taylor, 1801, by J H M Mahon\n(Bohn\u2019s Classical Library), 1848 Organon, with Porphyry\u2019s Introduction,\nby O F Owen (Bohn\u2019s Classical Library), 1848 Posterior Analytics, E\nPoste, 1850, E S Bourchier, 1901, On Fallacies, E Poste, 1866 Parva\nNaturaha (Greek and English), by G R T Ross, 1906, with De Anima, by W\nA Hammond, 1902 Youth and Old Age, Life and Death and Respiration, W\nOgle 1897 Poetica, with Notes from the French of D Acier, 1705, by H J\nPye, 1788, 1792, T Twining, 1789, 1812, with Preface and Notes by H\nHamilton, 1851, Treatise on Rhetorica and Poetica, by T Hobbes (Bohn\u2019s\nClassical Library), 1850, by Wharton, 1883 (see Greek version), S H\nButcher, 1895, 1898, 3rd edition, 1902, E S Bourchier, 1907, by Ingram\nBywater, 1909 De Partibus Animalium, W Ogle, 1882 De Republica\nAthenientium, by E Poste, 1891, F G Kenyon, 1891, T J Dymes, 1891 De\nVirtutibus et Vitus, by W Bridgman, 1804 Politica, from the French of\nRegius, 1598, by W Ellis, 1776, 1778, 1888 (Morley\u2019s Universal\nLibrary), 1893 (Lubbock\u2019s Hundred Books) by E Walford (with \u00c6conomics,\nand Life by Dr Gillies), (Bohn\u2019s Classical Library), 1848, J E. C.\nWelldon, 1883, B Jowett, 1885, with Introduction and Index by H W C\nDavis, 1905, Books i iii iv (vii) from Bekker\u2019s text by W E Bolland,\nwith Introduction by A Lang, 1877. Problemata (with writings of other\nphilosophers), 1597, 1607, 1680, 1684, etc. Rhetorica, A summary by T\nHobbes, 1655 (?), new edition, 1759, by the translators of the Art of\nThinking, 1686, 1816, by D M Crimmin, 1812, J Gillies, 1823, Anon 1847,\nJ E C Welldon, 1886, R C Jebb, with Introduction and Supplementary\nNotes by J E Sandys, 1909 (see under Poetica and Ethica). Secreta\nSecretorum (supposititious work), Anon 1702, from the Hebrew version by\nM Gaster, 1907, 1908. Version by Lydgate and Burgh, edited by R Steele\n(E E T S), 1894, 1898.\n\nLIFE, ETC J W Blakesley, 1839, A Crichton (Jardine\u2019s Naturalist\u2019s\nLibrary), 1843, JS Blackie, Four Phases of Morals, Socrates, Aristotle,\netc, 1871, G Grote, Aristotle, edited by A Bain and G C Robertson,\n1872, 1880, E Wallace, Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle, 1875,\n1880, A Grant (Ancient Classics for English readers), 1877, T Davidson,\nAristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals (Great Educators), 1892, F\nSewall, Swedenborg and Aristotle, 1895, W A Heidel, The Necessary and\nthe Contingent of the Aristotelian System (University of Chicago\nContributions to Philosophy), 1896, F W Bain, On the Realisation of the\nPossible, and the Spirit of Aristotle, 1899, J H Hyslop, The Ethics of\nthe Greek Philosophers, etc (Evolution of Ethics), 1903, M V Williams,\nSix Essays on the Platonic Theory of Knowledge as expounded in the\nlater dialogues and reviewed by Aristotle, 1908, J M Watson,\nAristotle\u2019s Criticism of Plato, 1909 A E Taylor, Aristotle, 1919, W D\nRoss, Aristotle, 1923.\n\n\n\n\nARISTOTLE\u2019S ETHICS\n\n\n\n\nBOOK I\n\nChapter I.\n\n\nEvery art, and every science reduced to a teachable form, and in like\nmanner every action and moral choice, aims, it is thought, at some\ngood: for which reason a common and by no means a bad description of\nthe Chief Good is, \u201cthat which all things aim at.\u201d\n\nNow there plainly is a difference in the Ends proposed: for in some\ncases they are acts of working, and in others certain works or tangible\nresults beyond and beside the acts of working: and where there are\ncertain Ends beyond and beside the actions, the works are in their\nnature better than the acts of working. Again, since actions and arts\nand sciences are many, the Ends likewise come to be many: of the\nhealing art, for instance, health; of the ship-building art, a vessel;\nof the military art, victory; and of domestic management, wealth; are\nrespectively the Ends.\n\nAnd whatever of such actions, arts, or sciences range under some one\nfaculty (as under that of horsemanship the art of making bridles, and\nall that are connected with the manufacture of horse-furniture in\ngeneral; this itself again, and every action connected with war, under\nthe military art; and in the same way others under others), in all\nsuch, the Ends of the master-arts are more choice-worthy than those\nranging under them, because it is with a view to the former that the\nlatter are pursued.\n\n(And in this comparison it makes no difference whether the acts of\nworking are themselves the Ends of the actions, or something further\nbeside them, as is the case in the arts and sciences we have been just\nspeaking of.)\n\nSince then of all things which may be done there is some one End which\nwe desire for its own sake, and with a view to which we desire\neverything else; and since we do not choose in all instances with a\nfurther End in view (for then men would go on without limit, and so the\ndesire would be unsatisfied and fruitless), this plainly must be the\nChief Good, _i.e._ the best thing of all.\n\nSurely then, even with reference to actual life and conduct, the\nknowledge of it must have great weight; and like archers, with a mark\nin view, we shall be more likely to hit upon what is right: and if so,\nwe ought to try to describe, in outline at least, what it is and of\nwhich of the sciences and faculties it is the End.\n\nNow one would naturally suppose it to be the End of that which is most\ncommanding and most inclusive: and to this description, \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74[1]\nplainly answers: for this it is that determines which of the sciences\nshould be in the communities, and which kind individuals are to learn,\nand what degree of proficiency is to be required. Again; we see also\nranging under this the most highly esteemed faculties, such as the art\nmilitary, and that of domestic management, and Rhetoric. Well then,\nsince this uses all the other practical sciences, and moreover lays\ndown rules as to what men are to do, and from what to abstain, the End\nof this must include the Ends of the rest, and so must be The Good of\nMan. And grant that this is the same to the individual and to the\ncommunity, yet surely that of the latter is plainly greater and more\nperfect to discover and preserve: for to do this even for a single\nindividual were a matter for contentment; but to do it for a whole\nnation, and for communities generally, were more noble and godlike.\n\nSuch then are the objects proposed by our treatise, which is of the\nnature of \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74: and I conceive I shall have spoken on them\nsatisfactorily, if they be made as distinctly clear as the nature of\nthe subject-matter will admit: for exactness must not be looked for in\nall discussions alike, any more than in all works of handicraft. Now\nthe notions of nobleness and justice, with the examination of which\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 is concerned, admit of variation and error to such a degree,\nthat they are supposed by some to exist conventionally only, and not in\nthe nature of things: but then, again, the things which are allowed to\nbe goods admit of a similar error, because harm comes to many from\nthem: for before now some have perished through wealth, and others\nthrough valour.\n\nWe must be content then, in speaking of such things and from such data,\nto set forth the truth roughly and in outline; in other words, since we\nare speaking of general matter and from general data, to draw also\nconclusions merely general. And in the same spirit should each person\nreceive what we say: for the man of education will seek exactness so\nfar in each subject as the nature of the thing admits, it being plainly\nmuch the same absurdity to put up with a mathematician who tries to\npersuade instead of proving, and to demand strict demonstrative\nreasoning of a Rhetorician.\n\nNow each man judges well what he knows, and of these things he is a\ngood judge: on each particular matter then he is a good judge who has\nbeen instructed in _it_, and in a general way the man of general mental\ncultivation.[2]\n\nHence the young man is not a fit student of Moral Philosophy, for he\nhas no experience in the actions of life, while all that is said\npresupposes and is concerned with these: and in the next place, since\nhe is apt to follow the impulses of his passions, he will hear as\nthough he heard not, and to no profit, the end in view being practice\nand not mere knowledge.\n\nAnd I draw no distinction between young in years, and youthful in\ntemper and disposition: the defect to which I allude being no direct\nresult of the time, but of living at the beck and call of passion, and\nfollowing each object as it rises.[3] For to them that are such the\nknowledge comes to be unprofitable, as to those of imperfect\nself-control: but, to those who form their desires and act in\naccordance with reason, to have knowledge on these points must be very\nprofitable.\n\nLet thus much suffice by way of preface on these three points, the\nstudent, the spirit in which our observations should be received, and\nthe object which we propose.\n\nChapter II.\n\nAnd now, resuming the statement with which we commenced, since all\nknowledge and moral choice grasps at good of some kind or another, what\ngood is that which we say \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 aims at? or, in other words, what is\nthe highest of all the goods which are the objects of action?\n\nSo far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement: for HAPPINESS\nboth the multitude and the refined few call it, and \u201cliving well\u201d and\n\u201cdoing well\u201d they conceive to be the same with \u201cbeing happy;\u201d but about\nthe Nature of this Happiness, men dispute, and the multitude do not in\ntheir account of it agree with the wise. For some say it is some one of\nthose things which are palpable and apparent, as pleasure or wealth or\nhonour; in fact, some one thing, some another; nay, oftentimes the same\nman gives a different account of it; for when ill, he calls it health;\nwhen poor, wealth: and conscious of their own ignorance, men admire\nthose who talk grandly and above their comprehension. Some again held\nit to be something by itself, other than and beside these many good\nthings, which is in fact to all these the cause of their being good.\n\nNow to sift all the opinions would be perhaps rather a fruitless task;\nso it shall suffice to sift those which are most generally current, or\nare thought to have some reason in them.\n\nAnd here we must not forget the difference between reasoning from\nprinciples, and reasoning to principles: for with good cause did Plato\ntoo doubt about this, and enquire whether the right road is from\nprinciples or to principles, just as in the racecourse from the judges\nto the further end, or _vice vers\u00e2_.\n\nOf course, we must begin with what is known; but then this is of two\nkinds, what we _do_ know, and what we _may_ know:[5] perhaps then as\nindividuals we must begin with what we _do_ know. Hence the necessity\nthat he should have been well trained in habits, who is to study, with\nany tolerable chance of profit, the principles of nobleness and justice\nand moral philosophy generally. For a principle is a matter of fact,\nand if the fact is sufficiently clear to a man there will be no need in\naddition of the reason for the fact. And he that has been thus trained\neither has principles already, or can receive them easily: as for him\nwho neither has nor can receive them, let him hear his sentence from\nHesiod:\n\nHe is best of all who of himself conceiveth all things;\nGood again is he too who can adopt a good suggestion;\nBut whoso neither of himself conceiveth nor hearing from another\nLayeth it to heart;\u2014he is a useless man.\n\nChapter III.\n\nBut to return from this digression.\n\nNow of the Chief Good (_i.e._ of Happiness) men seem to form their\nnotions from the different modes of life, as we might naturally expect:\nthe many and most low conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they are\ncontent with the life of sensual enjoyment. For there are three lines\nof life which stand out prominently to view: that just mentioned, and\nthe life in society, and, thirdly, the life of contemplation.\n\nNow the many are plainly quite slavish, choosing a life like that of\nbrute animals: yet they obtain some consideration, because many of the\ngreat share the tastes of Sardanapalus. The refined and active again\nconceive it to be honour: for this may be said to be the end of the\nlife in society: yet it is plainly too superficial for the object of\nour search, because it is thought to rest with those who pay rather\nthan with him who receives it, whereas the Chief Good we feel\ninstinctively must be something which is our own, and not easily to be\ntaken from us.\n\nAnd besides, men seem to pursue honour, that they may believe\nthemselves to be good:[6] for instance, they seek to be honoured by the\nwise, and by those among whom they are known, and for virtue: clearly\nthen, in the opinion at least of these men, virtue is higher than\nhonour. In truth, one would be much more inclined to think this to be\nthe end of the life in society; yet this itself is plainly not\nsufficiently final: for it is conceived possible, that a man possessed\nof virtue might sleep or be inactive all through his life, or, as a\nthird case, suffer the greatest evils and misfortunes: and the man who\nshould live thus no one would call happy, except for mere disputation\u2019s\nsake.[7]\n\nAnd for these let thus much suffice, for they have been treated of at\nsufficient length in my Encyclia.[8]\n\nA third line of life is that of contemplation, concerning which we\nshall make our examination in the following pages.[9]\n\nAs for the life of money-making, it is one of constraint, and wealth\nmanifestly is not the good we are seeking, because it is for use, that\nis, for the sake of something further: and hence one would rather\nconceive the forementioned ends to be the right ones, for men rest\ncontent with them for their own sakes. Yet, clearly, they are not the\nobjects of our search either, though many words have been wasted on\nthem.[10] So much then for these.\n\nAgain, the notion of one Universal Good (the same, that is, in all\nthings), it is better perhaps we should examine, and discuss the\nmeaning of it, though such an enquiry is unpleasant, because they are\nfriends of ours who have introduced these \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7.[11] Still perhaps it\nmay appear better, nay to be our duty where the safety of the truth is\nconcerned, to upset if need be even our own theories, specially as we\nare lovers of wisdom: for since both are dear to us, we are bound to\nprefer the truth. Now they who invented this doctrine of \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7, did not\napply it to those things in which they spoke of priority and\nposteriority, and so they never made any \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1 of numbers; but good is\npredicated in the categories of Substance, Quality, and Relation; now\nthat which exists of itself, i.e. Substance, is prior in the nature of\nthings to that which is relative, because this latter is an off-shoot,\nas it were, and result of that which is; on their own principle then\nthere cannot be a common \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1 in the case of these.\n\nIn the next place, since good is predicated in as many ways as there\nare modes of existence [for it is predicated in the category of\nSubstance, as God, Intellect\u2014and in that of Quality, as The Virtues\u2014and\nin that of Quantity, as The Mean\u2014and in that of Relation, as The\nUseful\u2014and in that of Time, as Opportunity\u2014and in that of Place, as\nAbode; and other such like things], it manifestly cannot be something\ncommon and universal and one in all: else it would not have been\npredicated in all the categories, but in one only.\n\nThirdly, since those things which range under one \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1 are also under\nthe cognisance of one science, there would have been, on their theory,\nonly one science taking cognisance of all goods collectively: but in\nfact there are many even for those which range under one category: for\ninstance, of Opportunity or Seasonableness (which I have before\nmentioned as being in the category of Time), the science is, in war,\ngeneralship; in disease, medical science; and of the Mean (which I\nquoted before as being in the category of Quantity), in food, the\nmedical science; and in labour or exercise, the gymnastic science. A\nperson might fairly doubt also what in the world they mean by very-this\nthat or the other, since, as they would themselves allow, the account\nof the humanity is one and the same in the very-Man, and in any\nindividual Man: for so far as the individual and the very-Man are both\nMan, they will not differ at all: and if so, then very-good and any\nparticular good will not differ, in so far as both are good. Nor will\nit do to say, that the eternity of the very-good makes it to be more\ngood; for what has lasted white ever so long, is no whiter than what\nlasts but for a day.\n\nNo. The Pythagoreans do seem to give a more credible account of the\nmatter, who place \u201cOne\u201d among the goods in their double list of goods\nand bads:[12] which philosophers, in fact, Speusippus[13] seems to have\nfollowed.\n\nBut of these matters let us speak at some other time. Now there is\nplainly a loophole to object to what has been advanced, on the plea\nthat the theory I have attacked is not by its advocates applied to all\ngood: but those goods only are spoken of as being under one \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1, which\nare pursued, and with which men rest content simply for their own\nsakes: whereas those things which have a tendency to produce or\npreserve them in any way, or to hinder their contraries, are called\ngood because of these other goods, and after another fashion. It is\nmanifest then that the goods may be so called in two senses, the one\nclass for their own sakes, the other because of these.\n\nVery well then, let us separate the independent goods from the\ninstrumental, and see whether they are spoken of as under one \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1.\nBut the question next arises, what kind of goods are we to call\nindependent? All such as are pursued even when separated from other\ngoods, as, for instance, being wise, seeing, and certain pleasures and\nhonours (for these, though we do pursue them with some further end in\nview, one would still place among the independent goods)? or does it\ncome in fact to this, that we can call nothing independent good except\nthe \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1, and so the concrete of it will be nought?\n\nIf, on the other hand, these are independent goods, then we shall\nrequire that the account of the goodness be the same clearly in all,\njust as that of the whiteness is in snow and white lead. But how stands\nthe fact? Why of honour and wisdom and pleasure the accounts are\ndistinct and different in so far as they are good. The Chief Good then\nis not something common, and after one \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1.\n\nBut then, how does the name come to be common (for it is not seemingly\na case of fortuitous equivocation)? Are different individual things\ncalled good by virtue of being from one source, or all conducing to one\nend, or rather by way of analogy, for that intellect is to the soul as\nsight to the body, and so on? However, perhaps we ought to leave these\nquestions now, for an accurate investigation of them is more properly\nthe business of a different philosophy. And likewise respecting the\n\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1: for even if there is some one good predicated in common of all\nthings that are good, or separable and capable of existing\nindependently, manifestly it cannot be the object of human action or\nattainable by Man; but we are in search now of something that is\nso.[14]\n\nIt may readily occur to any one, that it would be better to attain a\nknowledge of it with a view to such concrete goods as are attainable\nand practical, because, with this as a kind of model in our hands, we\nshall the better know what things are good for us individually, and\nwhen we know them, we shall attain them.\n\nSome plausibility, it is true, this argument possesses, but it is\ncontradicted by the facts of the Arts and Sciences; for all these,\nthough aiming at some good, and seeking that which is deficient, yet\npretermit the knowledge of it: now it is not exactly probable that all\nartisans without exception should be ignorant of so great a help as\nthis would be, and not even look after it; neither is it easy to see\nwherein a weaver or a carpenter will be profited in respect of his\ncraft by knowing the very-good, or how a man will be the more apt to\neffect cures or to command an army for having seen the \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1 itself. For\nmanifestly it is not health after this general and abstract fashion\nwhich is the subject of the physician\u2019s investigation, but the health\nof Man, or rather perhaps of this or that man; for he has to heal\nindividuals.\u2014Thus much on these points.\n\nChapter IV.\n\nAnd now let us revert to the Good of which we are in search: what can\nit be? for manifestly it is different in different actions and arts:\nfor it is different in the healing art and in the art military, and\nsimilarly in the rest. What then is the Chief Good in each? Is it not\n\u201cthat for the sake of which the other things are done?\u201d and this in the\nhealing art is health, and in the art military victory, and in that of\nhouse-building a house, and in any other thing something else; in\nshort, in every action and moral choice the End, because in all cases\nmen do everything else with a view to this. So that if there is some\none End of all things which are and may be done, this must be the Good\nproposed by doing, or if more than one, then these.\n\nThus our discussion after some traversing about has come to the same\npoint which we reached before. And this we must try yet more to clear\nup.\n\nNow since the ends are plainly many, and of these we choose some with a\nview to others (wealth, for instance, musical instruments, and, in\ngeneral, all instruments), it is clear that all are not final: but the\nChief Good is manifestly something final; and so, if there is some one\nonly which is final, this must be the object of our search: but if\nseveral, then the most final of them will be it.\n\nNow that which is an object of pursuit in itself we call more final\nthan that which is so with a view to something else; that again which\nis never an object of choice with a view to something else than those\nwhich are so both in themselves and with a view to this ulterior\nobject: and so by the term \u201cabsolutely final,\u201d we denote that which is\nan object of choice always in itself, and never with a view to any\nother.\n\nAnd of this nature Happiness is mostly thought to be, for this we\nchoose always for its own sake, and never with a view to anything\nfurther: whereas honour, pleasure, intellect, in fact every excellence\nwe choose for their own sakes, it is true (because we would choose each\nof these even if no result were to follow), but we choose them also\nwith a view to happiness, conceiving that through their instrumentality\nwe shall be happy: but no man chooses happiness with a view to them,\nnor in fact with a view to any other thing whatsoever.\n\nThe same result[15] is seen to follow also from the notion of\nself-sufficiency, a quality thought to belong to the final good. Now by\nsufficient for Self, we mean not for a single individual living a\nsolitary life, but for his parents also and children and wife, and, in\ngeneral, friends and countrymen; for man is by nature adapted to a\nsocial existence. But of these, of course, some limit must be fixed:\nfor if one extends it to parents and descendants and friends\u2019 friends,\nthere is no end to it. This point, however, must be left for future\ninvestigation: for the present we define that to be self-sufficient\n\u201cwhich taken alone makes life choice-worthy, and to be in want of\nnothing;\u201d now of such kind we think Happiness to be: and further, to be\nmost choice-worthy of all things; not being reckoned with any other\nthing,[16] for if it were so reckoned, it is plain we must then allow\nit, with the addition of ever so small a good, to be more choice-worthy\nthan it was before:[17] because what is put to it becomes an addition of so\nmuch more good, and of goods the greater is ever the more\nchoice-worthy.\n\nSo then Happiness is manifestly something final and self-sufficient,\nbeing the end of all things which are and may be done.\n\nChapter V.\n\nBut, it may be, to call Happiness the Chief Good is a mere truism, and\nwhat is wanted is some clearer account of its real nature. Now this\nobject may be easily attained, when we have discovered what is the work\nof man; for as in the case of flute-player, statuary, or artisan of any\nkind, or, more generally, all who have any work or course of action,\ntheir Chief Good and Excellence is thought to reside in their work, so\nit would seem to be with man, if there is any work belonging to him.\n\nAre we then to suppose, that while carpenter and cobbler have certain\nworks and courses of action, Man as Man has none, but is left by Nature\nwithout a work? or would not one rather hold, that as eye, hand, and\nfoot, and generally each of his members, has manifestly some special\nwork; so too the whole Man, as distinct from all these, has some work\nof his own?[18]\n\nWhat then can this be? not mere life, because that plainly is shared\nwith him even by vegetables, and we want what is peculiar to him. We\nmust separate off then the life of mere nourishment and growth, and\nnext will come the life of sensation: but this again manifestly is\ncommon to horses, oxen, and every animal. There remains then a kind of\nlife of the Rational Nature apt to act: and of this Nature there are\ntwo parts denominated Rational, the one as being obedient to Reason,\nthe other as having and exerting it. Again, as this life is also spoken\nof in two ways,[19] we must take that which is in the way of actual\nworking, because this is thought to be most properly entitled to the\nname. If then the work of Man is a working of the soul in accordance\nwith reason, or at least not independently of reason, and we say that\nthe work of any given subject, and of that subject good of its kind,\nare the same in kind (as, for instance, of a harp-player and a good\nharp-player, and so on in every case, adding to the work eminence in\nthe way of excellence; I mean, the work of a harp-player is to play the\nharp, and of a good harp-player to play it well); if, I say, this is\nso, and we assume the work of Man to be life of a certain kind, that is\nto say a working of the soul, and actions with reason, and of a good\nman to do these things well and nobly, and in fact everything is\nfinished off well in the way of the excellence which peculiarly belongs\nto it: if all this is so, then the Good of Man comes to be \u201ca working\nof the Soul in the way of Excellence,\u201d or, if Excellence admits of\ndegrees, in the way of the best and most perfect Excellence.\n\nAnd we must add, \u1f10\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u1ff3;[20] for as it is not one swallow or one\nfine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that\nmakes a man blessed and happy.\n\nLet this then be taken for a rough sketch of the Chief Good: since it\nis probably the right way to give first the outline, and fill it in\nafterwards. And it would seem that any man may improve and connect what\nis good in the sketch, and that time is a good discoverer and\nco-operator in such matters: it is thus in fact that all improvements\nin the various arts have been brought about, for any man may fill up a\ndeficiency.\n\nYou must remember also what has been already stated, and not seek for\nexactness in all matters alike, but in each according to the\nsubject-matter, and so far as properly belongs to the system. The\ncarpenter and geometrician, for instance, enquire into the right line\nin different fashion: the former so far as he wants it for his work,\nthe latter enquires into its nature and properties, because he is\nconcerned with the truth.\n\nSo then should one do in other matters, that the incidental matters may\nnot exceed the direct ones.\n\nAnd again, you must not demand the reason either in all things\nalike,[21] because in some it is sufficient that the fact has been well\ndemonstrated, which is the case with first principles; and the fact is\nthe first step, _i.e._ starting-point or principle.\n\nAnd of these first principles some are obtained by induction, some by\nperception,[22] some by a course of habituation, others in other\ndifferent ways. And we must try to trace up each in their own nature,\nand take pains to secure their being well defined, because they have\ngreat influence on what follows: it is thought, I mean, that the\nstarting-point or principle is more than half the whole matter, and\nthat many of the points of enquiry come simultaneously into view\nthereby.\n\nChapter VI.\n\nWe must now enquire concerning Happiness, not only from our conclusion\nand the data on which our reasoning proceeds, but likewise from what is\ncommonly said about it: because with what is true all things which\nreally are are in harmony, but with that which is false the true very\nsoon jars.\n\nNow there is a common division of goods into three classes; one being\ncalled external, the other two those of the soul and body respectively,\nand those belonging to the soul we call most properly and specially\ngood. Well, in our definition we assume that the actions and workings\nof the soul constitute Happiness, and these of course belong to the\nsoul. And so our account is a good one, at least according to this\nopinion, which is of ancient date, and accepted by those who profess\nphilosophy. Rightly too are certain actions and workings said to be the\nend, for thus it is brought into the number of the goods of the soul\ninstead of the external. Agreeing also with our definition is the\ncommon notion, that the happy man lives well and does well, for it has\nbeen stated by us to be pretty much a kind of living well and doing\nwell.\n\nAnd further, the points required in Happiness are found in combination\nin our account of it.\n\nFor some think it is virtue, others practical wisdom, others a kind of\nscientific philosophy; others that it is these, or else some one of\nthem, in combination with pleasure, or at least not independently of\nit; while others again take in external prosperity.\n\nOf these opinions, some rest on the authority of numbers or antiquity,\nothers on that of few, and those men of note: and it is not likely that\neither of these classes should be wrong in all points, but be right at\nleast in some one, or even in most.\n\nNow with those who assert it to be Virtue (Excellence), or some kind of\nVirtue, our account agrees: for working in the way of Excellence surely\nbelongs to Excellence.\n\nAnd there is perhaps no unimportant difference between conceiving of\nthe Chief Good as in possession or as in use, in other words, as a mere\nstate or as a working. For the state or habit[23] may possibly exist in\na subject without effecting any good, as, for instance, in him who is\nasleep, or in any other way inactive; but the working cannot so, for it\nwill of necessity act, and act well. And as at the Olympic games it is\nnot the finest and strongest men who are crowned, but they who enter\nthe lists, for out of these the prize-men are selected; so too in life,\nof the honourable and the good, it is they who act who rightly win the\nprizes.[24]\n\nTheir life too is in itself pleasant: for the feeling of pleasure is a\nmental sensation, and that is to each pleasant of which he is said to\nbe fond: a horse, for instance, to him who is fond of horses, and a\nsight to him who is fond of sights: and so in like manner just acts to\nhim who is fond of justice, and more generally the things in accordance\nwith virtue to him who is fond of virtue. Now in the case of the\nmultitude of men the things which they individually esteem pleasant\nclash, because they are not such by nature, whereas to the lovers of\nnobleness those things are pleasant which are such by nature: but the\nactions in accordance with virtue are of this kind, so that they are\npleasant both to the individuals and also in themselves.\n\nSo then their life has no need of pleasure as a kind of additional\nappendage, but involves pleasure in itself. For, besides what I have\njust mentioned, a man is not a good man at all who feels no pleasure in\nnoble actions,[25] just as no one would call that man just who does not\nfeel pleasure in acting justly, or liberal who does not in liberal\nactions, and similarly in the case of the other virtues which might be\nenumerated: and if this be so, then the actions in accordance with\nvirtue must be in themselves pleasurable. Then again they are certainly\ngood and noble, and each of these in the highest degree; if we are to\ntake as right the judgment of the good man, for he judges as we have\nsaid.\n\nThus then Happiness is most excellent, most noble, and most pleasant,\nand these attributes are not separated as in the well-known Delian\ninscription\u2014\n\n\u201cMost noble is that which is most just, but best is health;\nAnd naturally most pleasant is the obtaining one\u2019s desires.\u201d\n\n\nFor all these co-exist in the best acts of working: and we say that\nHappiness is these, or one, that is, the best of them.\n\nStill[26] it is quite plain that it does require the addition of\nexternal goods, as we have said: because without appliances it is\nimpossible, or at all events not easy, to do noble actions: for\nfriends, money, and political influence are in a manner instruments\nwhereby many things are done: some things there are again a deficiency\nin which mars blessedness; good birth, for instance, or fine offspring,\nor even personal beauty: for he is not at all capable of Happiness who\nis very ugly, or is ill-born, or solitary and childless; and still less\nperhaps supposing him to have very bad children or friends, or to have\nlost good ones by death. As we have said already, the addition of\nprosperity of this kind does seem necessary to complete the idea of\nHappiness; hence some rank good fortune, and others virtue, with\nHappiness.\n\nChapter VII.\n\nAnd hence too a question is raised, whether it is a thing that can be\nlearned, or acquired by habituation or discipline of some other kind,\nor whether it comes in the way of divine dispensation, or even in the\nway of chance.\n\nNow to be sure, if anything else is a gift of the Gods to men, it is\nprobable that Happiness is a gift of theirs too, and specially because\nof all human goods it is the highest. But this, it may be, is a\nquestion belonging more properly to an investigation different from\nours:[27] and it is quite clear, that on the supposition of its not\nbeing sent from the Gods direct, but coming to us by reason of virtue\nand learning of a certain kind, or discipline, it is yet one of the\nmost Godlike things; because the prize and End of virtue is manifestly\nsomewhat most excellent, nay divine and blessed.\n\nIt will also on this supposition be widely participated, for it may\nthrough learning and diligence of a certain kind exist in all who have\nnot been maimed[28] for virtue.\n\nAnd if it is better we should be happy thus than as a result of chance,\nthis is in itself an argument that the case is so; because those things\nwhich are in the way of nature, and in like manner of art, and of every\ncause, and specially the best cause, are by nature in the best way\npossible: to leave them to chance what is greatest and most noble would\nbe very much out of harmony with all these facts.[29]\n\nThe question may be determined also by a reference to our definition of\nHappiness, that it is a working of the soul in the way of excellence or\nvirtue of a certain kind: and of the other goods, some we must have to\nbegin with, and those which are co-operative and useful are given by\nnature as instruments.[30]\n\nThese considerations will harmonise also with what we said at the\ncommencement: for we assumed the End of \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 to be most excellent:\nnow this bestows most care on making the members of the community of a\ncertain character; good that is and apt to do what is honourable.\n\nWith good reason then neither ox nor horse nor any other brute animal\ndo we call happy, for none of them can partake in such working: and for\nthis same reason a child is not happy either, because by reason of his\ntender age he cannot yet perform such actions: if the term is applied,\nit is by way of anticipation.\n\nFor to constitute Happiness, there must be, as we have said, complete\nvirtue and a complete life: for many changes and chances of all kinds\narise during a life, and he who is most prosperous may become involved\nin great misfortunes in his old age, as in the heroic poems the tale is\ntold of Priam: but the man who has experienced such fortune and died in\nwretchedness, no man calls happy.\n\nChapter VIII.\n\nAre we then to call no man happy while he lives, and, as Solon would\nhave us, look to the end? And again, if we are to maintain this\nposition, is a man then happy when he is dead? or is not this a\ncomplete absurdity, specially in us who say Happiness is a working of a\ncertain kind?\n\nIf on the other hand we do not assert that the dead man is happy, and\nSolon does not mean this, but only that one would then be safe in\npronouncing a man happy, as being thenceforward out of the reach of\nevils and misfortunes, this too admits of some dispute, since it is\nthought that the dead has somewhat both of good and evil (if, as we\nmust allow, a man may have when alive but not aware of the\ncircumstances), as honour and dishonour, and good and bad fortune of\nchildren and descendants generally.\n\nNor is this view again without its difficulties: for, after a man has\nlived in blessedness to old age and died accordingly, many changes may\nbefall him in right of his descendants; some of them may be good and\nobtain positions in life accordant to their merits, others again quite\nthe contrary: it is plain too that the descendants may at different\nintervals or grades stand in all manner of relations to the\nancestors.[31] Absurd indeed would be the position that even the dead\nman is to change about with them and become at one time happy and at\nanother miserable. Absurd however it is on the other hand that the\naffairs of the descendants should in no degree and during no time\naffect the ancestors.\n\nBut we must revert to the point first raised,[32] since the present\nquestion will be easily determined from that.\n\nIf then we are to look to the end and then pronounce the man blessed,\nnot as being so but as having been so at some previous time, surely it\nis absurd that when he _is_ happy the truth is not to be asserted of\nhim, because we are unwilling to pronounce the living happy by reason\nof their liability to changes, and because, whereas we have conceived\nof happiness as something stable and no way easily changeable, the fact\nis that good and bad fortune are constantly circling about the same\npeople: for it is quite plain, that if we are to depend upon the\nfortunes of men, we shall often have to call the same man happy, and a\nlittle while after miserable, thus representing our happy man,\n\n\u201cChameleon-like, and based on rottenness.\u201d\n\n\nIs not this the solution? that to make our sentence dependent on the\nchanges of fortune, is no way right: for not in them stands the well,\nor the ill, but though human life needs these as accessories (which we\nhave allowed already), the workings in the way of virtue are what\ndetermine Happiness, and the contrary the contrary.\n\nAnd, by the way, the question which has been here discussed, testifies\nincidentally to the truth of our account of Happiness.[33] For to\nnothing does a stability of human results attach so much as it does to\nthe workings in the way of virtue, since these are held to be more\nabiding even than the sciences: and of these last again[34] the most\nprecious are the most abiding, because the blessed live in them most\nand most continuously, which seems to be the reason why they are not\nforgotten. So then this stability which is sought will be in the happy\nman, and he will be such through life, since always, or most of all, he\nwill be doing and contemplating the things which are in the way of\nvirtue: and the various chances of life he will bear most nobly, and at\nall times and in all ways harmoniously, since he is the truly good man,\nor in the terms of our proverb \u201ca faultless cube.\u201d\n\nAnd whereas the incidents of chance are many, and differ in greatness\nand smallness, the small pieces of good or ill fortune evidently do not\naffect the balance of life, but the great and numerous, if happening\nfor good, will make life more blessed (for it is their nature to\ncontribute to ornament, and the using of them comes to be noble and\nexcellent), but if for ill, they bruise as it were and maim the\nblessedness: for they bring in positive pain, and hinder many acts of\nworking. But still, even in these, nobleness shines through when a man\nbears contentedly many and great mischances not from insensibility to\npain but because he is noble and high-spirited.\n\nAnd if, as we have said, the acts of working are what determine the\ncharacter of the life, no one of the blessed can ever become wretched,\nbecause he will never do those things which are hateful and mean. For\nthe man who is truly good and sensible bears all fortunes, we presume,\nbecomingly, and always does what is noblest under the circumstances,\njust as a good general employs to the best advantage the force he has\nwith him; or a good shoemaker makes the handsomest shoe he can out of\nthe leather which has been given him; and all other good artisans\nlikewise. And if this be so, wretched never can the happy man come to\nbe: I do not mean to say he will be blessed should he fall into\nfortunes like those of Priam.\n\nNor, in truth, is he shifting and easily changeable, for on the one\nhand from his happiness he will not be shaken easily nor by ordinary\nmischances, but, if at all, by those which are great and numerous; and,\non the other, after such mischances he cannot regain his happiness in a\nlittle time; but, if at all, in a long and complete period, during\nwhich he has made himself master of great and noble things.\n\nWhy then should we not call happy the man who works in the way of\nperfect virtue, and is furnished with external goods sufficient for\nacting his part in the drama of life:[35] and this during no ordinary\nperiod but such as constitutes a complete life as we have been\ndescribing it.\n\nOr we must add, that not only is he to live so, but his death must be\nin keeping with such life, since the future is dark to us, and\nHappiness we assume to be in every way an end and complete. And, if\nthis be so, we shall call them among the living blessed who have and\nwill have the things specified, but blessed _as Men_.[36]\n\nOn these points then let it suffice to have denned thus much.\n\nChapter IX.\n\nNow that the fortunes of their descendants, and friends generally,\ncontribute nothing towards forming the condition of the dead, is\nplainly a very heartless notion, and contrary to the current opinions.\n\nBut since things which befall are many, and differ in all kinds of\nways, and some touch more nearly, others less, to go into minute\nparticular distinctions would evidently be a long and endless task: and\nso it may suffice to speak generally and in outline.\n\nIf then, as of the misfortunes which happen to one\u2019s self, some have a\ncertain weight and turn the balance of life, while others are, so to\nspeak, lighter; so it is likewise with those which befall all our\nfriends alike; if further, whether they whom each suffering befalls be\nalive or dead makes much more difference than in a tragedy the\npresupposing or actual perpetration of the various crimes and horrors,\nwe must take into our account this difference also, and still more\nperhaps the doubt concerning the dead whether they really partake of\nany good or evil; it seems to result from all these considerations,\nthat if anything does pierce the veil and reach them, be the same good\nor bad, it must be something trivial and small, either in itself or to\nthem; or at least of such a magnitude or such a kind as neither to make\nhappy them that are not so otherwise, nor to deprive of their\nblessedness them that are.[37]\n\nIt is plain then that the good or ill fortunes of their friends do\naffect the dead somewhat: but in such kind and degree as neither to\nmake the happy unhappy nor produce any other such effect.\n\nChapter X.\n\nHaving determined these points, let us examine with respect to\nHappiness, whether it belongs to the class of things praiseworthy or\nthings precious; for to that of faculties[38] it evidently does not.\n\nNow it is plain that everything which is a subject of praise is praised\nfor being of a certain kind and bearing a certain relation to something\nelse: for instance, the just, and the valiant, and generally the good\nman, and virtue itself, we praise because of the actions and the\nresults: and the strong man, and the quick runner, and so forth, we\npraise for being of a certain nature and bearing a certain relation to\nsomething good and excellent (and this is illustrated by attempts to\npraise the gods; for they are presented in a ludicrous aspect[39] by\nbeing referred to our standard, and this results from the fact, that\nall praise does, as we have said, imply reference to a standard). Now\nif it is to such objects that praise belongs, it is evident that what\nis applicable to the best objects is not praise, but something higher\nand better: which is plain matter of fact, for not only do we call the\ngods blessed and happy, but of men also we pronounce those blessed who\nmost nearly resemble the gods. And in like manner in respect of goods;\nno man thinks of praising Happiness as he does the principle of\njustice, but calls it blessed, as being somewhat more godlike and more\nexcellent.\n\nEudoxus[40] too is thought to have advanced a sound argument in support\nof the claim of pleasure to the highest prize: for the fact that,\nthough it is one of the good things, it is not praised, he took for an\nindication of its superiority to those which are subjects of praise: a\nsuperiority he attributed also to a god and the Chief Good, on the\nground that they form the standard to which everything besides is\nreferred. For praise applies to virtue, because it makes men apt to do\nwhat is noble; but encomia to definite works of body or mind.[41]\n\nHowever, it is perhaps more suitable to a regular treatise on encomia\nto pursue this topic with exactness: it is enough for our purpose that\nfrom what has been said it is evident that Happiness belongs to the\nclass of things precious and final. And it seems to be so also because\nof its being a starting-point; which it is, in that with a view to it\nwe all do everything else that is done; now the starting-point and\ncause of good things we assume to be something precious and divine.\n\nChapter XI.\n\nMoreover, since Happiness is a kind of working of the soul in the way\nof perfect Excellence, we must enquire concerning Excellence: for so\nprobably shall we have a clearer view concerning Happiness; and again,\nhe who is really a statesman is generally thought to have spent most\npains on this, for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to\nthe laws. (For examples of this class we have the lawgivers of the\nCretans and Laced\u00e6monians and whatever other such there have been.)\nBut if this investigation belongs properly to \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74, then clearly\nthe enquiry will be in accordance with our original design.\n\nWell, we are to enquire concerning Excellence, _i.e._ Human Excellence\nof course, because it was the Chief Good of Man and the Happiness of\nMan that we were enquiring of just now.\n\nAnd by Human Excellence we mean not that of man\u2019s body but that of his\nsoul; for we call Happiness a working of the Soul.\n\nAnd if this is so, it is plain that some knowledge of the nature of the\nSoul is necessary for the statesman, just as for the oculist a\nknowledge of the whole body, and the more so in proportion as \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\nis more precious and higher than the healing art: and in fact\nphysicians of the higher class do busy themselves much with the\nknowledge of the body.\n\nSo then the statesman is to consider the nature of the Soul: but he\nmust do so with these objects in view, and so far only as may suffice\nfor the objects of his special enquiry: for to carry his speculations\nto a greater exactness is perhaps a task more laborious than falls\nwithin his province.\n\nIn fact, the few statements made on the subject in my popular treatises\nare quite enough, and accordingly we will adopt them here: as, that the\nSoul consists of two parts, the Irrational and the Rational (as to\nwhether these are actually divided, as are the parts of the body, and\neverything that is capable of division; or are only metaphysically\nspeaking two, being by nature inseparable, as are convex and concave\ncircumferences, matters not in respect of our present purpose). And of\nthe Irrational, the one part seems common to other objects, and in fact\nvegetative; I mean the cause of nourishment and growth (for such a\nfaculty of the Soul one would assume to exist in all things that\nreceive nourishment, even in embryos, and this the same as in the\nperfect creatures; for this is more likely than that it should be a\ndifferent one).\n\nNow the Excellence of this manifestly is not peculiar to the human\nspecies but common to others: for this part and this faculty is thought\nto work most in time of sleep, and the good and bad man are least\ndistinguishable while asleep; whence it is a common saying that during\none half of life there is no difference between the happy and the\nwretched; and this accords with our anticipations, for sleep is an\ninactivity of the soul, in so far as it is denominated good or bad,\nexcept that in some wise some of its movements find their way through\nthe veil and so the good come to have better dreams than ordinary men.\nBut enough of this: we must forego any further mention of the nutritive\npart, since it is not naturally capable of the Excellence which is\npeculiarly human.\n\nAnd there seems to be another Irrational Nature of the Soul, which yet\nin a way partakes of Reason. For in the man who controls his appetites,\nand in him who resolves to do so and fails, we praise the Reason or\nRational part of the Soul, because it exhorts aright and to the best\ncourse: but clearly there is in them, beside the Reason, some other\nnatural principle which fights with and strains against the Reason.\n(For in plain terms, just as paralysed limbs of the body when their\nowners would move them to the right are borne aside in a contrary\ndirection to the left, so is it in the case of the Soul, for the\nimpulses of men who cannot control their appetites are to contrary\npoints: the difference is that in the case of the body we do see what\nis borne aside but in the case of the soul we do not. But, it may be,\nnot the less[42] on that account are we to suppose that there is in the\nSoul also somewhat besides the Reason, which is opposed to this and\ngoes against it; as to _how_ it is different, that is irrelevant.)\n\nBut of Reason this too does evidently partake, as we have said: for\ninstance, in the man of self-control it obeys Reason: and perhaps in\nthe man of perfected self-mastery,[43] or the brave man, it is yet\nmore obedient; in them it agrees entirely with the Reason.\n\nSo then the Irrational is plainly twofold: the one part, the merely\nvegetative, has no share of Reason, but that of desire, or appetition\ngenerally, does partake of it in a sense, in so far as it is obedient\nto it and capable of submitting to its rule. (So too in common phrase\nwe say we have \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 of our father or friends, and this in a different\nsense from that in which we say we have \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 of mathematics.)[44]\n\nNow that the Irrational is in some way persuaded by the Reason,\nadmonition, and every act of rebuke and exhortation indicate. If then\nwe are to say that this also has Reason, then the Rational, as well as\nthe Irrational, will be twofold, the one supremely and in itself, the\nother paying it a kind of filial regard.\n\nThe Excellence of Man then is divided in accordance with this\ndifference: we make two classes, calling the one Intellectual, and the\nother Moral; pure science, intelligence, and practical\nwisdom\u2014Intellectual: liberality, and perfected self-mastery\u2014Moral: in\nspeaking of a man\u2019s Moral character, we do not say he is a scientific\nor intelligent but a meek man, or one of perfected self-mastery: and we\npraise the man of science in right of his mental state;[45] and of\nthese such as are praiseworthy we call Excellences.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II\n\nChapter I.\n\n\nWell: human Excellence is of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral:[1] now\nthe Intellectual springs originally, and is increased subsequently,\nfrom teaching (for the most part that is[2]), and needs therefore\nexperience and time; whereas the Moral comes from custom, and so the\nGreek term denoting it is but a slight deflection from the term\ndenoting custom in that language.\n\nFrom this fact it is plain that not one of the Moral Virtues comes to\nbe in us merely by nature: because of such things as exist by nature,\nnone can be changed by custom: a stone, for instance, by nature\ngravitating downwards, could never by custom be brought to ascend, not\neven if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand\ntimes; nor could file again be brought to descend, nor in fact could\nanything whose nature is in one way be brought by custom to be in\nanother. The Virtues then come to be in us neither by nature, nor in\ndespite of nature,[3] but we are furnished by nature with a capacity\nfor receiving themu and are perfected in them through custom.\n\nAgain, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the faculties\nfirst and perform the acts of working afterwards; an illustration of\nwhich is afforded by the case of our bodily senses, for it was not from\nhaving often seen or heard that we got these senses, but just the\nreverse: we had them and so exercised them, but did not have them\nbecause we had exercised them. But the Virtues we get by first\nperforming single acts of working, which, again, is the case of other\nthings, as the arts for instance; for what we have to make when we have\nlearned how, these we learn how to make by making: men come to be\nbuilders, for instance, by building; harp-players, by playing on the\nharp: exactly so, by doing just actions we come to be just; by doing\nthe actions of self-mastery we come to be perfected in self-mastery;\nand by doing brave actions brave.\n\nAnd to the truth of this testimony is borne by what takes place in\ncommunities: because the law-givers make the individual members good\nmen by habituation, and this is the intention certainly of every\nlaw-giver, and all who do not effect it well fail of their intent; and\nherein consists the difference between a good Constitution and a bad.\n\nAgain, every Virtue is either produced or destroyed from and by the\nvery same circumstances: art too in like manner; I mean it is by\nplaying the harp that both the good and the bad harp-players are\nformed: and similarly builders and all the rest; by building well men\nwill become good builders; by doing it badly bad ones: in fact, if this\nhad not been so, there would have been no need of instructors, but all\nmen would have been at once good or bad in their several arts without\nthem.\n\nSo too then is it with the Virtues: for by acting in the various\nrelations in which we are thrown with our fellow men, we come to be,\nsome just, some unjust: and by acting in dangerous positions and being\nhabituated to feel fear or confidence, we come to be, some brave,\nothers cowards.\n\nSimilarly is it also with respect to the occasions of lust and anger:\nfor some men come to be perfected in self-mastery and mild, others\ndestitute of all self-control and passionate; the one class by behaving\nin one way under them, the other by behaving in another. Or, in one\nword, the habits are produced from the acts of working like to them:\nand so what we have to do is to give a certain character to these\nparticular acts, because the habits formed correspond to the\ndifferences of these.\n\nSo then, whether we are accustomed this way or that straight from\nchildhood, makes not a small but an important difference, or rather I\nwould say it makes all the difference.\n\nChapter II.\n\nSince then the object of the present treatise is not mere speculation,\nas it is of some others (for we are enquiring not merely that we may\nknow what virtue is but that we may become virtuous, else it would have\nbeen useless), we must consider as to the particular actions how we are\nto do them, because, as we have just said, the quality of the habits\nthat shall be formed depends on these.\n\nNow, that we are to act in accordance with Right Reason is a general\nmaxim, and may for the present be taken for granted: we will speak of\nit hereafter, and say both what Right Reason is, and what are its\nrelations to the other virtues.[4]\n\nBut let this point be first thoroughly understood between us, that all\nwhich can be said on moral action must be said in outline, as it were,\nand not exactly: for as we remarked at the commencement, such reasoning\nonly must be required as the nature of the subject-matter admits of,\nand matters of moral action and expediency have no fixedness any more\nthan matters of health. And if the subject in its general maxims is\nsuch, still less in its application to particular cases is exactness\nattainable:[5] because these fall not under any art or system of rules,\nbut it must be left in each instance to the individual agents to look\nto the exigencies of the particular case, as it is in the art of\nhealing, or that of navigating a ship. Still, though the present\nsubject is confessedly such, we must try and do what we can for it.\n\nFirst then this must be noted, that it is the nature of such things to\nbe spoiled by defect and excess; as we see in the case of health and\nstrength (since for the illustration of things which cannot be seen we\nmust use those that can), for excessive training impairs the strength\nas well as deficient: meat and drink, in like manner, in too great or\ntoo small quantities, impair the health: while in due proportion they\ncause, increase, and preserve it.\n\nThus it is therefore with the habits of perfected Self-Mastery and\nCourage and the rest of the Virtues: for the man who flies from and\nfears all things, and never stands up against anything, comes to be a\ncoward; and he who fears nothing, but goes at everything, comes to be\nrash. In like manner too, he that tastes of every pleasure and abstains\nfrom none comes to lose all self-control; while he who avoids all, as\ndo the dull and clownish, comes as it were to lose his faculties of\nperception: that is to say, the habits of perfected Self-Mastery and\nCourage are spoiled by the excess and defect, but by the mean state are\npreserved.\n\nFurthermore, not only do the origination, growth, and marring of the\nhabits come from and by the same circumstances, but also the acts of\nworking after the habits are formed will be exercised on the same: for\nso it is also with those other things which are more directly matters\nof sight, strength for instance: for this comes by taking plenty of\nfood and doing plenty of work, and the man who has attained strength is\nbest able to do these: and so it is with the Virtues, for not only do\nwe by abstaining from pleasures come to be perfected in Self-Mastery,\nbut when we have come to be so we can best abstain from them: similarly\ntoo with Courage: for it is by accustoming ourselves to despise objects\nof fear and stand up against them that we come to be brave; and after\nwe have come to be so we shall be best able to stand up against such\nobjects.\n\nAnd for a test of the formation of the habits we must take the pleasure\nor pain which succeeds the acts; for he is perfected in Self-Mastery\nwho not only abstains from the bodily pleasures but is glad to do so;\nwhereas he who abstains but is sorry to do it has not Self-Mastery: he\nagain is brave who stands up against danger, either with positive\npleasure or at least without any pain; whereas he who does it with pain\nis not brave.[6]\n\nFor Moral Virtue has for its object-matter pleasures and pains, because\nby reason of pleasure we do what is bad, and by reason of pain decline\ndoing what is right (for which cause, as Plato observes, men should\nhave been trained straight from their childhood to receive pleasure and\npain from proper objects, for this is the right education). Again:\nsince Virtues have to do with actions and feelings, and on every\nfeeling and every action pleasure and pain follow, here again is\nanother proof that Virtue has for its object-matter pleasure and pain.\nThe same is shown also by the fact that punishments are effected\nthrough the instrumentality of these; because they are of the nature of\nremedies, and it is the nature of remedies to be the contraries of the\nills they cure. Again, to quote what we said before: every habit of the\nSoul by its very nature has relation to, and exerts itself upon, things\nof the same kind as those by which it is naturally deteriorated or\nimproved: now such habits do come to be vicious by reason of pleasures\nand pains, that is, by men pursuing or avoiding respectively, either\nsuch as they ought not, or at wrong times, or in wrong manner, and so\nforth (for which reason, by the way, some people define the Virtues as\ncertain states of impassibility and utter quietude,[7] but they are\nwrong because they speak without modification, instead of adding \u201cas\nthey ought,\u201d \u201cas they ought not,\u201d and \u201cwhen,\u201d and so on). Virtue then\nis assumed to be that habit which is such, in relation to pleasures and\npains, as to effect the best results, and Vice the contrary.\n\nThe following considerations may also serve to set this in a clear\nlight. There are principally three things moving us to choice and three\nto avoidance, the honourable, the expedient, the pleasant; and their\nthree contraries, the dishonourable, the hurtful, and the painful: now\nthe good man is apt to go right, and the bad man wrong, with respect to\nall these of course, but most specially with respect to pleasure:\nbecause not only is this common to him with all animals but also it is\na concomitant of all those things which move to choice, since both the\nhonourable and the expedient give an impression of pleasure.\n\nAgain, it grows up with us all from infancy, and so it is a hard matter\nto remove from ourselves this feeling, engrained as it is into our very\nlife.\n\nAgain, we adopt pleasure and pain (some of us more, and some less) as\nthe measure even of actions: for this cause then our whole business\nmust be with them, since to receive right or wrong impressions of\npleasure and pain is a thing of no little importance in respect of the\nactions. Once more; it is harder, as Heraclitus says, to fight against\npleasure than against anger: now it is about that which is more than\ncommonly difficult that art comes into being, and virtue too, because\nin that which is difficult the good is of a higher order: and so for\nthis reason too both virtue and moral philosophy generally must wholly\nbusy themselves respecting pleasures and pains, because he that uses\nthese well will be good, he that does so ill will be bad.\n\nLet us then be understood to have stated, that Virtue has for its\nobject-matter pleasures and pains, and that it is either increased or\nmarred by the same circumstances (differently used) by which it is\noriginally generated, and that it exerts itself on the same\ncircumstances out of which it was generated.\n\nChapter III.\n\nNow I can conceive a person perplexed as to the meaning of our\nstatement, that men must do just actions to become just, and those of\nself-mastery to acquire the habit of self-mastery; \u201cfor,\u201d he would say,\n\u201cif men are doing the actions they have the respective virtues already,\njust as men are grammarians or musicians when they do the actions of\neither art.\u201d May we not reply by saying that it is not so even in the\ncase of the arts referred to: because a man may produce something\ngrammatical either by chance or the suggestion of another; but then\nonly will he be a grammarian when he not only produces something\ngrammatical but does so grammarian-wise, _i.e._ in virtue of the\ngrammatical knowledge he himself possesses.\n\nAgain, the cases of the arts and the virtues are not parallel: because\nthose things which are produced by the arts have their excellence in\nthemselves, and it is sufficient therefore that these when produced\nshould be in a certain state: but those which are produced in the way\nof the virtues, are, strictly speaking, actions of a certain kind (say\nof Justice or perfected Self-Mastery), not merely if in themselves they\nare in a certain state but if also he who does them does them being\nhimself in a certain state, first if knowing what he is doing, next if\nwith deliberate preference, and with such preference for the things\u2019\nown sake; and thirdly if being himself stable and unapt to change. Now\nto constitute possession of the arts these requisites are not reckoned\nin, excepting the one point of knowledge: whereas for possession of the\nvirtues knowledge avails little or nothing, but the other requisites\navail not a little, but, in fact, are all in all, and these requisites\nas a matter of fact do come from oftentimes doing the actions of\nJustice and perfected Self-Mastery.\n\nThe facts,[8] it is true, are called by the names of these habits when\nthey are such as the just or perfectly self-mastering man would do; but\nhe is not in possession of the virtues who merely does these facts, but\nhe who also so does them as the just and self-mastering do them.\n\nWe are right then in saying, that these virtues are formed in a man by\nhis doing the actions; but no one, if he should leave them undone,\nwould be even in the way to become a good man. Yet people in general do\nnot perform these actions, but taking refuge in talk they flatter\nthemselves they are philosophising, and that they will so be good men:\nacting in truth very like those sick people who listen to the doctor\nwith great attention but do nothing that he tells them: just as these\nthen cannot be well bodily under such a course of treatment, so neither\ncan those be mentally by such philosophising.\n\nChapter IV.\n\nNext, we must examine what Virtue is.[9] Well, since the things which\ncome to be in the mind are, in all, of three kinds, Feelings,\nCapacities, States, Virtue of course must belong to one of the three\nclasses.\n\nBy Feelings, I mean such as lust, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy,\nfriendship, hatred, longing, emulation, compassion, in short all such\nas are followed by pleasure or pain: by Capacities, those in right of\nwhich we are said to be capable of these feelings; as by virtue of\nwhich we are able to have been made angry, or grieved, or to have\ncompassionated; by States, those in right of which we are in a certain\nrelation good or bad to the aforementioned feelings; to having been\nmade angry, for instance, we are in a wrong relation if in our anger we\nwere too violent or too slack, but if we were in the happy medium we\nare in a right relation to the feeling. And so on of the rest.\n\nNow Feelings neither the virtues nor vices are, because in right of the\nFeelings we are not denominated either good or bad, but in right of the\nvirtues and vices we are.\n\nAgain, in right of the Feelings we are neither praised nor blamed,[10]\n(for a man is not commended for being afraid or being angry, nor blamed\nfor being angry merely but for being so in a particular way), but in\nright of the virtues and vices we are.\n\nAgain, both anger and fear we feel without moral choice, whereas the\nvirtues are acts of moral choice, or at least certainly not independent\nof it.\n\nMoreover, in right of the Feelings we are said to be moved, but in\nright of the virtues and vices not to be moved, but disposed, in a\ncertain way.\n\nAnd for these same reasons they are not Capacities, for we are not\ncalled good or bad merely because we are able to feel, nor are we\npraised or blamed.\n\nAnd again, Capacities we have by nature, but we do not come to be good\nor bad by nature, as we have said before.\n\nSince then the virtues are neither Feelings nor Capacities, it remains\nthat they must be States.\n\nChapter V.\n\nNow what the genus of Virtue is has been said; but we must not merely\nspeak of it thus, that it is a state but say also what kind of a state\nit is.\n\nWe must observe then that all excellence makes that whereof it is the\nexcellence both to be itself in a good state and to perform its work\nwell. The excellence of the eye, for instance, makes both the eye good\nand its work also: for by the excellence of the eye we see well. So too\nthe excellence of the horse makes a horse good, and good in speed, and\nin carrying his rider, and standing up against the enemy. If then this\nis universally the case, the excellence of Man, i.e. Virtue, must be a\nstate whereby Man comes to be good and whereby he will perform well his\nproper work. Now how this shall be it is true we have said already, but\nstill perhaps it may throw light on the subject to see what is its\ncharacteristic nature.\n\nIn all quantity then, whether continuous or discrete,[11] one may take\nthe greater part, the less, or the exactly equal, and these either with\nreference to the thing itself, or relatively to us: and the exactly\nequal is a mean between excess and defect. Now by the mean of the\nthing, _i.e._ absolute mean, I denote that which is equidistant from\neither extreme (which of course is one and the same to all), and by the\nmean relatively to ourselves, that which is neither too much nor too\nlittle for the particular individual. This of course is not one nor the\nsame to all: for instance, suppose ten is too much and two too little,\npeople take six for the absolute mean; because it exceeds the smaller\nsum by exactly as much as it is itself exceeded by the larger, and this\nmean is according to arithmetical proportion.[12]\n\nBut the mean relatively to ourselves must not be so found ; for it does\nnot follow, supposing ten min\u00e6[13] is too large a quantity to eat and\ntwo too small, that the trainer will order his man six; because for the\nperson who is to take it this also may be too much or too little: for\nMilo it would be too little, but for a man just commencing his athletic\nexercises too much: similarly too of the exercises themselves, as\nrunning or wrestling.\n\nSo then it seems every one possessed of skill avoids excess and defect,\nbut seeks for and chooses the mean, not the absolute but the relative.\n\nNow if all skill thus accomplishes well its work by keeping an eye on\nthe mean, and bringing the works to this point (whence it is common\nenough to say of such works as are in a good state, \u201cone cannot add to\nor take ought from them,\u201d under the notion of excess or defect\ndestroying goodness but the mean state preserving it), and good\nartisans, as we say, work with their eye on this, and excellence, like\nnature, is more exact and better than any art in the world, it must\nhave an aptitude to aim at the mean.\n\nIt is moral excellence, _i.e._ Virtue, of course which I mean, because\nthis it is which is concerned with feelings and actions, and in these\nthere can be excess and defect and the mean: it is possible, for\ninstance, to feel the emotions of fear, confidence, lust, anger,\ncompassion, and pleasure and pain generally, too much or too little,\nand in either case wrongly; but to feel them when we ought, on what\noccasions, towards whom, why, and as, we should do, is the mean, or in\nother words the best state, and this is the property of Virtue.\n\nIn like manner too with respect to the actions, there may be excess and\ndefect and the mean. Now Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions,\nin which the excess is wrong and the defect is blamed but the mean is\npraised and goes right; and both these circumstances belong to Virtue.\nVirtue then is in a sense a mean state, since it certainly has an\naptitude for aiming at the mean.\n\nAgain, one may go wrong in many different ways (because, as the\nPythagoreans expressed it, evil is of the class of the infinite, good\nof the finite), but right only in one; and so the former is easy, the\nlatter difficult; easy to miss the mark, but hard to hit it: and for\nthese reasons, therefore, both the excess and defect belong to Vice,\nand the mean state to Virtue; for, as the poet has it,\n\n\u201cMen may be bad in many ways,\nBut good in one alone.\u201d\n\nChapter VI.\n\nVirtue then is \u201ca state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the\nrelative mean, determined by reason, and[14] as the man of practical\nwisdom would determine.\u201d\n\nIt is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess on\none side and of defect on the other: and it is so moreover, because the\nfaulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed,\nwhat is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions; but\nVirtue finds, and when found adopts, the mean.\n\nAnd so, viewing it in respect of its essence and definition, Virtue is\na mean state; but in reference to the chief good and to excellence it\nis the highest state possible.\n\nBut it must not be supposed that every action or every feeling is\ncapable of subsisting in this mean state, because some there are which\nare so named as immediately to convey the notion of badness, as\nmalevolence, shamelessness, envy; or, to instance in actions, adultery,\ntheft, homicide; for all these and suchlike are blamed because they are\nin themselves bad, not the having too much or too little of them.\n\nIn these then you never can go right, but must always be wrong: nor in\nsuch does the right or wrong depend on the selection of a proper\nperson, time, or manner (take adultery for instance), but simply doing\nany one soever of those things is being wrong.\n\nYou might as well require that there should be determined a mean state,\nan excess and a defect in respect of acting unjustly, being cowardly,\nor giving up all control of the passions: for at this rate there will\nbe of excess and defect a mean state; of excess, excess; and of defect,\ndefect.\n\nBut just as of perfected self-mastery and courage there is no excess\nand defect, because the mean is in one point of view the highest\npossible state, so neither of those faulty states can you have a mean\nstate, excess, or defect, but howsoever done they are wrong: you\ncannot, in short, have of excess and defect a mean state, nor of a mean\nstate excess and defect.\n\nChapter VII.\n\nIt is not enough, however, to state this in general terms, we must also\napply it to particular instances, because in treatises on moral conduct\ngeneral statements have an air of vagueness, but those which go into\ndetail one of greater reality: for the actions after all must be in\ndetail, and the general statements, to be worth anything, must hold\ngood here.\n\nWe must take these details then from the well-known scheme.[15]\n\nI. In respect of fears and confidence or boldness:\n\nThe Mean state is Courage: men may exceed, of course, either in absence\nof fear or in positive confidence: the former has no name (which is a\ncommon case), the latter is called rash: again, the man who has too\nmuch fear and too little confidence is called a coward.\n\nII. In respect of pleasures and pains (but not all, and perhaps fewer\npains than pleasures):\n\nThe Mean state here is perfected Self-Mastery, the defect total absence\nof Self-control. As for defect in respect of pleasure, there are really\nno people who are chargeable with it, so, of course, there is really no\nname for such characters, but, as they are conceivable, we will give\nthem one and call them insensible.\n\nIII. In respect of giving and taking wealth[16] (_a_):\n\nThe mean state is Liberality, the excess Prodigality, the defect\nStinginess: here each of the extremes involves really an excess and\ndefect contrary to each other: I mean, the prodigal gives out too much\nand takes in too little, while the stingy man takes in too much and\ngives out too little. (It must be understood that we are now giving\nmerely an outline and summary, intentionally: and we will, in a later\npart of the treatise, draw out the distinctions with greater\nexactness.)\n\nIV. In respect of wealth (b):\n\nThere are other dispositions besides these just mentioned; a mean state\ncalled Munificence (for the munificent man differs from the liberal,\nthe former having necessarily to do with great wealth, the latter with\nbut small); the excess called by the names either of Want of taste or\nVulgar Profusion, and the defect Paltriness (these also differ from the\nextremes connected with liberality, and the manner of their difference\nshall also be spoken of later).\n\nV. In respect of honour and dishonour (a):\n\nThe mean state Greatness of Soul, the excess which may be called\n\u03c7\u03b1\u03c5\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2,[17] and the defect Littleness of Soul.\n\nVI. In respect of honour and dishonour (b):\n\nNow there is a state bearing the same relation to Greatness of Soul as\nwe said just now Liberality does to Munificence, with the difference\nthat is of being about a small amount of the same thing: this state\nhaving reference to small honour, as Greatness of Soul to great honour;\na man may, of course, grasp at honour either more than he should or\nless; now he that exceeds in his grasping at it is called ambitious, he\nthat falls short unambitious, he that is just as he should be has no\nproper name: nor in fact have the states, except that the disposition\nof the ambitious man is called ambition. For this reason those who are\nin either extreme lay claim to the mean as a debateable land, and we\ncall the virtuous character sometimes by the name ambitious,[18]\nsometimes by that of unambitious, and we commend sometimes the one and\nsometimes the other. Why we do it shall be said in the subsequent part\nof the treatise; but now we will go on with the rest of the virtues\nafter the plan we have laid down.\n\nVII. In respect of anger:\n\nHere too there is excess, defect, and a mean state; but since they may\nbe said to have really no proper names, as we call the virtuous\ncharacter Meek, we will call the mean state Meekness, and of the\nextremes, let the man who is excessive be denominated Passionate, and\nthe faulty state Passionateness, and him who is deficient Angerless,\nand the defect Angerlessness.\n\nThere are also three other mean states, having some mutual resemblance,\nbut still with differences; they are alike in that they all have for\ntheir object-matter intercourse of words and deeds, and they differ in\nthat one has respect to truth herein, the other two to what is\npleasant; and this in two ways, the one in relaxation and amusement,\nthe other in all things which occur in daily life. We must say a word\nor two about these also, that we may the better see that in all matters\nthe mean is praiseworthy, while the extremes are neither right nor\nworthy of praise but of blame.\n\nNow of these, it is true, the majority have really no proper names, but\nstill we must try, as in the other cases, to coin some for them for the\nsake of clearness and intelligibleness.\n\nI. In respect of truth:\n\n The man who is in the mean state we will call Truthful, and his state\n Truthfulness, and as to the disguise of truth, if it be on the side of\n exaggeration, Braggadocia, and him that has it a Braggadocio; if on\n that of diminution, Reserve and Reserved shall be the terms.\n\nII. In respect of what is pleasant in the way of relaxation or\namusement.\n\nThe mean state shall be called Easy-pleasantry, and the character\naccordingly a man of Easy-pleasantry; the excess Buffoonery, and the\nman a Buffoon; the man deficient herein a Clown, and his state\nClownishness.\n\nIII. In respect of what is pleasant in daily life.\n\nHe that is as he should be may be called Friendly, and his mean state\nFriendliness: he that exceeds, if it be without any interested motive,\nsomewhat too Complaisant, if with such motive, a Flatterer: he that is\ndeficient and in all instances unpleasant, Quarrelsome and Cross.\n\nThere are mean states likewise in feelings and matters concerning them.\nShamefacedness, for instance, is no virtue, still a man is praised for\nbeing shamefaced: for in these too the one is denominated the man in\nthe mean state, the other in the excess; the Dumbfoundered, for\ninstance, who is overwhelmed with shame on all and any occasions: the\nman who is in the defect, _i.e._ who has no shame at all in his\ncomposition, is called Shameless: but the right character Shamefaced.\n\nIndignation against successful vice,[19] again, is a state in the mean\nbetween Envy and Malevolence: they all three have respect to pleasure\nand pain produced by what happens to one\u2019s neighbour: for the man who\nhas this right feeling is annoyed at undeserved success of others,\nwhile the envious man goes beyond him and is annoyed at all success of\nothers, and the malevolent falls so far short of feeling annoyance that\nhe even rejoices [at misfortune of others].\n\nBut for the discussion of these also there will be another opportunity,\nas of Justice too, because the term is used in more senses than one. So\nafter this we will go accurately into each and say how they are mean\nstates: and in like manner also with respect to the Intellectual\nExcellences.\n\nChapter VIII.\n\nNow as there are three states in each case, two faulty either in the\nway of excess or defect, and one right, which is the mean state, of\ncourse all are in a way opposed to one another; the extremes, for\ninstance, not only to the mean but also to one another, and the mean to\nthe extremes: for just as the half is greater if compared with the less\nportion, and less if compared with the greater, so the mean states,\ncompared with the defects, exceed, whether in feelings or actions, and\n_vice versa_. The brave man, for instance, shows as rash when compared\nwith the coward, and cowardly when compared with the rash; similarly\ntoo the man of perfected self-mastery, viewed in comparison with the\nman destitute of all perception, shows like a man of no self-control,\nbut in comparison with the man who really has no self-control, he looks\nlike one destitute of all perception: and the liberal man compared with\nthe stingy seems prodigal, and by the side of the prodigal, stingy.\n\nAnd so the extreme characters push away, so to speak, towards each\nother the man in the mean state; the brave man is called a rash man by\nthe coward, and a coward by the rash man, and in the other cases\naccordingly. And there being this mutual opposition, the contrariety\nbetween the extremes is greater than between either and the mean,\nbecause they are further from one another than from the mean, just as\nthe greater or less portion differ more from each other than either\nfrom the exact half.\n\nAgain, in some cases an extreme will bear a resemblance to the mean;\nrashness, for instance, to courage, and prodigality to liberality; but\nbetween the extremes there is the greatest dissimilarity. Now things\nwhich are furthest from one another[20] are defined to be contrary, and\nso the further off the more contrary will they be.\n\nFurther: of the extremes in some cases the excess, and in others the\ndefect, is most opposed to the mean: to courage, for instance, not\nrashness which is the excess, but cowardice which is the defect;\nwhereas to perfected self-mastery not insensibility which is the defect\nbut absence of all self-control which is the excess.\n\nAnd for this there are two reasons to be given; one from the nature of\nthe thing itself, because from the one extreme being nearer and more\nlike the mean, we do not put this against it, but the other; as, for\ninstance, since rashness is thought to be nearer to courage than\ncowardice is, and to resemble it more, we put cowardice against courage\nrather than rashness, because those things which are further from the\nmean are thought to be more contrary to it. This then is one reason\narising from the thing itself; there is another arising from our own\nconstitution and make: for in each man\u2019s own case those things give the\nimpression of being more contrary to the mean to which we individually\nhave a natural bias. Thus we have a natural bias towards pleasures, for\nwhich reason we are much more inclined to the rejection of all\nself-control, than to self-discipline.\n\nThese things then to which the bias is, we call more contrary, and so\ntotal want of self-control (the excess) is more contrary than the\ndefect is to perfected self-mastery.\n\nChapter IX.\n\nNow that Moral Virtue is a mean state, and how it is so, and that it\nlies between two faulty states, one in the way of excess and another in\nthe way of defect, and that it is so because it has an aptitude to aim\nat the mean both in feelings and actions, all this has been set forth\nfully and sufficiently.\n\nAnd so it is hard to be good: for surely hard it is in each instance to\nfind the mean, just as to find the mean point or centre of a circle is\nnot what any man can do, but only he who knows how: just so to be\nangry, to give money, and be expensive, is what any man can do, and\neasy: but to do these to the right person, in due proportion, at the\nright time, with a right object, and in the right manner, this is not\nas before what any man can do, nor is it easy; and for this cause\ngoodness is rare, and praiseworthy, and noble.\n\nTherefore he who aims at the mean should make it his first care to keep\naway from that extreme which is more contrary than the other to the\nmean; just as Calypso in Homer advises Ulysses,\n\n\u201cClear of this smoke and surge thy barque direct;\u201d\n\nbecause of the two extremes the one is always more, and the other less,\nerroneous; and, therefore, since to hit exactly on the mean is\ndifficult, one must take the least of the evils as the safest plan;[21]\nand this a man will be doing, if he follows this method.\n\nWe ought also to take into consideration our own natural bias; which\nvaries in each man\u2019s case, and will be ascertained from the pleasure\nand pain arising in us. Furthermore, we should force ourselves off in\nthe contrary direction, because we shall find ourselves in the mean\nafter we have removed ourselves far from the wrong side, exactly as men\ndo in straightening bent timber.[22]\n\nBut in all cases we must guard most carefully against what is pleasant,\nand pleasure itself, because we are not impartial judges of it.\n\nWe ought to feel in fact towards pleasure as did the old counsellors\ntowards Helen, and in all cases pronounce a similar sentence; for so by\nsending it away from us, we shall err the less.[23]\n\nWell, to speak very briefly, these are the precautions by adopting\nwhich we shall be best able to attain the mean.\n\nStill, perhaps, after all it is a matter of difficulty, and specially\nin the particular instances: it is not easy, for instance, to determine\nexactly in what manner, with what persons, for what causes, and for\nwhat length of time, one ought to feel anger: for we ourselves\nsometimes praise those who are defective in this feeling, and we call\nthem meek; at another, we term the hot-tempered manly and spirited.\n\nThen, again, he who makes a small deflection from what is right, be it\non the side of too much or too little, is not blamed, only he who makes\na considerable one; for he cannot escape observation. But to what point\nor degree a man must err in order to incur blame, it is not easy to\ndetermine exactly in words: nor in fact any of those points which are\nmatter of perception by the Moral Sense: such questions are matters of\ndetail, and the decision of them rests with the Moral Sense.[24]\n\nAt all events thus much is plain, that the mean state is in all things\npraiseworthy, and that practically we must deflect sometimes towards\nexcess sometimes towards defect, because this will be the easiest\nmethod of hitting on the mean, that is, on what is right.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III\n\nChapter I.\n\nNow since Virtue is concerned with the regulation of feelings and\nactions, and praise and blame arise upon such as are voluntary, while\nfor the involuntary allowance is made, and sometimes compassion is\nexcited, it is perhaps a necessary task for those who are investigating\nthe nature of Virtue to draw out the distinction between what is\nvoluntary and what involuntary; and it is certainly useful for\nlegislators, with respect to the assigning of honours and punishments.\n\nInvoluntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being done\neither on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance. An action is, properly\nspeaking, compulsory, when the origination is external to the agent,\nbeing such that in it the agent (perhaps we may more properly say the\npatient) contributes nothing; as if a wind were to convey you anywhere,\nor men having power over your person.\n\nBut when actions are done, either from fear of greater evils, or from\nsome honourable motive, as, for instance, if you were ordered to commit\nsome base act by a despot who had your parents or children in his\npower, and they were to be saved upon your compliance or die upon your\nrefusal, in such cases there is room for a question whether the actions\nare voluntary or involuntary.\n\nA similar question arises with respect to cases of throwing goods\noverboard in a storm: abstractedly no man throws away his property\nwillingly, but with a view to his own and his shipmates\u2019 safety any one\nwould who had any sense.\n\nThe truth is, such actions are of a mixed kind, but are most like\nvoluntary actions; for they are choice-worthy at the time when they are\nbeing done, and the end or object of the action must be taken with\nreference to the actual occasion. Further, we must denominate an action\nvoluntary or involuntary at the time of doing it: now in the given case\nthe man acts voluntarily, because the originating of the motion of his\nlimbs in such actions rests with himself; and where the origination is\nin himself it rests with himself to do or not to do.\n\nSuch actions then are voluntary, though in the abstract perhaps\ninvoluntary because no one would choose any of such things in and by\nitself.\n\nBut for such actions men sometimes are even praised, as when they\nendure any disgrace or pain to secure great and honourable equivalents;\nif _vice vers\u00e2_, then they are blamed, because it shows a base mind to\nendure things very disgraceful for no honourable object, or for a\ntrifling one.\n\nFor some again no praise is given, but allowance is made; as where a\nman does what he should not by reason of such things as overstrain the\npowers of human nature, or pass the limits of human endurance.\n\nSome acts perhaps there are for which compulsion cannot be pleaded, but\na man should rather suffer the worst and die; how absurd, for instance,\nare the pleas of compulsion with which Alcmaeon in Euripides\u2019 play\nexcuses his matricide!\n\nBut it is difficult sometimes to decide what kind of thing should be\nchosen instead of what, or what endured in preference to what, and much\nmoreso to abide by one\u2019s decisions: for in general the alternatives are\npainful, and the actions required are base, and so praise or blame is\nawarded according as persons have been compelled or no.\n\nWhat kind of actions then are to be called compulsory? may we say,\nsimply and abstractedly whenever the cause is external and the agent\ncontributes nothing; and that where the acts are in themselves such as\none would not wish but choice-worthy at the present time and in\npreference to such and such things, and where the origination rests\nwith the agent, the actions are in themselves involuntary but at the\ngiven time and in preference to such and such things voluntary; and\nthey are more like voluntary than involuntary, because the actions\nconsist of little details, and these are voluntary.\n\nBut what kind of things one ought to choose instead of what, it is not\neasy to settle, for there are many differences in particular instances.\n\nBut suppose a person should say, things pleasant and honourable exert a\ncompulsive force (for that they are external and do compel); at that\nrate every action is on compulsion, because these are universal motives\nof action.\n\nAgain, they who act on compulsion and against their will do so with\npain; but they who act by reason of what is pleasant or honourable act\nwith pleasure.\n\nIt is truly absurd for a man to attribute his actions to external\nthings instead of to his own capacity for being easily caught by\nthem;[1] or, again, to ascribe the honourable to himself, and the base\nones to pleasure.\n\nSo then that seems to be compulsory \u201cwhose origination is from without,\nthe party compelled contributing nothing.\u201d\n\nChapter II.\n\nNow every action of which ignorance is the cause is not-voluntary, but\nthat only is involuntary which is attended with pain and remorse; for\nclearly the man who has done anything by reason of ignorance, but is\nnot annoyed at his own action, cannot be said to have done it _with_\nhis will because he did not know he was doing it, nor again _against_\nhis will because he is not sorry for it.\n\nSo then of the class \u201cacting by reason of ignorance,\u201d he who feels\nregret afterwards is thought to be an involuntary agent, and him that\nhas no such feeling, since he certainly is different from the other, we\nwill call a not-voluntary agent; for as there is a real difference it\nis better to have a proper name.\n\nAgain, there seems to be a difference between acting _because of_\nignorance and acting _with_ ignorance: for instance, we do not usually\nassign ignorance as the cause of the actions of the drunken or angry\nman, but either the drunkenness or the anger, yet they act not\nknowingly but with ignorance.\n\nAgain, every bad man is ignorant what he ought to do and what to leave\nundone, and by reason of such error men become unjust and wholly evil.\n\nAgain, we do not usually apply the term involuntary when a man is\nignorant of his own true interest;[2] because ignorance which affects\nmoral choice[3] constitutes depravity but not involuntariness: nor does\nany ignorance of principle (because for this men are blamed) but\nignorance in particular details, wherein consists the action and\nwherewith it is concerned, for in these there is both compassion and\nallowance, because he who acts in ignorance of any of them acts in a\nproper sense involuntarily.\n\nIt may be as well, therefore, to define these particular details; what\nthey are, and how many; viz. who acts, what he is doing, with respect\nto what or in what, sometimes with what, as with what instrument, and\nwith what result;[4] as that of preservation, for instance, and how, as\nwhether softly or violently.\n\nAll these particulars, in one and the same case, no man in his senses\ncould be ignorant of; plainly not of the agent, being himself. But what\nhe is doing a man may be ignorant, as men in speaking say a thing\nescaped them unawares; or as Aeschylus did with respect to the\nMysteries, that he was not aware that it was unlawful to speak of them;\nor as in the case of that catapult accident the other day the man said\nhe discharged it merely to display its operation. Or a person might\nsuppose a son to be an enemy, as Merope did; or that the spear really\npointed was rounded off; or that the stone was a pumice; or in striking\nwith a view to save might kill; or might strike when merely wishing to\nshow another, as people do in sham-fighting.\n\nNow since ignorance is possible in respect to all these details in\nwhich the action consists, he that acted in ignorance of any of them is\nthought to have acted involuntarily, and he most so who was in\nignorance as regards the most important, which are thought to be those\nin which the action consists, and the result.\n\nFurther, not only must the ignorance be of this kind, to constitute an\naction involuntary, but it must be also understood that the action is\nfollowed by pain and regret.\n\nChapter III.\n\nNow since all involuntary action is either upon compulsion or by reason\nof ignorance, Voluntary Action would seem to be \u201cthat whose origination\nis in the agent, he being aware of the particular details in which the\naction consists.\u201d\n\nFor, it may be, men are not justified by calling those actions\ninvoluntary, which are done by reason of Anger or Lust.\n\nBecause, in the first place, if this be so no other animal but man, and\nnot even children, can be said to act voluntarily. Next, is it meant\nthat we never act voluntarily when we act from Lust or Anger, or that\nwe act voluntarily in doing what is right and involuntarily in doing\nwhat is discreditable? The latter supposition is absurd, since the\ncause is one and the same. Then as to the former, it is a strange thing\nto maintain actions to be involuntary which we are bound to grasp at:\nnow there are occasions on which anger is a duty,[5] and there are\nthings which we are bound to lust after,[6] health, for instance, and\nlearning.\n\nAgain, whereas actions strictly involuntary are thought to be attended\nwith pain, those which are done to gratify lust are thought to be\npleasant.\n\nAgain: how does the involuntariness make any difference[7] between\nwrong actions done from deliberate calculation, and those done by\nreason of anger? for both ought to be avoided, and the irrational\nfeelings are thought to be just as natural to man as reason, and so of\ncourse must be such actions of the individual as are done from Anger\nand Lust. It is absurd then to class these actions among the\ninvoluntary.\n\nChapter IV.\n\nHaving thus drawn out the distinction between voluntary and involuntary\naction our next step is to examine into the nature of Moral Choice,\nbecause this seems most intimately connected with Virtue and to be a\nmore decisive test of moral character than a man\u2019s acts are.\n\nNow Moral Choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not\nco-extensive, voluntary being the more comprehensive term; for first,\nchildren and all other animals share in voluntary action but not in\nMoral Choice; and next, sudden actions we call voluntary but do not\nascribe them to Moral Choice.\n\nNor do they appear to be right who say it is lust or anger, or wish, or\nopinion of a certain kind; because, in the first place, Moral Choice is\nnot shared by the irrational animals while Lust and Anger are. Next;\nthe man who fails of self-control acts from Lust but not from Moral\nChoice; the man of self-control, on the contrary, from Moral Choice,\nnot from Lust. Again: whereas Lust is frequently opposed to Moral\nChoice, Lust is not to Lust.\n\nLastly: the object-matter of Lust is the pleasant and the painful, but\nof Moral Choice neither the one nor the other. Still less can it be\nAnger, because actions done from Anger are thought generally to be\nleast of all consequent on Moral Choice.\n\nNor is it Wish either, though appearing closely connected with it;\nbecause, in the first place, Moral Choice has not for its objects\nimpossibilities, and if a man were to say he chose them he would be\nthought to be a fool; but Wish may have impossible things for its\nobjects, immortality for instance.\n\nWish again may be exercised on things in the accomplishment of which\none\u2019s self could have nothing to do, as the success of any particular\nactor or athlete; but no man chooses things of this nature, only such\nas he believes he may himself be instrumental in procuring.\n\nFurther: Wish has for its object the End rather, but Moral Choice the\nmeans to the End; for instance, we wish to be healthy but we choose the\nmeans which will make us so; or happiness again we wish for, and\ncommonly say so, but to say we choose is not an appropriate term,\nbecause, in short, the province of Moral Choice seems to be those\nthings which are in our own power.\n\nNeither can it be Opinion; for Opinion is thought to be unlimited in\nits range of objects, and to be exercised as well upon things eternal\nand impossible as on those which are in our own power: again, Opinion\nis logically divided into true and false, not into good and bad as\nMoral Choice is.\n\nHowever, nobody perhaps maintains its identity with Opinion simply; but\nit is not the same with opinion of any kind,[8] because by choosing good\nand bad things we are constituted of a certain character, but by having\nopinions on them we are not.\n\nAgain, we choose to take or avoid, and so on, but we opine what a thing\nis, or for what it is serviceable, or how; but we do not opine to take\nor avoid.\n\nFurther, Moral Choice is commended rather for having a right object\nthan for being judicious, but Opinion for being formed in accordance\nwith truth.\n\nAgain, we choose such things as we pretty well know to be good, but we\nform opinions respecting such as we do not know at all.\n\nAnd it is not thought that choosing and opining best always go\ntogether, but that some opine the better course and yet by reason of\nviciousness choose not the things which they should.\n\nIt may be urged, that Opinion always precedes or accompanies Moral\nChoice; be it so, this makes no difference, for this is not the point\nin question, but whether Moral Choice is the same as Opinion of a\ncertain kind.\n\nSince then it is none of the aforementioned things, what is it, or how\nis it characterised? Voluntary it plainly is, but not all voluntary\naction is an object of Moral Choice. May we not say then, it is \u201cthat\nvoluntary which has passed through a stage of previous deliberation?\u201d\nbecause Moral Choice is attended with reasoning and intellectual\nprocess. The etymology of its Greek name seems to give a hint of it,\nbeing when analysed \u201cchosen in preference to somewhat else.\u201d\n\nChapter V.\n\nWell then; do men deliberate about everything, and is anything soever\nthe object of Deliberation, or are there some matters with respect to\nwhich there is none? (It may be as well perhaps to say, that by \u201cobject\nof Deliberation\u201d is meant such matter as a sensible man would\ndeliberate upon, not what any fool or madman might.)\n\nWell: about eternal things no one deliberates; as, for instance, the\nuniverse, or the incommensurability of the diameter and side of a\nsquare.\n\nNor again about things which are in motion but which always happen in\nthe same way either necessarily, or naturally, or from some other\ncause, as the solstices or the sunrise.\n\nNor about those which are variable, as drought and rains; nor\nfortuitous matters, as finding of treasure.\n\nNor in fact even about all human affairs; no Laced\u00e6monian, for\ninstance, deliberates as to the best course for the Scythian government\nto adopt; because in such cases we have no power over the result.\n\nBut we do deliberate respecting such practical matters as are in our\nown power (which are what are left after all our exclusions).\n\nI have adopted this division because causes seem to be divisible into\nnature, necessity, chance, and moreover intellect, and all human\npowers.\n\nAnd as man in general deliberates about what man in general can effect,\nso individuals do about such practical things as can be effected\nthrough their own instrumentality.\n\nAgain, we do not deliberate respecting such arts or sciences as are\nexact and independent: as, for instance, about written characters,\nbecause we have no doubt how they should be formed; but we do\ndeliberate on all buch things as are usually done through our own\ninstrumentality, but not invariably in the same way; as, for instance,\nabout matters connected with the healing art, or with money-making;\nand, again, more about piloting ships than gymnastic exercises, because\nthe former has been less exactly determined, and so forth; and more\nabout arts than sciences, because we more frequently doubt respecting\nthe former.\n\nSo then Deliberation takes place in such matters as are under general\nlaws, but still uncertain how in any given case they will issue, _i.e._\nin which there is some indefiniteness; and for great matters we\nassociate coadjutors in counsel, distrusting our ability to settle them\nalone.\n\nFurther, we deliberate not about Ends, but Means to Ends. No physician,\nfor instance, deliberates whether he will cure, nor orator whether he\nwill persuade, nor statesman whether he will produce a good\nconstitution, nor in fact any man in any other function about his\nparticular End; but having set before them a certain End they look how\nand through what means it may be accomplished: if there is a choice of\nmeans, they examine further which are easiest and most creditable; or,\nif there is but one means of accomplishing the object, then how it may\nbe through this, this again through what, till they come to the first\ncause; and this will be the last found; for a man engaged in a process\nof deliberation seems to seek and analyse, as a man, to solve a\nproblem, analyses the figure given him. And plainly not every search is\nDeliberation, those in mathematics to wit, but every Deliberation is a\nsearch, and the last step in the analysis is the first in the\nconstructive process. And if in the course of their search men come\nupon an impossibility, they give it up; if money, for instance, be\nnecessary, but cannot be got: but if the thing appears possible they\nthen attempt to do it.\n\nAnd by possible I mean what may be done through our own instrumentality\n(of course what may be done through our friends is through our own\ninstrumentality in a certain sense, because the origination in such\ncases rests with us). And the object of search is sometimes the\nnecessary instruments, sometimes the method of using them; and\nsimilarly in the rest sometimes through what, and sometimes how or\nthrough what.[9]\n\nSo it seems, as has been said, that Man is the originator of his\nactions; and Deliberation has for its object whatever may be done\nthrough one\u2019s own instrumentality, and the actions are with a view to\nother things; and so it is, not the End, but the Means to Ends on which\nDeliberation is employed.\n\nNor, again, is it employed on matters of detail, as whether the\nsubstance before me is bread, or has been properly cooked; for these\ncome under the province of sense, and if a man is to be always\ndeliberating, he may go on _ad infinitum_.\n\nFurther, exactly the same matter is the object both of Deliberation and\nMoral Choice; but that which is the object of Moral Choice is\nthenceforward separated off and definite,[10] because by object of\nMoral Choice is denoted that which after Deliberation has been\npreferred to something else: for each man leaves off searching how he\nshall do a thing when he has brought the origination up to himself,\n_i.e_. to the governing principle in himself,[11] because it is this\nwhich makes the choice. A good illustration of this is furnished by the\nold regal constitutions which Homer drew from, in which the Kings would\nannounce to the commonalty what they had determined before.\n\nNow since that which is the object of Moral Choice is something in our\nown power, which is the object of deliberation and the grasping of the\nWill, Moral Choice must be \u201ca grasping after something in our own power\nconsequent upon Deliberation:\u201d because after having deliberated we\ndecide, and then grasp by our Will in accordance with the result of our\ndeliberation.[12]\n\nLet this be accepted as a sketch of the nature and object of Moral\nChoice, that object being \u201cMeans to Ends.\u201d\n\nChapter VI.\n\nThat Wish has for its object-matter the End, has been already stated;\nbut there are two opinions respecting it; some thinking that its object\nis real good, others whatever impresses the mind with a notion of good.\n\nNow those who maintain that the object of Wish is real good are beset\nby this difficulty, that what is wished for by him who chooses wrongly\nis not really an object of Wish (because, on their theory, if it is an\nobject of wish, it must be good, but it is, in the case supposed,\nevil). Those who maintain, on the contrary, that that which impresses\nthe mind with a notion of good is properly the object of Wish, have to\nmeet this difficulty, that there is nothing naturally an object of Wish\nbut to each individual whatever seems good to him; now different people\nhave different notions, and it may chance contrary ones.\n\nBut, if these opinions do not satisfy us, may we not say that,\nabstractedly and as a matter of objective truth, the really good is the\nobject of Wish, but to each individual whatever impresses his mind with\nthe notion of good.[13] And so to the good man that is an object of\nWish which is really and truly so, but to the bad man anything may be;\njust as physically those things are wholesome to the healthy which are\nreally so, but other things to the sick. And so too of bitter and\nsweet, and hot and heavy, and so on. For the good man judges in every\ninstance correctly, and in every instance the notion conveyed to his\nmind is the true one.\n\nFor there are fair and pleasant things peculiar to, and so varying\nwith, each state; and perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of\nthe good man is his seeing the truth in every instance, he being, in\nfact, the rule and measure of these matters.\n\nThe multitude of men seem to be deceived by reason of pleasure, because\nthough it is not really a good it impresses their minds with the notion\nof goodness, so they choose what is pleasant as good and avoid pain as\nan evil.\n\nChapter VII.\n\nNow since the End is the object of Wish, and the means to the End of\nDeliberation and Moral Choice, the actions regarding these matters must\nbe in the way of Moral Choice, _i.e._ voluntary: but the acts of\nworking out the virtues are such actions, and therefore Virtue is in\nour power.\n\nAnd so too is Vice: because wherever it is in our power to do it is\nalso in our power to forbear doing, and _vice vers\u00e2_: therefore if the\ndoing (being in a given case creditable) is in our power, so too is the\nforbearing (which is in the same case discreditable), and _vice vers\u00e2_.\n\nBut if it is in our power to do and to forbear doing what is creditable\nor the contrary, and these respectively constitute the being good or\nbad, then the being good or vicious characters is in our power.\n\nAs for the well-known saying, \u201cNo man voluntarily is wicked or\ninvoluntarily happy,\u201d it is partly true, partly false; for no man is\nhappy against his will, of course, but wickedness is voluntary. Or must\nwe dispute the statements lately made, and not say that Man is the\noriginator or generator of his actions as much as of his children?\n\nBut if this is matter of plain manifest fact, and we cannot refer our\nactions to any other originations beside those in our own power, those\nthings must be in our own power, and so voluntary, the originations of\nwhich are in ourselves.\n\nMoreover, testimony seems to be borne to these positions both privately\nby individuals, and by law-givers too, in that they chastise and punish\nthose who do wrong (unless they do so on compulsion, or by reason of\nignorance which is not self-caused), while they honour those who act\nrightly, under the notion of being likely to encourage the latter and\nrestrain the former. But such things as are not in our own power,\n_i.e._ not voluntary, no one thinks of encouraging us to do, knowing it\nto be of no avail for one to have been persuaded not to be hot (for\ninstance), or feel pain, or be hungry, and so forth, because we shall\nhave those sensations all the same.\n\nAnd what makes the case stronger is this: that they chastise for the\nvery fact of ignorance, when it is thought to be self-caused; to the\ndrunken, for instance, penalties are double, because the origination in\nsuch case lies in a man\u2019s own self: for he might have helped getting\ndrunk, and this is the cause of his ignorance.\n\nAgain, those also who are ignorant of legal regulations which they are\nbound to know, and which are not hard to know, they chastise; and\nsimilarly in all other cases where neglect is thought to be the cause\nof the ignorance, under the notion that it was in their power to\nprevent their ignorance, because they might have paid attention.\n\nBut perhaps a man is of such a character that he cannot attend to such\nthings: still men are themselves the causes of having become such\ncharacters by living carelessly, and also of being unjust or destitute\nof self-control, the former by doing evil actions, the latter by\nspending their time in drinking and such-like; because the particular\nacts of working form corresponding characters, as is shown by those who\nare practising for any contest or particular course of action, for such\nmen persevere in the acts of working.\n\nAs for the plea, that a man did not know that habits are produced from\nseparate acts of working, we reply, such ignorance is a mark of\nexcessive stupidity.\n\nFurthermore, it is wholly irrelevant to say that the man who acts\nunjustly or dissolutely does not _wish_ to attain the habits of these\nvices: for if a man wittingly does those things whereby he must become\nunjust he is to all intents and purposes unjust voluntarily; but he\ncannot with a wish cease to be unjust and become just. For, to take the\nanalogous case, the sick man cannot with a wish be well again, yet in a\nsupposable case he is voluntarily ill because he has produced his\nsickness by living intemperately and disregarding his physicians. There\nwas a time then when he might have helped being ill, but now he has let\nhimself go he cannot any longer; just as he who has let a stone out of\nhis hand cannot recall it,[14] and yet it rested with him to aim and\nthrow it, because the origination was in his power. Just so the unjust\nman, and he who has lost all self-control, might originally have helped\nbeing what they are, and so they are voluntarily what they are; but now\nthat they are become so they no longer have the power of being\notherwise.\n\nAnd not only are mental diseases voluntary, but the bodily are so in\nsome men, whom we accordingly blame: for such as are naturally deformed\nno one blames, only such as are so by reason of want of exercise, and\nneglect: and so too of weakness and maiming: no one would think of\nupbraiding, but would rather compassionate, a man who is blind by\nnature, or from disease, or from an accident; but every one would blame\nhim who was so from excess of wine, or any other kind of intemperance.\nIt seems, then, that in respect of bodily diseases, those which depend\non ourselves are censured, those which do not are not censured; and if\nso, then in the case of the mental disorders, those which are censured\nmust depend upon ourselves.\n\nBut suppose a man to say, \u201cthat (by our own admission) all men aim at\nthat which conveys to their minds an impression of good, and that men\nhave no control over this impression, but that the End impresses each\nwith a notion correspondent to his own individual character; that to be\nsure if each man is in a way the cause of his own moral state, so he\nwill be also of the kind of impression he receives: whereas, if this is\nnot so, no one is the cause to himself of doing evil actions, but he\ndoes them by reason of ignorance of the true End, supposing that\nthrough their means he will secure the chief good. Further, that this\naiming at the End is no matter of one\u2019s own choice, but one must be\nborn with a power of mental vision, so to speak, whereby to judge\nfairly and choose that which is really good; and he is blessed by\nnature who has this naturally well: because it is the most important\nthing and the fairest, and what a man cannot get or learn from another\nbut will have such as nature has given it; and for this to be so given\nwell and fairly would be excellence of nature in the highest and truest\nsense.\u201d\n\nIf all this be true, how will Virtue be a whit more voluntary than\nVice? Alike to the good man and the bad, the End gives its impression\nand is fixed by nature or howsoever you like to say, and they act so\nand so, referring everything else to this End.\n\nWhether then we suppose that the End impresses each man\u2019s mind with\ncertain notions not merely by nature, but that there is somewhat also\ndependent on himself; or that the End is given by nature, and yet\nVirtue is voluntary because the good man does all the rest voluntarily,\nVice must be equally so; because his own agency equally attaches to the\nbad man in the actions, even if not in the selection of the End.\n\nIf then, as is commonly said, the Virtues are voluntary (because we at\nleast cooperate[15] in producing our moral states, and we assume the\nEnd to be of a certain kind according as we are ourselves of certain\ncharacters), the Vices must be voluntary also, because the cases are\nexactly similar.\n\nChapter VIII.\n\nWell now, we have stated generally respecting the Moral Virtues, the\ngenus (in outline), that they are mean states, and that they are\nhabits, and how they are formed, and that they are of themselves\ncalculated to act upon the circumstances out of which they were formed,\nand that they are in our own power and voluntary, and are to be done so\nas right Reason may direct.\n\nBut the particular actions and the habits are not voluntary in the same\nsense; for of the actions we are masters from beginning to end\n(supposing of course a knowledge of the particular details), but only\nof the origination of the habits, the addition by small particular\naccessions not being cognisiable (as is the case with sicknesses):\nstill they are voluntary because it rested with us to use our\ncircumstances this way or that.\n\nChapter IX.\n\nHere we will resume the particular discussion of the Moral Virtues, and\nsay what they are, what is their object-matter, and how they stand\nrespectively related to it: of course their number will be thereby\nshown.\n\nFirst, then, of Courage. Now that it is a mean state, in respect of\nfear and boldness, has been already said: further, the objects of our\nfears are obviously things fearful or, in a general way of statement,\nevils; which accounts for the common definition of fear, viz.\n\u201cexpectation of evil.\u201d\n\nOf course we fear evils of all kinds: disgrace, for instance, poverty,\ndisease, desolateness, death; but not all these seem to be the\nobject-matter of the Brave man, because there are things which to fear\nis right and noble, and not to fear is base; disgrace, for example,\nsince he who fears this is a good man and has a sense of honour, and he\nwho does not fear it is shameless (though there are those who call him\nBrave by analogy, because he somewhat resembles the Brave man who\nagrees with him in being free from fear); but poverty, perhaps, or\ndisease, and in fact whatever does not proceed from viciousness, nor is\nattributable to his own fault, a man ought not to fear: still, being\nfearless in respect of these would not constitute a man Brave in the\nproper sense of the term.\n\nYet we do apply the term[16] in right of the similarity of the cases;\nfor there are men who, though timid in the dangers of war, are liberal\nmen and are stout enough to face loss of wealth.\n\nAnd, again, a man is not a coward for fearing insult to his wife or\nchildren, or envy, or any such thing; nor is he a Brave man for being\nbold when going to be scourged.\n\nWhat kind of fearful things then do constitute the object-matter of the\nBrave man? first of all, must they not be the greatest, since no man is\nmore apt to withstand what is dreadful. Now the object of the greatest\ndread is death, because it is the end of all things, and the dead man\nis thought to be capable neither of good nor evil. Still it would seem\nthat the Brave man has not for his object-matter even death in every\ncircumstance; on the sea, for example, or in sickness: in what\ncircumstances then? must it not be in the most honourable? now such is\ndeath in war, because it is death in the greatest and most honourable\ndanger; and this is confirmed by the honours awarded in communities,\nand by monarchs.\n\nHe then may be most properly denominated Brave who is fearless in\nrespect of honourable death and such sudden emergencies as threaten\ndeath; now such specially are those which arise in the course of war.\n\nIt is not meant but that the Brave man will be fearless also on the sea\n(and in sickness), but not in the same way as sea-faring men; for these\nare light-hearted and hopeful by reason of their experience, while\nlandsmen though Brave are apt to give themselves up for lost and\nshudder at the notion of such a death: to which it should be added that\nCourage is exerted in circumstances which admit of doing something to\nhelp one\u2019s self, or in which death would be honourable; now neither of\nthese requisites attach to destruction by drowning or sickness.\n\nChapter X.\n\nAgain, fearful is a term of relation, the same thing not being so to\nall, and there is according to common parlance somewhat so fearful as\nto be beyond human endurance: this of course would be fearful to every\nman of sense, but those objects which are level to the capacity of man\ndiffer in magnitude and admit of degrees, so too the objects of\nconfidence or boldness.\n\nNow the Brave man cannot be frighted from his propriety (but of course\nonly so far as he is man); fear such things indeed he will, but he will\nstand up against them as he ought and as right reason may direct, with\na view to what is honourable, because this is the end of the virtue.\n\nNow it is possible to fear these things too much, or too little, or\nagain to fear what is not really fearful as if it were such. So the\nerrors come to be either that a man fears when he ought not to fear at\nall, or that he fears in an improper way, or at a wrong time, and so\nforth; and so too in respect of things inspiring confidence. He is\nBrave then who withstands, and fears, and is bold, in respect of right\nobjects, from a right motive, in right manner, and at right times:\nsince the Brave man suffers or acts as he ought and as right reason may\ndirect.\n\nNow the end of every separate act of working is that which accords with\nthe habit, and so to the Brave man Courage; which is honourable;\ntherefore such is also the End, since the character of each is\ndetermined by the End.[17]\n\nSo honour is the motive from which the Brave man withstands things\nfearful and performs the acts which accord with Courage.\n\nOf the characters on the side of Excess, he who exceeds in utter\nabsence of fear has no appropriate name (I observed before that many\nstates have none), but he would be a madman or inaccessible to pain if\nhe feared nothing, neither earthquake, nor the billows, as they tell of\nthe Celts.\n\nHe again who exceeds in confidence in respect of things fearful is\nrash. He is thought moreover to be a braggart, and to advance unfounded\nclaims to the character of Brave: the relation which the Brave man\nreally bears to objects of fear this man wishes to appear to bear, and\nso imitates him in whatever points he can; for this reason most of them\nexhibit a curious mixture of rashness and cowardice; because, affecting\nrashness in these circumstances, they do not withstand what is truly\nfearful.\n\nThe man moreover who exceeds in feeling fear is a coward, since there\nattach to him the circumstances of fearing wrong objects, in wrong\nways, and so forth. He is deficient also in feeling confidence, but he\nis most clearly seen as exceeding in the case of pains; he is a\nfainthearted kind of man, for he fears all things: the Brave man is\njust the contrary, for boldness is the property of the light-hearted\nand hopeful.\n\nSo the coward, the rash, and the Brave man have exactly the same\nobject-matter, but stand differently related to it: the two\nfirst-mentioned respectively exceed and are deficient, the last is in a\nmean state and as he ought to be. The rash again are precipitate, and,\nbeing eager before danger, when actually in it fall away, while the\nBrave are quick and sharp in action, but before are quiet and composed.\n\nWell then, as has been said, Courage is a mean state in respect of\nobjects inspiring boldness or fear, in the circumstances which have\nbeen stated, and the Brave man chooses his line and withstands danger\neither because to do so is honourable, or because not to do so is base.\nBut dying to escape from poverty, or the pangs of love, or anything\nthat is simply painful, is the act not of a Brave man but of a coward;\nbecause it is mere softness to fly from what is toilsome, and the\nsuicide braves the terrors of death not because it is honourable but to\nget out of the reach of evil.\n\nChapter XI.\n\nCourage proper is somewhat of the kind I have described, but there are\ndispositions, differing in five ways,[18] which also bear in common\nparlance the name of Courage.\n\nWe will take first that which bears most resemblance to the true, the\nCourage of Citizenship, so named because the motives which are thought\nto actuate the members of a community in braving danger are the\npenalties and disgrace held out by the laws to cowardice, and the\ndignities conferred on the Brave; which is thought to be the reason why\nthose are the bravest people among whom cowards are visited with\ndisgrace and the Brave held in honour.\n\nSuch is the kind of Courage Homer exhibits in his characters; Diomed\nand Hector for example. The latter says,\n\n\u201cPolydamas will be the first to fix\nDisgrace upon me.\u201d\n\n\nDiomed again,\n\n\u201cFor Hector surely will hereafter say,\nSpeaking in Troy, Tydides by my hand\u201d\u2014\n\n\nThis I say most nearly resembles the Courage before spoken of, because\nit arises from virtue, from a feeling of shame, and a desire of what is\nnoble (that is, of honour), and avoidance of disgrace which is base.\n\nIn the same rank one would be inclined to place those also who act\nunder compulsion from their commanders; yet are they really lower,\nbecause not a sense of honour but fear is the motive from which they\nact, and what they seek to avoid is not that which is base but that\nwhich is simply painful: commanders do in fact compel their men\nsometimes, as Hector says (to quote Homer again),\n\n\u201cBut whomsoever I shall find cowering afar from the fight,\nThe teeth of dogs he shall by no means escape.\u201d\n\n\nThose commanders who station staunch troops by doubtful ones,[19] or\nwho beat their men if they flinch, or who draw their troops up in line\nwith the trenches, or other similar obstacles, in their rear, do in\neffect the same as Hector, for they all use compulsion.\n\nBut a man is to be Brave, not on compulsion, but from a sense of\nhonour.\n\nIn the next place, Experience and Skill in the various particulars is\nthought to be a species of Courage: whence Socrates also thought that\nCourage was knowledge.[20]\n\nThis quality is exhibited of course by different men under different\ncircumstances, but in warlike matters, with which we are now concerned,\nit is exhibited by the soldiers (\u201cthe regulars\u201d): for there are, it\nwould seem, many things in war of no real importance[21] which these\nhave been constantly used to see; so they have a show of Courage\nbecause other people are not aware of the real nature of these things.\nThen again by reason of their skill they are better able than any\nothers to inflict without suffering themselves, because they are able\nto use their arms and have such as are most serviceable both with a\nview to offence and defence: so that their case is parallel to that of\narmed men fighting with unarmed or trained athletes with amateurs,\nsince in contests of this kind those are the best fighters, not who are\nthe bravest men, but who are the strongest and are in the best\ncondition.\n\nIn fact, the regular troops come to be cowards whenever the danger is\ngreater than their means of meeting it; supposing, for example, that\nthey are inferior in numbers and resources: then they are the first to\nfly, but the mere militia stand and fall on the ground (which as you\nknow really happened at the Herm\u00e6um),[22] for in the eyes of these\nflight was disgraceful and death preferable to safety bought at such a\nprice: while \u201cthe regulars\u201d originally went into the danger under a\nnotion of their own superiority, but on discovering their error they\ntook to flight,[23] having greater fear of death than of disgrace; but\nthis is not the feeling of the Brave man.\n\nThirdly, mere Animal Spirit is sometimes brought under the term\nCourage: they are thought to be Brave who are carried on by mere Animal\nSpirit, as are wild beasts against those who have wounded them, because\nin fact the really Brave have much Spirit, there being nothing like it\nfor going at danger of any kind; whence those frequent expressions in\nHomer, \u201cinfused strength into his spirit,\u201d \u201croused his strength and\nspirit,\u201d or again, \u201cand keen strength in his nostrils,\u201d \u201chis blood\nboiled:\u201d for all these seem to denote the arousing and impetuosity of\nthe Animal Spirit.\n\nNow they that are truly Brave act from a sense of honour, and this\nAnimal Spirit co-operates with them; but wild beasts from pain, that is\nbecause they have been wounded, or are frightened; since if they are\nquietly in their own haunts, forest or marsh, they do not attack men.\nSurely they are not Brave because they rush into danger when goaded on\nby pain and mere Spirit, without any view of the danger: else would\nasses be Brave when they are hungry, for though beaten they will not\nthen leave their pasture: profligate men besides do many bold actions\nby reason of their lust. We may conclude then that they are not Brave\nwho are goaded on to meet danger by pain and mere Spirit; but still\nthis temper which arises from Animal Spirit appears to be most natural,\nand would be Courage of the true kind if it could have added to it\nmoral choice and the proper motive.\n\nSo men also are pained by a feeling of anger, and take pleasure in\nrevenge; but they who fight from these causes may be good fighters, but\nthey are not truly Brave (in that they do not act from a sense of\nhonour, nor as reason directs, but merely from the present feeling),\nstill they bear some resemblance to that character.\n\nNor, again, are the Sanguine and Hopeful therefore Brave: since their\nboldness in dangers arises from their frequent victories over numerous\nfoes. The two characters are alike, however, in that both are\nconfident; but then the Brave are so from the afore-mentioned causes,\nwhereas these are so from a settled conviction of their being superior\nand not likely to suffer anything in return (they who are intoxicated\ndo much the same, for they become hopeful when in that state); but when\nthe event disappoints their expectations they run away: now it was said\nto be the character of a Brave man to withstand things which are\nfearful to man or produce that impression, because it is honourable so\nto do and the contrary is dishonourable.\n\nFor this reason it is thought to be a greater proof of Courage to be\nfearless and undisturbed under the pressure of sudden fear than under\nthat which may be anticipated, because Courage then comes rather from a\nfixed habit, or less from preparation: since as to foreseen dangers a\nman might take his line even from calculation and reasoning, but in\nthose which are sudden he will do so according to his fixed habit of\nmind.\n\nFifthly and lastly, those who are acting under Ignorance have a show of\nCourage and are not very far from the Hopeful; but still they are\ninferior inasmuch as they have no opinion of themselves; which the\nothers have, and therefore stay and contest a field for some little\ntime; but they who have been deceived fly the moment they know things\nto be otherwise than they supposed, which the Argives experienced when\nthey fell on the Laced\u00e6monians, taking them for the men of Sicyon.\n\nChapter XII.\n\nWe have described then what kind of men the Brave are, and what they\nwho are thought to be, but are not really, Brave.\n\nIt must be remarked, however, that though Courage has for its\nobject-matter boldness and fear it has not both equally so, but objects\nof fear much more than the former; for he that under pressure of these\nis undisturbed and stands related to them as he ought is better\nentitled to the name of Brave than he who is properly affected towards\nobjects of confidence. So then men are termed Brave for withstanding\npainful things.\n\nIt follows that Courage involves pain and is justly praised, since it\nis a harder matter to withstand things that are painful than to abstain\nfrom such as are pleasant.\n\nIt must not be thought but that the End and object of Courage is\npleasant, but it is obscured by the surrounding circumstances: which\nhappens also in the gymnastic games; to the boxers the End is pleasant\nwith a view to which they act, I mean the crown and the honours; but\nthe receiving the blows they do is painful and annoying to flesh and\nblood, and so is all the labour they have to undergo; and, as these\ndrawbacks are many, the object in view being small appears to have no\npleasantness in it.\n\nIf then we may say the same of Courage, of course death and wounds must\nbe painful to the Brave man and against his will: still he endures\nthese because it is honourable so to do or because it is dishonourable\nnot to do so. And the more complete his virtue and his happiness so\nmuch the more will he be pained at the notion of death: since to such a\nman as he is it is best worth while to live, and he with full\nconsciousness is deprived of the greatest goods by death, and this is a\npainful idea. But he is not the less Brave for feeling it to be so, nay\nrather it may be he is shown to be more so because he chooses the\nhonour that may be reaped in war in preference to retaining safe\npossession of these other goods. The fact is that to act with pleasure\ndoes not belong to all the virtues, except so far as a man realises the\nEnd of his actions.\n\nBut there is perhaps no reason why not such men should make the best\nsoldiers, but those who are less truly Brave but have no other good to\ncare for: these being ready to meet danger and bartering their lives\nagainst small gain.\n\nLet thus much be accepted as sufficient on the subject of Courage; the\ntrue nature of which it is not difficult to gather, in outline at\nleast, from what has been said.\n\nChapter XIII.\n\nNext let us speak of Perfected Self-Mastery, which seems to claim the\nnext place to Courage, since these two are the Excellences of the\nIrrational part of the Soul.\n\nThat it is a mean state, having for its object-matter Pleasures, we\nhave already said (Pains being in fact its object-matter in a less\ndegree and dissimilar manner), the state of utter absence of\nself-control has plainly the same object-matter; the next thing then is\nto determine what kind of Pleasures.\n\nLet Pleasures then be understood to be divided into mental and bodily:\ninstances of the former being love of honour or of learning: it being\nplain that each man takes pleasure in that of these two objects which\nhe has a tendency to like, his body being no way affected but rather\nhis intellect. Now men are not called perfectly self-mastering or\nwholly destitute of self-control in respect of pleasures of this class:\nnor in fact in respect of any which are not bodily; those for example\nwho love to tell long stories, and are prosy, and spend their days\nabout mere chance matters, we call gossips but not wholly destitute of\nself-control, nor again those who are pained at the loss of money or\nfriends.\n\nIt is bodily Pleasures then which are the object-matter of Perfected\nSelf-Mastery, but not even all these indifferently: I mean, that they\nwho take pleasure in objects perceived by the Sight, as colours, and\nforms, and painting, are not denominated men of Perfected Self-Mastery,\nor wholly destitute of self-control; and yet it would seem that one may\ntake pleasure even in such objects, as one ought to do, or excessively,\nor too little.\n\nSo too of objects perceived by the sense of Hearing; no one applies the\nterms before quoted respectively to those who are excessively pleased\nwith musical tunes or acting, or to those who take such pleasure as\nthey ought.\n\nNor again to those persons whose pleasure arises from the sense of\nSmell, except incidentally:[24] I mean, we do not say men have no\nself-control because they take pleasure in the scent of fruit, or\nflowers, or incense, but rather when they do so in the smells of\nunguents and sauces: since men destitute of self-control take pleasure\nherein, because hereby the objects of their lusts are recalled to their\nimagination (you may also see other men take pleasure in the smell of\nfood when they are hungry): but to take pleasure in such is a mark of\nthe character before named since these are objects of desire to him.\n\nNow not even brutes receive pleasure in right of these senses, except\nincidentally. I mean, it is not the scent of hares\u2019 flesh but the\neating it which dogs take pleasure in, perception of which pleasure is\ncaused by the sense of Smell. Or again, it is not the lowing of the ox\nbut eating him which the lion likes; but of the fact of his nearness\nthe lion is made sensible by the lowing, and so he appears to take\npleasure in this. In like manner, he has no pleasure in merely seeing\nor finding a stag or wild goat, but in the prospect of a meal.\n\nThe habits of Perfect Self-Mastery and entire absence of self-control\nhave then for their object-matter such pleasures as brutes also share\nin, for which reason they are plainly servile and brutish: they are\nTouch and Taste.\n\nBut even Taste men seem to make little or no use of; for to the sense\nof Taste belongs the distinguishing of flavours; what men do, in fact,\nwho are testing the quality of wines or seasoning \u201cmade dishes.\u201d\n\nBut men scarcely take pleasure at all in these things, at least those\nwhom we call destitute of self-control do not, but only in the actual\nenjoyment which arises entirely from the sense of Touch, whether in\neating or in drinking, or in grosser lusts. This accounts for the wish\nsaid to have been expressed once by a great glutton, \u201cthat his throat\nhad been formed longer than a crane\u2019s neck,\u201d implying that his pleasure\nwas derived from the Touch.\n\nThe sense then with which is connected the habit of absence of\nself-control is the most common of all the senses, and this habit would\nseem to be justly a matter of reproach, since it attaches to us not in\nso far as we are men but in so far as we are animals. Indeed it is\nbrutish to take pleasure in such things and to like them best of all;\nfor the most respectable of the pleasures arising from the touch have\nbeen set aside; those, for instance, which occur in the course of\ngymnastic training from the rubbing and the warm bath: because the\ntouch of the man destitute of self-control is not indifferently of\n_any_ part of the body but only of particular parts.\n\nNow of lusts or desires some are thought to be universal, others\npeculiar and acquired; thus desire for food is natural since every one\nwho really needs desires also food, whether solid or liquid, or both\n(and, as Homer says, the man in the prime of youth needs and desires\nintercourse with the other sex); but when we come to this or that\nparticular kind, then neither is the desire universal nor in all men is\nit directed to the same objects. And therefore the conceiving of such\ndesires plainly attaches to us as individuals. It must be admitted,\nhowever, that there is something natural in it: because different\nthings are pleasant to different men and a preference of some\nparticular objects to chance ones is universal. Well then, in the case\nof the desires which are strictly and properly natural few men go wrong\nand all in one direction, that is, on the side of too much: I mean, to\neat and drink of such food as happens to be on the table till one is\noverfilled is exceeding in quantity the natural limit, since the\nnatural desire is simply a supply of a real deficiency.\n\nFor this reason these men are called belly-mad, as filling it beyond\nwhat they ought, and it is the slavish who become of this character.\n\nBut in respect of the peculiar pleasures many men go wrong and in many\ndifferent ways; for whereas the term \u201cfond of so and so\u201d implies either\ntaking pleasure in wrong objects, or taking pleasure excessively, or as\nthe mass of men do, or in a wrong way, they who are destitute of all\nself-control exceed in all these ways; that is to say, they take\npleasure in some things in which they ought not to do so (because they\nare properly objects of detestation), and in such as it is right to\ntake pleasure in they do so more than they ought and as the mass of men\ndo.\n\nWell then, that excess with respect to pleasures is absence of\nself-control, and blameworthy, is plain. But viewing these habits on\nthe side of pains, we find that a man is not said to have the virtue\nfor withstanding them (as in the case of Courage), nor the vice for not\nwithstanding them; but the man destitute of self-control is such,\nbecause he is pained more than he ought to be at not obtaining things\nwhich are pleasant (and thus his pleasure produces pain to him), and\nthe man of Perfected Self-Mastery is such in virtue of not being pained\nby their absence, that is, by having to abstain from what is pleasant.\n\nNow the man destitute of self-control desires either all pleasant\nthings indiscriminately or those which are specially pleasant, and he\nis impelled by his desire to choose these things in preference to all\nothers; and this involves pain, not only when he misses the attainment\nof his objects but, in the very desiring them, since all desire is\naccompanied by pain. Surely it is a strange case this, being pained by\nreason of pleasure.\n\nAs for men who are defective on the side of pleasure, who take less\npleasure in things than they ought, they are almost imaginary\ncharacters, because such absence of sensual perception is not natural\nto man: for even the other animals distinguish between different kinds\nof food, and like some kinds and dislike others. In fact, could a man\nbe found who takes no pleasure in anything and to whom all things are\nalike, he would be far from being human at all: there is no name for\nsuch a character because it is simply imaginary.\n\nBut the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is in the mean with respect to\nthese objects: that is to say, he neither takes pleasure in the things\nwhich delight the vicious man, and in fact rather dislikes them, nor at\nall in improper objects; nor to any great degree in any object of the\nclass; nor is he pained at their absence; nor does he desire them; or,\nif he does, only in moderation, and neither more than he ought, nor at\nimproper times, and so forth; but such things as are conducive to\nhealth and good condition of body, being also pleasant, these he will\ngrasp at in moderation and as he ought to do, and also such other\npleasant things as do not hinder these objects, and are not unseemly or\ndisproportionate to his means; because he that should grasp at such\nwould be liking such pleasures more than is proper; but the man of\nPerfected Self-Mastery is not of this character, but regulates his\ndesires by the dictates of right reason.\n\nChapter XIV.\n\nNow the vice of being destitute of all Self-Control seems to be more\ntruly voluntary than Cowardice, because pleasure is the cause of the\nformer and pain of the latter, and pleasure is an object of choice,\npain of avoidance. And again, pain deranges and spoils the natural\ndisposition of its victim, whereas pleasure has no such effect and is\nmore voluntary and therefore more justly open to reproach.\n\nIt is so also for the following reason; that it is easier to be inured\nby habit to resist the objects of pleasure, there being many things of\nthis kind in life and the process of habituation being unaccompanied by\ndanger; whereas the case is the reverse as regards the objects of fear.\n\nAgain, Cowardice as a confirmed habit would seem to be voluntary in a\ndifferent way from the particular instances which form the habit;\nbecause it is painless, but these derange the man by reason of pain so\nthat he throws away his arms and otherwise behaves himself unseemly,\nfor which reason they are even thought by some to exercise a power of\ncompulsion.\n\nBut to the man destitute of Self-Control the particular instances are\non the contrary quite voluntary, being done with desire and direct\nexertion of the will, but the general result is less voluntary: since\nno man desires to form the habit.\n\nThe name of this vice (which signifies etymologically unchastened-ness)\nwe apply also to the faults of children, there being a certain\nresemblance between the cases: to which the name is primarily applied,\nand to which secondarily or derivatively, is not relevant to the\npresent subject, but it is evident that the later in point of time must\nget the name from the earlier. And the metaphor seems to be a very good\none; for whatever grasps after base things, and is liable to great\nincrease, ought to be chastened; and to this description desire and the\nchild answer most truly, in that children also live under the direction\nof desire and the grasping after what is pleasant is most prominently\nseen in these.\n\nUnless then the appetite be obedient and subjected to the governing\nprinciple it will become very great: for in the fool the grasping after\nwhat is pleasant is insatiable and undiscriminating; and every acting\nout of the desire increases the kindred habit, and if the desires are\ngreat and violent in degree they even expel Reason entirely; therefore\nthey ought to be moderate and few, and in no respect to be opposed to\nReason. Now when the appetite is in such a state we denominate it\nobedient and chastened.\n\nIn short, as the child ought to live with constant regard to the orders\nof its educator, so should the appetitive principle with regard to\nthose of Reason.\n\nSo then in the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, the appetitive principle\nmust be accordant with Reason: for what is right is the mark at which\nboth principles aim: that is to say, the man of perfected self-mastery\ndesires what he ought in right manner and at right times, which is\nexactly what Reason directs. Let this be taken for our account of\nPerfected Self-Mastery.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IV\n\nChapter I.\n\n\nWe will next speak of Liberality. Now this is thought to be the mean\nstate, having for its object-matter Wealth: I mean, the Liberal man is\npraised not in the circumstances of war, nor in those which constitute\nthe character of perfected self-mastery, nor again in judicial\ndecisions, but in respect of giving and receiving Wealth, chiefly the\nformer. By the term Wealth I mean \u201call those things whose worth is\nmeasured by money.\u201d\n\nNow the states of excess and defect in regard of Wealth are\nrespectively Prodigality and Stinginess: the latter of these terms we\nattach invariably to those who are over careful about Wealth, but the\nformer we apply sometimes with a complex notion; that is to say, we\ngive the name to those who fail of self-control and spend money on the\nunrestrained gratification of their passions; and this is why they are\nthought to be most base, because they have many vices at once.\n\nIt must be noted, however, that this is not a strict and proper use of\nthe term, since its natural etymological meaning is to denote him who\nhas one particular evil, viz. the wasting his substance: he is unsaved\n(as the term literally denotes) who is wasting away by his own fault;\nand this he really may be said to be; the destruction of his substance\nis thought to be a kind of wasting of himself, since these things are\nthe means of living. Well, this is our acceptation of the term\nProdigality.\n\nAgain. Whatever things are for use may be used well or ill, and Wealth\nbelongs to this class. He uses each particular thing best who has the\nvirtue to whose province it belongs: so that he will use Wealth best\nwho has the virtue respecting Wealth, that is to say, the Liberal man.\n\nExpenditure and giving are thought to be the using of money, but\nreceiving and keeping one would rather call the possessing of it. And\nso the giving to proper persons is more characteristic of the Liberal\nman, than the receiving from proper quarters and forbearing to receive\nfrom the contrary. In fact generally, doing well by others is more\ncharacteristic of virtue than being done well by, and doing things\npositively honourable than forbearing to do things dishonourable; and\nany one may see that the doing well by others and doing things\npositively honourable attaches to the act of giving, but to that of\nreceiving only the being done well by or forbearing to do what is\ndishonourable.\n\nBesides, thanks are given to him who gives, not to him who merely\nforbears to receive, and praise even more. Again, forbearing to receive\nis easier than giving, the case of being too little freehanded with\none\u2019s own being commoner than taking that which is not one\u2019s own.\n\nAnd again, it is they who give that are denominated Liberal, while they\nwho forbear to receive are commended, not on the score of Liberality\nbut of just dealing, while for receiving men are not, in fact, praised\nat all.\n\nAnd the Liberal are liked almost best of all virtuous characters,\nbecause they are profitable to others, and this their profitableness\nconsists in their giving.\n\nFurthermore: all the actions done in accordance with virtue are\nhonourable, and done from the motive of honour: and the Liberal man,\ntherefore, will give from a motive of honour, and will give rightly; I\nmean, to proper persons, in right proportion, at right times, and\nwhatever is included in the term \u201cright giving:\u201d and this too with\npositive pleasure, or at least without pain, since whatever is done in\naccordance with virtue is pleasant or at least not unpleasant, most\ncertainly not attended with positive pain.\n\nBut the man who gives to improper people, or not from a motive of\nhonour but from some other cause, shall be called not Liberal but\nsomething else. Neither shall he be so denominated who does it with\npain: this being a sign that he would prefer his wealth to the\nhonourable action, and this is no part of the Liberal man\u2019s character;\nneither will such an one receive from improper sources, because the so\nreceiving is not characteristic of one who values not wealth: nor again\nwill he be apt to ask, because one who does kindnesses to others does\nnot usually receive them willingly; but from proper sources (his own\nproperty, for instance) he will receive, doing this not as honourable\nbut as necessary, that he may have somewhat to give: neither will he be\ncareless of his own, since it is his wish through these to help others\nin need: nor will he give to chance people, that he may have wherewith\nto give to those to whom he ought, at right times, and on occasions\nwhen it is honourable so to do.\n\nAgain, it is a trait in the Liberal man\u2019s character even to exceed very\nmuch in giving so as to leave too little for himself, it being\ncharacteristic of such an one not to have a thought of self.\n\nNow Liberality is a term of relation to a man\u2019s means, for the\nLiberal-ness depends not on the amount of what is given but on the\nmoral state of the giver which gives in proportion to his means. There\nis then no reason why he should not be the more Liberal man who gives\nthe less amount, if he has less to give out of.\n\nAgain, they are thought to be more Liberal who have inherited, not\nacquired for themselves, their means; because, in the first place, they\nhave never experienced want, and next, all people love most their own\nworks, just as parents do and poets.\n\nIt is not easy for the Liberal man to be rich, since he is neither apt\nto receive nor to keep but to lavish, and values not wealth for its own\nsake but with a view to giving it away. Hence it is commonly charged\nupon fortune that they who most deserve to be rich are least so. Yet\nthis happens reasonably enough; it is impossible he should have wealth\nwho does not take any care to have it, just as in any similar case.\n\nYet he will not give to improper people, nor at wrong times, and so on:\nbecause he would not then be acting in accordance with Liberality, and\nif he spent upon such objects, would have nothing to spend on those on\nwhich he ought: for, as I have said before, he is Liberal who spends in\nproportion to his means, and on proper objects, while he who does so in\nexcess is prodigal (this is the reason why we never call despots\nprodigal, because it does not seem to be easy for them by their gifts\nand expenditure to go beyond their immense possessions).\n\nTo sum up then. Since Liberality is a mean state in respect of the\ngiving and receiving of wealth, the Liberal man will give and spend on\nproper objects, and in proper proportion, in great things and in small\nalike, and all this with pleasure to himself; also he will receive from\nright sources, and in right proportion: because, as the virtue is a\nmean state in respect of both, he will do both as he ought, and, in\nfact, upon proper giving follows the correspondent receiving, while\nthat which is not such is contrary to it. (Now those which follow one\nanother come to co-exist in the same person, those which are contraries\nplainly do not.)\n\nAgain, should it happen to him to spend money beyond what is needful,\nor otherwise than is well, he will be vexed, but only moderately and as\nhe ought; for feeling pleasure and pain at right objects, and in right\nmanner, is a property of Virtue.\n\nThe Liberal man is also a good man to have for a partner in respect of\nwealth: for he can easily be wronged, since he values not wealth, and\nis more vexed at not spending where he ought to have done so than at\nspending where he ought not, and he relishes not the maxim of\nSimonides.\n\nChapter II.\n\nBut the Prodigal man goes wrong also in these points, for he is neither\npleased nor pained at proper objects or in proper manner, which will\nbecome more plain as we proceed.\n\nWe have said already that Prodigality and Stinginess are respectively\nstates of excess and defect, and this in two things, giving and\nreceiving (expenditure of course we class under giving). Well now,\nProdigality exceeds in giving and forbearing to receive and is\ndeficient in receiving, while Stinginess is deficient in giving and\nexceeds in receiving, but it is in small things.\n\nThe two parts of Prodigality, to be sure, do not commonly go together;\nit is not easy, I mean, to give to all if you receive from none,\nbecause private individuals thus giving will soon find their means run\nshort, and such are in fact thought to be prodigal. He that should\ncombine both would seem to be no little superior to the Stingy man: for\nhe may be easily cured, both by advancing in years, and also by the\nwant of means, and he may come thus to the mean: he has, you see,\nalready the _facts_ of the Liberal man, he gives and forbears to\nreceive, only he does neither in right manner or well. So if he could\nbe wrought upon by habituation in this respect, or change in any other\nway, he would be a real Liberal man, for he will give to those to whom\nhe should, and will forbear to receive whence he ought not. This is the\nreason too why he is thought not to be low in moral character, because\nto exceed in giving and in forbearing to receive is no sign of badness\nor meanness, but only of folly.\n\nWell then, he who is Prodigal in this fashion is thought far superior\nto the Stingy man for the aforementioned reasons, and also because he\ndoes good to many, but the Stingy man to no one, not even to himself.\nBut most Prodigals, as has been said, combine with their other faults\nthat of receiving from improper sources, and on this point are Stingy:\nand they become grasping, because they wish to spend and cannot do this\neasily, since their means soon run short and they are necessitated to\nget from some other quarter; and then again, because they care not for\nwhat is honourable, they receive recklessly, and from all sources\nindifferently, because they desire to give but care not how or whence.\n\nAnd for this reason their givings are not Liberal, inasmuch as they are\nnot honourable, nor purely disinterested, nor done in right fashion;\nbut they oftentimes make those rich who should be poor, and to those\nwho are quiet respectable kind of people they will give nothing, but to\nflatterers, or those who subserve their pleasures in any way, they will\ngive much. And therefore most of them are utterly devoid of\nself-restraint; for as they are open-handed they are liberal in\nexpenditure upon the unrestrained gratification of their passions, and\nturn off to their pleasures because they do not live with reference to\nwhat is honourable.\n\nThus then the Prodigal, if unguided, slides into these faults; but if\nhe could get care bestowed on him he might come to the mean and to what\nis right.\n\nStinginess, on the contrary, is incurable: old age, for instance, and\nincapacity of any kind, is thought to make people Stingy; and it is\nmore congenial to human nature than Prodigality, the mass of men being\nfond of money rather than apt to give: moreover it extends far and has\nmany phases, the modes of stinginess being thought to be many. For as\nit consists of two things, defect of giving and excess of receiving,\neverybody does not have it entire, but it is sometimes divided, and one\nclass of persons exceed in receiving, the other are deficient in\ngiving. I mean those who are designated by such appellations as\nsparing, close-fisted, niggards, are all deficient in giving; but other\nmen\u2019s property they neither desire nor are willing to receive, in some\ninstances from a real moderation and shrinking from what is base.\n\nThere are some people whose motive, either supposed or alleged, for\nkeeping their property is this, that they may never be driven to do\nanything dishonourable: to this class belongs the skinflint, and every\none of similar character, so named from the excess of not-giving.\nOthers again decline to receive their neighbour\u2019s goods from a motive\nof fear; their notion being that it is not easy to take other people\u2019s\nthings yourself without their taking yours: so they are content neither\nto receive nor give.\n\nThe other class again who are Stingy in respect of receiving exceed in\nthat they receive anything from any source; such as they who work at\nilliberal employments, brothel keepers, and such-like, and usurers who\nlend small sums at large interest: for all these receive from improper\nsources, and improper amounts. Their common characteristic is\nbase-gaining, since they all submit to disgrace for the sake of gain\nand that small; because those who receive great things neither whence\nthey ought, nor what they ought (as for instance despots who sack\ncities and plunder temples), we denominate wicked, impious, and unjust,\nbut not Stingy.\n\nNow the dicer and bath-plunderer and the robber belong to the class of\nthe Stingy, for they are given to base gain: both busy themselves and\nsubmit to disgrace for the sake of gain, and the one class incur the\ngreatest dangers for the sake of their booty, while the others make\ngain of their friends to whom they ought to be giving.\n\nSo both classes, as wishing to make gain from improper sources, are\ngiven to base gain, and all such receivings are Stingy. And with good\nreason is Stinginess called the contrary of Liberality: both because it\nis a greater evil than Prodigality, and because men err rather in this\ndirection than in that of the Prodigality which we have spoken of as\nproperly and completely such.\n\nLet this be considered as what we have to say respecting Liberality and\nthe contrary vices.\n\nChapter III.\n\nNext in order would seem to come a dissertation on Magnificence, this\nbeing thought to be, like liberality, a virtue having for its\nobject-matter Wealth; but it does not, like that, extend to all\ntransactions in respect of Wealth, but only applies to such as are\nexpensive, and in these circumstances it exceeds liberality in respect\nof magnitude, because it is (what the very name in Greek hints at)\nfitting expense on a large scale: this term is of course relative: I\nmean, the expenditure of equipping and commanding a trireme is not the\nsame as that of giving a public spectacle: \u201cfitting\u201d of course also is\nrelative to the individual, and the matter wherein and upon which he\nhas to spend. And a man is not denominated Magnificent for spending as\nhe should do in small or ordinary things, as, for instance,\n\n\u201cOft to the wandering beggar did I give,\u201d\n\n\nbut for doing so in great matters: that is to say, the Magnificent man\nis liberal, but the liberal is not thereby Magnificent. The falling\nshort of such a state is called Meanness, the exceeding it Vulgar\nProfusion, Want of Taste, and so on; which are faulty, not because they\nare on an excessive scale in respect of right objects but, because they\nshow off in improper objects, and in improper manner: of these we will\nspeak presently. The Magnificent man is like a man of skill, because he\ncan see what is fitting, and can spend largely in good taste; for, as\nwe said at the commencement, the confirmed habit is determined by the\nseparate acts of working, and by its object-matter.\n\nWell, the expenses of the Magnificent man are great and fitting: such\nalso are his works (because this secures the expenditure being not\ngreat merely, but befitting the work). So then the work is to be\nproportionate to the expense, and this again to the work, or even above\nit: and the Magnificent man will incur such expenses from the motive of\nhonour, this being common to all the virtues, and besides he will do it\nwith pleasure and lavishly; excessive accuracy in calculation being\nMean. He will consider also how a thing may be done most beautifully\nand fittingly, rather, than for how much it may be done, and how at the\nleast expense.\n\nSo the Magnificent man must be also a liberal man, because the liberal\nman will also spend what he ought, and in right manner: but it is the\nGreat, that is to say tke large scale, which is distinctive of the\nMagnificent man, the object-matter of liberality being the same, and\nwithout spending more money than another man he will make the work more\nmagnificent. I mean, the excellence of a possession and of a work is\nnot the same: as a piece of property that thing is most valuable which\nis worth most, gold for instance; but as a work that which is great and\nbeautiful, because the contemplation of such an object is admirable,\nand so is that which is Magnificent. So the excellence of a work is\nMagnificence on a large scale. There are cases of expenditure which we\ncall honourable, such as are dedicatory offerings to the gods, and the\nfurnishing their temples, and sacrifices, and in like manner everything\nthat has reference to the Deity, and all such public matters as are\nobjects of honourable ambition, as when men think in any case that it\nis their duty to furnish a chorus for the stage splendidly, or fit out\nand maintain a trireme, or give a general public feast.\n\nNow in all these, as has been already stated, respect is had also to\nthe rank and the means of the man who is doing them: because they\nshould be proportionate to these, and befit not the work only but also\nthe doer of the work. For this reason a poor man cannot be a\nMagnificent man, since he has not means wherewith to spend largely and\nyet becomingly; and if he attempts it he is a fool, inasmuch as it is\nout of proportion and contrary to propriety, whereas to be in\naccordance with virtue a thing must be done rightly.\n\nSuch expenditure is fitting moreover for those to whom such things\npreviously belong, either through themselves or through their ancestors\nor people with whom they are connected, and to the high-born or people\nof high repute, and so on: because all these things imply greatness and\nreputation.\n\nSo then the Magnificent man is pretty much as I have described him, and\nMagnificence consists in such expenditures: because they are the\ngreatest and most honourable: and of private ones such as come but once\nfor all, marriage to wit, and things of that kind; and any occasion\nwhich engages the interest of the community in general, or of those who\nare in power; and what concerns receiving and despatching strangers;\nand gifts, and repaying gifts: because the Magnificent man is not apt\nto spend upon himself but on the public good, and gifts are pretty much\nin the same case as dedicatory offerings.\n\nIt is characteristic also of the Magnificent man to furnish his house\nsuitably to his wealth, for this also in a way reflects credit; and\nagain, to spend rather upon such works as are of long duration, these\nbeing most honourable. And again, propriety in each case, because the\nsame things are not suitable to gods and men, nor in a temple and a\ntomb. And again, in the case of expenditures, each must be great of its\nkind, and great expense on a great object is most magnificent, that is\nin any case what is great in these particular things.\n\nThere is a difference too between greatness of a work and greatness of\nexpenditure: for instance, a very beautiful ball or cup is magnificent\nas a present to a child, while the price of it is small and almost\nmean. Therefore it is characteristic of the Magnificent man to do\nmagnificently whatever he is about: for whatever is of this kind cannot\nbe easily surpassed, and bears a proper proportion to the expenditure.\n\nSuch then is the Magnificent man.\n\nThe man who is in the state of excess, called one of Vulgar Profusion,\nis in excess because he spends improperly, as has been said. I mean in\ncases requiring small expenditure he lavishes much and shows off out of\ntaste; giving his club a feast fit for a wedding-party, or if he has to\nfurnish a chorus for a comedy, giving the actors purple to wear in the\nfirst scene, as did the Megarians. And all such things he will do, not\nwith a view to that which is really honourable, but to display his\nwealth, and because he thinks he shall be admired for these things; and\nhe will spend little where he ought to spend much, and much where he\nshould spend little.\n\nThe Mean man will be deficient in every case, and even where he has\nspent the most he will spoil the whole effect for want of some trifle;\nhe is procrastinating in all he does, and contrives how he may spend\nthe least, and does even that with lamentations about the expense, and\nthinking that he does all things on a greater scale than he ought.\n\nOf course, both these states are faulty, but they do not involve\ndisgrace because they are neither hurtful to others nor very unseemly.\n\nChapter IV.\n\nThe very name of Great-mindedness implies, that great things are its\nobject-matter; and we will first settle what kind of things. It makes\nno difference, of course, whether we regard the moral state in the\nabstract or as exemplified in an individual.\n\nWell then, he is thought to be Great-minded who values himself highly\nand at the same time justly, because he that does so without grounds is\nfoolish, and no virtuous character is foolish or senseless. Well, the\ncharacter I have described is Great-minded. The man who estimates\nhimself lowly, and at the same time justly, is modest; but not\nGreat-minded, since this latter quality implies greatness, just as\nbeauty implies a large bodily conformation while small people are neat\nand well made but not beautiful.\n\nAgain, he who values himself highly without just grounds is a Vain man:\nthough the name must not be applied to every case of unduly high\nself-estimation. He that values himself below his real worth is\nSmall-minded, and whether that worth is great, moderate, or small, his\nown estimate falls below it. And he is the strongest case of this error\nwho is really a man of great worth, for what would he have done had his\nworth been less?\n\nThe Great-minded man is then, as far as greatness is concerned, at the\nsummit, but in respect of propriety he is in the mean, because he\nestimates himself at his real value (the other characters respectively\nare in excess and defect). Since then he justly estimates himself at a\nhigh, or rather at the highest possible rate, his character will have\nrespect specially to one thing: this term \u201crate\u201d has reference of\ncourse to external goods: and of these we should assume that to be the\ngreatest which we attribute to the gods, and which is the special\nobject of desire to those who are in power, and which is the prize\nproposed to the most honourable actions: now honour answers to these\ndescriptions, being the greatest of external goods. So the Great-minded\nman bears himself as he ought in respect of honour and dishonour. In\nfact, without need of words, the Great-minded plainly have honour for\ntheir object-matter: since honour is what the great consider themselves\nspecially worthy of, and according to a certain rate.\n\nThe Small-minded man is deficient, both as regards himself, and also as\nregards the estimation of the Great-minded: while the Vain man is in\nexcess as regards himself, but does not get beyond the Great-minded\nman. Now the Great-minded man, being by the hypothesis worthy of the\ngreatest things, must be of the highest excellence, since the better a\nman is the more is he worth, and he who is best is worth the most: it\nfollows then, that to be truly Great-minded a man must be good, and\nwhatever is great in each virtue would seem to belong to the\nGreat-minded. It would no way correspond with the character of the\nGreat-minded to flee spreading his hands all abroad; nor to injure any\none; for with what object in view will he do what is base, in whose\neyes nothing is great? in short, if one were to go into particulars,\nthe Great-minded man would show quite ludicrously unless he were a good\nman: he would not be in fact deserving of honour if he were a bad man,\nhonour being the prize of virtue and given to the good.\n\nThis virtue, then, of Great-mindedness seems to be a kind of ornament\nof all the other virtues, in that it makes them better and cannot be\nwithout them; and for this reason it is a hard matter to be really and\ntruly Great-minded; for it cannot be without thorough goodness and\nnobleness of character.\n\nHonour then and dishonour are specially the object-matter of the\nGreat-minded man: and at such as is great, and given by good men, he\nwill be pleased moderately as getting his own, or perhaps somewhat less\nfor no honour can be quite adequate to perfect virtue: but still he\nwill accept this because they have nothing higher to give him. But such\nas is given by ordinary people and on trifling grounds he will entirely\ndespise, because these do not come up to his deserts: and dishonour\nlikewise, because in his case there cannot be just ground for it.\n\nNow though, as I have said, honour is specially the object-matter of\nthe Great-minded man, I do not mean but that likewise in respect of\nwealth and power, and good or bad fortune of every kind, he will bear\nhimself with moderation, fall out how they may, and neither in\nprosperity will he be overjoyed nor in adversity will he be unduly\npained. For not even in respect of honour does he so bear himself; and\nyet it is the greatest of all such objects, since it is the cause of\npower and wealth being choice-worthy, for certainly they who have them\ndesire to receive honour through them. So to whom honour even is a\nsmall thing to him will all other things also be so; and this is why\nsuch men are thought to be supercilious.\n\nIt seems too that pieces of good fortune contribute to form this\ncharacter of Great-mindedness: I mean, the nobly born, or men of\ninfluence, or the wealthy, are considered to be entitled to honour, for\nthey are in a position of eminence and whatever is eminent by good is\nmore entitled to honour: and this is why such circumstances dispose men\nrather to Great-mindedness, because they receive honour at the hands of\nsome men.\n\nNow really and truly the good man alone is entitled to honour; only if\na man unites in himself goodness with these external advantages he is\nthought to be more entitled to honour: but they who have them without\nalso having virtue are not justified in their high estimate of\nthemselves, nor are they rightly denominated Great-minded; since\nperfect virtue is one of the indispensable conditions to such &\ncharacter.\n\nFurther, such men become supercilious and insolent, it not being easy\nto bear prosperity well without goodness; and not being able to bear\nit, and possessed with an idea of their own superiority to others, they\ndespise them, and do just whatever their fancy prompts; for they mimic\nthe Great-minded man, though they are not like him, and they do this in\nsuch points as they can, so without doing the actions which can only\nflow from real goodness they despise others. Whereas the Great-minded\nman despises on good grounds (for he forms his opinions truly), but the\nmass of men do it at random.\n\nMoreover, he is not a man to incur little risks, nor does he court\ndanger, because there are but few things he has a value for; but he\nwill incur great dangers, and when he does venture he is prodigal of\nhis life as knowing that there are terms on which it is not worth his\nwhile to live. He is the sort of man to do kindnesses, but he is\nashamed to receive them; the former putting a man in the position of\nsuperiority, the latter in that of inferiority; accordingly he will\ngreatly overpay any kindness done to him, because the original actor\nwill thus be laid under obligation and be in the position of the party\nbenefited. Such men seem likewise to remember those they have done\nkindnesses to, but not those from whom they have received them: because\nhe who has received is inferior to him who has done the kindness and\nour friend wishes to be superior; accordingly he is pleased to hear of\nhis own kind acts but not of those done to himself (and this is why, in\nHomer, Thetis does not mention to Jupiter the kindnesses she had done\nhim, nor did the Laced\u00e6monians to the Athenians but only the benefits\nthey had received).\n\nFurther, it is characteristic of the Great-minded man to ask favours\nnot at all, or very reluctantly, but to do a service very readily; and\nto bear himself loftily towards the great or fortunate, but towards\npeople of middle station affably; because to be above the former is\ndifficult and so a grand thing, but to be above the latter is easy; and\nto be high and mighty towards the former is not ignoble, but to do it\ntowards those of humble station would be low and vulgar; it would be\nlike parading strength against the weak.\n\nAnd again, not to put himself in the way of honour, nor to go where\nothers are the chief men; and to be remiss and dilatory, except in the\ncase of some great honour or work; and to be concerned in few things,\nand those great and famous. It is a property of him also to be open,\nboth in his dislikes and his likings, because concealment is a\nconsequent of fear. Likewise to be careful for reality rather than\nappearance, and talk and act openly (for his contempt for others makes\nhim a bold man, for which same reason he is apt to speak the truth,\nexcept where the principle of reserve comes in), but to be reserved\ntowards the generality of men.\n\nAnd to be unable to live with reference to any other but a friend;\nbecause doing so is servile, as may be seen in that all flatterers are\nlow and men in low estate are flatterers. Neither is his admiration\neasily excited, because nothing is great in his eyes; nor does he bear\nmalice, since remembering anything, and specially wrongs, is no part of\nGreat-mindedness, but rather overlooking them; nor does he talk of\nother men; in fact, he will not speak either of himself or of any\nother; he neither cares to be praised himself nor to have others\nblamed; nor again does he praise freely, and for this reason he is not\napt to speak ill even of his enemies except to show contempt and\ninsolence.\n\nAnd he is by no means apt to make laments about things which cannot be\nhelped, or requests about those which are trivial; because to be thus\ndisposed with respect to these things is consequent only upon real\nanxiety about them. Again, he is the kind of man to acquire what is\nbeautiful and unproductive rather than what is productive and\nprofitable: this being rather the part of an independent man.\n\nAlso slow motion, deep-toned voice, and deliberate style of speech, are\nthought to be characteristic of the Great-minded man: for he who is\nearnest about few things is not likely to be in a hurry, nor he who\nesteems nothing great to be very intent: and sharp tones and quickness\nare the result of these.\n\nChapter V.\n\nThis then is my idea of the Great-minded man; and he who is in the\ndefect is a Small-minded man, he who is in the excess a Vain man.\nHowever, as we observed in respect of the last character we discussed,\nthese extremes are not thought to be vicious exactly, but only\nmistaken, for they do no harm.\n\nThe Small-minded man, for instance, being really worthy of good\ndeprives himself of his deserts, and seems to have somewhat faulty from\nnot having a sufficiently high estimate of his own desert, in fact from\nself-ignorance: because, but for this, he would have grasped after what\nhe really is entitled to, and that is good. Still such characters are\nnot thought to be foolish, but rather laggards. But the having such an\nopinion of themselves seems to have a deteriorating effect on the\ncharacter: because in all cases men\u2019s aims are regulated by their\nsupposed desert, and thus these men, under a notion of their own want\nof desert, stand aloof from honourable actions and courses, and\nsimilarly from external goods.\n\nBut the Vain are foolish and self-ignorant, and that palpably: because\nthey attempt honourable things, as though they were worthy, and then\nthey are detected. They also set themselves off, by dress, and\ncarriage, and such-like things, and desire that their good\ncircumstances may be seen, and they talk of them under the notion of\nreceiving honour thereby. Small-mindedness rather than Vanity is\nopposed to Great-mindedness, because it is more commonly met with and\nis worse.\n\nChapter VI.\n\nWell, the virtue of Great-mindedness has for its object great Honour,\nas we have said: and there seems to be a virtue having Honour also for\nits object (as we stated in the former book), which may seem to bear to\nGreat-mindedness the same relation that Liberality does to\nMagnificence: that is, both these virtues stand aloof from what is\ngreat but dispose us as we ought to be disposed towards moderate and\nsmall matters. Further: as in giving and receiving of wealth there is a\nmean state, an excess, and a defect, so likewise in grasping after\nHonour there is the more or less than is right, and also the doing so\nfrom right sources and in right manner.\n\nFor we blame the lover of Honour as aiming at Honour more than he\nought, and from wrong sources; and him who is destitute of a love of\nHonour as not choosing to be honoured even for what is noble. Sometimes\nagain we praise the lover of Honour as manly and having a love for what\nis noble, and him who has no love for it as being moderate and modest\n(as we noticed also in the former discussion of these virtues).\n\nIt is clear then that since \u201cLover of so and so\u201d is a term capable of\nseveral meanings, we do not always denote the same quality by the term\n\u201cLover of Honour;\u201d but when we use it as a term of commendation we\ndenote more than the mass of men are; when for blame more than a man\nshould be.\n\nAnd the mean state having no proper name the extremes seem to dispute\nfor it as unoccupied ground: but of course where there is excess and\ndefect there must be also the mean. And in point of fact, men do grasp\nat Honour more than they should, and less, and sometimes just as they\nought; for instance, this state is praised, being a mean state in\nregard of Honour, but without any appropriate name. Compared with what\nis called Ambition it shows like a want of love for Honour, and\ncompared with this it shows like Ambition, or compared with both, like\nboth faults: nor is this a singular case among the virtues. Here the\nextreme characters appear to be opposed, because the mean has no name\nappropriated to it.\n\nChapter VII.\n\nMeekness is a mean state, having for its object-matter Anger: and as\nthe character in the mean has no name, and we may almost say the same\nof the extremes, we give the name of Meekness (leaning rather to the\ndefect, which has no name either) to the character in the mean.\n\nThe excess may be called an over-aptness to Anger: for the passion is\nAnger, and the producing causes many and various. Now he who is angry\nat what and with whom he ought, and further, in right manner and time,\nand for proper length of time, is praised, so this Man will be Meek\nsince Meekness is praised. For the notion represented by the term Meek\nman is the being imperturbable, and not being led away by passion, but\nbeing angry in that manner, and at those things, and for that length of\ntime, which Reason may direct. This character however is thought to err\nrather on the side of defect, inasmuch as he is not apt to take revenge\nbut rather to make allowances and forgive. And the defect, call it\nAngerlessness or what you will, is blamed: I mean, they who are not\nangry at things at which they ought to be angry are thought to be\nfoolish, and they who are angry not in right manner, nor in right time,\nnor with those with whom they ought; for a man who labours under this\ndefect is thought to have no perception, nor to be pained, and to have\nno tendency to avenge himself, inasmuch as he feels no anger: now to\nbear with scurrility in one\u2019s own person, and patiently see one\u2019s own\nfriends suffer it, is a slavish thing.\n\nAs for the excess, it occurs in all forms; men are angry with those\nwith whom, and at things with which, they ought not to be, and more\nthan they ought, and too hastily, and for too great a length of time. I\ndo not mean, however, that these are combined in any one person: that\nwould in fact be impossible, because the evil destroys itself, and if\nit is developed in its full force it becomes unbearable.\n\nNow those whom we term the Passionate are soon angry, and with people\nwith whom and at things at which they ought not, and in an excessive\ndegree, but they soon cool again, which is the best point about them.\nAnd this results from their not repressing their anger, but repaying\ntheir enemies (in that they show their feeings by reason of their\nvehemence), and then they have done with it.\n\nThe Choleric again are excessively vehement, and are angry at\neverything, and on every occasion; whence comes their Greek name\nsignifying that their choler lies high.\n\nThe Bitter-tempered are hard to reconcile and keep their anger for a\nlong while, because they repress the feeling: but when they have\nrevenged themselves then comes a lull; for the vengeance destroys their\nanger by producing pleasure in lieu of pain. But if this does not\nhappen they keep the weight on their minds: because, as it does not\nshow itself, no one attempts to reason it away, and digesting anger\nwithin one\u2019s self takes time. Such men are very great nuisances to\nthemselves and to their best friends.\n\nAgain, we call those Cross-grained who are angry at wrong objects, and\nin excessive degree, and for too long a time, and who are not appeased\nwithout vengeance or at least punishing the offender.\n\nTo Meekness we oppose the excess rather than the defect, because it is\nof more common occurrence: for human nature is more disposed to take\nthan to forgo revenge. And the Cross-grained are worse to live with\n[than they who are too phlegmatic].\n\nNow, from what has been here said, that is also plain which was said\nbefore. I mean, it is no easy matter to define how, and with what\npersons, and at what kind of things, and how long one ought to be\nangry, and up to what point a person is right or is wrong. For he that\ntransgresses the strict rule only a little, whether on the side of too\nmuch or too little, is not blamed: sometimes we praise those who are\ndeficient in the feeling and call them Meek, sometimes we call the\nirritable Spirited as being well qualified for government. So it is not\neasy to lay down, in so many words, for what degree or kind of\ntransgression a man is blameable: because the decision is in\nparticulars, and rests therefore with the Moral Sense. Thus much,\nhowever, is plain, that the mean state is praiseworthy, in virtue of\nwhich we are angry with those with whom, and at those things with\nwhich, we ought to be angry, and in right manner, and so on; while the\nexcesses and defects are blameable, slightly so if only slight, more so\nif greater, and when considerable very blameable.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that the mean state is what we are to hold to.\n\nThis then is to be taken as our account of the various moral states\nwhich have Anger for their object-matter.\n\nChapter VIII.\n\nNext, as regards social intercourse and interchange of words and acts,\nsome men are thought to be Over-Complaisant who, with a view solely to\ngiving pleasure, agree to everything and never oppose, but think their\nline is to give no pain to those they are thrown amongst: they, on the\nother hand, are called Cross and Contentious who take exactly the\ncontrary line to these, and oppose in everything, and have no care at\nall whether they give pain or not.\n\nNow it is quite clear of course, that the states I have named are\nblameable, and that the mean between them is praiseworthy, in virtue of\nwhich a man will let pass what he ought as he ought, and also will\nobject in like manner. However, this state has no name appropriated,\nbut it is most like Friendship; since the man who exhibits it is just\nthe kind of man whom we would call the amiable friend, with the\naddition of strong earnest affection; but then this is the very point\nin which it differs from Friendship, that it is quite independent of\nany feeling or strong affection for those among whom the man mixes: I\nmean, that he takes everything as he ought, not from any feeling of\nlove or hatred, but simply because his natural disposition leads him to\ndo so; he will do it alike to those whom he does know and those whom he\ndoes not, and those with whom he is intimate and those with whom he is\nnot; only in each case as propriety requires, because it is not fitting\nto care alike for intimates and strangers, nor again to pain them\nalike.\n\nIt has been stated in a general way that his social intercourse will be\nregulated by propriety, and his aim will be to avoid giving pain and to\ncontribute to pleasure, but with a constant reference to what is noble\nand expedient.\n\nHis proper object-matter seems to be the pleasures and pains which\narise out of social intercourse, but whenever it is not honourable or\neven hurtful to him to contribute to pleasure, in these instances he\nwill run counter and prefer to give pain.\n\nOr if the things in question involve unseemliness to the doer, and this\nnot inconsiderable, or any harm, whereas his opposition will cause some\nlittle pain, here he will not agree but will run counter.\n\nAgain, he will regulate differently his intercourse with great men and\nwith ordinary men, and with all people according to the knowledge he\nhas of them; and in like manner, taking in any other differences which\nmay exist, giving to each his due, and in itself preferring to give\npleasure and cautious not to give pain, but still guided by the\nresults, I mean by what is noble and expedient according as they\npreponderate.\n\nAgain, he will inflict trifling pain with a view to consequent\npleasure.\n\nWell, the man bearing the mean character is pretty well such as I have\ndescribed him, but he has no name appropriated to him: of those who try\nto give pleasure, the man who simply and disinterestedly tries to be\nagreeable is called Over-Complaisant, he who does it with a view to\nsecure some profit in the way of wealth, or those things which wealth\nmay procure, is a Flatterer: I have said before, that the man who is\n\u201calways non-content\u201d is Cross and Contentious. Here the extremes have\nthe appearance of being opposed to one another, because the mean has no\nappropriate name.\n\nChapter IX.\n\nThe mean state which steers clear of Exaggeration has pretty much the\nsame object-matter as the last we described, and likewise has no name\nappropriated to it. Still it may be as well to go over these states:\nbecause, in the first place, by a particular discussion of each we\nshall be better acquainted with the general subject of moral character,\nand next we shall be the more convinced that the virtues are mean\nstates by seeing that this is universally the case.\n\nIn respect then of living in society, those who carry on this\nintercourse with a view to pleasure and pain have been already spoken\nof; we will now go on to speak of those who are True or False, alike in\ntheir words and deeds and in the claims which they advance.\n\nNow the Exaggerator is thought to have a tendency to lay claim to\nthings reflecting credit on him, both when they do not belong to him at\nall and also in greater degree than that in which they really do:\nwhereas the Reserved man, on the contrary, denies those which really\nbelong to him or else depreciates them, while the mean character being\na Plain-matter-of-fact person is Truthful in life and word, admitting\nthe existence of what does really belong to him and making it neither\ngreater nor less than the truth.\n\nIt is possible of course to take any of these lines either with or\nwithout some further view: but in general men speak, and act, and live,\neach according to his particular character and disposition, unless\nindeed a man is acting from any special motive.\n\nNow since falsehood is in itself low and blameable, while truth is\nnoble and praiseworthy, it follows that the Truthful man (who is also\nin the mean) is praiseworthy, and the two who depart from strict truth\nare both blameable, but especially the Exaggerator.\n\nWe will now speak of each, and first of the Truthful man: I call him\nTruthful, because we are not now meaning the man who is true in his\nagreements nor in such matters as amount to justice or injustice (this\nwould come within the province of a different virtue), but, in such as\ndo not involve any such serious difference as this, the man we are\ndescribing is true in life and word simply because he is in a certain\nmoral state.\n\nAnd he that is such must be judged to be a good man: for he that has a\nlove for Truth as such, and is guided by it in matters indifferent,\nwill be so likewise even more in such as are not indifferent; for\nsurely he will have a dread of falsehood as base, since he shunned it\neven in itself: and he that is of such a character is praiseworthy, yet\nhe leans rather to that which is below the truth, this having an\nappearance of being in better taste because exaggerations are so\nhateful.\n\nAs for the man who lays claim to things above what really belongs to\nhim _without_ any special motive, he is like a base man because he\nwould not otherwise have taken pleasure in falsehood, but he shows as a\nfool rather than as a knave. But if a man does this _with_ a special\nmotive, suppose for honour or glory, as the Braggart does, then he is\nnot so very blameworthy, but if, directly or indirectly, for pecuniary\nconsiderations, he is more unseemly.\n\nNow the Braggart is such not by his power but by his purpose, that is\nto say, in virtue of his moral state, and because he is a man of a\ncertain kind; just as there are liars who take pleasure in falsehood\nfor its own sake while others lie from a desire of glory or gain. They\nwho exaggerate with a view to glory pretend to such qualities as are\nfollowed by praise or highest congratulation; they who do it with a\nview to gain assume those which their neighbours can avail themselves\nof, and the absence of which can be concealed, as a man\u2019s being a\nskilful soothsayer or physician; and accordingly most men pretend to\nsuch things and exaggerate in this direction, because the faults I have\nmentioned are in them.\n\nThe Reserved, who depreciate their own qualities, have the appearance\nof being more refined in their characters, because they are not thought\nto speak with a view to gain but to avoid grandeur: one very common\ntrait in such characters is their denying common current opinions, as\nSocrates used to do. There are people who lay claim falsely to small\nthings and things the falsity of their pretensions to which is obvious;\nthese are called Factotums and are very despicable.\n\nThis very Reserve sometimes shows like Exaggeration; take, for\ninstance, the excessive plainness of dress affected by the\nLaced\u00e6monians: in fact, both excess and the extreme of deficiency\npartake of the nature of Exaggeration. But they who practise Reserve in\nmoderation, and in cases in which the truth is not very obvious and\nplain, give an impression of refinement. Here it is the Exaggerator (as\nbeing the worst character) who appears to be opposed to the Truthful\nMan.\n\nChapter X.\n\nNext, as life has its pauses and in them admits of pastime combined\nwith Jocularity, it is thought that in this respect also there is a\nkind of fitting intercourse, and that rules may be prescribed as to the\nkind of things one should say and the manner of saying them; and in\nrespect of hearing likewise (and there will be a difference between the\nsaying and hearing such and such things). It is plain that in regard to\nthese things also there will be an excess and defect and a mean.\n\nNow they who exceed in the ridiculous are judged to be Buffoons and\nVulgar, catching at it in any and every way and at any cost, and aiming\nrather at raising laughter than at saying what is seemly and at\navoiding to pain the object of their wit. They, on the other hand, who\nwould not for the world make a joke themselves and are displeased with\nsuch as do are thought to be Clownish and Stern. But they who are\nJocular in good taste are denominated by a Greek term expressing\nproperly ease of movement, because such are thought to be, as one may\nsay, motions of the moral character; and as bodies are judged of by\ntheir motions so too are moral characters.\n\nNow as the ridiculous lies on the surface, and the majority of men take\nmore pleasure than they ought in Jocularity and Jesting, the Buffoons\ntoo get this name of Easy Pleasantry, as if refined and gentlemanlike;\nbut that they differ from these, and considerably too, is plain from\nwhat has been said.\n\nOne quality which belongs to the mean state is Tact: it is\ncharacteristic of a man of Tact to say and listen to such things as are\nfit for a good man and a gentleman to say and listen to: for there are\nthings which are becoming for such a one to say and listen to in the\nway of Jocularity, and there is a difference between the Jocularity of\nthe Gentleman and that of the Vulgarian; and again, between that of the\neducated and uneducated man. This you may see from a comparison of the\nOld and New Comedy: in the former obscene talk made the fun; in the\nlatter it is rather innuendo: and this is no slight difference _as\nregards decency_.\n\nWell then, are we to characterise him who jests well by his saying what\nis becoming a gentleman, or by his avoiding to pain the object of his\nwit, or even by his giving him pleasure? or will not such a definition\nbe vague, since different things are hateful and pleasant to different\nmen?\n\nBe this as it may, whatever he says such things will he also listen to,\nsince it is commonly held that a man will do what he will bear to hear:\nthis must, however, be limited; a man will not do quite all that he\nwill hear: because jesting is a species of scurrility and there are\nsome points of scurrility forbidden by law; it may be certain points of\njesting should have been also so forbidden. So then the refined and\ngentlemanlike man will bear himself thus as being a law to himself.\nSuch is the mean character, whether denominated the man of Tact or of\nEasy Pleasantry.\n\nBut the Buffoon cannot resist the ridiculous, sparing neither himself\nnor any one else so that he can but raise his laugh, saying things of\nsuch kind as no man of refinement would say and some which he would not\neven tolerate if said by others in his hearing.\n\nThe Clownish man is for such intercourse wholly useless: inasmuch as\ncontributing nothing jocose of his own he is savage with all who do.\n\nYet some pause and amusement in life are generally judged to be\nindispensable.\n\nThe three mean states which have been described do occur in life, and\nthe object-matter of all is interchange of words and deeds. They\ndiffer, in that one of them is concerned with truth, and the other two\nwith the pleasurable: and of these two again, the one is conversant\nwith the jocosities of life, the other with all other points of social\nintercourse.\n\nChapter XI.\n\nTo speak of Shame as a Virtue is incorrect, because it is much more\nlike a feeling than a moral state. It is defined, we know, to be \u201ca\nkind of fear of disgrace,\u201d and its effects are similar to those of the\nfear of danger, for they who feel Shame grow red and they who fear\ndeath turn pale. So both are evidently in a way physical, which is\nthought to be a mark of a feeling rather than a moral state.\n\nMoreover, it is a feeling not suitable to every age, but only to youth:\nwe do think that the young should be Shamefaced, because since they\nlive at the beck and call of passion they do much that is wrong and\nShame acts on them as a check. In fact, we praise such young men as are\nShamefaced, but no one would ever praise an old man for being given to\nit, inasmuch as we hold that he ought not to do things which cause\nShame; for Shame, since it arises at low bad actions, does not at all\nbelong to the good man, because such ought not to be done at all: nor\ndoes it make any difference to allege that some things are disgraceful\nreally, others only because they are thought so; for neither should be\ndone, so that a man ought not to be in the position of feeling Shame.\nIn truth, to be such a man as to do anything disgraceful is the part of\na faulty character. And for a man to be such that he would feel Shame\nif he should do anything disgraceful, and to think that this\nconstitutes him a good man, is absurd: because Shame is felt at\nvoluntary actions only, and a good man will never voluntarily do what\nis base.\n\nTrue it is, that Shame may be good on a certain supposition, as \u201cif a\nman should do such things, he would feel Shame:\u201d but then the Virtues\nare good in themselves, and not merely in supposed cases. And, granted\nthat impudence and the not being ashamed to do what is disgraceful is\nbase, it does not the more follow that it is good for a man to do such\nthings and feel Shame.\n\nNor is Self-Control properly a Virtue, but a kind of mixed state:\nhowever, all about this shall be set forth in a future Book.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK V\n\nChapter I.\n\n\nNow the points for our enquiry in respect of Justice and Injustice are,\nwhat kind of actions are their object-matter, and what kind of a mean\nstate Justice is, and between what points the abstract principle of it,\ni.e. the Just, is a mean. And our enquiry shall be, if you please,\nconducted in the same method as we have observed in the foregoing parts\nof this Treatise.\n\nWe see then that all men mean by the term Justice a moral state such\nthat in consequence of it men have the capacity of doing what is just,\nand actually do it, and wish it:[1] similarly also with respect to\nInjustice, a moral state such that in consequence of it men do unjustly\nand wish what is unjust: let us also be content then with these as a\nground-work sketched out.\n\nI mention the two, because the same does not hold with regard to States\nwhether of mind or body as with regard to Sciences or Faculties: I mean\nthat whereas it is thought that the same Faculty or Science embraces\ncontraries, a State will not: from health, for instance, not the\ncontrary acts are done but the healthy ones only; we say a man walks\nhealthily when he walks as the healthy man would.\n\nHowever, of the two contrary states the one may be frequently known\nfrom the other, and oftentimes the states from their subject-matter: if\nit be seen clearly what a good state of body is, then is it also seen\nwhat a bad state is, and from the things which belong to a good state\nof body the good state itself is seen, and _vice vers\u00e2_. If, for\ninstance, the good state is firmness of flesh it follows that the bad\nstate is flabbiness of flesh; and whatever causes firmness of flesh is\nconnected with the good state.\n\nIt follows moreover in general,[2] that if of two contrary terms the\none is used in many senses so also will the other be; as, for instance,\nif \u201cthe Just,\u201d then also \u201cthe Unjust.\u201d Now Justice and Injustice do\nseem to be used respectively in many senses, but, because the line of\ndemarcation between these is very fine and minute,[3] it commonly\nescapes notice that they are thus used, and it is not plain and\nmanifest as where the various significations of terms are widely\ndifferent for in these last the visible difference is great, for\ninstance, the word \u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 is used equivocally to denote the bone which\nis under the neck of animals and the instrument with which people close\ndoors.\n\nLet it be ascertained then in how many senses the term \u201cUnjust man\u201d is\nused. Well, he who violates the law, and he who is a grasping man, and\nthe unequal man, are all thought to be Unjust and so manifestly the\nJust man will be, the man who acts according to law, and the equal man\n\u201cThe Just\u201d then will be the lawful and the equal, and \u201cthe Unjust\u201d the\nunlawful and the unequal.\n\nWell, since the Unjust man is also a grasping man, he will be so, of\ncourse, with respect to good things, but not of every kind, only those\nwhich are the subject-matter of good and bad fortune and which are in\nthemselves always good but not always to the individual.[4] Yet men\npray for and pursue these things: this they should not do but pray that\nthings which are in the abstract good may be so also to them, and\nchoose what is good for themselves.\n\nBut the Unjust man does not always choose actually the greater part,\nbut even sometimes the less; as in the case of things which are simply\nevil: still, since the less evil is thought to be in a manner a good\nand the grasping is after good, therefore even in this case he is\nthought to be a grasping man, _i.e._ one who strives for more good than\nfairly falls to his share: of course he is also an unequal man, this\nbeing an inclusive and common term.\n\nChapter II.\n\nWe said that the violator of Law is Unjust, and the keeper of the Law\nJust: further, it is plain that all Lawful things are in a manner Just,\nbecause by Lawful we understand what have been defined by the\nlegislative power and each of these we say is Just. The Laws too give\ndirections on all points, aiming either at the common good of all, or\nthat of the best, or that of those in power (taking for the standard\nreal goodness or adopting some other estimate); in one way we mean by\nJust, those things which are apt to produce and preserve happiness and\nits ingredients for the social community.\n\nFurther, the Law commands the doing the deeds not only of the brave man\n(as not leaving the ranks, nor flying, nor throwing away one\u2019s arms),\nbut those also of the perfectly self-mastering man, as abstinence from\nadultery and wantonness; and those of the meek man, as refraining from\nstriking others or using abusive language: and in like manner in\nrespect of the other virtues and vices commanding some things and\nforbidding others, rightly if it is a good law, in a way somewhat\ninferior if it is one extemporised.\n\nNow this Justice is in fact perfect Virtue, yet not simply so but as\nexercised towards one\u2019s neighbour: and for this reason Justice is\nthought oftentimes to be the best of the Virtues, and\n\n\u201cneither Hesper nor the Morning-star\nSo worthy of our admiration:\u201d\n\n\nand in a proverbial saying we express the same;\n\n\u201cAll virtue is in Justice comprehended.\u201d\n\n\nAnd it is in a special sense perfect Virtue because it is the practice\nof perfect Virtue. And perfect it is because he that has it is able to\npractise his virtue towards his neighbour and not merely on himself; I\nmean, there are many who can practise virtue in the regulation of their\nown personal conduct who are wholly unable to do it in transactions\nwith their neighbour. And for this reason that saying of Bias is\nthought to be a good one,\n\n\u201cRule will show what a man is;\u201d\n\n\nfor he who bears Rule is necessarily in contact with others, i.e. in a\ncommunity. And for this same reason Justice alone of all the Virtues is\nthought to be a good to others, because it has immediate relation to\nsome other person, inasmuch as the Just man does what is advantageous\nto another, either to his ruler or fellow-subject. Now he is the basest\nof men who practises vice not only in his own person,[5] but towards\nhis friends also; but he the best who practises virtue not merely in\nhis own person but towards his neighbour, for this is a matter of some\ndifficulty.\n\nHowever, Justice in this sense is not a part of Virtue but is\nco-extensive with Virtue; nor is the Injustice which answers to it a\npart of Vice but co-extensive with Vice. Now wherein Justice in this\nsense differs from Virtue appears from what has been said: it is the\nsame really, but the point of view is not the same: in so far as it has\nrespect to one\u2019s neighbour it is Justice, in so far as it is such and\nsuch a moral state it is simply Virtue.\n\nChapter III.\n\nBut the object of our enquiry is Justice, in the sense in which it is a\npart of Virtue (for there is such a thing, as we commonly say), and\nlikewise with respect to particular Injustice. And of the existence of\nthis last the following consideration is a proof: there are many vices\nby practising which a man acts unjustly, of course, but does not grasp\nat more than his share of good; if, for instance, by reason of\ncowardice he throws away his shield, or by reason of ill-temper he uses\nabusive language, or by reason of stinginess does not give a friend\npecuniary assistance; but whenever he does a grasping action, it is\noften in the way of none of these vices, certainly not in all of them,\nstill in the way of some vice or other (for we blame him), and in the\nway of Injustice. There is then some kind of Injustice distinct from\nthat co-extensive with Vice and related to it as a part to a whole, and\nsome \u201cUnjust\u201d related to that which is co-extensive with violation of\nthe law as a part to a whole.\n\nAgain, suppose one man seduces a man\u2019s wife with a view to gain and\nactually gets some advantage by it,[6] and another does the same from\nimpulse of lust, at an expense of money and damage; this latter will be\nthought to be rather destitute of self-mastery than a grasping man, and\nthe former Unjust but not destitute of self-mastery: now why? plainly\nbecause of his gaining.\n\nAgain, all other acts of Injustice we refer to some particular\ndepravity, as, if a man commits adultery, to abandonment to his\npassions; if he deserts his comrade, to cowardice; if he strikes\nanother, to anger: but if he gains by the act to no other vice than to\nInjustice.\n\nThus it is clear that there is a kind of Injustice different from and\nbesides that which includes all Vice, having the same name because the\ndefinition is in the same genus; for both have their force in dealings\nwith others, but the one acts upon honour, or wealth, or safety, or by\nwhatever one name we can include all these things, and is actuated by\npleasure attendant on gain, while the other acts upon all things which\nconstitute the sphere of the good man\u2019s action.\n\nChapter IV.\n\nNow that there is more than one kind of Justice, and that there is one\nwhich is distinct from and besides that which is co-extensive with,\nVirtue, is plain: we must next ascertain what it is, and what are its\ncharacteristics.\n\nWell, the Unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unequal,\nand the Just accordingly into the lawful and the equal: the\naforementioned Injustice is in the way of the unlawful. And as the\nunequal and the more[7] are not the same, but differing as part to\nwhole (because all more is unequal, but not all unequal more), so the\nUnjust and the Injustice we are now in search of are not the same with,\nbut other than, those before mentioned, the one being the parts, the\nother the wholes; for this particular Injustice is a part of the\nInjustice co-extensive with Vice, and likewise this Justice of the\nJustice co-extensive with Virtue. So that what we have now to speak of\nis the particular Justice and Injustice, and likewise the particular\nJust and Unjust.\n\nHere then let us dismiss any further consideration of the Justice\nranking as co-extensive with Virtue (being the practice of Virtue in\nall its bearings towards others), and of the co-relative Injustice\n(being similarly the practice of Vice). It is clear too, that we must\nseparate off the Just and the Unjust involved in these: because one may\npretty well say that most lawful things are those which naturally\nresult in action from Virtue in its fullest sense, because the law\nenjoins the living in accordance with each Virtue and forbids living in\naccordance with each Vice. And the producing causes of Virtue in all\nits bearings are those enactments which have been made respecting\neducation for society.\n\nBy the way, as to individual education, in respect of which a man is\nsimply good without reference to others, whether it is the province of\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 or some other science we must determine at a future time: for\nit may be it is not the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen\nin every case.[8]\n\nChapter V.\n\nNow of the Particular Justice, and the Just involved in it, one species\nis that which is concerned in the distributions of honour, or wealth,\nor such other things as are to be shared among the members of the\nsocial community (because in these one man as compared with another may\nhave either an equal or an unequal share), and the other is that which\nis Corrective in the various transactions between man and man.\n\nAnd of this latter there are two parts: because of transactions some\nare voluntary and some involuntary; voluntary, such as follow; selling,\nbuying, use, bail, borrowing, deposit, hiring: and this class is called\nvoluntary because the origination of these transactions is voluntary.\n\nThe involuntary again are either such as effect secrecy; as theft,\nadultery, poisoning, pimping, kidnapping of slaves, assassination,\nfalse witness; or accompanied with open violence; as insult, bonds,\ndeath, plundering, maiming, foul language, slanderous abuse.\n\nChapter VI.\n\nWell, the unjust man we have said is unequal, and the abstract \u201cUnjust\u201d\nunequal: further, it is plain that there is some mean of the unequal,\nthat is to say, the equal or exact half (because in whatever action\nthere is the greater and the less there is also the equal, i.e. the\nexact half). If then the Unjust is unequal the Just is equal, which all\nmust allow without further proof: and as the equal is a mean the Just\nmust be also a mean. Now the equal implies two terms at least: it\nfollows then that the Just is both a mean and equal, and these to\ncertain persons; and, in so far as it is a mean, between certain things\n(that is, the greater and the less), and, so far as it is equal,\nbetween two, and in so far as it is just it is so to certain persons.\nThe Just then must imply four terms at least, for those[9]  to which it\nis just are two, and the terms representing the things are two.\n\nAnd there will be the same equality between the terms representing the\npersons, as between those representing the things: because as the\nlatter are to one another so are the former: for if the persons are not\nequal they must not have equal shares; in fact this is the very source\nof all the quarrelling and wrangling in the world, when either they who\nare equal have and get awarded to them things not equal, or being not\nequal those things which are equal. Again, the necessity of this\nequality of ratios is shown by the common phrase \u201caccording to rate,\u201d\nfor all agree that the Just in distributions ought to be according to\nsome rate: but what that rate is to be, all do not agree; the democrats\nare for freedom, oligarchs for wealth, others for nobleness of birth,\nand the aristocratic party for virtue.\n\nThe Just, then, is a certain proportionable thing. For proportion does\nnot apply merely to number in the abstract,[10] but to number\ngenerally, since it is equality of ratios, and implies four terms at\nleast (that this is the case in what may be called discrete proportion\nis plain and obvious, but it is true also in continual proportion, for\nthis uses the one term as two, and mentions it twice; thus A:B:C may be\nexpressed A:B::B:C. In the first, B is named twice; and so, if, as in\nthe second, B is actually written twice, the proportionals will be\nfour): and the Just likewise implies four terms at the least, and the\nratio between the two pair of terms is the same, because the persons\nand the things are divided similarly. It will stand then thus,\nA:B::C:D, and then permutando A:C::B:D, and then (supposing C and D to\nrepresent the things) A+C:B+D::A:B. The distribution in fact consisting\nin putting together these terms thus: and if they are put together so\nas to preserve this same ratio, the distribution puts them together\njustly.[11] So then the joining together of the first and third and\nsecond and fourth proportionals is the Just in the distribution, and\nthis Just is the mean relatively to that which violates the\nproportionate, for the proportionate is a mean and the Just is\nproportionate. Now mathematicians call this kind of proportion\ngeometrical: for in geometrical proportion the whole is to the whole as\neach part to each part. Furthermore this proportion is not continual,\nbecause the person and thing do not make up one term.\n\nThe Just then is this proportionate, and the Unjust that which violates\nthe proportionate; and so there comes to be the greater and the less:\nwhich in fact is the case in actual transactions, because he who acts\nunjustly has the greater share and he who is treated unjustly has the\nless of what is good: but in the case of what is bad this is reversed:\nfor the less evil compared with the greater comes to be reckoned for\ngood, because the less evil is more choice-worthy than the greater, and\nwhat is choice-worthy is good, and the more so the greater good.\n\nThis then is the one species of the Just.\n\nChapter VII.\n\nAnd the remaining one is the Corrective, which arises in voluntary as\nwell as involuntary transactions. Now this just has a different form\nfrom the aforementioned; for that which is concerned in distribution of\ncommon property is always according to the aforementioned proportion: I\nmean that, if the division is made out of common property, the shares\nwill bear the same proportion to one another as the original\ncontributions did: and the Unjust which is opposite to this Just is\nthat which violates the proportionate.\n\nBut the Just which arises in transactions between men is an equal in a\ncertain sense, and the Unjust an unequal, only not in the way of that\nproportion but of arithmetical.[12] Because it makes no difference\nwhether a robbery, for instance, is committed by a good man on a bad or\nby a bad man on a good, nor whether a good or a bad man has committed\nadultery: the law looks only to the difference created by the injury\nand treats the men as previously equal, where the one does and the\nother suffers injury, or the one has done and the other suffered harm.\nAnd so this Unjust, being unequal, the judge endeavours to reduce to\nequality again, because really when the one party has been wounded and\nthe other has struck him, or the one kills and the other dies, the\nsuffering and the doing are divided into unequal shares; well, the\njudge tries to restore equality by penalty, thereby taking from the\ngain.\n\nFor these terms gain and loss are applied to these cases, though\nperhaps the term in some particular instance may not be strictly\nproper, as gain, for instance, to the man who has given a blow, and\nloss to him who has received it: still, when the suffering has been\nestimated, the one is called loss and the other gain.\n\nAnd so the equal is a mean between the more and the less, which\nrepresent gain and loss in contrary ways (I mean, that the more of good\nand the less of evil is gain, the less of good and the more of evil is\nloss): between which the equal was stated to be a mean, which equal we\nsay is Just: and so the Corrective Just must be the mean between loss\nand gain. And this is the reason why, upon a dispute arising, men have\nrecourse to the judge: going to the judge is in fact going to the Just,\nfor the judge is meant to be the personification of the Just.[13] And\nmen seek a judge as one in the mean, which is expressed in a name given\nby some to judges (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9, or middle-men) under the notion that if\nthey can hit on the mean they shall hit on the Just. The Just is then\nsurely a mean since the judge is also.\n\nSo it is the office of a judge to make things equal, and the line, as\nit were, having been unequally divided, he takes from the greater part\nthat by which it exceeds the half, and adds this on to the less. And\nwhen the whole is divided into two exactly equal portions then men say\nthey have their own, when they have gotten the equal; and the equal is\na mean between the greater and the less according to arithmetical\nequality.\n\nThis, by the way, accounts for the etymology of the term by which we in\nGreek express the ideas of Just and Judge; (\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd quasi \u03b4\u03af\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, that\nis in two parts, and \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 quasi \u03b4\u03b9\u03c7\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, he who divides into two\nparts). For when from one of two equal magnitudes somewhat has been\ntaken and added to the other, this latter exceeds the former by twice\nthat portion: if it had been merely taken from the former and not added\nto the latter, then the latter would have exceeded the former only by\nthat one portion; but in the other case, the greater exceeds the mean\nby one, and the mean exceeds also by one that magnitude from which the\nportion was taken. By this illustration, then, we obtain a rule to\ndetermine what one ought to take from him who has the greater, and what\nto add to him who has the less. The excess of the mean over the less\nmust be added to the less, and the excess of the greater over the mean\nbe taken from the greater.\n\nThus let there be three straight lines equal to one another. From one\nof them cut off a portion, and add as much to another of them. The\nwhole line thus made will exceed the remainder of the first-named line,\nby twice the portion added, and will exceed the untouched line by that\nportion.[14] And these terms loss and gain are derived from voluntary\nexchange: that is to say, the having more than what was one\u2019s own is\ncalled gaining, and the having less than one\u2019s original stock is called\nlosing; for instance, in buying or selling, or any other transactions\nwhich are guaranteed by law: but when the result is neither more nor\nless, but exactly the same as there was originally,[15] people say they\nhave their own, and neither lose nor gain.\n\nSo then the Just we have been speaking of is a mean between loss and\ngain arising in involuntary transactions; that is, it is the having the\nsame after the transaction as one had before it took place.\n\nChapter VIII.\n\n\nThere are people who have a notion that Reciprocation is simply just,\nas the Pythagoreans said: for they defined the Just simply and without\nqualification as \u201cThat which reciprocates with another.\u201d But this\nsimple Reciprocation will not fit on either to the Distributive Just,\nor the Corrective (and yet this is the interpretation they put on the\nRhadamanthian rule of Just,\n\nIf a man should suffer what he hath done, then there would be\nstraightforward justice;\u201d)\n\n\nfor in many cases differences arise: as, for instance, suppose one in\nauthority has struck a man, he is not to be struck in turn; or if a man\nhas struck one in authority, he must not only be struck but punished\nalso.[16] And again, the voluntariness or involuntariness of actions\nmakes a great difference.\n\nBut in dealings of exchange such a principle of Justice as this\nReciprocation forms the bond of union, but then it must be\nReciprocation according to proportion and not exact equality, because\nby proportionate reciprocity of action the social community is held\ntogether, For either Reciprocation of evil is meant, and if this be not\nallowed it is thought to be a servile condition of things: or else\nReciprocation of good, and if this be not effected then there is no\nadmission to participation which is the very bond of their union.\n\nAnd this is the moral of placing the Temple of the Graces (\u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2) in\nthe public streets; to impress the notion that there may be requital,\nthis being peculiar to \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2[17] because a man ought to requite with a\ngood turn the man who has done him a favour and then to become himself\nthe originator of another \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2, by doing him a favour.\n\nNow the acts of mutual giving in due proportion may be represented by\nthe diameters of a parallelogram, at the four angles of which the\nparties and their wares are so placed that the side connecting the\nparties be opposite to that connecting the wares, and each party be\nconnected by one side with his own ware, as in the accompanying\ndiagram.\n\n [Illustration]\n\nThe builder is to receive from the shoemaker of his ware, and to give\nhim of his own: if then there be first proportionate equality, and\n_then_ the Reciprocation takes place, there will be the just result\nwhich we are speaking of: if not, there is not the equal, nor will the\nconnection stand: for there is no reason why the ware of the one may\nnot be better than that of the other, and therefore before the exchange\nis made they must have been equalised. And this is so also in the other\narts: for they would have been destroyed entirely if there were not a\ncorrespondence in point of quantity and quality between the producer\nand the consumer. For, we must remember, no dealing arises between two\nof the same kind, two physicians, for instance; but say between a\nphysician and agriculturist, or, to state it generally, between those\nwho are different and not equal, but these of course must have been\nequalised before the exchange can take place.\n\nIt is therefore indispensable that all things which can be exchanged\nshould be capable of comparison, and for this purpose money has come\nin, and comes to be a kind of medium, for it measures all things and so\nlikewise the excess and defect; for instance, how many shoes are equal\nto a house or a given quantity of food. As then the builder to the\nshoemaker, so many shoes must be to the house (or food, if instead of a\nbuilder an agriculturist be the exchanging party); for unless there is\nthis proportion there cannot be exchange or dealing, and this\nproportion cannot be unless the terms are in some way equal; hence the\nneed, as was stated above, of some one measure of all things. Now this\nis really and truly the Demand for them, which is the common bond of\nall such dealings. For if the parties were not in want at all or not\nsimilarly of one another\u2019s wares, there would either not be any\nexchange, or at least not the same.\n\nAnd money has come to be, by general agreement, a representative of\nDemand: and the account of its Greek name \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 is this, that it is\nwhat it is not naturally but by custom or law (\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2), and it rests\nwith us to change its value, or make it wholly useless.\n\nVery well then, there will be Reciprocation when the terms have been\nequalised so as to stand in this proportion; Agriculturist : Shoemaker\n: : wares of Shoemaker : wares of Agriculturist; but you must bring\nthem to this form of proportion when they exchange, otherwise the one\nextreme will combine both exceedings of the mean:[18] but when they\nhave exactly their own then they are equal and have dealings, because\nthe same equality can come to be in their case. Let A represent an\nagriculturist, C food, B a shoemaker, D his wares equalised with A\u2019s.\nThen the proportion will be correct, A:B::C:D; _now_ Reciprocation will\nbe practicable, if it were not, there would have been no dealing.\n\nNow that what connects men in such transactions is Demand, as being\nsome one thing, is shown by the fact that, when either one does not\nwant the other or neither want one another, they do not exchange at\nall: whereas they do[19] when one wants what the other man has, wine\nfor instance, giving in return corn for exportation.\n\nAnd further, money is a kind of security to us in respect of exchange\nat some future time (supposing that one wants nothing now that we shall\nhave it when we do): the theory of money being that whenever one brings\nit one can receive commodities in exchange: of course this too is\nliable to depreciation, for its purchasing power is not always the\nsame, but still it is of a more permanent nature than the commodities\nit represents. And this is the reason why all things should have a\nprice set upon them, because thus there may be exchange at any time,\nand if exchange then dealing. So money, like a measure, making all\nthings commensurable equalises them: for if there was not exchange\nthere would not have been dealing, nor exchange if there were not\nequality, nor equality if there were not the capacity of being\ncommensurate: it is impossible that things so greatly different should\nbe really commensurate, but we can approximate sufficiently for all\npractical purposes in reference to Demand. The common measure must be\nsome one thing, and also from agreement (for which reason it is called\n\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1), for this makes all things commensurable: in fact, all things\nare measured by money. Let B represent ten min\u00e6, A a house worth five\nmin\u00e6, or in other words half B, C a bed worth 1/10th of B: it is clear\nthen how many beds are equal to one house, namely, five.\n\nIt is obvious also that exchange was thus conducted before the\nexistence of money: for it makes no difference whether you give for a\nhouse five beds or the price of five beds.\n\nChapter IX.\n\nWe have now said then what the abstract Just and Unjust are, and these\nhaving been defined it is plain that just acting is a mean between\nacting unjustly and being acted unjustly towards: the former being\nequivalent to having more, and the latter to having less.\n\nBut Justice, it must be observed, is a mean state not after the same\nmanner as the forementioned virtues, but because it aims at producing\nthe mean, while Injustice occupies _both_ the extremes.\n\nAnd Justice is the moral state in virtue of which the just man is said\nto have the aptitude for practising the Just in the way of moral\nchoice, and for making division between, himself and another, or\nbetween two other men, not so as to give to himself the greater and to\nhis neighbour the less share of what is choice-worthy and contrariwise\nof what is hurtful, but what is proportionably equal, and in like\nmanner when adjudging the rights of two other men.\n\nInjustice is all this with respect to the Unjust: and since the Unjust\nis excess or defect of what is good or hurtful respectively, in\nviolation of the proportionate, therefore Injustice is both excess and\ndefect because it aims at producing excess and defect; excess, that is,\nin a man\u2019s own case of what is simply advantageous, and defect of what\nis hurtful: and in the case of other men in like manner generally\nspeaking, only that the proportionate is violated not always in one\ndirection as before but whichever way it happens in the given case. And\nof the Unjust act the less is being acted unjustly towards, and the\ngreater the acting unjustly towards others.[20]\n\nLet this way of describing the nature of Justice and Injustice, and\nlikewise the Just and the Unjust generally, be accepted as sufficient.\n\nChapter X.\n\n[Again, since a man may do unjust acts and not yet have formed a\ncharacter of injustice, the question arises whether a man is unjust in\neach particular form of injustice, say a thief, or adulterer, or\nrobber, by doing acts of a given character.\n\nWe may say, I think, that this will not of itself make any difference;\na man may, for instance, have had connection with another\u2019s wife,\nknowing well with whom he was sinning, but he may have done it not of\ndeliberate choice but from the impulse of passion: of course he acts\nunjustly, but he has not necessarily formed an unjust character: that\nis, he may have stolen yet not be a thief; or committed an act of\nadultery but still not be an adulterer, and so on in other cases which\nmight be enumerated.][21]\n\nOf the relation which Reciprocation bears to the Just we have already\nspoken: and here it should be noticed that the Just which we are\ninvestigating is both the Just in the abstract and also as exhibited in\nSocial Relations, which latter arises in the case of those who live in\ncommunion with a view to independence and who are free and equal either\nproportionately or numerically.[22]\n\nIt follows then that those who are not in this position have not among\nthemselves the Social Just, but still Just of some kind and resembling\nthat other. For Just implies mutually acknowledged law, and law the\npossibility of injustice, for adjudication is the act of distinguishing\nbetween the Just and the Unjust.\n\nAnd among whomsoever there is the possibility of injustice among these\nthere is that of acting unjustly; but it does not hold conversely that\ninjustice attaches to all among whom there is the possibility of acting\nunjustly, since by the former we mean giving one\u2019s self the larger\nshare of what is abstractedly good and the less of what is abstractedly\nevil.\n\nThis, by the way, is the reason why we do not allow a man to govern,\nbut Principle, because a man governs for himself and comes to be a\ndespot: but the office of a ruler is to be guardian of the Just and\ntherefore of the Equal. Well then, since he seems to have no peculiar\npersonal advantage, supposing him a Just man, for in this case he does\nnot allot to himself the larger share of what is abstractedly good\nunless it falls to his share proportionately (for which reason he\nreally governs for others, and so Justice, men say, is a good not to\none\u2019s self so much as to others, as was mentioned before), therefore\nsome compensation must be given him, as there actually is in the shape\nof honour and privilege; and wherever these are not adequate there\nrulers turn into despots.\n\nBut the Just which arises in the relations of Master and Father, is not\nidentical with, but similar to, these; because there is no possibility\nof injustice towards those things which are absolutely one\u2019s own; and a\nslave or child (so long as this last is of a certain age and not\nseparated into an independent being), is, as it were, part of a man\u2019s\nself, and no man chooses to hurt himself, for which reason there cannot\nbe injustice towards one\u2019s own self: therefore neither is there the\nsocial Unjust or Just, which was stated to be in accordance with law\nand to exist between those among whom law naturally exists, and these\nwere said to be they to whom belongs equality of ruling and being\nruled.\n\nHence also there is Just rather between a man and his wife than between\na man and his children or slaves; this is in fact the Just arising in\ndomestic relations: and this too is different from the Social Just.\n\nFurther, this last-mentioned Just is of two kinds, natural and\nconventional; the former being that which has everywhere the same force\nand does not depend upon being received or not; the latter being that\nwhich originally may be this way or that indifferently but not after\nenactment: for instance, the price of ransom being fixed at a mina, or\nthe sacrificing a goat instead of two sheep; and again, all cases of\nspecial enactment, as the sacrificing to Brasidas as a hero; in short,\nall matters of special decree.\n\nBut there are some men who think that all the Justs are of this latter\nkind, and on this ground: whatever exists by nature, they say, is\nunchangeable and has everywhere the same force; fire, for instance,\nburns not here only but in Persia as well, but the Justs they see\nchanged in various places.\n\nNow this is not really so, and yet it is in a way (though among the\ngods perhaps by no means): still even amongst ourselves there is\nsomewhat existing by nature: allowing that everything is subject to\nchange, still there is that which does exist by nature, and that which\ndoes not.[23]\n\nNay, we may go further, and say that it is practically plain what among\nthings which can be otherwise does exist by nature, and what does not\nbut is dependent upon enactment and conventional, even granting that\nboth are alike subject to be changed: and the same distinctive\nillustration will apply to this and other cases; the right hand is\nnaturally the stronger, still some men may become equally strong in\nboth.\n\nA parallel may be drawn between the Justs which depend upon convention\nand expedience, and measures; for wine and corn measures are not equal\nin all places, but where men buy they are large, and where these same\nsell again they are smaller: well, in like manner the Justs which are\nnot natural, but of human invention, are not everywhere the same, for\nnot even the forms of government are, and yet there is one only which\nby nature would be best in all places.\n\nChapter XI.\n\nNow of Justs and Lawfuls each bears to the acts which embody and\nexemplify it the relation of an universal to a particular; the acts\nbeing many, but each of the principles only singular because each is an\nuniversal. And so there is a difference between an unjust act and the\nabstract Unjust, and the just act and the abstract Just: I mean, a\nthing is unjust in itself, by nature or by ordinance; well, when this\nhas been embodied in act, there is an unjust act, but not till then,\nonly some unjust thing.[24] And similarly of a just act. (Perhaps\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 is more correctly the common or generic term for just\nact, the word \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, which I have here used, meaning generally and\nproperly the act corrective of the unjust act.) Now as to each of them,\nwhat kinds there are, and how many, and what is their object-matter, we\nmust examine afterwards.\n\nFor the present we proceed to say that, the Justs and the Unjusts being\nwhat have been mentioned, a man is said to act unjustly or justly when\nhe embodies these abstracts in voluntary actions, but when in\ninvoluntary, then he neither acts unjustly or justly except\naccidentally; I mean that the being just or unjust is really only\naccidental to the agents in such cases.\n\nSo both unjust and just actions are limited by the being voluntary or\nthe contrary: for when an embodying of the Unjust is voluntary, then it\nis blamed and is at the same time also an unjust action: but, if\nvoluntariness does not attach, there will be a thing which is in itself\nunjust but not yet an unjust action.\n\nBy voluntary, I mean, as we stated before, whatsoever of things in his\nown power a man does with knowledge, and the absence of ignorance as to\nthe person to whom, or the instrument with which, or the result with\nwhich he does; as, for instance, whom he strikes, what he strikes him\nwith, and with what probable result; and each of these points again,\nnot accidentally nor by compulsion; as supposing another man were to\nseize his hand and strike a third person with it, here, of course, the\nowner of the hand acts not voluntarily, because it did not rest with\nhim to do or leave undone: or again, it is conceivable that the person\nstruck may be his father, and he may know that it is a man, or even one\nof the present company, whom he is striking, but not know that it is\nhis father. And let these same distinctions be supposed to be carried\ninto the case of the result and in fact the whole of any given action.\nIn fine then, that is involuntary which is done through ignorance, or\nwhich, not resulting from ignorance, is not in the agent\u2019s control or\nis done on compulsion.\n\nI mention these cases, because there are many natural things which we\ndo and suffer knowingly but still no one of which is either voluntary\nor involuntary, growing old, or dying, for instance.\n\nAgain, accidentality may attach to the unjust in like manner as to the\njust acts. For instance, a man may have restored what was deposited\nwith him, but against his will and from fear of the consequences of a\nrefusal: we must not say that he either does what is just, or does\njustly, except accidentally: and in like manner the man who through\ncompulsion and against his will fails to restore a deposit, must be\nsaid to do unjustly, or to do what is unjust, accidentally only.\n\nAgain, voluntary actions we do either from deliberate choice or without\nit; from it, when we act from previous deliberation; without it, when\nwithout any previous deliberation. Since then hurts which may be done\nin transactions between man and man are threefold, those mistakes which\nare attended with ignorance are, when a man either does a thing not to\nthe man to whom he meant to do it, or not the thing he meant to do, or\nnot with the instrument, or not with the result which he intended:\neither he did not think he should hit him at all, or not with this, or\nthis is not the man he thought he should hit, or he did not think this\nwould be the result of the blow but a result has followed which he did\nnot anticipate; as, for instance, he did it not to wound but merely to\nprick him; or it is not the man whom, or the way in which, he meant.\n\nNow when the hurt has come about contrary to all reasonable\nexpectation, it is a Misadventure; when though not contrary to\nexpectation yet without any viciousness, it is a Mistake; for a man\nmakes a mistake when the origination of the cause rests with himself,\nhe has a misadventure when it is external to himself. When again he\nacts with knowledge, but not from previous deliberation, it is an\nunjust action; for instance, whatever happens to men from anger or\nother passions which are necessary or natural: for when doing these\nhurts or making these mistakes they act unjustly of course and their\nactions are unjust, still they are not yet confirmed unjust or wicked\npersons by reason of these, because the hurt did not arise from\ndepravity in the doer of it: but when it does arise from deliberate\nchoice, then the doer is a confirmed unjust and depraved man.\n\nAnd on this principle acts done from anger are fairly judged not to be\nfrom malice prepense, because it is not the man who acts in wrath who\nis the originator really but he who caused his wrath. And again, the\nquestion at issue in such cases is not respecting the fact but\nrespecting the justice of the case, the occasion of anger being a\nnotion of injury.[25] I mean, that the parties do not dispute about the\nfact, as in questions of contract (where one of the two must be a\nrogue, unless real forgetfulness can be pleaded), but, admitting the\nfact, they dispute on which side the justice of the case lies (the one\nwho plotted against the other, _i.e._ the real aggressor, of course,\ncannot be ignorant),[26] so that the one thinks there is injustice\ncommitted while the other does not.\n\nWell then, a man acts unjustly if he has hurt another of deliberate\npurpose, and he who commits such acts of injustice is _ipso facto_ an\nunjust character when they are in violation of the proportionate or the\nequal; and in like manner also a man is a just character when he acts\njustly of deliberate purpose, and he does act justly if he acts\nvoluntarily.\n\nThen as for involuntary acts of harm, they are either such as are\nexcusable or such as are not: under the former head come all errors\ndone not merely in ignorance but from ignorance; under the latter all\nthat are done not from ignorance but in ignorance caused by some\npassion which is neither natural nor fairly attributable to human\ninfirmity.\n\nChapter XII.\n\nNow a question may be raised whether we have spoken with sufficient\ndistinctness as to being unjustly dealt with, and dealing unjustly\ntowards others.\n\nFirst, whether the case is possible which Euripides has put, saying\nsomewhat strangely,\n\n\u201cMy mother he hath slain;  the tale is short,\nEither he willingly did slay her willing,\nOr else with her will but against his own.\u201d\n\n\nI mean then, is it really possible for a person to be unjustly dealt\nwith with his own consent, or must every case of being unjustly dealt\nwith be against the will of the sufferer as every act of unjust dealing\nis voluntary?\n\nAnd next, are cases of being unjustly dealt with to be ruled all one\nway as every act of unjust dealing is voluntary? or may we say that\nsome cases are voluntary and some involuntary?\n\nSimilarly also as regards being justly dealt with: all just acting is\nvoluntary, so that it is fair to suppose that the being dealt with\nunjustly or justly must be similarly opposed, as to being either\nvoluntary or involuntary.\n\nNow as for being justly dealt with, the position that every case of\nthis is voluntary is a strange one, for some are certainly justly dealt\nwith without their will.[27] The fact is a man may also fairly raise\nthis question, whether in every case he who has suffered what is unjust\nis therefore unjustly dealt with, or rather that the case is the same\nwith suffering as it is with acting; namely that in both it is possible\nto participate in what is just, but only accidentally. Clearly the case\nof what is unjust is similar: for doing things in themselves unjust is\nnot identical with acting unjustly, nor is suffering them the same as\nbeing unjustly dealt with. So too of acting justly and being justly\ndealt with, since it is impossible to be unjustly dealt with unless\nsome one else acts unjustly or to be justly dealt with unless some one\nelse acts justly.\n\nNow if acting unjustly is simply \u201churting another voluntarily\u201d (by\nwhich I mean, knowing whom you are hurting, and wherewith, and how you\nare hurting him), and the man who fails of self-control voluntarily\nhurts himself, then this will be a case of being voluntarily dealt\nunjustly with, and it will be possible for a man to deal unjustly with\nhimself. (This by the way is one of the questions raised, whether it is\npossible for a man to deal unjustly with himself.) Or again, a man may,\nby reason of failing of self-control, receive hurt from another man\nacting voluntarily, and so here will be another case of being unjustly\ndealt with voluntarily.\n\nThe solution, I take it, is this: the definition of being unjustly\ndealt with is not correct, but we must add, to the hurting with the\nknowledge of the person hurt and the instrument and the manner of\nhurting him, the fact of its being against the wish of the man who is\nhurt.\n\nSo then a man may be hurt and suffer what is in itself unjust\nvoluntarily, but unjustly dealt with voluntarily no man can be: since\nno man wishes to be hurt, not even he who fails of self-control, who\nreally acts contrary to his wish: for no man wishes for that which he\ndoes not _think_ to be good, and the man who fails of self-control does\nnot what he thinks he ought to do.\n\nAnd again, he that gives away his own property (as Homer says Glaucus\ngave to Diomed, \u201carmour of gold for brass, armour worth a hundred oxen\nfor that which was worth but nine\u201d) is not unjustly dealt with, because\nthe giving rests entirely with himself; but being unjustly dealt with\ndoes not, there must be some other person who is dealing unjustly\ntowards him.\n\nWith respect to being unjustly dealt with then, it is clear that it is\nnot voluntary.\n\nChapter XIII.\n\nThere remain yet two points on which we purposed to speak: first, is he\nchargeable with an unjust act who in distribution has _given_ the\nlarger share to one party contrary to the proper rate, or he that _has_\nthe larger share? next, can a man deal unjustly by himself?\n\nIn the first question, if the first-named alternative is possible and\nit is the distributor who acts unjustly and not he who has the larger\nshare, then supposing that a person knowingly and willingly gives more\nto another than to himself here is a case of a man dealing unjustly by\nhimself; which, in fact, moderate men are thought to do, for it is a\ncharacteristic of the equitable man to take less than his due.\n\nIs not this the answer? that the case is not quite fairly stated,\nbecause of some other good, such as credit or the abstract honourable,\nin the supposed case the man did get the larger share. And again, the\ndifficulty is solved by reference to the definition of unjust dealing:\nfor the man suffers nothing contrary to his own wish, so that, on this\nscore at least, he is not unjustly dealt with, but, if anything, he is\nhurt only.\n\nIt is evident also that it is the distributor who acts unjustly and not\nthe man who has the greater share: because the mere fact of the\nabstract Unjust attaching to what a man does, does not constitute\nunjust action, but the doing this voluntarily: and voluntariness\nattaches to that quarter whence is the origination of the action, which\nclearly is in the distributor not in the receiver. And again the term\ndoing is used in several senses; in one sense inanimate objects kill,\nor the hand, or the slave by his master\u2019s bidding; so the man in\nquestion does not act unjustly but does things which are in themselves\nunjust.\n\nAgain, suppose that a man has made a wrongful award in ignorance; in\nthe eye of the law he does not act unjustly nor is his awarding unjust,\nbut yet he is in a certain sense: for the Just according to law and\nprimary or natural Just are not coincident: but, if he knowingly\ndecided unjustly, then he himself as well as the receiver got the\nlarger share, that is, either of favour from the receiver or private\nrevenge against the other party: and so the man who decided unjustly\nfrom these motives gets a larger share, in exactly the same sense as a\nman would who received part of the actual matter of the unjust action:\nbecause in this case the man who wrongly adjudged, say a field, did not\nactually get land but money by his unjust decision.\n\nChapter XIV.\n\nNow men suppose that acting Unjustly rests entirely with themselves,\nand conclude that acting Justly is therefore also easy. But this is not\nreally so; to have connection with a neighbour\u2019s wife, or strike one\u2019s\nneighbour, or give the money with one\u2019s hand, is of course easy and\nrests with one\u2019s self: but the doing these acts with certain inward\ndispositions neither is easy nor rests entirely with one\u2019s self. And in\nlike way, the knowing what is Just and what Unjust men think no great\ninstance of wisdom because it is not hard to comprehend those things of\nwhich the laws speak. They forget that these are not Just actions,\nexcept accidentally: to be Just they must be done and distributed in a\ncertain manner: and this is a more difficult task than knowing what\nthings are wholesome; for in this branch of knowledge it is an easy\nmatter to know honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, or the use of the\nknife, but the knowing how one should administer these with a view to\nhealth, and to whom and at what time, amounts in fact to being a\nphysician.\n\nFrom this very same mistake they suppose also, that acting Unjustly is\nequally in the power of the Just man, for the Just man no less, nay\neven more, than the Unjust, may be able to do the particular acts; he\nmay be able to have intercourse with a woman or strike a man; or the\nbrave man to throw away his shield and turn his back and run this way\nor that. True: but then it is not the mere doing these things which\nconstitutes acts of cowardice or injustice (except accidentally), but\nthe doing them with certain inward dispositions: just as it is not the\nmere using or not using the knife, administering or not administering\ncertain drugs, which constitutes medical treatment or curing, but doing\nthese things in a certain particular way.\n\nAgain the abstract principles of Justice have their province among\nthose who partake of what is abstractedly good, and can have too much\nor too little of these.[28] Now there are beings who cannot have too\nmuch of them, as perhaps the gods; there are others, again, to whom no\nparticle of them is of use, those who are incurably wicked to whom all\nthings are hurtful; others to whom they are useful to a certain degree:\nfor this reason then the province of Justice is among _Men_.\n\nChapter XV.\n\nWe have next to speak of Equity and the Equitable, that is to say, of\nthe relations of Equity to Justice and the Equitable to the Just; for\nwhen we look into the matter the two do not appear identical nor yet\ndifferent in kind; and we sometimes commend the Equitable and the man\nwho embodies it in his actions, so that by way of praise we commonly\ntransfer the term also to other acts instead of the term good, thus\nshowing that the more Equitable a thing is the better it is: at other\ntimes following a certain train of reasoning we arrive at a difficulty,\nin that the Equitable though distinct from the Just is yet\npraiseworthy; it seems to follow either that the Just is not good or\nthe Equitable not Just, since they are by hypothesis different; or if\nboth are good then they are identical.\n\nThis is a tolerably fair statement of the difficulty which on these\ngrounds arises in respect of the Equitable; but, in fact, all these may\nbe reconciled and really involve no contradiction: for the Equitable is\nJust, being also better than one form of Just, but is not better than\nthe Just as though it were different from it in kind: Just and\nEquitable then are identical, and, both being good, the Equitable is\nthe better of the two.\n\nWhat causes the difficulty is this; the Equitable is Just, but not the\nJust which is in accordance with written law, being in fact a\ncorrection of that kind of Just. And the account of this is, that every\nlaw is necessarily universal while there are some things which it is\nnot possible to speak of rightly in any universal or general statement.\nWhere then there is a necessity for general statement, while a general\nstatement cannot apply rightly to all cases, the law takes the\ngenerality of cases, being fully aware of the error thus involved; and\nrightly too notwithstanding, because the fault is not in the law, or in\nthe framer of the law, but is inherent in the nature of the thing,\nbecause the matter of all action is necessarily such.\n\nWhen then the law has spoken in general terms, and there arises a case\nof exception to the general rule, it is proper, in so far as the\nlawgiver omits the case and by reason of his universality of statement\nis wrong, to set right the omission by ruling it as the lawgiver\nhimself would rule were he there present, and would have provided by\nlaw had he foreseen the case would arise. And so the Equitable is Just\nbut better than one form of Just; I do not mean the abstract Just but\nthe error which arises out of the universality of statement: and this\nis the nature of the Equitable, \u201ca correction of Law, where Law is\ndefective by reason of its universality.\u201d\n\nThis is the reason why not all things are according to law, because\nthere are things about which it is simply impossible to lay down a law,\nand so we want special enactments for particular cases. For to speak\ngenerally, the rule of the undefined must be itself undefined also,\njust as the rule to measure Lesbian building is made of lead: for this\nrule shifts according to the form of each stone and the special\nenactment according to the facts of the case in question.\n\nIt is clear then what the Equitable is; namely that it is Just but\nbetter than one form of Just: and hence it appears too who the\nEquitable man is: he is one who has a tendency to choose and carry out\nthese principles, and who is not apt to press the letter of the law on\nthe worse side but content to waive his strict claims though backed by\nthe law: and this moral state is Equity, being a species of Justice,\nnot a different moral state from Justice.\n\nChapter XVI.\n\nThe answer to the second of the two questions indicated above, \u201cwhether\nit is possible for a man to deal unjustly by himself,\u201d is obvious from\nwhat has been already stated.\n\nIn the first place, one class of Justs is those which are enforced by\nlaw in accordance with Virtue in the most extensive sense of the term:\nfor instance, the law does not bid a man kill himself; and whatever it\ndoes not bid it forbids: well, whenever a man does hurt contrary to the\nlaw (unless by way of requital of hurt), voluntarily, i.e. knowing to\nwhom he does it and wherewith, he acts Unjustly. Now he that from rage\nkills himself, voluntarily, does this in contravention of Right Reason,\nwhich the law does not permit. He therefore acts Unjustly: but towards\nwhom? towards the Community, not towards himself (because he suffers\nwith his own consent, and no man can be Unjustly dealt with with his\nown consent), and on this principle the Community punishes him; that is\na certain infamy is attached to the suicide as to one who acts Unjustly\ntowards the Community.\n\nNext, a man cannot deal Unjustly by himself in the sense in which a man\nis Unjust who only does Unjust acts without being entirely bad (for the\ntwo things are different, because the Unjust man is in a way bad, as\nthe coward is, not as though he were chargeable with badness in the\nfull extent of the term, and so he does not act Unjustly in this\nsense), because if it were so then it would be possible for the same\nthing to have been taken away from and added to the same person:[29]\nbut this is really not possible, the Just and the Unjust always\nimplying a plurality of persons.\n\nAgain, an Unjust action must be voluntary, done of deliberate purpose,\nand aggressive (for the man who hurts because he has first suffered and\nis merely requiting the same is not thought to act Unjustly), but here\nthe man does to himself and suffers the same things at the same time.\n\nAgain, it would imply the possibility of being Unjustly dealt with with\none\u2019s own consent.\n\nAnd, besides all this, a man cannot act Unjustly without his act\nfalling under some particular crime; now a man cannot seduce his own\nwife, commit a burglary on his own premises, or steal his own property.\n\nAfter all, the general answer to the question is to allege what was\nsettled respecting being Unjustly dealt with with one\u2019s own consent.\n\nChapter XVII.\n\nIt is obvious, moreover, that being Unjustly dealt by and dealing\nUnjustly by others are both wrong; because the one is having less, the\nother having more, than the mean, and the case is parallel to that of\nthe healthy in the healing art, and that of good condition in the art\nof training: but still the dealing Unjustly by others is the worst of\nthe two, because this involves wickedness and is blameworthy;\nwickedness, I mean, either wholly, or nearly so (for not all voluntary\nwrong implies injustice), but the being Unjustly dealt by does not\ninvolve wickedness or injustice.\n\nIn itself then, the being Unjustly dealt by is the least bad, but\naccidentally it may be the greater evil of the two. However, scientific\nstatement cannot take in such considerations; a pleurisy, for instance,\nis called a greater physical evil than a bruise: and yet this last may\nbe the greater accidentally; it may chance that a bruise received in a\nfall may cause one to be captured by the enemy and slain.\n\nFurther: Just, in the way of metaphor and similitude, there may be I do\nnot say between a man and himself exactly but between certain parts of\nhis nature; but not Just of every kind, only such as belongs to the\nrelation of master and slave, or to that of the head of a family. For\nall through this treatise the rational part of the Soul has been viewed\nas distinct from the irrational.\n\nNow, taking these into consideration, there is thought to be a\npossibility of injustice towards one\u2019s self, because herein it is\npossible for men to suffer somewhat in contradiction of impulses really\ntheir own; and so it is thought that there is Just of a certain kind\nbetween these parts mutually, as between ruler and ruled.\n\nLet this then be accepted as an account of the distinctions which we\nrecognise respecting Justice and the rest of the moral virtues.[30]\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VI\n\nChapter I.\n\n\nHaving stated in a former part of this treatise that men should choose\nthe mean instead of either the excess or defect, and that the mean is\naccording to the dictates of Right Reason; we will now proceed to\nexplain this term.\n\nFor in all the habits which we have expressly mentioned, as likewise in\nall the others, there is, so to speak, a mark with his eye fixed on\nwhich the man who has Reason tightens or slacks his rope;[1] and there\nis a certain limit of those mean states which we say are in accordance\nwith Right Reason, and lie between excess on the one hand and defect on\nthe other.\n\nNow to speak thus is true enough but conveys no very definite meaning:\nas, in fact, in all other pursuits requiring attention and diligence on\nwhich skill and science are brought to bear; it is quite true of course\nto say that men are neither to labour nor relax too much or too little,\nbut in moderation, and as Right Reason directs; yet if this were all a\nman had he would not be greatly the wiser; as, for instance, if in\nanswer to the question, what are proper applications to the body, he\nwere to be told, \u201cOh! of course, whatever the science of medicine, and\nin such manner as the physician, directs.\u201d\n\nAnd so in respect of the mental states it is requisite not merely that\nthis should be true which has been already stated, but further that it\nshould be expressly laid down what Right Reason is, and what is the\ndefinition of it.\n\nChapter II.\n\nNow in our division of the Excellences of the Soul, we said there were\ntwo classes, the Moral and the Intellectual: the former we have already\ngone through; and we will now proceed to speak of the others, premising\na few words respecting the Soul itself. It was stated before, you will\nremember, that the Soul consists of two parts, the Rational, and\nIrrational: we must now make a similar division of the Rational.\n\nLet it be understood then that there are two parts of the Soul\npossessed of Reason; one whereby we realise those existences whose\ncauses cannot be otherwise than they are, and one whereby we realise\nthose which can be otherwise than they are,[2] (for there must be,\nanswering to things generically different, generically different parts\nof the soul naturally adapted to each, since these parts of the soul\npossess their knowledge in virtue of a certain resemblance and\nappropriateness in themselves to the objects of which they are\npercipients);[3] and let us name the former, \u201cthat which is apt to\nknow,\u201d the latter, \u201cthat which is apt to calculate\u201d (because\ndeliberating and calculating are the same, and no one ever deliberates\nabout things which cannot be otherwise than they are: and so the\nCalculative will be one part of the Rational faculty of the soul).\n\nWe must discover, then, which is the best state of each of these,\nbecause that will be the Excellence of each; and this again is relative\nto the work each has to do.[4]\n\nThere are in the Soul three functions on which depend moral action and\ntruth; Sense, Intellect, Appetition, whether vague Desire or definite\nWill. Now of these Sense is the originating cause of no moral action,\nas is seen from the fact that brutes have Sense but are in no way\npartakers of moral action.[5]\n\n[Intellect and Will are thus connected,] what in the Intellectual\noperation is Affirmation and Negation that in the Will is Pursuit and\nAvoidance, And so, since Moral Virtue is a State apt to exercise Moral\nChoice and Moral Choice is Will consequent on deliberation, the Reason\nmust be true and the Will right, to constitute good Moral Choice, and\nwhat the Reason affirms the Will must pursue.[6]\n\nNow this Intellectual operation and this Truth is what bears upon Moral\nAction; of course truth and falsehood must be the good and the bad of\nthat Intellectual Operation which is purely Speculative, and concerned\nneither with action nor production, because this is manifestly the work\nof every Intellectual faculty, while of the faculty which is of a mixed\nPractical and Intellectual nature, the work is that Truth which, as I\nhave described above, corresponds to the right movement of the Will.\n\nNow the starting-point of moral action is Moral Choice, (I mean, what\nactually sets it in motion, not the final cause,)[7] and of Moral\nChoice, Appetition, and Reason directed to a certain result: and thus\nMoral Choice is neither independent of intellect, i. e. intellectual\noperation, nor of a certain moral state: for right or wrong action\ncannot be, independently of operation of the Intellect, and moral\ncharacter.\n\nBut operation of the Intellect by itself moves nothing, only when\ndirected to a certain result, i. e. exercised in Moral Action: (I say\nnothing of its being exercised in production, because this function is\noriginated by the former: for every one who makes makes with a view to\nsomewhat further; and that which is or may be made, is not an End in\nitself, but only relatively to somewhat else, and belonging to some\none:[8] whereas that which is or may be done is an End in itself,\nbecause acting well is an End in itself, and this is the object of the\nWill,) and so Moral Choice is either[9] Intellect put in a position of\nWill-ing, or Appetition subjected to an Intellectual Process. And such\na Cause is Man.\n\nBut nothing which is done and past can be the object of Moral Choice;\nfor instance, no man chooses to have sacked Troy; because, in fact, no\none ever deliberates about what is past, but only about that which is\nfuture, and which may therefore be influenced, whereas what has been\ncannot not have been: and so Agathon is right in saying\n\n\u201cOf this alone is Deity bereft,\nTo make undone whatever hath been done.\u201d\n\n\nThus then Truth is the work of both the Intellectual Parts of the Soul;\nthose states therefore are the Excellences of each in which each will\nbest attain truth.\n\nChapter III.\n\nCommencing then from the point stated above we will now speak of these\nExcellences again. Let those faculties whereby the Soul attains truth\nin Affirmation or Negation, be assumed to be in number five:[10] viz.\nArt, Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, Intuition: (Supposition and\nOpinion I do not include, because by these one may go wrong.)\n\nWhat Knowledge is, is plain from the following of considerations, if\none is to speak accurately, instead of being led away by resemblances.\nFor we all conceive that what we strictly speaking know, cannot be\notherwise than it is, because as to those things which can be otherwise\nthan they are, we are uncertain whether they are or are not, the moment\nthey cease to be within the sphere of our actual observation.\n\nSo then, whatever comes within the range of Knowledge is by necessity,\nand therefore eternal, (because all things are so which exist\nnecessarily,) and all eternal things are without beginning, and\nindestructible.\n\nAgain, all Knowledge is thought to be capable of being taught, and what\ncomes within its range capable of being learned. And all teaching is\nbased upon previous knowledge; (a statement you will find in the\nAnalytics also,)[11] for there are two ways of teaching, by Syllogism\nand by Induction. In fact. Induction is the source of universal\npropositions, and Syllogism reasons from these universals.[12]\nSyllogism then may reason from principles which cannot be themselves\nproved Syllogistically: and therefore must by Induction.\n\nSo Knowledge is \u201ca state or mental faculty apt to demonstrate\nsyllogistically,\u201d &c. as in the Analytics:[13] because a man, strictly\nand properly speaking, _knows_, when he establishes his conclusion in a\ncertain way, and the principles are known to him: for if they are not\nbetter known to him than the conclusion, such knowledge as he has will\nbe merely accidental.\n\nLet thus much be accepted as a definition of Knowledge.\n\nChapter IV.\n\nMatter which may exist otherwise than it actually does in any given\ncase (commonly called Contingent) is of two kinds, that which is the\nobject of Making, and that which is the object of Doing; now Making and\nDoing are two different things (as we show in the exoteric treatise),\nand so that state of mind, conjoined with Reason, which is apt to Do,\nis distinct from that also conjoined with Reason, which is apt to Make:\nand for this reason they are not included one by the other, that is,\nDoing is not Making, nor Making Doing.[14] Now[15] as Architecture is\nan Art, and is the same as \u201ca certain state of mind, conjoined with\nReason, which is apt to Make,\u201d and as there is no Art which is not such\na state, nor any such state which is not an Art, Art, in its strict and\nproper sense, must be \u201ca state of mind, conjoined with true Reason, apt\nto Make.\u201d\n\nNow all Art has to do with production, and contrivance, and seeing how\nany of those things may be produced which may either be or not be, and\nthe origination of which rests with the maker and not with the thing\nmade.\n\nAnd, so neither things which exist or come into being necessarily, nor\nthings in the way of nature, come under the province of Art, because\nthese are self-originating. And since Making and Doing are distinct,\nArt must be concerned with the former and not the latter. And in a\ncertain sense Art and Fortune are concerned with the same things, as,\nAgathon says by the way,\n\n\u201cArt Fortune loves, and is of her beloved.\u201d\n\n\nSo Art, as has been stated, is \u201ca certain state of mind, apt to Make,\nconjoined with true Reason;\u201d its absence, on the contrary, is the same\nstate conjoined with false Reason, and both are employed upon\nContingent matter.\n\nChapter V.\n\nAs for Practical Wisdom, we shall ascertain its nature by examining to\nwhat kind of persons we in common language ascribe it.[16]\n\nIt is thought then to be the property of the Practically Wise man to be\nable to deliberate well respecting what is good and expedient for\nhimself, not in any definite line,[17] as what is conducive to health\nor strength, but what to living well. A proof of this is that we call\nmen Wise in this or that, when they calculate well with a view to some\ngood end in a case where there is no definite rule. And so, in a\ngeneral way of speaking, the man who is good at deliberation will be\nPractically Wise. Now no man deliberates respecting things which cannot\nbe otherwise than they are, nor such as lie not within the range of his\nown action: and so, since Knowledge requires strict demonstrative\nreasoning, of which Contingent matter does not admit (I say Contingent\nmatter, because all matters of deliberation must be Contingent and\ndeliberation cannot take place with respect to things which are\nNecessarily), Practical Wisdom cannot be Knowledge nor Art; nor the\nformer, because what falls under the province of Doing must be\nContingent; not the latter, because Doing and Making are different in\nkind.\n\nIt remains then that it must be \u201ca state of mind true, conjoined with\nReason, and apt to Do, having for its object those things which are\ngood or bad for Man:\u201d because of Making something beyond itself is\nalways the object, but cannot be of Doing because the very well-doing\nis in itself an End.\n\nFor this reason we think Pericles and men of that stamp to be\nPractically Wise, because they can see what is good for themselves and\nfor men in general, and we also think those to be such who are skilled\nin domestic management or civil government. In fact, this is the reason\nwhy we call the habit of perfected self-mastery by the name which in\nGreek it bears, etymologically signifying \u201cthat which preserves the\nPractical Wisdom:\u201d for what it does preserve is the Notion I have\nmentioned, _i.e._ of one\u2019s own true interest.[18]\n\nFor it is not every kind of Notion which the pleasant and the painful\ncorrupt and pervert, as, for instance, that \u201cthe three angles of every\nrectilineal triangle are equal to two right angles,\u201d but only those\nbearing on moral action.\n\nFor the Principles of the matters of moral action are the final cause\nof them:[19] now to the man who has been corrupted by reason of\npleasure or pain the Principle immediately becomes obscured, nor does\nhe see that it is his duty to choose and act in each instance with a\nview to this final cause and by reason of it: for viciousness has a\ntendency to destroy the moral Principle: and so Practical Wisdom must\nbe \u201ca state conjoined with reason, true, having human good for its\nobject, and apt to do.\u201d\n\nThen again Art admits of degrees of excellence, but Practical Wisdom\ndoes not:[20] and in Art he who goes wrong purposely is preferable to\nhim who does so unwittingly,[21] but not so in respect of Practical\nWisdom or the other Virtues. It plainly is then an Excellence of a\ncertain kind, and not an Art.\n\nNow as there are two parts of the Soul which have Reason, it must be\nthe Excellence of the Opinionative [which we called before calculative\nor deliberative], because both Opinion and Practical Wisdom are\nexercised upon Contingent matter. And further, it is not simply a state\nconjoined with Reason, as is proved by the fact that such a state may\nbe forgotten and so lost while Practical Wisdom cannot.\n\nChapter VI.\n\nNow Knowledge is a conception concerning universals and Necessary\nmatter, and there are of course certain First Principles in all trains\nof demonstrative reasoning (that is of all Knowledge because this is\nconnected with reasoning): that faculty, then, which takes in the first\nprinciples of that which comes under the range of Knowledge, cannot be\neither Knowledge, or Art, or Practical Wisdom: not Knowledge, because\nwhat is the object of Knowledge must be derived from demonstrative\nreasoning; not either of the other two, because they are exercised upon\nContingent matter only. Nor can it be Science which takes in these,\nbecause the Scientific Man must in some cases depend on demonstrative\nReasoning.\n\nIt comes then to this: since the faculties whereby we always attain\ntruth and are never deceived when dealing with matter Necessary or even\nContingent are Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, and Intuition, and\nthe faculty which takes in First Principles cannot be any of the three\nfirst; the last, namely Intuition, must be it which performs this\nfunction.\n\nChapter VII.\n\nScience is a term we use principally in two meanings: in the first\nplace, in the Arts we ascribe it to those who carry their arts to the\nhighest accuracy;[22] Phidias, for instance, we call a Scientific or\ncunning sculptor; Polycleitus a Scientific or cunning statuary;\nmeaning, in this instance, nothing else by Science than an excellence\nof art: in the other sense, we think some to be Scientific in a general\nway, not in any particular line or in any particular thing, just as\nHomer says of a man in his Margites; \u201cHim the Gods made neither a\ndigger of the ground, nor ploughman, nor in any other way Scientific.\u201d\n\nSo it is plain that Science must mean the most accurate of all\nKnowledge; but if so, then the Scientific man must not merely know the\ndeductions from the First Principles but be in possession of truth\nrespecting the First Principles. So that Science must be equivalent to\nIntuition and Knowledge; it is, so to speak, Knowledge of the most\nprecious objects, _with a head on_.[23]\n\nI say of the most precious things, because it is absurd to suppose\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74,[24] or Practical Wisdom, to be the highest, unless it can be\nshown that Man is the most excellent of all that exists in the\nUniverse. Now if \u201chealthy\u201d and \u201cgood\u201d are relative terms, differing\nwhen applied to men or to fish, but \u201cwhite\u201d and \u201cstraight\u201d are the same\nalways, men must allow that the Scientific is the same always, but the\nPractically Wise varies: for whatever provides all things well for\nitself, to this they would apply the term Practically Wise, and commit\nthese matters to it; which is the reason, by the way, that they call\nsome brutes Practically Wise, such that is as plainly have a faculty of\nforethought respecting their own subsistence.\n\nAnd it is quite plain that Science and \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 cannot be identical:\nbecause if men give the name of Science to that faculty which is\nemployed upon what is expedient for themselves, there will be many\ninstead of one, because there is not one and the same faculty employed\non the good of all animals collectively, unless in the same sense as\nyou may say there is one art of healing with respect to all living\nbeings.\n\nIf it is urged that man is superior to all other animals, that makes no\ndifference: for there are many other things more Godlike in their\nnature than Man, as, most obviously, the elements of which the Universe\nis composed.[25]\n\nIt is plain then that Science is the union of Knowledge and Intuition,\nand has for its objects those things which are most precious in their\nnature. Accordingly, Anexagoras, Thales, and men of that stamp, people\ncall Scientific, but not Practically Wise because they see them\nignorant of what concerns themselves; and they say that what they know\nis quite out of the common run certainly, and wonderful, and hard, and\nvery fine no doubt, but still useless because they do not seek after\nwhat is good for them as men.\n\nChapter VIII.\n\nBut Practical Wisdom is employed upon human matters, and such as are\nobjects of deliberation (for we say, that to deliberate well is most\npeculiarly the work of the man who possesses this Wisdom), and no man\ndeliberates about things which cannot be otherwise than they are, nor\nabout any save those that have some definite End and this End good\nresulting from Moral Action; and the man to whom we should give the\nname of Good in Counsel, simply and without modification, is he who in\nthe way of calculation has a capacity for attaining that of practical\ngoods which is the best for Man.\n\nNor again does Practical Wisdom consist in a knowledge of general\nprinciples only, but it is necessary that one should know also the\nparticular details, because it is apt to act, and action is concerned\nwith details: for which reason sometimes men who have not much\nknowledge are more practical than others who have; among others, they\nwho derive all they know from actual experience: suppose a man to know,\nfor instance, that light meats are easy of digestion and wholesome, but\nnot what kinds of meat are light, he will not produce a healthy state;\nthat man will have a much better chance of doing so, who knows that the\nflesh of birds is light and wholesome. Since then Practical Wisdom is\napt to act, one ought to have both kinds of knowledge, or, if only one,\nthe knowledge of details rather than of Principles. So there will be in\nrespect of Practical Wisdom the distinction of supreme and\nsubordinate.[26]\n\nFurther: \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 and Practical Wisdom are the same mental state, but\nthe point of view is not the same.\n\nOf Practical Wisdom exerted upon a community that which I would call\nthe Supreme is the faculty of Legislation; the subordinate, which is\nconcerned with the details, generally has the common name \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74, and\nits functions are Action and Deliberation (for the particular enactment\nis a matter of action, being the ultimate issue of this branch of\nPractical Wisdom, and therefore people commonly say, that these men\nalone are really engaged in government, because they alone act, filling\nthe same place relatively to legislators, that workmen do to a\nmaster).[27]\n\nAgain, that is thought to be Practical Wisdom in the most proper sense\nwhich has for its object the interest of the Individual: and this\nusually appropriates the common name: the others are called\nrespectively Domestic Management, Legislation, Executive Government\ndivided into two branches, Deliberative and Judicial.[28] Now of\ncourse, knowledge for one\u2019s self is one kind of knowledge, but it\nadmits of many shades of difference: and it is a common notion that the\nman who knows and busies himself about his own concerns merely is the\nman of Practical Wisdom, while they who extend their solicitude to\nsociety at large are considered meddlesome.\n\nEuripides has thus embodied this sentiment; \u201cHow,\u201d says one of his\nCharacters, \u201cHow foolish am I, who whereas I might have shared equally,\nidly numbered among the multitude of the army *** for them that are\nbusy and meddlesome [Jove hates],\u201d because the generality of mankind\nseek their own good and hold that this is their proper business. It is\nthen from this opinion that the notion has arisen that such men are the\nPractically-Wise. And yet it is just possible that the good of the\nindividual cannot be secured independently of connection with a family\nor a community. And again, how a man should manage his own affairs is\nsometimes not quite plain, and must be made a matter of enquiry.[29]\n\nA corroboration of what I have said is[30] the fact, that the young\ncome to be geometricians, and mathematicians, and Scientific in such\nmatters, but it is not thought that a young man can come to be\npossessed of Practical Wisdom: now the reason is, that this Wisdom has\nfor its object particular facts, which come to be known from\nexperience, which a young man has not because it is produced only by\nlength of time.\n\nBy the way, a person might also enquire,[31] why a boy may be made a\nmathematician but not Scientific or a natural philosopher. Is not this\nthe reason? that mathematics are taken in by the process of\nabstraction, but the principles of Science[32] and natural philosophy\nmust be gained by experiment; and the latter young men talk of but do\nnot realise, while the nature of the former is plain and clear.\n\nAgain, in matter of practice, error attaches either to the general\nrule, in the process of deliberation, or to the particular fact: for\ninstance, this would be a general rule, \u201cAll water of a certain gravity\nis bad;\u201d the particular fact, \u201cthis water is of that gravity.\u201d\n\nAnd that Practical Wisdom is not Knowledge is plain, for it has to do\nwith the ultimate issue,[33] as has been said, because every object of\naction is of this nature.\n\nTo Intuition it is opposed, for this takes in those principles which\ncannot be proved by reasoning, while Practical Wisdom is concerned with\nthe ultimate particular fact which cannot be realised by Knowledge but\nby Sense; I do not mean one of the five senses, but the same by which\nwe take in the mathematical fact, that no rectilineal figure can be\ncontained by less than three lines, i.e. that a triangle is the\nultimate figure, because here also is a stopping point.\n\nThis however is Sense rather than Practical Wisdom, which is of another\nkind.[34]\n\nChapter IX.\n\nNow the acts of enquiring and deliberating differ, though deliberating\nis a kind of enquiring. We ought to ascertain about Good Counsel\nlikewise what it is, whether a kind of Knowledge, or Opinion, or Happy\nConjecture, or some other kind of faculty. Knowledge it obviously is\nnot, because men do not enquire about what they know, and Good Counsel\nis a kind of deliberation, and the man who is deliberating is enquiring\nand calculating.\n\nNeither is it Happy Conjecture; because this is independent of\nreasoning, and a rapid operation; but men deliberate a long time, and\nit is a common saying that one should execute speedily what has been\nresolved upon in deliberation, but deliberate slowly.\n\nQuick perception of causes[35] again is a different faculty from good\ncounsel, for it is a species of Happy Conjecture. Nor is Good Counsel\nOpinion of any kind.\n\nWell then, since he who deliberates ill goes wrong, and he who\ndeliberates well does so rightly, it is clear that Good Counsel is\nrightness of some kind, but not of Knowledge nor of Opinion: for\nKnowledge cannot be called right because it cannot be wrong, and\nRightness of Opinion is Truth: and again, all which is the object of\nopinion is definitely marked out.[36]\n\nStill, however, Good Counsel is not independent of Reason, Does it\nremain then that it is a rightness of Intellectual Operation simply,\nbecause this does not amount to an assertion; and the objection to\nOpinion was that it is not a process of enquiry but already a definite\nassertion; whereas whosoever deliberates, whether well or ill, is\nengaged in enquiry and calculation.\n\nWell, Good Counsel is a Rightness of deliberation, and so the first\nquestion must regard the nature and objects of deliberation. Now\nremember Rightness is an equivocal term; we plainly do not mean\nRightness of any kind whatever; the \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u1f74\u03c2, for instance, or the bad\nman, will obtain by his calculation what he sets before him as an\nobject, and so he may be said to have deliberated _rightly_ in one\nsense, but will have attained a great evil. Whereas to have deliberated\nwell is thought to be a good, because Good Counsel is Rightness of\ndeliberation of such a nature as is apt to attain good.\n\nBut even this again you may get by false reasoning, and hit upon the\nright effect though not through right means,[37] your middle term being\nfallacious: and so neither will this be yet Good Counsel in consequence\nof which you get what you ought but not through proper means.\n\nAgain, one man may hit on a thing after long deliberation, another\nquickly. And so that before described will not be yet Good Counsel, but\nthe Rightness must be with reference to what is expedient; and you must\nhave a proper end in view, pursue it in a right manner and right time.\n\nOnce more. One may deliberate well either generally or towards some\nparticular End.[38] Good counsel in the general then is that which goes\nright towards that which is the End in a general way of consideration;\nin particular, that which does so towards some particular End.\n\nSince then deliberating well is a quality of men possessed of Practical\nWisdom, Good Counsel must be \u201cRightness in respect of what conduces to\na given End, of which[39] Practical Wisdom is the true conception.\u201d\n\nChapter X.\n\nThere is too the faculty of Judiciousness, and also its absence, in\nvirtue of which we call men Judicious or the contrary.\n\nNow Judiciousness is neither entirely identical with Knowledge or\nOpinion (for then all would have been Judicious), nor is it any one\nspecific science, as medical science whose object matter is things\nwholesome; or geometry whose object matter is magnitude: for it has not\nfor its object things which always exist and are immutable, nor of\nthose things which come into being just any which may chance; but those\nin respect of which a man might doubt and deliberate.\n\nAnd so it has the same object matter as Practical Wisdom; yet the two\nfaculties are not identical, because Practical Wisdom has the capacity\nfor commanding and taking the initiative, for its End is \u201cwhat one\nshould do or not do:\u201d but Judiciousness is only apt to decide upon\nsuggestions (though we do in Greek put \u201cwell\u201d on to the faculty and its\nconcrete noun, these really mean exactly the same as the plain words),\nand Judiciousness is neither the having Practical Wisdom, nor attaining\nit: but just as learning is termed \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 when a man uses his\nknowledge, so judiciousness consists in employing the Opinionative\nfaculty in judging concerning those things which come within the\nprovince of Practical Wisdom, when another enunciates them; and not\njudging merely, but judging well (for \u03b5\u1f50 and \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 mean exactly the\nsame thing). And the Greek name of this faculty is derived from the use\nof the term \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 in learning: \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd and \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 being often\nused as synonymous.\n\nThe faculty called \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7,[40] in right of which we call men \u03b5\u1f50\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2,\nor say they have \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7, is \u201cthe right judgment of the equitable man.\u201d A\nproof of which is that we most commonly say that the equitable man has\na tendency to make allowance, and the making allowance in certain cases\nis equitable. And \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7 (the word denoting allowance) is right \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7\nhaving a capacity of making equitable decisions, By \u201cright\u201d I mean that\nof the Truthful man.\n\nChapter XI.\n\nNow all these mental states[41] tend to the same object, as indeed\ncommon language leads us to expect: I mean, we speak of \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7,\nJudiciousness, Practical Wisdom, and Practical Intuition, attributing\nthe possession of \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7 and Practical Intuition to the same Individuals\nwhom we denominate Practically-Wise and Judicious: because all these\nfaculties are employed upon the extremes,[42] i.e. on particular\ndetails; and in right of his aptitude for deciding on the matters which\ncome within the province of the Practically-Wise, a man is Judicious\nand possessed of good \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7; i.e. he is disposed to make allowance, for\nconsiderations of equity are entertained by all good men alike in\ntransactions with their fellows.\n\nAnd all matters of Moral Action belong to the class of particulars,\notherwise called extremes: for the man of Practical Wisdom must know\nthem, and Judiciousness and \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7 are concerned with matters of Moral\nActions, which are extremes.\n\nIntuition, moreover, takes in the extremes at both ends:[43] I mean,\nthe first and last terms must be taken in not by reasoning but by\nIntuition [so that Intuition comes to be of two kinds], and that which\nbelongs to strict demonstrative reasonings takes in immutable, i.e.\nNecessary, first terms; while that which is employed in practical\nmatters takes in the extreme, the Contingent, and the minor\nPremiss:[44] for the minor Premisses are the source of the Final Cause,\nUniversals being made up out of Particulars.[45] To take in these, of\ncourse, we must have Sense, i.e. in other words Practical Intuition.\n\nAnd for this reason these are thought to be simply gifts of nature; and\nwhereas no man is thought to be Scientific by nature, men are thought\nto have \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7, and Judiciousness, and Practical Intuition: a proof of\nwhich is that we think these faculties are a consequence even of\nparticular ages, and this given age has Practical Intuition and \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7,\nwe say, as if under the notion that nature is the cause. And thus\nIntuition is both the beginning and end, because the proofs are based\nupon the one kind of extremes and concern the other.\n\nAnd so[46] one should attend to the undemonstrable dicta and opinions\nof the skilful, the old and the Practically-Wise, no less than to those\nwhich are based on strict reasoning, because they see aright, having\ngained their power of moral vision from experience.\n\nChapter XII.\n\nWell, we have now stated the nature and objects of Practical Wisdom and\nScience respectively, and that they belong each to a different part of\nthe Soul. But I can conceive a person questioning their utility.\n\u201cScience,\u201d he would say, \u201cconcerns itself with none of the causes of\nhuman happiness (for it has nothing to do with producing anything):\nPractical Wisdom has this recommendation, I grant, but where is the\nneed of it, since its province is those things which are just and\nhonourable, and good for man, and these are the things which the good\nman as such does; but we are not a bit the more apt to do them because\nwe know them, since the Moral Virtues are Habits; just as we are not\nmore apt to be healthy or in good condition from mere knowledge of what\nrelates to these (I mean,[47] of course, things so called not from\ntheir producing health, etc., but from their evidencing it in a\nparticular subject), for we are not more apt to be healthy and in good\ncondition merely from knowing the art of medicine or training.\n\n\u201cIf it be urged that _knowing what is_ good does not by itself make a\nPractically-Wise man but _becoming_ good; still this Wisdom will be no\nuse either to those that are good, and so have it already, or to those\nwho have it not; because it will make no difference to them whether\nthey have it themselves or put themselves under the guidance of others\nwho have; and we might be contented to be in respect of this as in\nrespect of health: for though we wish to be healthy still we do not set\nabout learning the art of healing.\n\n\u201cFurthermore, it would seem to be strange that, though lower in the\nscale than Science, it is to be its master; which it is, because\nwhatever produces results takes the rule and directs in each matter.\u201d\n\nThis then is what we are to talk about, for these are the only points\nnow raised.\n\nNow first we say that being respectively Excellences of different parts\nof the Soul they must be choice-worthy, even on the supposition that\nthey neither of them produce results.\n\nIn the next place we say that they _do_ produce results; that Science\nmakes Happiness, not as the medical art but as healthiness makes\nhealth:[48] because, being a part of Virtue in its most extensive\nsense, it makes a man happy by being possessed and by working.\n\nNext, Man\u2019s work _as Man_ is accomplished by virtue of Practical Wisdom\nand Moral Virtue, the latter giving the right aim and direction, the\nformer the right means to its attainment;[49] but of the fourth part of\nthe Soul, the mere nutritive principle, there is no such Excellence,\nbecause nothing is in its power to do or leave undone.[50]\n\nAs to our not being more apt to do what is noble and just by reason of\npossessing Practical Wisdom, we must begin a little higher up,[51]\ntaking this for our starting-point. As we say that men may do things in\nthemselves just and yet not be just men; for instance, when men do what\nthe laws require of them, either against their will, or by reason of\nignorance or something else, at all events not for the sake of the\nthings themselves; and yet they do what they ought and all that the\ngood man should do; so it seems that to be a good man one must do each\nact in a particular frame of mind, I mean from Moral Choice and for the\nsake of the things themselves which are done. Now it is Virtue which\nmakes the Moral Choice right, but whatever is naturally required to\ncarry out that Choice comes under the province not of Virtue but of a\ndifferent faculty. We must halt, as it were, awhile, and speak more\nclearly on these points.\n\nThere is then a certain faculty, commonly named Cleverness, of such a\nnature as to be able to do and attain whatever conduces to _any_ given\npurpose: now if that purpose be a good one the faculty is praiseworthy;\nif otherwise, it goes by a name which, denoting strictly the ability,\nimplies the willingness to do _anything_; we accordingly call the\nPractically-Wise Clever, and also those who can and will do\nanything.[52]\n\nNow Practical Wisdom is not identical with Cleverness, nor is it\nwithout this power of adapting means to ends: but this Eye of the Soul\n(as we may call it) does not attain its proper state without goodness,\nas we have said before and as is quite plain, because the syllogisms\ninto which Moral Action may be analysed have for their Major\nPremiss,[53] \u201csince \u2014\u2014 is the End and the Chief Good\u201d[54] (fill up the\nblank with just anything you please, for we merely want to exhibit the\nForm, so that anything will do), but _how_ this blank should be filled\nis seen only by the good man: because Vice distorts the moral vision\nand causes men to be deceived in respect of practical principles.[55]\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that a man cannot be a Practically-Wise,\nwithout being a good, man.\n\nWe must enquire again also about Virtue: for it may be divided into\nNatural Virtue and Matured, which two bear to each other a relation\nsimilar to that which Practical Wisdom bears to Cleverness, one not of\nidentity but resemblance. I speak of Natural Virtue, because men hold\nthat each of the moral dispositions attach to us all somehow by nature:\nwe have dispositions[56] towards justice, self-mastery and courage, for\ninstance, immediately from our birth: but still we seek Goodness in its\nhighest sense as something distinct from these, and that these\ndispositions should attach to us in a somewhat different fashion.[57]\nChildren and brutes have these natural states, but then they are\nplainly hurtful unless combined with an intellectual element: at least\nthus much is matter of actual experience and observation, that as a\nstrong body destitute of sight must, if set in motion, fall violently\nbecause it has not sight, so it is also in the case we are considering:\nbut if it can get the intellectual element it then excels in acting.\nJust so the Natural State of Virtue, being like this strong body, will\nthen be Virtue in the highest sense when it too is combined with the\nintellectual element.\n\nSo that, as in the case of the Opinionative faculty, there are two\nforms, Cleverness and Practical Wisdom; so also in the case of the\nMoral there are two, Natural Virtue and Matured; and of these the\nlatter cannot be formed without Practical Wisdom.[58]\n\nThis leads some to say that all the Virtues are merely intellectual\nPractical Wisdom, and Socrates was partly right in his enquiry and\npartly wrong: wrong in that he thought all the Virtues were merely\nintellectual Practical Wisdom, right in saying they were not\nindependent of that faculty.\n\nA proof of which is that now all, in defining Virtue, add on the\n\u201cstate\u201d [mentioning also to what standard it has reference, namely\nthat] \u201cwhich is accordant with Right Reason:\u201d now \u201cright\u201d means in\naccordance with Practical Wisdom. So then all seem to have an\ninstinctive notion that that state which is in accordance with\nPractical Wisdom is Virtue; however, we must make a slight change in\ntheir statement, because that state is Virtue, not merely which is in\naccordance with but which implies the possession of Right Reason;\nwhich, upon such matters, is Practical Wisdom. The difference between\nus and Socrates is this: he thought the Virtues were reasoning\nprocesses (_i.e._ that they were all instances of Knowledge in its\nstrict sense), but we say they imply the possession of Reason.\n\nFrom what has been said then it is clear that one cannot be, strictly\nspeaking, good without Practical Wisdom nor Practically-Wise without\nmoral goodness.\n\nAnd by the distinction between Natural and Matured Virtue one can meet\nthe reasoning by which it might be argued \u201cthat the Virtues are\nseparable because the same man is not by nature most inclined to all at\nonce so that he will have acquired this one before he has that other:\u201d\nwe would reply that this is possible with respect to the Natural\nVirtues but not with respect to those in right of which a man is\ndenominated simply good: because they will all belong to him together\nwith the one faculty of Practical Wisdom.\n\nIt is plain too that even had it not been apt to act we should have\nneeded it, because it is the Excellence of a part of the Soul; and that\nthe moral choice cannot be right independently of Practical Wisdom and\nMoral Goodness; because this gives the right End, that causes the doing\nthese things which conduce to the End.\n\nThen again, it is not Master of Science (i.e. of the superior part of\nthe Soul), just as neither is the healing art Master of health; for it\ndoes not make use of it, but looks how it may come to be: so it\ncommands for the sake of it but does not command it.\n\nThe objection is, in fact, about as valid as if a man should say\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 governs the gods because it gives orders about all things in\nthe communty.\n\nAPPENDIX\n\nOn \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c0\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7, from I. Post. Analyt. chap. i. and ii.\n\n\n(Such parts only are translated as throw light on the Ethics.)\n\nAll teaching, and all intellectual learning, proceeds on the basis of\nprevious knowledge, as will appear on an examination of all. The\nMathematical Sciences, and every other system, draw their conclusions\nin this method. So too of reasonings, whether by syllogism, or\ninduction: for both teach through what is previously known, the former\nassuming the premisses as from wise men, the latter proving universals\nfrom the evidentness of the particulars. In like manner too\nrhetoricians persuade, either through examples (which amounts to\ninduction), or through enthymemes (which amounts to syllogism).\n\n CHAP. II\n\n\nWell, we suppose that we _know_ things (in the strict and proper sense\nof the word) when we suppose ourselves to know the cause by reason of\nwhich the thing is to be the cause of it; and that this cannot be\notherwise. It is plain that the idea intended to be conveyed by the\nterm _knowing_ is something of this kind; because they who do not\nreally know suppose themselves thus related to the matter in hand and\nthey who do know really are so that of whatsoever there is properly\nspeaking Knowledge this cannot be otherwise than it is Whether or no\nthere is another way of knowing we will say afterwards, but we do say\nthat we know through demonstration, by which I mean a syllogism apt to\nproduce Knowledge, i.e. in right of which through having it, we know.\n\nIf Knowledge then is such as we have described it, the Knowledge\nproduced by demonstrative reasoning must be drawn from premisses _true_\nand _first_, and _incapable of syllogistic proof_, and _better known_,\nand _prior in order of time_, and _causes of the conclusion_, for so\nthe principles will be akin to the conclusion demonstrated.\n\n(Syllogism, of course there may be without such premisses, but it will\nnot be demonstration because it will not produce knowledge).\n\n_True_, they must be, because it is impossible to know that which is\nnot.\n\n_First_, that is indemonstrable, because, if demonstrable, he cannot be\nsaid to _know_ them who has no demonstration of them for knowing such\nthings as are demonstrable is the same as having demonstration of them.\n\n_Causes_ they must be, and _better known_, and _prior_ in time,\n_causes_, because we then know when we are acquainted with the cause,\nand _prior_, if causes, and _known beforehand_, not merely comprehended\nin idea but known to exist (The terms prior, and better known, bear two\nsenses for _prior by nature_ and _prior relatively to ourselves_ are\nnot the same, nor _better known by nature_, and _better known to us_ I\nmean, by _prior_ and _better known relatively to ourselves_, such\nthings as are nearer to sensation, but abstractedly so such as are\nfurther Those are furthest which are most universal those nearest which\nare particulars, and these are mutually opposed.)\n\nAnd by _first_, I mean _principles akin to the conclusion_, for\nprinciple means the same as first And the principle or first step in\ndemonstration is a proposition incapable of syllogistic proof, _i.e._\none to which there is none prior. Now of such syllogistic principles I\ncall that a \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 which you cannot demonstrate, and which is\nunnecessary with a view to learning something else. That which is\nnecessary in order to learn something else is an Axiom.\n\nFurther, since one is to believe and know the thing by having a\nsyllogism of the kind called demonstration, and what constitutes it to\nbe such is the nature of the premisses, it is necessary not merely to\n_know before_, but to _know better than the conclusion_, either all or\nat least some of, the principles, because that which is the cause of a\nquality inhering in something else always inheres itself more as the\ncause of our loving is itself more lovable. So, since the principles\nare the cause of our knowing and behoving we know and believe them\nmore, because by reason of them we know also the conclusion following.\n\nFurther: the man who is to have the Knowledge which comes through\ndemonstration must not merely know and believe his principles better\nthan he does his conclusion, but he must believe nothing more firmly\nthan the contradictories of those principles out of which the contrary\nfallacy may be constructed: since he who _knows_, is to be simply and\nabsolutely infallible.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VII\n\nChapter I.\n\n\nNext we must take a different point to start from,[1] and observe that\nof what is to be avoided in respect of moral character there are three\nforms; Vice, Imperfect Self-Control, and Brutishness. Of the two former\nit is plain what the contraries are, for we call the one Virtue, the\nother Self-Control; and as answering to Brutishness it will be most\nsuitable to assign Superhuman, i.e. heroical and godlike Virtue, as, in\nHomer, Priam says of Hector \u201cthat he was very excellent, nor was he\nlike the offspring of mortal man, but of a god.\u201d and so, if, as is\ncommonly said, men are raised to the position of gods by reason of very\nhigh excellence in Virtue, the state opposed to the Brutish will\nplainly be of this nature: because as brutes are not virtuous or\nvicious so neither are gods; but the state of these is something more\nprecious than Virtue, of the former something different in kind from\nVice.\n\nAnd as, on the one hand, it is a rare thing for a man to be godlike (a\nterm the Laced\u00e6monians are accustomed to use when they admire a man\nexceedingly; \u03c3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u1f74\u03c1  they call him), so the brutish man is rare;\nthe character is found most among barbarians, and some cases of it are\ncaused by disease or maiming; also such men as exceed in vice all\nordinary measures we therefore designate by this opprobrious term.\nWell, we must in a subsequent place make some mention of this\ndisposition, and Vice has been spoken of before: for the present we\nmust speak of Imperfect Self-Control and its kindred faults of Softness\nand Luxury, on the one hand, and of Self-Control and Endurance on the\nother; since we are to conceive of them, not as being the same states\nexactly as Virtue and Vice respectively, nor again as differing in\nkind.\n\nAnd we should adopt the same course as before, i.e. state the\nphenomena, and, after raising and discussing difficulties which suggest\nthemselves, then exhibit, if possible, all the opinions afloat\nrespecting these affections of the moral character; or, if not all, the\ngreater part and the most important: for we may consider we have\nillustrated the matter sufficiently when the difficulties have been\nsolved, and such theories as are most approved are left as a residuum.\n\nThe chief points may be thus enumerated. It is thought,\n\nI. That Self-Control and Endurance belong to the class of things good\nand praiseworthy, while Imperfect Self-Control and Softness belong to\nthat of things low and blameworthy.\n\nII. That the man of Self-Control is identical with the man who is apt\nto abide by his resolution, and the man of Imperfect Self-Control with\nhim who is apt to depart from his resolution.\n\nIII. That the man of Imperfect Self-Control does things at the\ninstigation of his passions, knowing them to be wrong, while the man of\nSelf-Control, knowing his lusts to be wrong, refuses, by the influence\nof reason, to follow their suggestions.\n\nIV. That the man of Perfected Self-Mastery unites the qualities of\nSelf-Control and Endurance, and some say that every one who unites\nthese is a man of Perfect Self-Mastery, others do not.\n\nV. Some confound the two characters of the man who has _no_\nSelf-Control, and the man of _Imperfect Self-Control_, while others\ndistinguish between them.\n\nVI. It is sometimes said that the man of Practical Wisdom cannot be a\nman of Imperfect Self-Control, sometimes that men who are Practically\nWise and Clever are of Imperfect Self-Control.\n\nVII. Again, men are said to be of Imperfect Self-Control, not simply\nbut with the addition of the thing wherein, as in respect of anger, of\nhonour, and gain.\n\nThese then are pretty well the common statements.\n\nChapter II.\n\n\nNow a man may raise a question as to the nature of the right conception\nin violation of which a man fails of Self-Control.\n\nThat he can so fail when _knowing_ in the strict sense what is right\nsome say is impossible: for it is a strange thing, as Socrates thought,\nthat while Knowledge is present in his mind something else should\nmaster him and drag him about like a slave. Socrates in fact contended\ngenerally against the theory, maintaining there is no such state as\nthat of Imperfect Self-Control, for that no one acts contrary to what\nis best conceiving it to be best but by reason of ignorance what is\nbest.\n\nWith all due respect to Socrates, his account of the matter is at\nvariance with plain facts, and we must enquire with respect to the\naffection, if it be caused by ignorance what is the nature of the\nignorance: for that the man so failing does not suppose his acts to be\nright before he is under the influence of passion is quite plain.[2]\n\nThere are people who partly agree with Socrates and partly not: that\nnothing can be stronger than Knowledge they agree, but that no man acts\nin contravention of his conviction of what is better they do not agree;\nand so they say that it is not Knowledge, but only Opinion, which the\nman in question has and yet yields to the instigation of his pleasures.\n\nBut then, if it is Opinion and not Knowledge, that is it the opposing\nconception be not strong but only mild (as in the case of real doubt),\nthe not abiding by it in the face of strong lusts would be excusable:\nbut wickedness is not excusable, nor is anything which deserves blame.\n\nWell then, is it Practical Wisdom which in this case offers opposition:\nfor that is the strongest principle? The supposition is absurd, for we\nshall have the same man uniting Practical Wisdom and Imperfect\nSelf-Control, and surely no single person would maintain that it is\nconsistent with the character of Practical Wisdom to do voluntarily\nwhat is very wrong; and besides we have shown before that the very mark\nof a man of this character is aptitude to act, as distinguished from\nmere knowledge of what is right; because he is a man conversant with\nparticular details, and possessed of all the other virtues.\n\nAgain, if the having strong and bad lusts is necessary to the idea of\nthe man of Self-Control, this character cannot be identical with the\nman of Perfected Self-Mastery, because the having strong desires or bad\nones does not enter into the idea of this latter character: and yet the\nman of Self-Control must have such: for suppose them good; then the\nmoral state which should hinder a man from following their suggestions\nmust be bad, and so Self-Control would not be in all cases good:\nsuppose them on the other hand to be weak and not wrong, it would be\nnothing grand; nor anything great, supposing them to be wrong and weak.\n\nAgain, if Self-Control makes a man apt to abide by all opinions without\nexception, it may be bad, as suppose the case of a false opinion: and\nif Imperfect Self-Control makes a man apt to depart from all without\nexception, we shall have cases where it will be good; take that of\nNeoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles, for instance: he is to be\npraised for not abiding by what he was persuaded to by Ulysses, because\nhe was pained at being guilty of falsehood.\n\nOr again, false sophistical reasoning presents a difficulty: for\nbecause men wish to prove paradoxes that they may be counted clever\nwhen they succeed, the reasoning that has been used becomes a\ndifficulty: for the intellect is fettered; a man being unwilling to\nabide by the conclusion because it does not please his judgment, but\nunable to advance because he cannot disentangle the web of sophistical\nreasoning.\n\nOr again, it is conceivable on this supposition that folly joined with\nImperfect Self-Control may turn out, in a given case, goodness: for by\nreason of his imperfection of self-control a man acts in a way which\ncontradicts his notions; now his notion is that what is really good is\nbad and ought not to be done; and so he will eventually do what is good\nand not what is bad.\n\nAgain, on the same supposition, the man who acting on conviction\npursues and chooses things because they are pleasant must be thought a\nbetter man than he who does so not by reason of a quasi-rational\nconviction but of Imperfect Self-Control: because he is more open to\ncure by reason of the possibility of his receiving a contrary\nconviction. But to the man of Imperfect Self-Control would apply the\nproverb, \u201cwhen water chokes, what should a man drink then?\u201d for had he\nnever been convinced at all in respect of what he does,[3] then by a\nconviction in a contrary direction he might have stopped in his course;\nbut now though he has had convictions he notwithstanding acts against\nthem.\n\nAgain, if any and every thing is the object-matter of Imperfect and\nPerfect Self-Control, who is the man of Imperfect Self-Control simply?\nbecause no one unites all cases of it, and we commonly say that some\nmen are so simply, not adding any particular thing in which they are\nso.\n\nWell, the difficulties raised are pretty near such as I have described\nthem, and of these theories we must remove some and leave others as\nestablished; because the solving of a difficulty is a positive act of\nestablishing something as true.\n\nChapter III.\n\nNow we must examine first whether men of Imperfect Self-Control act\nwith a knowledge of what is right or not: next, if with such knowledge,\nin what sense; and next what are we to assume is the object-matter of\nthe man of Imperfect Self-Control, and of the man of Self-Control; I\nmean, whether pleasure and pain of all kinds or certain definite ones;\nand as to Self-Control and Endurance, whether these are designations of\nthe same character or different. And in like manner we must go into all\nquestions which are connected with the present.\n\nBut the real starting point of the enquiry is, whether the two\ncharacters of Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are distinguished\nby their object-matter, or their respective relations to it. I mean,\nwhether the man of Imperfect Self-Control is such simply by virtue of\nhaving such and such object-matter; or not, but by virtue of his being\nrelated to it in such and such a way, or by virtue of both: next,\nwhether Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are unlimited in their\nobject-matter: because he who is designated without any addition a man\nof Imperfect Self-Control is not unlimited in his object-matter, but\nhas exactly the same as the man who has lost all Self-Control: nor is\nhe so designated because of his relation to this object-matter merely\n(for then his character would be identical with that just mentioned,\nloss of all Self-Control), but because of his relation to it being such\nand such. For the man who has lost all Self-Control is led on with\ndeliberate moral choice, holding that it is his line to pursue pleasure\nas it rises: while the man of Imperfect Self-Control does not think\nthat he ought to pursue it, but does pursue it all the same.\n\nNow as to the notion that it is True Opinion and not Knowledge in\ncontravention of which men fail in Self-Control, it makes no difference\nto the point in question, because some of those who hold Opinions have\nno doubt about them but suppose themselves to have accurate Knowledge;\nif then it is urged that men holding Opinions will be more likely than\nmen who have Knowledge to act in contravention of their conceptions, as\nhaving but a moderate belief in them; we reply, Knowledge will not\ndiffer in this respect from Opinion: because some men believe their own\nOpinions no less firmly than others do their positive Knowledge:\nHeraclitus is a case in point.\n\nRather the following is the account of it: the term _knowing_ has two\nsenses; both the man who does not use his Knowledge, and he who does,\nare said to _know_: there will be a difference between a man\u2019s acting\nwrongly, who though possessed of Knowledge does not call it into\noperation, and his doing so who has it and actually exercises it: the\nlatter is a strange case, but the mere having, if not exercising,\npresents no anomaly.\n\nAgain, as there are two kinds of propositions affecting action,[4]\nuniversal and particular, there is no reason why a man may not act\nagainst his Knowledge, having both propositions in his mind, using the\nuniversal but not the particular, for the particulars are the objects\nof moral action.\n\nThere is a difference also in universal propositions;[5] a universal\nproposition may relate partly to a man\u2019s self and partly to the thing\nin question: take the following for instance; \u201cdry food is good for\nevery man,\u201d this may have the two minor premisses, \u201cthis is a man,\u201d and\n\u201cso and so is dry food;\u201d but whether a given substance is so and so a\nman either has not the Knowledge or does not exert it. According to\nthese different senses there will be an immense difference, so that for\na man to _know_ in the one sense, and yet act wrongly, would be nothing\nstrange, but in any of the other senses it would be a matter for\nwonder.\n\nAgain, men may have Knowledge in a way different from any of those\nwhich have been now stated: for we constantly see a man\u2019s state so\ndiffering by having and not using Knowledge, that he has it in a sense\nand also has not; when a man is asleep, for instance, or mad, or drunk:\nwell, men under the actual operation of passion are in exactly similar\nconditions; for anger, lust, and some other such-like things,\nmanifestly make changes even in the body, and in some they even cause\nmadness; it is plain then that we must say the men of Imperfect\nSelf-Control are in a state similar to these.\n\nAnd their saying what embodies Knowledge is no proof of their actually\nthen exercising it, because they who are under the operation of these\npassions repeat demonstrations; or verses of Empedocles,[6] just as\nchildren, when first learning, string words together, but as yet know\nnothing of their meaning, because they must grow into it, and this is a\nprocess requiring time: so that we must suppose these men who fail in\nSelf-Control to say these moral sayings just as actors do.\n\nFurthermore, a man may look at the account of the ph\u00e6nomenon in the\nfollowing way, from an examination of the actual working of the mind:\nAll action may be analysed into a syllogism, in which the one premiss\nis an universal maxim and the other concerns particulars of which Sense\n[moral or physical, as the case may be] is cognisant: now when one\nresults from these two, it follows necessarily that, as far as theory\ngoes the mind must assert the conclusion, and in practical propositions\nthe man must act accordingly.\n\nFor instance, let the universal be, \u201cAll that is sweet should be\ntasted,\u201d the particular, \u201cThis is sweet;\u201d it follows necessarily that\nhe who is able and is not hindered should not only draw, but put in\npractice, the conclusion \u201cThis is to be tasted.\u201d When then there is in\nthe mind one universal proposition forbidding to taste, and the other\n\u201cAll that is sweet is pleasant\u201d with its minor \u201cThis is sweet\u201d (which\nis the one that really works), and desire happens to be in the man, the\nfirst universal bids him avoid this but the desire leads him on to\ntaste; for it has the power of moving the various organs: and so it\nresults that he fails in Self-Control, in a certain sense under the\ninfluence of Reason and Opinion not contrary in itself to Reason but\nonly accidentally so; because it is the desire that is contrary to\nRight Reason, but not the Opinion:[7] and so for this reason brutes are\nnot accounted of Imperfect Self-Control, because they have no power of\nconceiving universals but only of receiving and retaining particular\nimpressions.\n\nAs to the manner in which the ignorance is removed and the man of\nImperfect Self-Control recovers his Knowledge, the account is the same\nas with respect to him who is drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar to\nthis affection, so physiologists[8] are the right people to apply to.\nBut whereas the minor premiss of every practical syllogism is an\nopinion on matter cognisable by Sense and determines the actions; he\nwho is under the influence of passion either has not this, or so has it\nthat his having does not amount to _knowing_ but merely saying, as a\nman when drunk might repeat Empedocles\u2019 verses; and because the minor\nterm[9] is neither universal, nor is thought to have the power of\nproducing Knowledge in like manner as the universal term: and so the\nresult which Socrates was seeking comes out, that is to say, the\naffection does not take place in the presence of that which is thought\nto be specially and properly Knowledge, nor is this dragged about by\nreason of the affection, but in the presence of that Knowledge which is\nconveyed by Sense.\n\nLet this account then be accepted of the question respecting the\nfailure in Self-Control, whether it is with Knowledge, and the manner\nin which such failure is possible or not, though a man possesses\nKnowledge.\n\nChapter IV.\n\nThe next question to be discussed is whether there is a character to be\ndesignated by the term \u201cof Imperfect Self-Control\u201d simply, or whether\nall who are so are to be accounted such, in respect of some particular\nthing; and, if there is such a character, what is his object-matter.\n\nNow that pleasures and pains are the object-matter of men of\nSelf-Control and of Endurance, and also of men of Imperfect\nSelf-Control and Softness, is plain.\n\nFurther, things which produce pleasure are either necessary, or objects\nof choice in themselves but yet admitting of excess. All bodily things\nwhich produce pleasure are necessary; and I call such those which\nrelate to food and other grosser appetities, in short such bodily\nthings as we assumed were the Object-matter of absence of Self-Control\nand of Perfected Self-Mastery.\n\nThe other class of objects are not necessary, but objects of choice in\nthemselves: I mean, for instance, victory, honour, wealth, and\nsuch-like good or pleasant things. And those who are excessive in their\nliking for such things contrary to the principle of Right Reason which\nis in their own breasts we do not designate men of Imperfect\nSelf-Control simply, but with the addition of the thing wherein, as in\nrespect of money, or gain, or honour, or anger, and not simply; because\nwe consider them as different characters and only having that title in\nright of a kind of resemblance (as when we add to a man\u2019s name\n\u201cconqueror in the Olympic games\u201d the account of him as Man differs but\nlittle from the account of him as the Man who conquered in the Olympic\ngames, but still it is different). And a proof of the real difference\nbetween these so designated with an addition and those simply so called\nis this, that Imperfect Self-Control is blamed, not as an error merely\nbut also as being a vice, either wholly or partially; but none of these\nother cases is so blamed.\n\nBut of those who have for their object-matter the bodily enjoyments,\nwhich we say are also the object-matter of the man of Perfected\nSelf-Mastery and the man who has lost all Self-Control, he that pursues\nexcessive pleasures and too much avoids[10] things which are painful\n(as hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and everything connected with\ntouch and taste), not from moral choice but in spite of his moral\nchoice and intellectual conviction, is termed \u201ca man of Imperfect\nSelf-Control,\u201d not with the addition of any particular object-matter as\nwe do in respect of want of control of anger but simply.\n\nAnd a proof that the term is thus applied is that the kindred term\n\u201cSoft\u201d is used in respect of these enjoyments but not in respect of any\nof those others. And for this reason we put into the same rank the man\nof Imperfect Self-Control, the man who has lost it entirely, the man\nwho has it, and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery; but not any of those\nother characters, because the former have for their object-matter the\nsame pleasures and pains: but though they have the same object-matter,\nthey are not related to it in the same way, but two of them act upon\nmoral choice, two without it. And so we should say that man is more\nentirely given up to his passions who pursues excessive pleasures, and\navoids moderate pains, being either not at all, or at least but little,\nurged by desire, than the man who does so because his desire is very\nstrong: because we think what would the former be likely to do if he\nhad the additional stimulus of youthful lust and violent pain\nconsequent on the want of those pleasures which we have denominated\nnecessary?\n\nWell then, since of desires and pleasures there are some which are in\nkind honourable and good (because things pleasant are divisible, as we\nsaid before, into such as are naturally objects of choice, such as are\nnaturally objects of avoidance, and such as are in themselves\nindifferent, money, gain, honour, victory, for instance); in respect of\nall such and those that are indifferent, men are blamed not merely[11]\nfor being affected by or desiring or liking them, but for exceeding in\nany way in these feelings.\n\nAnd so they are blamed, whosoever in spite of Reason are mastered by,\nthat is pursue, any object, though in its nature noble and good; they,\nfor instance, who are more earnest than they should be respecting\nhonour, or their children or parents; not but what these are good\nobjects and men are praised for being earnest about them: but still\nthey admit of excess; for instance, if any one, as Niobe did, should\nfight even against the gods, or feel towards his father as Satyrus, who\ngot therefrom the nickname of \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03c1, because he was thought to be\nvery foolish.\n\nNow depravity there is none in regard of these things, for the reason\nassigned above, that each of them in itself is a thing naturally\nchoice-worthy, yet the excesses in respect of them are wrong and matter\nfor blame: and similarly there is no Imperfect Self-Control in respect\nof these things; that being not merely a thing that should be avoided\nbut blameworthy.\n\nBut because of the resemblance of the affection to the Imperfection of\nSelf-Control the term is used with the addition in each case of the\nparticular object-matter, just as men call a man a bad physician, or\nbad actor, whom they would not think of calling simply bad. As then in\nthese cases we do not apply the term simply because each of the states\nis not a vice, but only like a vice in the way of analogy,[12] so it is\nplain that in respect of Imperfect Self-Control and Self-Control we\nmust limit the names to those states which have the same object-matter\nas Perfected Self-Mastery and utter loss of Self-Control, and that we\ndo apply it to the case of anger only in the way of resemblance: for\nwhich reason, with an addition, we designate a man of Imperfect\nSelf-Control in respect of anger, as of honour or of gain.\n\nChapter V.\n\nAs there are some things naturally pleasant, and of these two kinds;\nthose, namely, which are pleasant generally, and those which are so\nrelatively to particular kinds of animals and men; so there are others\nwhich are not naturally pleasant but which come to be so in consequence\neither of maimings, or custom, or depraved natural tastes: and one may\nobserve moral states similar to those we have been speaking of, having\nrespectively these classes of things for their object-matter.\n\nI mean the Brutish, as in the case of the female who, they say, would\nrip up women with child and eat the foetus; or the tastes which are\nfound among the savage tribes bordering on the Pontus, some liking raw\nflesh, and some being cannibals, and some lending one another their\nchildren to make feasts of; or what is said of Phalaris. These are\ninstances of Brutish states, caused in some by disease or madness;\ntake, for instance, the man who sacrificed and ate his mother, or him\nwho devoured the liver of his fellow-servant. Instances again of those\ncaused by disease or by custom, would be, plucking out of hair, or\neating one\u2019s nails, or eating coals and earth.[13] Now wherever nature\nis really the cause no one would think of calling men of Imperfect\nSelf-Control, ... nor, in like manner, such as are in a diseased state\nthrough custom.\n\nThe having any of these inclinations is something foreign to what is\ndenominated Vice, just as Brutishness is: and when a man has them his\nmastering them is not properly Self-Control, nor his being mastered by\nthem Imperfection of Self-Control in the proper sense, but only in the\nway of resemblance; just as we may say a man of ungovernable wrath\nfails of Self-Control in respect of anger but not simply fails of\nSelf-Control. For all excessive folly, cowardice, absence of\nSelf-Control, or irritability, are either Brutish or morbid. The man,\nfor instance, who is naturally afraid of all things, even if a mouse\nshould stir, is cowardly after a Brutish sort; there was a man again\nwho, by reason of disease, was afraid of a cat: and of the fools, they\nwho are naturally destitute of Reason and live only by Sense are\nBrutish, as are some tribes of the far-off barbarians, while others who\nare so by reason of diseases, epileptic or frantic, are in morbid\nstates.\n\nSo then, of these inclinations, a man may sometimes merely have one\nwithout yielding to it: I mean, suppose that Phalaris had restrained\nhis unnatural desire to eat a child: or he may both have and yield to\nit. As then Vice when such as belongs to human nature is called Vice\nsimply, while the other is so called with the addition of \u201cbrutish\u201d or\n\u201cmorbid,\u201d but not simply Vice, so manifestly there is Brutish and\nMorbid Imperfection of Self-Control, but that alone is entitled to the\nname without any qualification which is of the nature of utter absence\nof Self-Control, as it is found in Man.\n\nChapter VI.\n\nIt is plain then that the object-matter of Imperfect Self-Control and\nSelf-Control is restricted to the same as that of utter absence of\nSelf-Control and that of Perfected Self-Mastery, and that the rest is\nthe object-matter of a different species so named metaphorically and\nnot simply: we will now examine the position, \u201cthat Imperfect\nSelf-Control in respect of Anger is less disgraceful than that in\nrespect of Lusts.\u201d\n\nIn the first place, it seems that Anger does in a way listen to Reason\nbut mishears it; as quick servants who run out before they have heard\nthe whole of what is said and then mistake the order; dogs, again, bark\nat the slightest stir, before they have seen whether it be friend or\nfoe; just so Anger, by reason of its natural heat and quickness,\nlistening to Reason, but without having heard the command of Reason,\nrushes to its revenge. That is to say, Reason or some impression on the\nmind shows there is insolence or contempt[14] in the offender, and then\nAnger, reasoning as it were that one ought to fight against what is\nsuch, fires up immediately: whereas Lust, if Reason or Sense, as the\ncase may be, merely says a thing is sweet, rushes to the enjoyment of\nit: and so Anger follows Reason in a manner, but Lust does not and is\ntherefore more disgraceful: because he that cannot control his anger\nyields in a manner to Reason, but the other to his Lust and not to\nReason at all.\n\nAgain, a man is more excusable for following such desires as are\nnatural, just as he is for following such Lusts as are common to all\nand to that degree in which they are common. Now Anger and irritability\nare more natural than Lusts when in excess and for objects not\nnecessary. (This was the ground of the defence the man made who beat\nhis father, \u201cMy father,\u201d he said, \u201cused to beat his, and his father his\nagain, and this little fellow here,\u201d pointing to his child, \u201cwill beat\nme when he is grown a man: it runs in the family.\u201d And the father, as\nhe was being dragged along, bid his son leave off beating him at the\ndoor, because he had himself been used to drag his father so far and no\nfarther.)\n\nAgain, characters are less unjust in proportion as they involve less\ninsidiousness. Now the Angry man is not insidious, nor is Anger, but\nquite open: but Lust is: as they say of Venus,\n\n\u201cCyprus-born Goddess, _weaver of deceits_\u201d\n\n\nOr Homer of the girdle called the Cestus,\n\n\u201cPersuasiveness _cheating_ e\u2019en the subtlest mind.\u201d\n\n\nAnd so since this kind of Imperfect Self-Control is more unjust, it is\nalso more disgraceful than that in respect of Anger, and is simply\nImperfect Self-Control, and Vice in a certain sense.\n\nAgain, no man feels pain in being insolent, but every one who acts\nthrough Anger does act with pain; and he who acts insolently does it\nwith pleasure. If then those things are most unjust with which we have\nmost right to be angry, then Imperfect Self-Control, arising from Lust,\nis more so than that arising from Anger: because in Anger there is no\ninsolence.[15]\n\nWell then, it is clear that Imperfect Self-Control in respect of Lusts\nis more disgraceful than that in respect of Anger, and that the\nobject-matter of Self-Control, and the Imperfection of it, are bodily\nLusts and pleasures; but of these last we must take into account the\ndifferences; for, as was said at the commencement, some are proper to\nthe human race and natural both in kind and degree, others Brutish, and\nothers caused by maimings and diseases.\n\nNow the first of these only are the object-matter of Perfected\nSelf-Mastery and utter absence of Self-Control; and therefore we never\nattribute either of these states to Brutes (except metaphorically, and\nwhenever any one kind of animal differs entirely from another in\ninsolence, mischievousness, or voracity), because they have not moral\nchoice or process of deliberation, but are quite different from that\nkind of creature just as are madmen from other men.\n\nBrutishness is not so low in the scale as Vice, yet it is to be\nregarded with more fear: because it is not that the highest principle\nhas been corrupted, as in the human creature, but the subject has it\nnot at all.\n\nIt is much the same, therefore, as if one should compare an inanimate\nwith an animate being, which were the worse: for the badness of that\nwhich has no principle of origination is always less harmful; now\nIntellect is a principle of origination. A similar case would be the\ncomparing injustice and an unjust man together: for in different ways\neach is the worst: a bad man would produce ten thousand times as much\nharm as a bad brute.\n\nChapter VII.\n\nNow with respect to the pleasures and pains which come to a man through\nTouch and Taste, and the desiring or avoiding such (which we determined\nbefore to constitute the object-matter of the states of utter absence\nof Self-Control and Perfected Self-Mastery), one may be so disposed as\nto yield to temptations to which most men would be superior, or to be\nsuperior to those to which most men would yield: in respect of\npleasures, these characters will be respectively the man of Imperfect\nSelf-Control, and the man of Self-Control; and, in respect of pains,\nthe man of Softness and the man of Endurance: but the moral state of\nmost men is something between the two, even though they lean somewhat\nto the worse characters.\n\nAgain, since of the pleasures indicated some are necessary and some are\nnot, others are so to a certain degree but not the excess or defect of\nthem, and similarly also of Lusts and pains, the man who pursues the\nexcess of pleasant things, or such as are in themselves excess, or from\nmoral choice, for their own sake, and not for anything else which is to\nresult from them, is a man utterly void of Self-Control: for he must be\nincapable of remorse, and so incurable, because he that has not remorse\nis incurable. (He that has too little love of pleasure is the opposite\ncharacter, and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery the mean character.)\nHe is of a similar character who avoids the bodily pains, not because\nhe _cannot_, but because he _chooses not to_, withstand them.\n\nBut of the characters who go wrong without _choosing_ so to do, the one\nis led on by reason of pleasure, the other because he avoids the pain\nit would cost him to deny his lust; and so they are different the one\nfrom the other. Now every one would pronounce a man worse for doing\nsomething base without any impulse of desire, or with a very slight\none, than for doing the same from the impulse of a very strong desire;\nfor striking a man when not angry than if he did so in wrath: because\none naturally says, \u201cWhat would he have done had he been under the\ninfluence of passion?\u201d (and on this ground, by the bye, the man utterly\nvoid of Self-Control is worse than he who has it imperfectly). However,\nof the two characters which have been mentioned,[16] [as included in\nthat of utter absence of Self-Control], the one is rather Softness, the\nother properly the man of no Self-Control.\n\nFurthermore, to the character of Imperfect Self-Control is opposed that\nof Self-Control, and to that of Softness that of Endurance: because\nEndurance consists in continued resistance but Self-Control in actual\nmastery, and continued resistance and actual mastery are as different\nas not being conquered is from conquering; and so Self-Control is more\nchoice-worthy than Endurance.\n\nAgain, he who fails when exposed to those temptations against which the\ncommon run of men hold out, and are well able to do so, is Soft and\nLuxurious (Luxury being a kind of Softness): the kind of man, I mean,\nto let his robe drag in the dirt to avoid the trouble of lifting it,\nand who, aping the sick man, does not however suppose himself wretched\nthough he is like a wretched man. So it is too with respect to\nSelf-Control and the Imperfection of it: if a man yields to pleasures\nor pains which are violent and excessive it is no matter for wonder,\nbut rather for allowance if he made what resistance he could (instances\nare, Philoctetes in Theodectes\u2019 drama when wounded by the viper; or\nCercyon in the Alope of Carcinus, or men who in trying to suppress\nlaughter burst into a loud continuous fit of it, as happened, you\nremember, to Xenophantus), but it is a matter for wonder when a man\nyields to and cannot contend against those pleasures or pains which the\ncommon herd are able to resist; always supposing his failure not to be\nowing to natural constitution or disease, I mean, as the Scythian kings\nare constitutionally Soft, or the natural difference between the sexes.\n\nAgain, the man who is a slave to amusement is commonly thought to be\ndestitute of Self-Control, but he really is Soft; because amusement is\nan act of relaxing, being an act of resting, and the character in\nquestion is one of those who exceed due bounds in respect of this.\n\nMoreover of Imperfect Self-Control there are two forms, Precipitancy\nand Weakness: those who have it in the latter form though they have\nmade resolutions do not abide by them by reason of passion; the others\nare led by passion because they have never formed any resolutions at\nall: while there are some who, like those who by tickling themselves\nbeforehand get rid of ticklishness, having felt and seen beforehand the\napproach of temptation, and roused up themselves and their resolution,\nyield not to passion; whether the temptation be somewhat pleasant or\nsomewhat painful. The Precipitate form of Imperfect Self-Control they\nare most liable to who are constitutionally of a sharp or melancholy\ntemperament: because the one by reason of the swiftness, the other by\nreason of the violence, of their passions, do not wait for Reason,\nbecause they are disposed to follow whatever notion is impressed upon\ntheir minds.\n\nAgain, the man utterly destitute of Self-Control, as was observed\nbefore, is not given to remorse: for it is part of his character that\nhe abides by his moral choice: but the man of Imperfect Self-Control is\nalmost made up of remorse: and so the case is not as we determined it\nbefore, but the former is incurable and the latter may be cured: for\ndepravity is like chronic diseases, dropsy and consumption for\ninstance, but Imperfect Self-Control is like acute disorders: the\nformer being a continuous evil, the latter not so. And, in fact,\nImperfect Self-Control and Confirmed Vice are different in kind: the\nlatter being imperceptible to its victim, the former not so.[17]\n\nBut, of the different forms of Imperfect Self-Control, those are better\nwho are carried off their feet by a sudden access of temptation than\nthey who have Reason but do not abide by it; these last being overcome\nby passion less in degree, and not wholly without premeditation as are\nthe others: for the man of Imperfect Self-Control is like those who are\nsoon intoxicated and by little wine and less than the common run of\nmen.\n\nWell then, that Imperfection of Self-Control is not Confirmed\nViciousness is plain: and yet perhaps it is such in a way, because in\none sense it is contrary to moral choice and in another the result of\nit:[18] at all events, in respect of the actions, the case is much like\nwhat Demodocus said of the Miletians. \u201cThe people of Miletus are not\nfools, but they do just the kind of things that fools do;\u201d and so they\nof Imperfect Self-Control are not unjust, but they do unjust acts.\n\nBut to resume. Since the man of Imperfect Self-Control is of such a\ncharacter as to follow bodily pleasures in excess and in defiance of\nRight Reason, without acting on any deliberate conviction, whereas the\nman utterly destitute of Self-Control does act upon a conviction which\nrests on his natural inclination to follow after these pleasures; the\nformer may be easily persuaded to a different course, but the latter\nnot: for Virtue and Vice respectively preserve and corrupt the moral\nprinciple; now the motive is the principle or starting point in moral\nactions, just as axioms and postulates are in mathematics: and neither\nin morals nor mathematics is it Reason which is apt to teach the\nprinciple; but Excellence, either natural or acquired by custom, in\nholding right notions with respect to the principle. He who does this\nin morals is the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, and the contrary\ncharacter is the man utterly destitute of Self-Control.\n\nAgain, there is a character liable to be taken off his feet in defiance\nof Right Reason because of passion; whom passion so far masters as to\nprevent his acting in accordance with Right Reason, but not so far as\nto make him be convinced that it is his proper line to follow after\nsuch pleasures without limit: this character is the man of Imperfect\nSelf- Control, better than he who is utterly destitute of it, and not a\nbad man simply and without qualification: because in him the highest\nand best part, i.e. principle, is preserved: and there is another\ncharacter opposed to him who is apt to abide by his resolutions, and\nnot to depart from them; at all events, not at the instigation of\npassion.\n\nIt is evident then from all this, that Self-Control is a good state and\nthe Imperfection of it a bad one.\n\nChapter VIII.\n\nNext comes the question, whether a man is a man of Self-Control for\nabiding by his conclusions and moral choice be they of what kind they\nmay, or only by the right one; or again, a man of Imperfect\nSelf-Control for not abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be\nthey of whatever kind; or, to put the case we did before, is he such\nfor not abiding by false conclusions and wrong moral choice?\n\nIs not this the truth, that _incidentally_ it is by conclusions and\nmoral choice of any kind that the one character abides and the other\ndoes not, but _per se_ true conclusions and right moral choice:[19] to\nexplain what is meant by incidentally, and _per se_; suppose a man\nchooses or pursues this thing for the sake of that, he is said to\npursue and choose that _per se_, but this only incidentally. For the\nterm _per se_ we use commonly the word \u201csimply,\u201d and so, in a way, it\nis opinion of any kind soever by which the two characters respectively\nabide or not, but he is \u201csimply\u201d entitled to the designations who\nabides or not by the true opinion.\n\nThere are also people, who have a trick of abiding by their, own\nopinions, who are commonly called Positive, as they who are hard to be\npersuaded, and whose convictions are not easily changed: now these\npeople bear some resemblance to the character of Self-Control, just as\nthe prodigal to the liberal or the rash man to the brave, but they are\ndifferent in many points. The man of Self-Control does not change by\nreason of passion and lust, yet when occasion so requires he will be\neasy of persuasion: but the Positive man changes not at the call of\nReason, though many of this class take up certain desires and are led\nby their pleasures. Among the class of Positive are the Opinionated,\nthe Ignorant, and the Bearish: the first, from the motives of pleasure\nand pain: I mean, they have the pleasurable feeling of a kind of\nvictory in not having their convictions changed, and they are pained\nwhen their decrees, so to speak, are reversed: so that, in fact, they\nrather resemble the man of Imperfect Self-Control than the man of\nSelf-Control.\n\nAgain, there are some who depart from their resolutions not by reason\nof any Imperfection of Self-Control; take, for instance, Neoptolemus in\nthe Philoctetes of Sophocles. Here certainly pleasure was the motive of\nhis departure from his resolution, but then it was one of a noble sort:\nfor to be truthful was noble in his eyes and he had been persuaded by\nUlysses to lie.\n\nSo it is not every one who acts from the motive of pleasure who is\nutterly destitute of Self-Control or base or of Imperfect Self-Control,\nonly he who acts from the impulse of a base pleasure.\n\nChapter IX.\n\nMoreover as there is a character who takes less pleasure than he ought\nin bodily enjoyments, and he also fails to abide by the conclusion of\nhis Reason,[20] the man of Self-Control is the mean between him and the\nman of Imperfect Self-Control: that is to say, the latter fails to\nabide by them because of somewhat too much, the former because of\nsomewhat too little; while the man of Self-Control abides by them, and\nnever changes by reason of anything else than such conclusions.\n\nNow of course since Self-Control is good both the contrary States must\nbe bad, as indeed they plainly are: but because the one of them is seen\nin few persons, and but rarely in them, Self-Control comes to be viewed\nas if opposed only to the Imperfection of it, just as Perfected\nSelf-Mastery is thought to be opposed only to utter want of\nSelf-Control.\n\nAgain, as many terms are used in the way of similitude, so people have\ncome to talk of the Self-Control of the man of Perfected Self-Mastery\nin the way of similitude: for the man of Self-Control and the man of\nPerfected Self-Mastery have this in common, that they do nothing\nagainst Right Reason on the impulse of bodily pleasures, but then the\nformer has bad desires, the latter not; and the latter is so\nconstituted as not even to feel pleasure contrary to his Reason, the\nformer feels but does not yield to it.\n\nLike again are the man of Imperfect Self-Control and he who is utterly\ndestitute of it, though in reality distinct: both follow bodily\npleasures, but the latter under a notion that it is the proper line for\nhim to take, his former without any such notion.\n\nAnd it is not possible for the same man to be at once a man of\nPractical Wisdom and of Imperfect Self-Control: because the character\nof Practical Wisdom includes, as we showed before, goodness of moral\ncharacter. And again, it is not knowledge merely, but aptitude for\naction, which constitutes Practical Wisdom: and of this aptitude the\nman of Imperfect Self-Control is destitute. But there is no reason why\nthe Clever man should not be of Imperfect Self-Control: and the reason\nwhy some men are occasionally thought to be men of Practical Wisdom,\nand yet of Imperfect Self-Control, is this, that Cleverness differs\nfrom Practical Wisdom in the way I stated in a former book, and is very\nnear it so far as the intellectual element is concerned but differs in\nrespect of the moral choice.\n\nNor is the man of Imperfect Self-Control like the man who both has and\ncalls into exercise his knowledge, but like the man who, having it, is\noverpowered by sleep or wine. Again, he acts voluntarily (because he\nknows, in a certain sense, what he does and the result of it), but he\nis not a confirmed bad man, for his moral choice is good, so he is at\nall events only half bad. Nor is he unjust, because he does not act\nwith deliberate intent: for of the two chief forms of the character,\nthe one is not apt to abide by his deliberate resolutions, and the\nother, the man of constitutional strength of passion, is not apt to\ndeliberate at all.\n\nSo in fact the man of Imperfect Self-Control is like a community which\nmakes all proper enactments, and has admirable laws, only does not act\non them, verifying the scoff of Anaxandrides,\n\n\u201cThat State did will it, which cares nought for laws;\u201d\n\n\nwhereas the bad man is like one which acts upon its laws, but then\nunfortunately they are bad ones.\n\nImperfection of Self-Control and Self-Control, after all, are above the\naverage state of men; because he of the latter character is more true\nto his Reason, and the former less so, than is in the power of most\nmen.\n\nAgain, of the two forms of Imperfect Self-Control that is more easily\ncured which they have who are constitutionally of strong passions, than\nthat of those who form resolutions and break them; and they that are so\nthrough habituation than they that are so naturally; since of course\ncustom is easier to change than nature, because the very resemblance of\ncustom to nature is what constitutes the difficulty of changing it; as\nEvenus says,\n\n\u201cPractice, I say, my friend, doth long endure,\nAnd at the last is even very nature.\u201d\n\n\nWe have now said then what Self-Control is, what Imperfection of\nSelf-Control, what Endurance, and what Softness, and how these states\nare mutually related.\n\nAPPENDIX.\nBook VII. Chapters 12 to 15. (Bekker.)\n\nTo consider the subject of Pleasure and Pain falls within the province\nof the Social-Science Philosopher, since he it is who has to fix the\nMaster-End which is to guide us in dominating any object absolutely\nevil or good.\n\nBut we may say more: an enquiry into their nature is absolutely\nnecessary. First, because we maintained that Moral Virtue and Moral\nVice are both concerned with Pains and Pleasures: next, because the\ngreater part of mankind assert that Happiness must include Pleasure\n(which by the way accounts for the word they use, \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2; \u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\nbeing the root of that word).\n\nNow some hold that no one Pleasure is good, either in itself or as a\nmatter of result, because Good and Pleasure are not identical. Others\nthat some Pleasures are good but the greater number bad. There is yet a\nthird view; granting that every Pleasure is good, still the Chief Good\ncannot possibly be Pleasure.\n\nIn support of the first opinion (that Pleasure is utterly not-good) it\nis urged that:\n\n1. Every Pleasure is a sensible process towards a complete state; but\nno such process is akin to the end to be attained: _e.g._ no process of\nbuilding to the completed house.\n\n2. The man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures.\n\n3. The man of Practical Wisdom aims at avoiding Pain, not at attaining\nPleasure.\n\n4. Pleasures are an impediment to thought, and the more so the more\nkeenly they are felt. An obvious instance will readily occur.\n\n5. Pleasure cannot be referred to any Art: and yet every good is the\nresult of some Art.\n\n6. Children and brutes pursue Pleasures.\n\nIn support of the second (that not all Pleasures are good), That there\nare some base and matter of reproach, and some even hurtful: because\nsome things that are pleasant produce disease.\n\nIn support of the third (that Pleasure is not the Chief Good), That it\nis not an End but a process towards creating an End.\n\nThis is, I think, a fair account of current views on the matter.\n\nBut that the reasons alleged do not prove it either to be not-good or\nthe Chief Good is plain from the following considerations.\n\nFirst. Good being either absolute or relative, of course the natures\nand states embodying it will be so too; therefore also the movements\nand the processes of creation. So, of those which are thought to be bad\nsome will be bad absolutely, but relatively not bad, perhaps even\nchoice-worthy; some not even choice-worthy relatively to any particular\nperson, only at certain times or for a short time but not in themselves\nchoice-worthy.\n\nOthers again are not even Pleasures at all though they produce that\nimpression on the mind: all such I mean as imply pain and whose purpose\nis cure; those of sick people, for instance.\n\nNext, since Good may be either an active working or a state, those\n[\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 or \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2] which tend to place us in our natural state are\npleasant incidentally because of that tendency: but the active working\nis really in the desires excited in the remaining (sound) part of our\nstate or nature: for there are Pleasures which have no connection with\npain or desire: the acts of contemplative intellect, for instance, in\nwhich case there is no deficiency in the nature or state of him who\nperforms the acts.\n\nA proof of this is that the same pleasant thing does not produce the\nsensation of Pleasure when the natural state is being filled up or\ncompleted as when it is already in its normal condition: in this latter\ncase what give the sensation are things pleasant _per se_, in the\nformer even those things which are contrary. I mean, you find people\ntaking pleasure in sharp or bitter things of which no one is naturally\nor in itself pleasant; of course not therefore the Pleasures arising\nfrom them, because it is obvious that as is the classification of\npleasant things such must be that of the Pleasures arising from them.\n\nNext, it does not follow that there must be something else better than\nany given pleasure because (as some say) the End must be better than\nthe process which creates it. For it is not true that all Pleasures are\nprocesses or even attended by any process, but (some are) active\nworkings or even Ends: in fact they result not from our coming to be\nsomething but from our using our powers. Again, it is not true that the\nEnd is, in every case, distinct from the process: it is true only in\nthe case of such processes as conduce to the perfecting of the natural\nstate.\n\nFor which reason it is wrong to say that Pleasure is \u201ca sensible\nprocess of production.\u201d For \u201cprocess etc.\u201d should be substituted\n\u201cactive working of the natural state,\u201d for \u201csensible\u201d \u201cunimpeded.\u201d The\nreason of its being thought to be a \u201cprocess etc.\u201d is that it is good\nin the highest sense: people confusing \u201cactive working\u201d and \u201cprocess,\u201d\nwhereas they really are distinct.\n\nNext, as to the argument that there are bad Pleasures because some\nthings which are pleasant are also hurtful to health, it is the same as\nsaying that some healthful things are bad for \u201cbusiness.\u201d In this\nsense, of course, both may be said to be bad, but then this does not\nmake them out to be bad _simpliciter_: the exercise of the pure\nIntellect sometimes hurts a man\u2019s health: but what hinders Practical\nWisdom or any state whatever is, not the Pleasure peculiar to, but some\nPleasure foreign to it: the Pleasures arising from the exercise of the\npure Intellect or from learning only promote each.\n\nNext. \u201cNo Pleasure is the work of any Art.\u201d What else would you expect?\nNo active working is the work of any Art, only the faculty of so\nworking. Still the perfumer\u2019s Art or the cook\u2019s are thought to belong\nto Pleasure.\n\nNext. \u201cThe man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures.\u201d \u201cThe man of\nPractical Wisdom aims at escaping Pain rather than at attaining\nPleasure.\u201d\n\n\u201cChildren and brutes pursue Pleasures.\u201d\n\nOne answer will do for all.\n\nWe have already said in what sense all Pleasures are good _per se_ and\nin what sense not all are good: it is the latter class that brutes and\nchildren pursue, such as are accompanied by desire and pain, that is\nthe bodily Pleasures (which answer to this description) and the\nexcesses of them: in short, those in respect of which the man utterly\ndestitute of Self-Control is thus utterly destitute. And it is the\nabsence of the pain arising from these Pleasures that the man of\nPractical Wisdom aims at. It follows that these Pleasures are what the\nman of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids: for obviously he has Pleasures\npeculiarly his own.\n\nThen again, it is allowed that Pain is an evil and a thing to be\navoided partly as bad _per se_, partly as being a hindrance in some\nparticular way. Now the contrary of that which is to be avoided, _qu\u00e2_\nit is to be avoided, _i.e._ evil, is good. Pleasure then must be _a_\ngood.\n\nThe attempted answer of Speusippus, \u201cthat Pleasure may be opposed and\nyet not contrary to Pain, just as the greater portion of any magnitude\nis contrary to the less but only opposed to the exact half,\u201d will not\nhold: for he cannot say that Pleasure is identical with evil of any\nkind.\n\nAgain. Granting that some Pleasures are low, there is no reason why\nsome particular Pleasure may not be very good, just as some particular\nScience may be although there are some which are low.\n\nPerhaps it even follows, since each state may have active working\nunimpeded, whether the active workings of all be Happiness or that of\nsome one of them, that this active working, if it be unimpeded, must be\nchoice-worthy: now Pleasure is exactly this. So that the Chief Good may\nbe Pleasure of some kind, though most Pleasures be (let us assume) low\n_per se_.\n\nAnd for this reason all men think the happy life is pleasant, and\ninterweave Pleasure with Happiness. Reasonably enough: because\nHappiness is perfect, but no impeded active working is perfect; and\ntherefore the happy man needs as an addition the goods of the body and\nthe goods external and fortune that in these points he may not be\nfettered. As for those who say that he who is being tortured on the\nwheel, or falls into great misfortunes is happy provided only he be\ngood, they talk nonsense, whether they mean to do so or not. On the\nother hand, because fortune is needed as an addition, some hold good\nfortune to be identical with Happiness: which it is not, for even this\nin excess is a hindrance, and perhaps then has no right to be called\ngood fortune since it is good only in so far as it contributes to\nHappiness.\n\nThe fact that all animals, brute and human alike, pursue Pleasure, is\nsome presumption of its being in a sense the Chief Good;\n\n(\u201cThere must be something in what most folks say,\u201d) only as one and the\nsame nature or state neither is nor is thought to be the best, so\nneither do all pursue the same Pleasure, Pleasure nevertheless all do.\nNay further, what they pursue is, perhaps, not what they think nor what\nthey would say they pursue, but really one and the same: for in all\nthere is some instinct above themselves. But the bodily Pleasures have\nreceived the name exclusively, because theirs is the most frequent form\nand that which is universally partaken of; and so, because to many\nthese alone are known they believe them to be the only ones which\nexist.\n\nIt is plain too that, unless Pleasure and its active working be good,\nit will not be true that the happy man\u2019s life embodies Pleasure: for\nwhy will he want it on the supposition that it is not good and that he\ncan live even with Pain? because, assuming that Pleasure is not good,\nthen Pain is neither evil nor good, and so why should he avoid it?\n\nBesides, the life of the good man is not more pleasurable than any\nother unless it be granted that his active workings are so too.\n\nSome enquiry into the bodily Pleasures is also necessary for those who\nsay that some Pleasures, to be sure, are highly choice-worthy (the good\nones to wit), but not the bodily Pleasures; that is, those which are\nthe object-matter of the man utterly destitute of Self-Control.\n\nIf so, we ask, why are the contrary Pains bad? they cannot be (on their\nassumption) because the contrary of bad is good.\n\nMay we not say that the necessary bodily Pleasures are good in the\nsense in which that which is not-bad is good? or that they are good\nonly up to a certain point? because such states or movements as cannot\nhave too much of the better cannot have too much of Pleasure, but those\nwhich can of the former can also of the latter. Now the bodily\nPleasures do admit of excess: in fact the low bad man is such because\nhe pursues the excess of them instead of those which are necessary\n(meat, drink, and the objects of other animal appetites do give\npleasure to all, but not in right manner or degree to all). But his\nrelation to Pain is exactly the contrary: it is not excessive Pain, but\nPain at all, that he avoids [which makes him to be in this way too a\nbad low man], because only in the case of him who pursues excessive\nPleasure is Pain contrary to excessive Pleasure.\n\nIt is not enough however merely to state the truth, we should also show\nhow the false view arises; because this strengthens conviction. I mean,\nwhen we have given a probable reason why that impresses people as true\nwhich really is not true, it gives them a stronger conviction of the\ntruth. And so we must now explain why the bodily Pleasures appear to\npeople to be more choice-worthy than any others.\n\nThe first obvious reason is, that bodily Pleasure drives out Pain; and\nbecause Pain is felt in excess men pursue Pleasure in excess, _i.e._\ngenerally bodily Pleasure, under the notion of its being a remedy for\nthat Pain. These remedies, moreover, come to be violent ones; which is\nthe very reason they are pursued, since the impression they produce on\nthe mind is owing to their being looked at side by side with their\ncontrary.\n\nAnd, as has been said before, there are the two following reasons why\nbodily Pleasure is thought to be not-good.\n\n1. Some Pleasures of this class are actings of a low nature, whether\ncongenital as in brutes, or acquired by custom as in low bad men.\n\n2. Others are in the nature of cures, cures that is of some deficiency;\nnow of course it is better to have [the healthy state] originally than\nthat it should accrue afterwards.\n\n(But some Pleasures result when natural states are being perfected:\nthese therefore are good as a matter of result.)\n\nAgain, the very fact of their being violent causes them to be pursued\nby such as can relish no others: such men in fact create violent\nthirsts for themselves (if harmless ones then we find no fault, if\nharmful then it is bad and low) because they have no other things to\ntake pleasure in, and the neutral state is distasteful to some people\nconstitutionally; for toil of some kind is inseparable from life, as\nphysiologists testify, telling us that the acts of seeing or hearing\nare painful, only that we are used to the pain and do not find it out.\n\nSimilarly in youth the constant growth produces a state much like that\nof vinous intoxication, and youth is pleasant. Again, men of the\nmelancholic temperament constantly need some remedial process (because\nthe body, from its temperament, is constantly being worried), and they\nare in a chronic state of violent desire. But Pleasure drives out Pain;\nnot only such Pleasure as is directly contrary to Pain but even any\nPleasure provided it be strong: and this is how men come to be utterly\ndestitute of Self-Mastery, _i.e._ low and bad.\n\nBut those Pleasures which are unconnected with Pains do not admit of\nexcess: _i.e._ such as belong to objects which are naturally pleasant\nand not merely as a matter of result: by the latter class I mean such\nas are remedial, and the reason why these are thought to be pleasant is\nthat the cure results from the action in some way of that part of the\nconstitution which remains sound. By \u201cpleasant naturally\u201d I mean such\nas put into action a nature which is pleasant.\n\nThe reason why no one and the same thing is invariably pleasant is that\nour nature is, not simple, but complex, involving something different\nfrom itself (so far as we are corruptible beings). Suppose then that\none part of this nature be doing something, this something is, to the\nother part, unnatural: but, if there be an equilibrium of the two\nnatures, then whatever is being done is indifferent. It is obvious that\nif there be any whose nature is simple and not complex, to such a being\nthe same course of acting will always be the most pleasurable.\n\nFor this reason it is that the Divinity feels Pleasure which is always\none, _i.e._ simple: not motion merely but also motionlessness acts, and\nPleasure resides rather in the absence than in the presence of motion.\n\nThe reason why the Poet\u2019s dictum \u201cchange is of all things most\npleasant\u201d is true, is \u201ca baseness in our blood;\u201d for as the bad man is\neasily changeable, bad must be also the nature that craves change,\n_i.e._ it is neither simple nor good.\n\nWe have now said our say about Self-Control and its opposite; and about\nPleasure and Pain. What each is, and how the one set is good the other\nbad. We have yet to speak of Friendship.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VIII\n\nChapter I.\n\n\nNext would seem properly to follow a dissertation on Friendship:\nbecause, in the first place, it is either itself a virtue or connected\nwith virtue; and next it is a thing most necessary for life, since no\none would choose to live without friends though he should have all the\nother good things in the world: and, in fact, men who are rich or\npossessed of authority and influence are thought to have special need\nof friends: for where is the use of such prosperity if there be taken\naway the doing of kindnesses of which friends are the most usual and\nmost commendable objects? Or how can it be kept or preserved without\nfriends? because the greater it is so much the more slippery and\nhazardous: in poverty moreover and all other adversities men think\nfriends to be their only refuge.\n\nFurthermore, Friendship helps the young to keep from error: the old, in\nrespect of attention and such deficiencies in action as their weakness\nmakes them liable to; and those who are in their prime, in respect of\nnoble deeds (\u201cThey _two_ together going,\u201d Homer says, you may\nremember), because they are thus more able to devise plans and carry\nthem out.\n\nAgain, it seems to be implanted in us by Nature: as, for instance, in\nthe parent towards the offspring and the offspring towards the parent\n(not merely in the human species, but likewise in birds and most\nanimals), and in those of the same tribe towards one another, and\nspecially in men of the same nation; for which reason we commend those\nmen who love their fellows: and one may see in the course of travel how\nclose of kin and how friendly man is to man.\n\nFurthermore, Friendship seems to be the bond of Social Communities, and\nlegislators seem to be more anxious to secure it than Justice even. I\nmean, Unanimity is somewhat like to Friendship, and this they certainly\naim at and specially drive out faction as being inimical.\n\nAgain, where people are in Friendship Justice is not required;[1] but,\non the other hand, though they are just they need Friendship in\naddition, and that principle which is most truly just is thought to\npartake of the nature of Friendship.\n\nLastly, not only is it a thing necessary but honourable likewise: since\nwe praise those who are fond of friends, and the having numerous\nfriends is thought a matter of credit to a man; some go so far as to\nhold, that \u201cgood man\u201d and \u201cfriend\u201d are terms synonymous.\n\nChapter II.\n\nYet the disputed points respecting it are not few: some men lay down\nthat it is a kind of resemblance, and that men who are like one another\nare friends: whence come the common sayings, \u201cLike will to like,\u201d\n\u201cBirds of a feather,\u201d and so on. Others, on the contrary, say, that all\nsuch come under the maxim, \u201cTwo of a trade never agree.\u201d[2]\n\nAgain, some men push their enquiries on these points higher and reason\nphysically: as Euripides, who says,\n\n\u201cThe earth by drought consumed doth love the rain,\nAnd the great heaven, overcharged with rain,\nDoth love to fall in showers upon the earth.\u201d\n\n\nHeraclitus, again, maintains, that \u201ccontrariety is expedient, and that\nthe best agreement arises from things differing, and that all things\ncome into being in the way of the principle of antagonism.\u201d\n\nEmpedocles, among others, in direct opposition to these, affirms, that\n\u201clike aims at like.\u201d\n\nThese physical questions we will take leave to omit, inasmuch as they\nare foreign to the present enquiry; and we will examine such as are\nproper to man and concern moral characters and feelings: as, for\ninstance, \u201cDoes Friendship arise among all without distinction, or is\nit impossible for bad men to be friends?\u201d and, \u201cIs there but one\nspecies of Friendship, or several?\u201d for they who ground the opinion\nthat there is but one on the fact that Friendship admits of degrees\nhold that upon insufficient proof; because things which are different\nin species admit likewise of degrees (on this point we have spoken\nbefore).\n\nChapter III.\n\nOur view will soon be cleared on these points when we have ascertained\nwhat is properly the object-matter of Friendship: for it is thought\nthat not everything indiscriminately, but some peculiar matter alone,\nis the object of this affection; that is to say, what is good, or\npleasurable, or useful. Now it would seem that that is useful through\nwhich accrues any good or pleasure, and so the objects of Friendship,\nas absolute Ends, are the good and the pleasurable.\n\nA question here arises; whether it is good absolutely or that which is\ngood to the individuals, for which men feel Friendship (these two being\nsometimes distinct): and similarly in respect of the pleasurable. It\nseems then that each individual feels it towards that which is good to\nhimself, and that abstractedly it is the real good which is the object\nof Friendship, and to each individual that which is good to each. It\ncomes then to this; that each individual feels Friendship not for what\n_is_ but for that which _conveys to his mind the impression of being_\ngood to himself. But this will make no real difference, because that\nwhich is truly the object of Friendship will also convey this\nimpression to the mind.\n\nThere are then three causes from which men feel Friendship: but the\nterm is not applied to the case of fondness for things inanimate\nbecause there is no requital of the affection nor desire for the good\nof those objects: it certainly savours of the ridiculous to say that a\nman fond of wine wishes well to it: the only sense in which it is true\nbeing that he wishes it to be kept safe and sound for his own use and\nbenefit.[3] But to the friend they say one should wish all good for his\nsake. And when men do thus wish good to another (he not reciprocating\nthe feeling), people call them Kindly; because Friendship they describe\nas being \u201cKindliness between persons who reciprocate it.\u201d But must they\nnot add that the feeling must be mutually known? for many men are\nkindly disposed towards those whom they have never seen but whom they\nconceive to be amiable or useful: and this notion amounts to the same\nthing as a real feeling between them.\n\nWell, these are plainly Kindly-disposed towards one another: but how\ncan one call them friends while their mutual feelings are unknown to\none another? to complete the idea of Friendship, then, it is requisite\nthat they have kindly feelings towards one another, and wish one\nanother good from one of the aforementioned causes, and that these\nkindly feelings should be mutually known.\n\nChapter IV.\n\nAs the motives to Friendship differ in kind so do the respective\nfeelings and Friendships. The species then of Friendship are three, in\nnumber equal to the objects of it, since in the line of each there may\nbe \u201cmutual affection mutually known.\u201d\n\nNow they who have Friendship for one another desire one another\u2019s good\naccording to the motive of their Friendship; accordingly they whose\nmotive is utility have no Friendship for one another really, but only\nin so far as some good arises to them from one another.\n\nAnd they whose motive is pleasure are in like case: I mean, they have\nFriendship for men of easy pleasantry, not because they are of a given\ncharacter but because they are pleasant to themselves. So then they\nwhose motive to Friendship is utility love their friends for what is\ngood to themselves; they whose motive is pleasure do so for what is\npleasurable to themselves; that is to say, not in so far as the friend\nbeloved _is_ but in so far as he is useful or pleasurable. These\nFriendships then are a matter of result: since the object is not\nbeloved in that he is the man he is but in that he furnishes advantage\nor pleasure as the case may be.\n\nSuch Friendships are of course very liable to dissolution if the\nparties do not continue alike: I mean, that the others cease to have\nany Friendship for them when they are no longer pleasurable or useful.\nNow it is the nature of utility not to be permanent but constantly\nvarying: so, of course, when the motive which made them friends is\nvanished, the Friendship likewise dissolves; since it existed only\nrelatively to those circumstances.\n\nFriendship of this kind is thought to exist principally among the old\n(because men at that time of life pursue not what is pleasurable but\nwhat is profitable); and in such, of men in their prime and of the\nyoung, as are given to the pursuit of profit. They that are such have\nno intimate intercourse with one another; for sometimes they are not\neven pleasurable to one another; nor, in fact, do they desire such\nintercourse unless their friends are profitable to them, because they\nare pleasurable only in so far as they have hopes of advantage. With\nthese Friendships is commonly ranked that of hospitality.\n\nBut the Friendship of the young is thought to be based on the motive of\npleasure: because they live at the beck and call of passion and\ngenerally pursue what is pleasurable to themselves and the object of\nthe present moment: and as their age changes so likewise do their\npleasures.\n\nThis is the reason why they form and dissolve Friendships rapidly:\nsince the Friendship changes with the pleasurable object and such\npleasure changes quickly.\n\nThe young are also much given up to Love; this passion being, in great\nmeasure, a matter of impulse and based on pleasure: for which cause\nthey conceive Friendships and quickly drop them, changing often in the\nsame day: but these wish for society and intimate intercourse with\ntheir friends, since they thus attain the object of their Friendship.\n\nChapter V.\n\nThat then is perfect Friendship which subsists between those who are\ngood and whose similarity consists in their goodness: for these men\nwish one another\u2019s good in similar ways; in so far as they are good\n(and good they are in themselves); and those are specially friends who\nwish good to their friends for their sakes, because they feel thus\ntowards them on their own account and not as a mere matter of result;\nso the Friendship between these men continues to subsist so long as\nthey are good; and goodness, we know, has in it a principle of\npermanence.\n\nMoreover, each party is good abstractedly and also relatively to his\nfriend, for all good men are not only abstractedly good but also useful\nto one another. Such friends are also mutually pleasurable because all\ngood men are so abstractedly, and also relatively to one another,\ninasmuch as to each individual those actions are pleasurable which\ncorrespond to his nature, and all such as are like them. Now when men\nare good these will be always the same, or at least similar.\n\nFriendship then under these circumstances is permanent, as we should\nreasonably expect, since it combines in itself all the requisite\nqualifications of friends. I mean, that Friendship of whatever kind is\nbased upon good or pleasure (either abstractedly or relatively to the\nperson entertaining the sentiment of Friendship), and results from a\nsimilarity of some sort; and to this kind belong all the aforementioned\nrequisites in the parties themselves, because in this the parties are\nsimilar, and so on:[4] moreover, in it there is the abstractedly good\nand the abstractedly pleasant, and as these are specially the\nobject-matter of Friendship so the feeling and the state of Friendship\nis found most intense and most excellent in men thus qualified.\n\nRare it is probable Friendships of this kind will be, because men of\nthis kind are rare. Besides, all requisite qualifications being\npresupposed, there is further required time and intimacy: for, as the\nproverb says, men cannot know one another \u201ctill they have eaten the\nrequisite quantity of salt together;\u201d nor can they in fact admit one\nanother to intimacy, much less be friends, till each has appeared to\nthe other and been proved to be a fit object of Friendship. They who\nspeedily commence an interchange of friendly actions may be said to\nwish to be friends, but they are not so unless they are also proper\nobjects of Friendship and mutually known to be such: that is to say, a\ndesire for Friendship may arise quickly but not Friendship itself.\n\nWell, this Friendship is perfect both in respect of the time and in all\nother points; and exactly the same and similar results accrue to each\nparty from the other; which ought to be the case between friends.\n\nThe friendship based upon the pleasurable is, so to say, a copy of\nthis, since the good are sources of pleasure to one another: and that\nbased on utility likewise, the good being also useful to one another.\nBetween men thus connected Friendships are most permanent when the same\nresult accrues to both from one another, pleasure, for instance; and\nnot merely so but from the same source, as in the case of two men of\neasy pleasantry; and not as it is in that of a lover and the object of\nhis affection, these not deriving their pleasure from the same causes,\nbut the former from seeing the latter and the latter from receiving the\nattentions of the former: and when the bloom of youth fades the\nFriendship sometimes ceases also, because then the lover derives no\npleasure from seeing and the object of his affection ceases to receive\nthe attentions which were paid before: in many cases, however, people\nso connected continue friends, if being of similar tempers they have\ncome from custom to like one another\u2019s disposition.\n\nWhere people do not interchange pleasure but profit in matters of Love,\nthe Friendship is both less intense in degree and also less permanent:\nin fact, they who are friends because of advantage commonly part when\nthe advantage ceases; for, in reality, they never were friends of one\nanother but of the advantage.\n\nSo then it appears that from motives of pleasure or profit bad men may\nbe friends to one another, or good men to bad men or men of neutral\ncharacter to one of any character whatever: but disinterestedly, for\nthe sake of one another, plainly the good alone can be friends; because\nbad men have no pleasure even in themselves unless in so far as some\nadvantage arises.\n\nAnd further, the Friendship of the good is alone superior to calumny;\nit not being easy for men to believe a third person respecting one whom\nthey have long tried and proved: there is between good men mutual\nconfidence, and the feeling that one\u2019s friend would never have done one\nwrong, and all other such things as are expected in Friendship really\nworthy the name; but in the other kinds there is nothing to prevent all\nsuch suspicions.\n\nI call them Friendships, because since men commonly give the name of\nfriends to those who are connected from motives of profit (which is\njustified by political language, for alliances between states are\nthought to be contracted with a view to advantage), and to those who\nare attached to one another by the motive of pleasure (as children\nare), we may perhaps also be allowed to call such persons friends, and\nsay there are several species of Friendship; primarily and specially\nthat of the good, in that they are good, and the rest only in the way\nof resemblance: I mean, people connected otherwise are friends in that\nway in which there arises to them somewhat good and some mutual\nresemblance (because, we must remember the pleasurable is good to those\nwho are fond of it).\n\nThese secondary Friendships, however, do not combine very well; that is\nto say, the same persons do not become friends by reason of advantage\nand by reason of the pleasurable, for these matters of result are not\noften combined. And Friendship having been divided into these kinds,\nbad men will be friends by reason of pleasure or profit, this being\ntheir point of resemblance; while the good are friends for one\nanother\u2019s sake, that is, in so far as they are good.\n\nThese last may be termed abstractedly and simply friends, the former as\na matter of result and termed friends from their resemblance to these\nlast.\n\nChapter VI.\n\n\nFurther; just as in respect of the different virtues some men are\ntermed good in respect of a certain inward state, others in respect of\nacts of working, so is it in respect of Friendship: I mean, they who\nlive together take pleasure in, and impart good to, one another: but\nthey who are asleep or are locally separated do not perform acts, but\nonly are in such a state as to act in a friendly way if they acted at\nall: distance has in itself no direct effect upon Friendship, but only\nprevents the acting it out: yet, if the absence be protracted, it is\nthought to cause a forgetfulness even of the Friendship: and hence it\nhas been said, \u201cmany and many a Friendship doth want of intercourse\ndestroy.\u201d\n\nAccordingly, neither the old nor the morose appear to be calculated for\nFriendship, because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one\ncan spend his days in company with that which is positively painful or\neven not pleasurable; since to avoid the painful and aim at the\npleasurable is one of the most obvious tendencies of human nature. They\nwho get on with one another very fairly, but are not in habits of\nintimacy, are rather like people having kindly feelings towards one\nanother than friends; nothing being so characteristic of friends as the\nliving with one another, because the necessitous desire assistance, and\nthe happy companionship, they being the last persons in the world for\nsolitary existence: but people cannot spend their time together unless\nthey are mutually pleasurable and take pleasure in the same objects, a\nquality which is thought to appertain to the Friendship of\ncompanionship.\n\nChapter VII.\n\nThe connection then subsisting between the good is Friendship _par\nexcellence_, as has already been frequently said: since that which is\nabstractedly good or pleasant is thought to be an object of Friendship\nand choice-worthy, and to each individual whatever is such to him; and\nthe good man to the good man for both these reasons.\n\n(Now the entertaining the sentiment is like a feeling, but Friendship\nitself like a state: because the former may have for its object even\nthings inanimate, but requital of Friendship is attended with moral\nchoice which proceeds from a moral state: and again, men wish good to\nthe objects of their Friendship for their sakes, not in the way of a\nmere feeling but of moral state.)\n\nAnd the good, in loving their friend, love their own good (inasmuch as\nthe good man, when brought into that relation, becomes a good to him\nwith whom he is so connected), so that either party loves his own good,\nand repays his friend equally both in wishing well and in the\npleasurable: for equality is said to be a tie of Friendship. Well,\nthese points belong most to the Friendship between good men.\n\nBut between morose or elderly men Friendship is less apt to arise,\nbecause they are somewhat awkward-tempered, and take less pleasure in\nintercourse and society; these being thought to be specially friendly\nand productive of Friendship: and so young men become friends quickly,\nold men not so (because people do not become friends with any, unless\nthey take pleasure in them); and in like manner neither do the morose.\nYet men of these classes entertain kindly feelings towards one another:\nthey wish good to one another and render mutual assistance in respect\nof their needs, but they are not quite friends, because they neither\nspend their time together nor take pleasure in one another, which\ncircumstances are thought specially to belong to Friendship.\n\nTo be a friend to many people, in the way of the perfect Friendship, is\nnot possible; just as you cannot be in love with many at once: it is,\nso to speak, a state of excess which naturally has but one object; and\nbesides, it is not an easy thing for one man to be very much pleased\nwith many people at the same time, nor perhaps to find many really\ngood. Again, a man needs experience, and to be in habits of close\nintimacy, which is very difficult.\n\nBut it _is_ possible to please many on the score of advantage and\npleasure: because there are many men of the kind, and the services may\nbe rendered in a very short time.\n\nOf the two imperfect kinds that which most resembles the perfect is the\nFriendship based upon pleasure, in which the same results accrue from\nboth and they take pleasure in one another or in the same objects; such\nas are the Friendships of the young, because a generous spirit is most\nfound in these. The Friendship because of advantage is the connecting\nlink of shopkeepers.\n\nThen again, the very happy have no need of persons who are profitable,\nbut of pleasant ones they have because they wish to have people to live\nintimately with; and what is painful they bear for a short time indeed,\nbut continuously no one could support it, nay, not even the Chief Good\nitself, if it were painful to him individually: and so they look out\nfor pleasant friends: perhaps they ought to require such to be good\nalso; and good moreover to themselves individually, because then they\nwill have all the proper requisites of Friendship.\n\nMen in power are often seen to make use of several distinct friends:\nfor some are useful to them and others pleasurable, but the two are not\noften united: because they do not, in fact, seek such as shall combine\npleasantness and goodness, nor such as shall be useful for honourable\npurposes: but with a view to attain what is pleasant they look out for\nmen of easy-pleasantry; and again, for men who are clever at executing\nany business put into their hands: and these qualifications are not\ncommonly found united in the same man.\n\nIt has been already stated that the good man unites the qualities of\npleasantness and usefulness: but then such a one will not be a friend\nto a superior unless he be also his superior in goodness: for if this\nbe not the case, he cannot, being surpassed in one point, make things\nequal by a proportionate degree of Friendship.[5] And characters who\nunite superiority of station and goodness are not common.\n\nChapter VIII.\n\nNow all the kinds of Friendship which have been already mentioned exist\nin a state of equality, inasmuch as either the same results accrue to\nboth and they wish the same things to one another, or else they barter\none thing against another; pleasure, for instance, against profit: it\nhas been said already that Friendships of this latter kind are less\nintense in degree and less permanent.\n\nAnd it is their resemblance or dissimilarity to the same thing which\nmakes them to be thought to be and not to be Friendships: they show\nlike Friendships in right of their likeness to that which is based on\nvirtue (the one kind having the pleasurable, the other the profitable,\nboth of which belong also to the other); and again, they do not show\nlike Friendships by reason of their unlikeness to that true kind; which\nunlikeness consists herein, that while that is above calumny and so\npermanent these quickly change and differ in many other points.\n\nBut there is another form of Friendship, that, namely, in which the one\nparty is superior to the other; as between father and son, elder and\nyounger, husband and wife, ruler and ruled. These also differ one from\nanother: I mean, the Friendship between parents and children is not the\nsame as between ruler and the ruled, nor has the father the same\ntowards the son as the son towards the father, nor the husband towards\nthe wife as she towards him; because the work, and therefore the\nexcellence, of each of these is different, and different therefore are\nthe causes of their feeling Friendship; distinct and different\ntherefore are their feelings and states of Friendship.\n\nAnd the same results do not accrue to each from the other, nor in fact\nought they to be looked for: but, when children render to their parents\nwhat they ought to the authors of their being, and parents to their\nsons what they ought to their offspring, the Friendship between such\nparties will be permanent and equitable.\n\nFurther; the feeling of Friendship should be in a due proportion in all\nFriendships which are between superior and inferior; I mean, the better\nman, or the more profitable, and so forth, should be the object of a\nstronger feeling than he himself entertains, because when the feeling\nof Friendship comes to be after a certain rate then equality in a\ncertain sense is produced, which is thought to be a requisite in\nFriendship.\n\n(It must be remembered, however, that the equal is not in the same case\nas regards Justice and Friendship: for in strict Justice the exactly\nproportioned equal ranks first, and the actual numerically equal ranks\nsecond, while in Friendship this is exactly reversed.)\n\nAnd that equality is thus requisite is plainly shown by the occurrence\nof a great difference of goodness or badness, or prosperity, or\nsomething else: for in this case, people are not any longer friends,\nnay they do not even feel that they ought to be. The clearest\nillustration is perhaps the case of the gods, because they are most\nsuperior in all good things. It is obvious too, in the case of kings,\nfor they who are greatly their inferiors do not feel entitled to be\nfriends to them; nor do people very insignificant to be friends to\nthose of very high excellence or wisdom. Of course, in such cases it is\nout of the question to attempt to define up to what point they may\ncontinue friends: for you may remove many points of agreement and the\nFriendship last nevertheless; but when one of the parties is very far\nseparated (as a god from men), it cannot continue any longer.\n\nThis has given room for a doubt, whether friends do really wish to\ntheir friends the very highest goods, as that they may be gods:\nbecause, in case the wish were accomplished, they would no longer have\nthem for friends, nor in fact would they have the good things they had,\nbecause friends are good things. If then it has been rightly said that\na friend wishes to his friend good things for that friend\u2019s sake, it\nmust be understood that he is to remain such as he now is: that is to\nsay, he will wish the greatest good to him of which as man he is\ncapable: yet perhaps not all, because each man desires good for himself\nmost of all.\n\nIt is thought that desire for honour makes the mass of men wish rather\nto be the objects of the feeling of Friendship than to entertain it\nthemselves (and for this reason they are fond of flatterers, a\nflatterer being a friend inferior or at least pretending to be such and\nrather to entertain towards another the feeling of Friendship than to\nbe himself the object of it), since the former is thought to be nearly\nthe same as being honoured, which the mass of men desire. And yet men\nseem to choose honour, not for its own sake, but incidentally:[6] I\nmean, the common run of men delight to be honoured by those in power\nbecause of the hope it raises; that is they think they shall get from\nthem anything they may happen to be in want of, so they delight in\nhonour as an earnest of future benefit. They again who grasp at honour\nat the hands of the good and those who are really acquainted with their\nmerits desire to confirm their own opinion about themselves: so they\ntake pleasure in the conviction that they are good, which is based on\nthe sentence of those who assert it. But in being the objects of\nFriendship men delight for its own sake, and so this may be judged to\nbe higher than being honoured and Friendship to be in itself\nchoice-worthy. Friendship, moreover, is thought to consist in feeling,\nrather than being the object of, the sentiment of Friendship, which is\nproved by the delight mothers have in the feeling: some there are who\ngive their children to be adopted and brought up by others, and knowing\nthem bear this feeling towards them never seeking to have it returned,\nif both are not possible; but seeming to be content with seeing them\nwell off and bearing this feeling themselves towards them, even though\nthey, by reason of ignorance, never render to them any filial regard or\nlove.\n\nSince then Friendship stands rather in the entertaining, than in being\nthe object of, the sentiment, and they are praised who are fond of\ntheir friends, it seems that entertaining the sentiment is the\nExcellence of friends; and so, in whomsoever this exists in due\nproportion these are stable friends and their Friendship is permanent.\nAnd in this way may they who are unequal best be friends, because they\nmay thus be made equal.\n\nEquality, then, and similarity are a tie to Friendship, and specially\nthe similarity of goodness, because good men, being stable in\nthemselves, are also stable as regards others, and neither ask\ndegrading services nor render them, but, so to say, rather prevent\nthem: for it is the part of the good neither to do wrong themselves nor\nto allow their friends in so doing.\n\nThe bad, on the contrary, have no principle of stability: in fact, they\ndo not even continue like themselves: only they come to be friends for\na short time from taking delight in one another\u2019s wickedness. Those\nconnected by motives of profit, or pleasure, hold together somewhat\nlonger: so long, that is to say, as they can give pleasure or profit\nmutually.\n\nThe Friendship based on motives of profit is thought to be most of all\nformed out of contrary elements: the poor man, for instance, is thus a\nfriend of the rich, and the ignorant of the man of information; that is\nto say, a man desiring that of which he is, as it happens, in want,\ngives something else in exchange for it. To this same class we may\nrefer the lover and beloved, the beautiful and the ill-favoured. For\nthis reason lovers sometimes show in a ridiculous light by claiming to\nbe the objects of as intense a feeling as they themselves entertain: of\ncourse if they are equally fit objects of Friendship they are perhaps\nentitled to claim this, but if they have nothing of the kind it is\nridiculous.\n\nPerhaps, moreover, the contrary does not aim at its contrary for its\nown sake but incidentally: the mean is really what is grasped at; it\nbeing good for the dry, for instance, not to become wet but to attain\nthe mean, and so of the hot, etc.\n\nHowever, let us drop these questions, because they are in fact somewhat\nforeign to our purpose.\n\nChapter IX.\n\nIt seems too, as was stated at the commencement, that Friendship and\nJustice have the same object-matter, and subsist between the same\npersons: I mean that in every Communion there is thought to be some\nprinciple of Justice and also some Friendship: men address as friends,\nfor instance, those who are their comrades by sea, or in war, and in\nlike manner also those who are brought into Communion with them in\nother ways: and the Friendship, because also the Justice, is\nco-extensive with the Communion, This justifies the common proverb,\n\u201cthe goods of friends are common,\u201d since Friendship rests upon\nCommunion.\n\nNow brothers and intimate companions have all in common, but other\npeople have their property separate, and some have more in common and\nothers less, because the Friendships likewise differ in degree. So too\ndo the various principles of Justice involved, not being the same\nbetween parents and children as between brothers, nor between\ncompanions as between fellow-citizens merely, and so on of all the\nother conceivable Friendships. Different also are the principles of\nInjustice as regards these different grades, and the acts become\nintensified by being done to friends; for instance, it is worse to rob\nyour companion than one who is merely a fellow-citizen; to refuse help\nto a brother than to a stranger; and to strike your father than any one\nelse. So then the Justice naturally increases with the degree of\nFriendship, as being between the same parties and of equal extent.\n\nAll cases of Communion are parts, so to say, of the great Social one,\nsince in them men associate with a view to some advantage and to\nprocure some of those things which are needful for life; and the great\nSocial Communion is thought originally to have been associated and to\ncontinue for the sake of some advantage: this being the point at which\nlegislators aim, affirming that to be just which is generally\nexpedient.\n\nAll the other cases of Communion aim at advantage in particular points;\nthe crew of a vessel at that which is to result from the voyage which\nis undertaken with a view to making money, or some such object;\ncomrades in war at that which is to result from the war, grasping\neither at wealth or victory, or it may be a political position; and\nthose of the same tribe, or Demus, in like manner.\n\nSome of them are thought to be formed for pleasure\u2019s sake, those, for\ninstance, of bacchanals or club-fellows, which are with a view to\nSacrifice or merely company. But all these seem to be ranged under the\ngreat Social one, inasmuch as the aim of this is, not merely the\nexpediency of the moment but, for life and at all times; with a view to\nwhich the members of it institute sacrifices and their attendant\nassemblies, to render honour to the gods and procure for themselves\nrespite from toil combined with pleasure. For it appears that\nsacrifices and religious assemblies in old times were made as a kind of\nfirst-fruits after the ingathering of the crops, because at such\nseasons they had most leisure.\n\nSo then it appears that all the instances of Communion are parts of the\ngreat Social one: and corresponding Friendships will follow upon such\nCommunions.\n\nChapter X.\n\nOf Political Constitutions there are three kinds; and equal in number\nare the deflections from them, being, so to say, corruptions of them.\n\nThe former are Kingship, Aristocracy, and that which recognises the\nprinciple of wealth, which it seems appropriate to call Timocracy (I\ngive to it the name of a political constitution because people commonly\ndo so). Of these the best is Monarchy, and Timocracy the worst.\n\nFrom Monarchy the deflection is Despotism; both being Monarchies but\nwidely differing from each other; for the Despot looks to his own\nadvantage, but the King to that of his subjects: for he is in fact no\nKing who is not thoroughly independent and superior to the rest in all\ngood things, and he that is this has no further wants: he will not then\nhave to look to his own advantage but to that of his subjects, for he\nthat is not in such a position is a mere King elected by lot for the\nnonce.\n\nBut Despotism is on a contrary footing to this Kingship, because the\nDespot pursues his own good: and in the case of this its inferiority is\nmost evident, and what is worse is contrary to what is best. The\nTransition to Despotism is made from Kingship, Despotism being a\ncorrupt form of Monarchy, that is to say, the bad King comes to be a\nDespot.\n\nFrom Aristocracy to Oligarchy the transition is made by the fault of\nthe Rulers in distributing the public property contrary to right\nproportion; and giving either all that is good, or the greatest share,\nto themselves; and the offices to the same persons always, making\nwealth their idol; thus a few bear rule and they bad men in the place\nof the best.\n\nFrom Timocracy the transition is to Democracy, they being contiguous:\nfor it is the nature of Timocracy to be in the hands of a multitude,\nand all in the same grade of property are equal. Democracy is the least\nvicious of all, since herein the form of the constitution undergoes\nleast change.\n\nWell, these are generally the changes to which the various\nConstitutions are liable, being the least in degree and the easiest to\nmake.\n\nLikenesses, and, as it were, models of them, one may find even in\nDomestic life: for instance, the Communion between a Father and his\nSons presents the figure of Kingship, because the children are the\nFather\u2019s care: and hence Homer names Jupiter Father because Kingship is\nintended to be a paternal rule. Among the Persians, however, the\nFather\u2019s rule is Despotic, for they treat their Sons as slaves. (The\nrelation of Master to Slaves is of the nature of Despotism because the\npoint regarded herein is the Master\u2019s interest): this now strikes me to\nbe as it ought, but the Persian custom to be mistaken; because for\ndifferent persons there should be different rules.\n\nBetween Husband and Wife the relation takes the form of Aristocracy,\nbecause he rules by right and in such points only as the Husband\nshould, and gives to the Wife all that befits her to have. Where the\nHusband lords it in everything he changes the relation into an\nOligarchy; because he does it contrary to right and not as being the\nbetter of the two. In some instances the Wives take the reins of\ngovernment, being heiresses: here the rule is carried on not in right\nof goodness but by reason of wealth and power, as it is in Oligarchies.\n\nTimocracy finds its type in the relation of Brothers: they being equal\nexcept as to such differences as age introduces: for which reason, if\nthey are very different in age, the Friendship comes to be no longer a\nfraternal one: while Democracy is represented specially by families\nwhich have no head (all being there equal), or in which the proper head\nis weak and so every member does that which is right in his own eyes.\n\nChapter XI.\n\nAttendant then on each form of Political Constitution there plainly is\nFriendship exactly co-extensive with the principle of Justice; that\nbetween a King and his Subjects being in the relation of a superiority\nof benefit, inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it being assumed that\nhe is a good king and takes care of their welfare as a shepherd tends\nhis flock; whence Homer (to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, \u201cshepherd\nof the people.\u201d And of this same kind is the Paternal Friendship, only\nthat it exceeds the former in the greatness of the benefits done;\nbecause the father is the author of being (which is esteemed the\ngreatest benefit) and of maintenance and education (these things are\nalso, by the way, ascribed to ancestors generally): and by the law of\nnature the father has the right of rule over his sons, ancestors over\ntheir descendants, and the king over his subjects.\n\nThese friendships are also between superiors and inferiors, for which\nreason parents are not merely loved but also honoured. The principle of\nJustice also between these parties is not exactly the same but\naccording to proportiton, because so also is the Friendship.\n\nNow between Husband and Wife there is the same Friendship as in\nAristocracy: for the relation is determined by relative excellence, and\nthe better person has the greater good and each has what befits: so too\nalso is the principle of Justice between them.\n\nThe Fraternal Friendship is like that of Companions, because brothers\nare equal and much of an age, and such persons have generally like\nfeelings and like dispositions. Like to this also is the Friendship of\na Timocracy, because the citizens are intended to be equal and\nequitable: rule, therefore, passes from hand to hand, and is\ndistributed on equal terms: so too is the Friendship accordingly.\n\nIn the deflections from the constitutional forms, just as the principle\nof Justice is but small so is the Friendship also: and least of all in\nthe most perverted form: in Despotism there is little or no Friendship.\nFor generally wherever the ruler and the ruled have nothing in common\nthere is no Friendship because there is no Justice; but the case is as\nbetween an artisan and his tool, or between soul and body, and master\nand slave; all these are benefited by those who use them, but towards\nthings inanimate there is neither Friendship nor Justice: nor even\ntowards a horse or an ox, or a slave _qu\u00e2_ slave, because there is\nnothing in common: a slave as such is an animate tool, a tool an\ninanimate slave. _Qu\u00e2_ slave, then, there is no Friendship towards him,\nonly _qu\u00e2_ man: for it is thought that there is some principle of\nJustice between every man, and every other who can share in law and be\na party to an agreement; and so somewhat of Friendship, in so far as he\nis man. So in Despotisms the Friendships and the principle of Justice\nare inconsiderable in extent, but in Democracies they are most\nconsiderable because they who are equal have much in common.\n\nChapter XII.\n\nNow of course all Friendship is based upon Communion, as has been\nalready stated: but one would be inclined to separate off from the rest\nthe Friendship of Kindred, and that of Companions: whereas those of men\nof the same city, or tribe, or crew, and all such, are more peculiarly,\nit would seem, based upon Communion, inasmuch as they plainly exist in\nright of some agreement expressed or implied: among these one may rank\nalso the Friendship of Hospitality,\n\nThe Friendship of Kindred is likewise of many kinds, and appears in all\nits varieties to depend on the Parental: parents, I mean, love their\nchildren as being a part of themselves, children love their parents as\nbeing themselves somewhat derived from them. But parents know their\noffspring more than these know that they are from the parents, and the\nsource is more closely bound to that which is produced than that which\nis produced is to that which formed it: of course, whatever is derived\nfrom one\u2019s self is proper to that from which it is so derived (as, for\ninstance, a tooth or a hair, or any other thing whatever to him that\nhas it): but the source to it is in no degree proper, or in an inferior\ndegree at least.\n\nThen again the greater length of time comes in: the parents love their\noffspring from the first moment of their being, but their offspring\nthem only after a lapse of time when they have attained intelligence or\ninstinct. These considerations serve also to show why mothers have\ngreater strength of affection than fathers.\n\nNow parents love their children as themselves (since what is derived\nfrom themselves becomes a kind of other Self by the fact of\nseparation), but children their parents as being sprung from them. And\nbrothers love one another from being sprung from the same; that is,\ntheir sameness with the common stock creates a sameness with one\nanother;[7] whence come the phrases, \u201csame blood,\u201d \u201croot,\u201d and so on.\nIn fact they are the same, in a sense, even in the separate distinct\nindividuals.\n\nThen again the being brought up together, and the nearness of age, are\na great help towards Friendship, for a man likes one of his own age and\npersons who are used to one another are companions, which accounts for\nthe resemblance between the Friendship of Brothers and that of\nCompanions.\n\nAnd cousins and all other relatives derive their bond of union from\nthese, that is to say, from their community of origin: and the strength\nof this bond varies according to their respective distances from the\ncommon ancestor.\n\nFurther: the Friendship felt by children towards parents, and by men\ntowards the gods, is as towards something good and above them; because\nthese have conferred the greatest possible benefits, in that they are\nthe causes of their being and being nourished, and of their having been\neducated after they were brought into being.\n\nAnd Friendship of this kind has also the pleasurable and the profitable\nmore than that between persons unconnected by blood, in proportion as\ntheir life is also more shared in common. Then again in the Fraternal\nFriendship there is all that there is in that of Companions, and more\nin the good, and generally in those who are alike; in proportion as\nthey are more closely tied and from their very birth have a feeling of\naffection for one another to begin with, and as they are more like in\ndisposition who spring from the same stock and have grown up together\nand been educated alike: and besides this they have the greatest\nopportunities in respect of time for proving one another, and can\ntherefore depend most securely upon the trial.\n\nBetween Husband and Wife there is thought to be Friendship by a law of\nnature: man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to associate in\nCommunities: in proportion as the family is prior in order of time and\nmore absolutely necessary than the Community. And procreation is more\ncommon to him with other animals; all the other animals have Communion\nthus far, but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake of\nprocreation but also with a view to life in general::[8] because in\nthis connection the works are immediately divided, and some belong to\nthe man, others to the woman: thus they help one the other, putting\nwhat is peculiar to each into the common stock.\n\nAnd for these reasons this Friendship is thought to combine the\nprofitable and the pleasurable: it will be also based upon virtue if\nthey are good people; because each has goodness and they may take\ndelight in this quality in each other. Children too are thought to be a\ntie: accordingly the childless sooner separate, for the children are a\ngood common to both and anything in common is a bond of union.\n\nThe question how a man is to live with his wife, or (more generally)\none friend with another, appears to be no other than this, how it is\njust that they should: because plainly there is not the same principle\nof Justice between a friend and friend, as between strangers, or\ncompanions, or mere chance fellow-travellers.\n\nChapter XIII.\n\nThere are then, as was stated at the commencement of this book, three\nkinds of Friendship, and in each there may be friends on a footing of\nequality and friends in the relation of superior and inferior; we find,\nI mean, that people who are alike in goodness, become friends, and\nbetter with worse, and so also pleasant people; again, because of\nadvantage people are friends, either balancing exactly their mutual\nprofitableness or differing from one another herein. Well then, those\nwho are equal should in right of this equality be equalised also by the\ndegree of their Friendship and the other points, and those who are on a\nfooting of inequality by rendering Friendship in proportion to the\nsuperiority of the other party.\n\nFault-finding and blame arises, either solely or most naturally, in\nFriendship of which utility is the motive: for they who are friends by\nreason of goodness, are eager to do kindnesses to one another because\nthis is a natural result of goodness and Friendship; and when men are\nvying with each other for this End there can be no fault-finding nor\ncontention: since no one is annoyed at one who entertains for him the\nsentiment of Friendship and does kindnesses to him, but if of a refined\nmind he requites him with kind actions. And suppose that one of the two\nexceeds the other, yet as he is attaining his object he will not find\nfault with his friend, for good is the object of each party.\n\nNeither can there well be quarrels between men who are friends for\npleasure\u2019s sake: because supposing them to delight in living together\nthen both attain their desire; or if not a man would be put in a\nridiculous light who should find fault with another for not pleasing\nhim, since it is in his power to forbear intercourse with him. But the\nFriendship because of advantage is very liable to fault-finding;\nbecause, as the parties use one another with a view to advantage, the\nrequirements are continually enlarging, and they think they have less\nthan of right belongs to them, and find fault because though justly\nentitled they do not get as much as they want: while they who do the\nkindnesses, can never come up to the requirements of those to whom they\nare being done.\n\nIt seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and the\nlegal, so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what may be\ncalled the Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source of\ncomplaints is that parties contract obligations and discharge them not\nin the same line of Friendship. The Legal is upon specified conditions,\neither purely tradesmanlike from hand to hand or somewhat more\ngentlemanly as regards time but still by agreement a _quid pro quo_.\n\nIn this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute,\nthe friendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for\nthis reason in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for\nthe recovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on\nthe footing of credit must be content to abide the issue.\n\nThat which may be termed the Moral kind is not upon specified\nconditions, but a man gives as to his friend and so on: but still he\nexpects to receive an equivalent, or even more, as though he had not\ngiven but lent: he also will find fault, because he does not get the\nobligation discharged in the same way as it was contracted.\n\nNow this results from the fact, that all men, or the generality at\nleast, _wish_ what is honourable, but, when tested, _choose_ what is\nprofitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedly is honourable\nwhile receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases one should, if\nable, make a return proportionate to the good received, and do so\nwillingly, because one ought not to make a disinterested friend[9] of a\nman against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made a\nmistake originally in receiving kindness from one from whom one ought\nnot to have received it, he being not a friend nor doing the act\ndisinterestedly; one should therefore discharge one\u2019s self of the\nobligation as having received a kindness on specified terms: and if\nable a man would engage to repay the kindness, while if he were unable\neven the doer of it would not expect it of him: so that if he is able\nhe ought to repay it. But one ought at the first to ascertain from whom\none is receiving kindness, and on what understanding, that on that same\nunderstanding one may accept it or not.\n\nA question admitting of dispute is whether one is to measure a kindness\nby the good done to the receiver of it, and make this the standard by\nwhich to requite, or by the kind intention of the doer?\n\nFor they who have received kindnesses frequently plead in depreciation\nthat they have received from their benefactors such things as were\nsmall for them to give, or such as they themselves could have got from\nothers: while the doers of the kindnesses affirm that they gave the\nbest they had, and what could not have been got from others, and under\ndanger, or in such-like straits.\n\nMay we not say, that as utility is the motive of the Friendship the\nadvantage conferred on the receiver must be the standard? because he it\nis who requests the kindness and the other serves him in his need on\nthe understanding that he is to get an equivalent: the assistance\nrendered is then exactly proportionate to the advantage which the\nreceiver has obtained, and he should therefore repay as much as he\ngained by it, or even more, this being more creditable.\n\nIn Friendships based on goodness, the question, of course, is never\nraised, but herein the motive of the doer seems to be the proper\nstandard, since virtue and moral character depend principally on\nmotive.\n\nChapter XIV.\n\nQuarrels arise also in those Friendships in which the parties are\nunequal because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater\nshare, and of course, when this happens, the Friendship is broken up.\n\nThe man who is better than the other thinks that having the greater\nshare pertains to him of right, for that more is always awarded to the\ngood man: and similarly the man who is more profitable to another than\nthat other to him: \u201cone who is useless,\u201d they say, \u201cought not to share\nequally, for it comes to a tax, and not a Friendship, unless the fruits\nof the Friendship are reaped in proportion to the works done:\u201d their\nnotion being, that as in a money partnership they who contribute more\nreceive more so should it be in Friendship likewise.\n\nOn the other hand, the needy man and the less virtuous advance the\nopposite claim: they urge that \u201cit is the very business of a good\nfriend to help those who are in need, else what is the use of having a\ngood or powerful friend if one is not to reap the advantage at all?\u201d\n\nNow each seems to advance a right claim and to be entitled to get more\nout of the connection than the other, only _not more of the same\nthing_: but the superior man should receive more respect, the needy man\nmore profit: respect being the reward of goodness and beneficence,\nprofit being the aid of need.\n\nThis is plainly the principle acted upon in Political Communities: he\nreceives no honour who gives no good to the common stock: for the\nproperty of the Public is given to him who does good to the Public, and\nhonour is the property of the Public; it is not possible both to make\nmoney out of the Public and receive honour likewise; because no one\nwill put up with the less in every respect: so to him who suffers loss\nas regards money they award honour, but money to him who can be paid by\ngifts: since, as has been stated before, the observing due proportion\nequalises and preserves Friendship.\n\nLike rules then should be observed in the intercourse of friends who\nare unequal; and to him who advantages another in respect of money, or\ngoodness, that other should repay honour, making requital according to\nhis power; because Friendship requires what is possible, not what is\nstrictly due, this being not possible in all cases, as in the honours\npaid to the gods and to parents: no man could ever make the due return\nin these cases, and so he is thought to be a good man who pays respect\naccording to his ability.\n\nFor this reason it may be judged never to be allowable for a son to\ndisown his father, whereas a father may his son: because he that owes\nis bound to pay; now a son can never, by anything he has done, fully\nrequite the benefits first conferred on him by his father, and so is\nalways a debtor. But they to whom anything is owed may cast off their\ndebtors: therefore the father may his son. But at the same time it must\nperhaps be admitted, that it seems no father ever _would_ sever himself\nutterly from a son, except in a case of exceeding depravity: because,\nindependently of the natural Friendship, it is like human nature not to\nput away from one\u2019s self the assistance which a son might render. But\nto the son, if depraved, assisting his father is a thing to be avoided,\nor at least one which he will not be very anxious to do; most men being\nwilling enough to receive kindness, but averse to doing it as\nunprofitable.\n\nLet thus much suffice on these points.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IX\n\nChapter I.\n\n\nWell, in all the Friendships the parties to which are dissimilar it is\nthe proportionate which equalises and preserves the Friendship, as has\nbeen already stated: I mean, in the Social Friendship the cobbler, for\ninstance, gets an equivalent for his shoes after a certain rate; and\nthe weaver, and all others in like manner. Now in this case a common\nmeasure has been provided in money, and to this accordingly all things\nare referred and by this are measured: but in the Friendship of Love\nthe complaint is sometimes from the lover that, though he loves\nexceedingly, his love is not requited; he having perhaps all the time\nnothing that can be the object of Friendship: again, oftentimes from\nthe object of love that he who as a suitor promised any and every thing\nnow performs nothing. These cases occur because the Friendship of the\nlover for the beloved object is based upon pleasure, that of the other\nfor him upon utility, and in one of the parties the requisite quality\nis not found: for, as these are respectively the grounds of the\nFriendship, the Friendship comes to be broken up because the motives to\nit cease to exist: the parties loved not one another but qualities in\none another which are not permanent, and so neither are the\nFriendships: whereas the Friendship based upon the moral character of\nthe parties, being independent and disinterested, is permanent, as we\nhave already stated.\n\nQuarrels arise also when the parties realise different results and not\nthose which they desire; for the not attaining one\u2019s special object is\nall one, in this case, with getting nothing at all: as in the\nwell-known case where a man made promises to a musician, rising in\nproportion to the excellence of his music; but when, the next morning,\nthe musician claimed the performance of his promises, he said that he\nhad given him pleasure for pleasure: of course, if each party had\nintended this, it would have been all right: but if the one desires\namusement and the other gain, and the one gets his object but the other\nnot, the dealing cannot be fair: because a man fixes his mind upon what\nhe happens to want, and will give so and so for that specific thing.\n\nThe question then arises, who is to fix the rate? the man who first\ngives, or the man who first takes? because, _prim\u00e2 facie_, the man who\nfirst gives seems to leave the rate to be fixed by the other party.\nThis, they say, was in fact the practice of Protagoras: when he taught\na man anything he would bid the learner estimate the worth of the\nknowledge gained by his own private opinion; and then he used to take\nso much from him. In such cases some people adopt the rule,\n\n\u201cWith specified reward a friend should be content.\u201d\n\n\nThey are certainly fairly found fault with who take the money in\nadvance and then do nothing of what they said they would do, their\npromises having been so far beyond their ability; for such men do not\nperform what they agreed, The Sophists, however, are perhaps obliged to\ntake this course, because no one would give a sixpence for their\nknowledge. These then, I say, are fairly found fault with, because they\ndo not what they have already taken money for doing.\n\nIn cases where no stipulation as to the respective services is made\nthey who disinterestedly do the first service will not raise the\nquestion (as we have said before), because it is the nature of\nFriendship, based on mutual goodness to be reference to the intention\nof the other, the intention being characteristic of the true friend and\nof goodness.\n\nAnd it would seem the same rule should be laid down for those who are\nconnected with one another as teachers and learners of philosophy; for\nhere the value of the commodity cannot be measured by money, and, in\nfact, an exactly equivalent price cannot be set upon it, but perhaps it\nis sufficient to do what one can, as in the case of the gods or one\u2019s\nparents.\n\nBut where the original giving is not upon these terms but avowedly for\nsome return, the most proper course is perhaps for the requital to be\nsuch as _both_ shall allow to be proportionate, and, where this cannot\nbe, then for the receiver to fix the value would seem to be not only\nnecessary but also fair: because when the first giver gets that which\nis equivalent to the advantage received by the other, or to what he\nwould have given to secure the pleasure he has had, then he has the\nvalue from him: for not only is this seen to be the course adopted in\nmatters of buying and selling but also in some places the law does not\nallow of actions upon voluntary dealings; on the principle that when\none man has trusted another he must be content to have the obligation\ndischarged in the same spirit as he originally contracted it: that is\nto say, it is thought fairer for the trusted, than for the trusting,\nparty, to fix the value. For, in general, those who have and those who\nwish to get things do not set the same value on them: what is their\nown, and what they give in each case, appears to them worth a great\ndeal: but yet the return is made according to the estimate of those who\nhave received first, it should perhaps be added that the receiver\nshould estimate what he has received, not by the value he sets upon it\nnow that he has it, but by that which he set upon it before he obtained\nit.\n\nChapter II.\n\nQuestions also arise upon such points as the following: Whether one\u2019s\nfather has an unlimited claim on one\u2019s services and obedience, or\nwhether the sick man is to obey his physician? or, in an election of a\ngeneral, the warlike qualities of the candidates should be alone\nregarded?\n\nIn like manner whether one should do a service rather to one\u2019s friend\nor to a good man? whether one should rather requite a benefactor or\ngive to one\u2019s companion, supposing that both are not within one\u2019s\npower?\n\nIs not the true answer that it is no easy task to determine all such\nquestions accurately, inasmuch as they involve numerous differences of\nall kinds, in respect of amount and what is honourable and what is\nnecessary? It is obvious, of course, that no one person can unite in\nhimself all claims. Again, the requital of benefits is, in general, a\nhigher duty than doing unsolicited kindnesses to one\u2019s companion; in\nother words, the discharging of a debt is more obligatory upon one than\nthe duty of giving to a companion. And yet this rule may admit of\nexceptions; for instance, which is the higher duty? for one who has\nbeen ransomed out of the hands of robbers to ransom in return his\nransomer, be he who he may, or to repay him on his demand though he has\nnot been taken by robbers, or to ransom his own father? for it would\nseem that a man ought to ransom his father even in preference to\nhimself.\n\nWell then, as has been said already, as a general rule the debt should\nbe discharged, but if in a particular case the giving greatly\npreponderates as being either honourable or necessary, we must be\nswayed by these considerations: I mean, in some cases the requital of\nthe obligation previously existing may not be equal; suppose, for\ninstance, that the original benefactor has conferred a kindness on a\ngood man, knowing him to be such, whereas this said good man has to\nrepay it believing him to be a scoundrel.\n\nAnd again, in certain cases no obligation lies on a man to lend to one\nwho has lent to him; suppose, for instance, that a bad man lent to him,\nas being a good man, under the notion that he should get repaid,\nwhereas the said good man has no hope of repayment from him being a bad\nman. Either then the case is really as we have supposed it and then the\nclaim is not equal, or it is not so but supposed to be; and still in so\nacting people are not to be thought to act wrongly. In short, as has\nbeen oftentimes stated before, all statements regarding feelings and\nactions can be definite only in proportion as their object-matter is\nso; it is of course quite obvious that all people have not the same\nclaim upon one, nor are the claims of one\u2019s father unlimited; just as\nJupiter does not claim all kinds of sacrifice without distinction: and\nsince the claims of parents, brothers, companions, and benefactors, are\nall different, we must give to each what belongs to and befits each.\n\nAnd this is seen to be the course commonly pursued: to marriages men\ncommonly invite their relatives, because these are from a common stock\nand therefore all the actions in any way pertaining thereto are common\nalso: and to funerals men think that relatives ought to assemble in\npreference to other people, for the same reason.\n\nAnd it would seem that in respect of maintenance it is our duty to\nassist our parents in preference to all others, as being their debtors,\nand because it is more honourable to succour in these respects the\nauthors of our existence than ourselves. Honour likewise we ought to\npay to our parents just as to the gods, but then, not all kinds of\nhonour: not the same, for instance, to a father as to a mother: nor\nagain to a father the honour due to a scientific man or to a general\nbut that which is a father\u2019s due, and in like manner to a mother that\nwhich is a mother\u2019s.\n\nTo all our elders also the honour befitting their age, by rising up in\ntheir presence, turning out of the way for them, and all similar marks\nof respect: to our companions again, or brothers, frankness and free\nparticipation in all we have. And to those of the same family, or\ntribe, or city, with ourselves, and all similarly connected with us, we\nshould constantly try to render their due, and to discriminate what\nbelongs to each in respect of nearness of connection, or goodness, or\nintimacy: of course in the case of those of the same class the\ndiscrimination is easier; in that of those who are in different classes\nit is a matter of more trouble. This, however, should not be a reason\nfor giving up the attempt, but we must observe the distinctions so far\nas it is practicable to do so.\n\nChapter III.\n\nA question is also raised as to the propriety of dissolving or not\ndissolving those Friendships the parties to which do not remain what\nthey were when the connection was formed.\n\nNow surely in respect of those whose motive to Friendship is utility or\npleasure there can be nothing wrong in breaking up the connection when\nthey no longer have those qualities; because they were friends [not of\none another, but] of those qualities: and, these having failed, it is\nonly reasonable to expect that they should cease to entertain the\nsentiment.\n\nBut a man has reason to find fault if the other party, being really\nattached to him because of advantage or pleasure, pretended to be so\nbecause of his moral character: in fact, as we said at the\ncommencement, the most common source of quarrels between friends is\ntheir not being friends on the same grounds as they suppose themselves\nto be.\n\nNow when a man has been deceived in having supposed himself to excite\nthe sentiment of Friendship by reason of his moral character, the other\nparty doing nothing to indicate he has but himself to blame: but when\nhe has been deceived by the pretence of the other he has a right to\nfind fault with the man who has so deceived him, aye even more than\nwith utterers of false coin, in proportion to the greater preciousness\nof that which is the object-matter of the villany.\n\nBut suppose a man takes up another as being a good man, who turns out,\nand is found by him, to be a scoundrel, is he bound still to entertain\nFriendship for him? or may we not say at once it is impossible? since\nit is not everything which is the object-matter of Friendship, but only\nthat which is good; and so there is no obligation to be a bad man\u2019s\nfriend, nor, in fact, ought one to be such: for one ought not to be a\nlover of evil, nor to be assimilated to what is base; which would be\nimplied, because we have said before, like is friendly to like.\n\nAre we then to break with him instantly? not in all cases; only where\nour friends are incurably depraved; when there is a chance of amendment\nwe are bound to aid in repairing the moral character of our friends\neven more than their substance, in proportion as it is better and more\nclosely related to Friendship. Still he who should break off the\nconnection is not to be judged to act wrongly, for he never was a\nfriend to such a character as the other now is, and therefore, since\nthe man is changed and he cannot reduce him to his original state, he\nbacks out of the connection.\n\nTo put another case: suppose that one party remains what he was when\nthe Friendship was formed, while the other becomes morally improved and\nwidely different from his friend in goodness; is the improved character\nto treat the other as a friend?\n\nMay we not say it is impossible? The case of course is clearest where\nthere is a great difference, as in the Friendships of boys: for suppose\nthat of two boyish friends the one still continues a boy in mind and\nthe other becomes a man of the highest character, how can they be\nfriends? since they neither are pleased with the same objects nor like\nand dislike the same things: for these points will not belong to them\nas regards one another, and without them it was assumed they cannot be\nfriends because they cannot live in intimacy: and of the case of those\nwho cannot do so we have spoken before.\n\nWell then, is the improved party to bear himself towards his former\nfriend in no way differently to what he would have done had the\nconnection never existed?\n\nSurely he ought to bear in mind the intimacy of past times, and just as\nwe think ourselves bound to do favours for our friends in preference to\nstrangers, so to those who have been friends and are so no longer we\nshould allow somewhat on the score of previous Friendship, whenever the\ncause of severance is not excessive depravity on their part.\n\nChapter IV.\n\nNow the friendly feelings which are exhibited towards our friends, and\nby which Friendships are characterised, seem to have sprung out of\nthose which we entertain toward ourselves.\n\nI mean, people define a friend to be \u201cone who intends and does what is\ngood (or what he believes to be good) to another for that other\u2019s\nsake,\u201d or \u201cone who wishes his friend to be and to live for that\nfriend\u2019s own sake\u201d (which is the feeling of mothers towards their\nchildren, and of friends who have come into collision). Others again,\n\u201cone who lives with another and chooses the same objects,\u201d or \u201cone who\nsympathises with his friend in his sorrows and in his joys\u201d (this too\nis especially the case with mothers).\n\nWell, by some one of these marks people generally characterise\nFriendship: and each of these the good man has towards himself, and all\nothers have them in so far as they suppose themselves to be good. (For,\nas has been said before, goodness, that is the good man, seems to be a\nmeasure to every one else.)\n\nFor he is at unity in himself, and with every part of his soul he\ndesires the same objects; and he wishes for himself both what is, and\nwhat he believes to be, good; and he does it (it being characteristic\nof the good man to work at what is good), and for the sake of himself,\ninasmuch as he does it for the sake of his Intellectual Principle which\nis generally thought to be a man\u2019s Self. Again, he wishes himself And\nspecially this Principle whereby he is an intelligent being, to live\nand be preserved in life, because existence is a good to him that is a\ngood man.\n\nBut it is to himself that each individual wishes what is good, and no\nman, conceiving the possibility of his becoming other than he now is,\nchooses that that New Self should have all things indiscriminately: a\ngod, for instance, has at the present moment the Chief Good, but he has\nit in right of being whatever he actually now is: and the Intelligent\nPrinciple must be judged to be each man\u2019s Self, or at least eminently\nso [though other Principles help, of course, to constitute him the man\nhe is].\n\nFurthermore, the good man wishes to continue to live with himself; for\nhe can do it with pleasure, in that his memories of past actions are\nfull of delight and his anticipations of the future are good and such\nare pleasurable. Then, again, he has good store of matter for his\nIntellect to contemplate, and he most especially sympathises with his\nSelf in its griefs and joys, because the objects which give him pain\nand pleasure are at all times the same, not one thing to-day and a\ndifferent one to-morrow: because he is not given to repentance,[1] if\none may so speak. It is then because each of these feelings are\nentertained by the good man towards his own Self and a friend feels\ntowards a friend as towards himself (a friend being in fact another\nSelf), that Friendship is thought to be some one of these things and\nthey are accounted friends in whom they are found. Whether or no there\ncan really be Friendship between a man and his Self is a question we\nwill not at present entertain: there may be thought to be Friendship,\nin so far as there are two or more of the aforesaid requisites, and\nbecause the highest degree of Friendship, in the usual acceptation of\nthat term, resembles the feeling entertained by a man towards himself.\n\nBut it may be urged that the aforesaid requisites are to all appearance\nfound in the common run of men, though they are men of a low stamp.\n\nMay it not be answered, that they share in them only in so far as they\nplease themselves, and conceive themselves to be good? for certainly,\nthey are not either really, or even apparently, found in any one of\nthose who are very depraved and villainous; we may almost say not even\nin those who are bad men at all: for they are at variance with\nthemselves and lust after different things from those which in cool\nreason they wish for, just as men who fail of Self-Control: I mean,\nthey choose things which, though hurtful, are pleasurable, in\npreference to those which in their own minds they believe to be good:\nothers again, from cowardice and indolence, decline to do what still\nthey are convinced is best for them: while they who from their\ndepravity have actually done many dreadful actions hate and avoid life,\nand accordingly kill themselves: and the wicked seek others in whose\ncompany to spend their time, but fly from themselves because they have\nmany unpleasant subjects of memory, and can only look forward to others\nlike them when in solitude but drown their remorse in the company of\nothers: and as they have nothing to raise the sentiment of Friendship\nso they never feel it towards themselves.\n\nNeither, in fact, can they who are of this character sympathise with\ntheir Selves in their joys and sorrows, because their soul is, as it\nwere, rent by faction, and the one principle, by reason of the\ndepravity in them, is grieved at abstaining from certain things, while\nthe other and better principle is pleased thereat; and the one drags\nthem this way and the other that way, as though actually tearing them\nasunder.[2] And though it is impossible actually to have at the same\ntime the sensations of pain and pleasure; yet after a little time the\nman is sorry for having been pleased, and he could wish that those\nobjects had not given him pleasure; for the wicked are full of remorse.\n\nIt is plain then that the wicked man cannot be in the position of a\nfriend even towards himself, because he has in himself nothing which\ncan excite the sentiment of Friendship. If then to be thus is\nexceedingly wretched it is a man\u2019s duty to flee from wickedness with\nall his might and to strive to be good, because thus may he be friends\nwith himself and may come to be a friend to another.\n\nChapter V.\n\nKindly Feeling, though resembling Friendship, is not identical with it,\nbecause it may exist in reference to those whom we do not know and\nwithout the object of it being aware of its existence, which Friendship\ncannot. (This, by the way, has also been said before.) And further, it\nis not even Affection because it does not imply intensity nor yearning,\nwhich are both consequences of Affection. Again Affection requires\nintimacy but Kindly Feeling may arise quite suddenly, as happens\nsometimes in respect of men against whom people are matched in any way,\nI mean they come to be kindly disposed to them and sympathise in their\nwishes, but still they would not join them in any action, because, as\nwe said, they conceive this feeling of kindness suddenly and so have\nbut a superficial liking.\n\nWhat it does seem to be is the starting point of a Friendship; just as\npleasure, received through the sight, is the commencement of Love: for\nno one falls in love without being first pleased with the personal\nappearance of the beloved object, and yet he who takes pleasure in it\ndoes not therefore necessarily love, but when he wearies for the object\nin its absence and desires its presence. Exactly in the same way men\ncannot be friends without having passed through the stage of Kindly\nFeeling, and yet they who are in that stage do not necessarily advance\nto Friendship: they merely have an inert wish for the good of those\ntoward whom they entertain the feeling, but would not join them in any\naction, nor put themselves out of the way for them. So that, in a\nmetaphorical way of speaking, one might say that it is dormant\nFriendship, and when it has endured for a space and ripened into\nintimacy comes to be real Friendship; but not that whose object is\nadvantage or pleasure, because such motives cannot produce even Kindly\nFeeling.\n\nI mean, he who has received a kindness requites it by Kindly Feeling\ntowards his benefactor, and is right in so doing: but he who wishes\nanother to be prosperous, because he has hope of advantage through his\ninstrumentality, does not seem to be kindly disposed to that person but\nrather to himself; just as neither is he his friend if he pays court to\nhim for any interested purpose.\n\nKindly Feeling always arises by reason of goodness and a certain\namiability, when one man gives another the notion of being a fine\nfellow, or brave man, etc., as we said was the case sometimes with\nthose matched against one another.\n\nChapter VI.\n\nUnity of Sentiment is also plainly connected with Friendship, and\ntherefore is not the same as Unity of Opinion, because this might exist\neven between people unacquainted with one another.\n\nNor do men usually say people are united in sentiment merely because\nthey agree in opinion on _any_ point, as, for instance, on points of\nastronomical science (Unity of Sentiment herein not having any\nconnection with Friendship), but they say that Communities have Unity\nof Sentiment when they agree respecting points of expediency and take\nthe same line and carry out what has been determined in common\nconsultation.\n\nThus we see that Unity of Sentiment has for its object matters of\naction, and such of these as are of importance, and of mutual, or, in\nthe case of single States, common, interest: when, for instance, all\nagree in the choice of magistrates, or forming alliance with the\nLaced\u00e6monians, or appointing Pittacus ruler (that is to say, supposing\nhe himself was willing). But when each wishes himself to be in power\n(as the brothers in the Ph\u0153niss\u00e6), they quarrel and form parties: for,\nplainly, Unity of Sentiment does not merely imply that each entertains\nthe same idea be it what it may, but that they do so in respect of the\nsame object, as when both the populace and the sensible men of a State\ndesire that the best men should be in office, because then all attain\ntheir object.\n\nThus Unity of Sentiment is plainly a social Friendship, as it is also\nsaid to be: since it has for its object-matter things expedient and\nrelating to life.\n\nAnd this Unity exists among the good: for they have it towards\nthemselves and towards one another, being, if I may be allowed the\nexpression, in the same position: I mean, the wishes of such men are\nsteady and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus, and they wish what is\njust and expedient and aim at these things in common.\n\nThe bad, on the contrary, can as little have Unity of Sentiment as they\ncan be real friends, except to a very slight extent, desiring as they\ndo unfair advantage in things profitable while they shirk labour and\nservice for the common good: and while each man wishes for these things\nfor himself he is jealous of and hinders his neighbour: and as they do\nnot watch over the common good it is lost. The result is that they\nquarrel while they are for keeping one another to work but are not\nwilling to perform their just share.\n\nChapter VII.\n\nBenefactors are commonly held to have more Friendship for the objects\nof their kindness than these for them: and the fact is made a subject\nof discussion and enquiry, as being contrary to reasonable expectation.\n\nThe account of the matter which satisfies most persons is that the one\nare debtors and the others creditors: and therefore that, as in the\ncase of actual loans the debtors wish their creditors out of the way\nwhile the creditors are anxious for the preservation of their debtors,\nso those who have done kindnesses desire the continued existence of the\npeople they have done them to, under the notion of getting a return of\ntheir good offices, while these are not particularly anxious about\nrequital.\n\nEpicharmus, I suspect, would very probably say that they who give this\nsolution judge from their own baseness; yet it certainly is like human\nnature, for the generality of men have short memories on these points,\nand aim rather at receiving than conferring benefits.\n\nBut the real cause, it would seem, rests upon nature, and the case is\nnot parallel to that of creditors; because in this there is no\naffection to the persons, but merely a wish for their preservation with\na view to the return: whereas, in point of fact, they who have done\nkindnesses feel friendship and love for those to whom they have done\nthem, even though they neither are, nor can by possibility hereafter\nbe, in a position to serve their benefactors.\n\nAnd this is the case also with artisans; every one, I mean, feels more\naffection for his own work than that work possibly could for him if it\nwere animate. It is perhaps specially the case with poets: for these\nentertain very great affection for their poems, loving them as their\nown children. It is to this kind of thing I should be inclined to\ncompare the case of benefactors: for the object of their kindness is\ntheir own work, and so they love this more than this loves its creator.\n\nAnd the account of this is that existence is to all a thing\nchoice-worthy and an object of affection; now we exist by acts of\nworking, that is, by living and acting; he then that has created a\ngiven work exists, it may be said, by his act of working: therefore he\nloves his work because he loves existence. And this is natural, for the\nwork produced displays in act what existed before potentially.\n\nThen again, the benefactor has a sense of honour in right of his\naction, so that he may well take pleasure in him in whom this resides;\nbut to him who has received the benefit there is nothing honourable in\nrespect of his benefactor, only something advantageous which is both\nless pleasant and less the object of Friendship.\n\nAgain, pleasure is derived from the actual working out of a present\naction, from the anticipation of a future one, and from the\nrecollection of a past one: but the highest pleasure and special object\nof affection is that which attends on the actual working. Now the\nbenefactor\u2019s work abides (for the honourable is enduring), but the\nadvantage of him who has received the kindness passes away.\n\nAgain, there is pleasure in recollecting honourable actions, but in\nrecollecting advantageous ones there is none at all or much less (by\nthe way though, the contrary is true of the expectation of advantage).\n\nFurther, the entertaining the feeling of Friendship is like acting on\nanother; but being the object of the feeling is like being acted upon.\n\nSo then, entertaining the sentiment of Friendship, and all feelings\nconnected with it, attend on those who, in the given case of a\nbenefaction, are the superior party.\n\nOnce more: all people value most what has cost them much labour in the\nproduction; for instance, people who have themselves made their money\nare fonder of it than those who have inherited it: and receiving\nkindness is, it seems, unlaborious, but doing it is laborious. And this\nis the reason why the female parents are most fond of their offspring;\nfor their part in producing them is attended with most labour, and they\nknow more certainly that they are theirs. This feeling would seem also\nto belong to benefactors.\n\nChapter VIII.\n\nA question is also raised as to whether it is right to love one\u2019s Self\nbest, or some one else: because men find fault with those who love\nthemselves best, and call them in a disparaging way lovers of Self; and\nthe bad man is thought to do everything he does for his own sake\nmerely, and the more so the more depraved he is; accordingly men\nreproach him with never doing anything unselfish: whereas the good man\nacts from a sense of honour (and the more so the better man he is), and\nfor his friend\u2019s sake, and is careless of his own interest.\n\nBut with these theories facts are at variance, and not unnaturally: for\nit is commonly said also that a man is to love most him who is most his\nfriend, and he is most a friend who wishes good to him to whom he\nwishes it for that man\u2019s sake even though no one knows. Now these\nconditions, and in fact all the rest by which a friend is\ncharacterised, belong specially to each individual in respect of his\nSelf: for we have said before that all the friendly feelings are\nderived to others from those which have Self primarily for their\nobject. And all the current proverbs support this view; for instance,\n\u201cone soul,\u201d \u201cthe goods of friends are common,\u201d \u201cequality is a tie of\nFriendship,\u201d \u201cthe knee is nearer than the shin.\u201d For all these things\nexist specially with reference to a man\u2019s own Self: he is specially a\nfriend to himself and so he is bound to love himself the most.\n\nIt is with good reason questioned which of the two parties one should\nfollow, both having plausibility on their side. Perhaps then, in\nrespect of theories of this kind, the proper course is to distinguish\nand define how far each is true, and in what way. If we could ascertain\nthe sense in which each uses the term \u201cSelf-loving,\u201d this point might\nbe cleared up.\n\nWell now, they who use it disparagingly give the name to those who, in\nrespect of wealth, and honours, and pleasures of the body, give to\nthemselves the larger share: because the mass of mankind grasp after\nthese and are earnest about them as being the best things; which is the\nreason why they are matters of contention. They who are covetous in\nregard to these gratify their lusts and passions in general, that is to\nsay the irrational part of their soul: now the mass of mankind are so\ndisposed, for which reason the appellation has taken its rise from that\nmass which is low and bad. Of course they are justly reproached who are\nSelf-loving in this sense.\n\nAnd that the generality of men are accustomed to apply the term to\ndenominate those who do give such things to themselves is quite plain:\nsuppose, for instance, that a man were anxious to do, more than other\nmen, acts of justice, or self-mastery, or any other virtuous acts, and,\nin general, were to secure to himself that which is abstractedly noble\nand honourable, no one would call him Self-loving, nor blame him.\n\nYet might such an one be judged to be more truly Self-loving: certainly\nhe gives to himself the things which are most noble and most good, and\ngratifies that Principle of his nature which is most rightfully\nauthoritative, and obeys it in everything: and just as that which\npossesses the highest authority is thought to constitute a Community or\nany other system, so also in the case of Man: and so he is most truly\nSelf-loving who loves and gratifies this Principle.\n\nAgain, men are said to have, or to fail of having, self-control,\naccording as the Intellect controls or not, it being plainly implied\nthereby that this Principle constitutes each individual; and people are\nthought to have done of themselves, and voluntarily, those things\nspecially which are done with Reason.\n\nIt is plain, therefore, that this Principle does, either entirely or\nspecially constitute the individual man, and that the good man\nspecially loves this. For this reason then he must be specially\nSelf-loving, in a kind other than that which is reproached, and as far\nsuperior to it as living in accordance with Reason is to living at the\nbeck and call of passion, and aiming at the truly noble to aiming at\napparent advantage.\n\nNow all approve and commend those who are eminently earnest about\nhonourable actions, and if all would vie with one another in respect of\nthe \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd, and be intent upon doing what is most truly noble and\nhonourable, society at large would have all that is proper while each\nindividual in particular would have the greatest of goods, Virtue being\nassumed to be such.\n\nAnd so the good man ought to be Self-loving: because by doing what is\nnoble he will have advantage himself and will do good to others: but\nthe bad man ought not to be, because he will harm himself and his\nneighbours by following low and evil passions. In the case of the bad\nman, what he ought to do and what he does are at variance, but the good\nman does what he ought to do, because all Intellect chooses what is\nbest for itself and the good man puts himself under the direction of\nIntellect.\n\nOf the good man it is true likewise that he does many things for the\nsake of his friends and his country, even to the extent of dying for\nthem, if need be: for money and honours, and, in short, all the good\nthings which others fight for, he will throw away while eager to secure\nto himself the \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd: he will prefer a brief and great joy to a tame\nand enduring one, and to live nobly for one year rather than ordinarily\nfor many, and one great and noble action to many trifling ones. And\nthis is perhaps that which befals men who die for their country and\nfriends; they choose great glory for themselves: and they will lavish\ntheir own money that their friends may receive more, for hereby the\nfriend gets the money but the man himself the \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd; so, in fact he\ngives to himself the greater good. It is the same with honours and\noffices; all these things he will give up to his friend, because this\nreflects honour and praise on himself: and so with good reason is he\nesteemed a fine character since he chooses the honourable before all\nthings else. It is possible also to give up the opportunities of action\nto a friend; and to have caused a friend\u2019s doing a thing may be more\nnoble than having done it one\u2019s self.\n\nIn short, in all praiseworthy things the good man does plainly give to\nhimself a larger share of the honourable. In this sense it is right to\nbe Self-loving, in the vulgar acceptation of the term it is not.\n\nChapter IX.\n\nA question is raised also respecting the Happy man, whether he will\nwant Friends, or no?\n\nSome say that they who are blessed and independent have no need of\nFriends, for they already have all that is good, and so, as being\nindependent, want nothing further: whereas the notion of a friend\u2019s\noffice is to be as it were a second Self and procure for a man what he\ncannot get by himself: hence the saying,\n\n\u201cWhen Fortune gives us good, what need we Friends?\u201d\n\n\nOn the other hand, it looks absurd, while we are assigning to the Happy\nman all other good things, not to give him Friends, which are, after\nall, thought to be the greatest of external goods.\n\nAgain, if it is more characteristic of a friend to confer than to\nreceive kindnesses, and if to be beneficent belongs to the good man and\nto the character of virtue, and if it is more noble to confer\nkindnesses on friends than strangers, the good man will need objects\nfor his benefactions. And out of this last consideration springs a\nquestion whether the need of Friends be greater in prosperity or\nadversity, since the unfortunate man wants people to do him kindnesses\nand they who are fortunate want objects for their kind acts.\n\nAgain, it is perhaps absurd to make our Happy man a solitary, because\nno man would choose the possession of all goods in the world on the\ncondition of solitariness, man being a social animal and formed by\nnature for living with others: of course the Happy man has this\nqualification since he has all those things which are good by nature:\nand it is obvious that the society of friends and good men must be\npreferable to that of strangers and ordinary people, and we conclude,\ntherefore, that the Happy man does need Friends.\n\nBut then, what do they mean whom we quoted first, and how are they\nright? Is it not that the mass of mankind mean by Friends those who are\nuseful? and of course the Happy man will not need such because he has\nall good things already; neither will he need such as are Friends with\na view to the pleasurable, or at least only to a slight extent; because\nhis life, being already pleasurable, does not want pleasure imported\nfrom without; and so, since the Happy man does not need Friends of\nthese kinds, he is thought not to need any at all.\n\nBut it may be, this is not true: for it was stated originally, that\nHappiness is a kind of Working; now Working plainly is something that\nmust come into being, not be already there like a mere piece of\nproperty.\n\nIf then the being happy consists in living and working, and the good\nman\u2019s working is in itself excellent and pleasurable (as we said at the\ncommencement of the treatise), and if what is our own reckons among\nthings pleasurable, and if we can view our neighbours better than\nourselves and their actions better than we can our own, then the\nactions of their Friends who are good men are pleasurable to the good;\ninasmuch as they have both the requisites which are naturally pleasant.\nSo the man in the highest state of happiness will need Friends of this\nkind, since he desires to contemplate good actions, and actions of his\nown, which those of his friend, being a good man, are.\n\nAgain, common opinion requires that the Happy man live with pleasure to\nhimself: now life is burthensome to a man in solitude, for it is not\neasy to work continuously by one\u2019s self, but in company with, and in\nregard to others, it is easier, and therefore the working, being\npleasurable in itself will be more continuous (a thing which should be\nin respect of the Happy man); for the good man, in that he is good\ntakes pleasure in the actions which accord with Virtue and is annoyed\nat those which spring from Vice, just as a musical man is pleased with\nbeautiful music and annoyed by bad. And besides, as Theognis says,\nVirtue itself may be improved by practice, from living with the good.\n\nAnd, upon the following considerations more purely metaphysical, it\nwill probably appear that the good friend is naturally choice-worthy to\nthe good man. We have said before, that whatever is naturally good is\nalso in itself good and pleasant to the good man; now the fact of\nliving, so far as animals are concerned, is characterised generally by\nthe power of sentience, in man it is characterised by that of\nsentience, or of rationality (the faculty of course being referred to\nthe actual operation of the faculty, certainly the main point is the\nactual operation of it); so that living seems mainly to consist in the\nact of sentience or exerting rationality: now the fact of living is in\nitself one of the things that are good and pleasant (for it is a\ndefinite totality, and whatever is such belongs to the nature of good),\nbut what is naturally good is good to the good man: for which reason it\nseems to be pleasant to all. (Of course one must not suppose a life\nwhich is depraved and corrupted, nor one spent in pain, for that which\nis such is indefinite as are its inherent qualities: however, what is\nto be said of pain will be clearer in what is to follow.)\n\nIf then the fact of living is in itself good and pleasant (and this\nappears from the fact that all desire it, and specially those who are\ngood and in high happiness; their course of life being most\nchoice-worthy and their existence most choice-worthy likewise), then\nalso he that sees perceives that he sees; and he that hears perceives\nthat he hears; and he that walks perceives that he walks; and in all\nthe other instances in like manner there is a faculty which reflects\nupon and perceives the fact that we are working, so that we can\nperceive that we perceive and intellectually know that we\nintellectually know: but to perceive that we perceive or that we\nintellectually know is to perceive that we exist, since existence was\ndefined to be perceiving or intellectually knowing. Now to perceive\nthat one lives is a thing pleasant in itself, life being a thing\nnaturally good, and the perceiving of the presence in ourselves of\nthings naturally good being pleasant.\n\nTherefore the fact of living is choice-worthy, and to the good\nspecially so since existence is good and pleasant to them: for they\nreceive pleasure from the internal consciousness of that which in\nitself is good.\n\nBut the good man is to his friend as to himself, friend being but a\nname for a second Self; therefore as his own existence is choice-worthy\nto each so too, or similarly at least, is his friend\u2019s existence. But\nthe ground of one\u2019s own existence being choice-worthy is the perceiving\nof one\u2019s self being good, any such perception being in itself pleasant.\nTherefore one ought to be thoroughly conscious of one\u2019s friend\u2019s\nexistence, which will result from living with him, that is sharing in\nhis words and thoughts: for this is the meaning of the term as applied\nto the human species, not mere feeding together as in the case of\nbrutes.\n\nIf then to the man in a high state of happiness existence is in itself\nchoice-worthy, being naturally good and pleasant, and so too a friend\u2019s\nexistence, then the friend also must be among things choice-worthy. But\nwhatever is choice-worthy to a man he should have or else he will be in\nthis point deficient. The man therefore who is to come up to our notion\n\u201cHappy\u201d will need good Friends.\n\nChapter X.\n\nAre we then to make our friends as numerous as possible? or, as in\nrespect of acquaintance it is thought to have been well said \u201chave not\nthou many acquaintances yet be not without;\u201d so too in respect of\nFriendship may we adopt the precept, and say that a man should not be\nwithout friends, nor again have exceeding many friends?\n\nNow as for friends who are intended for use, the maxim I have quoted\nwill, it seems, fit in exceedingly well, because to requite the\nservices of many is a matter of labour, and a whole life would not be\nlong enough to do this for them. So that, if more numerous than what\nwill suffice for one\u2019s own life, they become officious, and are\nhindrances in respect of living well: and so we do not want them. And\nagain of those who are to be for pleasure a few are quite enough, just\nlike sweetening in our food.\n\nBut of the good are we to make as many as ever we can, or is there any\nmeasure of the number of friends, as there is of the number to\nconstitute a Political Community? I mean, you cannot make one out of\nten men, and if you increase the number to one hundred thousand it is\nnot any longer a Community. However, the number is not perhaps some one\ndefinite number but any between certain extreme limits.\n\nWell, of friends likewise there is a limited number, which perhaps may\nbe laid down to be the greatest number with whom it would be possible\nto keep up intimacy; this being thought to be one of the greatest marks\nof Friendship, and it being quite obvious that it is not possible to be\nintimate with many, in other words, to part one\u2019s self among many. And\nbesides it must be remembered that they also are to be friends to one\nanother if they are all to live together: but it is a matter of\ndifficulty to find this in many men at once.\n\nIt comes likewise to be difficult to bring home to one\u2019s self the joys\nand sorrows of many: because in all probability one would have to\nsympathise at the same time with the joys of this one and the sorrows\nof that other.\n\nPerhaps then it is well not to endeavour to have very many friends but\nso many as are enough for intimacy: because, in fact, it would seem not\nto be possible to be very much a friend to many at the same time: and,\nfor the same reason, not to be in love with many objects at the same\ntime: love being a kind of excessive Friendship which implies but one\nobject: and all strong emotions must be limited in the number towards\nwhom they are felt.\n\nAnd if we look to facts this seems to be so: for not many at a time\nbecome friends in the way of companionship, all the famous Friendships\nof the kind are between _two_ persons: whereas they who have many\nfriends, and meet everybody on the footing of intimacy, seem to be\nfriends really to no one except in the way of general society; I mean\nthe characters denominated as over-complaisant.\n\nTo be sure, in the way merely of society, a man may be a friend to many\nwithout being necessarily over-complaisant, but being truly good: but\none cannot be a friend to many because of their virtue, and for the\npersons\u2019 own sake; in fact, it is a matter for contentment to find even\na few such.\n\nChapter XI.\n\nAgain: are friends most needed in prosperity or in adversity? they are\nrequired, we know, in both states, because the unfortunate need help\nand the prosperous want people to live with and to do kindnesses to:\nfor they have a desire to act kindly to some one.\n\nTo have friends is more necessary in adversity, and therefore in this\ncase useful ones are wanted; and to have them in prosperity is more\nhonourable, and this is why the prosperous want good men for friends,\nit being preferable to confer benefits on, and to live with, these. For\nthe very presence of friends is pleasant even in adversity: since men\nwhen grieved are comforted by the sympathy of their friends.\n\nAnd from this, by the way, the question might be raised, whether it is\nthat they do in a manner take part of the weight of calamities, or only\nthat their presence, being pleasurable, and the consciousness of their\nsympathy, make the pain of the sufferer less.\n\nHowever, we will not further discuss whether these which have been\nsuggested or some other causes produce the relief, at least the effect\nwe speak of is a matter of plain fact.\n\nBut their presence has probably a mixed effect: I mean, not only is the\nvery seeing friends pleasant, especially to one in misfortune, and\nactual help towards lessening the grief is afforded (the natural\ntendency of a friend, if he is gifted with tact, being to comfort by\nlook and word, because he is well acquainted with the sufferer\u2019s temper\nand disposition and therefore knows what things give him pleasure and\npain), but also the perceiving a friend to be grieved at his\nmisfortunes causes the sufferer pain, because every one avoids being\ncause of pain to his friends. And for this reason they who are of a\nmanly nature are cautious not to implicate their friends in their pain;\nand unless a man is exceedingly callous to the pain of others he cannot\nbear the pain which is thus caused to his friends: in short, he does\nnot admit men to wail with him, not being given to wail at all: women,\nit is true, and men who resemble women, like to have others to groan\nwith them, and love such as friends and sympathisers. But it is plain\nthat it is our duty in all things to imitate the highest character.\n\nOn the other hand, the advantages of friends in our prosperity are the\npleasurable intercourse and the consciousness that they are pleased at\nour good fortune.\n\nIt would seem, therefore, that we ought to call in friends readily on\noccasion of good fortune, because it is noble to be ready to do good to\nothers: but on occasion of bad fortune, we should do so with\nreluctance; for we should as little as possible make others share in\nour ills; on which principle goes the saying, \u201cI am unfortunate, let\nthat suffice.\u201d The most proper occasion for calling them in is when\nwith small trouble or annoyance to themselves they can be of very great\nuse to the person who needs them.\n\nBut, on the contrary, it is fitting perhaps to go to one\u2019s friends in\ntheir misfortunes unasked and with alacrity (because kindness is the\nfriend\u2019s office and specially towards those who are in need and who do\nnot demand it as a right, this being more creditable and more pleasant\nto both); and on occasion of their good fortune to go readily, if we\ncan forward it in any way (because men need their friends for this\nlikewise), but to be backward in sharing it, any great eagerness to\nreceive advantage not being creditable.\n\nOne should perhaps be cautious not to present the appearance of\nsullenness in declining the sympathy or help of friends, for this\nhappens occasionally.\n\nIt appears then that the presence of friends is, under all\ncircumstances, choice-worthy.\n\nChapter XII.\n\nMay we not say then that, as seeing the beloved object is most prized\nby lovers and they choose this sense rather than any of the others\nbecause Love\n\n\u201cIs engendered in the eyes,\nWith gazing fed,\u201d\n\n\nin like manner intimacy is to friends most choice-worthy, Friendship\nbeing communion? Again, as a man is to himself so is he to his friend;\nnow with respect to himself the perception of his own existence is\nchoice-worthy, therefore is it also in respect of his friend.\n\nAnd besides, their Friendship is acted out in intimacy, and so with\ngood reason they desire this. And whatever in each man\u2019s opinion\nconstitutes existence, or whatsoever it is for the sake of which they\nchoose life, herein they wish their friends to join with them; and so\nsome men drink together, others gamble, others join in gymnastic\nexercises or hunting, others study philosophy together: in each case\nspending their days together in that which they like best of all things\nin life, for since they wish to be intimate with their friends they do\nand partake in those things whereby they think to attain this object.\n\nTherefore the Friendship of the wicked comes to be depraved; for, being\nunstable, they share in what is bad and become depraved in being made\nlike to one another: but the Friendship of the good is good, growing\nwith their intercourse; they improve also, as it seems, by repeated\nacts, and by mutual correction, for they receive impress from one\nanother in the points which give them pleasure; whence says the Poet,\n\n\u201cThou from the good, good things shalt surely learn.\u201d\n\n\nHere then we will terminate our discourse of Friendship. The next thing\nis to go into the subject of Pleasure.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK X\n\nChapter I.\n\n\nNext, it would seem, follows a discussion respecting Pleasure, for it\nis thought to be most closely bound up with our kind: and so men train\nthe young, guiding them on their course by the rudders of Pleasure and\nPain. And to like and dislike what one ought is judged to be most\nimportant for the formation of good moral character: because these\nfeelings extend all one\u2019s life through, giving a bias towards and\nexerting an influence on the side of Virtue and Happiness, since men\nchoose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful.\n\nSubjects such as these then, it would seem, we ought by no means to\npass by, and specially since they involve much difference of opinion.\nThere are those who call Pleasure the Chief Good; there are others who\non the contrary maintain that it is exceedingly bad;[1] some perhaps\nfrom a real conviction that such is the case, others from a notion that\nit is better, in reference to our life and conduct, to show up Pleasure\nas bad, even if it is not so really; arguing that, as the mass of men\nhave a bias towards it and are the slaves of their pleasures, it is\nright to draw them to the contrary, for that so they may possibly\narrive at the mean.[2]\n\nI confess I suspect the soundness of this policy; in matters respecting\nmen\u2019s feelings and actions theories are less convincing than facts:\nwhenever, therefore, they are found conflicting with actual experience,\nthey not only are despised but involve the truth in their fall: he, for\ninstance, who deprecates Pleasure, if once seen to aim at it, gets the\ncredit of backsliding to it as being universally such as he said it\nwas, the mass of men being incapable of nice distinctions.\n\nReal accounts, therefore, of such matters seem to be most expedient,\nnot with a view to knowledge merely but to life and conduct: for they\nare believed as being in harm with facts, and so they prevail with the\nwise to live in accordance with them.\n\nBut of such considerations enough: let us now proceed to the current\nmaxims respecting Pleasure.\n\nChapter II.\n\nNow Eudoxus thought Pleasure to be the Chief Good because he saw all,\nrational and irrational alike, aiming at it: and he argued that, since\nin all what was the object of choice must be good and what most so the\nbest, the fact of all being drawn to the same thing proved this thing\nto be the best for all: \u201cFor each,\u201d he said, \u201cfinds what is good for\nitself just as it does its proper nourishment, and so that which is\ngood for all, and the object of the aim of all, is their Chief Good.\u201d\n\n(And his theories were received, not so much for their own sake, as\nbecause of his excellent moral character; for he was thought to be\neminently possessed of perfect self-mastery, and therefore it was not\nthought that he said these things because he was a lover of Pleasure\nbut that he really was so convinced.)\n\nAnd he thought his position was not less proved by the argument from\nthe contrary: that is, since Pain was in itself an object of avoidance\nto all the contrary must be in like manner an object of choice.\n\nAgain he urged that that is most choice-worthy which we choose, not by\nreason of, or with a view to, anything further; and that Pleasure is\nconfessedly of this kind because no one ever goes on to ask to what\npurpose he is pleased, feeling that Pleasure is in itself\nchoice-worthy.\n\nAgain, that when added to any other good it makes it more\nchoice-worthy; as, for instance, to actions of justice, or perfected\nself-mastery; and good can only be increased by itself.\n\nHowever, this argument at least seems to prove only that it belongs to\nthe class of goods, and not that it does so more than anything else:\nfor every good is more choicewortby in combination with some other than\nwhen taken quite alone. In fact, it is by just such an argument that\nPlato proves that Pleasure is not the Chief Good:[3] \u201cFor,\u201d says he,\n\u201cthe life of Pleasure is more choice-worthy in combination with\nPractical Wisdom than apart from it; but, if the compound better then\nsimple Pleasure cannot be the Chief Good; because the very Chief Good\ncannot by any addition become choice-worthy than it is already:\u201d and it\nis obvious that nothing else can be the Chief Good, which by\ncombination with any of the things in themselves good comes to be more\nchoice-worthy.\n\nWhat is there then of such a nature? (meaning, of course, whereof we\ncan partake; because that which we are in search of must be such).\n\nAs for those who object that \u201cwhat all aim at is not necessarily good,\u201d\nI confess I cannot see much in what they say, because what all _think_\nwe say _is_. And he who would cut away this ground from under us will\nnot bring forward things more dependable: because if the argument had\nrested on the desires of irrational creatures there might have been\nsomething in what he says, but, since the rational also desire\nPleasure, how can his objection be allowed any weight? and it may be\nthat, even in the lower animals, there is some natural good principle\nabove themselves which aims at the good peculiar to them.\n\nNor does that seem to be sound which is urged respecting the argument\nfrom the contrary: I mean, some people say \u201cit does not follow that\nPleasure must be good because Pain is evil, since evil may be opposed\nto evil, and both evil and good to what is indifferent:\u201d now what they\nsay is right enough in itself but does not hold in the present\ninstance. If both Pleasure and Pain were bad both would have been\nobjects of avoidance; or if neither then neither would have been, at\nall events they must have fared alike: but now men do plainly avoid the\none as bad and choose the other as good, and so there is a complete\nopposition.\n\nNor again is Pleasure therefore excluded from being good because it\ndoes not belong to the class of qualities:[4] the acts of Virtue are\nnot qualities, neither is Happiness [yet surely both are goods].\n\nAgain, they say the Chief Good is limited but Pleasure unlimited, in\nthat it admits of degrees.\n\nNow if they judge this from the act of feeling Pleasure then the same\nthing will apply to justice and all the other virtues,[5] in respect of\nwhich clearly it is said that men are more or less of such and such\ncharacters (according to the different virtues), they are more just or\nmore brave, or one may practise justice and self-mastery more or less.\n\nIf, on the other hand, they judge in respect of the Pleasures\nthemselves then it may be they miss the true cause, namely that some\nare unmixed and others mixed: for just as health being in itself\nlimited, admits of degrees, why should not Pleasure do so and yet be\nlimited? in the former case we account for it by the fact that there is\nnot the same adjustment of parts in all men, nor one and the same\nalways in the same individual: but health, though relaxed, remains up\nto a certain point, and differs in degrees; and of course the same may\nbe the case with Pleasure.\n\nAgain, assuming the Chief Good to be perfect and all Movements[6] and\nGenerations imperfect, they try to shew that Pleasure is a Movement and\na Generation.\n\nYet they do not seem warranted in saying even that it is a Movement:\nfor to every Movement are thought to belong swiftness and slowness, and\nif not in itself, as to that of the universe, yet relatively: but to\nPleasure neither of these belongs: for though one may have got quickly\ninto the state Pleasure, as into that of anger, one cannot be in the\nstate quickly,[7] nor relatively to the state of any other person; but\nwe can walk or grow, and so on, quickly or slowly.\n\nOf course it is possible to change into the state of Pleasure quickly\nor slowly, but to act in the state (by which, I mean, have the\nperception of Pleasure) quickly, is not possible.\n\nAnd how can it be a Generation? because, according to notions generally\nheld, not _any_thing is generated from _any_thing, but a thing resolves\nitself into that out of which it was generated: whereas of that of\nwhich Pleasure is a Generation Pain is a Destruction.\n\nAgain, they say that Pain is a lack of something suitable to nature and\nPleasure a supply of it.\n\nBut these are affections of the body: now if Pleasure really is a\nsupplying of somewhat suitable to nature, that must feel the Pleasure\nin which the supply takes place, therefore the body of course: yet this\nis not thought to be so: neither then is Pleasure a supplying, only a\nperson of course will be pleased when a supply takes place just as he\nwill be pained when he is cut short.\n\nThis notion would seem to have arisen out of the Pains and Pleasures\nconnected with natural nourishment; because, when people have felt a\nlack and so have had Pain first, they, of course, are pleased with the\nsupply of their lack.\n\nBut this is not the case with all Pleasures: those attendant on\nmathematical studies, for instance, are unconnected with any Pain; and\nof such as attend on the senses those which arise through the sense of\nSmell; and again, many sounds, and sights, and memories, and hopes: now\nof what can these be Generations? because there has been here no lack\nof anything to be afterwards supplied.\n\nAnd to those who bring forward disgraceful Pleasures we may reply that\nthese are not really pleasant things; for it does not follow because\nthey are pleasant to the ill-disposed that we are to admit that they\nare pleasant except to them; just as we should not say that those\nthings are really wholesome, or sweet, or bitter, which are so to the\nsick, or those objects really white which give that impression to\npeople labouring under ophthalmia.[8]\n\nOr we might say thus, that the Pleasures are choice-worthy but not as\nderived from these sources: just as wealth is, but not as the price of\ntreason; or health, but not on the terms of eating anything however\nloathsome.\n\nOr again, may we not say that Pleasures differ in kind? those derived\nfrom honourable objects, for instance are different from those arising\nfrom disgraceful ones; and it is not possible to experience the\nPleasure of the just man without being just, or of the musical man\nwithout being musical; and so on of others.\n\nThe distinction commonly drawn between the friend and the flatterer\nwould seem to show clearly either that Pleasure is not a good, or that\nthere are different kinds of Pleasure: for the former is thought to\nhave good as the object of his intercourse, the latter Pleasure only;\nand this last is reproached, but the former men praise as having\ndifferent objects in his intercourse.\n\nAgain, no one would choose to live with a child\u2019s intellect all his\nlife through, though receiving the highest possible Pleasure from such\nobjects as children receive it from; or to take Pleasure in doing any\nof the most disgraceful things, though sure never to be pained.\n\nThere are many things also about which we should be diligent even\nthough they brought no Pleasure; as seeing, remembering, knowing,\npossessing the various Excellences; and the fact that Pleasures do\nfollow on these naturally makes no difference, because we should\ncertainly choose them even though no Pleasure resulted from them.\n\nIt seems then to be plain that Pleasure is not the Chief Good, nor is\nevery kind of it choice-worthy: and that there are some choice-worthy\nin themselves, differing in kind, _i.e._ in the sources from which they\nare derived. Let this then suffice by way of an account of the current\nmaxims respecting Pleasure and Pain.\n\nChapter III.\n\nNow what it is, and how characterised, will be more plain if we take up\nthe subject afresh.\n\nAn act of Sight is thought to be complete at any moment; that is to\nsay, it lacks nothing the accession of which subsequently will complete\nits whole nature.\n\nWell, Pleasure resembles this: because it is a whole, as one may say;\nand one could not at any moment of time take a Pleasure whose whole\nnature would be completed by its lasting for a longer time. And for\nthis reason it is not a Movement: for all Movement takes place in time\nof certain duration and has a certain End to accomplish; for instance,\nthe Movement of house-building[9] is then only complete when the\nbuilder has produced what he intended, that is, either in the whole\ntime [necessary to complete the whole design], or in a given\nportion.[10] But all the subordinate Movements are incomplete in the\nparts of the time, and are different in kind from the whole movement\nand from one another (I mean, for instance, that the fitting the stones\ntogether is a Movement different from that of fluting the column, and\nboth again from the construction of the Temple as a whole: but this\nlast is complete as lacking nothing to the result proposed; whereas\nthat of the basement, or of the triglyph, is incomplete, because each\nis a Movement of a part merely).\n\nAs I said then, they differ in kind, and you cannot at any time you\nchoose find a Movement complete in its whole nature, but, if at all, in\nthe whole time requisite.\n\nAnd so it is with the Movement of walking and all others: for, if\nmotion be a Movement from one place to another place, then of it too\nthere are different kinds, flying, walking, leaping, and such-like. And\nnot only so, but there are different kinds even in walking: the\nwhere-from and where-to are not the same in the whole Course as in a\nportion of it; nor in one portion as in another; nor is crossing this\nline the same as crossing that: because a man is not merely crossing a\nline but a line in a given place, and this is in a different place from\nthat.\n\nOf Movement I have discoursed exactly in another treatise. I will now\ntherefore only say that it seems not to be complete at any given\nmoment; and that most movements are incomplete and specifically\ndifferent, since the whence and whither constitute different species.\n\nBut of Pleasure the whole nature is complete at any given moment: it is\nplain then that Pleasure and Movement must be different from one\nanother, and that Pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and\ncomplete. And this might appear also from the impossibility of moving\nexcept in a definite time, whereas there is none with respect to the\nsensation of Pleasure, for what exists at the very present moment is a\nkind of \u201cwhole.\u201d\n\nFrom these considerations then it is plain that people are not\nwarranted in saying that Pleasure is a Movement or a Generation:\nbecause these terms are not applicable to all things, only to such as\nare divisible and not \u201cwholes:\u201d I mean that of an act of Sight there is\nno Generation, nor is there of a point, nor of a monad, nor is any one\nof these a Movement or a Generation: neither then of Pleasure is there\nMovement or Generation, because it is, as one may say, \u201ca whole.\u201d[11]\n\nChapter IV.\n\nNow since every Percipient Faculty works upon the Object answering to\nit, and perfectly the Faculty in a good state upon the most excellent\nof the Objects within its range (for Perfect Working is thought to be\nmuch what I have described; and we will not raise any question about\nsaying \u201cthe Faculty\u201d works, instead of, \u201cthat subject wherein the\nFaculty resides\u201d), in each case the best Working is that of the Faculty\nin its best state upon the best of the Objects answering to it. And\nthis will be, further, most perfect and most pleasant: for Pleasure is\nattendant upon every Percipient Faculty, and in like manner on every\nintellectual operation and speculation; and that is most pleasant which\nis most perfect, and that most perfect which is the Working of the best\nFaculty upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range.\n\nAnd Pleasure perfects the Working. But Pleasure does not perfect it in\nthe same way as the Faculty and Object of Perception do, being good;\njust as health and the physician are not in similar senses causes of a\nhealthy state.\n\nAnd that Pleasure does arise upon the exercise of every Percipient\nFaculty is evident, for we commonly say that sights and sounds are\npleasant; it is plain also that this is especially the case when the\nFaculty is most excellent and works upon a similar Object: and when\nboth the Object and Faculty of Perception are such, Pleasure will\nalways exist, supposing of course an agent and a patient.\n\nFurthermore, Pleasure perfects the act of Working not in the way of an\ninherent state but as a supervening finish, such as is bloom in people\nat their prime. Therefore so long as the Object of intellectual or\nsensitive Perception is such as it should be and also the Faculty which\ndiscerns or realises the Object, there will be Pleasure in the Working:\nbecause when that which has the capacity of being acted on and that\nwhich is apt to act are alike and similarly related, the same result\nfollows naturally.\n\nHow is it then that no one feels Pleasure continuously? is it not that\nhe wearies, because all human faculties are incapable of unintermitting\nexertion; and so, of course, Pleasure does not arise either, because\nthat follows upon the act of Working. But there are some things which\nplease when new, but afterwards not in the like way, for exactly the\nsame reason: that at first the mind is roused and works on these\nObjects with its powers at full tension; just as they who are gazing\nstedfastly at anything; but afterwards the act of Working is not of the\nkind it was at first, but careless, and so the Pleasure too is dulled.\n\nAgain, a person may conclude that all men grasp at Pleasure, because\nall aim likewise at Life and Life is an act of Working, and every man\nworks at and with those things which also he best likes; the musical\nman, for instance, works with his hearing at music; the studious man\nwith his intellect at speculative questions, and so forth. And Pleasure\nperfects the acts of Working, and so Life after which men grasp. No\nwonder then that they aim also at Pleasure, because to each it perfects\nLife, which is itself choice-worthy. (We will take leave to omit the\nquestion whether we choose Life for Pleasure\u2019s sake of Pleasure for\nLife\u2019s sake; because these two plainly are closely connected and admit\nnot of separation; since Pleasure comes not into being without Working,\nand again, every Working Pleasure perfects.)\n\nAnd this is one reason why Pleasures are thought to differ in kind,\nbecause we suppose that things which differ in kind must be perfected\nby things so differing: it plainly being the case with the productions\nof Nature and Art; as animals, and trees, and pictures, and statues,\nand houses, and furniture; and so we suppose that in like manner acts\nof Working which are different in kind are perfected by things\ndiffering in kind. Now Intellectual Workings differ specifically from\nthose of the Senses, and these last from one another; therefore so do\nthe Pleasures which perfect them.\n\nThis may be shown also from the intimate connection subsisting between\neach Pleasure and the Working which it perfects: I mean, that the\nPleasure proper to any Working increases that Working; for they who\nwork with Pleasure sift all things more closely and carry them out to a\ngreater degree of nicety; for instance, those men become geometricians\nwho take Pleasure in geometry, and they apprehend particular points\nmore completely: in like manner men who are fond of music, or\narchitecture, or anything else, improve each on his own pursuit,\nbecause they feel Pleasure in them. Thus the Pleasures aid in\nincreasing the Workings, and things which do so aid are proper and\npeculiar: but the things which are proper and peculiar to others\nspecifically different are themselves also specifically different.\n\nYet even more clearly may this be shown from the fact that the\nPleasures arising from one kind of Workings hinder other Workings; for\ninstance, people who are fond of flute-music cannot keep their\nattention to conversation or discourse when they catch the sound of a\nflute; because they take more Pleasure in flute-playing than in the\nWorking they are at the time engaged on; in other words, the Pleasure\nattendant on flute-playing destroys the Working of conversation or\ndiscourse.\n\nMuch the same kind of thing takes place in other cases, when a person\nis engaged in two different Workings at the same time: that is, the\npleasanter of the two keeps pushing out the other, and, if the\ndisparity in pleasantness be great, then more and more till a man even\nceases altogether to work at the other.\n\nThis is the reason why, when we are very much pleased with anything\nwhatever, we do nothing else, and it is only when we are but moderately\npleased with one occupation that we vary it with another: people, for\ninstance, who eat sweetmeats in the theatre do so most when the\nperformance is indifferent.\n\nSince then the proper and peculiar Pleasure gives accuracy to the\nWorkings and makes them more enduring and better of their kind, while\nthose Pleasures which are foreign to them mar them, it is plain there\nis a wide difference between them: in fact, Pleasures foreign to any\nWorking have pretty much the same effect as the Pains proper to it,[12]\nwhich, in fact, destroy the Workings; I mean, if one man dislikes\nwriting, or another calculation, the one does not write, the other does\nnot calculate; because, in each case, the Working is attended with some\nPain: so then contrary effects are produced upon the Workings by the\nPleasures and Pains proper to them, by which I mean those which arise\nupon the Working, in itself, independently of any other circumstances.\nAs for the Pleasures foreign to a Working, we have said already that\nthey produce a similar effect to the Pain proper to it; that is they\ndestroy the Working, only not in like way.\n\nWell then, as Workings differ from one another in goodness and badness,\nsome being fit objects of choice, others of avoidance, and others in\ntheir nature indifferent, Pleasures are similarly related; since its\nown proper Pleasure attends or each Working: of course that proper to a\ngood Working is good, that proper to a bad, bad: for even the desires\nfor what is noble are praiseworthy, and for what is base blameworthy.\n\nFurthermore, the Pleasures attendant on Workings are more closely\nconnected with them even than the desires after them: for these last\nare separate both in time and nature, but the former are close to the\nWorkings, and so indivisible from them as to raise a question whether\nthe Working and the Pleasure are identical; but Pleasure does not seem\nto be an Intellectual Operation nor a Faculty of Perception, because\nthat is absurd; but yet it gives some the impression of being the same\nfrom not being separated from these.\n\nAs then the Workings are different so are their Pleasures; now Sight\ndiffers from Touch in purity, and Hearing and Smelling from Taste;\ntherefore, in like manner, do their Pleasures; and again, Intellectual\nPleasures from these Sensual, and the different kinds both of\nIntellectual and Sensual from one another.\n\nIt is thought, moreover, that each animal has a Pleasure proper to\nitself, as it has a proper Work; that Pleasure of course which is\nattendant on the Working. And the soundness of this will appear upon\nparticular inspection: for horse, dog, and man have different\nPleasures; as Heraclitus says, an ass would sooner have hay than gold;\nin other words, provender is pleasanter to asses than gold. So then the\nPleasures of animals specifically different are also specifically\ndifferent, but those of the same, we may reasonably suppose, are\nwithout difference.\n\nYet in the case of human creatures they differ not a little: for the\nvery same things please some and pain others: and what are painful and\nhateful to some are pleasant to and liked by others. The same is the\ncase with sweet things: the same will not seem so to the man in a fever\nas to him who is in health: nor will the invalid and the person in\nrobust health have the same notion of warmth. The same is the case with\nother things also.\n\nNow in all such cases that is held to _be_ which impresses the good man\nwith the notion of being such and such; and if this is a second maxim\n(as it is usually held to be), and Virtue, that is, the Good man, in\nthat he is such, is the measure of everything, then those must be real\nPleasures which gave him the impression of being so and those things\npleasant in which he takes Pleasure. Nor is it at all astonishing that\nwhat are to him unpleasant should give another person the impression of\nbeing pleasant, for men are liable to many corruptions and marrings;\nand the things in question are not pleasant really, only to these\nparticular persons, and to them only as being thus disposed.\n\nWell of course, you may say, it is obvious that we must assert those\nwhich are confessedly disgraceful to be real Pleasures, except to\ndepraved tastes: but of those which are thought to be good what kind,\nor which, must we say is _The Pleasure of Man?_ is not the answer plain\nfrom considering the Workings, because the Pleasures follow upon these?\n\nIf then there be one or several Workings which belong to the perfect\nand blessed man, the Pleasures which perfect these Workings must be\nsaid to be specially and properly _The Pleasures of Man;_ and all the\nrest in a secondary sense, and in various degrees according as the\nWorkings are related to those highest and best ones.\n\nChapter V.\n\nNow that we have spoken about the Excellences of both kinds, and\nFriendship in its varieties, and Pleasures, it remains to sketch out\nHappiness, since we assume that to be the one End of all human things:\nand we shall save time and trouble by recapitulating what was stated\nbefore.\n\nWell then, we said that it is not a State merely; because, if it were,\nit might belong to one who slept all his life through and merely\nvegetated, or to one who fell into very great calamities: and so, if\nthese possibilities displease us and we would rather put it into the\nrank of some kind of Working (as was also said before), and Workings\nare of different kinds (some being necessary and choice-worthy with a\nview to other things, while others are so in themselves), it is plain\nwe must rank Happiness among those choice-worthy for their own sakes\nand not among those which are so with a view to something further:\nbecause Happiness has no lack of anything but is self-sufficient.\n\nBy choice-worthy in themselves are meant those from which nothing is\nsought beyond the act of Working: and of this kind are thought to be\nthe actions according to Virtue, because doing what is noble and\nexcellent is one of those things which are choice-worthy for their own\nsake alone.\n\nAnd again, such amusements as are pleasant; because people do not\nchoose them with any further purpose: in fact they receive more harm\nthan profit from them, neglecting their persons and their property.\nStill the common run of those who are judged happy take refuge in such\npastimes, which is the reason why they who have varied talent in such\nare highly esteemed among despots; because they make themselves\npleasant in those things which these aim at, and these accordingly want\nsuch men.\n\nNow these things are thought to be appurtenances of Happiness because\nmen in power spend their leisure herein: yet, it may be, we cannot\nargue from the example of such men: because there is neither Virtue nor\nIntellect necessarily involved in having power, and yet these are the\nonly sources of good Workings: nor does it follow that because these\nmen, never having tasted pure and generous Pleasure, take refuge in\nbodily ones, we are therefore to believe them to be more choice-worthy:\nfor children too believe that those things are most excellent which are\nprecious in their eyes.\n\nWe may well believe that as children and men have different ideas as to\nwhat is precious so too have the bad and the good: therefore, as we\nhave many times said, those things are really precious and pleasant\nwhich seem so to the good man: and as to each individual that Working\nis most choice-worthy which is in accordance with his own state to the\ngood man that is so which is in accordance with Virtue.\n\nHappiness then stands not in amusement; in fact the very notion is\nabsurd of the End being amusement, and of one\u2019s toiling and enduring\nhardness all one\u2019s life long with a view to amusement: for everything\nin the world, so to speak, we choose with some further End in view,\nexcept Happiness, for that is the End comprehending all others. Now to\ntake pains and to labour with a view to amusement is plainly foolish\nand very childish: but to amuse one\u2019s self with a view to steady\nemployment afterwards, as Anacharsis says, is thought to be right: for\namusement is like rest, and men want rest because unable to labour\ncontinuously.\n\nRest, therefore, is not an End, because it is adopted with a view to\nWorking afterwards.\n\nAgain, it is held that the Happy Life must be one in the way of\nExcellence, and this is accompanied by earnestness,[13] and stands not\nin amusement. Moreover those things which are done in earnest, we say,\nare better than things merely ludicrous and joined with amusement: and\nwe say that the Working of the better part, or the better man, is more\nearnest; and the Working of the better is at once better and more\ncapable of Happiness.\n\nThen, again, as for bodily Pleasures, any ordinary person, or even a\nslave, might enjoy them, just as well as the best man living but\nHappiness no one supposes a slave to share except so far as it is\nimplied in life: because Happiness stands not in such pastimes but in\nthe Workings in the way of Excellence, as has also been stated before.\n\nChapter VI.\n\nNow if Happiness is a Working in the way of Excellence of course that\nExcellence must be the highest, that is to say, the Excellence of the\nbest Principle. Whether then this best Principle is Intellect or some\nother which is thought naturally to rule and to lead and to conceive of\nnoble and divine things, whether being in its own nature divine or the\nmost divine of all our internal Principles, the Working of this in\naccordance with its own proper Excellence must be the perfect\nHappiness.\n\nThat it is Contemplative has been already stated: and this would seem\nto be consistent with what we said before and with truth: for, in the\nfirst place, this Working is of the highest kind, since the Intellect\nis the highest of our internal Principles and the subjects with which\nit is conversant the highest of all which fall within the range of our\nknowledge.\n\nNext, it is also most Continuous: for we are better able to contemplate\nthan to do anything else whatever, continuously.\n\nAgain, we think Pleasure must be in some way an ingredient in\nHappiness, and of all Workings in accordance with Excellence that in\nthe way of Science is confessedly most pleasant: at least the pursuit\nof Science is thought to contain Pleasures admirable for purity and\npermanence; and it is reasonable to suppose that the employment is more\npleasant to those who have mastered, than to those who are yet seeking\nfor, it.[14]\n\nAnd the Self-Sufficiency which people speak of will attach chiefly to\nthe Contemplative Working: of course the actual necessaries of life are\nneeded alike by the man of science, and the just man, and all the other\ncharacters; but, supposing all sufficiently supplied with these, the\njust man needs people towards whom, and in concert with whom, to\npractise his justice; and in like manner the man of perfected\nself-mastery, and the brave man, and so on of the rest; whereas the man\nof science can contemplate and speculate even when quite alone, and the\nmore entirely he deserves the appellation the more able is he to do so:\nit may be he can do better for having fellow-workers but still he is\ncertainly most Self-Sufficient.\n\nAgain, this alone would seem to be rested in for its own sake, since\nnothing results from it beyond the fact of having contemplated; whereas\nfrom all things which are objects of moral action we do mean to get\nsomething beside the doing them, be the same more or less.\n\nAlso, Happiness is thought to stand in perfect rest;[15] for we toil\nthat we may rest, and war that we may be at peace. Now all the\nPractical Virtues require either society or war for their Working, and\nthe actions regarding these are thought to exclude rest; those of war\nentirely, because no one chooses war, nor prepares for war, for war\u2019s\nsake: he would indeed be thought a bloodthirsty villain who should make\nenemies of his friends to secure the existence of fighting and\nbloodshed. The Working also of the statesman excludes the idea of rest,\nand, beside the actual work of government, seeks for power and\ndignities or at least Happiness for the man himself and his\nfellow-citizens: a Happiness distinct[16] from the national Happiness,\nwhich we evidently seek as being different and distinct.\n\nIf then of all the actions in accordance with the various virtues those\nof policy and war are pre-eminent in honour and greatness, and these\nare restless, and aim at some further End and are not choice-worthy for\ntheir own sakes, but the Working of the Intellect, being apt for\ncontemplation, is thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no End\nbeyond itself and to have Pleasure of its own which helps to increase\nthe Working, and if the attributes of Self-Sufficiency, and capacity of\nrest, and unweariedness (as far as is compatible with the infirmity of\nhuman nature), and all other attributes of the highest Happiness,\nplainly belong to this Working, this must be perfect Happiness, if\nattaining a complete duration of life, which condition is added because\nnone of the points of Happiness is incomplete.\n\nBut such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man\nwill live thus, not in so far as he is man but in so far as there is in\nhim a divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excels his\ncomposite nature so far does the Working thereof excel that in\naccordance with any other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pure\nIntellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will the\nlife in accordance with it be divine compared with man\u2019s ordinary life.\n\nYet must we not give ear to those who bid one as man to mind only man\u2019s\naffairs, or as mortal only mortal things; but, so far as we can, make\nourselves like immortals and do all with a view to living in accordance\nwith the highest Principle in us, for small as it may be in bulk yet in\npower and preciousness it far more excels all the others.\n\nIn fact this Principle would seem to constitute each man\u2019s \u201cSelf,\u201d\nsince it is supreme and above all others in goodness it _would_ be\nabsurd then for a man not to choose his own life but that of some\nother.\n\nAnd here will apply an observation made before, that whatever is proper\nto each is naturally best and pleasantest to him: such then is to Man\nthe life in accordance with pure Intellect (since this Principle is\nmost truly Man), and if so, then it is also the happiest.\n\nAnd second in degree of Happiness will be that Life which is in\naccordance with the other kind of Excellence, for the Workings in\naccordance with this are proper to Man: I mean, we do actions of\njustice, courage, and the other virtues, towards one another, in\ncontracts, services of different kinds, and in all kinds of actions and\nfeelings too, by observing what is befitting for each: and all these\nplainly are proper to man. Further, the Excellence of the Moral\ncharacter is thought to result in some points from physical\ncircumstances, and to be, in many, very closely connected with the\npassions.\n\nAgain, Practical Wisdom[17] and Excellence of the Moral character are\nvery closely united; since the Principles of Practical Wisdom are in\naccordance with the Moral Virtues and these are right when they accord\nwith Practical Wisdom.\n\nThese moreover, as bound up with the passions, must belong to the\ncomposite nature, and the Excellences or Virtues of the composite\nnature are proper to man: therefore so too will be the life and\nHappiness which is in accordance with them. But that of the Pure\nIntellect is separate and distinct: and let this suffice upon the\nsubject, since great exactness is beyond our purpose,\n\nIt would seem, moreover, to require supply of external goods to a small\ndegree, or certainly less than the Moral Happiness: for, as far as\nnecessaries of life are concerned, we will suppose both characters to\nneed them equally (though, in point of fact, the man who lives in\nsociety does take more pains about his person and all that kind of\nthing; there will really be some little difference), but when we come\nto consider their Workings there will be found a great difference.\n\nI mean, the liberal man must have money to do his liberal actions with,\nand the just man to meet his engagements (for mere intentions are\nuncertain, and even those who are unjust make a pretence of _wishing_\nto do justly), and the brave man must have power, if he is to perform\nany of the actions which appertain to his particular Virtue, and the\nman of perfected self-mastery must have opportunity of temptation, else\nhow shall he or any of the others display his real character?\n\n(By the way, a question is sometimes raised, whether the moral choice\nor the actions have most to do with Virtue, since it consists in both:\nit is plain that the perfection of virtuous action requires both: but\nfor the actions many things are required, and the greater and more\nnumerous they are the more.) But as for the man engaged in\nContemplative Speculation, not only are such things unnecessary for his\nWorking, but, so to speak, they are even hindrances: as regards the\nContemplation at least; because of course in so far as he is Man and\nlives in society he chooses to do what Virtue requires, and so he will\nneed such things for maintaining his character as Man though not as a\nspeculative philosopher.\n\nAnd that the perfect Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Working\nmay appear also from the following consideration: our conception of the\ngods is that they are above all blessed and happy: now what kind of\nMoral actions are we to attribute to them? those of justice? nay, will\nthey not be set in a ridiculous light if represented as forming\ncontracts, and restoring deposits, and so on? well then, shall we\npicture them performing brave actions, withstanding objects of fear and\nmeeting dangers, because it is noble to do so? or liberal ones? but to\nwhom shall they be giving? and further, it is absurd to think they have\nmoney or anything of the kind. And as for actions of perfected\nself-mastery, what can theirs be? would it not be a degrading praise\nthat they have no bad desires? In short, if one followed the subject\ninto all details all the circumstances connected with Moral actions\nwould appear trivial and unworthy of Gods.\n\nStill, every one believes that they live, and therefore that they Work\nbecause it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like\nEndymion: now if from a living being you take away Action, still more\nif Creation, what remains but Contemplation? So then the Working of the\nGods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for Contemplative\nSpeculation; and of all human Workings that will have the greatest\ncapacity for Happiness which is nearest akin to this.\n\nA corroboration of which position is the fact that the other animals do\nnot partake of Happiness, being completely shut out from any such\nWorking.\n\nTo the Gods then all their life is blessed; and to men in so far as\nthere is in it some copy of such Working, but of the other animals none\nis happy because it in no way shares in Contemplative Speculation.\n\nHappiness then is co-extensive with this Contemplative Speculation, and\nin proportion as people have the act of Contemplation so far have they\nalso the being happy, not incidentally, but in the way of Contemplative\nSpeculation because it is in itself precious.\n\nChapter VII.\n\nSo Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Speculation; but since it\nis Man we are speaking of he will need likewise External Prosperity,\nbecause his Nature is not by itself sufficient for Speculation, but\nthere must be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of all\nkinds.\n\nHowever, it must not be thought, because without external goods a man\ncannot enjoy high Happiness, that therefore he will require many and\ngreat goods in order to be happy: for neither Self-sufficiency, nor\nAction, stand in Excess, and it is quite possible to act nobly without\nbeing ruler of sea and land, since even with moderate means a man may\nact in accordance with Virtue.\n\nAnd this may be clearly seen in that men in private stations are\nthought to act justly, not merely no less than men in power but even\nmore: it will be quite enough that just so much should belong to a man\nas is necessary, for his life will be happy who works in accordance\nwith Virtue.\n\nSolon perhaps drew a fair picture of the Happy, when he said that they\nare men moderately supplied with external goods, and who have achieved\nthe most noble deeds, as he thought, and who have lived with perfect\nself-mastery: for it is quite possible for men of moderate means to act\nas they ought.\n\nAnaxagoras also seems to have conceived of the Happy man not as either\nrich or powerful, saying that he should not wonder if he were accounted\na strange man in the judgment of the multitude: for they judge by\noutward circumstances of which alone they have any perception.\n\nAnd thus the opinions of the Wise seem to be accordant with our account\nof the matter: of course such things carry some weight, but truth, in\nmatters of moral action, is judged from facts and from actual life, for\nherein rests the decision. So what we should do is to examine the\npreceding statements by referring them to facts and to actual life, and\nwhen they harmonise with facts we may accept them, when they are at\nvariance with them conceive of them as mere theories.\n\nNow he that works in accordance with, and pays observance to, Pure\nIntellect, and tends this, seems likely to be both in the best frame of\nmind and dearest to the Gods: because if, as is thought, any care is\nbestowed on human things by the Gods then it must be reasonable to\nthink that they take pleasure in what is best and most akin to\nthemselves (and this must be the Pure Intellect); and that they requite\nwith kindness those who love and honour this most, as paying observance\nto what is dear to them, and as acting rightly and nobly. And it is\nquite obvious that the man of Science chiefly combines all these: he is\ntherefore dearest to the Gods, and it is probable that he is at the\nsame time most Happy.\n\nThus then on this view also the man of Science will be most Happy.\n\nChapter VIII.\n\nNow then that we have said enough in our sketchy kind of way on these\nsubjects; I mean, on the Virtues, and also on Friendship and Pleasure;\nare we to suppose that our original purpose is completed? Must we not\nrather acknowledge, what is commonly said, that in matters of moral\naction mere Speculation and Knowledge is not the real End but rather\nPractice: and if so, then neither in respect of Virtue is Knowledge\nenough; we must further strive to have and exert it, and take whatever\nother means there are of becoming good.\n\nNow if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient to make men\ngood, they would justly, as Theognis observes have reaped numerous and\ngreat rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them: but in\npoint of fact, while they plainly have the power to guide and stimulate\nthe generous among the young and to base upon true virtuous principle\nany noble and truly high-minded disposition, they as plainly are\npowerless to guide the mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because it\nis not their nature to be amenable to a sense of shame but only to\nfear; nor to abstain from what is low and mean because it is\ndisgraceful to do it but because of the punishment attached to it: in\nfact, as they live at the beck and call of passion, they pursue their\nown proper pleasures and the means of securing them, and they avoid the\ncontrary pains; but as for what is noble and truly pleasurable they\nhave not an idea of it, inasmuch as they have never tasted of it.\n\nMen such as these then what mere words can transform? No, indeed! it is\neither actually impossible, or a task of no mean difficulty, to alter\nby words what has been of old taken into men\u2019s very dispositions: and,\nit may be, it is a ground for contentment if with all the means and\nappliances for goodness in our hands we can attain to Virtue.\n\nThe formation of a virtuous character some ascribe to Nature, some to\nCustom, and some to Teaching. Now Nature\u2019s part, be it what it may,\nobviously does not rest with us, but belongs to those who in the truest\nsense are fortunate, by reason of certain divine agency,\n\nThen, as for Words and Precept, they, it is to be feared, will not\navail with all; but it may be necessary for the mind of the disciple to\nhave been previously prepared for liking and disliking as he ought;\njust as the soil must, to nourish the seed sown. For he that lives in\nobedience to passion cannot hear any advice that would dissuade him,\nnor, if he heard, understand: now him that is thus how can one reform?\nin fact, generally, passion is not thought to yield to Reason but to\nbrute force. So then there must be, to begin with, a kind of affinity\nto Virtue in the disposition; which must cleave to what is honourable\nand loath what is disgraceful. But to get right guidance towards Virtue\nfrom the earliest youth is not easy unless one is brought up under laws\nof such kind; because living with self-mastery and endurance is not\npleasant to the mass of men, and specially not to the young. For this\nreason the food, and manner of living generally, ought to be the\nsubject of legal regulation, because things when become habitual will\nnot be disagreeable.\n\nYet perhaps it is not sufficient that men while young should get right\nfood and tendance, but, inasmuch as they will have to practise and\nbecome accustomed to certain things even after they have attained to\nman\u2019s estate, we shall want laws on these points as well, and, in fine,\nrespecting one\u2019s whole life, since the mass of men are amenable to\ncompulsion rather than Reason, and to punishment rather than to a sense\nof honour.\n\nAnd therefore some men hold that while lawgivers should employ the\nsense of honour to exhort and guide men to Virtue, under the notion\nthat they will then obey who have been well trained in habits; they\nshould impose chastisement and penalties on those who disobey and are\nof less promising nature; and the incurable expel entirely: because the\ngood man and he who lives under a sense of honour will be obedient to\nreason; and the baser sort, who grasp at pleasure, will be kept in\ncheck, like beasts of burthen by pain. Therefore also they say that the\npains should be such as are most contrary to the pleasures which are\nliked.\n\nAs has been said already, he who is to be good must have been brought\nup and habituated well, and then live accordingly under good\ninstitutions, and never do what is low and mean, either against or with\nhis will. Now these objects can be attained only by men living in\naccordance with some guiding Intellect and right order, with power to\nback them.\n\nAs for the Paternal Rule, it possesses neither strength nor compulsory\npower, nor in fact does the Rule of any one man, unless he is a king or\nsome one in like case: but the Law has power to compel, since it is a\ndeclaration emanating from Practical Wisdom and Intellect. And people\nfeel enmity towards their fellow-men who oppose their impulses, however\nrightly they may do so: the Law, on the contrary, is not the object of\nhatred, though enforcing right rules.\n\nThe Laced\u00e6monian is nearly the only State in which the framer of the\nConstitution has made any provision, it would seem, respecting the food\nand manner of living of the people: in most States these points are\nentirely neglected, and each man lives just as he likes, ruling his\nwife and children Cyclops-Fashion.\n\nOf course, the best thing would be that there should be a right Public\nSystem and that we should be able to carry it out: but, since as a\npublic matter those points are neglected, the duty would seem to\ndevolve upon each individual to contribute to the cause of Virtue with\nhis own children and friends, or at least to make this his aim and\npurpose: and this, it would seem, from what has been said, he will be\nbest able to do by making a Legislator of himself: since all public\nsystems, it is plain, are formed by the instrumentality of laws and\nthose are good which are formed by that of good laws: whether they are\nwritten or unwritten, whether they are applied to the training of one\nor many, will not, it seems, make any difference, just as it does not\nin music, gymnastics, or any other such accomplishments, which are\ngained by practice.\n\nFor just as in Communities laws and customs prevail, so too in families\nthe express commands of the Head, and customs also: and even more in\nthe latter, because of blood-relationship and the benefits conferred:\nfor there you have, to begin with, people who have affection and are\nnaturally obedient to the authority which controls them.\n\nThen, furthermore, Private training has advantages over Public, as in\nthe case of the healing art: for instance, as a general rule, a man who\nis in a fever should keep quiet, and starve; but in a particular case,\nperhaps, this may not hold good; or, to take a different illustration,\nthe boxer will not use the same way of fighting with all antagonists.\n\nIt would seem then that the individual will be most exactly attended to\nunder Private care, because so each will be more likely to obtain what\nis expedient for him. Of course, whether in the art of healing, or\ngymnastics, or any other, a man will treat individual cases the better\nfor being acquainted with general rules; as, \u201cthat so and so is good\nfor all, or for men in such and such cases:\u201d because general maxims are\nnot only said to be but are the object-matter of sciences: still this\nis no reason against the possibility of a man\u2019s taking excellent care\nof some _one_ case, though he possesses no scientific knowledge but\nfrom experience is exactly acquainted with what happens in each point;\njust as some people are thought to doctor themselves best though they\nwould be wholly unable to administer relief to others. Yet it may seem\nto be necessary nevertheless, for one who wishes to become a real\nartist and well acquainted with the theory of his profession, to have\nrecourse to general principles and ascertain all their capacities: for\nwe have already stated that these are the object-matter of sciences.\n\nIf then it appears that we may become good through the instrumentality\nof laws, of course whoso wishes to make men better by a system of care\nand training must try to make a Legislator of himself; for to treat\nskilfully just any one who may be put before you is not what any\nordinary person can do, but, if any one, he who has knowledge; as in\nthe healing art, and all others which involve careful practice and\nskill.\n\nWill not then our next business be to enquire from what sources, or how\none may acquire this faculty of Legislation; or shall we say, that, as\nin similar cases, Statesmen are the people to learn from, since this\nfaculty was thought to be a part of the Social Science? Must we not\nadmit that the Political Science plainly does not stand on a similar\nfooting to that of other sciences and faculties? I mean, that while in\nall other cases those who impart the faculties and themselves exert\nthem are identical (physicians and painters for instance) matters of\nStatesmanship the Sophists profess to teach, but not one of them\npractises it, that being left to those actually engaged in it: and\nthese might really very well be thought to do it by some singular knack\nand by mere practice rather than by any intellectual process: for they\nneither write nor speak on these matters (though it might be more to\ntheir credit than composing speeches for the courts or the assembly),\nnor again have they made Statesmen of their own sons or their friends.\n\nOne can hardly suppose but that they would have done so if they could,\nseeing that they could have bequeathed no more precious legacy to their\ncommunities, nor would they have preferred, for themselves or their\ndearest friends, the possession of any faculty rather than this.\n\nPractice, however, seems to contribute no little to its acquisition;\nmerely breathing the atmosphere of politics would never have made\nStatesmen of them, and therefore we may conclude that they who would\nacquire a knowledge of Statesmanship must have in addition practice.\n\nBut of the Sophists they who profess to teach it are plainly a long way\noff from doing so: in fact, they have no knowledge at all of its nature\nand objects; if they had, they would never have put it on the same\nfooting with Rhetoric or even on a lower: neither would they have\nconceived it to be \u201can easy matter to legislate by simply collecting\nsuch laws as are famous because of course one could select the best,\u201d\nas though the selection were not a matter of skill, and the judging\naright a very great matter, as in Music: for they alone, who have\npractical knowledge of a thing, can judge the performances rightly or\nunderstand with what means and in what way they are accomplished, and\nwhat harmonises with what: the unlearned must be content with being\nable to discover whether the result is good or bad, as in painting.\n\nNow laws may be called the performances or tangible results of\nPolitical Science; how then can a man acquire from these the faculty of\nLegislation, or choose the best? we do not see men made physicians by\ncompilations: and yet in these treatises men endeavour to give not only\nthe cases but also how they may be cured, and the proper treatment in\neach case, dividing the various bodily habits. Well, these are thought\nto be useful to professional men, but to the unprofessional useless. In\nlike manner it may be that collections of laws and Constitutions would\nbe exceedingly useful to such as are able to speculate on them, and\njudge what is well, and what ill, and what kind of things fit in with\nwhat others: but they who without this qualification should go through\nsuch matters cannot have right judgment, unless they have it by\ninstinct, though they may become more intelligent in such matters.\n\nSince then those who have preceded us have left uninvestigated the\nsubject of Legislation, it will be better perhaps for us to investigate\nit ourselves, and, in fact, the whole subject of Polity, that thus what\nwe may call Human Philosophy may be completed as far as in us lies.\n\nFirst then, let us endeavour to get whatever fragments of good there\nmay be in the statements of our predecessors, next, from the Polities\nwe have collected, ascertain what kind of things preserve or destroy\nCommunities, and what, particular Constitutions; and the cause why some\nare well and others ill managed, for after such enquiry, we shall be\nthe better able to take a concentrated view as to what kind of\nConstitution is best, what kind of regulations are best for each, and\nwhat laws and customs.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\nBOOK I\n\n\n[1] For this term, as here employed, our language contains no\nequivalent expression except an inconvenient paraphrase.\n\nThere are three senses which it bears in this treatise: the first (in\nwhich it is here employed) is its strict etymological signfication \u201cThe\nscience of Society,\u201d and this includes everything which can bear at all\nupon the well-being of Man in his social capacity, \u201cQuicquid agunt\nhomines nostri est farrago libelli.\u201d It is in this view that it is\nfairly denominated most commanding and inclusive.\n\nThe second sense (in which it occurs next, just below) is \u201cMoral\nPhilosophy.\u201d Aristotle explains the term in this sense in the Rhetoric\n(1 2) [Greek: hae peri ta aethae pragmateia aen dikaion esti\nprosagoreuen politikaen]. He has principally in view in this treatise\nthe moral training of the Individual, the branch of the Science of\nSociety which we call Ethics Proper, bearing the same relation to the\nlarger Science as the hewing and squaring of the stones to the building\nof the Temple, or the drill of the Recruit to the manoeuvres of the\nfield. Greek Philosophy viewed men principally as constituent parts of\na [Greek: polis], considering this function to be the real End of each,\nand this state as that in which the Individual attained his highest and\nmost complete development.\n\nThe third sense is \u201cThe detail of Civil Government,\u201d which Aristotle\nexpressly states (vi. 8) was the most common acceptation of the term.\n\n[2] Matters of which a man is to judge either belong to some\ndefinite art or science, or they do not. In the former case he is the\nbest judge who has thorough acquaintance with that art or science, in\nthe latter, the man whose powers have been developed and matured by\neducation. A lame horse one would show to a farmer, not to the best and\nwisest man of one\u2019s acquaintance; to the latter, one would apply in a\ndifficult case of conduct.\n\nExperience answers to the first, a state of self-control to the latter.\n\n[3] In the last chapter of the third book of this treatise it\nis said of the fool, that his desire of pleasure is not only\ninsatiable, but indiscriminate in its objects, \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c7\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd.\n\n[4] \u1f08\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74 is a word used in this treatise in various significations. The\nprimary one is \u201cbeginning or first cause,\u201d and this runs through all\nits various uses.\n\n\u201cRule,\u201d and sometimes \u201cRulers,\u201d are denoted by this term the initiative\nbeing a property of Rule.\n\n\u201cPrinciple\u201d is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the most\ncharacteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means\n\u201cstarting-point.\u201d Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve \u03bf\u1f57\n\u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1, and that of Action (\u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f21 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). I desire praise of men this\nthen is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to be\nattained, I resolve upon some course and this Resolve is the beginning\nof Action.\n\nThe beginnings of Resolve, \u1f08\u03c1\u03c7\u1f76 or Motives, when formally stated, are\nthe major premisses of what Aristotle calls the \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd, i.e. the reasoning into which actions may be analysed.\n\nThus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the\nPharisees, or the principle on which they acted.\n\nTheir practical syllogism then would stand thus:\n\nWhatever gains human praise is to be done;\nPublic praying and almsgiving gave human praise:\n[ergo] Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.\n\n\nThe major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action,\nand this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.\n\n[5] The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the\nsignification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorima\naplos]\n\nI have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as\ndenoting respectively what _is_ and what _may_ be known. All truth is\n[Greek: gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which we\nindividually realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek:\ngnorima aemin] which _we have received as true_. From this appears\nimmediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study\nof Moral Philosophy for good training in habits will either work\nprinciples into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as\nsoon as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can\ndo. The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have\nheard the fifth Commandment but it is in the very texture of his\nnature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally\ntrue and right the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for\nwhich he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove\nits truth if he should ask.\n\nBut these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect.\n10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are so\ndenominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have\nexisted before the instances of their operation. Justice must have\nexisted before just actions, Redness before red things, but since what\nwe meet with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the\nprinciples and laws), the particulars are said to be [Greek:\ngnorimotera aemin]\n\nAdopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage,\nwhich will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume\nprinciples, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, \u201cWe\nmust begin of course with what is known but then this term denotes\neither particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin with\nparticulars and hence the necessity of a previous good training in\nhabits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for\na fact is a starting point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there\nwill be no want of the reason for the fact in addition\u201d\n\nThe objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai]\noccurs immediately afterwards in the sense of \u201cprinciples.\u201d\n\nUtere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.\n\n[6] Or \u201cprove themselves good,\u201d as in the Prior Analytics, ii 25,\n[Greek: apanta pisteuomen k.t l] but the other rendering is supported\nby a passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. [Greek: oi d\u2019 upo ton epieikon kai\neidoton oregomenoi timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan ephientai peri\nauton chairousi de oti eisin agathoi, pisteuontes te ton legonton\nkrisei]\n\n[7] [Greek: thesis] meant originally some paradoxical statement by any\nphilosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come to mean any\ndialectical question. Topics, I. chap. ix.\n\n[8] A lost work, supposed to have been so called, because\ncontaining miscellaneous questions.\n\n[9] It is only quite at the close of the treatise that Aristotle refers\nto this, and allows that [Greek: theoria] constitutes the highest\nhappiness because it is the exercise of the highest faculty in man the\nreason of thus deferring the statement being that till the lower, that\nis the moral, nature has been reduced to perfect order, [Greek:\ntheoria] cannot have place, though, had it been held out from the\nfirst, men would have been for making the experiment at once, without\nthe trouble of self-discipline.\n\n[10] Or, as some think, \u201cmany theories have been founded on them.\u201d\n\n[11] The \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1 is the archetype, the \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 the concrete embodying the\nresemblance of it; hence Aristotle alludes to the theory under both\nnames, and this is the reason for retaining the Greek terms.\n\n[12] The list ran thus\u2014\n\n  [Greek:\n  to peras     to apeiron      |    to euthu\n  to perisson  to artion       |    to phos\n  to en        to plethos      |    to tetragonon\n  to dexion    to aristeron    |    to aeremoun\n  to arren     to thelu        |    to agathon\n  ]\n\n[13] Plato\u2019s sister\u2019s son.\n\n[14] This is the capital defect in Aristotle\u2019s eyes, who being\neminently practical, could not like a theory which not only did not\nnecessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it by\nenabling unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a way\nof stating facts, and leads to no action.\n\n[15] _i.e._ the identification of Happiness with the Chief Good.\n\n[16] _i.e._ without the capability of addition.\n\n[17] And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be the Chief\nGood. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to the Chief\nGood. See Book X. chap. 11. [Greek: delon os oud allo ouden tagathon an\neiae o meta tenos ton kath\u2019 auto agathon airetoteron ginetai.]\n\n[18] Compare Bishop Butler\u2019s account of \u201cHuman Nature as a System\u201d in\nthe Preface to his Sermons.\n\n[19] _i.e._ as working or as quiescent.\n\n[20] The mere translation of this term would convey no idea of its\nmeaning, I have therefore retained the Greek term. It is afterwards\nexplained to include space of time and external appliances requisite\nfor the full development of Man\u2019s energies; here the time only is\nalluded to.\n\n[21] This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations,\nin the Topics, I. chap. ix.\n\n[22] Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moral senses.\n\u201cFire burns,\u201d is an instance of the former, \u201cTreason is odious,\u201d of the\nlatter.\n\n[23] I have thought it worthwhile to vary the interpretation of this\nword, because though \u201chabitus\u201d may be equivalent to all the senses of\n[Greek: exis], \u201chabit\u201d is not, at least according to our colloquial\nusage we commonly denote by \u201chabit\u201d a state formed by habituation.\n\n[24] Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering this passage\nis to apply [Greek: kalon kagathon] to things, and let them depend\ngrammatically on [Greek: epaeboli]. It is to be remembered, however,\nthat [Greek: kalos kagathos] bore a special and well-known meaning also\nthe comparison is in the text more complete, and the point of the\npassage seems more completely brought out.\n\n[25] \u201cGoodness always implies the love of itself, an affection to\ngoodness.\u201d (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii ) Aristotle describes pleasure\nin the Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty of\nperception meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure\nbeing as truly pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness\nthen implies the love of itself, the percipient will always have its\nobject present, and pleasure continually result.\n\n[26] In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact that external\ncircumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happiness not that\nHappiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it to be\nidentical with virtuous action we must understand that it is to have a\nfair field; in fact, the other side of [Greek: bios teleios].\n\n[27] It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what he\nconsiders an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a direct\ngift from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive to\nself-discipline and moral improvement would vanish He shows therefore\nthat it is no depreciation of the value of Happiness to suppose it to\ncome partly at least from ourselves, and he then goes on with other\nreasons why we should think with him.\n\n[28] This term is important, what has been maimed was once perfect; he\ndoes not contemplate as possible the case of a man being born incapable\nof virtue, and so of happiness.\n\n[29] [Greek] Plato. Ph\u00e6don. xlvi.\n\n[30] But why give materials and instruments, if there is no work to do?\n\n[31] The supposed pair of ancestors.\n\n[32] Solon says, \u201cCall no man happy till he is dead.\u201d He must mean\neither, The man when dead _is_ happy (a), or, The man when dead _may be\nsaid to have been happy_ (b). If the former, does he mean positive\nhappiness (a)? or only freedom from unhappiness (\u03b2)? _We_ cannot allow\n(a), Men\u2019s opinions disallow (\u03b2), We revert now to the consideration of\n(b).\n\n[33] The difficulty was raised by the clashing of a notion commonly\nheld, and a fact universally experienced. Most people conceive that\nHappiness should be abiding, every one knows that fortune is\nchangeable. It is the notion which supports the definition, because we\nhave therein based Happiness on the most abiding cause.\n\n[34] I have taken \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd to refer to \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd, against Magirus\nand the Paraphrase of Andronicus Rhodius. I would refer to Aristotle\u2019s\naccount of \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 in the Tenth Book, chap. vii. where he expressly says\nof the working of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 or pure intelect, that it is \u201cmost continuous.\u201d\n\n[35] The term seems to be employed advisedly. The Choragus, of\ncourse, dressed his actors _for their parts;_ not according to their\nfancies or his own.\n\nHooker has (E. P. v. ixxvi. 5) a passage which seems to be an admirable\nparaphrase on this.\n\n\u201cAgain, that the measure of our outward prosperity be taken by\nproportion with that which every man\u2019s estate in this present life\nrequireth. External abilities are instruments of action. It contenteth\nwise artificers to have their instruments proportionable to their work,\nrather fit for use than huge and goodly to please the eye. Seeing then\nthe actions of a servant do not need that which may be necessary for\nmen of calling and place in the world, neither men of inferior\ncondition many things which greater personages can hardly want; surely\nthey are blessed in worldly respects who have wherewith to perform what\ntheir station and place asketh, though they have no more.\u201d\n\n[36] Always bearing in mind that man \u201cnever continueth in one stay.\u201d\n\n[37] The meaning is this: personal fortunes, we have said, must be in\ncertain weight and number to affect our own happiness, this will be\ntrue, of course, of those which are reflected on us from our friends:\nand these are the only ones to which the dead are supposed to be\nliable? add then the difference of sensibility which it is fair to\npresume, and there is a very small residuum of joy or sorrow.\n\n[38] This is meant for an exhaustive division of goods, which are\neither so _in esse_ or _in posse_.\n\nIf _in esse_, they are either above praise, or subjects of praise.\nThose _in posse_, here called faculties, are good only when rightly\nused. Thus Rhetoric is a faculty which may be used to promote justice\nor abused to support villainy. Money in like way.\n\n[39] The doubt is, whether [Greek] or [Greek] is the subject of the\nsentence. It is translated as above, not merely with reference to the\nsense of this passage, but on a comparison with a similar one in Book\nX. chap 8. [Greek].\n\n[40] Eudoxus, a philosopher holding the doctrine afterwards adopted by\nEpicurus respecting pleasure, but (as Aristotle testifies in the Tenth\nBook) of irreproachable character.\n\n[41] See the Rhetoric, Book I. chap ix.\n\n[42] The unseen is at least as real as the seen.\n\n[43] The terms are borrowed from the Seventh Book and are here used in\ntheir strict philosophical meaning. The [Greek: enkrates] is he who has\nbad or unruly appetites, but whose reason is strong enough to keep them\nunder. The [Greek: akrates] is he whose appetites constantly prevail\nover his reason and previous good resolutions.\n\nBy the law of habits the former is constantly approximating to a state\nin which the appetites are wholly quelled. This state is called [Greek:\nsophrosyne], and the man in it [Greek: sophron]. By the same law the\nremonstrances of reason in the latter grow fainter and fainter till\nthey are silenced for ever. This state is called [Greek: akolasia], and\nthe man in it [Greek: akolastos].\n\n[44] This is untranslateable. As the Greek phrase, [Greek: echein logon\ntinos], really denotes substituting that person\u2019s [Greek: logos] for\none\u2019s own, so the Irrational nature in a man of self-control or\nperfected self-mastery substitutes the orders of Reason for its own\nimpulses. The other phrase means the actual possession of mathematical\ntruths as part of the mental furniture, _i.e._ knowing them.\n\n[45] [Greek: xin] may be taken as opposed to [Greek: energeian], and\nthe meaning will be, to show a difference between Moral and\nIntellectual Excellences, that men are commended for merely having the\nlatter, but only for exerting and using the former.\n\n\nBOOK II\n\n[1] Which we call simply virtue.\n\n[2] For nature must of course supply the capacity.\n\n[3] Or \u201cas a simple result of nature.\u201d\n\n[4] This is done in the Sixth Book.\n\n[5] It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particular details\nof practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies no rule can be\nso framed, that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler\u2019s Sermon\non the character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit.\n\n[6] The words \u1f00\u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 and \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u1f78\u03c2 are not used here in their strict\nsignifications to denote confirmed states of vice: the \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u1f74\u03c2\nnecessarily feels pain, because he must always be thwarting passions\nwhich are a real part of his nature; though this pain will grow less\nand less as he nears the point of \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7 or perfected Self-Mastery,\nwhich being attained the pain will then and then only cease entirely.\nSo a certain degree of fear is necessary to the _formation_ of true\ncourage. All that is meant here is, that no habit of courage or\nself-mastery can be said to be matured, until pain altogether vanishes.\n\n[7] Virtue consists in the due regulation of _all_ the parts of our\nnature our passions are a real part of that nature, and as such have\ntheir proper office, it is an error then to aim at their extirpation.\nIt is true that in a perfect moral state emotion will be rare, but then\nthis will have been gained by regular process, being the legitimate\nresult of the law that \u201cpassive impressions weaken as active habits are\nstrengthened, by repetition.\u201d If musical instruments are making\ndiscord, I may silence or I may bring them into harmony in either case\nI get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the positive enjoyment\nof music. The Stoics would have the passions rooted out, Aristotle\nwould have them cultivated to use an apt figure (whose I know not),\nThey would pluck the blossom off at once, he would leave it to fall in\ndue course when the fruit was formed. Of them we might truly say,\n_Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant_. See on this point Bishop\nButler\u2019s fifth Sermon, and sect. 11. of the chapter on Moral Discipline\nin the first part of his Analogy.\n\n[8] I have adopted this word from our old writers, because our word\n_act_ is so commonly interchanged with _action_. [Greek: Praxis]\n(action) properly denotes the whole process from the conception to the\nperformance. [Greek: Pragma] (fact) only the result. The latter may be\nright when the former is wrong if, for example, a murderer was killed\nby his accomplices. Again, the [Greek: praxis] may be _good_ though the\n[Greek: pragma] be wrong, as if a man under erroneous impressions does\nwhat would have been right if his impressions had been true (subject of\ncourse to the question how far he is guiltless of his original error),\nbut in this case we could not call the [Greek: praxis] _right_. No\nrepetition of [Greek: pragmata] goes to form a habit. See Bishop Butler\non the Theory of Habits m the chapter on Moral Discipline, quoted\nabove, sect. 11. \u201cAnd in like manner as habits belonging to the body,\u201d\netc.\n\n[9] Being about to give a strict logical definition of Virtue,\nAristotle ascertains first what is its genus [Greek: ti estin].\n\n[10] That is, not for _merely having_ them, because we did not make\nourselves.\n\nSee Bishop Butler\u2019s account of our nature as containing \u201cparticular\npropensions,\u201d in sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral discipline, and in\nthe Preface to the Sermons.\n\n[11] This refers to the division of quantity ([Greek: poson]) in the\nCategories. Those Quantities are called by Aristotle Continuous whose\nparts have position relatively to one another, as a line, surface, or\nsolid, those discrete, whose parts have no such relation, as numbers\nthemselves, or any string of words grammatically unconnected.\n\n[12] Numbers are in arithmetical proportion (more usually called\nprogression), when they increase or decrease by a common difference\nthus, 2, 6, 10 are so, because 2 + 4 = 6, 6 + 4= 10, or _vice versa_,\n10 - 4 = 6, 6 - 4 = 2.\n\n[13] If the mina be taken at 15 oz. avoirdupois, (Dict. of G. and R.\nAntiquities, article _Talentum_,) we must be sadly degenerate in our\ngastric capacity.\n\n[14] The two are necessary, because since the reason itself may be\nperverted, a man must have recourse to an external standard; we may\nsuppose his [Greek: logos] originally to have been a sufficient guide,\nbut when he has injured his moral perceptions in any degree, he must go\nout of himself for direction.\n\n[15] This is one of the many expressions which seem to imply that this\ntreatise is rather a collection of notes of a _viv\u00e2 voce_ lecture than\na set formal treatise. \u201cThe table\u201d of virtues and vices probably was\nsketched out and exhibited to the audience.\n\n[16] Afterwards defined as \u201cAll things whose value is measured by\nmoney.\u201d\n\n[17] We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be illustrated by\nHorace\u2019s use of the term _hiatus_:\n\n\u201cQuid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?\u201d Opening the mouth wide\ngives a promise of something great to come, if nothing great does come,\nthis is a case of [Greek: chaunotes] or fruitless and unmeaning\n_hiatus_; the transference to the present subject is easy.\n\n[18] In like manner _we_ talk of laudable ambition, implying of course\nthere may be that which is not laudable.\n\n[19] An expression of Bishop Butler\u2019s, which corresponds exactly to the\ndefinition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric.\n\n[20] That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must be\ngenerically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en to\nauto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15.\n\n[21] \u201c[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb,\u201d says the Scholiast on the\nPhaedo, \u201cused of those who do anything safely and cautiously inasmuch\nas they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about then:\npreparations for the second cautiously,\u201d and he then alludes to this\npassage.\n\n[22] That is, you must allow for the _recoil_. \u201cNaturam expellas furca\ntamen usque recurret.\u201d\n\nP. 43, l. 2. This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines\nentertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics\nregarding pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.\n\nThe reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen\ncomes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have\nno difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred\nsuch suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go,\nthat she bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.\n\nThis exactly represents Aristotle\u2019s relation to Pleasure he does not,\nwith Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as\nParis would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it\nwholly evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused\nhad \u201cbanished all the beauty from her cheek,\u201d but, with the aged\ncounsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness\nresolves to deny himself, he \u201cfeels her sweetness, yet defies her\nthrall.\u201d\n\n[24] \u0391\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 is here used as an analogous noun, to denote the faculty\nwhich, in respect of moral matters, discharges the same function that\nbodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It is worth while to\nnotice how in our colloquial language we carry out the same analogy. We\nsay of a transaction, that it \u201clooks ugly,\u201d \u201csounds oddly,\u201d is a \u201cnasty\njob,\u201d \u201cstinks in our nostrils,\u201d is a \u201chard dealing.\u201d\n\n\nBOOK III\n\n[1] A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos], because\n\u201cparticular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the\nobjects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all,\nor not with the allowance of the moral principle.\u201d But he is\nresponsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed,\nhe \u201cmight have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure\nstate of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the\nmoral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus\nwithstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily\narose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his\nintegrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, by\nbeing inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and his\nsecurity against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral\nprinciple would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things\nare implied in the notion of virtuous habits.\u201d (From the chapter on\nMoral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this\ndisquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the\nthird chapter of this Book.\n\n[2] Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral\nGovernment of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in\nBishop Butler\u2019s manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two\nprinciples in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest,\nand these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon\nII.)\n\n[3] Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not of the\n[Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance of _i.e._\nincapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution to have\nbeen depraved, _i.e._ shows Conscience to be perverted, or the sight of\nSelf-love to be impaired.\n\n[4] [Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and effect\nall circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result are\n[Greek: eneka] that result.\n\nFrom the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from\npresent causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce,\nthese results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely,\nbut _designed_ causation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive,\nor final cause.\n\nIt is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a\ncontradiction in terms to speak of a man\u2019s being ignorant of his own\nMotive of action.\n\nWhen the man \u201cdrew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel\nbetween the joints of the harnesss\u201d (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek:\neneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of\n[Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King\u2019s death was _in fact the\nresult_, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the\nKing was disguised and the shot was at a venture.\n\n[5] Bishop Butler would agree to this: he says of settled deliberate\nanger, \u201cIt seems in us plainly connected with a sense of virtue and\nvice, of moral good and evil.\u201d See the whole Sermon on Resentment.\n\n[6] Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here, by using\n[Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no following\nhis argument without condescending to the same device, I have used our\nword lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, \u201cWhat man is he\nthat lusteth to live?\u201d\n\n[7] The meaning is, that the _onus probandi_ is thrown upon the person\nwho maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a _prima facie_ case. The\nwhole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the passage\nfrom [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker\u2019s seems to intend\nal 81 ir/jd\u00a3eis as a separate argument but if so, the argument would be\na mere _petitio principii_. I have adopted Cardwell\u2019s reading in part,\nbut retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last\nfour words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell\u2019s\nreading seems to restrict them to the last argument.\n\n[8] _i.e._ on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the\nsame as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute\ncharacter, opinions are in general _signs_ of character, but when they\nbegin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral\nChoice.\n\n\u201cTreason doth never prosper, what\u2019s the reason?\nWhen it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason.\u201d\n\n[9] The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a mere\nuseless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added to\n[Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications that\nthe treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished\nor systematic one.\n\n[10] Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the\nthree is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his\nchoice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object\nof Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so\ndistinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one\nchosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta],\nthe one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].\n\n[11] Compare Bishop Butler\u2019s \u201cSystem of Human Nature,\u201d in the Preface\nto the Sermons.\n\n[12] These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai\u2014bouleusin], contain the\naccount of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is\na Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation, for it\nhas been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter\nmeans to Ends supposed to be set before the mind, the next step is\nDeliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the\nmental hand towards the object thus selected, the two last constitute\n[Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word [Greek: orexis] means\nliterally \u201ca grasping at or after\u201d now as this physically may be either\nvague or definite, so too may the mental act, consequently the term as\ntransferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first\nwish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite movement, Will in its\nstrict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric\n(I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into [Greek: alogos] and\n[Greek: logistikae].\n\nThe illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as\nthe Kings first decided and then announced their decision for\nacceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided\non the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which\nthen proceeds to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an\naction of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival\nat land is naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain\nloss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question\nbeing debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to\nthe Will, which causes the owner\u2019s hands to throw overboard his goods:\nthe act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but\nin so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was\nobtained. In a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage\nof Wish, for no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless,\nconsequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no\nChoice.\n\n[13] Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti d hae\nmen boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho\neinai agathon)]\n\n[14] A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then\nplaced under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled\nor altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which\ngravitation operates irretrievably, \u201cthere is a certain bound to\nimprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no\nplace for repentance in the natural course of things.\u201d Bishop Butler\u2019s\nAnalogy, First Part, chap 11.\n\n[15] Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain\ncircumstances we can only choose how we will act not what circumstances\nwe will have to act under.\n\n[16] \u201c_Moral_ Courage\u201d is our phrase.\n\n[17] The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except by a\nparaphrase.\n\n\u201cThe object of each separate act of working is that which accords with\nthe habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of\nbravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords\nwith Courage, _i.e._ Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which\nimplies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are\ndenominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of\neach separate act of bravery is honour.\u201d\n\n[18] For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of danger. 2.\nA Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be\nfound to fail in one or other, or both.\n\n[19] This may merely mean, \u201cwho give strict orders\u201d not to flinch,\nwhich would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is capable of\nthe sense given above, which seems more forcible.\n\n[20] See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes aehen oun\nlogous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]\n\n[21] Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion\nwhich to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says\nof the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in _vanos_ tumultus gens.\n\n[22]In Coronea in B\u0153otia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed\nto some Phocians. \u201cThe regulars\u201d were Boeotian troops, the [Greek:\npolitika] Coroneans.\n\n[23] By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two\nthings, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried\ninto the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to\nimitate.\n\n[24] The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as here used,\nin given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis todi dia todi\naireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai aireitai, kata\nsumbebaekos de to proteron].\n\n\nBOOK V\n\n[1] Each term is important to make up the character of Justice, men\nmust have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice.\n\n[2] But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two senses, \u201cto\nlove\u201d and \u201cto kiss,\u201d [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I. chap. XIII. 5.\n\n[3] _Things_ are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name in\ncommon, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] is\n_close_ therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There\nis no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], \u201cequivocal\u201d being\napplied to a term and not to its various significates.\n\n[4] See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen echei kai\ntagatha k.t.l.]\n\n[5] A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as confining\nhis vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt to touch\nhim; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his virtue to\nhis own person.\n\n[6] See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.\n\n[7] Cardwell\u2019s text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon], yields a much\neasier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates law, but only the\nparticular kinds violate equality; and therefore the unlawful : the\nunequal :: universal Injustice the particular _i.e._ as whole to part.\n\nThere is a reading which also alters the words within the parenthesis,\nbut this hardly affects the gist of the passage.\n\n[8] There are two reasons why the characters are not necessarily\ncoincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry out the\n[Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty, so\ntherefore _pro tanto_ is he.\n\nAgain, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that he\ndoes the _facts_ of a good man but for the perfection of his own\nindividual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move\nrightly in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.\n\nThe question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the\ndistinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III.\nchap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler\u2019s first Sermon.\n\n[9] Terms used for persons.\n\n[10] By [Greek:\u2014\u2014] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50, etc, by\n[Greek:\u2014\u2014] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.\n\n[11] The profits of a mercantile transaction (say \u00a31000) are to be\ndivided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real\npoint to be settled); then,\n\nA : B :: 400 : 600.\n\nA : 400 :: B : 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as\nto make them commensurable with the respectiy sums).\n\nA+400 : B+600 :: A : B. This represents the actual distribution; its\nfairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.\n\n[12] _i.e._ where the ratio is that of equality, thus 2 : 2 :: 40 : 40\n\n[13] Her Majesty\u2019s \u201cJustices.\u201d\n\n[14] I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of\nplace here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not being\nlikely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at\nliberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that\nhe put them where they made the best sense.\n\n[15] This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not pretend\nto be able to get it out of the words.\n\n[16] This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not\nreally so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck\nwrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and\nin the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two\noffences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and\nanother against the office.\n\n[17] \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2 denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a gratuitous act\nof kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a generous\nmind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness.\n\n[18] The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only had (say)\none pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to have.\nThus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most\nvaluable, and _vice versa_.\n\nAdopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:\u2014\u2014] at\n[Greek:\u2014\u2014], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before\nReciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the\nwares as between the persons, _i.e._ the ratio of equality.\n\nIf we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring\ninto the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai\nouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.\n\nSay that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be\nthe same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist will\ncarry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both\n[Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr.\nshoes = 1 house.\n\n     Builder : Shoemaker : : 1  pr.  shoes      : 1 house\u2014_wrong_.\n     \u2014\u2014          \u2014\u2014          100 pr. shoes      : 1 house\u2014_right_\n     \u2014\u2014          \u2014\u2014          10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house\u2014_wrong_.\n\n[19] [Greek] Compare a similar use of [Greek]. De Interpretatione, II.\n2. [Greek].\n\n[20] Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is a violation\nof [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less share, the\nformer being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of\ninjury.\n\n[21] This passage certainly occurs awkwardly here. If attached to the\nclose of the preceding Chapter it would leave that Chapter incomplete,\nfor the question is not gone into, but only stated. As the commencement\nof this Chapter it is yet more out of place; I should propose to insert\nit at the commencement of the following Chapter, to which it forms an\nappropriate introduction.\n\n[22] In a pure democracy men are absolutely, _i.e._ numerically, equal,\nin other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British\nsubject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that is to say, is\nas fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.\n\n[23] Or, according to Cardwell\u2019s reading ([Greek: kineton ou mentoi\npan]) \u201cbut amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally\nvariable, but certainly all Just is not such.\u201d The sense of the passage\nis not affected by the reading. In Bekker\u2019s text we must take [Greek:\nkineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon], _i.e._ \u201cwe admit\nthere is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still,\u201d etc.\nWith Cardwell\u2019s, [Greek: kineton] will mean \u201cwhich not only _does_ but\nnaturally _may_ vary.\u201d\n\n[24] Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by enactment.\nTherefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads is an\nunjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act _materially_\nunjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See\nthe note on page 32, l. 16.\n\n[25] \u201cAs distinct from pain or loss.\u201d Bishop Butler\u2019s Sermon on\nResentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].\n\n[26] This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell as quoted in\nCardwell\u2019s Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The Paraphrast\ngives it as follows:\n\n\u201cBut the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels\nhimself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the\naggressor], but the other does not.\u201d\n\n[27] As when a man is \u201c_justified_ at the Grass Market,\u201d _i.e._ hung.\n\n[28] Where the stock of good is limited, if any individual takes more\nthan his share some one else must have less than his share; where it is\ninfinite, or where there is no good at all this cannot happen.\n\n[29] The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the law\nviews the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally\nequal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the\nloser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but _one_\nparty.\n\n[30] So in the Politics, 1. 2.\n\n_Hae men gar psuchae tou somatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous\ntaes orexeos politikaen kai despotikaev._\n\nCompare also Bishop Butler\u2019s account of human nature as a system\u2014of the\ndifferent authority of certain principles, and specially the supremacy\nof Conscience.\n\n\nBOOK VI\n\n[1] I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of\nlowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for\ninstance, in a building.\n\n[2] Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent matter.\n\n[3] One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in common\nlanguage, _he has a turn for_ Mathematics, _i e_ something in his\nmental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the\nbump denoting this aptitude.\n\n[4] And therefore the question resolves itself into this, \u201cWhat is the\nwork of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty of Reason.\u201d\nSee the description of _apetae_ II. 5.\n\n[5] _praxis_ is here used in its strict and proper meaning.\n\n[6] That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which Reason is the\njudge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act accordingly.\n\nThe question at issue always is, _Is this Good?_ because the Will is\nonly moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be always\n_Aye or No_, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former\ncase, and retracted in the later.\n\nSo far as what must take place in _every_ Moral Action, right or wrong,\nthe Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a\ngood Moral Choice, _i e._. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye\nwhen it ought.\n\nThe cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is\nperfect but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or\nwhen the direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not\nmove in accordance with that direction, in other words, when the\nMachinery is out of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]\u2014video\nmeliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.\n\n[7] See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.\n\n[8] The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which are to clothe\nthe feet of someone and the price to be paid, _i.e._ the produce of his\nindustry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his\nproduction is subordinate to Moral Action.\n\n[9] It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied\nhis phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is\nfounded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded\nto (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action\nmay be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason.\nThe vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in\nMoral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take\nplace.\n\nReason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler\nobserves that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral\nChoice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].\n\nBut one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite\nnature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves\ndo not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general,\nfairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler\u2019s\nSermon II. and the First upon Compassion.\n\n[10] The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself\n([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka\ntinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]),\nnon-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods\n([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view to _act_ ([Greek:\nphronesis]), or with a view to _make_ ([Greek: techne]).\n\nOtherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If\nnecessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]),\nor Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]),\nProduction ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell\u2019s notes.)\n\n[11] It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.\n\n[12] Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics\nII. 25, defines it to be \u201cthe proving the inherence of the major term\nin the middle (_i.e._ proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1)\nthrough the minor term.\u201d He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure\nwith an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course,\nfrom an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by\nInduction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. \u201cIf\nof one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is\ncoextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of\nthat which is thus coextensive.\u201d The fact of this coextensiveness must\nbe ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive\nFaculty. We will take Aldrich\u2019s instance.\n    All Magnets attract iron\n    A B C are Magnets\n    A B C attract iron.\nPresupposed Syllogism reasoning from an universal.\n\nA B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment)\n\nAll Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive\nfaculty)\n\nAll Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by\ntaking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)\n\nOr, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C\nattract iron.\n\nBut [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with\nthe term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they\nattract iron.\n\nInduction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says\nin the same place that for this reason we must _conceive_ ([Greek:\nnoehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above)\nas composed of all the Individuals.\n\nIf Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it\nwould cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of\nSimple Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the\nsteps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and\nagain out of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity\ndepends _entirely_ upon the quality of the particular mind which\nperforms it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark of\nGenius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It\nmay be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which\nexhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premiss _literally_\nfalse. It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction\n_as the term is used by Aristotle_, Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica\nPost. I. 1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.\n\n[13] The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is impossible\nto understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a perusal of\nthe chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the\nnature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae] draws its\nconclusions they are to be \u201ctrue, first principles incapable of any\nsyllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and\ncauses of it.\u201d (See the appendix to this Book.)\n\n[14] This is the test of correct logical division, that the _membra\ndividentia_ shall be opposed, _i.e._ not included the one by the other.\n\n[15] The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be this: the appeal\nis made in the first instance to popular language, just as it the case\nof [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek: phronaesis] and\n[Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and\nso, therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected to\nprove that connection to be \u201ccoextensiveness,\u201d we predicate one of the\nother and then simply convert the proposition, which is the proper test\nof any logical definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics,\n1. vi.\n\n[16] See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense\nof [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek: ephaenesen ho\nkurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen hoti ohi\nviohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]\u2014Luke xvi. 8.\n\n[17] Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath\u2019 ekasta pepaideumenos]\nof Book I. chap. 1.\n\n[18] The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as claiming\nthe allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of\nbeing truly expedient, because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are\nthe two Principles of our moral constitution naturally supreme and\n\u201cConscience and Self-Love, _if we understand our true happiness_,\nalways lead us the same way.\u201d Bishop Butler, end of Sermon III.\n\nAnd again:\n\n\u201cIf by _a sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard to what is\nupon the whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with the\nprinciple of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea\nitself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be\nimproved as really as any principle in our nature. So little cause is\nthere for Moralists to disclaim this principle.\u201d From the note on sect.\niv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part I chap. v.\n\n[19] See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.\n\nThe student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the\nfollowing\u2014Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d\u2019 exis to\nommati touto k. t. l]\u2014vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.]\nvii. 9.\u2014[Greek: ae gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]\u2014iii. 7 _ad\nfinem_. [Greek: ei de tis legoi. k.t.l.]\n\n[20] This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not\nadmit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom. In\npopular language we use the term \u201cwiser man,\u201d as readily as \u201cbetter\nartist\u201d really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation\nto Practical Wisdom and Art respectively, [Greek: dia to ginesthai tous\nepainous di anaphoras]. I. 12.\n\n[21] He would be a _better Chymist_ who should poison intentionally,\nthan he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that \u201cEpsom Salts\nmean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum.\u201d\n\n[22]The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old\nTestament in the sense first given to [Greek:\u2014\u2014] here. \u201cThen wrought\nBezaleel and Ahohab, and every _wise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put\nwisdom and understanding_ to know how to work all manner of work for\nthe service of the Sanctuary\u201d Exodus xxxvi. i.\n\n[23] [Greek:\u2014\u2014] and [Greek:\u2014\u2014], (in the strict sense, for it is used in\nmany different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole\nfunction [Greek:\u2014\u2014], [Greek:\u2014\u2014] takes in conclusions, drawn by strict\nreasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek: \u2014\u2014] supplies.\nIt is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these principles by\nIntuition and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek: \u2014\u2014] might exist\nindependent of [Greek:\u2014\u2014], but not this without that. Put the two\ntogether, the head to the trunk, and you form the living being\n[Greek:\u2014\u2014]. There are three branches of [Greek:\u2014\u2014] according to Greek\nPhilosophy, [Greek:\u2014\u2014], [Greek:\u2014\u2014], [Greek:\u2014\u2014]. Science is perhaps the\nnearest English term, but we have none really equivalent.\n\n[24][Greek:\u2014\u2014] is here used in its most extensive sense, [Greek:\u2014\u2014]\nwould be its chief Instrument.\n\n[25] The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:\u2014\u2014].\n\n[26] In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is\nemployed there will be general principles, and the application of them,\nbut in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the\noperations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.\n\nThus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil\nGovernment, is called Legislation, as administering its particular\nfunctions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there\nare of course general Rules, and also the particular application of\nthem; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when\nSelf-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.\n\n[27] [Greek:\u2014\u2014], \u201cour mere Operatives in Public business.\u201d (Chalmers.)\n\n[28] Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self, (which is\n[Greek:\u2014\u2014] proper) or not-Self, _i.e._ either one\u2019s family=[Greek:\u2014\u2014],\nor one\u2019s community=[Greek:\u2014\u2014], but here the supreme and subordinate are\ndistinguished, the former is [Greek:\u2014\u2014], the latter [Greek:\u2014\u2014] proper,\nwhose functions are deliberation and the administration of justice.\n\n[29] But where can this be done, if there be no community? see Horace\u2019s\naccount of the way in which his father made him reap instruction from\nthe examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also\nBishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.\n\nThe whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop\nButler\u2019s first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the\ncoincidence in _fact_ of enlightened Self-Love and Benevolence _i.e._\nlove of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this\ntreatise, chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia].\n\n[30] More truly \u201cimplied,\u201d namely, that Practical Wisdom results from\nexperience.\n\n[31] This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested\nby the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.\n\n[32]  An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei]. (Book 1.\nchap. viii.)\n\n[33] Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are last\narrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we have\nthe term applied to first principles, because they stand at one\nextremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.\n\n[34] I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives this sense,\n\u201cWell, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the\nother we mentioned is different in kind.\u201d In a passage so utterly\nunimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while\nto take much trouble about such a point.\n\n[35] The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1. xxiv.), \u201ca\nhappy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it.\u201d\n\nThe quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation\nthe rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia]. All\nthat receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun.\nThe moon receives light from the sun, The moon is bright on the side\nnext the sun. The [Greek: anchinoia] consists in rapidly and correctly\naccounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on the side\nnext to the sun.\n\n[36] Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental act.\n\n[37] The End does not sanctify the Means.\n\n[38] The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this\nsense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends but there\nare also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Great End\nof all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to\nthe subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects as being right\nmeans to the Grand End of all.\n\n[39] The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron],\nbut that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and\nthis construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that\n[Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos].\n\n[40] We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this\nword, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which\nconnects it with [Greek: suggnomae].\n\n[41] Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action.\n[Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis,\ngnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it).\n\nThe faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is\n[Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness\ninformed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not\nactually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so\nproper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.\n\nIs the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End?\nhe is then [Greek: euboulos]\u2014is he passing under review the suggestions\nof others? he is [Greek: sunetos]\u2014is he judging of the acts of others?\nhe admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness\u2014is he\napplying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek:\nnous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]\u2014while in each and all he is\n[Greek: phronimos]?\n\n[42] See note, on p. 140.\n\n[43] There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without\nproof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all\nreasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are\nsimply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these\ncases within the province of [Greek: nous], _i.e._ he calls by this\nname the Faculty which attains Truth in each.\n\n[44] _i.e._ of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].\n\n[45] See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact\nand mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is\nwrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss\n(_i.e._ by [Greek: ethismos]).\n\n     All that is pleasant is to be done,\n     This is pleasant,\n     This is to be done\n\n\nBy habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, _i.e._ on the suggestions of\n[Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss.\nAristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is\nfirmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification\nof his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein\naytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress\ntowards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of\nprevious good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to\n[Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the\nright one. Book VII. 8 and 5.\n\n[46] The _consequentia_ is this:\n\nThere are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of\nreasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous].\nWhat makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e.\nExperience, and _therefore_, etc.\n\n[47] This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika],\nhe gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics,\nI. xiii. 10,\n\n     { [Greek: to men hygieias poi\u00e6tikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai]\n     { [Greek: to de phylaktikon],\n     { [Greek: to de s\u00e6mantikon].\n\nOf course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].\n\n[48] Healthiness is the formal cause of health.\n     Medicine is the efficient cause of health.\n\nSee Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud h\u00e6 hygieia kai ho iatros\nhomoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].\n\n[49] [Greek: phron\u00e6sis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the\nIntellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom.\n\n[50] This is another case of an observation being thrown in _obiter_,\nnot relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.\n\n[51] See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.\n\n[52]The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the\nabstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. \u201cUp to\nanything\u201d is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too\nnearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.\n\n[53] See the note on [Greek: Arch\u00e6] on page 4, l. 30.\n\nP. 147, l. 14. And for the Minor, of course,\n\n\u201cThis particular action is\u2014\u2014\u2014.\u201d\n\nWe may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein\u2014ti gar\ndei prattein h\u00e6 m\u00e6, to telos aut\u00e6s estin] i.e. [Greek: t\u00e6s\nphron\u00e6seos].\u2014(Chap. xi. of this Book.)\n\n[55] \u201cLook asquint on the face of truth.\u201d Sir T. Browne, Religio\nMedici.\n\n[56] The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the\nsignification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term\nto denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues.\n\n[57] Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. [Greek: nun de\nphainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek t\u00e6s aret\u00e6s].\n\n[58] It must be remembered, that [Greek: phron\u00e6sis] is used throughout\nthis chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical\nWisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of\nit.\n\n\nBOOK VII\n\n[1] The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather\nwhat men _may be_ than what they _are_. In this book we take a\npractical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day\ndevelopment.\n\n[2] This illustrates the expression, \u201c_Deceits_ of the Flesh.\u201d\n\n[3] Another reading omits the [Greek:\u2014\u2014]; the meaning of the whole\npassage would be exactly the same\u2014it would then run, \u201cif he had been\nconvinced of the rightness of what he does, _i.e._ if he were now\nacting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of\nconviction.\u201d\n\n[4] Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:\u2014\u2014] [Greek\u2014\u2014]\n\n[5]Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not.\n\n[6] As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott\u2019s \u201cRed Gauntlet.\u201d\n\n[7] That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premise,\nit is true, that \u201call that is sweet is pleasant,\u201d it is true also, that\n\u201cthis is sweet,\u201d what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in\nthis minor to the major _i.e._ the universal maxim, forbidding to\ntaste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his\nmind \u201cAll excess is to be avoided,\u201d at a certain time his [Greek:\u2014\u2014]\ntells him \u201cThis glass is excess.\u201d As a matter of mere reasoning, he\ncannot help receiving the conclusion \u201cThis glass is to be avoided,\u201d and\nsupposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But\n[Greek:\u2014\u2014], being a simple tendency towards indulgence suggests, in\nplace of the minor premise \u201cThis is excess,\u201d its own premise \u201cThis is\nsweet,\u201d this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or principle\n(\u2018[Greek:\u2014\u2014]), \u201cAll that is sweet is to be tasted,\u201d and so, by strict\nlogical sequence, proves \u201cThis glass is to be tasted.\u201d\n\nThe solution then of the ph\u00e6nomenon of [Greek:\u2014\u2014] is this that\n[Greek:\u2014\u2014], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the\nsuggestions of Right Reason.\n\nOn the high ground of Universals, [Greek:\u2014\u2014] i.e. [Greek:\u2014\u2014] easily\ndefeats [Greek:\u2014\u2014]. The [Greek:\u2014\u2014], an hour before he is in temptation,\nwould never deliberately prefer the maxim \u201cAll that is sweet is to be\ntasted\u201d to \u201cAll excess is to be avoided.\u201d The [Greek:\u2014\u2014] would.\n\n     Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2):\n\n     Qu\u00e6 virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvo\n     Discite, _non inter lances mensasque nitentes_\n     Verum hic _impransi_ mecum disquirite\n\n\nCompare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. \u201cLook not thou upon the wine when it\nis red,\u201d etc.\n\n[8] As we commonly speak, Metaphysicians. Physiology of course includes\nMetaphysics.\n\n[9] [Greek: oron]. Aristotle\u2019s own account of this word (Prior Analyt\nii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis], but both in the\naccount of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the proposition itself\nis really indicated by it.\n\n[10] The Greek would give \u201cavoids excessive pain,\u201d but this is not\ntrue, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant for\ntranslating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below [Greek:\ndiokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas].\n\n[11] Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy, Part I\nchap v sect. iv.\n\n[12] That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.\n\n[14] Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on [Greek:\norgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler\u2019s Sermon on\nResentment.\n\n[15] The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concisement of\nexpression, the following exposition of it is subjoined.\n\n     Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,\n     Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,[*]\n     Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,\n     Actions of Lust are more unjust\n\n     [*] [Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance from\n     which this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in\n     the Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.\n\n[16][Greek: ton dae lechthenton]. Considerable difference of opinion\nexists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation which\nsubstitutes [Greek: akrataes] for [Greek: akolastos] removes all\ndifficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to [Greek: ton mae\nproairoumenon] but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker,\nbecause the authority of MSS and old editions is all on this side.\n\nI understand [Greek: mallon] as meant to modify the word [Greek:\nmalakias], which properly denotes that phase of [Greek: akrasia] (not\n[Greek: akolasia]) which is caused by pain.\n\nThe [Greek: akolastos] _deliberately_ pursues pleasure and declines\npain if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes\nunder [Greek: malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps\nnot quite properly.\n\nOr the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts\ncaused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then\nof course the names of [Greek: malakia] and [Greek: akolasia] may be\nfitly given respectively.\n\n[17] \u201cIf we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying, we\nshould think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician\nwho knew the whole, would behold them with despair. And there is a\nmortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the first\nsymptoms of returning hope are pain and anguish\u201d Sewell, Sermons to\nYoung Men (Sermon xii.)\n\n[18] Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makes his\nMoral Choice to act rightly, but, at the moment of acting, the powerful\nstrain of desire makes him contravene this choice his Will does not act\nin accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason. His\nactions are therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i, and\nnote on page 128.\n\n[19] Let a man be punctual _on principle_ to any one engagement in the\nday, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all his others in their\ndue places relatively to this one; and so will often wear an appearance\nof being needlessly punctilious in trifles.\n\n[20] Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action, which\nare intended to supply the defects of the higher principle.\n\nSee Bishop Butler\u2019s first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion of\nnote on p. 129.\n\n\nBOOK VIII\n\n[1] \u201cOwe no man anything, but to _love_ one another for he that loveth\nanother _hath fulfilled the Law_.\u201d Romans XIII. 8.\n\n[2] [Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line from Hesiod,\n[Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton].\n\n[3] In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin that she\n\n     \u201ctwo stone bottles found,\n     To hold the liquor that she _loved_,\n     And keep it safe and sound.\u201d\n\n[4] Cardwell\u2019s reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta loipa] is\nhere adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker\u2019s.\n\n[5]The Great man will have a right to look for more Friendship than he\nbestows, but the Good man _can_ feel Friendship only for, and in\nproportion to, the goodness of the other.\n\n[6] See note on page 68, 1. 8.\n\n[7] See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of [Greek: tauton].\n\n[8] \u201cFor the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one ought to\nhave of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.\u201d\n\n[9] Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognise\nthe obligation to requite the favour or kindness.\n\n\nBOOK IX\n\n[1] \u201cNeither the Son of man, that He should _repent_.\u201d Numbers xxiii.\n19.\n\n\u201cIn a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment\nof a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use.\u201d\nWhately, Logic, iii. 10.\n\n[2] \u201cI have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is that\nChamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to many\nguests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shall command\nhim to come to the window, and the other to the table, and another to\nthe bed, and another to the chimney, and another to come upstairs, and\nanother to go downstairs, and all in the same instant, how would he be\ndistracted to please them all? And yet such is the sad condition of nay\nsoul by nature, not only a servant but a slave unto sin. Pride calls me\nto the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness to the bed, laziness\nto the chimney, ambition commands me to go upstairs, and covetousness\nto come down. Vices, I see, are as well contrary to themselves as to\nVirtue.\u201d (Fuller\u2019s Good Thoughts in Bad Times. Mix\u2019t Contemplations,\nviii.)\n\n\nBOOK X\n\n[1] See note, p. 43.\n\n[2] See Book II. chap. ix.\n\n[3] See Book I. chap. v. ad finem.\n\n[4] The notion alluded to is that of the [greek: idea]: that there is\nno real substantial good except the [greek: auto agathon], and\ntherefore whatever is so called is so named in right of its\nparticipation in that.\n\n[5] See note on page 136, 1. 15.\n\nP. 238, 1. 24. Movement is, according to Aristotle, of six kinds:\n   From not being to being    .  .  .  .    Generation\n   From being to not being    .  .  .  .    Destruction\n   From being to being more   .  .  .  .    Increase\n   From being to being less   .  .  .  .    Diminution\n   From being here to being there   .  .    Change of Place\n   From being in this way to being in that  Alteration\n\n[7] _A_ may go to sleep quicker than _B_, but cannot _do more sleep_ in\na given time.\n\n[8] Compare Book III. chap. vi. [Greek: osper kai epi ton somaton, k.\nt. l.]\n\n[9] Which is of course a [Greek: genesis].\n\n[10] That is, subordinate Movements are complete before the whole\nMovement is.\n\n[11] Pleasure is so instantaneous a sensation, that it cannot be\nconceived divisible or incomplete; the longest continued Pleasure is\nonly a succession of single sparks, so rapid as to give the appearance\nof a stream, of light.\n\n[12] A man is as effectually hindered from taking a walk by the [Greek:\nallotria haedouae] of reading a novel, as by the [Greek: oikeia lupae]\nof gout in the feet.\n\n[13] I have thus rendered [Greek: spoudae (ouk agnoon to\nhamartanomenon)]; but, though the English term does not represent the\ndepth of the Greek one, it is some approximation to the truth to\nconnect an earnest serious purpose with Happiness.\n\n[14] Bishop Butler, _contra_ (Sermon XV.).\n\n\u201cKnowledge is not our proper Happiness. Whoever will in the least\nattend to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having, of\nit, which is the entertainment of the mind.\u201d The two statements may\nhowever be reconciled. Aristotle may be well understood only to mean,\nthat the pursuit of knowledge will be the pleasanter, the freer it is\nfrom the minor hindrances which attend on _learning_.\n\n[15] The clause immediately following indicates that Aristotle felt\nthis statement to be at first sight startling, Happiness having been\nall the way through connected with [Greek: energeia], but the statement\nillustrates and confirms what was said in note on page 6, 1. 15.\n\n[16] That is to say, he aims at producing not merely a happy aggregate,\nbut an aggregate of happy individuals. Compare what is said of\nLegislators in the last chapter of Book I and the first of Book II.\n\n[17] See note, page 146, 1. 17.","title":"The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":113322}