{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_919/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_919","id":"gutenberg_919","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/919","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Ethics","Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBenedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS\n(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)\n\nTranslated by R. H. M. Elwes\n\n\n\n\nPART I: CONCERNING GOD.\n\n\nDEFINITIONS.\n\nI. By that which is 'self-caused' I mean that of which the\nessence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only\nconceivable as existent.\n\nII. A thing is called 'finite after its kind' when it can be\nlimited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body\nis called finite because we always conceive another greater body.\nSo, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is\nnot limited by thought, nor a thought by body.\n\nIII. By 'substance' I mean that which is in itself, and is\nconceived through itself: in other words, that of which a\nconception can be formed independently of any other conception.\n\nIV. By 'attribute' I mean that which the intellect perceives as\nconstituting the essence of substance.\n\nV. By 'mode' I mean the modifications (\"affectiones\") of\nsubstance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through,\nsomething other than itself.\n\nVI. By 'God' I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a\nsubstance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each\nexpresses eternal and infinite essentiality.\n\n>>>>>Explanation--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after\nits kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite\nattributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,\ncontains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves\nno negation.\n\nVII. That thing is called 'free,' which exists solely by the\nnecessity of its own nature, and of which the action is\ndetermined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is\nnecessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by\nsomething external to itself to a fixed and definite method of\nexistence or action.\n\nVIII. By 'eternity' I mean existence itself, in so far as it is\nconceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of\nthat which is eternal.\n\n>>>>>Explanation--Existence of this kind is conceived as an\neternal truth, like the essence of a thing and, therefore,\ncannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though\ncontinuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.\n\nAXIOMS. I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or\nin something else.\n\nII. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be\nconceived through itself.\n\nIII. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;\nand, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is\nimpossible that an effect can follow.\n\nIV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the\nknowledge of a cause.\n\nV. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the\none by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve\nthe conception of the other.\n\nVI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.\n\nVII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence\ndoes not involve existence.\n\nPROPOSITIONS. I. Substance is by nature prior to its\nmodifications.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.\n\nII. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have\nnothing in common.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in\nitself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the\nconception of one does not imply the conception of the other.\n\nIII. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause\nof the other.\n\n>>>>>Proof--If they have nothing in common, it follows that one\ncannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,\ntherefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).\nQ.E.D.\n\nIV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the\nother, either by the difference of the attributes of the\nsubstances, or by the difference of their modifications.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Everything which exists, exists either in itself or\nin something else (Ax. i.),-- that is (by Deff. iii. and v.),\nnothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except\nsubstance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given\nbesides the understanding, by which several things may be\ndistinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in\nother words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.\nQ.E.D.\n\nV. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances\nhaving the same nature or attribute.\n\n>>>>>Proof--If several distinct substances be granted, they must\nbe distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of\ntheir attributes, or by the difference of their modifications\n(Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it\nwill be granted that there cannot be more than one with an\nidentical attribute. If by the difference of their\nmodifications--as substance is naturally prior to its\nmodifications (Prop. i.)--it follows that setting the\nmodifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is\ntruly, (Deff. iii and vi.), there cannot be conceived one\nsubstance different from another--that is (by Prop. iv.), there\ncannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.\nQ.E.D.\n\nVI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.\n\n>>>>>Proof--It is impossible that there should be in the universe\ntwo substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have\nanything common to them both (Prop ii.), and, therefore (Prop.\niii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be\nproduced by the other. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--Substance cannot be produced by anything external\n(Cor., Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause--that is,\nits essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs\nto its nature.\n\nVIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.\n\n>>>>>Proof--There can only be one substance with an identical\nattribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.);\nits nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or\ninfinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Deff. ii.) it\nwould then be limited by something else of the same kind, which\nwould also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be two\nsubstances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop.\nv.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note I.--As finite existence involves a partial negation,\nand infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given\nnature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance\nis necessarily infinite.\n\n*****Note II.--No doubt it will be difficult for those who think\nabout things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them\nby their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of\nProp. vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the\nmodifications of substances and the substances themselves, and\nare ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence\nthey may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe\nin natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes make\ncomplete confusion--think that trees might talk just as well as\nmen--that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;\nand imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,\nalso, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,\nreadily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so\nlong as they do not know how passions originate in the mind.\nBut, if people would consider the nature of substance, they would\nhave no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this\nproposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.\nFor, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself,\nand is conceived through itself--that is, something of which the\nconception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas\nmodifications exist in something external to themselves, and a\nconception of them is formed by means of a conception of the\nthings in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas\nof non-existent modifications; for, although they may have no\nactual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their\nessence is so involved in something external to themselves that\nthey may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth\nsubstances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in\ntheir existence, because they are conceived through themselves.\nTherefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and\ndistinct--that is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is\nnot sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if\nhe said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no\nit was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if\nanyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same\nas saying that a false idea was true--in short, the height of\nabsurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the\nexistence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And\nwe can hence conclude by another process of reasoning--that there\nis but one such substance. I think that this may profitably be\ndone at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the\ndemonstration, we must premise:--\n\n+++++1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor\nexpresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From\nthis it follows that--\n\n+++++2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of\nindividuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature\nof the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle\nexpresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it\ndoes not imply any fixed number of triangles.\n\n+++++3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing\na cause why it should exist.\n\n+++++4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the\nnature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated\napart from such definition.\n\nIt therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things\nexist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of\nexactly that number, neither more nor less. For example, if\ntwenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's sake, I will\nsuppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no\npredecessors), and we want to account for the existence of these\ntwenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human\nexistence in general; we must also show why there are exactly\ntwenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be assigned\nfor the existence of each individual. Now this cause cannot be\ncontained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of\nman does not involve any consideration of the number twenty.\nConsequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men,\nand, consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be sought\nexternally to each individual. Hence we may lay down the absolute\nrule, that everything which may consist of several individuals\nmust have an external cause. And, as it has been shown already\nthat existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence\nmust necessarily be included in its definition; and from its\ndefinition alone existence must be deducible. But from its\ndefinition (as we have shown, Notes ii., iii.), we cannot infer\nthe existence of several substances; therefore it follows that\nthere is only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.\n\nIX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the\nnumber of its attributes (Def. iv.).\n\nX. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be\nconceived through itself.\n\n>>>>>Proof--An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of\nsubstance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,\ntherefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in\nfact, conceived as distinct--that is, one without the help of the\nother--yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute\ntwo entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature\nof substance that each of its attributes is conceived through\nitself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed\nsimultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;\nbut each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is,\nthen, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one\nsubstance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each\nand every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that\nits reality or being is in proportion to the number of its\nattributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.\nConsequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite\nbeing must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite\nattributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and\ninfinite essence.\n\nIf anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish\ndifferent substances, let him read the following propositions,\nwhich show that there is but one substance in the universe, and\nthat it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be\nsought in vain.\n\nXI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of\nwhich each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,\nnecessarily exists.\n\n>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God\ndoes not exist: then his essence does not involve existence.\nBut this (Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily\nexists.\n\n>>>>>Another proof--Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason\nmust be assigned, either for its existence, or for its\nnon-existence--e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must\nbe granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not\nexist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from\nexisting, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause must\neither be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be\nexternal to it. For instance, the reason for the non-existence\nof a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it\nwould involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence\nof substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its\nnature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)\n\n But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does\nnot follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order\nof universal nature in extension. From the latter it must\nfollow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is\nimpossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. It\nfollows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or\nreason be granted which prevents its existence.\n\nIf, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the\nexistence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must\ncertainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a\nreason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the\nvery nature of God, or be external to him--that is, drawn from\nanother substance of another nature. For if it were of the same\nnature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But\nsubstance of another nature could have nothing in common with God\n(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or\nto destroy his existence.\n\nAs, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine\nexistence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine\nnature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn\nfrom God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To\nmake such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and\nsupremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of\nGod, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be\nassigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God\nnecessarily exists. Q.E.D.\n\n>>>>>Another proof--The potentiality of non-existence is a\nnegation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence\nis a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily\nexists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more\npowerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously\nabsurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being\nabsolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either\nin ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see\nAx. i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely\ninfinite--in other words, God (Def. vi.)--necessarily exists.\nQ.E.D.\n\n*****Note--In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's\nexistence 'a posteriori,' so that the proof might be more easily\nfollowed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence\ndoes not follow 'a priori.' For, as the potentiality of\nexistence is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality\nincreases in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its\nstrength for existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite,\nsuch as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of\nexistence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will\nbe many who will be unable to see the force of this proof,\ninasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things\nwhich flow from external causes. Of such things, they see that\nthose which quickly come to pass--that is, quickly come into\nexistence--quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more\ndifficult of accomplishment --that is, not so easily brought into\nexistence--those things which they conceive as more complicated.\n\nHowever, to do away with this misconception, I need not here show\nthe measure of truth in the proverb, \"What comes quickly, goes\nquickly,\" nor discuss whether, from the point of view of\nuniversal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I\nneed only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which\ncome to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of\nsubstances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any\nexternal cause. Things which are produced by external causes,\nwhether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever\nperfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of\ntheir external cause; wherefore the existence of substance must\narise solely from its own nature, which is nothing else but its\nessence. Thus, the perfection of a thing does not annul its\nexistence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection, on\nthe other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot be more\ncertain of the existence of anything, than of the existence of a\nbeing absolutely infinite or perfect--that is, of God. For\ninasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves\nabsolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence\nis done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given.\nThis, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive\nreader.\n\nXII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it\nwould follow that substance can be divided.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The parts into which substance as thus conceived\nwould be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or\nthey will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part\nwill necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop vi.) self-caused, and\n(by Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so\nthat, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one\nsubstance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts\n(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and\nthe whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. X) could both exist and be\nconceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be\nabsurd. If we adopt the second alternative--namely, that the\nparts will not retain the nature of substance--then, if the\nwhole substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the\nnature of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop.\nvii.) is absurd.\n\nXIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.\n\n>>>>>Proof--If it could be divided, the parts into which it was\ndivided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite\nsubstance, or they would not. If the former, we should have\nseveral substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is\nabsurd. If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance\nabsolutely infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is\nalso absurd.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no\nattribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied\n(by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any\nsubstance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained\nby some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same\nattribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,\nbesides God no substance can be granted, or consequently be\nconceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to\nbe conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this\nproof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can be\ngranted or conceived. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--Besides God, no substance is granted or can be\nconceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which\nis in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def.\nv.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;\nwherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only\nthrough it be conceived. But substances and modes form the sum\ntotal of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing\ncan be, or be conceived. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and\nmind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have\nstrayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been\nsaid. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise\nreflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this\nthey find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body\na definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a\ncertain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate\nsuch a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile\nby other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they\nshow that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart\nfrom the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom\nthe divine nature can have been created, they are wholly\nignorant; thus they clearly show that they do not know the\nmeaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently\nclearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Cor. Prop. vi., and Note\n2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by\nanything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.)\nthat besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.\nHence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of\nthe infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain\nmore fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which\nall start from the following points:--\n\nExtended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as\nthey think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be\ninfinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. This\nthey illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or\ntwo. If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be\nconceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be\neither finite or infinite. If the former, then infinite\nsubstance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If\nthe latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another\ninfinite, which is also absurd.\n\nFurther, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths, it\nwill consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would\nequally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part\nmeasured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve\ntimes as great as the other.\n\nLastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two\ndiverging lines which at first are at a definite distance apart,\nbut are produced to infinity, it is certain that the distance\nbetween the two lines will be continually increased, until at\nlength it changes from definite to indefinable. As these\nabsurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity as\ninfinite, the conclusion is drawn that extended substance must\nnecessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain to the\nnature of God.\n\nThe second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection.\nGod, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being,\ncannot be passive; but extended substance, insofar as it is\ndivisible, is passive. It follows, therefore, that extended\nsubstance does not appertain to the essence of God.\n\nSuch are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who by\nthem try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the\ndivine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto. However, I\nthink an attentive reader will see that I have already answered\ntheir propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the\nhypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such\na hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Cor. Prop. xiii.) to\nbe absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all these\nabsurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now\ndiscussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion\nthat extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the\nnotion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that\nan infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts:\ntherefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that infinite\nquantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of finite\nparts. This is exactly what we have already proved (in Prop.\nxii.). Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in\nreality recoiled upon themselves. If, from this absurdity of\ntheirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended\nsubstance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like\na man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,\nand, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to\ndeny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to\nthe circumference are equal. For, taking extended substance,\nwhich can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible\n(Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it\nis finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can\nbe multiplied and divided.\n\nSo, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of\npoints, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be\ninfinitely divided. Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert\nthat extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it\nwould be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface\nof lines, and a line of points. This must be admitted by all who\nknow clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who\ndeny the possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substance\ncould be so divided that its parts were really separate, why\nshould not one part admit of being destroyed, the others\nremaining joined together as before? And why should all be so\nfitted into one another as to leave no vacuum? Surely in the\ncase of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one\ncan exist without the other, and can remain in its original\ncondition. As, then, there does not exist a vacuum in nature (of\nwhich anon), but all parts are bound to come together to prevent\nit, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be\ndistinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is\nsubstance cannot be divided.\n\nIf anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally so\nprone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived by\nus in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine\nit; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect.\nIf, then, we regard quantity as it is represented in our\nimagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall find\nthat it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we\nregard it as it is represented in our intellect, and conceive it\nas substance, which it is very difficult to do, we shall then, as\nI have sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, and\nindivisible. This will be plain enough to all who make a\ndistinction between the intellect and the imagination,\nespecially if it be remembered that matter is everywhere the\nsame, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as\nwe conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are\ndistinguished, not really, but modally. For instance, water, in\nso far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts\nto be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is\nextended substance; from this point of view it is neither\nseparated nor divisible. Further, water, in so far as it is\nwater, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is\nsubstance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.\n\nI think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in fact,\nfounded on the same assumption as the first--namely, that matter,\nin so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed of\nparts. Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be\nconsidered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God\n(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could\nreceive its modifications. All things, I repeat, are in God, and\nall things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the\nlaws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly\nshow) from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can in\nnowise be said that God is passive in respect to anything other\nthan himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the\ndivine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is\ngranted to be infinite and eternal. But enough of this for the\npresent.\n\nXVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an\ninfinite number of things in infinite ways--that is, all things\nwhich can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition will be clear to everyone, who\nremembers that from the given definition of any thing the\nintellect infers several properties, which really necessarily\nfollow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing\ndefined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the\ndefinition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in\nproportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more\nreality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite\nattributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite\nessence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its\nnature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which\ncan fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must\nnecessarily follow. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from\nthe necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,\nsolely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things\nabsolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved\n(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived;\nbut that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist\noutside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to\nact. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,\nand is not constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--All things which are, are in God, and must be\nconceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,\nCor. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.\nThis is our first point. Further, besides God there can be no\nsubstance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to\nGod. This is our second point. God, therefore, is the\nindwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.\n\nXIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.\n>>>>>Proof--God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)\nnecessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains\nto its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its\ndefinition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. vii.). Further,\nby the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.\niv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance--in other\nwords, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should\nbe involved in the attributes of substance. Now eternity\nappertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in\nProp. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the\nattributes, and thus all are eternal. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--This proposition is also evident from the manner in\nwhich (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is\nevident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,\nlike his essence, is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. xix. of\nmy \"Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy\"), I have proved the\neternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here\nrepeat.\n\nXX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.\n\n>>>>>Proof--God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are\neternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses\nexistence. Therefore the same attributes of God which explain\nhis eternal essence, explain at the same time his eternal\nexistence--in other words, that which constitutes God's essence\nconstitutes at the same time his existence. Wherefore God's\nexistence and God's essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the\nproposition to be denied), that something in some attribute of\nGod can follow from the absolute nature of the said attribute,\nand that at the same time it is finite, and has a conditioned\nexistence or duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in\nthe attribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed\nto be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its\nnature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,\nit is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived as\nfinite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is\nnot limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted\nthe idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);\ntherefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not\nconstituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)\nmust necessarily exist.\n\nWe have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea\nof God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally\nfollow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for\nit is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,\nthe idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if\nthe idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,\nanything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any\nexample, as the proof is of universal application) follows from\nthe necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the\nsaid thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first\npoint.\n\nFurthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the\nnature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if\nit can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the\nnature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for\ninstance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and\nlet it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be\nabout not to exist.\n\nNow thought being an attribute of God must necessarily exist\nunchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Cor. ii.); and beyond the\nlimits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the latter\nat some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist)\nthought would perforce have existed without the idea of God,\nwhich is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,\nthought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed\ntherefrom. Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or\nanything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of\nsome attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but\nthrough the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.\nBear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of\nanything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's\nabsolute nature.\n\nXXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as\nit is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as\ninfinite, through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily\nand as infinite.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of\nthe preceding one.\n\nXXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as\ninfinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature\nof some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a\nmodification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.\n\n>>>>>Proof--A mode exists in something else, through which it\nmust be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists\nsolely in God, and solely through God can be conceived. If\ntherefore a mode is conceived as necessarily existing and\ninfinite, it must necessarily be inferred or perceived through\nsome attribute of God, in so far as such attribute is conceived\nas expressing the infinity and necessity of existence, in other\nwords (Def. viii.) eternity; that is, in so far as it is\nconsidered absolutely. A mode, therefore, which necessarily\nexists as infinite, must follow from the absolute nature of some\nattribute of God, either immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the\nmeans of some modification, which follows from the absolute\nnature of the said attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which\nexists necessarily and as infinite.\n\nXXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve\nexistence.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that of\nwhich the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is\nself-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the\nessence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by\nAx. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is\nabsurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.\nQ.E.D.\n\n*****Note--This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.\nFor it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the\nessence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their\nexistence--in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,\nin the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This\nwill be made still clearer by the following corollary.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--That by which things are said to be conditioned to\nact in a particular manner is necessarily something positive\n(this is obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its\nexistence God by the necessity of his nature is the efficient\ncause (Props. xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point. Our\nsecond point is plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a\nthing, which has not been conditioned by God, could condition\nitself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this, as\nwe have shown is absurd.\n\nXXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a\nparticular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Ax. iii.\n\nXXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite\nand has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned\nto act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a\ncause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a\nconditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn\nexist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for\nexistence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and\nhas a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been\nthus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Cor.)\n\nBut that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot\nbe produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for\nwhatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of\nGod is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore,\nfollow from some attribute of God, in so far as the said\nattribute is considered as in some way modified; for substance\nand modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i. and Def.\niii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the\nattributes of God. But from God, or from any of his attributes,\nin so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite\nand eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore it\nmust follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by\nGod or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are\nmodified by some modification which is finite, and has a\nconditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this\ncause or this modification (for the reason by which we\nestablished the first part of this proof) must in its turn be\nconditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a\nconditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the\nsame reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.\nQ.E.D.\n\n*****Note--As certain things must be produced immediately by God,\nnamely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute\nnature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,\nnevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it\nfollows: 1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those\nthings immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after\nhis kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot\neither exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.\nxxiv. Cor.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote\ncause of individual things, except for the sake of\ndistinguishing these from what he immediately produces, or rather\nfrom what follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote\ncause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the\neffect. But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on\nGod, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.\n\nXXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are\nconditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the\nnecessity of the divine nature.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannot\nbe called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists\nnecessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the\ndivine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently\n(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the\ndivine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way\nconditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only the\ncause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.\nxxiv., Cor.), but also in so far as they are considered as\nconditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).\nIf they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is\nimpossible, and not contingent, that they should condition\nthemselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is\nimpossible, and not contingent, that they should render\nthemselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by\nthe necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also\nto exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing\nthat is contingent. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what\nwe should understand by nature viewed as active (natura\nnaturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say\nto explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,\nfrom what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature\nviewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,\nand is conceived through itself, or those attributes of\nsubstance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other\nwords (Prop. xiv., Cor. i., and Prop. xvii., Cor. ii.) God, in so\nfar as he is considered as a free cause.\n\nBy nature viewed as passive I understand all that which follows\nfrom the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the\nattributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of\nGod, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,\nand which without God cannot exist or be conceived.\n\nXXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function\ninfinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the\nmodifications of God, and nothing else.\n\n>>>>>Proof--A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in\nother words (obviously) that which is contained in the intellect\nin representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in\nnature (by Prop. xiv., Cor. i.) there is no substance save God,\nnor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in God,\nand cannot without God either be or be conceived. Therefore the\nintellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must\ncomprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,\nand nothing else. Q.E.D.\n\nXXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as\nwill, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive nature and\nnot to active nature.\n\n>>>>>Proof--By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute\nthought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from\nother modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)\nrequiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (by\nProp. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which\nexpresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so\nconceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be\nconceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passive\nrather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of\nthinking. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,\nadmit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:\nbut, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of\nwhat is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of\nunderstanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. For\nwe cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of\nthe act of understanding.\n\nXXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary\ncause.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like\nintellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,\nnor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause\nother than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,\nand so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must\nalso be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his\nbeing substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his\npossessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal\nessence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus, however it be\nconceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by\nwhich it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def.\nvii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or\nconstrained cause. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--All things necessarily follow from the nature of God\n(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist\nand act in a particular way (Prop. xxix). If things, therefore,\ncould have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned\nto act in a different way, so that the order of nature would\nhave been different, God's nature would also have been able to\nbe different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop.\nxi.)that different nature also would have perforce existed, and\nconsequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.\nThis (by Prop. xiv., Cor. i.) is absurd. Therefore, things\ncould not have been brought into being by God in any other\nmanner, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note I--As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at\nnoonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things\ncontingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall\nattach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the words\nnecessary and impossible.\n\nA thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or\nin respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing\nnecessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or\nfrom a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is\nsaid to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or\ndefinition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause\n is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but\na thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation\nto the imperfection of our knowledge.\n\nA thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does\nnot involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it does\nnot involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt concerning\nthe existence, because the order of causes escapes us,--such a\nthing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or\nimpossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.\n\n*****Note II--It clearly follows from what we have said, that\nthings have been brought into being by God in the highest\nperfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a\nmost perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in\nGod, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its\ncontrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just\nshown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been\nbrought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to\nGod a nature different from that, which we are bound to\nattribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect\nbeing.\n\nI do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and\nwill refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply\nbecause they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very\ndifferent from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They\nassign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also\nconvinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly\nweigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject\nsuch freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,\nbut also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is\nno need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.\nxvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,\nthat although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of\nGod, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things\ncould not have been by him created other than they are, or in a\ndifferent order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what\nour opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely\non the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. If\nit were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.\nFurther, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all\neternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be\nconvicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no\nsuch thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely\nfrom the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never\nwould have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist\nbefore his decrees, and would not exist without them. But, it\nis said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or\nhad ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature\nand her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection\nin God. But persons who say this must admit that God can change\nhis decrees. For if God had ordained any decrees concerning\nnature and her order, different from those which he has\nordained--in other words, if he had willed and conceived\nsomething different concerning nature--he would perforce have\nhad a different intellect from that which he has, and also a\ndifferent will. But if it were allowable to assign to God a\ndifferent intellect and a different will, without any change in\nhis essence or his perfection, what would there be to prevent\nhim changing the decrees which he has made concerning created\nthings, and nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect\nand will concerning things created and their order are the same,\nin respect to his essence and perfection, however they be\nconceived.\n\nFurther, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that God's\nintellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as they\nalso admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's\nessence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a\ndifferent actual intellect and a different will, his essence\nwould also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at\nfirst, if things had been brought into being by God in a\ndifferent way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and\nwill, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have\nbeen different, which is absurd.\n\nAs these things could not have been brought into being by God in\nany but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as the\ntruth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of\nGod; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to\nbelieve that God did not wish to create all the things which were\nin his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as\nhe had understood them.\n\nBut, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor\nimperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be\ncalled perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the\nwill of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought it\nabout that what is now perfection should be extreme\nimperfection, and vice versa. What is such an assertion, but\nan open declaration that God, who necessarily understands that\nwhich he wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he\nshould understand things differently from the way in which he\ndoes understand them? This (as we have just shown) is the height\nof absurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its\nemployers, as follows:--All things depend on the power of God.\nIn order that things should be different from what they are,\nGod's will would necessarily have to be different. But God's\nwill cannot be different (as we have just most clearly\ndemonstrated) from God's perfection. Therefore neither can\nthings be different. I confess, that the theory which subjects\nall things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that\nthey are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth\nthan the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all\nthings with a view of promoting what is good. For these latter\npersons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not\ndepend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,\nor which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only another\nname for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter\nabsurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first\nand only free cause of the essence of all things and also of\ntheir existence. I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting\nsuch wild theories.\n\nXXXIV. God's power is identical with his essence.\n\n>>>>>Proof--From the sole necessity of the essence of God it\nfollows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all\nthings (Prop. xvi. and Cor.). Wherefore the power of God, by\nwhich he and all things are and act, is identical with his\nessence. Q.E.D.\n\nXXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,\nnecessarily exists.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last\nProp.) be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it\nnecessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.\nQ.E.D.\n\nXXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not\nfollow.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence\nin a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Cor.); that is,\n(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given\nconditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all\nthings, therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily\nfollow. Q.E.D.\n\n APPENDIX: In the foregoing I have explained the nature and\nproperties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists,\nthat he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of\nhis own nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how\nhe is so; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that\nwithout him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly,\nthat all things are predetermined by God, not through his free\nwill or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or\ninfinite power. I have further, where occasion afforded, taken\ncare to remove the prejudices, which might impede the\ncomprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain\nmisconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave\nhindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things,\nas I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth\nwhile to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.\n\nAll such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained,\nthat all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely,\nwith an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God\nhimself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said\nthat God made all things for man, and man that he might worship\nhim). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,\nwhy it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so\nprone to adopt it?; secondly, I will point out its falsity;\nand, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices\nabout good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and\nconfusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is\nnot the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of\nthe human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a\nstarting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,\nthat all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all\nhave the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that\nthey are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first,\nthat men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of\ntheir volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their\nignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and\ndesire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for\nthat which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it\ncomes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final\ncauses of events, and when these are learned, they are content,\nas having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such\ncauses from external sources, they are compelled to turn to\nconsidering themselves, and reflecting what end would have\ninduced them personally to bring about the given event, and thus\nthey necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as\nthey find in themselves and outside themselves many means which\nassist them not a little in the search for what is useful, for\ninstance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals\nfor yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for\nbreeding fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a\nmeans for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware,\nthat they found these conveniences and did not make them, they\nthink they have cause for believing, that some other being has\nmade them for their use. As they look upon things as means, they\ncannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from the\nmeans which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they\nare bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe\nendowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted\neverything for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature\nof such rulers (having no information on the subject) in\naccordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that\nthe gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to\nbind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor.\nHence also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself,\naccording to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God,\nso that God might love him more than his fellows, and direct the\nwhole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity\nand insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into\nsuperstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this\nreason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain\nthe final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that\nnature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to\nman, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods,\nand men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result:\namong the many helps of nature they were bound to find some\nhindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c.: so they\ndeclared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at\nsome wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in\ntheir worship. Experience day by day protested and showed by\ninfinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot\nof pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their\ninveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such\ncontradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were\nignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition\nof ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning\nand start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, that\nGod's judgments far transcend human understanding. Such a\ndoctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the\nhuman race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished\nanother standard of verity in considering solely the essence and\nproperties of figures without regard to their final causes.\nThere are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides\nmathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed\nto these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge\nof the truth.\n\nI have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no\nneed to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in\nview, and that final causes are mere human figments. This, I\nthink, is already evident enough, both from the causes and\nfoundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based,\nand also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii.,\nand, in fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that\neverything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with\nthe utmost perfection. However, I will add a few remarks in\norder to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly. That\nwhich is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice\nversa: it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and\nthat which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.\nPassing over the questions of cause and priority as\nself-evident, it is plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that\nthe effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God;\nthe effect which requires for its production several\nintermediate causes is, in that respect, more imperfect. But if\nthose things which were made immediately by God were made to\nenable him to attain his end, then the things which come after,\nfor the sake of which the first were made, are necessarily the\nmost excellent of all.\n\nFurther, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:\nfor, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something\nwhich he lacks. Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw\na distinction between the object of want and the object of\nassimilation; still they confess that God made all things for\nthe sake of himself, not for the sake of creation. They are\nunable to point to anything prior to creation, except God\nhimself, as an object for which God should act, and are\ntherefore driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God\nlacked those things for whose attainment he created means, and\nfurther that he desired them.\n\nWe must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine,\nanxious to display their talent in assigning final causes, have\nimported a new method of argument in proof of their\ntheory--namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to\nignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of\nexhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a\nroof onto someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate\nby their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the\nman; for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object,\nhow could so many circumstances (and there are often many\nconcurrent circumstances) have all happened together by chance?\nPerhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts that\nthe wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way. \"But\nwhy,\" they will insist, \"was the wind blowing, and why was the\nman at that very time walking that way?\" If you again answer,\nthat the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be\nagitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and\nthat the man had been invited by a friend, they will again\ninsist: \"But why was the sea agitated, and why was the man\ninvited at that time?\" So they will pursue their questions from\ncause to cause, till at last you take refuge in the will of\nGod--in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance. So, again,\nwhen they survey the frame of the human body, they are amazed;\nand being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art,\nconclude that it has been fashioned, not mechanically, but by\ndivine and supernatural skill, and has been so put together that\none part shall not hurt another.\n\nHence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and\nstrives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,\nand not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced\nas an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the\ninterpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that,\nwith the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only\navailable means for proving and preserving their authority would\nvanish also. But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my\nthird point.\n\nAfter men persuaded themselves, that everything which is created\nis created for their sake, they were bound to consider as the\nchief quality in everything that which is most useful to\nthemselves, and to account those things the best of all which\nhave the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they were\nbound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature\nof things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,\ncold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that\nthey are free agents arose the further notions of praise and\nblame, sin and merit.\n\nI will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human\nnature; the former I will briefly explain here.\n\nEverything which conduces to health and the worship of God they\nhave called good, everything which hinders these objects they\nhave styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not understand the\nnature of things do not verify phenomena in any way, but merely\nimagine them after a fashion, and mistake their imagination for\nunderstanding, such persons firmly believe that there is an\norder in things, being really ignorant both of things and their\nown nature. When phenomena are of such a kind, that the\nimpression they make on our senses requires little effort of\nimagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say\nthat they are well-ordered; if the contrary, that they are\nill-ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easily\nimagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to\nconfusion--as though there were any order in nature, except in\nrelation to our imagination--and say that God has created all\nthings in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing\nimagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God\nforesaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it\nshould be most easily imagined. If this be their theory, they\nwould not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an\ninfinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination,\nand very many others which confound its weakness. But enough\nhas been said on this subject. The other abstract notions are\nnothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is\ndifferently affected: though they are considered by the\nignorant as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they\nbelieve that everything was created for the sake of themselves;\nand, according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,\nhealthy or rotten or corrupt. For instance, if the motion which\nobjects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,\nthe objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary motion\nbe excited, they are styled ugly.\n\nThings which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled\nfragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,\nfull-flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft,\nrough or smooth, &c.\n\nWhatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound,\nor harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic enough to\nbelieve, that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony; and\nphilosophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves, that\nthe motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony--all of\nwhich instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things\naccording to the state of his brain, or rather mistakes for\nthings the forms of his imagination. We need no longer wonder\nthat there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed,\nand finally skepticism: for, although human bodies in many\nrespects agree, yet in very many others they differ; so that what\nseems good to one seems confused to another; what is pleasing to\none displeases another, and so on. I need not further\nenumerate, because this is not the place to treat the subject at\nlength, and also because the fact is sufficiently well known.\nIt is commonly said: \"So many men, so many minds; everyone is\nwise in his own way; brains differ as completely as palates.\"\nAll of which proverbs show, that men judge of things according\nto their mental disposition, and rather imagine than understand:\nfor, if they understood phenomena, they would, as\nmathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I\nhave urged.\n\nWe have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given\nof nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate the\ntrue nature of anything, but only the constitution of the\nimagination; and, although they have names, as though they were\nentities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them\nentities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all\narguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily\nrebutted.\n\nMany argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity of\nthe absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many\nimperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt\nto the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil,\nsin, &c. But these reasoners are, as I have said, easily\nconfuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only\nfrom their own nature and power; things are not more or less\nperfect, according as they are serviceable or repugnant to\nmankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men,\nthat they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer\nbut this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation\nof every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more\nstrictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to\nsuffice for the production of everything conceivable by an\ninfinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.\n\nSuch are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if there\nare any more of the same sort, everyone may easily dissipate\nthem for himself with the aid of a little reflection.\n\n\n\n\n\nEND OF PART I","title":"Ethics \u2014 Part 1","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":13864}