{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_920/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_920","id":"gutenberg_920","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/920","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics","Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBenedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS\n(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)\n\nTranslated by R. H. M. Elwes\n\n\n\n\nPart II: ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND\n\n\n\nPREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which must\nnecessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal\nand infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in\nPart i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an\ninfinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead\nus, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind\nand its highest blessedness.\n\nDEFINITIONS I. By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in a\ncertain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he\nis considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.\nCor.)\n\nII. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that,\nwhich being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and,\nwhich being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in\nother words, that without which the thing, and which itself\nwithout the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.\n\nIII. By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed by\nthe mind as a thinking thing.\n\n>>>>>Explanation--I say 'conception' rather than perception,\nbecause the word perception seems to imply that the mind is\npassive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to\nexpress an activity of the mind.\n\nIV. By 'an adequate idea,' I mean an idea which, in so far as\nit is considered in itself, without relation to the object, has\nall the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.\n\n>>>>>Explanation--I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude that\nmark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea\nand its object (ideatum).\n\nV. 'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing.\n\n>>>>>Explanation--I say 'indefinite,' because it cannot be\ndetermined through the existence itself of the existing thing,\nor by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence\nof the thing, but does not take it away.\n\nVI. 'Reality' and 'perfection' I use as synonymous terms.\n\nVII. By 'particular things,' I mean things which are finite and\nhave a conditioned existence; but if several individual things\nconcur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect\nof one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular\nthing.\n\n AXIOMS I. The essence of man does not involve necessary\nexistence, that is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass\nthat this or that man does or does not exist.\n\nII. Man thinks.\n\nIII. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of\nthe passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same\nindividual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea\ncan exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.\n\nIV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.\n\nV. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and\nmodes of thought.\n\nN.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.\nxiii.\n\n PROPOSITIONS I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a\nthinking thing.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are\nmodes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature\nof God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Cor.). God therefore possesses the\nattribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in\nall particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.\nThought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,\nwhich express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.\nvi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that\nwe are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in\nproportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more\nthoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or\nperfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite\nnumber of things in an infinite number of ways, is,\nnecessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore,\nfrom the consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite\nbeing, thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of\nthe infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.\n\nII. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended\nthing.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of\nthe last.\n\nIII. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his\nessence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from\nhis essence.\n\n>>>>>Proof--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an\ninfinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same\nthing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,\nand of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all\nthat is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop.\nxxxv.). Therefore, such an idea as we are considering\nnecessarily is, and in God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)\n\n*****Note--The multitude understand by the power of God the free\nwill of God, and the right over all things that exist, which\nlatter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. For\nit is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to\nreduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very often\nlikened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have\nrefuted (Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Cors. i. and ii.), and we have\nshown (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity,\nas that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it\nfollows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),\nthat God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same\nnecessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We\nfurther showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is\nidentical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as\nimpossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive\nhim as non-existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I\ncould point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to\nGod is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the\nmultitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a\nnegation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same\nground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, to\nturn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part i.\nfrom Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my\nmeaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the\npower of God with the human power and right of kings.\n\nIV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things\nfollow in infinite ways, can only be one.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the\nattributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).\nNow God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Cor.). Therefore the idea\nof God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite\nways, can only be one. Q.E.D.\n\nV. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so\nfar as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he\nis unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of\nthe attributes of God and of particular things do not own as\ntheir efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things\nperceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this\nPart. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea\nof his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily\ntherefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because\nhe is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of\nideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.\nIt may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of\nideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.\nxxv., Cor.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the\nnature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore\n(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute\nof God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect\nof any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of\nideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a\nthinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nVI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so\nfar as he is considered through the attribute of which they are\nmodes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other\nattribute.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without\nany other part (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each\nattribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of\nany other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only\nin so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes\nthey are, and not in so far as he is considered through any\nother. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.\nFor the idea of everything that is caused depends on a\nknowledge of the cause, whereof it is an effect.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the last; it is\nunderstood more clearly from the preceding note.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is\nan individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes\n(by the Cor. and Note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus (by\nProp. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only as he\nis a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.) in\nso far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as\nhe is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he\nis the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and\nso on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is\n(by Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection\nof causes. Therefore of a given individual idea another\nindividual idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as\nmodified by that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God\nis the cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, and\nso on to infinity. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its\nidea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he\nis infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by\nanother idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by\nProp. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is\nthe same as the order and connection of things. The knowledge,\ntherefore, of that which takes place in any individual object\nwill be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that\nobject. Q.E.D.\n\nX. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of\nman--in other words, substance does not constitute the actual\nbeing (forma) of man.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The being of substance involves necessary existence\n(Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance\nappertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man\nwould necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,\nconsequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd (II.\nAx. i.). Therefore &c. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in\nwhich it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the\nsame nature; for as there may be many men, the being of\nsubstance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man.\nAgain, the proposition is evident from the other properties of\nsubstance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,\nimmutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--The essence of man (by the Cor. of the last Prop.) is\nconstituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely\n(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.\nAx. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is\ngiven, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior\nin nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).\nTherefore an idea is the first element constituting the human\nmind. But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.\nviii. Cor.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must\ntherefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of\nan infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must\nalways necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an\nabsurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the\nactual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually\nexisting. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,\nthe knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Cor.), in\nso far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said\nobject, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind\nof anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object\nconstituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof\nis necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of\nthe human mind; that is (by II. xi. Cor.) the knowledge of the\nsaid thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words the\nmind perceives it.\n\n*****Note--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly\nto be understood from II. vii., which see.\n\nXIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the\nbody, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually\nexists, and nothing else.\n\n>>>>>Proof--If indeed the body were not the object of the human\nmind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in\nGod (II. ix. Cor.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but\nin virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that is\n(II. xi. Cor.) the ideas of the modifications of the body would\nnot be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the idea\nof the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of the\nidea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as it\nactually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other\nobject of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as\nnothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.\nxxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,\nwhich would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but\n(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our\nmind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is\nunited to the body, but also the nature of the union between\nmind and body. However, no one will be able to grasp this\nadequately or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge\nof the nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced\nhitherto have been entirely general, applying not more to men\nthan to other individual things, all of which, though in\ndifferent degrees, are animated (animata). For of everything\nthere is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause,\nin the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus\nwhatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must\nnecessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else.\nStill, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like\nobjects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than\nanother and containing more reality, just as the object of one\nidea is more excellent than the object of another idea, and\ncontains more reality.\n\nWherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs\nfrom other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is\nnecessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of\nthe human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to\nexplain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,\nthat I should do so. I will only say generally, that in\nproportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing\nmany actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is\nthe mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for\nforming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions\nof the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies\nconcur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which\nit is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus\nrecognize the superiority of one mind over others, and may\nfurther see the cause, why we have only a very confused\nknowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which I\nwill, in the following propositions, deduce from what has been\nadvanced. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain\nand prove more strictly my present statements. In order to do\nso, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of\nbodies.\n\n---Axiom I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.\n\n---Axiom II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,\nsometimes more quickly.\n\nLemma I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of\nmotion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of\nsubstance.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The first part of this proposition is, I take it,\nself-evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect of\nsubstance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii. It is brought\nout still more clearly from I. xv., Note.\n\nLemma II. All bodies agree in certain respects.\n\n>>>>>Proof--All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the\nconception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).\nFurther, in the fact that they may be moved less or more\nquickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.\n\nLemma III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined to\nmotion or rest by another body, which other body has been\ndetermined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third\nagain by a fourth, and so on to infinity.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which\n(Lemma i.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to\nmotion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be\ndetermined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely\n(II. vi.) by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in\nmotion or at rest. And this body again can only have been set\nin motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body\nto motion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so on\nto infinity. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of\nsubstance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an\nindividual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but\nthis union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will\n(by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,\nwill retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance\nand in respect of mode. Q.E.D.\n\nLemma V. If the parts composing an individual become greater or\nless, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same\nmutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still\npreserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be\nchanged.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The same as for the last Lemma.\n\nLemma VI. If certain bodies composing an individual be compelled\nto change the motion, which they have in one direction, for\nmotion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they be\nable to continue their motions and their mutual communication in\nthe same relations as before, the individual will retain its own\nnature without any change of its actuality.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for the individual\nis supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we\nspoke of as its actual being.\n\nLemma VII. Furthermore, the individual thus composed preserves\nits nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at rest,\nwhether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as each\npart retains its motion, and preserves its communication with\nother parts as before.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the definition of an\nindividual prefixed to Lemma iv.\n\n*****Note--We thus see, how a composite individual may be\naffected in many different ways, and preserve its nature\nnotwithstanding. Thus far we have conceived an individual as\ncomposed of bodies only distinguished one from the other in\nrespect of motion and rest, speed and slowness; that is, of\nbodies of the most simple character. If, however, we now\nconceive another individual composed of several individuals of\ndiverse natures, we shall find that the number of ways in which\nit can be affected, without losing its nature, will be greatly\nmultiplied. Each of its parts would consist of several bodies,\nand therefore (by Lemma vi.) each part would admit, without\nchange to its nature, of quicker or slower motion, and would\nconsequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more\n slowly to the remaining parts. If we further conceive a third\nkind of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind,\nwe shall find that they may be affected in a still greater\nnumber of ways without changing their actuality. We may easily\nproceed thus to infinity, and conceive the whole of nature as\none individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in\ninfinite ways, without any change in the individual as a whole.\nI should feel bound to explain and demonstrate this point at\nmore length, if I were writing a special treatise on body. But\nI have already said that such is not my object; I have only\ntouched on the question, because it enables me to prove easily\nthat which I have in view.\n\nPOSTULATES I. The human body is composed of a number of\nindividual parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in\nitself extremely complex.\n\nII. Of the individual parts composing the human body some are\nfluid, some soft, some hard.\n\nIII. The individual parts composing the human body, and\nconsequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of\nways by external bodies.\n\nIV. The human body stands in need for its preservation of a\nnumber of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,\nregenerated.\n\nV. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an\nexternal body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes\nthe surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the\nimpression thereupon of the external body which impels it.\n\nVI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them in\na variety of ways.\n\nPROPOSITIONS XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a\ngreat number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is\ncapable of receiving a great number of impressions.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in\nvery many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many\nways of affecting external bodies. But (II.xii.) the human mind\nmust perceive all that takes place in the human body; the human\nmind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of\nthings, and is so in proportion, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nXV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human\nmind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The idea constituting the actual being of the human\nmind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is\ncomposed of a great number of complex individual parts. But\nthere is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part\nwhereof the body is composed (II. viii. Cor.); therefore (II.\nvii.), the idea of the human body is composed of each of these\nnumerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.\n\nXVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is\naffected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the\nhuman body, and also the nature of the external body.\n\n>>>>>Proof--All the modes, in which any given body is affected,\nfollow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the\nnature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Cor. of Lemma\niii.), wherefore their idea is also necessarily (by I, Ax. iv.)\ninvolves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of every\nmode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies,\ninvolves the nature of the human body and of the external body.\nQ.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the\nhuman body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human\nmind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body --that is\n(by the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as\nactually existing, and this idea involves the nature of the\nexternal body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Cor. i.) will\nregard the external body as actually existing, until it is\naffected, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the\nhuman body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they\nchange the surface of the last named (Post. v); hence (Ax. ii.,\nafter the Cor. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in a\ndifferent manner from that which they followed before such\nchange; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new\nsurfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be\nrefracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled\ntowards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they\nwill, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human\nbody in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again\ntake cognizance --that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again\nregard the external body as present, and will do so, as often as\nthe fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid\nsurfaces by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although\nthe external bodies, by which the human body has once been\naffected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless\nregard them as present, as often as this action of the body is\nrepeated. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,\nthat we regard as present many things which are not. It is\npossible that the same result may be brought about by other\ncauses; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one\npossible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the\ntrue cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the\ntruth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which\nrest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be\ncontroverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human\nbody, as we feel it, exists (Cor. after II. xiii.). Furthermore\n(II. vii. Cor., II. xvi. Cor. ii.), we clearly understand what is\nthe difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which\nconstitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the\nsaid Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former\ndirectly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only\nimplies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates\nrather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter,\nand, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts,\nPaul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though\nhe no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology,\nthe modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent\nexternal bodies as present to us, we will call the images of\nthings, though they do not recall the figure of things. When\nthe mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines.\nI will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate\nwhere error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at\nin themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in\nthe mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded\nas being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such\nthings as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while\nimagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the same\ntime conscious that they do not really exist, this power of\nimagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and\nnot to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend\nsolely on its own nature--that is (I. Def. vii.), if this\nfaculty of imagination be free.\n\nXVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or more\nbodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines any\nof them, it will straightway remember the others also.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The mind (II. xvii. Cor.) imagines any given body,\nbecause the human body is affected and disposed by the\nimpressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is\naffected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said\nexternal body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so\ndisposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore,\nit will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and\nthe mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the\nother. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--We now clearly see what 'Memory' is. It is simply a\ncertain association of ideas involving the nature of things\noutside the human body, which association arises in the mind\naccording to the order and association of the modifications\n(affectiones) of the human body. I say, first, it is an\nassociation of those ideas only, which involve the nature of\nthings outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the\nnature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the\nhuman body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which\ninvolve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies.\nI say, secondly, that this association arises according to the\norder and association of the modifications of the human body, in\norder to distinguish it from that association of ideas, which\narises from the order of the intellect, whereby the mind\nperceives things through their primary causes, and which is in\nall men the same. And hence we can further clearly understand,\nwhy the mind from the thought of one thing, should straightway\narrive at the thought of another thing, which has no similarity\nwith the first; for instance, from the thought of the word\n'pomum' (an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the\nthought of the fruit apple, which has no similitude with the\narticulate sound in question, nor anything in common with it,\nexcept that the body of the man has often been affected by these\ntwo things; that is, that the man has often heard the word\n'pomum,' while he was looking at the fruit; similarly every man\nwill go on from one thought to another, according as his habit\nhas ordered the images of things in his body. For a soldier,\nfor instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will\nat once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a\nhorseman, and thence to the thought of war, &c.; while a\ncountryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the\nthought of a plough, a field, &c. Thus every man will follow\nthis or that train of thought, according as he has been in the\nhabit of conjoining and associating the mental images of things\nin this or that manner.\n\nXIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not\nknow it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications\nwhereby the body is affected.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the\nhuman body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as\nhe is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing\nactually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body\nstands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,\ncontinually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas\nis the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);\nthis idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded\nas affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus\nGod has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in\nso far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so\nfar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by\nII. xi. Cor.), the human mind does not know the human body. But\nthe ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far as\nhe constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind\nperceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently (II.\nxvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing; therefore\nthe mind perceives thus far only the human body. Q.E.D.\n\nXX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God,\nfollowing in God in the same manner, and being referred to God\nin the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore\n(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of\nthought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also\nof the human mind (II. xi.). Further, this idea or knowledge of\nthe mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite,\nbut in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual\nthing (II. ix.). But (II. vii.) the order and connection of\nideas is the same as the order and connection of causes;\ntherefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is\nreferred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of\nthe body. Q.E.D.\n\nXXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way\nas the mind is united to the body.\n\n>>>>>Proof--That the mind is united to the body we have shown\nfrom the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii.\nand xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must\nbe united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same\nmanner as the mind is united to the body. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--This proposition is comprehended much more clearly\nfrom what we have said in the note to II. vii. We there showed\nthat the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II.\nxiii.), are one and the same individual conceived now under the\nattribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension;\nwherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and\nthe same thing, which is conceived under one and the same\nattribute, namely, thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and\nthe mind itself are in God by the same necessity and follow from\nhim from the same power of thinking. Strictly speaking, the\nidea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but\nthe distinctive quality (forma) of the idea in so far as it is\nconceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object;\nif a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he\nknows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows\nit, and so on to infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter.\n\nXXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the\nbody, but also the ideas of such modifications.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God\nin the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,\nas the ideas of the said modifications. This is proved in the\nsame way as II. xx. But the ideas of the modifications of the\nbody are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so\nfar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore\nthe ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the\nknowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they\nwill be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not\nonly the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such\nmodifications. Q.E.D.\n\nXXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it\nperceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows\nin God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same\nmanner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (II.\nxix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is\n (II. xi. Cor.), since the knowledge of the human body is not\nreferred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the\nhuman mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind\nreferred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the\nhuman mind; therefore (by the same Cor. II. xi.), the human mind\nthus far has no knowledge of itself. Further the ideas of the\nmodifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the nature\nof the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.), they\nagree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge of\nthese ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but (by\nthe last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human\nmind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has\nknowledge of itself. Q.E.D.\n\nXXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of\nthe parts composing the human body.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The parts composing the human body do not belong to\nthe essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate\ntheir motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def.\nafter Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as\nindividuals without relation to the human body. The parts of\nthe human body are highly complex individuals (Post. i.), whose\nparts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in\nany way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the\nlatter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after\nLemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II.\niii.) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,\ninasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another idea\nof a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the\norder of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.). We may affirm\nthe same thing of each part of each individual composing the\nhuman body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the\nhuman body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many\nideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the\nhuman body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the\nnature of the human mind (II. xiii.); therefore (II. xi. Cor.),\nthe human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the\nhuman body. Q.E.D.\n\nXXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not\ninvolve an adequate knowledge of the external body.\n\n>>>>>Proof--We have shown that the idea of a modification of the\nhuman body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as\nthat external body conditions the human body in a given manner.\nBut, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has\nno reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is\nin God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by\nthe idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior\nto the said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowledge of\nthe external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of\nthe modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of\nthe modification of the human body does not involve an adequate\nknowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.\n\nXXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body as\nactually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications\nof its own body.\n\n>>>>>Proof--If the human body is in no way affected by a given\nexternal body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human\nbody, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the\nidea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in\nany manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human\nbody is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far\n(II. xvi. and Cor.) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--When the human mind regards external bodies through\nthe ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it\nimagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine\nexternal bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by II. xxv.),\nin so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an\nadequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.\n\nXXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not\ninvolve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Every idea of a modification of the human body\ninvolves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human\nbody is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.). But\ninasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected\nin many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.\nQ.E.D.\n\nXXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so\nfar as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear\nand distinct, but confused.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The ideas of the modifications of the human body\ninvolve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies\n(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human\nbody but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes\n(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,\nconsequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (by\nII. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as\nalso of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in\nso far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in\nso far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas\nof modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human\nmind alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other\nwords, confused ideas. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--The idea which constitutes the nature of the human\nmind is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered\nin itself and alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case\nwith the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of\nthe modifications of the human body, in so far as they are\nreferred to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.\n\nXXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human\nbody does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The idea of a modification of the human body (II.\nxxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,\nin other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is\n(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind\nadequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi.) the idea of this idea does\nnot adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not\ninvolve an adequate knowledge thereof.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--The duration of our body does not depend on its\nessence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.\nxxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate\nby causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and\noperate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these\nlast again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.\nThe duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of\nnature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may\nbe constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,\nin so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as\nhe has the idea of the human body only (II. ix. Cor.).\nWherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God\nvery inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting\nthe nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Cor.), this\nknowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.\n\nXXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the\nduration of particular things external to ourselves.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Every particular thing, like the human body, must be\nconditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in\na fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must\nlikewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity (I.\nxxviii.). As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from\nthis common property of particular things, we have only a very\ninadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a\nsimilar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular\nthings, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate\nknowledge of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--All ideas which are in God agree in every respect\nwith their objects (II. ii. Cor.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they\nare all true. Q.E.D.\n\nXXXII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to\nbe called false.\n\n>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive\nmode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive\nquality of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God\n(II. xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I.\nxv.). Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes\nthem to be called false. Q.E.D.\n\nXXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and\nperfect, is true.\n\n>>>>>Proof--When we say that an idea in us is adequate and\nperfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Cor.), that the idea is\nadequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the\nessence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such\nan idea is true. Q.E.D.\n\nXXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which\ninadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.\n\n>>>>>Proof--There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them\nto be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in\nsimple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to\nbe mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for\nignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in\nthe privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or\nconfused ideas involve. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error\nconsists in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw\nmore light on the subject I will give an example. For instance,\nmen are mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is\nmade up of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of\nthe causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of\nfreedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for\ntheir actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on\nthe will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond\nthereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none\nof them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign\ndwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke\neither laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun,\nwe imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;\nthis error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact\nthat, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true\ndistance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards\nlearn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of\nthe earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be\nnear; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are\nignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of\nour body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said\nbody is affected thereby.\n\nXXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same\nnecessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.\n\n>>>>>Proof--All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they\nare referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Cor.)\nadequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,\nexcept in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and\nxxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,\nfollow by the same necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D.\n\nXXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II, above), and\nwhich is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute\nthe essence of any particular thing.\n\n>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it\nconstitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance,\nthe essence of B. Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B\neither exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.\nTherefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it\nconstitute the essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D.\n\nXXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which are\nequally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except\nadequately.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Let A be something, which is common to all bodies,\nand which is equally present in the part of any given body and\nin the whole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately.\nFor the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II.\nvii. Cor.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human\nbody, and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications\nof the human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part\nthe nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies;\nthat is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be\nadequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in\nso far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.\nTherefore the mind (II. xi. Cor.) necessarily perceives A\nadequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as\nit perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or\nany external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner.\nQ.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--If A be that, which is common to and a property of\nthe human body and external bodies, and equally present in the\nhuman body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each\nexternal body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of\nA in God (II. vii. Cor.), both in so far as he has the idea of\nthe human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given\nexternal bodies. Let it now be granted, that the human body is\naffected by an external body through that, which it has in common\ntherewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involve\nthe property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Cor.) the\nidea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property\nA, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the\nidea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he\nconstitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.\nCor.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident. For when we say\nthat an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are\ntherein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Cor.), that an\nidea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not in\nso far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the\nideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as he\nconstitutes the essence of the human mind.\n\n*****Note I--I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,\nwhich are common to all men, and which form the basis of our\nratiocinations. But there are other causes of certain axioms or\nnotions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this\nmethod of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more\nuseful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at\nall. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all\nmen, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who\nare unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which\nare ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notions\ncalled \"secondary\" derived their origin, and consequently the\naxioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest\nconnected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over\nthe subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another\ntreatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by\ntoo great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit\nanything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the\ncauses, whence are derived the terms styled \"transcendental,\"\nsuch as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the\nfact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of\ndistinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is\nI explained in the II. xvii. note) within itself at the same\ntime; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be\nconfused; if this number of images, of which the body is capable\nof forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all\nwill become entirely confused one with another. This being so,\nit is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Cor., and xviii.) that the\nhuman mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously,\nas its body can form images simultaneously. When the images\nbecome quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all\nbodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend\nthem, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the\nattribute of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn\nfrom the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from\nother analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here;\nfor the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to\nconsider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms\nrepresent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar\ncauses arise those notions, which we call \"general,\" such as\nman, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so\nmany images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in\nthe human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not\nindeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of\nsmall differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.)\nand their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in\nwhich all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by\nthem, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said\nindividuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by\nthe name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of\nparticular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to\nimagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however,\nbear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all\nmen in the same way, but vary in each individual according as\nthe point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected\nand which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For\ninstance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the\nstature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of\nerect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some\nother attribute, will form a different general image of man, for\ninstance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal\nwithout feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,\neveryone will form general images of things according to the\nhabit of his body.\n\nIt is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who\nseek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of\nthem, so many controversies should have arisen.\n\n*****Note II--From all that has been said above it is clear, that\nwe, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1.)\nFrom particular things represented to our intellect\nfragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses\n(II. xxix. Cor.); I have settled to call such perceptions by the\nname of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.)\nFrom symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard\ncertain words we remember things and form certain ideas\nconcerning them, similar to those through which we imagine\nthings (II. xviii. Note). I shall call both these ways of\nregarding things \"knowledge of the first kind,\" \"opinion,\" or\n\"imagination.\" (3.) From the fact that we have notions common\nto all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II.\nxxxviii. Cor., xxxix. and Cor., and xl.); this I call \"reason\"\nand \"knowledge of the second kind.\" Besides these two kinds of\nknowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of\nknowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge\nproceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of\ncertain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the\nessence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of\nknowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for\nfinding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is\nto the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second\nby the third, and divide the product by the first; either\nbecause they have not forgotten the rule which they received\nfrom a master without any proof, or because they have often made\ntrial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of\nthe nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid,\nnamely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.\n\nBut with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For\ninstance, one, two, three being given, everyone can see that the\nfourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because\nwe infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the\nratio, which the first bears to the second.\n\nXLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity,\nknowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.\n\n>>>>>Proof--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the\nforegoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate\nand confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only\nsource of falsity (II. xxxv.). Furthermore, we assigned to the\nsecond and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are\nadequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.\nxxxiv.). Q.E.D.\n\nXLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of\nthe first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the\nfalse.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident. He, who knows how\nto distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate\nidea of true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must\nknow the true and the false by the second or third kind of\nknowledge.\n\nXLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has\na true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing\nperceived.\n\n>>>>>Proof--A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in\nGod, in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the\nhuman mind (II. xi. Cor.). Let us suppose that there is in God,\nin so far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate\nidea, A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God,\nand be referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II.\nxx., whereof the proof is of universal application). But the\nidea A is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is\ndisplayed through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the\nidea A must be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by\nII. xi. Cor.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the\nmind, which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an\nadequate idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the\nsame time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his\nknowledge; that is, obviously, he must be assured. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by\nthe idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing\nproposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a\ntrue idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest\ncertainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression\nfor knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one,\nindeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is\nsomething lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of\nthinking--namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I\nask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do first\nunderstand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of\na thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what\ncan there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a\nstandard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and\ndarkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.\n\nI think I have thus sufficiently answered these\nquestions--namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false\nidea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a\ntrue idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea\n(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);\nconsequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any\nadvantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes\nit that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure,\nthat he has ideas which agree with their objects? These\nquestions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently\nanswered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea\nis plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is\nrelated to the latter as being is to not-being. The causes of\nfalsity I have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv.\nwith the note. From what is there stated, the difference\nbetween a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false\nideas, is made apparent. As for the last question--as to how a\nman can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects,\nI have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his\nknowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which\ncorresponds with its object--in other words, that truth is its\nown standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it\nperceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God\n(II. xi. Cor.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the\nmind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.\n\nXLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as\ncontingent, but as necessary.\n\n>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things\ntruly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in\nthemselves--that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as\nnecessary. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not\nas contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives\nthis necessity of things (II. xli.) truly--that is (I. Ax. vi.),\nas it is in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is\nthe very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it\nis in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of\neternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions\n(II. xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which\n(II. xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular\nthing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to\ntime, under a certain form of eternity.\n\nXLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing\nactually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite\nessence of God.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The idea of a particular thing actually existing\nnecessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the\nsaid thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot be\nconceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they\nhave God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the\nattribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas\nmust necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the\nattributes of those ideas--that is (I. vi.), the eternal and\ninfinite essence of God. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is,\nexistence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a\ncertain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of\nexistence, which is assigned to particular things, because they\nfollow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal\nnecessity of God's nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat,\nof the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are\nin God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by\nanother particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force\nwhereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from\nthe eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Cor.).\n\nXLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God\nwhich every idea involves is adequate and perfect.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The proof of the last proposition is universal; and\nwhether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea\nthereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),\nwill involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore,\nthat, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence\nof God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the\nwhole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.\n Q.E.D.\n\nXLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal\nand infinite essence of God.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.\nxxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and\nexternal bodies (II. xvi. Cor. i. and II. xvii.) as actually\nexisting; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate\nknowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the\neternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God,\nand are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer\nmany things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that\nthird kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II.\nxl., and of the excellence and use of which we shall have\noccasion to speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge\nof God as they have of general notions, because they are unable\nto imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have\nassociated the name God with images of things that they are in\nthe habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing,\nbeing, as they are, men, and continually affected by external\nbodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head,\nnamely, that we do not apply names to things rightly. For\ninstance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre\nof a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all\nevents, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different\nfrom that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make\nmistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their\nmind, and another on the paper. If we could see into their\nminds, they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because\nwe think, that they have the same numbers in their mind as they\nhave on the paper. If this were not so, we should not believe\nthem to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in\nerror, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had\nflown into a neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me\nsufficiently clear. Very many controversies have arisen from the\nfact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not\nrightly interpret the meaning of others. For, as a matter of\nfact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one\nside, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the\nopinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their\nopponents.\n\nXLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the\nmind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has\nalso been determined by another cause, and this last by another\ncause, and so on to infinity.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.\nxi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.\nxvii. Cor. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute\nfaculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it\nmust be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by\nanother cause, and this last by another, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the\nmind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.\nWhence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either\nentirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,\nsuch as we are accustomed to put together from particular\nthings. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same\nrelation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as\n\"lapidity\" to this or that stone, or as \"man\" to Peter and\nPaul. The cause which leads men to consider themselves free has\nbeen set forth in the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed\nfurther, I would here remark that, by the will to affirm and\ndecide, I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat,\nthe faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or\nfalse, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns\naway from any given thing. After we have proved, that these\nfaculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be\ndistinguished from the particular instances on which they are\nbased, we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything\nbesides the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether\nthere is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that,\nwhich the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves. On which\nsubject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest\nthe idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by ideas I do\nnot mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in\nthe midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.\n\nXLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and\nnegation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,\ninvolves.\n\n>>>>>Proof--There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive\nor negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely,\nthis or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us\nconceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking\nwhereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a\ntriangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation\ninvolves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without\nthe idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same\nthing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as\nit is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further,\nthis affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea\nof a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor\nbe conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea\nof a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that\nits three interior angles are equal to two right angles.\nWherefore, and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be\nnor be conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this\naffirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle,\nand is nothing besides. What we have said of this volition\n(inasmuch as we have selected it at random) may be said of any\nother volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--Will and understanding are nothing beyond the\nindividual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But a\nparticular volition and a particular idea are one and the same\n(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are\none and the same. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--We have thus removed the cause which is commonly\nassigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity\nconsists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas\nwhich are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea,\ninasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we\nsay, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he\nhas no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,\nbut only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what\nis false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause\nhis imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, although\nthe man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never\nsay that he is certain. For by certainty we mean something\npositive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.\n\nHowever, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully\nexplained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and\nI will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced\nagainst our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,\nI have thought it worth while to point out some of the\nadvantages, which follow therefrom. I say \"some,\" for they will\nbe better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth\npart.\n\nI begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make\nan accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of the\nmind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is further\nnecessary that they should distinguish between idea and words,\nwhereby we signify things. These three--namely, images, words,\nand ideas--are by many persons either entirely confused\ntogether, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,\nand hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely\nnecessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for\nphilosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those\nwho think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by\ncontact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas\nof those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not\nideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of\nour will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate\npictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not\nsee that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an\naffirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with\nideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think\nthat they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm,\nor deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one,\nwho reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in\nno wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore\nclearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does\nnot consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence\nof words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in\nno wise involve the conception of thought.\n\nThese few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore\npass on to consider the objections, which may be raised against\nour doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those, who\nthink that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and\nthat therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for their\nholding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the\nunderstanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an\nincrease in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or\nnegation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we\ndo not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their\nfaculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from\nthe intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.\nSecondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us\nespecially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment\nbefore assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed\nby the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he\nperceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or\ndissents.\n\nFor instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore\nadmit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived,\nunless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist.\nNothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience,\nthan that the will or faculty of assent is free and different\nfrom the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be objected\nthat one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality\nthan another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for\naffirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for\naffirming, that what is false is true. We have, however, seen\nthat one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for\nas objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the\nideas of them some more excellent than others; this also seems\nto point to a difference between the understanding and the will.\nFourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free\nwill, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally\nbalanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish of\nhunger and thirst? If I say that he would not, he would then\ndetermine his own action, and would consequently possess the\nfaculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections\nmight also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence\neverything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the\ntask of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as\npossible.\n\nTo the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a\nwider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be\nmeant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will\nhas a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of\nforming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition\nshould be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:\nfor, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an\ninfinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot\naffirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by\nthe same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an\ninfinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an\ninfinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,\nthat we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,\nconsequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be\nurged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive\nthem, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of\nperception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have\nalready. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring\nit about that we should understand an infinite number of other\nentities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater\nunderstanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that\nwhich we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.\nWe have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby\nwe explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which\nis common to all such volitions.\n\nAs, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or\nuniversal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be\nwondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself\ninto the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for\nwhat is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an\ninfinite number of individuals.\n\nTo the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free\npower of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyone\nsuspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does\nnot perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of\njudgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not\nfree will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a\nboy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else. Inasmuch as\nthis imagination involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii.\nCor.), and the boy does not perceive anything which would\nexclude the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard\nthe horse as present: he will not be able to doubt of its\nexistence, although he be not certain thereof. We have daily\nexperience of such a state of things in dreams; and I do not\nsuppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he\nis dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment\nconcerning the things in his dream, and bringing it about that\nhe should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees;\nyet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend\nour judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.\n\nFurther, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual\nperception extends--that is, I grant that the mind's\nimaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.\nxvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of\nperception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of\na winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the\nmind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would\nregard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons\nfor doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless\nthe imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which\nprecludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind\nperceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is\ninadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the\nexistence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on\nthe subject.\n\nI think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection,\nnamely, that the will is something universal which is predicated\nof all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is common to\nall ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must,\ntherefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be\nin every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all,\nnot in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's\nessence: for, in this respect, particular affirmations differ\none from the other, as much as do ideas. For instance, the\naffirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from\nthat which involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea\nof a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.\n\nFurther, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal power\nof thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and to\naffirm that that which is false is true. These two\naffirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to\none another as being and not-being; for there is nothing\npositive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of\nfalsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).\n\nWe must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when we\nconfuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason\nand abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, I\nam quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium\ndescribed (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,\na certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from\nhim) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such\n an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I\nanswer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should\nbe considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider\nchildren, fools, madmen, &c.\n\nIt remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this\ndoctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered\nfrom what has been said. The doctrine is good,\n\n1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the\ndecree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so\nmuch the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and\nmore understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely\ntranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest\nhappiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of\nGod, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid\nus. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true\nestimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God\nwith high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as\nfor having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the\nservice of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.\n\n2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves\nwith respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not\nin our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows\nus, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns\nwith an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the\neternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from\nthe essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two\nright angles.\n\n3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to\nhate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be\nangry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be\ncontent with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any\nwomanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the\nguidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand,\nas I will show in Part III.\n\n4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the\ncommonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and\nled, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do\nwhatsoever things are best.\n\nI have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this\nnote, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a\nclose. I think I have therein explained the nature and\nproperties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,\nconsidering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient\nclearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many\nexcellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary\nto be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.\n\n\n\n\n\nEND OF PART II","title":"Ethics \u2014 Part 2","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":18057}