{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_9306/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_9306","id":"gutenberg_9306","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/9306","summary":null,"tags":["Aesthetics","Category: Art","Category: Language & Communication","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Language and languages -- Philosophy","Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by Charles Aldarondo, Tiffany Vergon, Beth Trapaga\nand PG Distributed Proofreaders\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAESTHETIC AS SCIENCE OF EXPRESSION\n\nAND GENERAL LINGUISTIC\n\n\nTRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN OF BENEDETTO CROCE\n\n\nBY\n\nDOUGLAS AINSLIE\nB.A. (OXON.)\n\n\n1909\n\n\nTHE AESTHETIC IS DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR TO THE MEMORY OF HIS PARENTS\nPASQUALE AND LUISA SIPARI AND OF HIS SISTER MARIA\n\n\nNOTE\n\nI give here a close translation of the complete _Theory of Aesthetic_,\nand in the Historical Summary, with the consent of the author, an\nabbreviation of the historical portion of the original work.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nTHEORY\n\nI\nINTUITION AND EXPRESSION\n\nIntuitive knowledge--Its independence in respect to the intellect--\nIntuition and perception--Intuition and the concepts of space and\ntime--Intuition and sensation--Intuition and association--Intuition\nand representation--Intuition and expression--Illusions as to their\ndifference--Identity of intuition and expression.\n\nII\nINTUITION AND ART\n\nCorollaries and explanations--Identity of art and of intuitive knowledge--\nNo specific difference--No difference of intensity--Difference extensive\nand empirical--Artistic genius--Content and form in Aesthetic--Critique\nof the imitation of nature and of the artistic illusion--Critique of art\nconceived as a sentimental, not a theoretic fact--The origin of Aesthetic,\nand sentiment--Critique of the theory of Aesthetic senses--Unity and\nindivisibility of the work of art--Art as deliverer.\n\nIII\nART AND PHILOSOPHY\n\nIndissolubility of intellective and of intuitive knowledge--Critique\nof the negations of this thesis--Art and science--Content and form:\nanother meaning. Prose and poetry--The relation of first and second\ndegree--Inexistence of other cognoscitive forms--Historicity--Identity\nand difference in respect of art--Historical criticism--Historical\nscepticism--Philosophy as perfect science. The so-called natural\nsciences, and their limits--The phenomenon and the noumenon.\n\nIV\nHISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN AESTHETIC\n\nCritique of the verisimilar and of naturalism--Critique of ideas in\nart, of art as thesis, and of the typical--Critique of the symbol and\nof the allegory--Critique of the theory of artistic and literary\ncategories--Errors derived from this theory in judgments on art--\nEmpirical meaning of the divisions of the categories.\n\nV\nANALOGOUS ERRORS IN HISTORY AND IN LOGIC\n\nCritique of the philosophy of History--Aesthetic invasions of Logic--\nLogic in its essence--Distinction between logical and non-logical\njudgments--The syllogism--False Logic and true Aesthetic--Logic\nreformed.\n\nVI\nTHEORETIC AND PRACTICAL ACTIVITY\n\nThe will--The will as ulterior grade in respect of knowledge--Objections\nand explanations--Critique of practical judgments or judgments of\nvalue--Exclusion of the practical from the aesthetic--Critique of\nthe theory of the end of art and of the choice of content--Practical\ninnocence of art--Independence of art--Critique of the saying: the\nstyle is the man--Critique of the concept of sincerity in art.\n\nVII\nANALOGY BETWEEN THE THEORETIC AND THE PRACTICAL\n\nThe two forms of practical activity--The economically useful--\nDistinction between the useful and the technical--Distinction between\nthe useful and the egoistic--Economic and moral volition--Pure\neconomicity--The economic side of morality--The merely economical and\nthe error of the morally indifferent--Critique of utilitarianism and\nthe reform of Ethic and of Economic--Phenomenon and noumenon in\npractical activity.\n\nVIII\nEXCLUSION OF OTHER SPIRITUAL FORMS\n\nThe system of the spirit--The forms of genius--Inexistence of a fifth\nform of activity--Law; sociality--Religiosity--Metaphysic--Mental\nimagination and the intuitive intellect--Mystical Aesthetic--Mortality\nand immortality of art.\n\nIX\nINDIVISIBILITY OF EXPRESSION INTO MODES OR GRADES AND CRITIQUE OF\nRHETORIC\n\nThe characteristics of art--Inexistence of modes of expression--\nImpossibility of translations--Critique of rhetorical categories--\nEmpirical meaning of rhetorical categories--Their use as synonyms\nof the aesthetic fact--Their use as indicating various aesthetic\nimperfections--Their use as transcending the aesthetic fact, and\nin the service of science--Rhetoric in schools--Similarities of\nexpressions--Relative possibility of translations.\n\nX\nAESTHETIC SENTIMENTS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE\nUGLY\n\nVarious meanings of the word sentiment--Sentiment as activity--\nIdentification of sentiment with economic activity--Critique of\nhedonism--Sentiment as concomitant of every form of activity--Meaning\nof certain ordinary distinctions of sentiments--Value and disvalue:\nthe contraries and their union--The beautiful as the value of expression,\nor expression without adjunct--The ugly and the elements of beauty that\nconstitute it--Illusion that there exist expressions neither beautiful\nnor ugly--Proper aesthetic sentiments and concomitant and accidental\nsentiments--Critique of apparent sentiments.\n\nXI\nCRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC HEDONISM\n\nCritique of the beautiful as what pleases the superior senses--Critique\nof the theory of play--Critique of the theory of sexuality and of the\ntriumph--Critique of the Aesthetic of the sympathetic--Meaning in it of\ncontent and of form--Aesthetic hedonism and moralism--The rigoristic\nnegation, and the pedagogic negation of art--Critique of pure beauty.\n\nXII\nTHE AESTHETIC OF THE SYMPATHETIC AND PSEUDO-AESTHETIC CONCEPTS\n\nPseudo-aesthetic concepts, and the Aesthetic of the sympathetic--\nCritique of the theory of the ugly in art and of its surmounting--\nPseudo-aesthetic concepts appertain to Psychology--Impossibility of\nrigorous definitions of these--Examples: definitions of the sublime,\nof the comic, of the humorous--Relation between those concepts and\naesthetic concepts.\n\nXIII\nTHE SO-CALLED PHYSICALLY BEAUTIFUL IN NATURE AND IN ART\n\nAesthetic activity and physical concepts--Expression in the aesthetic\nsense, and expression in the naturalistic sense--Intuitions and\nmemory--The production of aids to memory--The physically beautiful--\nContent and form: another meaning--Natural beauty and artificial\nbeauty--Mixed beauty--Writings--The beautiful that is free and that\nwhich is not free--Critique of the beautiful that is not free--\nStimulants of production.\n\nXIV\nERRORS ARISING FROM THE CONFUSION BETWEEN PHYSIC AND AESTHETIC\n\nCritique of aesthetic associationism--Critique of aesthetic physic--\nCritique of the theory of the beauty of the human body--Critique of\nthe beauty of geometrical figures--Critique of another aspect of the\nimitation of nature--Critique of the theory of the elementary forms of\nthe beautiful--Critique of the search for the objective conditions of\nthe beautiful--The astrology of Aesthetic.\n\nXV\nTHE ACTIVITY OF EXTERNALIZATION. TECHNIQUE AND THE THEORY OF THE ARTS\n\nThe practical activity of externalization--The technique of\nexternalization--Technical theories of single arts--Critique of the\nclassifications of the arts--Relation of the activity of externalization\nwith utility and morality.\n\nXVI\nTASTE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ART\n\nAesthetic judgment. Its identity with aesthetic reproduction--\nImpossibility of divergences--Identity of taste and genius--Analogy\nwith the other activities--Critique of absolutism (intellectualism) and\nof aesthetic relativism--Critique of relative relativism--Objections\nfounded on the variation of the stimulus and of the psychic disposition--\nCritique of the distinction of signs as natural and conventional--The\nsurmounting of variety--Restorations and historical interpretation.\n\nXVII\nTHE HISTORY OF LITERATURE AND OF ART\n\nHistorical criticism in literature and art. Its importance--Artistic and\nliterary history. Its distinction from historical criticism and from the\naesthetic judgment--The method of artistic and literary history--Critique\nof the problem of the origin of art--The criterion of progress and\nhistory--Inexistence of a single line of progress in artistic and\nliterary history--Errors in respect of this law--Other meanings of\nthe word \"progress\" in relation to Aesthetic.\n\nXVIII\nCONCLUSION: IDENTITY OF LINGUISTIC AND AESTHETIC\n\nSummary of the inquiry--Identity of Linguistic with Aesthetic--\nAesthetic formulation of linguistic problems. Nature of language--\nOrigin of language and its development--Relation between Grammatic\nand Logic--Grammatical categories or parts of speech--Individuality\nof speech and the classification of languages--Impossibility of a\nnormative Grammatic--Didactic organisms--Elementary linguistic\nelements, or roots--The aesthetic judgment and the model language--\nConclusion.\n\nHISTORICAL SUMMARY\n\nAesthetic ideas in Graeco-Roman antiquity--In the Middle Age and\n at the Renaissance--Fermentation of thought in the seventeenth\ncentury--Aesthetic ideas in Cartesianism, Leibnitzianism, and in\nthe \"Aesthetic\" of Baumgarten--G.B. Vico--Aesthetic doctrines in\nthe eighteenth century--Emmanuel Kant--The Aesthetic of Idealism\nwith Schiller and Hegel--Schopenhauer and Herbart--Friedrich\nSchleiermacher--The philosophy of language with Humboldt and\nSteinthal--Aesthetic in France, England, and Italy during the first\nhalf of the nineteenth century--Francesco de Sanctis--The Aesthetic\nof the epigoni--Positivism and aesthetic naturalism--Aesthetic\npsychologism and other recent tendencies--Glance at the history\nof certain particular doctrines--Conclusion.\n\nAPPENDIX\n\nTranslation of the lecture on Pure Intuition and the lyrical nature of\nart, delivered by Benedetto Croce before the International Congress of\nPhilosophy at Heidelberg.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThere are always Americas to be discovered: the most interesting in\nEurope.\n\nI can lay no claim to having discovered an America, but I do claim to\nhave discovered a Columbus. His name is Benedetto Croce, and he dwells\non the shores of the Mediterranean, at Naples, city of the antique\nParthenope.\n\nCroce's America cannot be expressed in geographical terms. It is more\nimportant than any space of mountain and river, of forest and dale. It\nbelongs to the kingdom of the spirit, and has many provinces. That\nprovince which most interests me, I have striven in the following pages\nto annex to the possessions of the Anglo-Saxon race; an act which cannot\nbe blamed as predatory, since it may be said of philosophy more truly\nthan of love, that \"to divide is not to take away.\"\n\nThe Historical Summary will show how many a brave adventurer has\nnavigated the perilous seas of speculation upon Art, how Aristotle's\nmarvellous insight gave him glimpses of its beauty, how Plato threw away\nits golden fruit, how Baumgarten sounded the depth of its waters, Kant\nsailed along its coast without landing, and Vico hoisted the Italian\nflag upon its shore.\n\nBut Benedetto Croce has been the first thoroughly to explore it, cutting\nhis way inland through the tangled undergrowth of imperfect thought. He\nhas measured its length and breadth, marked out and described its\nspiritual features with minute accuracy. The country thus won to\nphilosophy will always bear his name, _Estetica di Croce_, a new\nAmerica.\n\nIt was at Naples, in the winter of 1907, that I first saw the Philosopher\nof Aesthetic. Benedetto Croce, although born in the Abruzzi, Province of\nAquila (1866), is essentially a Neapolitan, and rarely remains long absent\nfrom the city, on the shore of that magical sea, where once Ulysses\nsailed, and where sometimes yet (near Amalfi) we may hear the Syrens sing\ntheir song. But more wonderful than the song of any Syren seems to me the\nTheory of Aesthetic as the Science of Expression, and that is why I have\novercome the obstacles that stood between me and the giving of this\ntheory, which in my belief is the truth, to the English-speaking world.\n\nNo one could have been further removed than myself, as I turned over at\nNaples the pages of _La Critica_, from any idea that I was nearing the\nsolution of the problem of Art. All my youth it had haunted me. As an\nundergraduate at Oxford I had caught the exquisite cadence of Walter\nPater's speech, as it came from his very lips, or rose like the perfume\nof some exotic flower from the ribbed pages of the _Renaissance_.\n\nSeeming to solve the riddle of the Sphinx, he solved it not--only\ndelighted with pure pleasure of poetry and of subtle thought as he led\none along the pathways of his Enchanted Garden, where I shall always\nlove to tread.\n\nOscar Wilde, too, I had often heard at his best, the most brilliant\ntalker of our time, his wit flashing in the spring sunlight of Oxford\nluncheon-parties as now in his beautiful writings, like the jewelled\nrapier of Mercutio. But his works, too, will be searched in vain by the\nseeker after definite aesthetic truth.\n\nWith A.C. Swinburne I had sat and watched the lava that yet flowed from\nthose lips that were kissed in youth by all the Muses. Neither from him\nnor from J.M. Whistler's brilliant aphorisms on art could be gathered\nanything more than the exquisite pleasure of the moment: the\n_monochronos haedonae_. Of the great pedagogues, I had known, but never\nsat at the feet of Jowett, whom I found far less inspiring than any of\nthe great men above mentioned. Among the dead, I had studied Herbert\nSpencer and Matthew Arnold, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Guyau: I had\nconversed with that living Neo-Latin, Anatole France, the modern\nRousseau, and had enjoyed the marvellous irony and eloquence of his\nwritings, which, while they delight the society in which he lives, may\nwell be one of the causes that lead to its eventual destruction.\n\nThe solution of the problem of Aesthetic is not in the gift of the Muses.\n\nTo return to Naples. As I looked over those pages of the bound volumes\nof _La Critica_. I soon became aware that I was in the presence of a\nmind far above the ordinary level of literary criticism. The profound\nstudies of Carducci, of d'Annunzio, and of Pascoli (to name but three),\nin which those writers passed before me in all their strength and in all\ntheir weakness, led me to devote several days to the _Critica_. At the\nend of that time I was convinced that I had made a discovery, and wrote\nto the philosopher, who owns and edits that journal.\n\nIn response to his invitation, I made my way, on a sunny day in November,\npast the little shops of the coral-vendors that surround, like a\nnecklace, the Rione de la Bellezza, and wound zigzag along the\nover-crowded Toledo. I knew that Signor Croce lived in the old part of\nthe town, but had hardly anticipated so remarkable a change as I\nexperienced on passing beneath the great archway and finding myself in\nold Naples. This has already been described elsewhere, and I will not\nhere dilate upon this world within a world, having so much of greater\ninterest to tell in a brief space. I will merely say that the costumes\nhere seemed more picturesque, the dark eyes flashed more dangerously\nthan elsewhere, there was a quaint life, an animation about the streets,\ndifferent from anything I had known before. As I climbed the lofty stone\nsteps of the Palazzo to the floor where dwells the philosopher of\nAesthetic I felt as though I had stumbled into the eighteenth century\nand were calling on Giambattista Vico. After a brief inspection by a\nyoung man with the appearance of a secretary, I was told that I was\nexpected, and admitted into a small room opening out of the hall.\nThence, after a few moments' waiting, I was led into a much larger room.\nThe walls were lined all round with bookcases, barred and numbered,\nfilled with volumes forming part of the philosopher's great library. I\nhad not long to wait. A door opened behind me on my left, and a rather\nshort, thick-set man advanced to greet me, and pronouncing my name at\nthe same time with a slight foreign accent, asked me to be seated beside\nhim. After the interchange of a few brief formulae of politeness in\nFrench, our conversation was carried on in Italian, and I had a better\nopportunity of studying my host's air and manner. His hands he held\nclasped before him, but frequently released them, to make those vivid\ngestures with which Neapolitans frequently clinch their phrase. His most\nremarkable feature was his eyes, of a greenish grey: extraordinary eyes,\nnot for beauty, but for their fathomless depth, and for the sympathy\nwhich one felt welling up in them from the soul beneath. This was\nespecially noticeable as our conversation fell upon the question of Art\nand upon the many problems bound up with it. I do not know how long that\nfirst interview lasted, but it seemed a few minutes only, during which\nwas displayed before me a vast panorama of unknown height and headland,\nof league upon league of forest, with its bright-winged birds of thought\nflying from tree to tree down the long avenues into the dim blue vistas\nof the unknown.\n\nI returned with my brain awhirl, as though I had been in fairyland, and\nwhen I looked at the second edition of the _Estetica_, with his\ninscription, I was sure of it.\n\nThese lines will suffice to show how the translation of the _Estetica_\noriginated from the acquaintance thus formed, which has developed into\nfriendship. I will now make brief mention of Benedetto Croce's other\nwork, especially in so far as it throws light upon the _Aesthetic_.\nFor this purpose, besides articles in Italian and German reviews, I\nhave made use of the excellent monograph on the philosopher, by G.\nPrezzolini.[1]\n\nFirst, then, it will be well to point out that the _Aesthetic_ forms\npart of a complete philosophical system, to which the author gives the\ngeneral title of \"Philosophy of the Spirit.\" The _Aesthetic_ is the\nfirst of the three volumes. The second is the _Logic_, the third the\n_Philosophy of the Practical_.\n\nIn the _Logic_, as elsewhere in the system, Croce combats that false\nconception, by which natural science, in the shape of psychology, makes\nclaim to philosophy, and formal logic to absolute value. The thesis of\nthe _pure concept_ cannot be discussed here. It is connected with the\nlogic of evolution as discovered by Hegel, and is the only logic which\ncontains in itself the interpretation and the continuity of reality.\nBergson in his _L'Evolution Cr\u00e9atrice_ deals with logic in a somewhat\nsimilar manner. I recently heard him lecture on the distinction between\nspirit and matter at the Coll\u00e8ge de France, and those who read French\nand Italian will find that both Croce's _Logic_ and the book above\nmentioned by the French philosopher will amply repay their labour. The\nconception of nature as something lying outside the spirit which informs\nit, as the non-being which aspires to being, underlies all Croce's\nthought, and we find constant reference to it throughout his\nphilosophical system.\n\nWith regard to the third volume, the _Philosophy of the Practical_, it\nis impossible here to give more than a hint of its treasures. I merely\nrefer in passing to the treatment of the will, which is posited as a\nunity _inseparable from the volitional act_. For Croce there is no\ndifference between action and intention, means and end: they are one\nthing, inseparable as the intuition-expression of Aesthetic. The\n_Philosophy of the Practical_ is a logic and science of the will, not a\nnormative science. Just as in Aesthetic the individuality of expression\nmade models and rules impossible, so in practical life the individuality\nof action removes the possibility of catalogues of virtues, of the exact\napplication of laws, of the existence of practical judgments and\njudgments of value _previous to action_.\n\nThe reader will probably ask here: But what, then, becomes of morality?\nThe question will be found answered in the _Theory of Aesthetic_, and I\nwill merely say here that Croce's thesis of the _double degree_ of the\npractical activity, economic and moral, is one of the greatest\ncontributions to modern thought. Just as it is proved in the _Theory of\nAesthetic_ that the _concept_ depends upon the _intuition_, which is the\nfirst degree, the primary and indispensable thing, so it is proved in\nthe _Philosophy of the Practical_ that _Morality_ or _Ethic_ depends\nupon _Economic_, which is the _first_ degree of the practical activity.\nThe volitional act is _always economic_, but true freedom of the will\nexists and consists in conforming not merely to economic, but to moral\nconditions, to the human spirit, which is greater than any individual.\nHere we are face to face with the ethics of Christianity, to which Croce\naccords all honour.\n\nThis Philosophy of the Spirit is symptomatic of the happy reaction of\nthe twentieth century against the crude materialism of the second half\nof the nineteenth. It is the spirit which gives to the work of art its\nvalue, not this or that method of arrangement, this or that tint or\ncadence, which can always be copied by skilful plagiarists: not so the\n_spirit_ of the creator. In England we hear too much of (natural)\nscience, which has usurped the very name of Philosophy. The natural\nsciences are very well in their place, but discoveries such as aviation\nare of infinitely less importance to the race than the smallest addition\nto the philosophy of the spirit. Empirical science, with the collusion\nof positivism, has stolen the cloak of philosophy and must be made to\ngive it back.\n\nAmong Croce's other important contributions to thought must be mentioned\nhis definition of History as being aesthetic and differing from Art\nsolely in that history represents the _real_, art the _possible_. In\nconnection with this definition and its proof, the philosopher recounts\nhow he used to hold an opposite view. Doing everything thoroughly, he\nhad prepared and written out a long disquisition on this thesis, which\nwas already in type, when suddenly, from the midst of his meditations,\n_the truth flashed upon him_. He saw for the first time clearly that\nhistory cannot be a science, since, like art, it always deals with the\nparticular. Without a moment's hesitation he hastened to the printers\nand bade them break up the type.\n\nThis incident is illustrative of the sincerity and good faith of\nBenedetto Croce. One knows him to be severe for the faults and\nweaknesses of others, merciless for his own.\n\nYet though severe, the editor of _La Critica_ is uncompromisingly just,\nand would never allow personal dislike or jealousy, or any extrinsic\nconsideration, to stand in the way of fair treatment to the writer\nconcerned. Many superficial English critics might benefit considerably\nby attention to this quality in one who is in other respects also so\nimmeasurably their superior. A good instance of this impartiality is his\ncritique of Schopenhauer, with whose system he is in complete\ndisagreement, yet affords him full credit for what of truth is contained\nin his voluminous writings.[2]\n\nCroce's education was largely completed in Germany, and on account of\ntheir thoroughness he has always been an upholder of German methods. One\nof his complaints against the Italian Positivists is that they only read\nsecond-rate works in French or at the most \"the dilettante booklets\npublished in such profusion by the Anglo-Saxon press.\" This tendency\ntowards German thought, especially in philosophy, depends upon the fact\nof the former undoubted supremacy of Germany in that field, but Croce\ndoes not for a moment admit the inferiority of the Neo-Latin races, and\nadds with homely humour in reference to Germany, that we \"must not throw\naway the baby with the bath-water\"! Close, arduous study and clear\nthought are the only key to scientific (philosophical) truth, and Croce\nnever begins an article for a newspaper without the complete collection\nof the works of the author to be criticized, and his own elaborate notes\non the table before him. Schopenhauer said there were three kinds of\nwriters--those who write without thinking, the great majority; those who\nthink while they write, not very numerous; those who write after they\nhave thought, very rare. Croce certainly belongs to the last division,\nand, as I have said, always feeds his thought upon complete erudition.\nThe bibliography of the works consulted for the _Estetica_ alone, as\nprinted at the end of the Italian edition, extends to many pages and\ncontains references to works in any way dealing with the subject in all\nthe European languages. For instance, Croce has studied Mr. B.\nBosanquet's eclectic works on Aesthetic, largely based upon German\nsources and by no means without value. But he takes exception to Mr.\nBosanquet's statement that _he_ has consulted all works of importance on\nthe subject of Aesthetic. As a matter of fact, Mr. Bosanquet reveals his\nignorance of the greater part of the contribution to Aesthetic made by\nthe Neo-Latin races, which the reader of this book will recognize as of\nfirst-rate importance.\n\nThis thoroughness it is which gives such importance to the literary and\nphilosophical criticisms of _La Critica_. Croce's method is always\nhistorical, and his object in approaching any work of art is to classify\nthe spirit of its author, as expressed in that work. There are, he\nmaintains, but two things to be considered in criticizing a book. These\nare, _firstly_, what is its _peculiarity_, in what way is it singular,\nhow is it differentiated from other works? _Secondly_, what is its\ndegree of purity?--That is, to what extent has its author kept himself\nfree from all considerations alien to the perfection of the work as an\nexpression, as a lyrical intuition? With the answering of these\nquestions Croce is satisfied. He does not care to know if the author\nkeep a motor-car, like Maeterlinck; or prefer to walk on Putney Heath,\nlike Swinburne. This amounts to saying that all works of art must be\njudged by their own standard. How far has the author succeeded in doing\nwhat he intended?\n\nCroce is far above any personal animus, although the same cannot be said\nof those he criticizes. These, like d'Annunzio, whose limitations he\npoints out--his egoism, his lack of human sympathy--are often very\nbitter, and accuse the penetrating critic of want of courtesy. This\nseriousness of purpose runs like a golden thread through all Croce's\nwork. The flimsy superficial remarks on poetry and fiction which too\noften pass for criticism in England (Scotland is a good deal more\nthorough) are put to shame by _La Critica_, the study of which I commend\nto all readers who read or wish to read Italian.[3] They will find in\nits back numbers a complete picture of a century of Italian literature,\nbesides a store-house of philosophical criticism. The _Quarterly_ and\n_Edinburgh Reviews_ are our only journals which can be compared to _The\nCritica_, and they are less exhaustive on the philosophical side. We\nshould have to add to these _Mind_ and the _Hibbert Journal_ to get even\nan approximation to the scope of the Italian review.\n\nAs regards Croce's general philosophical position, it is important to\nunderstand that he is _not_ a Hegelian, in the sense of being a close\nfollower of that philosopher. One of his last works is that in which he\ndeals in a masterly manner with the philosophy of Hegel. The title may\nbe translated, \"What is living and what is dead of the philosophy of\nHegel.\" Here he explains to us the Hegelian system more clearly than\nthat wondrous edifice was ever before explained, and we realize at the\nsame time that Croce is quite as independent of Hegel as of Kant, of\nVico as of Spinoza. Of course he has made use of the best of Hegel, just\nas every thinker makes use of his predecessors and is in his turn made\nuse of by those that follow him. But it is incorrect to accuse of\nHegelianism the author of an anti-hegelian _Aesthetic_, of a _Logic_\nwhere Hegel is only half accepted, and of a _Philosophy of the\nPractical_, which contains hardly a trace of Hegel. I give an instance.\nIf the great conquest of Hegel be the dialectic of opposites, his great\nmistake lies in the confusion of opposites with things which are\ndistinct but not opposite. If, says Croce, we take as an example the\napplication of the Hegelian triad that formulates becoming (affirmation,\nnegation and synthesis), we find it applicable for those opposites which\nare true and false, good and evil, being and not-being, but _not\napplicable_ to things which are distinct but not opposite, such as art\nand philosophy, beauty and truth, the useful and the moral. These\nconfusions led Hegel to talk of the death of art, to conceive as\npossible a Philosophy of History, and to the application of the natural\nsciences to the absurd task of constructing a Philosophy of Nature.\nCroce has cleared away these difficulties by shewing that if from the\nmeeting of opposites must arise a superior synthesis, such a synthesis\ncannot arise from things which are distinct _but not opposite_, since\nthe former are connected together as superior and inferior, and the\ninferior can exist without the superior, but _not vice versa_. Thus we\nsee how philosophy cannot exist without art, while art, occupying the\nlower place, can and does exist without philosophy. This brief example\nreveals Croce's independence in dealing with Hegelian problems.\n\nI know of no philosopher more generous than Croce in praise and\nelucidation of other workers in the same field, past and present. For\ninstance, and apart from Hegel, _Kant_ has to thank him for drawing\nattention to the marvellous excellence of the _Critique of Judgment_,\ngenerally neglected in favour of the Critiques of _Pure Reason and of\nPractical Judgment_; _Baumgarten_ for drawing the attention of the world\nto his obscure name and for reprinting his Latin thesis in which the\nword _Aesthetic_ occurs for the first time; and _Schleiermacher_ for the\ntributes paid to his neglected genius in the History of Aesthetic. _La\nCritica_, too, is full of generous appreciation of contemporaries by\nCroce and by that profound thinker, Gentile.\n\nBut it is not only philosophers who have reason to be grateful to Croce\nfor his untiring zeal and diligence. Historians, economists, poets,\nactors, and writers of fiction have been rescued from their undeserved\nlimbo by this valiant Red Cross knight, and now shine with due\nbrilliance in the circle of their peers. It must also be admitted that a\nlarge number of false lights, popular will o' the wisps, have been\nruthlessly extinguished with the same breath. For instance, Karl Marx,\nthe socialist theorist and agitator, finds in Croce an exponent of his\nviews, in so far as they are based upon the truth, but where he\nblunders, his critic immediately reveals the origin and nature of his\nmistakes. Croce's studies in Economic are chiefly represented by his\nwork, the title of which may be translated \"Historical Materialism and\nMarxist Economic.\"\n\nTo indicate the breadth and variety of Croce's work I will mention the\nfurther monograph on the sixteenth century Neapolitan Pulcinella (the\noriginal of our Punch), and the personage of the Neapolitan in comedy, a\nmonument of erudition and of acute and of lively dramatic criticism,\nthat would alone have occupied an ordinary man's activity for half a\nlifetime. One must remember, however, that Croce's average working day\nis of ten hours. His interest is concentrated on things of the mind, and\nalthough he sits on several Royal Commissions, such as those of the\nArchives of all Italy and of the monument to King Victor Emmanuel, he\nhas taken no university degree, and much dislikes any affectation of\nacademic superiority. He is ready to meet any one on equal terms and try\nwith them to get at the truth on any subject, be it historical,\nliterary, or philosophical. \"Truth,\" he says, \"is democratic,\" and I can\ntestify that the search for it, in his company, is very stimulating. As\nis well said by Prezzolini, \"He has a new word for all.\"\n\nThere can be no doubt of the great value of Croce's work as an\n_educative influence_, and if we are to judge of a philosophical system\nby its action on others, then we must place the _Philosophy of the\nSpirit_ very high. It may be said with perfect truth that since the\ndeath of the poet Carducci there has been no influence in Italy to\ncompare with that of Benedetto Croce.\n\nHis dislike of Academies and of all forms of prejudice runs parallel\nwith his breadth and sympathy with all forms of thought. His activity in\nthe present is only equalled by his reverence for the past. Naples he\nloves with the blind love of the child for its parent, and he has been\nof notable assistance to such Neapolitan talent as is manifested in the\nworks of Salvatore di Giacomo, whose best poems are written in the\ndialect of Naples, or rather in a dialect of his own, which Croce had\ndifficulty in persuading the author always to retain. The original jet\nof inspiration having been in dialect, it is clear that to amend this\ninspiration at the suggestion of wiseacres at the Caf\u00e9 would have been\nto ruin it altogether.\n\nOf the popularity that his system and teaching have already attained we\nmay judge by the fact that the _Aesthetic_[4], despite the difficulty of\nthe subject, is already in its third edition in Italy, where, owing to\nits influence, philosophy sells better than fiction; while the French\nand Germans, not to mention the Czechs, have long had translations of\nthe earlier editions. His _Logic_ is on the point of appearing in its\nsecond edition, and I have no doubt that the _Philosophy of the\nPractical_ will eventually equal these works in popularity. _The\nimportance and value of Italian thought have been too long neglected in\nGreat Britain_. Where, as in Benedetto Croce, we get the clarity of\nvision of the Latin, joined to the thoroughness and erudition of the\nbest German tradition, we have a combination of rare power and\neffectiveness, which can by no means be neglected.\n\nThe philosopher feels that he has a great mission, which is nothing less\nthan the leading back of thought to belief in the spirit, deserted by so\nmany for crude empiricism and positivism. His view of philosophy is that\nit sums up all the higher human activities, including religion, and that\nin proper hands it is able to solve any problem. But there is no\nfinality about problems: the solution of one leads to the posing of\nanother, and so on. Man is the maker of life, and his spirit ever\nproceeds from a lower to a higher perfection. Connected with this view\nof life is Croce's dislike of \"Modernism.\" When once a problem has been\ncorrectly solved, it is absurd to return to the same problem. Roman\nCatholicism cannot march with the times. It can only exist by being\nconservative--its only Logic is to be illogical. Therefore, Croce is\nopposed to Loisy and Neo-Catholicism, and supports the Encyclical\nagainst Modernism. The Catholic religion, with its great stores of myth\nand morality, which for many centuries was the best thing in the world,\nis still there for those who are unable to assimilate other food.\nAnother instance of his dislike for Modernism is his criticism of\nPascoli, whose attempts to reveal enigmas in the writings of Dante he\nlooks upon as useless. We do not, he says, read Dante in the twentieth\ncentury for his hidden meanings, but for his revealed poetry.\n\nI believe that Croce will one day be recognized as one of the very few\ngreat teachers of humanity. At present he is not appreciated at nearly\nhis full value. One rises from a study of his philosophy with a sense of\nhaving been all the time as it were in personal touch with the truth,\nwhich is very far from the case after the perusal of certain other\nphilosophies.\n\nCroce has been called the philosopher-poet, and if we take philosophy as\nNovalis understood it, certainly Croce does belong to the poets, though\nnot to the formal category of those who write in verse. Croce is at any\nrate a born philosopher, and as every trade tends to make its object\nprosaic, so does every vocation tend to make it poetic. Yet no one has\ntoiled more earnestly than Croce. \"Thorough\" might well be his motto,\nand if to-day he is admitted to be a classic without the stiffness one\nconnects with that term, be sure he has well merited the designation.\nHis name stands for the best that Italy has to give the world of\nserious, stimulating thought. I know nothing to equal it elsewhere.\n\nSecure in his strength, Croce will often introduce a joke or some\namusing illustration from contemporary life, in the midst of a most\nprofound and serious argument. This spirit of mirth is a sign of\nsuperiority. He who is not sure of himself can spare no energy for the\nmaking of mirth. Croce loves to laugh at his enemies and with his\nfriends. So the philosopher of Naples sits by the blue gulf and explains\nthe universe to those who have ears to hear. \"One can philosophize\nanywhere,\" he says--but he remains significantly at Naples.\n\nThus I conclude these brief remarks upon the author of the _Aesthetic_,\nconfident that those who give time and attention to its study will be\ngrateful for having placed in their hands this pearl of great price from\nthe diadem of the antique Parthenope.\n\nDOUGLAS AINSLIE.\n\nTHE ATHENAEUM, PALL MALL, _May_ 1909.\n\n[1] Napoli, Riccardo Ricciardi, 1909.\n\n[2] The reader will find this critique summarized in the historical\n    portion of this volume.\n\n[3] _La Critica_ is published every other month by Laterza of Bari.\n\n[4] This translation is made from the third Italian edition (Bari,\n    1909), enlarged and corrected by the author. The _Theory of\n    Aesthetic_ first appeared in 1900 in the form of a communication\n    to the _Accademia Pontiana_ of Naples, vol. xxx. The first edition\n    is dated 1902, the second 1904 (Palermo).\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nINTUITION AND EXPRESSION\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _Intuitive knowledge._\n\nHuman knowledge has two forms: it is either intuitive knowledge or\nlogical knowledge; knowledge obtained through the imagination or\nknowledge obtained through the intellect; knowledge of the individual or\nknowledge of the universal; of individual things or of the relations\nbetween them: it is, in fact, productive either of images or of\nconcepts.\n\nIn ordinary life, constant appeal is made to intuitive knowledge. It\nis said to be impossible to give expression to certain truths; that\nthey are not demonstrable by syllogisms; that they must be learnt\nintuitively. The politician finds fault with the abstract reasoner, who\nis without a lively knowledge of actual conditions; the pedagogue\ninsists upon the necessity of developing the intuitive faculty in the\npupil before everything else; the critic in judging a work of art makes\nit a point of honour to set aside theory and abstractions, and to judge\nit by direct intuition; the practical man professes to live rather by\nintuition than by reason.\n\nBut this ample acknowledgment, granted to intuitive knowledge in\nordinary life, does not meet with an equal and adequate acknowledgment\nin the field of theory and of philosophy. There exists a very ancient\nscience of intellective knowledge, admitted by all without discussion,\nnamely, Logic; but a science of intuitive knowledge is timidly and with\ndifficulty admitted by but a few. Logical knowledge has appropriated the\nlion's share; and if she does not quite slay and devour her companion,\nyet yields to her with difficulty the humble little place of maidservant\nor doorkeeper. What, it says, is intuitive knowledge without the light\nof intellective knowledge? It is a servant without a master; and though\na master find a servant useful, the master is a necessity to the\nservant, since he enables him to gain his livelihood. Intuition is\nblind; Intellect lends her eyes.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Its independence in respect to intellective knowledge._\n\nNow, the first point to be firmly fixed in the mind is that intuitive\nknowledge has no need of a master, nor to lean upon any one; she does\nnot need to borrow the eyes of others, for she has most excellent eyes\nof her own. Doubtless it is possible to find concepts mingled with\nintuitions. But in many other intuitions there is no trace of such a\nmixture, which proves that it is not necessary. The impression of a\nmoonlight scene by a painter; the outline of a country drawn by a\ncartographer; a musical motive, tender or energetic; the words of a\nsighing lyric, or those with which we ask, command and lament in\nordinary life, may well all be intuitive facts without a shadow of\nintellective relation. But, think what one may of these instances, and\nadmitting further that one may maintain that the greater part of the\nintuitions of civilized man are impregnated with concepts, there yet\nremains to be observed something more important and more conclusive.\nThose concepts which are found mingled and fused with the intuitions,\nare no longer concepts, in so far as they are really mingled and fused,\nfor they have lost all independence and autonomy. They have been\nconcepts, but they have now become simple elements of intuition.\nThe philosophical maxims placed in the mouth of a personage of tragedy\nor of comedy, perform there the function, not of concepts, but of\ncharacteristics of such personage; in the same way as the red in a\npainted figure does not there represent the red colour of the\nphysicists, but is a characteristic element of the portrait. The whole\nit is that determines the quality of the parts. A work of art may be\nfull of philosophical concepts; it may contain them in greater\nabundance and they may be there even more profound than in a\nphilosophical dissertation, which in its turn may be rich to\noverflowing with descriptions and intuitions. But, notwithstanding all\nthese concepts it may contain, the result of the work of art is an\nintuition; and notwithstanding all those intuitions, the result of the\nphilosophical dissertation is a concept. The _Promessi Sposi_ contains\ncopious ethical observations and distinctions, but it does not for\nthat reason lose in its total effect its character of simple story, of\nintuition. In like manner the anecdotes and satirical effusions which\nmay be found in the works of a philosopher like Schopenhauer, do not\nremove from those works their character of intellective treatises. The\ndifference between a scientific work and a work of art, that is,\nbetween an intellective fact and an intuitive fact lies in the result,\nin the diverse effect aimed at by their respective authors. This it is\nthat determines and rules over the several parts of each.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Intuition and perception._\n\nBut to admit the independence of intuition as regards concept does not\nsuffice to give a true and precise idea of intuition. Another error\narises among those who recognize this, or who, at any rate, do not make\nintuition explicitly dependent upon the intellect. This error obscures\nand confounds the real nature of intuition. By intuition is frequently\nunderstood the _perception_ or knowledge of actual reality, the\napprehension of something as _real_.\n\nCertainly perception is intuition: the perception of the room in which I\nam writing, of the ink-bottle and paper that are before me, of the pen I\nam using, of the objects that I touch and make use of as instruments of\nmy person, which, if it write, therefore exists;--these are all\nintuitions. But the image that is now passing through my brain of a me\nwriting in another room, in another town, with different paper, pen and\nink, is also an intuition. This means that the distinction between\nreality and non-reality is extraneous, secondary, to the true nature of\nintuition. If we assume the existence of a human mind which should have\nintuitions for the first time, it would seem that it could have\nintuitions of effective reality only, that is to say, that it could have\nperceptions of nothing but the real. But if the knowledge of reality be\nbased upon the distinction between real images and unreal images, and if\nthis distinction does not originally exist, these intuitions would in\ntruth not be intuitions either of the real or of the unreal, but pure\nintuitions. Where all is real, nothing is real. The child, with its\ndifficulty of distinguishing true from false, history from fable, which\nare all one to childhood, can furnish us with a sort of very vague and\nonly remotely approximate idea of this ingenuous state. Intuition is the\nindifferentiated unity of the perception of the real and of the simple\nimage of the possible. In our intuitions we do not oppose ourselves to\nexternal reality as empirical beings, but we simply objectify our\nimpressions, whatever they be.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Intuition and the concepts of space and time._\n\nThose, therefore, who look upon intuition as sensation formed and\narranged simply according to the categories of space and time, would\nseem to approximate more nearly to the truth. Space and time (they say)\nare the forms of intuition; to have intuitions is to place in space and\nin temporal sequence. Intuitive activity would then consist in this\ndouble and concurrent function of spatiality and temporality. But for\nthese two categories must be repeated what was said of intellectual\ndistinctions, found mingled with intuitions. We have intuitions without\nspace and without time: a tint of sky and a tint of sentiment, an Ah! of\npain and an effort of will, objectified in consciousness. These are\nintuitions, which we possess, and with their making, space and time have\nnothing to do. In some intuitions, spatiality may be found without\ntemporality, in others, this without that; and even where both are\nfound, they are perceived by posterior reflexion: they can be fused with\nthe intuition in like manner with all its other elements: that is, they\nare in it _materialiter_ and not _formaliter_, as ingredients and not as\nessentials. Who, without a similar act of interruptive reflexion, is\nconscious of temporal sequence while listening to a story or a piece of\nmusic? That which intuition reveals in a work of art is not space and\ntime, but character, individual physiognomy. Several attempts may be\nnoted in modern philosophy, which confirm the view here exposed. Space\nand time, far from being very simple and primitive functions, are shown\nto be intellectual constructions of great complexity. And further, even\nin some of those who do not altogether deny to space and time the\nquality of forming or of categories and functions, one may observe the\nattempt to unify and to understand them in a different manner from that\ngenerally maintained in respect of these categories. Some reduce\nintuition to the unique category of spatiality, maintaining that time\nalso can only be conceived in terms of space. Others abandon the three\ndimensions of space as not philosophically necessary, and conceive the\nfunction of spatiality as void of every particular spatial\ndetermination. But what could such a spatial function be, that should\ncontrol even time? May it not be a residuum of criticisms and of\nnegations from which arises merely the necessity to posit a generic\nintuitive activity? And is not this last truly determined, when one\nunique function is attributed to it, not spatializing nor temporalizing,\nbut characterizing? Or, better, when this is conceived as itself a\ncategory or function, which gives knowledge of things in their\nconcretion and individuality?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Intuition and sensation._\n\nHaving thus freed intuitive knowledge from any suggestion of\nintellectualism and from every posterior and external adjunct, we must\nnow make clear and determine its limits from another side and from a\ndifferent kind of invasion and confusion. On the other side, and before\nthe inferior boundary, is sensation, formless matter, which the spirit\ncan never apprehend in itself, in so far as it is mere matter. This it\ncan only possess with form and in form, but postulates its concept as,\nprecisely, a limit. Matter, in its abstraction, is mechanism, passivity;\nit is what the spirit of man experiences, but does not produce. Without\nit no human knowledge and activity is possible; but mere matter produces\nanimality, whatever is brutal and impulsive in man, not the spiritual\ndominion, which is humanity. How often do we strive to understand\nclearly what is passing within us? We do catch a glimpse of something,\nbut this does not appear to the mind as objectified and formed. In such\nmoments it is, that we best perceive the profound difference between\nmatter and form. These are not two acts of ours, face to face with one\nanother; but we assault and carry off the one that is outside us, while\nthat within us tends to absorb and make its own that without. Matter,\nattacked and conquered by form, gives place to concrete form. It is the\nmatter, the content, that differentiates one of our intuitions from\nanother: form is constant: it is spiritual activity, while matter is\nchangeable. Without matter, however, our spiritual activity would not\nleave its abstraction to become concrete and real, this or that\nspiritual content, this or that definite intuition.\n\nIt is a curious fact, characteristic of our times, that this very form,\nthis very activity of the spirit, which is essentially ourselves, is so\neasily ignored or denied. Some confound the spiritual activity of man\nwith the metaphorical and mythological activity of so-called nature,\nwhich is mechanism and has no resemblance to human activity, save when\nwe imagine, with Aesop, that _arbores loquuntur non tantum ferae_. Some\neven affirm that they have never observed in themselves this\n\"miraculous\" activity, as though there were no difference, or only one\nof quantity, between sweating and thinking, feeling cold and the energy\nof the will. Others, certainly with greater reason, desire to unify\nactivity and mechanism in a more general concept, though admitting that\nthey are specifically distinct. Let us, however, refrain for the moment\nfrom examining if such a unification be possible, and in what sense, but\nadmitting that the attempt may be made, it is clear that to unify two\nconcepts in a third implies a difference between the two first. And here\nit is this difference that is of importance and we set it in relief.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Intuition and association._\n\nIntuition has often been confounded with simple sensation. But, since\nthis confusion is too shocking to good sense, it has more frequently\nbeen attenuated or concealed with a phraseology which seems to wish to\nconfuse and to distinguish them at the same time. Thus, it has been\nasserted that intuition is sensation, but not so much simple sensation\nas _association_ of sensations. The equivoque arises precisely from the\nword \"association.\" Association is understood, either as memory,\nmnemonic association, conscious recollection, and in that case is\nevident the absurdity of wishing to join together in memory elements\nwhich are not intuified, distinguished, possessed in some way by the\nspirit and produced by consciousness: or it is understood as association\nof unconscious elements. In this case we remain in the world of\nsensation and of nature. Further, if with certain associationists we\nspeak of an association which is neither memory nor flux of sensations,\nbut is a _productive_ association (formative, constructive,\ndistinguishing); then we admit the thing itself and deny only its name.\nIn truth, productive association is no longer association in the sense\nof the sensualists, but _synthesis_, that is to say, spiritual activity.\nSynthesis may be called association; but with the concept of\nproductivity is already posited the distinction between passivity and\nactivity, between sensation and intuition.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Intuition and representation._\n\nOther psychologists are disposed to distinguish from sensation something\nwhich is sensation no longer, but is not yet intellective concept: _the\nrepresentation or image_. What is the difference between their\nrepresentation or image, and our intuitive knowledge? The greatest, and\nnone at all. \"Representation,\" too, is a very equivocal word. If by\nrepresentation be understood something detached and standing out from\nthe psychic base of the sensations, then representation is intuition.\nIf, on the other hand, it be conceived as a complex sensation, a return\nis made to simple sensation, which does not change its quality according\nto its richness or poverty, operating alike in a rudimentary or in a\ndeveloped organism full of traces of past sensations. Nor is the\nequivoque remedied by defining representation as a psychic product of\nsecondary order in relation to sensation, which should occupy the first\nplace. What does secondary order mean here? Does it mean a qualitative,\na formal difference? If so, we agree: representation is elaboration of\nsensation, it is intuition. Or does it mean greater complexity and\ncomplication, a quantitative, material difference? In that case\nintuition would be again confused with simple sensation.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Intuition and expression._\n\nAnd yet there is a sure method of distinguishing true intuition, true\nrepresentation, from that which is inferior to it: the spiritual fact\nfrom the mechanical, passive, natural fact. Every true intuition or\nrepresentation is, also, _expression_. That which does not objectify\nitself in expression is not intuition or representation, but sensation\nand naturality. The spirit does not obtain intuitions, otherwise than by\nmaking, forming, expressing. He who separates intuition from expression\nnever succeeds in reuniting them.\n\n_Intuitive activity possesses intuitions to the extent that it expresses\nthem_.--Should this expression seem at first paradoxical, that is\nchiefly because, as a general rule, a too restricted meaning is given to\nthe word \"expression.\" It is generally thought of as restricted to\nverbal expression. But there exist also non-verbal expressions, such as\nthose of line, colour, and sound; to all of these must be extended our\naffirmation. The intuition and expression together of a painter are\npictorial; those of a poet are verbal. But be it pictorial, or verbal,\nor musical, or whatever else it be called, to no intuition can\nexpression be wanting, because it is an inseparable part of intuition.\nHow can we possess a true intuition of a geometrical figure, unless we\npossess so accurate an image of it as to be able to trace it immediately\nupon paper or on a slate? How can we have an intuition of the contour of\na region, for example, of the island of Sicily, if we are not able to\ndraw it as it is in all its meanderings? Every one can experience the\ninternal illumination which follows upon his success in formulating to\nhimself his impressions and sentiments, but only so far as he is able to\nformulate them. Sentiments or impressions, then, pass by means of words\nfrom the obscure region of the soul into the clarity of the\ncontemplative spirit. In this cognitive process it is impossible to\ndistinguish intuition from expression. The one is produced with the\nother at the same instant, because they are not two, but one.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Illusions as to their difference._\n\nThe principal reason which makes our theme appear paradoxical as we\nmaintain it, is the illusion or prejudice that we possess a more\ncomplete intuition of reality than we really do. One often hears people\nsay that they have in their minds many important thoughts, but that they\nare not able to express them. In truth, if they really had them, they\nwould have coined them into beautiful, ringing words, and thus expressed\nthem. If these thoughts seem to vanish or to become scarce and poor in\nthe act of expressing them, either they did not exist or they really\nwere scarce and poor. People think that all of us ordinary men imagine\nand have intuitions of countries, figures and scenes, like painters; of\nbodies, like sculptors; save that painters and sculptors know how to\npaint and to sculpture those images, while we possess them only within\nour souls. They believe that anyone could have imagined a Madonna of\nRaphael; but that Raphael was Raphael owing to his technical ability in\nputting the Madonna upon the canvas. Nothing can be more false than this\nview. The world of which as a rule we have intuitions, is a small thing.\nIt consists of little expressions which gradually become greater and\nmore ample with the increasing spiritual concentration of certain\nmoments. These are the sort of words which we speak within ourselves,\nthe judgments that we tacitly express: \"Here is a man, here is a horse,\nthis is heavy, this is hard, this pleases me,\" etc. It is a medley of\nlight and colour, which could not pictorially attain to any more sincere\nexpression than a haphazard splash of colours, from among which would\nwith difficulty stand out a few special, distinctive traits. This and\nnothing else is what we possess in our ordinary life; this is the basis\nof our ordinary action. It is the index of a book. The labels tied to\nthings take the place of the things themselves. This index and labels\n(which are themselves expressions) suffice for our small needs and small\nactions. From time to time we pass from the index to the book, from the\nlabel to the thing, or from the slight to the greater intuitions, and\nfrom these to the greatest and most lofty. This passage is sometimes far\nfrom being easy. It has been observed by those who have best studied the\npsychology of artists, that when, after having given a rapid glance at\nanyone, they attempt to obtain a true intuition of him, in order, for\nexample, to paint his portrait, then this ordinary vision, that seemed\nso precise, so lively, reveals itself as little better than nothing.\nWhat remains is found to be at the most some superficial trait, which\nwould not even suffice for a caricature. The person to be painted stands\nbefore the artist like a world to discover. Michael Angelo said, \"one\npaints, not with one's hands, but with one's brain.\" Leonardo shocked\nthe prior of the convent delle Grazie by standing for days together\nopposite the \"Last Supper\" without touching it with the brush. He\nremarked of this attitude \"that men of the most lofty genius, when they\nare doing the least work, are then the most active, seeking invention\nwith their minds.\" The painter is a painter, because he sees what others\nonly feel or catch a glimpse of, but do not see. We think we see a\nsmile, but in reality we have only a vague impression of it, we do not\nperceive all the characteristic traits from which it results, as the\npainter perceives them after his internal meditations, which thus enable\nhim to fix them on the canvas. Even in the case of our intimate friend,\nwho is with us every day and at all hours, we do not possess intuitively\nmore than, at the most, certain traits of his physiognomy, which enable\nus to distinguish him from others. The illusion is less easy as regards\nmusical expression; because it would seem strange to everyone to say\nthat the composer had added or attached notes to the motive, which is\nalready in the mind of him who is not the composer. As if Beethoven's\nNinth Symphony were not his own intuition and his own intuition the\nNinth Symphony. Thus, just as he who is deceived as to his material\nwealth is confuted by arithmetic, which states its exact amount, so is\nhe confuted who nourishes delusions as to the wealth of his own thoughts\nand images. He is brought back to reality, when he is obliged to cross\nthe Bridge of Asses of expression. We say to the former, count; to the\nlatter, speak, here is a pencil, draw, express yourself.\n\nWe have each of us, as a matter of fact, a little of the poet, of the\nsculptor, of the musician, of the painter, of the prose writer: but how\nlittle, as compared with those who are so called, precisely because of\nthe lofty degree in which they possess the most universal dispositions\nand energies of human nature! How little does a painter possess of the\nintuitions of a poet! How little does one painter possess those of\nanother painter! Nevertheless, that little is all our actual patrimony\nof intuitions or representations. Beyond these are only impressions,\nsensations, feelings, impulses, emotions, or whatever else one may term\nwhat is outside the spirit, not assimilated by man, postulated for the\nconvenience of exposition, but effectively inexistent, if existence be\nalso a spiritual fact.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Identity of intuition and expression._\n\nWe may then add this to the verbal variants descriptive of intuition,\nnoted at the beginning: intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge,\nindependent and autonomous in respect to intellectual function;\nindifferent to discriminations, posterior and empirical, to reality and\nto unreality, to formations and perceptions of space and time, even when\nposterior: intuition or representation is distinguished as form from\nwhat is felt and suffered, from the flux or wave of sensation, or from\npsychic material; and this form this taking possession of, is\nexpression. To have an intuition is to express. It is nothing else!\n(nothing more, but nothing less) than _to express_.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nINTUITION AND ART\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _Corollaries and explanations._\n\nBefore proceeding further, it seems opportune to draw certain\nconsequences from what has been established and to add some explanation.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Identity of art and intuitive knowledge._\n\nWe have frankly identified intuitive or expressive knowledge with the\naesthetic or artistic fact, taking works of art as examples of intuitive\nknowledge and attributing to them the characteristics of intuition, and\n_vice versa_. But our identification is combated by the view, held even\nby many philosophers, who consider art to be an intuition of an\naltogether special sort. \"Let us admit\" (they say) \"that art is\nintuition; but intuition is not always art: artistic intuition is of a\ndistinct species differing from intuition in general by something\n_more_.\"\n\n    [Sidenote] _No specific difference._\n\nBut no one has ever been able to indicate of what this something more\nconsists. It has sometimes been thought that art is not a simple\nintuition, but an intuition of an intuition, in the same way as the\nconcept of science has been defined, not as the ordinary concept, but as\nthe concept of a concept. Thus man should attain to art, by\nobjectifying, not his sensations, as happens with ordinary intuition,\nbut intuition itself. But this process of raising to a second power does\nnot exist; and the comparison of it with the ordinary and scientific\nconcept does not imply what is wished, for the good reason that it is\nnot true that the scientific concept is the concept of a concept. If\nthis comparison imply anything, it implies just the opposite. The\nordinary concept, if it be really a concept and not a simple\nrepresentation, is a perfect concept, however poor and limited. Science\nsubstitutes concepts for representations; it adds and substitutes other\nconcepts larger and more comprehensive for those that are poor and\nlimited. It is ever discovering new relations. But its method does not\ndiffer from that by which is formed the smallest universal in the brain\nof the humblest of men. What is generally called art, by antonomasia,\ncollects intuitions that are wider and more complex than those which we\ngenerally experience, but these intuitions are always of sensations and\nimpressions.\n\nArt is the expression of impressions, not the expression of expressions.\n\n    [Sidenote] _No difference of intensity._\n\nFor the same reason, it cannot be admitted that intuition, which is\ngenerally called artistic, differs from ordinary intuition as to\nintensity. This would be the case if it were to operate differently on\nthe same matter. But since artistic function is more widely distributed\nin different fields, but yet does not differ in method from ordinary\nintuition, the difference between the one and the other is not intensive\nbut extensive. The intuition of the simplest popular love-song, which\nsays the same thing, or very nearly, as a declaration of love such as\nissues at every moment from the lips of thousands of ordinary men, may\nbe intensively perfect in its poor simplicity, although it be\nextensively so much more limited than the complex intuition of a\nlove-song by Leopardi.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The difference is extensive and empirical._\n\nThe whole difference, then, is quantitative, and as such, indifferent to\nphilosophy, _scientia qualitatum_. Certain men have a greater aptitude,\na more frequent inclination fully to express certain complex states of\nthe soul. These men are known in ordinary language as artists. Some very\ncomplicated and difficult expressions are more rarely achieved and these\nare called works of art. The limits of the expressions and intuitions\nthat are called art, as opposed to those that are vulgarly called\nnot-art, are empirical and impossible to define. If an epigram be art,\nwhy not a single word? If a story; why not the occasional note of the\njournalist? If a landscape, why not a topographical sketch? The teacher\nof philosophy in Moli\u00e8re's comedy was right: \"whenever we speak we\ncreate prose.\" But there will always be scholars like Monsieur Jourdain,\nastonished at having created prose for forty years without knowing it,\nand who will have difficulty in persuading themselves that when they\ncall their servant John to bring their slippers, they have spoken\nnothing less than--prose.\n\nWe must hold firmly to our identification, because among the principal\nreasons which have prevented Aesthetic, the science of art, from\nrevealing the true nature of art, its real roots in human nature, has\nbeen its separation from the general spiritual life, the having made of\nit a sort of special function or aristocratic circle. No one is\nastonished when he learns from physiology that every cellule is an\norganism and every organism a cellule or synthesis of cellules. No one\nis astonished at finding in a lofty mountain the same chemical elements\nthat compose a small stone or fragment. There is not one physiology of\nsmall animals and one of large animals; nor is there a special chemical\ntheory of stones as distinct from mountains. In the same way, there is\nnot a science of lesser intuition distinct from a science of greater\nintuition, nor one of ordinary intuition distinct from artistic\nintuition. There is but one Aesthetic, the science of intuitive or\nexpressive knowledge, which is the aesthetic or artistic fact. And this\nAesthetic is the true analogy of Logic. Logic includes, as facts of the\nsame nature, the formation of the smallest and most ordinary concept and\nthe most complicated scientific and philosophical system.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Artistic genius._\n\nNor can we admit that the word _genius_ or artistic genius, as distinct\nfrom the non-genius of the ordinary man, possesses more than a\nquantitative signification. Great artists are said to reveal us to\nourselves. But how could this be possible, unless there be identity of\nnature between their imagination and ours, and unless the difference be\nonly one of quantity? It were well to change _poeta nascitur_ into _homo\nnascitur poeta_: some men are born great poets, some small. The cult and\nsuperstition of the genius has arisen from this quantitative difference\nhaving been taken as a difference of quality. It has been forgotten that\ngenius is not something that has fallen from heaven, but humanity\nitself. The man of genius, who poses or is represented as distant from\nhumanity, finds his punishment in becoming or appearing somewhat\nridiculous. Examples of this are the _genius_ of the romantic period and\nthe _superman_ of our time.\n\nBut it is well to note here, that those who claim unconsciousness as the\nchief quality of an artistic genius, hurl him from an eminence far above\nhumanity to a position far below it. Intuitive or artistic genius, like\nevery form of human activity, is always conscious; otherwise it would be\nblind mechanism. The only thing that may be wanting to the artistic\ngenius is the _reflective_ consciousness, the superadded consciousness\nof the historian or critic, which is not essential to artistic genius.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Content and form in Aesthetic._\n\nThe relation between matter and form, or between _content and form_, as\nit is generally called, is one of the most disputed questions in\nAesthetic. Does the aesthetic fact consist of content alone, or of form\nalone, or of both together? This question has taken on various meanings,\nwhich we shall mention, each in its place. But when these words are\ntaken as signifying what we have above defined, and matter is understood\nas emotivity not aesthetically elaborated, that is to say, impressions,\nand form elaboration, intellectual activity and expression, then our\nmeaning cannot be doubtful. We must, therefore, reject the thesis that\nmakes the aesthetic fact to consist of the content alone (that is, of\nthe simple impressions), in like manner with that other thesis, which\nmakes it to consist of a junction between form and content, that is, of\nimpressions plus expressions. In the aesthetic fact, the aesthetic\nactivity is not added to the fact of the impressions, but these latter\nare formed and elaborated by it. The impressions reappear as it were in\nexpression, like water put into a filter, which reappears the same and\nyet different on the other side. The aesthetic fact, therefore, is form,\nand nothing but form.\n\nFrom this it results, not that the content is something superfluous (it\nis, on the contrary, the necessary point of departure for the expressive\nfact); but that _there is no passage_ between the quality of the content\nand that of the form. It has sometimes been thought that the content, in\norder to be aesthetic, that is to say, transformable into form, should\npossess some determinate or determinable quality. But were that so, then\nform and content, expression and impression, would be the same thing. It\nis true that the content is that which is convertible into form, but it\nhas no determinable qualities until this transformation takes place. We\nknow nothing of its nature. It does not become aesthetic content at\nonce, but only when it has been effectively transformed. Aesthetic\ncontent has also been defined as what is _interesting_. That is not an\nuntrue statement; it is merely void of meaning. What, then, is\ninteresting? Expressive activity? Certainly the expressive activity\nwould not have raised the content to the dignity of form, had it not\nbeen interested. The fact of its having been interested is precisely the\nfact of its raising the content to the dignity of form. But the word\n\"interesting\" has also been employed in another not illegitimate sense,\nwhich we shall explain further on.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the imitation of nature and of the artistic\n               illusion._\n\nThe proposition that art is _imitation of nature_ has also several\nmeanings. Now truth has been maintained or at least shadowed with these\nwords, now error. More frequently, nothing definite has been thought.\nOne of the legitimate scientific meanings occurs when imitation is\nunderstood as representation or intuition of nature, a form of\nknowledge. And when this meaning has been understood, by placing in\ngreater relief the spiritual character of the process, the other\nproposition becomes also legitimate: namely, that art is the\n_idealization_ or _idealizing_ imitation of nature. But if by imitation\nof nature be understood that art gives mechanical reproductions, more or\nless perfect duplicates of natural objects, before which the same tumult\nof impressions caused by natural objects begins over again, then the\nproposition is evidently false. The painted wax figures that seem to be\nalive, and before which we stand astonished in the museums where such\nthings are shown, do not give aesthetic intuitions. Illusion and\nhallucination have nothing to do with the calm domain of artistic\nintuition. If an artist paint the interior of a wax-work museum, or if\nan actor give a burlesque portrait of a man-statue on the stage, we\nagain have spiritual labour and artistic intuition. Finally, if\nphotography have anything in it of artistic, it will be to the extent\nthat it transmits the intuition of the photographer, his point of view,\nthe pose and the grouping which he has striven to attain. And if it be\nnot altogether art, that is precisely because the element of nature in\nit remains more or less insubordinate and ineradicable. Do we ever,\nindeed, feel complete satisfaction before even the best of photographs?\nWould not an artist vary and touch up much or little, remove or add\nsomething to any of them?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of art conceived as a sentimental not a\n               theoretical fact. Aesthetic appearance and feeling._\n\nThe statements repeated so often, with others similar, that art is not\nknowledge, that it does not tell the truth, that it does not belong to\nthe world of theory, but to the world of feeling, arise from the failure\nto realize exactly the theoretic character of the simple intuition. This\nsimple intuition is quite distinct from intellectual knowledge, as it is\ndistinct from the perception of the real. The belief that only the\nintellective is knowledge, or at the most also the perception of the\nreal, also arises from the failure to grasp the theoretic character of\nthe simple intuition. We have seen that intuition is knowledge, free of\nconcepts and more simple than the so-called perception of the real.\nSince art is knowledge and form, it does not belong to the world of\nfeeling and of psychic material. The reason why so many aestheticians\nhave so often insisted that art is _appearance_ (_Schein_), is precisely\nbecause they have felt the necessity of distinguishing it from the more\ncomplex fact of perception by maintaining its pure intuitivity. For the\nsame reason it has been claimed that art is _sentiment_. In fact, if the\nconcept as content of art, and historical reality as such, be excluded,\nthere remains no other content than reality apprehended in all its\ningenuousness and immediateness in the vital effort, in _sentiment_,\nthat is to say, pure intuition.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of theory of aesthetic senses._\n\nThe theory of the _aesthetic senses_ has also arisen from the failure to\nestablish, or from having lost to view the character of the expression\nas distinct from the impression, of the form as distinct from the\nmatter.\n\nAs has just been pointed out, this reduces itself to the error of\nwishing to seek a passage from the quality of the content to that of the\nform. To ask, in fact, what the aesthetic senses may be, implies asking\nwhat sensible impressions may be able to enter into aesthetic\nexpressions, and what must of necessity do so. To this we must at once\nreply, that all impressions can enter into aesthetic expressions or\nformations, but that none are bound to do so. Dante raised to the\ndignity of form not only the \"sweet colour of the oriental sapphire\"\n(visual impression), but also tactile or thermic impressions, such as\nthe \"thick air\" and the \"fresh rivulets\" which \"parch all the more\" the\nthroat of the thirsty. The belief that a picture yields only visual\nimpressions is a curious illusion. The bloom of a cheek, the warmth of a\nyouthful body, the sweetness and freshness of a fruit, the cutting of a\nsharpened blade, are not these, also, impressions that we have from a\npicture? Maybe they are visual? What would a picture be for a\nhypothetical man, deprived of all or many of his senses, who should in\nan instant acquire the sole organ of sight? The picture we are standing\nopposite and believe we see only with our eyes, would appear to his eyes\nas little more than the paint-smeared palette of a painter.\n\nSome who hold firmly to the aesthetic character of given groups of\nimpressions (for example, the visual, the auditive), and exclude others,\nadmit, however, that if visual and auditive impressions enter _directly_\ninto the aesthetic fact, those of the other senses also enter into it,\nbut only as _associated_. But this distinction is altogether arbitrary.\nAesthetic expression is a synthesis, in which it is impossible to\ndistinguish direct and indirect. All impressions are by it placed on a\nlevel, in so far as they are aestheticised. He who takes into himself\nthe image of a picture or of a poem does not experience, as it were, a\nseries of impressions as to this image, some of which have a prerogative\nor precedence over others. And nothing is known of what happens prior to\nhaving received it, for the distinctions made after reflexion have\nnothing to do with art.\n\nThe theory of the aesthetic senses has also been presented in another\nway; that is to say, as the attempt to establish what physiological\norgans are necessary for the aesthetic fact. The physiological organ or\napparatus is nothing but a complex of cellules, thus and thus\nconstituted, thus and thus disposed; that is to say, it is merely\nphysical and natural fact or concept. But expression does not recognize\nphysiological facts. Expression has its point of departure in the\nimpressions, and the physiological path by which these have found their\nway to the mind is to it altogether indifferent. One way or another\namounts to the same thing: it suffices that they are impressions.\n\nIt is true that the want of given organs, that is, of given complexes of\ncells, produces an absence of given impressions (when these are not\nobtained by another path by a kind of organic compensation). The man\nborn blind cannot express or have the intuition of light. But the\nimpressions are not conditioned solely by the organ, but also by the\nstimuli which operate upon the organ. Thus, he who has never had the\nimpression of the sea will never be able to express it, in the same way\nas he who has never had the impression of the great world or of the\npolitical conflict will never express the one or the other. This,\nhowever, does not establish a dependence of the expressive function on\nthe stimulus or on the organ. It is the repetition of what we know\nalready: expression presupposes impression. Therefore, given expressions\nimply given impressions. Besides, every impression excludes other\nimpressions during the moment in which it dominates; and so does every\nexpression.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Unity and indivisibility of the work of art._\n\nAnother corollary of the conception of expression as activity is the\n_indivisibility_ of the work of art. Every expression is a unique\nexpression. Activity is a fusion of the impressions in an organic whole.\nA desire to express this has always prompted the affirmation that the\nworld of art should have _unity_, or, what amounts to the same thing,\n_unity in variety_. Expression is a synthesis of the various, the\nmultiple, in the one.\n\nThe fact that we divide a work of art into parts, as a poem into scenes,\nepisodes, similes, sentences, or a picture into single figures and\nobjects, background, foreground, etc., may seem to be an objection to\nthis affirmation. But such division annihilates the work, as dividing\nthe organism into heart, brain, nerves, muscles and so on, turns the\nliving being into a corpse. It is true that there exist organisms in\nwhich the division gives place to more living things, but in such a\ncase, and if we transfer the analogy to the aesthetic fact, we must\nconclude for a multiplicity of germs of life, that is to say, for a\nspeedy re-elaboration of the single parts into new single expressions.\n\nIt will be observed that expression is sometimes based on other\nexpressions. There are simple and there are _compound_ expressions. One\nmust admit some difference between the _eureka_, with which Archimedes\nexpressed all his joy after his discovery, and the expressive act\n(indeed all the five acts) of a regular tragedy. Not in the least:\nexpression is always directly based on impressions. He who conceives a\ntragedy puts into a crucible a great quantity, so to say, of\nimpressions: the expressions themselves, conceived on other occasions,\nare fused together with the new in a single mass, in the same way as we\ncan cast into a smelting furnace formless pieces of bronze and most\nprecious statuettes. Those most precious statuettes must be melted in\nthe same way as the formless bits of bronze, before there can be a new\nstatue. The old expressions must descend again to the level of\nimpressions, in order to be synthetized in a new single expression.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Art as the deliverer._\n\nBy elaborating his impressions, man _frees_ himself from them. By\nobjectifying them, he removes them from him and makes himself their\nsuperior. The liberating and purifying function of art is another aspect\nand another formula of its character of activity. Activity is the\ndeliverer, just because it drives away passivity.\n\nThis also explains why it is customary to attribute to artists alike the\nmaximum of sensibility or _passion_, and the maximum insensibility or\nOlympic _serenity_. Both qualifications agree, for they do not refer to\nthe same object. The sensibility or passion relates to the rich material\nwhich the artist absorbs into his psychic organism; the insensibility or\nserenity to the form with which he subjugates and dominates the tumult\nof the feelings and of the passions.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nART AND PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _Indissolubility of intellective from intuitive knowledge._\n\nThe two forms of knowledge, aesthetic and intellectual or conceptual,\nare indeed diverse, but this does not amount altogether to separation\nand disjunction, as we find with two forces going each its own way. If\nwe have shown that the aesthetic form is altogether independent of the\nintellectual and suffices to itself without external support, we have\nnot said that the intellectual can stand without the aesthetic. This\n_reciprocity_ would not be true.\n\nWhat is knowledge by concepts? It is knowledge of relations of things,\nand those things are intuitions. Concepts are not possible without\nintuitions, just as intuition is itself impossible without the material\nof impressions. Intuitions are: this river, this lake, this brook, this\nrain, this glass of water; the concept is: water, not this or that\nappearance and particular example of water, but water in general, in\nwhatever time or place it be realized; the material of infinite\nintuitions, but of one single and constant concept.\n\nHowever, the concept, the universal, if it be no longer intuition in one\nrespect, is in another respect intuition, and cannot fail of being\nintuition. For the man who thinks has impressions and emotions, in so\nfar as he thinks. His impression and emotion will not be love or hate,\nbut _the effort of his thought itself_, with the pain and the joy, the\nlove and the hate joined to it. This effort cannot but become intuitive\nin form, in becoming objective to the mind. To speak, is not to think\nlogically; but to _think logically_ is, at the same time, to _speak_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the negations of this thesis._\n\nThat thought cannot exist without speech, is a truth generally admitted.\nThe negations of this thesis are all founded on equivoques and errors.\n\nThe first of the equivoques is implied by those who observe that one can\nlikewise think with geometrical figures, algebraical numbers,\nideographic signs, without a single word, even pronounced silently and\nalmost insensibly within one. They also affirm that there are languages\nin which the word, the phonetic sign, expresses nothing, unless the\nwritten sign also be looked at. But when we said \"speech,\" we intended\nto employ a synecdoche, and that \"expression\" generically, should be\nunderstood, for expression is not only so-called verbal expression, as\nwe have already noted. It may be admitted that certain concepts may be\nthought without phonetic manifestations. But the very examples adduced\nto show this also prove that those concepts never exist without\nexpressions.\n\nOthers maintain that animals, or certain animals, think or reason\nwithout speaking. Now as to how, whether, and what animals think,\nwhether they be rudimentary, half-savage men resisting civilization,\nrather than physiological machines, as the old spiritualists would have\nit, are questions that do not concern us here. When the philosopher\ntalks of animal, brutal, impulsive, instinctive nature and the like, he\ndoes not base himself on conjectures as to these facts concerning dogs\nor cats, lions or ants; but upon observations of what is called animal\nand brutal in man: of the boundary or animal basis of what we feel in\nourselves. If individual animals, dogs or cats, lions or ants, possess\nsomething of the activity of man, so much the better, or so much the\nworse for them. This means that as regards them also we must talk, not\nof their nature as a whole, but of its animal basis, as being perhaps\nlarger and more strong than the animal basis of man. And if we suppose\nthat animals think, and form concepts, what is there in the line of\nconjecture to justify the admission that they do so without\ncorresponding expressions? The analogy with man, the knowledge of the\nspirit, human psychology, which is the instrument of all our conjectures\nas to animal psychology, would oblige us to suppose that if they think\nin any way, they also have some sort of speech.\n\nIt is from human psychology, that is, literary psychology, that comes\nthe other objection, to the effect that the concept can exist without\nthe word, because it is true that we all know books that are _well\nthought and badly written_: that is to say, a thought which remains\nthought _beyond_ the expression, _notwithstanding_ the imperfect\nexpression. But when we talk of books well thought and badly written, we\ncannot mean other than that in those books are parts, pages, periods or\npropositions well thought out and well written, and other parts (perhaps\nthe least important) ill thought out and badly written, not truly\nthought out and therefore not truly expressed. Where Vico's _Scienza\nnuova_ is really ill written, it is also ill thought out. If we pass\nfrom the consideration of big books to a short proposition, the error or\nthe imprecision of this statement will be recognized at once. How could\na proposition be clearly thought and confusedly written out?\n\nAll that can be admitted is that sometimes we possess thoughts\n(concepts) in an intuitive form, or in an abbreviated or, better,\npeculiar expression, sufficient for us, but not sufficient to\ncommunicate it with ease to another or other definite individuals. Hence\npeople say inaccurately, that we have the thought without the\nexpression; whereas it should properly be said that we have, indeed, the\nexpression, but in a form that is not easy of social communication.\nThis, however, is a very variable and altogether relative fact. There\nare always people who catch our thought on the wing, and prefer it in\nthis abbreviated form, and would be displeased with the greater\ndevelopment of it, necessary for other people. In other words, the\nthought considered abstractly and logically will be the same; but\naesthetically we are dealing with two different intuition-expressions,\ninto both of which enter different psychological elements. The same\nargument suffices to destroy, that is, to interpret correctly, the\naltogether empirical distinction between an _internal_ and an _external_\nlanguage.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Art and science._\n\nThe most lofty manifestations, the summits of intellectual and of\nintuitive knowledge shining from afar, are called, as we know, Art and\nScience. Art and Science, then, are different and yet linked together;\nthey meet on one side, which is the aesthetic side. Every scientific\nwork is also a work of art. The aesthetic side may remain little\nnoticed, when our mind is altogether taken up with the effort to\nunderstand the thought of the man of science, and to examine its truth.\nBut it is no longer concealed, when we pass from the activity of\nunderstanding to that of contemplation, and behold that thought either\ndeveloped before us, limpid, exact, well-shaped, without superfluous\nwords, without lack of words, with appropriate rhythm and intonation; or\nconfused, broken, embarrassed, tentative. Great thinkers are sometimes\ntermed great writers, while other equally great thinkers remain more or\nless fragmentary writers, if indeed their fragments are scientifically\nto be compared with harmonious, coherent, and perfect works.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Content and form: another meaning. Prose and poetry._\n\nWe pardon thinkers and men of science their literary mediocrity. The\nfragments console us for the failure of the whole, for it is far more\neasy to recover the well-arranged composition from the fragmentary work\nof genius than to achieve the discovery of genius. But how can we pardon\nmediocre expression in pure artists? _Mediocribus esse poetis non di,\nnon homines, non concessere columnae_. The poet or painter who lacks\nform, lacks everything, because he lacks _himself_. Poetical material\npermeates the Soul of all: the expression alone, that is to say, the\nform, makes the poet. And here appears the truth of the thesis which\ndenies to art all content, as content being understood just the\nintellectual concept. In this sense, when we take \"content\" as equal to\n\"concept\" it is most true, not only that art does not consist of\ncontent, but also that _it has no content_.\n\nIn the same way the distinction between _poetry and prose_ cannot be\njustified, save in that of art and science. It was seen in antiquity\nthat such distinction could not be founded on external elements, such as\nrhythm and metre, or on the freedom or the limitation of the form; that\nit was, on the contrary, altogether internal. Poetry is the language of\nsentiment; prose of the intellect; but since the intellect is also\nsentiment, in its concretion and reality, so all prose has a poetical\nside.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The relation of first and second degree._\n\nThe relation between intuitive knowledge or expression, and intellectual\nknowledge or concept, between art and science, poetry and prose, cannot\nbe otherwise defined than by saying that it is one of _double degree_.\nThe first degree is the expression, the second the concept: the first\ncan exist without the second, but the second cannot exist without the\nfirst. There exists poetry without prose, but not prose without poetry.\nExpression, indeed, is the first affirmation of human activity. Poetry\nis \"the maternal language of the human race\"; the first men \"were by\nnature sublime poets.\" We also admit this in another way, when we\nobserve that the passage from soul to mind, from animal to human\nactivity, is effected by means of language. And this should be said of\nintuition or expression in general. But to us it appears somewhat\ninaccurate to define language or expression as an _intermediate_ link\nbetween nature and humanity, as though it were a mixture of the one and\nof the other. Where humanity appears, the rest has already disappeared;\nthe man who expresses himself, certainly emerges from the state of\nnature, but he really does emerge: he does not stand half within and\nhalf without, as the use of the phrase \"intermediate link\" would imply.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Inexistence of other forms of knowledge._\n\nThe cognitive intellect has no form other than these two. Expression and\nconcept exhaust it completely. The whole speculative life of man is\nspent in passing from one to the other and back again.\n\n    [Sidenote] _History. Its identity with and difference from art._\n\n_Historicity_ is incorrectly held to be a third theoretical form.\nHistory is not form, but content: as form, it is nothing but intuition\nor aesthetic fact. History does not seek for laws nor form concepts; it\nemploys neither induction nor deduction; it is directed _ad narrandum,\nnon ad demonstrandum_; it does not construct universals and\nabstractions, but posits intuitions. The this, the that, the _individuum\nomni modo determinatum_, is its kingdom, as it is the kingdom of art.\nHistory, therefore, is included under the universal concept of art.\n\nFaced with this proposition and with the impossibility of conceiving a\nthird mode of knowledge, objections have been brought forward which\nwould lead to the affiliation of history to intellective or scientific\nknowledge. The greater portion of these objections is dominated by the\nprejudice that in refusing to history the character of conceptual\nscience, something of its value and dignity has been taken from it. This\nreally arises from a false idea of art, conceived, not as an essential\ntheoretic function, but as an amusement, a superfluity, a frivolity.\nWithout reopening a long debate, which so far as we are concerned, is\nfinally closed, we will mention here one sophism which has been and\nstill is widely repeated. It is intended to show the logical and\nscientific nature of history. The sophism consists in admitting that\nhistorical knowledge has for its object the individual; but not the\nrepresentation, it is added, so much as the concept of the individual.\nFrom this it is argued that history is also a logical or scientific form\nof knowledge. History, in fact, should elaborate the concept of a\npersonage such as Charlemagne or Napoleon; of an epoch, like the\nRenaissance or the Reformation; of an event, such as the French\nRevolution and the Unification of Italy. This it is held to do in the\nsame way as Geometry elaborates the concepts of spatial form, or\nAesthetic those of expression. But all this is untrue. History cannot do\notherwise than represent Napoleon and Charlemagne, the Renaissance and\nthe Reformation, the French Revolution and the Unification of Italy as\nindividual facts with their individual physiognomy: that is, in the same\nway as logicians state, that one cannot have a concept of an individual,\nbut only a representation. The so-called concept of the individual is\nalways a universal or general concept, full of details, very rich, if\nyou will, but however rich it be, yet incapable of attaining to that\nindividuality, to which historical knowledge, as aesthetic knowledge,\nalone attains.\n\nLet us rather show how the content of history comes to be distinguished\nfrom that of art. The distinction is secondary. Its origin will be found\nin what has already been observed as to the ideal character of the\nintuition or first perception, in which all is real and therefore\nnothing is real. The mind forms the concepts of external and internal at\na later stage, as it does those of what has happened and of what is\ndesired, of object and subject, and the like. Thus it distinguishes\nhistorical from non-historical intuition, the _real_ from the _unreal_,\nreal fancy from pure fancy. Even internal facts, what is desired and\nimagined, castles in the air, and countries of Cockagne, have their\nreality. The soul, too, has its history. His illusions form part of the\nbiography of every individual. But the history of an individual soul is\nhistory, because in it is always active the distinction between the real\nand the unreal, even when the real is the illusions themselves. But\nthese distinctive concepts do not appear in history as do scientific\nconcepts, but rather like those that we have seen dissolved and melted\nin the aesthetic intuitions, although they stand out in history in an\naltogether new relief. History does not construct the concepts of the\nreal and unreal, but makes use of them. History, in fact, is not the\ntheory of history. Mere conceptual analysis is of no use in realizing\nwhether an event in our lives were real or imaginary. It is necessary to\nreproduce the intuitions in the mind in the most complete form, as they\nwere at the moment of production, in order to recognize the content.\nHistoricity is distinguished in the concrete from pure imagination only\nas one intuition is distinguished from another: in the memory.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Historical criticism._\n    [Sidenote] _Historical scepticism._\n\nWhere this is not possible, owing to the delicate and fleeting shades\nbetween the real and unreal intuitions, which confuse the one with the\nother, we must either renounce, for the time at least, the knowledge of\nwhat really happened (and this we often do), or we must fall back upon\nconjecture, verisimilitude, probability. The principle of verisimilitude\nand of probability dominates in fact all historical criticism.\nExamination of the sources and of authority is directed toward\nestablishing the most credible evidence. And what is the most credible\nevidence, save that of the best observers, that is, of those who best\nremember and (be it understood) have not desired to falsify, nor had\ninterest in falsifying the truth of things? From this it follows that\nintellectual scepticism finds it easy to deny the certainty of any\nhistory, for the certainty of history is never that of science.\nHistorical certainty is composed of memory and of authority, not of\nanalyses and of demonstration. To speak of historical induction or\ndemonstration, is to make a metaphorical use of these expressions, which\nbear quite a different meaning in history to that which they bear in\nscience. The conviction of the historian is the undemonstrable\nconviction of the juryman, who has heard the witnesses, listened\nattentively to the case, and prayed Heaven to inspire him. Sometimes,\nwithout doubt, he is mistaken, but the mistakes are in a negligible\nminority compared with the occasions when he gets hold of the truth.\nThat is why good sense is right against the intellectualists, in\nbelieving in history, which is not a \"fable agreed upon,\" but that which\nthe individual and humanity remember of their past. We strive to enlarge\nand to render as precise as possible this record, which in some places\nis dim, in others very clear. We cannot do without it, such as it is,\nand taken as a whole, it is rich in truth. In a spirit of paradox only,\ncan one doubt if there ever were a Greece or a Rome, an Alexander or a\nCaesar, a feudal Europe overthrown by a series of revolutions, that on\nthe 1st of November 1517 the theses of Luther were seen fixed to the\ndoor of the church of Wittenberg, or that the Bastile was taken by the\npeople of Paris on the 14th of July 1789.\n\n\"What proof givest thou of all this?\" asks the sophist, ironically.\nHumanity replies \"I remember.\"\n\n    [Sidenote] _Philosophy as perfect science. The so-called natural\n               sciences, and their limits._\n\nThe world of what has happened, of the concrete, of history, is the\nworld that is called real, natural, including in this definition the\nreality that is called physical, as well as that which is called\nspiritual and human. All this world is intuition; historical intuition,\nif it be realistically shown as it is, or imaginary intuition, artistic\nin the strict sense, if shown under the aspect of the possible, that is\nto say, of the imaginable.\n\nScience, true science, which is not intuition but concept, not\nindividuality but universality, cannot be anything but a science of the\nspirit, that is, of what is universal in reality: Philosophy. If natural\n_sciences_ be spoken of, apart from philosophy, it is necessary to\nobserve that these are not perfect sciences: they are complexes of\nknowledge, arbitrarily abstracted and fixed. The so-called natural\nsciences themselves recognize, in fact, that they are surrounded by\nlimitations. These limitations are nothing more than historical and\nintuitive data. They calculate, measure, establish equalities,\nregularity, create classes and types, formulate laws, show in their own\nway how one fact arises out of other facts; but in their progress they\nare always met with facts which are known intuitively and historically.\nEven geometry now states that it rests altogether on hypotheses, since\nspace is not three-dimensional or Euclidean, but this assumption is made\nuse of by preference, because it is more convenient. What there is of\ntruth in the natural sciences, is either philosophy or historical fact.\nWhat they contain proper to themselves is abstract and arbitrary. When\nthe natural sciences wish to form themselves into perfect sciences, they\nmust issue from their circle and enter the philosophical circle. This\nthey do when they posit concepts which are anything but natural, such as\nthose of the atom without extension in space, of ether or vibrating\nmatter, of vital force, of space beyond the reach of intuition, and the\nlike. These are true and proper philosophical efforts, when they are not\nmere words void of meaning. The concepts of natural science are, without\ndoubt, most useful; but one cannot obtain from them that _system_, which\nbelongs only to the spirit.\n\nThese historical and intuitive assumptions, which cannot be separated\nfrom the natural sciences, furthermore explain, not only how, in the\nprogress of knowledge, that which was once considered to be truth\ndescends gradually to the grade of mythological beliefs and imaginary\nillusions, but also how, among natural scientists, there are some who\nterm all that serves as basis of argument in their teaching _mythical\nfacts, verbal expedients_, or _conventions_. The naturalists and\nmathematicians who approach the study of the energies of the spirit\nwithout preparation, are apt to carry thither these mental habits and to\nspeak, in philosophy, of such and such conventions \"as arranged by man.\"\nThey make conventions of truth and morality, and their supreme\nconvention is the Spirit itself! However, if there are to be\nconventions, something must exist about which there is no convention to\nbe made, but which is itself the agent of the convention. This is the\nspiritual activity of man. The limitation of the natural sciences\npostulates the illimitation of philosophy.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The phenomenon and the noumenon._\n\nThese explications have firmly established that the pure or fundamental\nforms of knowledge are two: the intuition and the concept--Art, and\nScience or Philosophy. With these are to be included History, which is,\nas it were, the product of intuition placed in contact with the concept,\nthat is, of art receiving in itself philosophic distinctions, while\nremaining concrete and individual. All the other forms (natural sciences\nand mathematics) are impure, being mingled with extraneous elements of\npractical origin. The intuition gives the world, the phenomenon; the\nconcept gives the noumenon, the Spirit.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nHISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN AESTHETIC\n\n\nThese relations between intuitive or aesthetic knowledge and the other\nfundamental or derivative forms of knowledge having been definitely\nestablished, we are now in a position to reveal the errors of a series\nof theories which have been, or are, presented, as theories of\nAesthetic.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of verisimilitude and of naturalism._\n\nFrom the confusion between the exigencies of art in general and the\nparticular exigencies of history has arisen the theory (which has lost\nground to-day, but used to dominate in the past) of _verisimilitude_ as\nthe object of art. As is generally the case with erroneous propositions,\nthe intention of those who employed and employ the concept of\nverisimilitude has no doubt often been much more reasonable than the\ndefinition given of the word. By verisimilitude used to be meant the\nartistic _coherence_ of the representation, that is to say, its\ncompleteness and effectiveness. If \"verisimilar\" be translated by\n\"coherent,\" a most exact meaning will often be found in the discussions,\nexamples, and judgments of the critics. An improbable personage, an\nimprobable ending to a comedy, are really badly-drawn personages,\nbadly-arranged endings, happenings without artistic motive. It has been\nsaid with reason that even fairies and sprites must have verisimilitude,\nthat is to say, be really sprites and fairies, coherent artistic\nintuitions. Sometimes the word \"possible\" has been used instead of\n\"verisimilar.\" As we have already remarked in passing, this word\npossible is synonymous with that which is imaginable or may be known\nintuitively. Everything which is really, that is to say, coherently,\nimagined, is possible. But formerly, and especially by the\ntheoreticians, by verisimilar was understood historical credibility, or\nthat historical truth which is not demonstrable, but conjecturable, not\ntrue, but verisimilar. It has been sought to impose a like character\nupon art. Who does not recall the great part played in literary history\nby the criticism of the verisimilar? For example, the fault found with\nthe _Jerusalem Delivered_, based upon the history of the Crusades, or of\nthe Homeric poems, upon that of the verisimilitude of the costume of the\nemperors and kings?\n\nAt other times has been imposed upon art the duty of the aesthetic\nreproduction of historical reality. This is another of the erroneous\nsignifications assumed by the theory concerning _the imitation of\nnature_. Verism and naturalism have since afforded the spectacle of a\nconfusion of the aesthetic fact with the processes of the natural\nsciences, by aiming at some sort of _experimental_ drama or romance.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of ideas in art, of theses in art, and of the\n               typical._\n\nThe confusions between the methods of art and those of the philosophical\nsciences have been far more frequent. Thus it has often been held to be\nwithin the competence of art to develop concepts, to unite the\nintelligible with the sensible, to represent _ideas or universals_,\nputting art in the place of science, that is, confusing the artistic\nfunction in general with the particular case in which it becomes\naesthetico-logical.\n\nThe theory of art as supporting _theses_ can be reduced to the same\nerror, as can be the theory of art considered as individual\nrepresentation, exemplifying scientific laws. The example, in so far as\nit is an example, stands for the thing exemplified, and is thus an\nexposition of the universal, that is to say, a form of science, more or\nless popular or vulgarized.\n\nThe same may be said of the aesthetic theory of the _typical_, when by\ntype is understood, as it frequently is, just the abstraction or the\nconcept, and it is affirmed that art should make _the species shine in\nthe individual_. If by typical be here understood the individual, here,\ntoo, we have a merely verbal variation. To typify would signify, in this\ncase, to characterize; that is, to determine and to represent the\nindividual. Don Quixote is a type; but of whom is he a type, if not of\nall Don Quixotes? A type, that is to say, of himself. Certainly he is\nnot a type of abstract concepts, such as the loss of the sense of\nreality, or of the love of glory. An infinite number of personages can\nbe thought of under these concepts, who are not Don Quixote. In other\nwords, we find our own impressions fully determined and verified in the\nexpression of a poet (for example in a poetical personage). We call that\nexpression typical, which we might call simply aesthetic. Poetical or\nartistic universals have been spoken of in like manner, in order to show\nthat the artistic product is altogether spiritual and ideal in itself.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the symbol and of the allegory._\n\nContinuing to correct these errors, or to make clear equivoques, we will\nnote that the _symbol_ has sometimes been given as essence of art. Now,\nif the symbol be given as inseparable from the artistic intuition, it is\nthe synonym of the intuition itself, which always has an ideal\ncharacter. There is no double-bottom to art, but one only; in art all is\nsymbolical, because all is ideal. But if the symbol be looked upon as\nseparable--if on the one side can be expressed the symbol, and on the\nother the thing symbolized, we fall back again into the intellectualist\nerror: that pretended symbol is the exposition of an abstract concept,\nit is an _allegory_, it is science, or art that apes science. But we\nmust be just toward the allegorical also. In some cases, it is\naltogether harmless. Given the _Gerusalemme liberata_, the allegory was\nimagined afterwards; given the _Adone_ of Marino, the poet of the\nlascivious insinuated afterwards that it was written to show how\n\"immoderate indulgence ends in pain\"; given a statue of a beautiful\nwoman, the sculptor can write on a card that the statue represents\n_Clemency_ or _Goodness_. This allegory linked to a finished work _post\nfestum_ does not change the work of art. What is it, then? It is an\nexpression externally _added_ to another expression. A little page of\nprose is added to the _Gerusalemme_, expressing another thought of the\npoet; a verse or a strophe is added to the _Adone_, expressing what the\npoet would like to make a part of his public swallow; while to the\nstatue nothing more than the single word is added: _Clemency_ or\n_Goodness_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the theory of artistic and literary classes._\n\nBut the greatest triumph of the intellectualist error lies in the theory\nof artistic and literary classes, which still has vogue in literary\ntreatises, and disturbs the critics and the historians of art. Let us\nobserve its genesis.\n\nThe human mind can pass from the aesthetic to the logical, just because\nthe former is a first step, in respect to the latter. It can destroy the\nexpressions, that is, the thought of the individual with the thought of\nthe universal. It can reduce expressive facts to logical relations. We\nhave already shown that this operation in its turn becomes concrete in\nan expression, but this does not mean that the first expressions have\nnot been destroyed. They have yielded their place to the new\naesthetico-logical expressions. When we are on the second step, we have\nleft the first.\n\nHe who enters a picture-gallery, or who reads a series of poems, may,\nafter he has looked and read, go further: he may seek out the relations\nof the things there expressed. Thus those pictures and compositions,\neach of which is an individual inexpressible by logic, are resolved into\nuniversals and abstractions, such as _costumes, landscapes, portraits,\ndomestic life, battles, animals, flowers, fruit, seascapes, lakes,\ndeserts, tragic, comic, piteous, cruel, lyrical, epic, dramatic,\nknightly, idyllic facts_, and the like. They are often also resolved\ninto merely quantitative categories, such as _little picture, picture,\nstatuette, group, madrigal, song, sonnet, garland of sonnets, poetry,\npoem, story, romance_, and the like.\n\nWhen we think the concept _domestic life_, or _knighthood_, or _idyll_,\nor _cruelty_, or any other quantitative concept, the individual\nexpressive fact from which we started is abandoned. From aesthetes that\nwe were, we have been changed into logicians; from contemplators of\nexpression, into reasoners. Certainly no objection can be made to such a\nprocess. In what other way could science be born, which, if aesthetic\nexpressions be assumed in it, yet has for function to go beyond them?\nThe logical or scientific form, as such, excludes the aesthetic form. He\nwho begins to think scientifically has already ceased to contemplate\naesthetically; although his thought will assume of necessity in its turn\nan aesthetic form, as has already been said, and as it would be\nsuperfluous to repeat.\n\nThe error begins when we try to deduce the expression from the concept,\nand to find in the thing substituting the laws of the thing substituted;\nwhen the difference between the second and the first step has not been\nobserved, and when, in consequence, we declare that we are standing on\nthe first step, when we are really standing on the second. This error is\nknown as _the theory of artistic and literary classes_.\n\nWhat is the aesthetic form of domestic life, of knighthood, of the\nidyll, of cruelty, and so forth? How should these contents be\n_represented_? Such is the absurd problem implied in the theory of\nartistic and literary classes. It is in this that consists all search\nafter laws or rules of styles. Domestic life, knighthood, idyll,\ncruelty, and the like, are not impressions, but concepts. They are not\ncontents, but logico-aesthetic forms. You cannot express the form, for\nit is already itself expression. And what are the words cruelty, idyll,\nknighthood, domestic life, and so on, but the expression of those\nconcepts?\n\nEven the most refined of these distinctions, those that have the most\nphilosophic appearance, do not resist criticism; as, for instance, when\nworks of art are divided into the subjective and the objective styles,\ninto lyric and epic, into works of feeling and works of design. It is\nimpossible to separate in aesthetic analysis, the subjective from the\nobjective side, the lyric from the epic, the image of feeling from that\nof things.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Errors derived from this theory appearing in judgments\n               on art._\n\nFrom the theory of the artistic and literary classes derive those\nerroneous modes of judgment and of criticism, thanks to which, instead\nof asking before a work of art if it be expressive, and what it\nexpresses, whether it speak or stammer, or be silent altogether, it is\nasked if it be obedient to the _laws_ of the epic poem, or to those of\ntragedy, to those of historical portraiture, or to those of landscape\npainting. Artists, however, while making a verbal pretence of agreeing,\nor yielding a feigned obedience to them, have really always disregarded\nthese _laws of styles_. Every true work of art has violated some\nestablished class and upset the ideas of the critics, who have thus been\nobliged to enlarge the number of classes, until finally even this\nenlargement has proved too narrow, owing to the appearance of new works\nof art, which are naturally followed by new scandals, new upsettings,\nand-new enlargements.\n\nFrom the same theory come the prejudices, owing to which at one time\n(and is it really passed?) people used to lament that Italy had no\ntragedy (until a poet arose who gave to Italy that wreath which was the\nonly thing wanting to her glorious hair), nor France the epic poem\n(until the _Henriade_, which slaked the thirsty throats of the critics).\nEulogies accorded to the inventors of new styles are connected with\nthese prejudices, so much so, that in the seventeenth century the\ninvention of the _mock-heroic_ poem seemed an important event, and the\nhonour of it was disputed, as though it were the discovery of America.\nBut the works adorned with this name (the _Secchia rapita_ and the\n_Scherno degli Dei_) were still-born, because their authors (a slight\ndraw-back) had nothing new or original to say. Mediocrities racked their\nbrains to invent, artificially, new styles. The _piscatorial_ eclogue\nwas added to the _pastoral_, and then, finally, the _military_ eclogue.\nThe _Aminta_ was bathed and became the _Alceo_. Finally, there have been\nhistorians of art and literature, so much fascinated with these ideas of\nclasses, that they claimed to write the history, not of single and\neffective literary and artistic works, but of their classes, those empty\nphantoms. They have claimed to portray, not the evolution of the\n_artistic spirit_, but the _evolution of classes_.\n\nThe philosophical condemnation of artistic and literary classes is found\nin the formulation and demonstration of what artistic activity has ever\nsought and good taste ever recognized. What is to be done if good taste\nand the real fact, put into formulas, sometimes assume the air of\nparadoxes?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Empirical sense of the divisions of classes._\n\nNow if we talk of tragedies, comedies, dramas, romances, pictures of\neveryday life, battle-pieces, landscapes, seascapes, poems, versicles,\nlyrics, and the like, if it be only with a view to be understood, and to\ndraw attention in general and approximatively to certain groups of\nworks, to which, for one reason or another, it is desired to draw\nattention, in that case, no scientific error has been committed. We\nemploy _vocables and phrases_; we do not establish _laws and\ndefinitions_. The mistake arises when the weight of a scientific\ndefinition is given to a word, when we ingenuously let ourselves be\ncaught in the meshes of that phraseology. Pray permit me a comparison.\nIt is necessary to arrange the books in a library in one way or another.\nThis used generally to be done by means of a rough classification by\nsubjects (among which the categories of miscellaneous and eccentric were\nnot wanting); they are now generally arranged by sizes or by publishers.\nWho can deny the necessity and the utility of these groupings? But what\nshould we say if some one began seriously to seek out the literary laws\nof miscellanies and of eccentricities from the Aldine or Bodonian\ncollection, from size A or size B, that is to say, from these altogether\narbitrary groupings whose sole object has been their practical use?\nWell, whoever should undertake an enterprise such as this, would be\ndoing neither more nor less than those who seek out the aesthetic laws\nof literary and artistic classes.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nANALOGOUS ERRORS IN HISTORIC AND LOGIC\n\n\nThe better to confirm these criticisms, it will be opportune to cast a\nrapid glance over analogous and opposite errors, born of ignorance as to\nthe true nature of art, and of its relation to history and to science.\nThese errors have injured alike the theory of history and of science, of\nHistoric (or Historiology) and of Logic.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the philosophy of history._\n\nHistorical intellectualism has been the cause of the many researches\nwhich have been made, especially during the last two centuries,\nresearches which continue to-day, for _a philosophy of history_, for an\n_ideal history_, for a _sociology_, for a _historical psychology_, or\nhowever may be otherwise entitled or described a science whose object is\nto extract from history, universal laws and concepts. Of what kind must\nbe these laws, these universals? Historical laws and historical\nconcepts? In that case, an elementary criticism of knowledge suffices to\nmake clear the absurdity of the attempt. When such expressions as a\n_historical law_, a _historical concept_ are not simply metaphors\ncolloquially employed, they are true contradictions in terms: the\nadjective is as unsuitable to the substantive as in the expressions\n_qualitative quantity_ or _pluralistic monism_. History means concretion\nand individuality, law and concept mean abstraction and universality.\nIf, on the other hand, the attempt to draw from history historical laws\nand concepts be abandoned, and it be merely desired to draw from it laws\nand concepts, the attempt is certainly not frivolous; but the science\nthus obtained will be, not a philosophy of history, but rather,\naccording to the case, either philosophy in its various specifications\nof Ethic, Logic, etc., or empirical science in its infinite divisions\nand subdivisions. Thus are sought out either those philosophical\nconcepts which are, as has already been observed, at the bottom of every\nhistorical construction and separate perception from intuition,\nhistorical intuition from pure intuition, history from art; or already\nformed historical intuitions are collected and reduced to types and\nclasses, which is exactly the method of the natural sciences. Great\nthinkers have sometimes donned the unsuitable cloak of the philosophy of\nhistory, and notwithstanding the covering, they have conquered\nphilosophical truths of the greatest magnitude. The cloak has been\ndropped, the truth has remained. Modern sociologists are rather to be\nblamed, not so much for the illusion in which they are involved when\nthey talk of an impossible science of sociology, as for the infecundity\nwhich almost always accompanies their illusion. It is but a small evil\nthat Aesthetic should be termed sociological Aesthetic, or Logic, social\nLogic. The grave evil is that their Aesthetic is an old-fashioned\nexpression of sensualism, their Logic verbal and incoherent. The\nphilosophical movement, to which we have referred, has borne two good\nfruits in relation to history. First of all has been felt the desire to\nconstruct a theory of historiography, that is, to understand the nature\nand the limits of history, a theory which, in conformity with the\nanalyses made above, cannot obtain satisfaction, save in a general\nscience of intuition, in an Aesthetic, from which Historic would be\nseparated under a special head by means of the intervention of the\nuniversals. Furthermore, concrete truths relating to historical events\nhave often been expressed beneath the false and presumptuous cloak of a\nphilosophy of history; canons and empirical advice have been formulated\nby no means superfluous to students and critics. It does not seem\npossible to deny this utility to the most recent of philosophies of\nhistory, to so-called historical materialism, which has thrown a very\nvivid light upon many sides of social life, formerly neglected or ill\nunderstood.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Aesthetic invasions into Logic._\n\nThe principle of authority, of the _ipse dixit_, is an invasion of\nhistoricity into the domains of science and philosophy which has raged\nin the schools. This substitutes for introspection and philosophical\nanalyses, this or that evidence, document, or authoritative statement,\nwith which history certainly cannot dispense. But Logic, the science of\nthought and of intellectual knowledge, has suffered the most grave and\ndestructive disturbances and errors of all, through the imperfect\nunderstanding of the aesthetic fact. How, indeed, could it be otherwise,\nif logical activity come after and contain in itself aesthetic activity?\nAn inexact Aesthetic must of necessity drag after it an inexact Logic.\n\nWhoever opens logical treatises, from the _Organum_ of Aristotle to the\nmoderns, must admit that they all contain a haphazard mixture of verbal\nfacts and facts of thought, of grammatical forms and of conceptual\nforms, of Aesthetic and of Logic. Not that attempts have been wanting to\nescape from verbal expression and to seize thought in its effective\nnature. Aristotelian logic itself did not become mere syllogistic and\nverbalism, without some stumbling and oscillation. The especially\nlogical problem was often touched upon in the Middle Ages, by the\nnominalists, realists, and conceptualists, in their disputes. With\nGalileo and with Bacon, the natural sciences gave an honourable place to\ninduction. Vico combated formalist and mathematical logic in favour of\ninventive methods. Kant called attention to _a priori_ syntheses. The\nabsolute idealists despised the Aristotelian logic. The followers of\nHerbart, bound to Aristotle, on the other hand, set in relief those\njudgments which they called narrative, which are of a character\naltogether different from other logical judgments. Finally, the\nlinguists insisted upon the irrationality of the word, in relation to\nthe concept. But a conscious, sure, and radical movement of reform can\nfind no base or starting-point, save in the science of Aesthetic.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Logic in its essence._\n\nIn a Logic suitably reformed on this basis, it will be fitting to\nproclaim before all things this truth, and to draw from it all its\nconsequences: the logical fact, _the only logical fact_, is _the\nconcept_, the universal, the spirit that forms, and in so far as it\nforms, the universal. And if be understood by induction, as has\nsometimes been understood, the formation of universals, and by deduction\nthe verbal development of these, then it is clear that true Logic can be\nnothing but inductive Logic. But since by the word \"deduction\" has been\nmore frequently understood the special processes of mathematics, and by\nthe word \"induction\" those of the natural sciences, it will be advisable\nto avoid the one and the other denomination, and to say that true Logic\nis the Logic of the concept. The Logic of the concept, adopting a method\nwhich is at once induction and deduction, will adopt neither the one nor\nthe other exclusively, that is, will adopt the (speculative) method,\nwhich is intrinsic to it.\n\nThe concept, the universal, is in itself, abstractly considered,\n_inexpressible_. No word is proper to it. So true is this, that the\nlogical concept remains always the same, notwithstanding the variation\nof verbal forms. In respect to the concept, expression is a simple\n_sign_ or _indication_. There must be an expression, it cannot fail; but\nwhat it is to be, this or that, is determined by the historical and\npsychological conditions of the individual who is speaking. The quality\nof the expression is not deducible from the nature of the concept. There\ndoes not exist a true (logical) sense of words. He who forms a concept\nbestows on each occasion their true meaning on the words.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Distinction between logical and non-logical judgements._\n\nThis being established, the only truly logical (that is,\naesthetico-logical) propositions, the only rigorously logical judgments,\ncan be nothing but those whose proper and exclusive content is the\ndetermination of a concept. These propositions or judgments are the\n_definitions_. Science itself is nothing but a complex of definitions,\nunified in a supreme definition; a system of concepts, or chief concept.\n\nIt is therefore necessary to exclude from Logic all those propositions\nwhich do not affirm universals. Narrative judgments, not less than those\ntermed non-enunciative by Aristotle, such as the expression of desires,\nare not properly logical judgments. They are either purely aesthetic\npropositions or historical propositions. \"Peter is passing; it is\nraining to-day; I am sleepy; I want to read\": these and an infinity of\npropositions of the same kind, are nothing but either a mere enclosing,\nin words the impression of the fact that Peter is passing, of the\nfalling rain, of my organism inclining to sleep, and of my will directed\nto reading, or they are existential affirmation concerning those facts.\nThey are expressions of the real or of the unreal, of historical or of\npure imagination; they are certainly not definitions of universals.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Syllogistic._\n\nThis exclusion cannot meet with great difficulties. It is already almost\nan accomplished fact, and the only thing required is to render it\nexplicit, decisive, and coherent. But what is to be done with all that\npart of human experience which is called _syllogistic_, consisting of\njudgments and reasonings which are based on concepts. What is\nsyllogistic? Is it to be looked down upon from above with contempt, as\nsomething useless, as has so often been done in the reaction of the\nhumanists against scholasticism, in absolute idealism, in the\nenthusiastic admiration of our times for the methods of observation and\nexperiment of the natural sciences? Syllogistic, reasoning _in forma_,\nis not a discovery of truth; it is the art of exposing, debating,\ndisputing with oneself and others. Proceeding from concepts already\nformed, from facts already observed and making appeal to the persistence\nof the true or of thought (such is the meaning of the principle of\nidentity and contradiction), it infers consequences from these data,\nthat is, it represents what has already been discovered. Therefore, if\nit be an _idem per idem_ from the point of view of invention, it is most\nefficacious as a teaching and an exposition. To reduce affirmations to\nthe syllogistic scheme is a way of controlling one's own thought and of\ncriticizing that of others. It is easy to laugh at syllogisers, but, if\nsyllogistic has been born and retains its place, it must have good roots\nof its own. Satire applied to it can concern only its abuses, such as\nthe attempt to prove syllogistically questions of fact, observation, and\nintuition, or the neglect of profound meditation and unprejudiced\ninvestigation of problems, for syllogistic formality. And if so-called\n_mathematical Logic_ can sometimes aid us in our attempt to remember\nwith ease, to manipulate the results of our own thought, let us welcome\nthis form of the syllogism also, long prophesied by Leibnitz and essayed\nby many, even in our days.\n\nBut precisely because syllogistic is the art of exposing and of\ndebating, its theory cannot hold the first place in a philosophical\nLogic, usurping that belonging to the doctrine of the concept, which is\nthe central and dominating doctrine, to which is reduced everything\nlogical in syllogistic, without leaving a residuum (relations of\nconcepts, subordination, co-ordination, identification, and so on). Nor\nmust it ever be forgotten that the concept, the (logical) judgment, and\nthe syllogism do not occupy the same position. The first alone is the\nlogical fact, the second and third are the forms in which the first\nmanifests itself. These, in so far as they are forms, cannot be examined\nsave aesthetically (grammatically); in so far as they possess logical\ncontent, only by neglecting the forms themselves and passing to the\ndoctrine of the concept.\n\n    [Sidenote] _False Logic and true Aesthetic._\n\nThis shows the truth of the ordinary remark to the effect that he who\nreasons ill, also speaks and writes ill, that exact logical analysis is\nthe basis of good expression. This truth is a tautology, for to reason\nwell is in fact to express oneself well, because the expression is the\nintuitive possession of one's own logical thought. The principle of\ncontradiction, itself, is at bottom nothing but the aesthetic principle\nof coherence. It will be said that starting from erroneous concepts it\nis possible to write and to speak exceedingly well, as it is also\npossible to reason well; that some who are dull at research may yet be\nmost limpid writers. That is precisely because to write well depends\nupon having a clear intuition of one's own thought, even if it be\nerroneous; that is to say, not of its scientific, but of its aesthetic\ntruth, since it is this truth itself. A philosopher like Schopenhauer\ncan imagine that art is a representation of the Platonic ideas. This\ndoctrine is absolutely false scientifically, yet he may develop this\nfalse knowledge in excellent prose, aesthetically most true. But we have\nalready replied to these objections, when we observed that at that\nprecise point where a speaker or a writer enunciates an ill-thought\nconcept, he is at the same time speaking ill and writing ill. He may,\nhowever, afterwards recover himself in the many other parts of his\nthought, which consist of true propositions, not connected with the\npreceding errors, and lucid expressions may with him follow upon turbid\nexpressions.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Logic reformed._\n\nAll enquiries as to the forms of judgments and of syllogisms, on their\nconversion and on their various relations, which still encumber\ntreatises on Logic, are therefore destined to become less, to be\ntransformed, to be reduced to something else.\n\nThe doctrine of the concept and of the organism of the concepts, of\ndefinition, of system, of philosophy, and of the various sciences, and\nthe like, will fill the place of these and will constitute the only true\nand proper Logic.\n\nThose who first had some suspicion of the intimate connexion between\nAesthetic and Logic and conceived Aesthetic as a _Logic of sensible\nknowledge_, were strangely addicted to applying logical categories to\nthe new knowledge, talking of _aesthetic concepts, aesthetic judgments,\naesthetic syllogisms_, and so on. We are less superstitious as regards\nthe solidity of the traditional Logic of the schools, and better\ninformed as to the nature of Aesthetic. We do not recommend the\napplication of Logic to Aesthetic, but the liberation of Logic from\naesthetic forms. These have given rise to non-existent forms or\ncategories of Logic, due to the following of altogether arbitrary and\ncrude distinctions.\n\nLogic thus reformed will always be _formal_ Logic; it will study the\ntrue form or activity of thought, the concept, excluding single and\nparticular concepts. The old Logic is ill called formal; it were better\nto call it _verbal_ or _formalistic_. Formal Logic will drive out\nformalistic Logic. To attain this object, it will not be necessary to\nhave recourse, as some have done, to a real or material Logic, which is\nnot a science of thought, but thought itself in the act; not only a\nLogic, but the complex of Philosophy, in which Logic also is included.\nThe science of thought (Logic) is that of the concept, as that of fancy\n(Aesthetic) is the science of expression. The well-being of both\nsciences lies in exactly following in every particular the distinction\nbetween the two domains.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nTHEORETIC AND PRACTICAL ACTIVITY\n\n\nThe intuitive and intellective forms exhaust, as we have said, all the\ntheoretic form of the spirit. But it is not possible to know them\nthoroughly, nor to criticize another series of erroneous aesthetic\ntheories, without first establishing clearly their relations with\nanother form of the spirit, which is the _practical_ form.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The will._\n\nThis form or practical activity is the _will_. We do not employ this\nword here in the sense of any philosophical system, in which the will is\nthe foundation of the universe, the principle of things and the true\nreality. Nor do we employ it in the ample sense of other systems, which\nunderstand by will the energy of the spirit, the spirit or activity in\ngeneral, making of every act of the human spirit an act of will. Neither\nsuch metaphysical nor such metaphorical meaning is ours. For us, the\nwill is, as generally accepted, that activity of the spirit, which\ndiffers from the mere theoretical contemplation of things, and is\nproductive, not of knowledge, but of actions. Action is really action,\nin so far as it is voluntary. It is not necessary to remark that in the\nwill to do, is included, in the scientific sense, also what is vulgarly\ncalled not-doing: the will to resist, to reject, the prometheutic will,\nis also action.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The will as an ulterior stage in respect to knowledge._\n\nMan understands things with the theoretical form, with the practical\nform he changes them; with the one he appropriates the universe, with\nthe other he creates it. But the first form is the basis of the second;\nand the relation of _double degree_, which we have already found\nexisting between aesthetic and logical activity, is repeated between\nthese two on a larger scale. Knowledge independent of the will is\nthinkable; will independent of knowledge is unthinkable. Blind will is\nnot will; true will has eyes.\n\nHow can we will, without having before us historical intuitions\n(perceptions) of objects, and knowledge of (logical) relations, which\nenlighten us as to the nature of those objects? How can we really will,\nif we do not know the world which surrounds us, and the manner of\nchanging things by acting upon them?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Objections and elucidations._\n\nIt has been objected that men of action, practical men in the eminent\nsense, are the least disposed to contemplate and to theorize: their\nenergy is not delayed in contemplation, it rushes at once into will. And\nconversely, that contemplative men, philosophers, are often very\nmediocre in practical matters, weak willed, and therefore neglected and\nthrust aside in the tumult of life. It is easy to see that these\ndistinctions are merely empirical and quantitative. Certainly, the\npractical man has no need of a philosophical system in order to act, but\nin the spheres where he does act, he starts from intuitions and concepts\nwhich are most clear to him. Otherwise he could not will the most\nordinary actions. It would not be possible to will to feed oneself, for\ninstance, without knowledge of the food, and of the link of cause and\neffect between certain movements and certain organic sensations. Rising\ngradually to the more complex forms of action, for example to the\npolitical, how could we will anything politically good or bad, without\nknowing the real conditions of society, and consequently the means and\nexpedients to be adopted? When the practical man feels himself in the\ndark about one or more of these points, or when he is seized with doubt,\naction either does not begin or stops. It is then that the theoretical\nmoment, which in the rapid succession of human actions is hardly noticed\nand rapidly forgotten, becomes important and occupies consciousness for\na longer time. And if this moment be prolonged, then the practical man\nmay become Hamlet, divided between desire for action and his small\namount of theoretical clarity as regards the situation and the means to\nbe employed. And if he develop a taste for contemplation and discovery,\nand leave willing and acting, to a more or less great extent, to others,\nthere is formed in him the calm disposition of the artist, of the man of\nscience, or of the philosopher, who are sometimes unpractical or\naltogether blameworthy. These observations are all obvious. Their\nexactitude cannot be denied. Let us, however, repeat that they are\nfounded on quantitative distinctions and do not disprove, but confirm\nthe fact that an action, however slight it be, cannot really be an\naction, that is, an action that is willed, unless it be preceded by\ncognoscitive activity.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of practical judgments or judgments of value._\n\nSome psychologists, on the other hand, place before practical action an\naltogether special class of judgments, which they call _practical_\njudgments or judgments _of value_. They say that in order to resolve to\nperform an action, it is necessary to have judged: \"this action is\nuseful, this action is good.\" And at first sight this seems to have the\ntestimony of consciousness on its side. But he who observes better and\nanalyses with greater subtlety, discovers that such judgments follow\ninstead of preceding the affirmation of the will; they are nothing but\nthe expression of the already exercised volition. A good or useful\naction is an action that is willed. It will always be impossible to\ndistil from the objective study of things a single drop of usefulness or\ngoodness. We do not desire things because we know them to be good or\nuseful; but we know them to be good and useful, because we desire them.\nHere too, the rapidity, with which the facts of consciousness follow one\nanother has given rise to an illusion. Practical action is preceded by\nknowledge, but not by practical knowledge, or better by the practical:\nto obtain this, it is first necessary to have practical action. The\nthird moment, therefore, of practical judgments, or judgments of value,\nis altogether imaginary. It does not come between the two moments or\ndegrees of theory and practice. That is why there exist no normative\nsciences in general, which regulate or command, discover and indicate\nvalues to the practical activity; because there is none for any other\nactivity, assuming every science already realized and that activity\ndeveloped, which it afterwards takes as its object.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Exclusion of the practical from the aesthetic._\n\nThese distinctions established, we must condemn as erroneous every\ntheory which confuses aesthetic with practical activity, or introduces\nthe laws of the second into the first. That science is theory and art\npractice has been many times affirmed. Those who make this statement,\nand look upon the aesthetic fact as a practical fact, do not do so\ncapriciously or because they are groping in the void; but because they\nhave their eye on something which is really practical. But the practical\nwhich they are looking at is not Aesthetic, nor within Aesthetic; it is\n_outside and beside it_; and although they are often found united, they\nare not necessarily united, that is to say, by the bond of identity of\nnature.\n\nThe aesthetic fact is altogether completed in the expressive elaboration\nof the impressions. When we have conquered the word within us, conceived\ndefinitely and vividly a figure or a statue, or found a musical motive,\nexpression is born and is complete; there is no need for anything else.\nIf after this we should open our mouths and _will_ to open them, to\nspeak, or our throats to sing, and declare in a loud voice and with\nextended throat what we have completely said or sung to ourselves; or if\nwe should stretch out and _will_ to stretch out our hands to touch the\nnotes of the piano, or to take up the brushes and the chisel, making\nthus in detail those movements which we have already done rapidly, and\ndoing so in such a way as to leave more or less durable traces; this is\nall an addition, a fact which obeys quite different laws to the first,\nand with these laws we have not to occupy ourselves for the moment. Let\nus, however, here recognize that this second movement is a production of\nthings, a _practical_ fact, or a fact of _will_. It is customary to\ndistinguish the internal from the external work of art: the terminology\nseems here to be infelicitous, for the work of art (the aesthetic work)\nis always _internal_; and that which is called _external_ is no longer a\nwork of art. Others distinguish between _aesthetic_ fact and _artistic_\nfact, meaning by the second the external or practical stage, which may\nand generally does follow the first. But in this case, it is simply a\ncase of linguistic usage, doubtless permissible, although perhaps not\nopportune.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the theory of the end of art and of the\n               choice of the content._\n\nFor the same reasons the search for the _end of art_ is ridiculous, when\nit is understood of art as art. And since to fix an end is to choose,\nthe theory that the content of art must be _selected_ is another form of\nthe same error. A selection from among impressions and sensations\nimplies that these are already expressions, otherwise, how can a\nselection be made among what is continuous and indistinct? To choose is\nto will: to will this and not to will that: and this and that must be\nbefore us, they must be expressed. Practice follows, it does not precede\ntheory; expression is free inspiration.\n\nThe true artist, in fact, finds himself big with his theme, he knows not\nhow; he feels the moment of birth drawing near, but he cannot will it or\nnot will it. If he were to wish to act in opposition to his inspiration,\nto make an arbitrary choice, if, born Anacreon, he were to wish to sing\nof Atreus and of Alcides, his lyre would warn him of his mistake,\nechoing only of Venus and of Love, notwithstanding his efforts to the\ncontrary.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Practical innocence of art._\n\nThe theme or content cannot, therefore, be practically or morally\ncharged with epithets of praise or of blame. When critics of art remark\nthat a theme is _badly selected_, in cases where that observation has a\njust foundation, it is a question of blaming, not the selection of the\ntheme (which would be absurd), but the manner in which the artist has\ntreated it. The expression has failed, owing to the contradictions which\nit contains. And when the same critics rebel against the theme or the\ncontent as being unworthy of art and blameworthy, in respect to works\nwhich they proclaim to be artistically perfect; if these expressions\nreally are perfect, there is nothing to be done but to advise the\ncritics to leave the artists in peace, for they cannot get inspiration,\nsave from what has made an impression upon them. The critics should\nthink rather of how they can effect changes in nature and in society, in\norder that those impressions may not exist. If ugliness were to vanish\nfrom the world, if universal virtue and felicity were established there,\nperhaps artists would no longer represent perverse or pessimistic\nsentiments, but sentiments that are calm, innocent, and joyous, like\nArcadians of a real Arcady. But so long as ugliness and turpitude exist\nin nature and impose themselves on the artist, it is not possible to\nprevent the expression of these things also; and when it has arisen,\n_factum infectum fieri nequit_. We speak thus entirely from the\naesthetic point of view, and from that of pure aesthetic criticism.\n\nWe do not delay to pass here in review the damage which the criticism of\nchoice does to artistic production, with the prejudices which it\nproduces or maintains among the artists themselves, and with the\ncontrast which it occasions between artistic impulse and critical\nexigencies. It is true that sometimes it seems to do some good also, by\nassisting the artists to discover themselves, that is, their own\nimpressions and their own inspiration, and to acquire consciousness of\nthe task which is, as it were, imposed upon them by the historical\nmoment in which they live, and by their individual temperament. In these\ncases, criticism of choice merely recognizes and aids the expressions\nwhich are already being formed. It believes itself to be the mother,\nwhere, at most, it is only the midwife.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The independence of art._\n\nThe impossibility of choice of content completes the theorem of the\n_independence of art_, and is also the only legitimate meaning of the\nexpression: _art for art's sake_. Art is thus independent of science, as\nit is of the useful and the moral. Let it not be feared that thus may be\njustified art that is frivolous or cold, since that which is truly\nfrivolous or cold is so because it has not been raised to expression; or\nin other words, frivolity and frigidity come always from the form of the\naesthetic elaboration, from the lack of a content, not from the material\nqualities of the content.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the saying: the style is the man._\n\nThe saying: _the style is the man_, can also not be completely\ncriticized, save by starting from the distinction between the theoretic\nand the practical, and from the theoretic character of the aesthetic\nactivity. Man is not simply knowledge and contemplation: he is also\nwill, which contains in it the cognoscitive moment. Now the saying is\neither altogether void, as when it is understood that the man is the\nstyle, in so far as he is style, that is to say, the man, but only in so\nfar as he is an expression of activity; or it is erroneous, when the\nattempt is made to deduce from what a man has seen and expressed, that\nwhich he has done and willed, inferring thereby that there is a\nnecessary link between knowing and willing. Many legends in the\nbiographies of artists have sprung from this erroneous identification,\nsince it seemed impossible that a man who gives expression to generous\nsentiments should not be a noble and generous man in practical life; or\nthat the dramatist who gives a great many stabs in his plays, should not\nhimself have given a few at least in real life. Vainly do the artists\nprotest: _lasciva est nobis pagina, vita proba_. They are merely taxed\nin addition with lying and hypocrisy. O you poor women of Verona, how\nfar more subtle you were, when you founded your belief that Dante had\nreally descended to hell, upon his dusky countenance! Yours was at any\nrate a historical conjecture.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the concept of sincerity in art._\n\nFinally, _sincerity_ imposed upon the artist as a duty (this law of\nethics which, they say, is also a law of aesthetic) arises from another\nequivoke. For by sincerity is meant either the moral duty not to deceive\none's neighbour; and in that case Is foreign to the artist. For he, in\nfact, deceives no one, since he gives form to what is already in his\nmind. He would deceive, only if he were to betray his duty as an artist\nby a lesser devotion to the intrinsic necessity of his task. If lies and\ndeceit are in his mind, then the form which he gives to these things\ncannot be deceit or lies, precisely because it is aesthetic. The artist,\nif he be a charlatan, a liar, or a miscreant, purifies his other self by\nreflecting it in art. Or by sincerity is meant, fulness and truth of\nexpression, and it is clear that this second sense has nothing to do\nwith the ethical concept. The law, which is at once ethical and\naesthetic, reveals itself in this case in a word employed alike by Ethic\nand Aesthetic.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\nANALOGY BETWEEN THE THEORETIC AND THE PRACTICAL\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _The two forms of practical activity._\n\nThe twofold grade of the theoretical activity, aesthetic and logical,\nhas an important parallel in the practical activity, which has not yet\nbeen placed in due relief. The practical activity is also divided into a\nfirst and second degree, the second implying the first. The first\npractical degree is the simply _useful_ or _economical_ activity; the\nsecond the _moral_ activity.\n\nEconomy is, as it were, the Aesthetic of practical life; Morality its\nLogic.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The economically useful._\n\nIf this has not been clearly seen by philosophers; if its suitable place\nin the system of the mind has not been given to the economic activity,\nand it has been left to wander in the prolegomena to treatises on\npolitical economy, often uncertain and but slightly elaborated, this is\ndue, among other reasons, to the fact that the useful or economic has\nbeen confused, now with the concept of _technique_, now with that of the\n_egoistic_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Distinction between the useful and the technical._\n\n_Technique_ is certainly not a special activity of the spirit.\nTechnique is knowledge; or better, it is knowledge itself, in general,\nthat takes this name, as we have seen, in so far as it serves as basis\nfor practical action. Knowledge which is not followed, or is presumed to\nbe not easily followed by practical action, is called pure: the same\nknowledge, if effectively followed by action, is called applied; if it\nis presumed that it can be easily followed by the same action, it is\ncalled technical or applied. This word, then, indicates a _situation_ in\nwhich knowledge already is, or easily can be found, not a special form\nof knowledge. So true is this, that it would be altogether impossible to\nestablish whether a given order of knowledge were, intrinsically, pure\nor applied. All knowledge, however abstract and philosophical one may\nimagine it to be, can be a guide to practical acts; a theoretical error\nin the ultimate principles of morals can be reflected and always is\nreflected in some way, in practical life. One can only speak roughly and\nunscientifically of truths that are pure and of others that are applied.\n\nThe same knowledge which is called technical, can also be called\n_useful_. But the word \"useful,\" in conformity with the criticism of\njudgments of value made above, is to be understood as used here in a\nlinguistic or metaphorical sense. When we say that water is useful for\nputting out fire, the word \"useful\" is used in a non-scientific sense.\nWater thrown on the fire is the cause of its going out: this is the\nknowledge that serves for basis to the action, let us say, of firemen.\nThere is a link, not of nature, but of simple succession, between the\nuseful action of the person who extinguishes the conflagration, and this\nknowledge. The technique of the effects of the water is the theoretical\nactivity which precedes; the _action_ of him who extinguishes the fire\nis alone useful.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Distinction between the useful and the egoistic._\n\nSome economists identify utility with _ego\u00efsm_, that is to say, with\nmerely economical action or desire, with that which is profitable to the\nindividual, in so far as individual, without regard to and indeed in\ncomplete opposition to the moral law. The egoistic is the immoral. In\nthis case Economy would be a very strange science, standing, not beside,\nbut facing Ethic, like the devil facing God, or at least like the\n_advocatus diaboli_ in the processes of canonization. Such a conception\nof it is altogether inadmissible: the science of immorality is implied\nin that of morality, as the science of the false is implied in _Logic_,\nthe science of the true, and a science of ineffectual expression in\nAesthetic, the science of successful expression. If, then, Economy were\nthe scientific treatment of egoism, it would be a chapter of Ethic, or\nEthic itself; because every moral determination implies, at the same\ntime, a negation of its contrary.\n\nFurther, conscience tells us that to conduct oneself economically is not\nto conduct oneself egoistically; that even the most morally scrupulous\nman must conduct himself usefully (economically), if he does not wish to\nbe inconclusive and, therefore, not truly moral. If utility were egoism,\nhow could it be the duty of the altruist to behave like an egoist?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Economic will and moral will._\n\nIf we are not mistaken, the difficulty is solved in a manner perfectly\nanalogous to that in which is solved the problem of the relations\nbetween the expression and the concept, between Aesthetic and Logic.\n\nTo will economically is to _will an end_; to will morally is to _will\nthe rational end_. But whoever wills and acts morally, cannot but will\nand act usefully (economically). How could he will the _rational_,\nunless he willed it also _as his particular end_?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Pure economicity._\n\nThe reciprocal is not true; as it is not true in aesthetic science that\nthe expressive fact must of necessity be linked with the logical fact.\nIt is possible to will economically without willing morally; and it is\npossible to conduct oneself with perfect economic coherence, while\npursuing an end which is objectively irrational (immoral), or, better,\nan end which would be so judged in a superior grade of consciousness.\n\nExamples of the economic, without the moral character, are the Prince of\nMachiavelli, Caesar Borgia, or the Iago of Shakespeare. Who can help\nadmiring their strength of will, although their activity is only\neconomic, and is opposed to what we hold moral? Who can help admiring\nthe ser Ciappelletto of Boccaccio, who, even on his death-bed, pursues\nand realizes his ideal of the perfect rascal, making the small and timid\nlittle thieves who are present at his burlesque confession exclaim:\n\"What manner of man is this, whose perversity, neither age, nor\ninfirmity, nor the fear of death, which he sees at hand, nor the fear of\nGod, before whose judgment-seat he must stand in a little while, have\nbeen able to remove, nor to cause that he should not wish to die as he\nhas lived?\"\n\n    [Sidenote] _The economic side of morality._\n\nThe moral man unites with the pertinacity and fearlessness of a Caesar\nBorgia, of an Iago, or of a ser Ciappelletto, the good will of the saint\nor of the hero. Or, better, good will would not be will, and\nconsequently not good, if it did not possess, in addition to the side\nwhich makes it _good_, also that which makes it _will_. Thus a logical\nthought, which does not succeed in expressing itself, is not thought,\nbut at the most, a confused presentiment of a thought yet to come.\n\nIt is not correct, then, to conceive of the amoral man as also the\nanti-economical man, or to make of morality an element of coherence in\nthe acts of life, and therefore of economicity. Nothing prevents us from\nconceiving (an hypothesis which is verified at least during certain\nperiods and moments, if not during whole lifetimes) a man altogether\nwithout moral conscience. In a man thus organized, what for us is\nimmorality is not so for him, because it is not so felt. The\nconsciousness of the contradiction between what is desired as a rational\nend and what is pursued egoistically cannot be born in him. This\ncontradiction is anti-economicity. Immoral conduct becomes also\nanti-economical only in the man who possesses moral conscience. The\nmoral remorse which is the proof of this, is also economical remorse;\nthat is to say, pain at not having known how to will completely and to\nattain to that moral ideal which was willed at the first moment, but was\nafterwards perverted by the passions. _Video meliora proboque, deteriora\nsequor_. The _video_ and the _probo_ are here an initial will\nimmediately contradicted and passed over. In the man deprived of moral\nsense, we must admit a remorse which is _merely economic_; like that of\na thief or of an assassin who should be attacked when on the point of\nrobbing or of assassinating, and should abstain from doing so, not owing\nto a conversion of his being, but owing to his impressionability and\nbewilderment, or even owing to a momentary awakening of the moral\nconsciousness. When he has come back to himself, that thief or assassin\nwill regret and be ashamed of his inconsequence; his remorse will not be\ndue to having done wrong, but to not having done it; his remorse is,\ntherefore, economic, not moral, since the latter is excluded by\nhypothesis. However, a lively moral conscience is generally found among\nthe majority of men, and its total absence is a rare and perhaps\nnon-existent monstrosity. It may, therefore, be admitted, that morality\ncoincides with economicity in the conduct of life.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The merely economic and the error of the morally\n               indifferent._\n\nThere need be no fear lest the parallelism affirmed by us should\nintroduce afresh into the category of the _morally indifferent_, of that\nwhich is in truth action and volition, but is neither moral nor immoral;\nthe category in sum of the _licit_ and of the _permissible_, which has\nalways been the cause or mirror of ethical corruption, as is the case\nwith Jesuitical morality in which it dominated. It remains quite certain\nthat indifferent moral actions do not exist, because moral activity\npervades and must pervade every least volitional movement of man. But\nthis, far from upsetting the parallelism, confirms it. Do there exist\nintuitions which science and the intellect do not pervade and analyse,\nresolving them into universal concepts, or changing them into historical\naffirmations? We have already seen that true science, philosophy, knows\nno external limits which bar its way, as happens with the so-called\nnatural sciences. Science and morality entirely dominate, the one the\naesthetic intuitions, the other the economic volitions of man, although\nneither of them can appear in the concrete, save in the intuitive form\nas regards the one, in the economic as regards the other.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of utilitarianism and the reform of Ethic and\n               of Economic._\n\nThis combined identity and difference of the useful and of the moral, of\nthe economic and of the ethic, explains the fortune enjoyed now and\nformerly by the utilitarian theory of Ethic. It is in fact easy to\ndiscover and to show a utilitarian side in every moral action; as it is\neasy to show an aesthetic side of every logical proposition. The\ncriticism of ethical utilitarianism cannot escape by denying this truth\nand seeking out absurd and inexistent examples of _useless_ moral\nactions. It must admit the utilitarian side and explain it as the\nconcrete form of morality, which consists of what is _within_ this form.\nUtilitarians do not see this within. This is not the place for a more\nample development of such ideas. Ethic and Economic cannot but be\ngainers, as we have said of Logic and Aesthetic, by a more exact\ndetermination of the relations that exist between them. Economic science\nis now rising to the animating concept of the useful, as it strives to\npass beyond the mathematical phase, in which it is still entangled; a\nphase which, when it superseded historicism, was in its turn a progress,\ndestroying a series of arbitrary distinctions and false theories of\nEconomic, implied in the confusion of the theoretical with the\nhistorical. With this conception, it will be easy on the one hand to\nabsorb and to verify the semi-philosophical theories of so-called pure\neconomy, and on the other, by the introduction of successive\ncomplications and additions, and by passing from the philosophical to\nthe empirical or naturalistic method, to include the particular theories\nof the political or national economy of the schools.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Phenomenon and noumenon in practical activity._\n\nAs aesthetic intuition knows the phenomenon or nature, and philosophic\nintuition the noumenon or spirit; so economic activity wills the\nphenomenon or nature, and moral activity the noumenon or spirit. _The\nspirit which desires itself_, its true self, the universal which is in\nthe empirical and finite spirit: that is the formula which perhaps\ndefines the essence of morality with the least impropriety. This will\nfor the true self is _absolute liberty_.\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\nEXCLUSION OF OTHER SPIRITUAL FORMS\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _The system of the spirit._\n\nIn this summary sketch that we have given, of the entire philosophy of\nthe spirit in its fundamental moments, the spirit is conceived as\nconsisting of four moments or grades, disposed in such a way that the\ntheoretical activity is to the practical as is the first theoretical\ngrade to the second theoretical, and the first practical grade to the\nsecond practical. The four moments imply one another regressively by\ntheir concretion. The concept cannot be without expression, the useful\nwithout the one and the other, and morality without the three preceding\ngrades. If the aesthetic fact is alone independent, and the others more\nor less dependent, then the logical is the least so and the moral will\nthe most. Moral intention operates on given theoretic bases, which\ncannot be dispensed with, save by that absurd practice, the jesuitical\n_direction of intention_. Here people pretend to themselves not to know\nwhat at bottom they know perfectly well.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The forms of genius._\n\nIf the forms of human activity are four, four also are the forms of\ngenius. Geniuses in art, in science, in moral will or heroes, have\ncertainly always been recognized. But the genius of pure Economic has\nmet with opposition. It is not altogether without reason that a category\nof bad geniuses or of _geniuses of evil_ has been created. The\npractical, merely economic genius, which is not directed to a rational\nend, cannot but excite an admiration mingled with alarm. It would be a\nmere question of words, were we to discuss whether the word \"genius\"\nshould be applied only to creators of aesthetic expression, or also to\nmen of scientific research and of action. To observe, on the other hand,\nthat genius, of whatever kind it be, is always a quantitative conception\nand an empirical distinction, would be to repeat what has already been\nexplained as regards artistic genius.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Non-existence of a fifth form of activity. Law;\n               sociality._\n\nA fifth form of spiritual activity does not exist. It would be easy to\ndemonstrate how all the other forms, either do not possess the character\nof activity, or are verbal variants of the activities already examined,\nor are complex and derived facts, in which the various activities are\nmingled, or are filled with special contents and contingent data.\n\nThe _judicial_ fact, for example, considered as what is called objective\nlaw, is derived both from the economic and from the logical activities.\nLaw is a rule, a formula (whether oral or written matters little here)\nin which is contained an economic relation willed by an individual or by\na collectivity. This economic side at once unites it with and\ndistinguishes it from moral activity. Take another example. Sociology\n(among the many meanings the word bears in our times) is sometimes\nconceived as the study of an original element, which is called\n_sociality_. Now what is it that distinguishes sociality, or the\nrelations which are developed in a meeting of men, not of subhuman\nbeings, if it be not just the various spiritual activities which exist\namong the former and which are supposed not to exist, or to exist only\nin a rudimentary degree, among the latter? Sociality, then, far from\nbeing an original, simple, irreducible conception, is very complex and\ncomplicated. This could be proved by the impossibility, generally\nrecognized, of enunciating a single sociological law, properly\nso-called. Those that are improperly called by that name are revealed as\neither empirical historical observations, or spiritual laws, that is to\nsay judgments, into which are translated the conceptions of the\nspiritual activities; when they are not simply empty and indeterminate\ngeneralizations, like the so-called law of evolution. Sometimes, too,\nnothing more is understood by sociality than social rule, and so law;\nand thus sociology is confounded with the science or theory of law\nitself. Law, sociality, and like terms, are to be dealt with in a mode\nanalogous to that employed by us in the consideration of historicity and\ntechnique.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Religiosity._\n\nIt may seem fitting to form a different judgment as to _religious_\nactivity. But religion is nothing but knowledge, and does not differ\nfrom its other forms and subforms. For it is in truth and in turn either\nthe expression of practical and ideal aspirations (religious ideals), or\nhistorical narrative (legend), or conceptual science (dogma).\n\nIt can therefore be maintained with equal truth, both that religion is\ndestroyed by the progress of human knowledge, and that it is always\npresent there. Their religion was the whole patrimony of knowledge of\nprimitive peoples: our patrimony of knowledge is our religion. The\ncontent has been changed, bettered, refined, and it will change and\nbecome better and more refined in the future also; but its function is\nalways the same. We do not know what use could be made of religion by\nthose who wish to preserve it side by side with the theoretic activity\nof man, with his art, with his criticism, and with his philosophy. It is\nimpossible to preserve an imperfect and inferior kind of knowledge, like\nreligion, side by side with what has surpassed and disproved it.\nCatholicism, which is always coherent, will not tolerate a Science, a\nHistory, an Ethic, in contradiction to its views and doctrines. The\nrationalists are less coherent. They are disposed to allow a little\nspace in their souls for a religion which is in contradiction with their\nwhole theoretic world.\n\nThese affectations and religious susceptibilities of the rationalists of\nour times have their origin in the superstitious cult of the natural\nsciences. These, as we know and as is confessed by the mouth of their\nchief adepts, are all surrounded by _limits_. Science having been\nwrongly identified with the so-called natural sciences, it could be\nforeseen that the remainder would be asked of religion; that remainder\nwith which the human spirit cannot dispense. We are therefore indebted\nto materialism, to positivism, to naturalism for this unhealthy and\noften disingenuous reflowering of religious exaltation. Such things are\nthe business of the hospital, when they are not the business of the\npolitician.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Metaphysic._\n\nPhilosophy withdraws from religion all reason for existing, because it\nsubstitutes itself for religion. As the science of the spirit, it looks\nupon religion as a phenomenon, a transitory historical fact, a psychic\ncondition that can be surpassed. Philosophy shares the domain of\nknowledge with the natural disciplines, with history and with art. It\nleaves to the first, narration, measurement and classification; to the\nsecond, the chronicling of what has individually happened; to the third,\nthe individually possible. There is nothing left to share with religion.\nFor the same reason, philosophy, as the science of the spirit, cannot be\nphilosophy of the intuitive datum; nor, as has been seen, _Philosophy of\nHistory, nor Philosophy of Nature_; and therefore there cannot be a\nphilosophic science of what is not form and universal, but material and\nparticular. This amounts to affirming the impossibility of _metaphysic_.\n\nThe Method or Logic of history followed the Philosophy of history; a\ngnoseology of the conceptions which are employed in the natural sciences\nsucceeded natural philosophy. What philosophy can study of the one is\nits mode of construction (intuition, perception, document, probability,\netc.); of the others she can study the forms of the conceptions which\nappear in them (space, time, motion, number, types, classes, etc.).\nPhilosophy, which should become metaphysical in the sense above\ndescribed, would, on the other hand, claim to compete with narrative\nhistory, and with the natural sciences, which in their field are alone\nlegitimate and effective. Such a competition becomes in fact a labour\nspoiling labour. We are _antimetaphysical_ in this sense, while yet\ndeclaring ourselves _ultrametaphysical_, if by that word it be desired\nto claim and to affirm the function of philosophy as the\nautoconsciousness of the spirit, as opposed to the merely empirical and\nclassificatory function of the natural sciences.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Mental imagination and the intuitive intellect._\n\nIn order to maintain itself side by side with the sciences of the\nspirit, metaphysic has been obliged to assert the existence of a\nspecific spiritual activity, of which it would be the product. This\nactivity, which in antiquity was called _mental or superior\nimagination_, and in modern times more often _intuitive intellect or\nintellectual intuition_, would unite in an altogether special form the\ncharacters of imagination and of intellect. It would provide the method\nof passing, by deduction or dialectically, from the infinite to the\nfinite, from form to matter, from the concept to the intuition, from\nscience to history, operating by a method which should be at once unity\nand compenetration of the universal and the particular, of the abstract\nand the concrete, of intuition and of intellect. A faculty marvellous\nindeed and delightful to possess; but we, who do not possess it, have no\nmeans of proving its existence.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Mystical aesthetic._\n\nIntellectual intuition has sometimes been considered as the true\naesthetic activity. At others a not less marvellous aesthetic activity\nhas been placed beside, below, or above it, a faculty altogether\ndifferent from simple intuition. The glories of this faculty have been\nsung, and to it have been attributed the fact of art, or at the least\ncertain groups of artistic production, arbitrarily chosen. Art,\nreligion, and philosophy have seemed in turn one only, or three distinct\nfaculties of the spirit, now one, now another of these being superior in\nthe dignity assigned to each.\n\nIt is impossible to enumerate all the various attitudes assumed by this\nconception of Aesthetic, which we will call _mystical_. We are here in\nthe kingdom, not of the science of imagination, but of imagination\nitself, which creates its world with the varying elements of the\nimpressions and of the feelings. Let it suffice to mention that this\nmysterious faculty has been conceived, now as practical, now as a mean\nbetween the theoretic and the practical, at others again as a theoretic\ngrade together with philosophy and religion.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Mortality and immortality of art._\n\nThe immortality of art has sometimes been deduced from this last\nconception as belonging with its sisters to the sphere of absolute\nspirit. At other times, on the other hand, when religion has been looked\nupon as mortal and as dissolved in philosophy, then the mortality, even\nthe actual death, or at least the agony of art has been proclaimed.\nThese questions have no meaning for us, because, seeing that the\nfunction of art is a necessary grade of the spirit, to ask if art can be\neliminated is the same thing as asking if sensation or intelligence can\nbe eliminated. But metaphysic, in the above sense, since it transplants\nitself to an arbitrary world, is not to be criticized in detail, any\nmore than one can criticize the botany of the garden of Alcina or the\nnavigation of the voyage of Astolfo. Criticism can only be made by\nrefusing to join the game; that is to say, by rejecting the very\npossibility of metaphysic, always in the sense above indicated.\n\nAs we do not admit intellectual intuition in philosophy, we can also not\nadmit its shadow or equivalent, aesthetic intellectual intuition, or any\nother mode by which this imaginary function may be called and\nrepresented. We repeat again that we do not know of a fifth grade beyond\nthe four grades of spirit which consciousness reveals to us.\n\n\n\n\nIX\n\nINDIVISIBILITY OF EXPRESSION INTO MODES OR GRADES AND CRITIQUE OF\nRHETORIC\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _The characteristics of art._\n\nIt is customary to give long enumerations of the characteristics of art.\nHaving reached this point of the treatise, having studied the artistic\nfunction as spiritual activity, as theoretic activity, and as special\ntheoretic activity (intuitive), we are able to discern that those\nvarious and copious descriptions mean, when they mean anything at all,\nnothing but a repetition of what may be called the qualities of the\naesthetic function, generic, specific, and characteristic. To the first\nof these are referred, as we have already observed, the characters, or\nbetter, the verbal variants of _unity_, and of _unity_ in _variety_,\nthose also of _simplicity_, of _originality_, and so on; to the second of\nthese, the characteristics of _truth_, of _sincerity_, and the like; to\nthe third, the characteristics of _life_, of _vivacity_, of _animation_,\nof _concretion_, of _individuality_, of _characteristicality_. The words\nmay vary yet more, but they will not contribute anything scientifically\nnew. The results which we have shown have altogether exhausted the\nanalysis of expression as such.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Inexistence of modes of expression._\n\nBut at this point, the question as to whether there be various _modes or\ngrades_ of expression is still perfectly legitimate. We have\ndistinguished two grades of activity, each of which is subdivided into\ntwo other grades, and there is certainly, so far, no visible logical\nreason why there should not exist two or more modes of the aesthetic,\nthat is of expression.--The only objection is that these modes do not\nexist.\n\nFor the present at least, it is a question of simple internal\nobservation and of self consciousness. One may scrutinize aesthetic\nfacts as much as one will: no formal differences will ever be found\namong them, nor will the aesthetic fact be divisible into a first and a\nsecond degree.\n\nThis signifies that a philosophical classification of expressions is not\npossible. Single expressive facts are so many individuals, of which the\none cannot be compared with the other, save generically, in so far as\neach is expression. To use the language of the schools, expression is a\nspecies which cannot in its turn perform the functions of genus.\nImpressions, that is to say contents, vary; every content differs from\nevery other content, because nothing in life repeats itself; and the\ncontinuous variation of contents follows the irreducible variety of\nexpressive facts, the aesthetic syntheses of the impressions.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Impossibility of translations._\n\nA corollary of this is the impossibility of _translations_, in so far as\nthey pretend to effect the transference of one expression into another,\nlike a liquid poured from a vase of a certain shape into a vase of\nanother shape. We can elaborate logically what we have already\nelaborated in aesthetic form only; but we cannot reduce that which has\nalready possessed its aesthetic form to another form also aesthetic. In\ntruth, every translation either diminishes and spoils; or it creates a\nnew expression, by putting the former back into the crucible and mixing\nit with other impressions belonging to the pretended translator. In the\nformer case, the expression always remains one, that of the original,\nthe translation being more or less deficient, that is to say, not\nproperly expression: in the other case, there would certainly be two\nexpressions, but with two different contents. \"Ugly faithful ones or\nfaithless beauties\" is a proverb that well expresses the dilemma with\nwhich every translator is faced. In aesthetic translations, such as\nthose which are word for word or interlinear, or paraphrastic\ntranslations, are to be looked upon as simple commentaries on the\noriginal.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of rhetorical categories._\n\nThe division of expressions into various classes is known in literature\nby the name of theory of _ornament_ or of _rhetorical categories_. But\nsimilar attempts at classification in the other forms of art are not\nwanting: suffice it to mention the _realistic and symbolic forms_,\nspoken of in painting and sculpture.\n\nThe scientific value to be attached in Aesthetic and in aesthetic\ncriticism to these distinctions of _realistic and symbolic_, of _style\nand absence of style_, of _objective and subjective_, of _classic and\nromantic_, of _simple and ornate_, of _proper and metaphorical_, of the\nfourteen forms of metaphor, of the figures of _word_ and of _sentence_,\nand further of _pleonasm_, of _ellipse_, of _inversion_, of\n_repetition_, of _synonyms and homonyms_, and so on; is _nil_ or\naltogether negative. To none of these terms and distinctions can be\ngiven a satisfactory aesthetic definition. Those that have been\nattempted, when they are not obviously erroneous, are words devoid of\nsense. A typical example of this is the very common definition of\nmetaphor as of _another word used in place of the word itself_. Now why\ngive oneself this trouble? Why take the worse and longer road when you\nknow the shorter and better road? Perhaps, as is generally said, because\nthe correct word is in certain cases not so _expressive_ as the\nso-called incorrect word or metaphor? But in that case the metaphor\nbecomes exactly the right word, and the so-called right word, if it were\nused, would be _but little expressive_ and therefore most improper.\nSimilar observations of elementary good sense can be made regarding the\nother categories, as, for example, the generic one of the ornate. One\ncan ask oneself how an ornament can be joined to expression. Externally?\nIn that case it must always remain separate. Internally? In that case,\neither it does not assist expression and mars it; or it does form part\nof it and is not ornament, but a constituent element of expression,\nindistinguishable from the whole.\n\nIt is not necessary to dwell upon the harm done by these distinctions.\nRhetoric has often been declaimed against, but although there has been\nrebellion against its consequences, its principles have been carefully\npreserved, perhaps in order to show proof of philosophic coherence.\nRhetoric has contributed, if not to make dominant in literary\nproduction, at least to justify theoretically, that particular mode of\nwriting ill which is called fine writing or writing according to\nrhetoric.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Empirical sense of the rhetorical categories._\n\nThe terms above mentioned would never have gone beyond the schools,\nwhere we all of us learned them (certain of never finding the\nopportunity of using them in strictly aesthetic discussions, or even of\ndoing so jocosely and with a comic intention), save when occasionally\nemployed in one of the following significations: as _verbal variants _of\nthe aesthetic concept; as indications of the _anti-aesthetic_, or,\nfinally (and this is their most important use), in a sense which is no\nlonger aesthetic and literary, _but merely logical_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Use of these categories as synonyms of the aesthetic\n               fact._\n\nExpressions are not divisible into classes, but some are successful,\nothers half-successful, others failures. There are perfect and\nimperfect, complete and deficient expressions. The terms already cited,\nthen, sometimes indicate the successful expression, sometimes the\nvarious forms of the failures. But they are employed in the most\ninconstant and capricious manner, for it often happens that the same\nword serves, now to proclaim the perfect, now to condemn the imperfect.\n\nAn instance of this is found when someone, criticizing two pictures--the\none without inspiration, in which the author has copied natural objects\nwithout intelligence; the other inspired, but without obvious likeness\nto existing objects--calls the first _realistic_, the second _symbolic_.\nOthers, on the contrary, pronounce the word _realistic_ about a strongly\nfelt picture representing a scene of ordinary life, while they talk of\n_symbolic_ in reference to another picture representing but a cold\nallegory. It is evident that in the first case symbolic means artistic,\nand realistic inartistic, while in the second, realistic is synonymous\nwith artistic and symbolic with inartistic. How, then, can we be\nastonished when some hotly maintain that the true art form is the\nsymbolic, and that the realistic is inartistic; others, that the\nrealistic is the artistic, and the symbolic the inartistic? We cannot\nbut grant that both are right, since each makes use of the same words in\nsenses so diverse.\n\nThe great disputes about the _classic_ and the _romantic_ are frequently\nbased upon such equivokes. Sometimes the former was understood as the\nartistically perfect, and the second as lacking balance and imperfect;\nat others, the classic was cold and artificial, the romantic sincere,\nwarm, efficacious, and truly expressive. Thus it was always possible to\ntake the side of the classic against the romantic, or of the romantic\nagainst the classic.\n\nThe same thing happens as regards the word _style_. Sometimes it is\naffirmed that every writer should have style. Here style is synonymous\nwith form or expression. Sometimes the form of a code of laws or of a\nmathematical work is said to be devoid of style. Here the error of\nadmitting diverse modes of expression is again committed, of admitting\nan ornate and a naked form of expression, because, since style is form,\nthe code and the mathematical treatise must also, strictly speaking,\nhave each its style. At other times, one hears the critics blaming\nsomeone for \"having too much style\" or for \"writing a style.\" Here it is\nclear that style signifies, not the form, nor a mode of it, but improper\nand pretentious expression, which is one form of the inartistic.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Their use to indicate various aesthetic imperfections._\n\nPassing to the second, not altogether insignificant, use of these words\nand distinctions, we sometimes find in the examination of a literary\ncomposition such remarks as follow: here is a pleonasm, here an ellipse,\nthere a metaphor, here again a synonym or an equivoke. This means that\nin one place is an error consisting of using a larger number of words\nthan is necessary (pleonasm); that in another the error arises from too\nfew having been used (ellipse), elsewhere from the use of an unsuitable\nword (metaphor), or from the use of two words which seem to express two\ndifferent things, where they really express the same thing (synonym); or\nthat, on the contrary, it arises from having employed one which seems to\nexpress the same thing where it expresses two different things\n(equivoke). This pejorative and pathological use of the terms is,\nhowever, more uncommon than the preceding.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Their use in a sense transcending aesthetic, in the\n               service of science._\n\nFinally, when rhetorical terminology possesses no aesthetic\nsignification similar or analogous to those passed in review, and yet\none is aware that it is not void of meaning and designates something\nthat deserves to be noted, it is then used in the service of logic and\nof science. If it be granted that a concept used in a scientific sense\nby a given writer is expressed with a definite term, it is natural that\nother words formed by that writer as used to signify the same concept,\nor incidentally made use of by him, become, _in respect to_ the\nvocabulary fixed upon by him as true, metaphors, synecdoches, synonyms,\nelliptic forms, and the like. We, too, in the course of this treatise,\nhave several times made use of, and intend again to make use of such\nterms, in order to make clear the sense of the words we employ, or may\nfind employed. But this proceeding, which is of value in the\ndisquisitions of scientific and intellectual criticism, has none\nwhatever in aesthetic criticism. For science there exist appropriate\nwords and metaphors. The same concept may be psychologically formed in\nvarious circumstances and therefore be expressed with various\nintuitions. When the scientific terminology of a given writer has been\nestablished, and one of these modes has been fixed as correct, then all\nother uses of it become improper or tropical. But in the aesthetic fact\nexist only appropriate words. The same intuition can only be expressed\nin one way, precisely because it is an intuition and not a concept.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Rhetoric in the schools._\n\nSome, while they admit the aesthetic insufficiency of the rhetorical\ncategories, yet make a reserve as regards their utility and the service\nthey are supposed to render, especially in schools of literature. We\nconfess that we fail to understand how error and confusion can educate\nthe mind to logical clearness, or aid the teaching of a science which\nthey disturb and obscure. Perhaps it may be desired to say that they can\naid memory and learning as empirical classes, as was admitted above for\nliterary and artistic styles. But there is another purpose for which the\nrhetorical categories should certainly continue to be admitted to the\nschools: to be criticized there. We cannot simply forget the errors of\nthe past, and truth cannot be kept alive, save by making it fight\nagainst error. Unless a notion of the rhetorical categories be given,\naccompanied by a suitable criticism of these, there is a risk of their\nspringing up again. For they are already springing up with certain\nphilologists, disguised as most recent _psychological_ discoveries.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The resemblances of expressions._\n\nIt would seem as though we wished to deny all bond of likeness among\nthemselves between expressions and works of art. The likenesses exist,\nand owing to them, works of art can be arranged in this or that group.\nBut they are likenesses such as are observed among individuals, and can\nnever be rendered with abstract definitions. That is to say, these\nlikenesses have nothing to do with identification, subordination,\nco-ordination, and the other relations of concepts. They consist wholly\nin what is called a _family likeness_, and are connected with those\nhistorical conditions existing at the birth of the various works, or in\nan affinity of soul between the artists.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The relative possibility of translations._\n\nIt is in these resemblances that lies the _relative_ possibility of\ntranslations. This does not consist of the reproduction of the same\noriginal expressions (which it would be vain to attempt), but in the\nmeasure that expressions are given, more or less nearly resembling\nthose. The translation that passes for good is an approximation which\nhas original value as a work of art and can stand by itself.\n\n\n\n\nX\n\nAESTHETIC FEELINGS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UGLY AND THE\nBEAUTIFUL\n\n\nPassing on to the study of more complex concepts, where the aesthetic\nactivity is found in conjunction with other orders of facts, and showing\nthe mode of this union or complication, we find ourselves at once face\nto face with the concept of _feeling_ and with the feelings which are\ncalled _aesthetic_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Various significances of the word feeling._\n\nThe word \"feeling\" is one of the richest in meanings. We have already\nhad occasion to meet with it once, among those used to designate the\nspirit in its passivity, the matter or content of art, and also as\nsynonym of _impressions_. Once again (and then the meaning was\naltogether different), we have met with it as designating the\n_non-logical_ and _non-historical_ character of the aesthetic fact, that\nis to say pure intuition, a form of truth which defines no concept and\nstates no fact.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Feeling as activity._\n\nBut feeling is not here understood in either of these two senses, nor in\nthe others in which it has nevertheless been used to designate other\n_cognoscitive_ forms of spirit. Its meaning here is that of a special\nactivity, of non-cognoscitive nature, but possessing its two poles,\npositive and negative, in _pleasure_ and _pain_. This activity has\nalways greatly embarrassed philosophers, who have attempted either to\ndeny it as an activity, or to attribute it to _nature_ and to exclude it\nfrom spirit. Both solutions bristle with difficulties, and these are of\nsuch a kind that the solutions prove themselves finally unacceptable to\nanyone who examines them with care. For of what could a non-spiritual\nactivity consist, an _activity of nature_, when we have no other\nknowledge of activity save as spiritual, and of spirituality save as\nactivity? Nature is, in this case, by definition, the merely passive,\ninert, mechanical and material. On the other hand, the negation of the\ncharacter of activity to feeling is energetically disproved by those\nvery poles of pleasure and of pain which appear in it and manifest\nactivity in its concreteness, and, we will say, all aquiver.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Identification of feeling with economic activity._\n\nThis critical conclusion ought to place us in the greatest\nembarrassment, for in the sketch of the system of the spirit given\nabove, we have left no room for the new activity, of which we are now\nobliged to recognize the existence. But activity of feeling, if it be\nactivity, is not specially new. It has already had its place assigned to\nit in the system which we have sketched, where, however, it has been\nindicated under another name, as _economic_ activity. What is called the\nactivity of feeling is nothing but that more elementary and fundamental\npractical activity, which we have distinguished from ethical activity,\nand made to consist of the appetite and desire for some individual end,\nwithout any moral determination.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of hedonism._\n\nIf feeling has been sometimes considered as organic or natural activity,\nthis has happened precisely because it does not coincide either with\nlogical, aesthetic, or ethical activity. Looked at from the standpoint\nof these three (which were the only ones admitted), it has seemed to lie\n_outside_ the true and real spirit, the spirit in its aristocracy, and\nto be almost a determination of nature and of the soul, in so far as it\nis nature. Thus the thesis, several times maintained, that the aesthetic\nactivity, like the ethical and intellectual activities, is not feeling,\nbecomes at once completely proved. This thesis was inexpugnable, when\nsensation had already been reduced confusedly and implicitly to economic\nvolition. The view which has been refuted is known by the name of\n_hedonism_. For hedonism, all the various forms of the spirit are\nreduced to one, which thus itself also loses its own distinctive\ncharacter and becomes something turbid and mysterious, like \"the shades\nin which all cows are black.\" Having effected this reduction and\nmutilation, the hedonists naturally do not succeed in seeing anything\nelse in any activity but pleasure and pain. They find no substantial\ndifference between the pleasure of art and that of an easy digestion,\nbetween the pleasure of a good action and that of breathing the fresh\nair with wide-expanded lungs.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Feeling as a concomitant to every form of activity._\n\nBut if the activity of feeling in the sense here defined must not be\nsubstituted for all the other forms of spiritual activity, we have not\nsaid that it cannot _accompany_ them. Indeed it accompanies them of\nnecessity, because they are all in close relation, both with one another\nand with the elementary volitional form. Therefore each of them has for\nconcomitants individual volitions and volitional pleasures and pains\nwhich are known as feeling. But we must not confound what is\nconcomitant, with the principal fact, and take the one for the other.\nThe discovery of the truth, or the satisfaction of a moral duty\nfulfilled, produces in us a joy which makes our whole being vibrate,\nfor, by attaining to those forms of spiritual activity, it attains at\nthe same time that to which it was _practically_ tending, as to its end,\nduring the effort. Nevertheless, economic or hedonistic satisfaction,\nethical satisfaction, aesthetic satisfaction, intellectual satisfaction,\nremain always distinct, even when in union.\n\nThus is solved at the same time the much-debated question, which has\nseemed, not wrongly, a matter of life or death for aesthetic science,\nnamely, whether the feeling and the pleasure precede or follow, are\ncause or effect of the aesthetic fact. We must enlarge this question, to\ninclude the relation between the various spiritual forms, and solve it\nin the sense that in the unity of the spirit one cannot talk of cause\nand effect and of what comes first and what follows it in time.\n\nAnd once the relation above exposed is established, the statements,\nwhich it is customary to make, as to the nature of aesthetic, moral,\nintellectual, and even, as is sometimes said, economic feelings, must\nalso fall. In this last case, it is clear that it is a question, not of\ntwo terms, but of one, and the quest of economic feeling can be but that\nsame one concerning the economic activity. But in the other cases also,\nthe search can never be directed to the substantive, but to the\nadjective: aesthetic, morality, logic, explain the colouring of the\nfeelings as aesthetic, moral, and intellectual, while feeling, studied\nalone, will never explain those refractions.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Meaning of certain ordinary distinctions of feelings._\n\nA further consequence is, that we can free ourselves from the\ndistinction between values or feelings _of value_, and feelings that are\nmerely hedonistic and _without value_; also from other similar\ndistinctions, like those between _disinterested_ feelings and\n_interested_ feelings, between _objective _feelings and the others that\nare not _objective_ but simply _subjective_, between feelings of\n_approval_ and others of _mere pleasure_ (_Gefallen_ and _Vergn\u00fcgen_ of\nthe Germans). Those distinctions strove hard to save the three spiritual\nforms, which have been recognised as the triad of the _True_, the\n_Good_, and the _Beautiful_, from confusion with the fourth form, still\nunknown, yet insidious through its indeterminateness, and mother of\nscandals. For us this triad has finished its task, because we are\ncapable of reaching the distinction far more directly, by welcoming even\nthe selfish, subjective, merely pleasurable feelings, among the\nrespectable forms of the spirit; and where formerly antitheses were\nconceived of by ourselves and others, between value and feelings, as\nbetween spirituality and naturality, henceforth we see nothing but\ndifference between value and value.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Value and disvalue: the contraries and their union._\n\nAs has already been said, the economic feeling or activity reveals\nitself as divided into two poles, positive and negative, pleasure and\npain, which we can now translate into useful, and useless or hurtful.\nThis bipartition has already been noted above, as a mark of the active\ncharacter of feeling, precisely because the same bipartition is found in\nall forms of activity. If each of these is a _value_, each has opposed\nto it _antivalue or disvalue_. Absence of value is not sufficient to\ncause disvalue, but activity and passivity must be struggling between\nthemselves, without the one getting the better of the other; hence the\ncontradiction, and the disvalue of the activity that is embarrassed,\ncontested, or interrupted. Value is activity that unfolds itself freely:\ndisvalue is its contrary.\n\nWe will content ourselves with this definition of the two terms, without\nentering into the problem of the relation between value and disvalue,\nthat is, between the problem of contraries. (Are these to be thought of\ndualistically, as two beings or two orders of beings, like Ormuzd and\nAhriman, angels and devils, enemies to one another; or as a unity, which\nis also contrariety?) This definition of the two terms will be\nsufficient for our purpose, which is to make clear aesthetic activity in\nparticular, and one of the most obscure and disputed concepts of\nAesthetic which arises at this point: the concept of the _Beautiful_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The Beautiful as the value of expression, or expression\n               and nothing more._\n\nAesthetic, intellectual, economic, and ethical values and disvalues are\nvariously denominated in current speech: _beautiful, true, good, useful,\njust_, and so on--these words designate the free development of\nspiritual activity, action, scientific research, artistic production,\nwhen they are successful; _ugly, false, bad, useless, unbecoming,\nunjust, inexact_ designate embarrassed activity, the product of which is\na failure. In linguistic usage, these denominations are being\ncontinually shifted from one order of facts to another, and from this to\nthat. _Beautiful_, for instance, is said not only of a successful\nexpression, but also of a scientific truth, of an action successfully\nachieved, and of a moral action: thus we talk of an _intellectual\nbeauty_, of a _beautiful action_, of a _moral beauty_. Many\nphilosophers, especially aestheticians, have lost their heads in their\npursuit of these most varied uses: they have entered an inextricable and\nimpervious verbal labyrinth. For this reason it has hitherto seemed\nconvenient studiously to avoid the use of the word beautiful to indicate\nsuccessful expression. But after all the explanations that have been\ngiven, and all danger of misunderstanding being now dissipated, and\nsince, on the other hand, we cannot fail to recognize that the\nprevailing tendency, alike in current speech and in philosophy, is to\nlimit the meaning of the vocable _beautiful_ altogether to the aesthetic\nvalue, we may define beauty as _successful expression_, or better, as\n_expression_ and nothing more, because expression, when it is not\nsuccessful, is not expression.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The ugly, and the elements of beauty which compose it._\n\nConsequently, the ugly is unsuccessful expression. The paradox is true,\nthat, in works of art that are failures, the beautiful is present as\n_unity_ and the ugly as _multiplicity_. Thus, with regard to works of\nart that are more or less failures, we talk of qualities, that is to say\nof _those parts of them that are beautiful_. We do not talk thus of\nperfect works. It is in fact impossible to enumerate their qualities or\nto designate those parts of them that are beautiful. In them there is\ncomplete fusion: they have but one quality. Life circulates in the whole\norganism: it is not withdrawn into certain parts.\n\nThe qualities of works that are failures may be of various degrees. They\nmay even be very great. The beautiful does not possess degrees, for\nthere is no conceiving a more beautiful, that is, an expressive that is\nmore expressive, an adequate that is more than adequate. Ugliness, on\nthe other hand, does possess degrees, from the rather ugly (or almost\nbeautiful) to the extremely ugly. But if the ugly were _complete_, that\nis to say, without any element of beauty, it would for that very reason\ncease to be ugly, because in it would be absent the contradiction which\nis the reason of its existence. The disvalue would become nonvalue;\nactivity would give place to passivity, with which it is not at war,\nsave when there effectively is war.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Illusions that there exist expressions which are neither\n               beautiful nor ugly._\n\nAnd because the distinctive consciousness of the beautiful and of the\nugly is based on the contrasts and contradictions in which aesthetic\nactivity is developed, it is evident that this consciousness becomes\nattenuated to the point of disappearing altogether, as we descend from\nthe more complicated to the more simple and to the simplest cases of\nexpression. From this arises the illusion that there are expressions\nwhich are neither beautiful nor ugly, those which are obtained without\nsensible effort and appear easy and natural being so considered.\n\n    [Sidenote] _True aesthetic feelings and concomitant or accidental\n               feelings._\n\nThe whole mystery of the _beautiful_ and the _ugly_ is reduced to these\nhenceforth most easy definitions. Should any one object that there exist\nperfect aesthetic expressions before which no pleasure is felt, and\nothers, perhaps even failures, which give him the greatest pleasure, it\nis necessary to advise him to pay great attention, as regards the\naesthetic fact, to that only which is truly aesthetic pleasure.\nAesthetic pleasure is sometimes reinforced by pleasures arising from\nextraneous facts, which are only casually found united with it. The poet\nor any other artist affords an instance of purely aesthetic pleasure,\nduring the moment in which he sees (or has the intuition of) his work\nfor the first time; that is to say, when his impressions take form and\nhis countenance is irradiated with the divine joy of the creator. On the\nother hand, a mixed pleasure is experienced by any one who goes to the\ntheatre, after a day's work, to witness a comedy: when the pleasure of\nrest and amusement, and that of laughingly snatching a nail from the\ngaping coffin, is accompanied at a certain moment by real aesthetic\npleasure, obtained from the art of the dramatist and of the actors. The\nsame may be said of the artist who looks upon his labour with pleasure,\nwhen it is finished, experiencing, in addition to the aesthetic\npleasure, that very different one which arises from the thought of\nself-love satisfied, or of the economic gain which will come to him from\nhis work. Examples could be multiplied.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of apparent feelings._\n\nA category of _apparent_ aesthetic feelings has been formed in modern\nAesthetic. These have nothing to do with the aesthetic sensations of\npleasure arising from the form, that is to say from the work of art. On\nthe contrary, they arise from the content of the work of art. It has\nbeen observed that \"artistic representations arouse pleasure and pain in\ntheir infinite variety and gradations. We tremble with anxiety, we\nrejoice, we fear, we laugh, we weep, we desire, with the personages of a\ndrama or of a romance, with the figures in a picture, or with the melody\nof music. But these feelings are not those that would give occasion to\nthe real fact outside art; that is to say, they are the same in quality,\nbut they are quantitively an attenuation. Aesthetic and _apparent_\npleasure and pain are slight, of little depth, and changeable.\" We have\nno need to treat of these _apparent feelings_, for the good reason that\nwe have already amply discussed them; indeed, we have treated of them\nalone. What are ever feelings that become apparent or manifest, but\nfeelings objectified, intensified, expressed? And it is natural that\nthey do not trouble and agitate us passionately, as do those of real\nlife, because those were matter, these are form and activity; those true\nand proper feelings, these intuitions and expressions. The formula,\nthen, of _apparent feelings_ is nothing but a tautology. The best that\ncan be done is to run the pen through it.\n\n\n\n\nXI\n\nCRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC HEDONISM\n\n\nAs we are opposed to hedonism in general, that is to say, to the theory\nwhich is based on the pleasure and pain intrinsic to Economy and\naccompanies every other form of activity, confounding the content and\nthat which contains it, and fails to recognize any process but the\nhedonistic; so we are opposed to aesthetic hedonism in particular, which\nlooks upon the aesthetic at any rate, if not also upon all other\nactivities, as a simple fact of feeling, and confounds the _pleasurable\nof expression_, which is the beautiful, with the pleasurable and nothing\nmore, and with the pleasurable of all sorts.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the beautiful as that which pleases the\n               higher senses._\n\nThe aesthetic-hedonistic point of view has been presented in several\nforms. One of the most ancient conceives the beautiful as that which\npleases the sight and hearing, that is to say, the so-called superior\nsenses. When analysis of aesthetic facts first began, it was, in fact,\ndifficult to avoid the mistake of thinking that a picture and a piece of\nmusic are impressions of sight or of hearing: it was and is an\nindisputable fact that the blind man does not enjoy the picture, nor the\ndeaf man the music. To show, as we have shown, that the aesthetic fact\ndoes not depend upon the nature of the impressions, but that all\nsensible impressions can be raised to aesthetic expression and that none\nneed of necessity be so raised, is an idea which presents itself only\nwhen all the other ways out of the difficulty have been tried. But whoso\nimagines that the aesthetic fact is something pleasing to the eyes or to\nthe hearing, has no line of defence against him who proceeds logically\nto identify the beautiful with the pleasurable in general, and includes\ncooking in Aesthetic, or, as some positivist has done, the viscerally\nbeautiful.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the theory of play._\n\nThe theory of _play_ is another form of aesthetic hedonism. The\nconception of play has sometimes helped towards the realization of the\nactifying character of the expressive fact: man (it has been said) is\nnot really man, save when he begins to play; that is to say, when he\nfrees himself from natural and mechanical causality and operates\nspiritually; and his first game is art. But since the word _play_ also\nmeans that pleasure which arises from the expenditure of the exuberant\nenergy of the organism (that is to say, from a practical act), the\nconsequence of this theory has been, that every game has been called an\naesthetic fact, and that the aesthetic function has been called a game,\nin so far as it is possible to play with it, for, like science and every\nother thing, Aesthetic can be made part of a game. But morality cannot\nbe provoked at the intention of playing, on the ground that it does not\nconsent; on the contrary, it dominates and regulates the act of playing\nitself.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the theories of sexuality and of the triumph._\n\nFinally, there have been some who have tried to deduce the pleasure of\nart from the reaction of the sexual organs. There are some very modern\naestheticians who place the genesis of the aesthetic fact in the\npleasure of _conquering_, of _triumphing_, or, as others add, in the\ndesire of the male, who wishes to conquer the female. This theory is\nseasoned with much anecdotal erudition, Heaven knows of what degree of\ncredibility! on the customs of savage peoples. But in very truth there\nwas no necessity for such important aid, for one often meets in ordinary\nlife poets who adorn themselves with their poetry, like cocks that raise\ntheir crests, or turkeys that spread their tails. But he who does such\nthings, in so far as he does them, is not a poet, but a poor devil of a\ncock or turkey. The conquest of woman does not suffice to explain the\nart fact. It would be just as correct to term poetry _economic_, because\nthere have been aulic and stipendiary poets, and there are poets the\nsale of whose verses helps them to gain their livelihood, if it does not\naltogether provide it. However, this definition has not failed to win\nover some zealous neophytes of historical materialism.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the Aesthetic of the sympathetic. Meaning in\n               it of content and form._\n\nAnother less vulgar current of thought considers Aesthetic to be the\nscience of the _sympathetic_, of that with which we sympathize, which\nattracts, rejoices, gives us pleasure and excites admiration. But the\nsympathetic is nothing but the image or representation of what pleases.\nAnd, as such, it is a complex fact, resulting from a constant element,\nthe aesthetic element of representation, and from a variable element,\nthe pleasing in its infinite forms, arising from all the various classes\nof values.\n\nIn ordinary language, there is sometimes a feeling of repugnance at\ncalling an expression beautiful, which is not an expression of the\nsympathetic. Hence the continual contrast between the point of view of\nthe aesthetician or of the art critic and that of the ordinary person,\nwho cannot succeed in persuading himself that the image of pain and of\nturpitude can be beautiful, or, at least, can be beautiful with as much\nright as the pleasing and the good.\n\nThe opposition could be solved by distinguishing two different sciences,\none of expression and the other of the sympathetic, if the latter could\nbe the object of a special science; that is to say, if it were not, as\nhas been shown, a complex fact. If predominance be given to the\nexpressive fact, it becomes a part of Aesthetic as science of\nexpression; if to the pleasurable content, we fall back to the study of\nfacts which are essentially hedonistic (utilitarian), however\ncomplicated they may appear. The origin, also, of the connexion between\ncontent and form is to be sought for in the Aesthetic of the\nsympathetic, when this is conceived as the sum of two values.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Aesthetic hedonism and moralism._\n\nIn all the doctrines just now discussed, the art fact is posited as\nmerely hedonistic. But this view cannot be maintained, save by uniting\nit with a philosophic hedonism that is complete and not partial, that is\nto say, with a hedonism which does not admit any other form of value.\nHardly has this hedonistic conception of art been received by\nphilosophers, who admit one or more spiritual values, of truth or of\nmorality, than the following question must necessarily be asked: What\nshould be done with art? To what use should it be put? Should a free\ncourse be allowed to its pleasures? And if so, to what extent? The\nquestion of the _end of art_, which in the Aesthetic of expression would\nbe a contradiction of terms, here appears in place, and altogether\nlogical.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The rigoristic negation, and the pedagogic justification\n               of art._\n\nNow it is evident that, admitting the premisses, but two solutions of\nsuch a question can be given, the one altogether negative, the other\nrestrictive. The first, which we shall call _rigoristic_ or _ascetic_,\nappears several times, although not frequently, in the history of ideas.\nIt looks upon art as an inebriation of the senses, and therefore, not\nonly useless, but harmful. According to this theory, then, it is\nnecessary to drive it with all our strength from the human soul, which\nit troubles. The other solution, which we shall call _pedagogic_ or\n_moralistico-utilitarian_, admits art, but only in so far as it concurs\nwith the end of morality; in so far as it assists with innocent pleasure\nthe work of him who leads to the true and the good; in so far as it\nsprinkles with dulcet balm the sides of the vase of wisdom and of\nmorality.\n\nIt is well to observe that it would be an error to divide this second\nview into intellectualist and moralistico-utilitarian, according to\nwhether the end of leading to the true or to what is practically good,\nbe assigned to art. The task of instructing, which is imposed upon it,\nprecisely because it is an end which is sought after and advised, is no\nlonger merely a theoretical fact, but a theoretical fact become the\nmaterial for practical action; it is not, therefore, intellectualism, but\npedagogism and practicism. Nor would it be more exact to subdivide the\npedagogic view into the pure utilitarian and the moralistico-utilitarian;\nbecause those who admit only the individually useful (the desire of the\nindividual), precisely because they are absolute hedonists, have no\nmotive for seeking an ulterior justification for art.\n\nBut to enunciate these theories at the point to which we have attained\nis to confute them. We therefore restrict ourselves to observing that in\nthe pedagogic theory of art is to be found another of the reasons why it\nhas been erroneously claimed that the content of art should be _chosen_\nwith a view to certain practical effects.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of pure beauty._\n\nThe thesis, re-echoed by the artists, that art consists of _pure\nbeauty_, has often been brought forward against hedonistic and pedagogic\nAesthetic: \"Heaven places All our joy in _pure beauty_, and the Verse is\neverything.\" If it is wished that this should be understood in the sense\nthat art is not to be confounded with sensual pleasure, that is, in\nfact, with utilitarian practicism, nor with moralism, then our Aesthetic\nalso must be permitted to adorn itself with the title of _Aesthetic of\npure beauty_. But if (as is often the case) something mystical and\ntranscendental be meant by this, something that is unknown to our poor\nhuman world, or something spiritual and beatific, but not expressive, we\nmust reply that while applauding the conception of a beauty, free of all\nthat is not the spiritual form of expression, we are yet unable to\nconceive a beauty altogether purified of expression, that is to say,\nseparated from itself.\n\n\n\n\nXII\n\nTHE AESTHETIC OF THE SYMPATHETIC AND PSEUDO-AESTHETIC CONCEPTS\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _Pseudo-aesthetic concepts, and the aesthetic of the\n               sympathetic._\n\nThe doctrine of the sympathetic (very often animated and seconded in\nthis by the capricious metaphysical and mystical Aesthetic, and by that\nblind tradition which assumes an intimate connection between things by\nchance treated of together by the same authors and in the same books),\nhas introduced and rendered familiar in systems of Aesthetic, a series\nof concepts, of which one example suffices to justify our resolute\nexpulsion of them from our own treatise.\n\nTheir catalogue is long, not to say interminable: _tragic, comic,\nsublime, pathetic, moving, sad, ridiculous, melancholy, tragi-comic,\nhumoristic, majestic, dignified, serious, grave, imposing, noble,\ndecorous, graceful, attractive, piquant, coquettish, idyllic, elegiac,\ncheerful, violent, ingenuous, cruel, base, horrible, disgusting,\ndreadful, nauseating_; the list can be increased at will.\n\nSince that doctrine took as its special object the sympathetic, it was\nnaturally unable to neglect any of the varieties of this, or any of the\ncombinations or gradations which lead at last from the sympathetic to\nthe antipathetic. And seeing that the sympathetic content was held to be\nthe _beautiful_ and the antipathetic the _ugly_, the varieties (tragic,\ncomic, sublime, pathetic, etc.) constituted for it the shades and\ngradations intervening between the beautiful and the ugly.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the theory of the ugly in art and of the\n               ugly surmounted._\n\nHaving enumerated and defined, as well as it could, the chief among\nthese varieties, the Aesthetic of the sympathetic set itself the problem\nof the place to be assigned to the _ugly in art_. This problem is\nwithout meaning for us, who do not recognize any ugliness save the\nanti-aesthetic or inexpressive, which can never form part of the\naesthetic fact, being, on the contrary, its antithesis. But the question\nfor the doctrine which we are here criticizing was to reconcile in some\nway the false and defective idea of art from which it started, reduced\nto the representation of the agreeable, with effective art, which\noccupies a far wider field. Hence the artificial attempt to settle what\nexamples of the ugly (antipathetic) could be admitted in artistic\nrepresentation, and for what reasons, and in what ways.\n\nThe answer was: that the ugly is admissible, only when it can be\n_overcome_, an unconquerable ugliness, such as the _disgusting_ or the\n_nauseating_, being altogether excluded. Further, that the duty of the\nugly, when admitted in art, is to contribute towards heightening the\neffect of the beautiful (sympathetic), by producing a series of\ncontrasts, from which the pleasurable shall issue more efficacious and\npleasure-giving. It is, in fact, a common observation that pleasure is\nmore vividly felt when It has been preceded by abstinence or by\nsuffering. Thus the ugly in art was looked upon as the servant of the\nbeautiful, its stimulant and condiment.\n\nThat special theory of hedonistic refinement, which used to be pompously\ncalled the _surmounting of the ugly_, falls with the general theory of\nthe sympathetic; and with it the enumeration and the definition of the\nconcepts mentioned above remain completely excluded from Aesthetic. For\nAesthetic does not recognize the sympathetic or the antipathetic In\ntheir varieties, but only the spiritual activity of the representation.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Pseudo-aesthetic concepts belong to Psychology._\n\nHowever, the large space which, as we have said, those concepts have\nhitherto occupied in aesthetic treatises makes opportune a rather more\ncopious explanation of what they are. What will be their lot? As they\nare excluded from Aesthetic, in what other part of Philosophy will they\nbe received?\n\nTruly, in none. All those concepts are without philosophical value. They\nare nothing but a series of classes, which can be bent in the most\nvarious ways and multiplied at pleasure, to which it is sought to reduce\nthe infinite complications and shadings of the values and disvalues of\nlife. Of those classes, there are some that have an especially positive\nsignificance, like the beautiful, the sublime, the majestic, the solemn,\nthe serious, the weighty, the noble, the elevated; others have a\nsignificance especially negative, like the ugly, the horrible, the\ndreadful, the tremendous, the monstrous, the foolish, the extravagant;\nin others prevails a mixed significance, as is the case with the comic,\nthe tender, the melancholy, the humorous, the tragi-comic. The\ncomplications are infinite, because the individuations are infinite;\nhence it is not possible to construct the concepts, save in the\narbitrary and approximate manner of the natural sciences, whose duty it\nis to make as good a plan as possible of that reality which they cannot\nexhaust by enumeration, nor understand and surpass speculatively. And\nsince _Psychology_ is the naturalistic discipline, which undertakes to\nconstruct types and plans of the spiritual processes of man (of which,\nin fact, it is always accentuating in our day the merely empirical and\ndescriptive character), these concepts do not appertain to Aesthetic,\nnor, in general, to Philosophy. They must simply be handed over to\nPsychology.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Impossibility of rigoristic definitions of them._\n\nAs is the case with all other psychological constructions, so is it with\nthose concepts: no rigorous definitions are possible; and consequently\nthe one cannot be deduced from the other and they cannot be connected in\na system, as has, nevertheless, often been attempted, at great waste of\ntime and without result. But it can be claimed as possible to obtain,\napart from philosophical definitions recognised as impossible, empirical\ndefinitions, universally acceptable as true. Since there does not exist\na unique definition of a given fact, but innumerable definitions can be\ngiven of it, according to the cases and the objects for which they are\nmade, so it is clear that if there were only one, and that the true one,\nthis would no longer be an empirical, but a rigorous and philosophical\ndefinition. Speaking exactly, every time that one of the terms to which\nwe have referred has been employed, or any other of the innumerable\nseries, a definition of it has at the same time been given, expressed or\nunderstood. And each one of these definitions has differed somewhat from\nthe others, in some particular, perhaps of very small importance, such\nas tacit reference to some individual fact or other, which thus became\nespecially an object of attention and was raised to the position of a\ngeneral type. So it happens that not one of such definitions satisfies\nhim who hears it, nor does it satisfy even him who constructs it. For,\nthe moment after, this same individual finds himself face to face with a\nnew case, for which he recognizes that his definition is more or less\ninsufficient, ill-adapted, and in need of remodelling. It is necessary,\ntherefore, to leave writers and speakers free to define the sublime or\nthe comic, the tragic or the humoristic, on every occasion, as they\nplease and as may seem suitable to their purpose. And if you insist upon\nobtaining an empirical definition of universal validity, we can but\nsubmit this one:--The sublime (comic, tragic, humoristic, etc.) is\n_everything_ that is or will be so _called_ by those who have employed\nor shall employ this _word_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Examples: definitions of the sublime, the comic, and\n               the humoristic._\n\nWhat is the sublime? The unexpected affirmation of an ultra-powerful\nmoral force: that is one definition. But that other definition is\nequally good, which also recognizes the sublime where the force which\ndeclares itself is an ultra-powerful, but immoral and destructive will.\nBoth remain vague and assume no precise form, until they are applied to\na concrete case, which makes clear what is here meant by\n_ultra-powerful_, and what by _unexpected_. They are quantitative\nconcepts, but falsely quantitative, since there is no way of measuring\nthem; they are, at bottom, metaphors, emphatic phrases, or logical\ntautologies. The humorous will be laughter mingled with tears, bitter\nlaughter, the sudden passage from the comic to the tragic, and from the\ntragic to the comic, the comic romantic, the inverted sublime, war\ndeclared against every attempt at insincerity, compassion which is\nashamed to lament, the mockery not of the fact, but of the ideal itself;\nand whatever else may better please, according as it is desired to get a\nview of the physiognomy of this or that poet, of this or that poem,\nwhich is, in its uniqueness, its own definition, and though momentary\nand circumscribed, yet the sole adequate. The comic has been defined as\nthe displeasure arising from the perception of a deformity immediately\nfollowed by a greater pleasure arising from the relaxation of our\npsychical forces, which were strained in anticipation of a perception\nwhose importance was foreseen. While listening to a narrative, which,\nfor example, should describe the magnificent and heroic purpose of a\ndefinite person, we anticipate in imagination the occurrence of an\naction both heroic and magnificent, and we prepare ourselves to receive\nit, by straining our psychic forces. If, however, in a moment, instead\nof the magnificent and heroic action, which the premises and the tone of\nthe narrative had led us to expect, by an unexpected change there occur\na slight, mean, foolish action, unequal to our expectation, we have been\ndeceived, and the recognition of the deceit brings with it an instant of\ndispleasure. But this instant is as it were overcome by the one\nimmediately following, in which we are able to discard our strained\nattention, to free ourselves from the provision of psychic energy\naccumulated and, henceforth superfluous, to feel ourselves reasonable\nand relieved of a burden. This is the pleasure of the comic, with its\nphysiological equivalent, laughter. If the unpleasant fact that has\noccurred should painfully affect our interests, pleasure would not\narise, laughter would be at once choked, the psychic energy would be\nstrained and overstrained by other more serious perceptions. If, on the\nother hand, such more serious perceptions do not arise, if the whole\nloss be limited to a slight deception of our foresight, then the\nsupervening feeling of our psychic wealth affords ample compensation for\nthis very slight displeasure.--This, stated in a few words, is one of\nthe most accurate modern definitions of the comic. It boasts of\ncontaining, justified or corrected, the manifold attempts to define the\ncomic, from Hellenic antiquity to our own day. It includes Plato's\ndictum in the _Philebus_, and Aristotle's, which is more explicit. The\nlatter looks upon the comic as an _ugliness without pain_. It contains\nthe theory of Hobbes, who placed it in the feeling of _individual\nsuperiority_; of Kant, who saw in it a _relaxation of tension_; and\nthose of other thinkers, for whom it was _the contrast between great and\nsmall, between the finite and the infinite_. But on close observation,\nthe analysis and definition above given, although most elaborate and\nrigorous in appearance, yet enunciates characteristics which are\napplicable, not only to the comic, but to every spiritual process; such\nas the succession of painful and agreeable moments and the satisfaction\narising from the consciousness of force and of its free development. The\ndifferentiation here given is that of quantitative determinations, to\nwhich limits cannot be assigned. They remain vague phrases, attaining to\nsome meaning from their reference to this or that single comic fact. If\nsuch definitions be taken too seriously, there happens to them what Jean\nPaul Richter said of all the definitions of the comic: namely, that\ntheir sole merit is _to be themselves comic_ and to produce, in reality,\nthe fact, which they vainly try to define logically. And who will ever\ndetermine logically the dividing line between the comic and the\nnon-comic, between smiles and laughter, between smiling and gravity; who\nwill cut into clearly divided parts that ever-varying continuity into\nwhich life melts?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Relations between those concepts and aesthetic concepts._\n\nThe facts, classified as well as possible in the above-quoted\npsychological concepts, bear no relation to the artistic fact, beyond\nthe generic that all of them, in so far as they designate the material\nof life, can be represented by art; and the other accidental relation,\nthat aesthetic facts also may sometimes enter into the processes\ndescribed, as in the impression of the sublime that the work of a\nTitanic artist such as Dante or Shakespeare may produce, and that of the\ncomic produced by the effort of a dauber or of a scribbler.\n\nThe process is external to the aesthetic fact In this case also; for the\nonly feeling linked with that is the feeling of aesthetic value and\ndisvalue, of the beautiful and of the ugly. The Dantesque Farinata is\naesthetically beautiful, and nothing but beautiful: if, in addition, the\nforce of will of this personage appear sublime, or the expression that\nDante gives him, by reason of his great genius, seem sublime by\ncomparison with that of a less energetic poet, all this is not a matter\nfor aesthetic consideration. This consists always and only in adequation\nto truth; that is, in beauty.\n\n\n\n\nXIII\n\nTHE SO-CALLED PHYSICALLY BEAUTIFUL IN NATURE AND ART\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _Aesthetic activity and physical concepts._\n\nAesthetic activity is distinct from practical activity but when it\nexpresses itself is always physical accompanied by practical activity.\nHence its utilitarian or hedonistic side, and the pleasure and pain,\nwhich are, as it were, the practical echo of aesthetic values and\ndisvalues, of the beautiful and of the ugly. But this practical side of\nthe aesthetic activity has also, in its turn, a _physical_ or\n_psychophysical_ accompaniment, which consists of sounds, tones,\nmovements, combinations of lines and colours, and so on.\n\nDoes it _really_ possess this side, or does it only seem to possess it,\nas the result of the construction which we raise in physical science,\nand of the useful and arbitrary methods, which we have shown to be\nproper to the empirical and abstract sciences? Our reply cannot be\ndoubtful, that is, it cannot be affirmative as to the first of the two\nhypotheses.\n\nHowever, it will be better to leave it at this point in suspense, for it\nis not at present necessary to prosecute this line of inquiry any\nfurther. The mention already made must suffice to prevent our having\nspoken of the physical element as of something objective and existing,\nfor reasons of simplicity and adhesion to ordinary language, from\nleading to hasty conclusions as to the concepts and the connexion\nbetween spirit and nature.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Expression in the aesthetic sense, and expression in\n               the naturalistic sense._\n\nIt is important to make clear that as the existence of the hedonistic\nside in every spiritual activity has given rise to the confusion between\nthe aesthetic activity and the useful or pleasurable, so the existence,\nor, better, the possibility of constructing this physical side, has\ngenerated the confusion between _aesthetic_ expression and expression\n_in the naturalistic sense_; between a spiritual fact, that is to say,\nand a mechanical and passive fact (not to say, between a concrete\nreality and an abstraction or fiction). In common speech, sometimes it\nis the words of the poet that are called _expressions_, the notes of the\nmusician, or the figures of the painter; sometimes the blush which is\nwont to accompany the feeling of shame, the pallor resulting from fear,\nthe grinding of the teeth proper to violent anger, the glittering of the\neyes, and certain movements of the muscles of the mouth, which reveal\ncheerfulness. A certain degree of heat is also said to be the\n_expression_ of fever, as the falling of the barometer is of rain, and\neven that the height of the rate of exchange _expresses_ the discredit\nof the paper-money of a State, or social discontent the approach of a\nrevolution. One can well imagine what sort of scientific results would\nbe attained by allowing oneself to be governed by linguistic usage and\nplacing in one sheaf facts so widely different. But there is, in fact,\nan abyss between a man who is the prey of anger with all its natural\nmanifestations, and another man who expresses it aesthetically; between\nthe aspect, the cries, and the contortions of one who is tortured with\nsorrow at the loss of a dear one, and the words or song with which the\nsame individual portrays his torture at another moment; between the\ndistortion of emotion and the gesture of the actor. Darwin's book on the\nexpression of the feelings in man and animals does not belong to\nAesthetic; because there is nothing in common between the science of\nspiritual expression and a _Semiotic_, whether it be medical,\nmeteorological, political, physiognomic, or chiromantic.\n\nExpression in the naturalistic sense simply lacks expression in the\nspiritual sense, that is to say, the characteristic itself of activity\nand of spirituality, and therefore the bipartition into poles of beauty\nand of ugliness. It is nothing more than a relation between cause and\neffect, fixed by the abstract intellect. The complete process of\naesthetic production can be symbolized in four steps, which are: _a_,\nimpressions; _b_, expression or spiritual aesthetic synthesis; _c_,\nhedonistic accompaniment, or pleasure of the beautiful (aesthetic\npleasure); _d_, translation of the aesthetic fact into physical\nphenomena (sounds, tones, movements, combinations of lines and colours,\netc.). Anyone can see that the capital point, the only one that is\nproperly speaking aesthetic and truly real, is in that _b_, which is\nlacking to the mere manifestation or naturalistic construction,\nmetaphorically also called expression.\n\nThe expressive process is exhausted when those four steps have been\ntaken. It begins again with new impressions, a new aesthetic synthesis,\nand relative accompaniments.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Intuitions and memory._\n\nExpressions or representations follow and expel one another. Certainly,\nthis passing away, this disassociation, is not perishing, it is not\ntotal elimination: nothing of what is born dies with that complete death\nwhich would be identical with never having been born. Though all things\npass away, yet none can die. The representations which we have\nforgotten, also persist in some way in our spirit, for without them we\ncould not explain acquired habits and capacities. Thus, the strength of\nlife lies in this apparent forgetting: one forgets what has been\nabsorbed and what life has superseded.\n\nBut many other things, many other representations, are still efficacious\nelements in the actual processes of our spirit; and it is incumbent on\nus not to forget them, or to be capable of recalling them when necessity\ndemands them. The will is always vigilant in this work of preservation,\nfor it aims at preserving (so to say) the greater and more fundamental\npart of all our riches. Certainly its vigilance is not always\nsufficient. Memory, we know, leaves or betrays us in various ways. For\nthis very reason, the vigilant will excogitates expedients, which help\nmemory in its weakness, and are its _aids_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The production of aids to memory._\n\nWe have already explained how these aids are possible. Expressions or\nrepresentations are, at the same time, practical facts, which are also\ncalled physical facts, in so far as to the physical belongs the task of\nclassifying them and reducing them to types. Now it is clear, that if we\ncan succeed in making those facts in some way permanent, it will always\nbe possible (other conditions remaining equal) to reproduce in us, by\nperceiving it, the already produced expression or intuition.\n\nIf that in which the practical concomitant acts, or (to use physical\nterms) the movements have been isolated and made in some sort permanent,\nbe called the object or physical stimulus, and if it be designated by\nthe letter _e_; then the process of reproduction will take place in the\nfollowing order: _e_, the physical stimulus; _d-b_, perceptions of\nphysical facts (sounds, tones, mimic, combinations of lines and colours,\netc.), which form together the aesthetic synthesis, already produced;\n_c_, the hedonistic accompaniment, which is also reproduced.\n\nAnd what are those combinations of words which are called poetry, prose,\npoems, novels, romances, tragedies or comedies, but _physical stimulants\nof reproduction_ (the _e_ stage); what are those combinations of sound\nwhich are called operas, symphonies, sonatas; and what those of lines\nand of colours, which are called pictures, statues, architecture? The\nspiritual energy of memory, with the assistance of those physical facts\nabove mentioned, makes possible the preservation and the reproduction of\nthe intuitions produced, often so laboriously, by ourselves and by\nothers. If the physiological organism, and with it memory, become\nweakened; if the monuments of art be destroyed; then all the aesthetic\nwealth, the fruit of the labours of many generations, becomes lessened\nand rapidly disappears.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The physically beautiful._\n\nMonuments of art, which are the stimulants of aesthetic reproduction,\nare called _beautiful things or the physically beautiful_. This\ncombination of words constitutes a verbal paradox, because the beautiful\nis not a physical fact; it does not belong to things, but to the\nactivity of man, to spiritual energy. But henceforth it is clear through\nwhat wanderings and what abbreviations, physical things and facts, which\nare simply aids to the reproduction of the beautiful, end by being\ncalled, elliptically, beautiful things and physically beautiful. And now\nthat we have made the existence of this ellipse clear, we shall\nourselves make use of it without hesitation.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Content and form: another meaning._\n\nThe intervention of the physically beautiful serves to explain another\nmeaning of the words _content and form_, as employed by aestheticians.\nSome call \"content\" the internal fact or expression (which is for us\nalready form), and they call \"form\" the marble, the colours, the rhythm,\nthe sounds (for us form no longer); thus they look upon the physical\nfact as the form, which may or may not be joined to the content. This\nserves to explain another aspect of what is called aesthetic ugliness.\nHe who has nothing definite to express may try to hide his internal\nemptiness with a flood of words, with sounding verse, with deafening\npolyphony, with painting that dazzles the eye, or by collocating great\narchitectonic masses, which arrest and disturb, although, at bottom,\nthey convey nothing. Ugliness, then, is the arbitrary, the\ncharlatanesque; and, in reality, if the practical will do not intervene\nin the theoretic function, there may be absence of beauty, but never\neffective presence of the ugly.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Natural and artificial beauty._\n\nPhysical beauty is wont to be divided into _natural_ and _artificial_\nbeauty. Thus we reach one of the facts, which has given great labour to\nthinkers: _the beautiful in nature_. These words often designate simply\nfacts of practical pleasure. He alludes to nothing aesthetic who calls a\nlandscape beautiful where the eye rests upon verdure, where bodily\nmotion is easy, and where the warm sun-ray envelops and caresses the\nlimbs. But it is nevertheless indubitable, that on other occasions the\nadjective \"beautiful,\" applied to objects and scenes existing in nature,\nhas a completely aesthetic signification.\n\nIt has been observed, that in order to enjoy natural objects\naesthetically, we should withdraw them from their external and\nhistorical reality, and separate their simple appearance or origin from\nexistence; that if we contemplate a landscape with our head between our\nlegs, in such a way as to remove ourselves from our wonted relations\nwith it, the landscape appears as an ideal spectacle; that nature is\nbeautiful only for him who contemplates her _with the eye of the\nartist_; that zoologists and botanists do not recognize beautiful\nanimals and flowers; that natural beauty is _discovered_ (and examples\nof discovery are the points of view, pointed out by men of taste and\nimagination, and to which more or less aesthetic travellers and\nexcursionists afterwards have recourse in pilgrimage, whence a more or\nless collective _suggestion_); that, _without the aid of the\nimagination_, no part of nature is beautiful, and that with such aid the\nsame natural object or fact is now expressive, according to the\ndisposition of the soul, now insignificant, now expressive of one\ndefinite thing, now of another, sad or glad, sublime or ridiculous,\nsweet or laughable; finally, that _natural beauty_, which an artist\nwould not _to some extent correct, does not exist_.\n\nAll these observations are most just, and confirm the fact that natural\nbeauty is simply a _stimulus_ to aesthetic reproduction, which\npresupposes previous production. Without preceding aesthetic intuitions\nof the imagination, nature cannot arouse any at all. As regards natural\nbeauty, man is like the mythical Narcissus at the fountain. They show\nfurther that since this stimulus is accidental, it is, for the most\npart, imperfect or equivocal. Leopardi said that natural beauty is\n\"rare, scattered, and fugitive.\" Every one refers the natural fact to\nthe expression which is in his mind. One artist is, as it were, carried\naway by a laughing landscape, another by a rag-shop, another by the\npretty face of a young girl, another by the squalid countenance of an\nold ruffian. Perhaps the first will say that the rag-shop and the ugly\nface of the old ruffian are _disgusting_; the second, that the laughing\nlandscape and the face of the young girl are _insipid_. They may dispute\nfor ever; but they will never agree, save when they have supplied\nthemselves with a sufficient dose of aesthetic knowledge, which will\nenable them to recognize that they are both right. _Artificial_ beauty,\ncreated by man, is a much more ductile and efficacious aid to\nreproduction.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Mixed beauty._\n\nIn addition to these two classes, aestheticians also sometimes talk in\ntheir treatises of a _mixed_ beauty. Of what is it a mixture? Just of\nnatural and artificial. Whoso fixes and externalizes, operates with\nnatural materials, which he does not create, but combines and\ntransforms. In this sense, every artificial product is a mixture of\nnature and artifice; and there would be no occasion to speak of a mixed\nbeauty, as of a special category. But it happens that, in certain cases,\ncombinations already given in nature can be used a great deal more than\nin others; as, for instance, when we design a beautiful garden and\ninclude in our design groups of trees or ponds which are already there.\nOn other occasions externalization is limited by the impossibility of\nproducing certain effects artificially. Thus we may mix the colouring\nmatters, but we cannot create a powerful voice or a personage and an\nappearance appropriate to this or that personage of a drama. We must\ntherefore seek for them among things already existing, and make use of\nthem when we find them. When, therefore, we adopt a great number of\ncombinations already existing in nature, such as we should not be able\nto produce artificially if they did not exist, the result is called\n_mixed_ beauty.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Writings._\n\nWe must distinguish from artificial beauty those instruments of\nreproduction called _writings_, such as alphabets, musical notes,\nhieroglyphics, and all pseudo-languages, from the language of flowers\nand flags, to the language of patches (so much the vogue in the society\nof the eighteenth century). Writings are not physical facts which arouse\ndirectly impressions answering to aesthetic expressions; they are simple\n_indications_ of what must be done in order to produce such physical\nfacts. A series of graphic signs serves to remind us of the movements\nwhich we must execute with our vocal apparatus in order to emit certain\ndefinite sounds. If, through practice, we become able to hear the words\nwithout opening our mouths and (what is much more difficult) to hear the\nsounds by running the eye down the page of the music, all this does not\nalter anything of the nature of the writings, which are altogether\ndifferent from direct physical beauty. No one calls the book which\ncontains the _Divine Comedy_, or the portfolio which contains _Don\nGiovanni_, beautiful in the same sense as the block of marble which\ncontains Michael Angelo's _Moses_, or the piece of coloured wood which\ncontains the _Transfiguration_ are metaphorically called beautiful. Both\nserve for the reproduction of the beautiful, but the former by a far\nlonger and far more indirect route than the latter.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The beautiful as free and not free._\n\nAnother division of the beautiful, which is still found in treatises, is\nthat into _free and not free_. By beauties that are not free, are\nunderstood those objects which have to serve a double purpose,\nextra-aesthetic and aesthetic (stimulants of intuitions); and since it\nappears that the first purpose limits and impedes the second, the\nbeautiful object resulting therefrom has been considered as a beauty\nthat is not free.\n\nArchitectural works are especially cited; and precisely for this reason,\nhas architecture often been excluded from the number of the so-called\nfine arts. A temple must be above all things adapted to the use of a\ncult; a house must contain all the rooms requisite for commodity of\nliving, and they must be arranged with a view to this commodity; a\nfortress must be a construction capable of resisting the attacks of\ncertain armies and the blows of certain instruments of war. It is\ntherefore held that the architect's field is limited: he may be able to\n_embellish_ to some extent the temple, the house, the fortress; but his\nhands are bound by the _object_ of these buildings, and he can only\nmanifest that part of his vision of beauty in their construction which\ndoes not impair their extrinsic, but fundamental, objects.\n\nOther examples are taken from what is called art applied to industry.\nPlates, glasses, knives, guns, and combs can be made beautiful; but it\nis held that their beauty must not so far exceed as to prevent our\neating from the plate, drinking from the glass, cutting with the knife,\nfiring off the gun, or combing one's hair with the comb. The same is\nsaid of the art of printing: a book should be beautiful, but not to the\nextent of its being difficult or impossible to read it.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the beautiful that is not free._\n\nIn respect to all this, we must observe, in the first place, that the\nexternal purpose, precisely because it is such, does not of necessity\nlimit or trammel the other purpose of being a stimulus to aesthetic\nreproduction. Nothing, therefore, can be more erroneous than the thesis\nthat architecture, for example, is by its nature not free and imperfect,\nsince it must also fulfil other practical objects. Beautiful\narchitectural works, however, themselves undertake to deny this by their\nsimple presence.\n\nIn the second place, not only are the two objects not necessarily in\nopposition; but, we must add, the artist always has the means of\npreventing this contradiction from taking place. In what way? By taking,\nas the material of his intuition and aesthetic externalization,\nprecisely the _destination_ of the object, which serves a practical end.\nHe will not need to add anything to the object, in order to make it the\ninstrument of aesthetic intuitions: it will be so, if perfectly adapted\nto its practical purpose. Rustic dwellings and palaces, churches and\nbarracks, swords and ploughs, are beautiful, not in so far as they are\nembellished and adorned, but in so far as they express the purpose for\nwhich they were made. A garment is only beautiful because it is quite\nsuitable to a given person in given conditions. The sword bound to the\nside of the warrior Rinaldo by the amorous Armida was not beautiful: \"so\nadorned that it seemed a useless ornament, not the warlike instrument of\na warrior.\" It was beautiful, if you will, in the eyes and imagination\nof the sorceress, who loved her lover in this effeminate way. The\naesthetic fact can always accompany the practical fact, because\nexpression is truth.\n\nIt cannot, however, be denied that aesthetic contemplation sometimes\nhinders practical use. For instance, it is a quite common experience to\nfind certain new things so well adapted to their purpose, and yet so\nbeautiful, that people occasionally feel scruples in maltreating them by\nusing after contemplating them, which amounts to consuming them. It was\nfor this reason that King Frederick William of Prussia evinced\nrepugnance to ordering his magnificent grenadiers, so well suited for\nwar, to endure the strain of battle; but his less aesthetic son,\nFrederick the Great, obtained from them excellent services.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The stimulants of production._\n\nIt might be objected to the explanation of the physically beautiful as a\nsimple adjunct for the reproduction of the internally beautiful, that is\nto say, of expressions, that the artist creates his expressions by\npainting or by sculpturing, by writing or by composing, and that\ntherefore the physically beautiful, instead of following, sometimes\nprecedes the aesthetically beautiful. This would be a somewhat\nsuperficial mode of understanding the procedure of the artist, who never\nmakes a stroke with his brush without having previously seen it with his\nimagination; and if he has not yet seen it, he will make the stroke, not\nin order to externalize his expression (which does not yet exist), but\nas though to have a rallying point for ulterior meditation and for\ninternal concentration. The physical point on which he leans is not the\nphysically beautiful, instrument of reproduction, but what may be called\na pedagogic means, similar to retiring into solitude, or to the many\nother expedients, frequently very strange, adopted by artists and\nphilosophers, who vary in these according to their various\nidiosyncrasies. The old aesthetician Baumgarten advised poets to ride on\nhorseback, as a means of inspiration, to drink wine in moderation, and\n(provided they were chaste) to look at beautiful women.\n\n\n\n\nXIV\n\nMISTAKES ARISING FROM THE CONFUSION BETWEEN PHYSIC AND AESTHETIC\n\n\nIt is necessary to mention a series of scientific mistakes which have\narisen from the failure to understand the purely external relation\nbetween the aesthetic fact or artistic vision, and the physical fact or\ninstrument, which serves as an aid to reproduce it. We must here\nindicate the proper criticism, which derives from what has already been\nsaid.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of aesthetic associationism_\n\nThat form of associationism which identifies the aesthetic fact with the\n_association of two_ images finds a place among these errors. By what\npath has it been possible to arrive at such a mistake, against which our\naesthetic consciousness, which is a consciousness of perfect unity,\nnever of duality, rebels? Just because the physical and the aesthetic\nfacts have been considered separately, as two distinct images, which\nenter the spirit, the one drawn forth from the other, the one first and\nthe other afterwards. A picture is divided into the image of the\n_picture_ and the image of the _meaning_ of the picture; a poem, into\nthe image of the words and the image of the _meaning_ of the words. But\nthis dualism of images is non-existent: the physical fact does not enter\nthe spirit as an image, but causes the reproduction of the image (the\nonly image, which is the aesthetic fact), in so far as it blindly\nstimulates the psychic organism and produces an impression answering to\nthe aesthetic expression already produced.\n\nThe efforts of the associationists (the usurpers of to-day in the field\nof Aesthetic) to emerge from the difficulty, and to reaffirm in some way\nthe unity which has been destroyed by their principle of associationism,\nare highly instructive. Some maintain that the image called back again\nis unconscious; others, leaving unconsciousness alone, hold that, on the\ncontrary, it is vague, vaporous, confused, thus reducing the _force_ of\nthe aesthetic fact to the _weakness_ of bad memory. But the dilemma is\ninexorable: either keep association and give up unity, or keep unity and\ngive up association. No third way out of the difficulty exists.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of aesthetic physic._\n\nFrom the failure to analyze so-called natural beauty thoroughly, and to\nrecognize that it is simply an incident of aesthetic reproduction, and\nfrom having, on the contrary, looked upon it as given in nature, is\nderived all that portion of treatises upon Aesthetic which is entitled\n_The Beautiful in Nature or Aesthetic Physic_; sometimes even\nsubdivided, save the mark! into Aesthetic Mineralogy, Botany, and\nZoology. We do not wish to deny that such treatises contain many just\nremarks, and are sometimes themselves works of art, in so far as they\nrepresent beautifully the imaginings and fantasies, that is the\nimpressions, of their authors. But we must state that it is\nscientifically false to ask oneself if the dog be beautiful, and the\nornithorhynchus ugly; if the lily be beautiful, and the artichoke ugly.\nIndeed, the error is here double. On one hand, aesthetic Physic falls\nback into the equivoke of the theory of artistic and literary classes,\nby attempting to determine aesthetically the abstractions of our\nintellect; on the other, fails to recognize, as we said, the true\nformation of so-called natural beauty; for which the question as to\nwhether some given individual animal, flower, or man be beautiful or\nugly, is altogether excluded. What is not produced by the aesthetic\nspirit, or cannot be referred to it, is neither beautiful nor ugly. The\naesthetic process arises from the ideal relations in which natural\nobjects are arranged.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the theory of the beauty of the human body._\n\nThe double error can be exemplified by the question, upon which whole\nvolumes have been written, as to the _Beauty of the human body_. Here it\nis necessary, above all things, to urge those who discuss this subject\nfrom the abstract toward the concrete, by asking: \"What do you mean by\nthe human body, that of the male, of the female, or of the androgyne?\"\nLet us assume that they reply by dividing the inquiry into two distinct\ninquiries, as to the virile and feminine beauty (there really are\nwriters who seriously discuss whether man or woman is the more\nbeautiful); and let us continue: \"Masculine or feminine beauty; but of\nwhat race of men--the white, the yellow, or the black, and whatever\nothers there may be, according to the division of races?\" Let us assume\nthat they limit themselves to the white race, and let us continue: \"What\nsub-species of the white race?\" And when we have restricted them\ngradually to one section of the white world, that is to say, to the\nItalian, Tuscan, Siennese, or Porta Camollia section, we will continue:\n\"Very good; but at what age of the human body, and in what condition and\nstate of development--that of the new-born babe, of the child, of the\nboy, of the adolescent, of the man of middle age, and so on? and is the\nman at rest or at work, or is he occupied as is Paul Potter's cow, or\nthe Ganymede of Rembrandt?\"\n\nHaving thus arrived, by successive reductions, at the individual\n_omnimode determinatum_, or, better, at the man pointed out with the\nfinger, it will be easy to expose the other error, by recalling what has\nbeen said about the natural fact, which is now beautiful, now ugly,\naccording to the point of view, according to what is passing in the mind\nof the artist. Finally, if the Gulf of Naples have its detractors, and\nif there be artists who declare it inexpressive, preferring the \"gloomy\nfirs,\" the \"clouds and perpetual north winds,\" of the northern seas; let\nit be believed, if possible, that such relativity does not exist for the\nhuman body, source of the most various suggestions!\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the beauty of geometric figures._\n\nThe question of the _beauty of geometrical figures_ is connected with\naesthetic Physic. But if by geometrical figures be understood the\nconcepts of geometry, the concept of the triangle, the square, the cone,\nthese are neither beautiful nor ugly: they are concepts. If, on the\nother hand, by such figures be understood bodies which possess definite\ngeometrical forms, these will be ugly or beautiful, like every natural\nfact, according to the ideal connexions in which they are placed. Some\nhold that those geometrical figures are beautiful which point upwards,\nsince they give the suggestion of firmness and of force. It is not\ndenied that such may be the case. But neither must it be denied that\nthose also which give the impression of instability and of being crushed\ndown may possess their beauty, where they represent just the ill-formed\nand the crushed; and that in these last cases the firmness of the\nstraight line and the lightness of the cone or of the equilateral\ntriangle would, on the contrary, seem elements of ugliness.\n\nCertainly, such questions as to the beauty of nature and the beauty of\ngeometry, like the others analogous of the historically beautiful and of\nhuman beauty, seem less absurd in the Aesthetic of the sympathetic,\nwhich means, at bottom, by the words \"aesthetic beauty\" the\nrepresentation of what is pleasing. But the pretension to determine\nscientifically what are the sympathetic contents, and what are the\nirremediably antipathetic, is none the less erroneous, even in the\nsphere of that doctrine and after the laying down of those premises. One\ncan only answer such questions by repeating with an infinitely long\npostscript the _Sunt quos_ of the first ode of the first book of Horace,\nand the _Havvi chi_ of Leopardi's letter to Carlo Pepoli. To each man\nhis beautiful ( = sympathetic), as to each man his fair one. Philography\nis not a science.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of another aspect of the imitation of nature._\n\nThe artist sometimes has naturally existing facts before him, in\nproducing the artificial instrument, or physically beautiful. These are\ncalled his _models_: bodies, stuffs, flowers, and so on. Let us run over\nthe sketches, the studies, and the notes of the artists: Leonardo noted\ndown in his pocket-book, when he was working on the Last Supper:\n\"Giovannina, fantastic appearance, is at St. Catherine's, at the\nHospital; Cristofano di Castiglione is at the Piet\u00e0, he has a fine head;\nChrist, Giovan Conte, is of the suite of Cardinal Mortaro.\" And so on.\nFrom this comes the illusion that the artist _imitates nature_; when it\nwould perhaps be more exact to say that nature imitates the artist, and\nobeys him. The theory that _art imitates nature_ has sometimes been\ngrounded upon and found sustenance in this illusion, as also its\nvariant, more easily to be defended, which makes art the _idealizer of\nnature_. This last theory presents the process in a disorderly manner,\nindeed inversely to the true order; for the artist does not proceed from\nextrinsic reality, in order to modify it by approaching it to the ideal;\nbut he proceeds from the impression of external nature to expression,\nthat is to say, to his ideal, and from this he passes to the natural\nfact, which he employs as the instrument of reproduction of the ideal\nfact.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the theory of the elementary forms of the\n               beautiful._\n\nAnother consequence of the confusion between the aesthetic and the\nphysical fact is the theory of the _elementary forms of the beautiful_.\nIf expression, if the beautiful, be indivisible, the physical fact, in\nwhich it externalizes itself, can well be divided and subdivided; for\nexample, a painted surface, into lines and colours, groups and curves of\nlines, kinds of colours, and so on; a poem, into strophes, verses, feet,\nsyllables; a piece of prose, into chapters, paragraphs, headings,\nperiods, phrases, words, and so on. The parts thus obtained are not\naesthetic facts, but smaller physical facts, cut up in an arbitrary\nmanner. If this path were followed, and the confusion persisted in, we\nshould end by concluding that the true forms of the beautiful are\n_atoms_.\n\nThe aesthetic law, several times promulgated, that beauty must have\n_bulk_, could be invoked against the atoms. It cannot be the\nimperceptibility of the too small, nor the unapprehensibility of the too\nlarge. But a bigness which depends upon perceptibility, not measurement,\nderives from a concept widely different from the mathematical. For what\nis called imperceptible and incomprehensible does not produce an\nimpression, because it is not a real fact, but a concept: the requisite\nof bulk in the beautiful is thus reduced to the effective reality of the\nphysical fact, which serves for the reproduction of the beautiful.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the search for the objective conditions of\n               the beautiful._\n\nContinuing the search for the _physical laws_ or for the _objective\nconditions of the beautiful_, it has been asked: To what physical facts\ndoes the beautiful correspond? To what the ugly? To what unions of\ntones, colours, sizes, mathematically determinable? Such inquiries are\nas if in Political Economy one were to seek for the laws of exchange in\nthe physical nature of the objects exchanged. The constant infecundity\nof the attempt should have at once given rise to some suspicion as to\nits vanity. In our times, especially, has the necessity for an\n_inductive_ Aesthetic been often proclaimed, of an Aesthetic starting\n_from below_, which should proceed like natural science and not hasten\nits conclusions. Inductive? But Aesthetic has always been both inductive\nand deductive, like every philosophical science; induction and deduction\ncannot be separated, nor can they separately avail to characterize a\ntrue science. But the word \"inductive\" was not here pronounced\naccidentally and without special intention. It was wished to imply by\nits use that the aesthetic fact is nothing, at bottom, but a physical\nfact, which should be studied by applying to it the methods proper to\nthe physical and natural sciences. With such a presupposition and in\nsuch a faith did inductive Aesthetic or Aesthetic of the inferior (what\npride in this modesty!) begin its labours. It has conscientiously begun\nby making a collection of _beautiful things_, for example of a great\nnumber of envelopes of various shapes and sizes, and has asked which of\nthese give the impression of the beautiful and which of the ugly. As was\nto be expected, the inductive aestheticians speedily found themselves in\na difficulty, for the same objects that appeared ugly in one aspect\nwould appear beautiful in another. A yellow, coarse envelope, which\nwould be extremely ugly for the purpose of enclosing a love-letter, is,\nhowever, just what is wanted for a writ served by process on stamped\npaper. This in its turn would look very bad, or seem at any rate an\nirony, if enclosed in a square English envelope. Such considerations of\nsimple common sense should have sufficed to convince inductive\naestheticians, that the beautiful has no physical existence, and cause\nthem to remit their vain and ridiculous quest. But no: they have had\nrecourse to an expedient, as to which we would find it difficult to say\nhow far it belongs to natural science. They have sent their envelopes\nround from one to the other and opened a _referendum_, thus striving to\ndecide by the votes of the majority in what consists the beautiful and\nthe ugly.\n\nWe will not waste time over this argument, because we should seem to be\nturning ourselves into narrators of comic anecdotes rather than\nexpositors of aesthetic science and of its problems. It is an actual\nfact, that the inductive aestheticians have not yet discovered _one\nsingle law_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Astrology of Aesthetic._\n\nHe who dispenses with doctors is prone to abandon himself to charlatans.\nThus it has befallen those who have believed in the natural laws of the\nbeautiful. Artists sometimes adopt empirical canons, such as that of the\nproportions of the human body, or of the golden section, that is to say,\nof a line divided into two parts in such a manner that the less is to\nthe greater as is the greater to the whole line (_bc: ac=ac: ab_). Such\ncanons easily become their superstitions, and they attribute to such the\nsuccess of their works. Thus Michael Angelo left as a precept to his\ndisciple Marco del Pino of Siena that \"he should always make a pyramidal\nserpentine figure multiplied by one, two, three,\" a precept which did\nnot enable Marco di Siena to emerge from that mediocrity which we can\nyet observe in his many works, here in Naples. Others extracted from the\nsayings of Michael Angelo the precept that serpentine undulating lines\nwere the true _lines of beauty_. Whole volumes have been composed on\nthese laws of beauty, on the golden section and on the undulating and\nserpentine lines. These should in our opinion be looked upon as the\n_astrology of Aesthetic_.\n\n\n\n\nXV\n\nTHE ACTIVITY OF EXTERNALIZATION, TECHNIQUE AND THE THEORY OF THE ARTS\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _The practical activity of externalization._\n\nThe fact of the production of the physically beautiful implies, as has\nalready been remarked, a vigilant will, which persists in not allowing\ncertain visions, intuitions, or representations, to be lost. Such a will\nmust be able to act with the utmost rapidity, and as it were\ninstinctively, and also be capable of long and laborious deliberations.\nThus and only thus does the practical activity enter into relations with\nthe aesthetic, that is to say, in effecting the production of physical\nobjects, which are aids to memory. Here it is not merely a concomitant,\nbut really a distinct moment of the aesthetic activity. We cannot will\nor not will our aesthetic vision: we can, however, will or not will to\nexternalize it, or better, to preserve and communicate, or not, to\nothers, the externalization produced.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The technique of externalization._\n\nThis volitional fact of externalization is preceded by a complex of\nvarious kinds of knowledge. These are known as _techniques_, like all\nknowledge which precedes the practical activity. Thus we talk of an\nartistic technique in the same metaphorical and elliptic manner that we\ntalk of the physically beautiful, that is to say (in more precise\nlanguage), _knowledge employed by the practical activity engaged in\nproducing stimuli to aesthetic reproduction_. In place of employing so\nlengthy a phrase, we shall here avail ourselves of the vulgar\nterminology, since we are henceforward aware of its true meaning.\n\nThe possibility of this technical knowledge, at the service of artistic\nreproduction, has caused people to imagine the existence of an aesthetic\ntechnique of internal expression, which is tantamount to saying, _a\ndoctrine of the means of internal expression_, which is altogether\ninconceivable. And we know well the reason why it is inconceivable;\nexpression, considered in itself, is primary theoretic activity, and, in\nso far as it is this, it precedes the practical activity and the\nintellectual knowledge which illumines the practical activity, and is\nthus independent alike of the one and of the other. It also helps to\nillumine the practical activity, but is not illuminated by it.\nExpression does not employ _means_, because it has not an _end_; it has\nintuitions of things, but does not will them, and is thus indivisible\ninto means and end. Thus if it be said, as sometimes is the case, that a\ncertain writer has invented a new technique of fiction or of drama, or\nthat a painter has discovered a new mode of distribution of light, the\nword is used in a false sense; because the so-called _new technique is\nreally that romance itself, or that new picture_ itself. The\ndistribution of light belongs to the vision itself of the picture; as\nthe technique of a dramatist is his dramatic conception itself. On other\noccasions, the word \"technique\" is used to designate certain merits or\ndefects in a work which is a failure; and it is said, euphemistically,\nthat the conception is bad, but the technique good, or that the\nconception is good, and the technique bad.\n\nOn the other hand, when the different ways of painting in oils, or of\netching, or of sculpturing in alabaster, are discussed, then the word\n\"technique\" is in its place; but in such a case the adjective \"artistic\"\nis used metaphorically. And if a dramatic technique in the artistic\nsense be impossible, a theatrical technique is not impossible, that is\nto say, processes of externalization of certain given aesthetic works.\nWhen, for instance, women were introduced on the stage in Italy in the\nsecond half of the sixteenth century, in place of men dressed as women,\nthis was a true and real discovery in theatrical technique; such too was\nthe perfecting in the following century by the impresarios of Venice, of\nmachines for the rapid changing of the scenes.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The theoretic techniques of the individual arts._\n\nThe collection of technical knowledge at the service of artists desirous\nof externalizing their expressions, can be divided into groups, which\nmay be entitled _theories of the arts_. Thus is born a theory of\nArchitecture, comprising mechanical laws, information relating to the\nweight or to the resistance of the materials of construction or of\nfortification, manuals relating to the method of mixing chalk or stucco;\na theory of Sculpture, containing advice as to the instruments to be\nused for sculpturing the various sorts of stone, for obtaining a\nsuccessful fusion of bronze, for working with the chisel, for the exact\ncopying of the model in chalk or plaster, for keeping chalk damp; a\ntheory of Painting, on the various techniques of tempera, of\noil-painting, of water-colour, of pastel, on the proportions of the\nhuman body, on the laws of perspective; a theory of Oratory, with\nprecepts as to the method of producing, of exercising and of\nstrengthening the voice, of mimic and gesture; a theory of Music, on the\ncombinations and fusions of tones and sounds; and so on. Such\ncollections of precepts abound in all literatures. And since it soon\nbecomes impossible to say what is useful and what useless to know, books\nof this sort become very often a sort of encyclopaedias or catalogues of\ndesiderata. Vitruvius, in his treatise on Architecture, claims for the\narchitect a knowledge of letters, of drawing, of geometry, of\narithmetic, of optic, of history, of natural and moral philosophy, of\njurisprudence, of medicine, of astrology, of music, and so on.\nEverything is worth knowing: learn the art and lay it aside.\n\nIt should be evident that such empirical collections are not reducible\nto a science. They are composed of notions, taken from various sciences\nand teachings, and their philosophical and scientific principles are to\nbe found in them. To undertake the construction of a scientific theory\nof the different arts, would be to wish to reduce to the single and\nhomogeneous what is by nature multiple and heterogeneous; to wish to\ndestroy the existence as a collection of what was put together precisely\nto form a collection. Were we to give a scientific form to the manuals\nof the architect, the painter, or the musician, it is clear that nothing\nwould remain in our hands but the general principles of Mechanic, Optic,\nor Acoustic. Or if the especially artistic observations disseminated\nthrough it be extracted and isolated, and a science be made of them,\nthen the sphere of the individual art is deserted and that of Aesthetic\nentered upon, for Aesthetic is always general Aesthetic, or better, it\ncannot be divided into general and special. This last case (that is, the\nattempt to furnish a technique of Aesthetic) is found, when men\npossessing strong scientific instincts and a natural tendency to\nphilosophy, set themselves to work to produce such theories and\ntechnical manuals.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the aesthetic theories of the individual\n               arts._\n\nBut the confusion between Physic and Aesthetic has attained to its\nhighest degree, when aesthetic theories of the different arts are\nimagined, to answer such questions as: What are the _limits_ of each\nart? What can be represented with colours, and what with sounds? What\nwith simple monochromatic lines, and what with touches of various\ncolours? What with notes, and what with metres and rhymes? What are the\nlimits between the figurative and the auditional arts, between painting\nand sculpture, poetry and music?\n\nThis, translated into scientific language, is tantamount to asking: What\nis the connexion between Acoustic and aesthetic expression? What between\nthe latter and Optic?--and the like. Now, if _there is no passage_ from\nthe physical fact to the aesthetic, how could there be from the\naesthetic to particular groups of aesthetic facts, such as the phenomena\nof Optic or of Acoustic?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the classifications of the arts._\n\nThe things called _Arts_ have no aesthetic limits, because, in order to\nhave them, they would need to have also aesthetic existence; and we have\ndemonstrated the altogether empirical genesis of those divisions.\nConsequently, any attempt at an aesthetic classification of the arts is\nabsurd. If they be without limits, they are not exactly determinable,\nand consequently cannot be philosophically classified. All the books\ndealing with classifications and systems of the arts could be burned\nwithout any loss whatever. (We say this with the utmost respect to the\nwriters who have expended their labours upon them.)\n\nThe impossibility of such classifications finds, as it were, its proof\nin the strange methods to which recourse has been had to carry them out.\nThe first and most common classification is that into arts of _hearing,\nsight_, and _imagination_; as if eyes, ears, and imagination were on the\nsame level, and could be deduced from the same logical variable, as\nfoundation of the division. Others have proposed the division into arts\nof _space and time_, and arts of _rest_ and _motion_; as if the concepts\nof space, time, rest, and motion could determine special aesthetic\nforms, or have anything in common with art as such. Finally, others have\namused themselves by dividing them into _classic and romantic_, or into\n_oriental, classic, and romantic_, thereby conferring the value of\nscientific concepts on simple historical denominations, or adopting\nthose pretended partitions of expressive forms, already criticized\nabove; or by talking of arts _that can only be seen from one side_, like\npainting, and of arts _that can be seen from all sides_, like\nsculpture--and similar extravagances, which exist neither in heaven nor\non the earth.\n\nThe theory of the limits of the arts was, perhaps, at the time when it\nwas put forward, a beneficial critical reaction against those who\nbelieved in the possibility of the flowing of one expression into\nanother, as of the _Iliad_ or of _Paradise Lost_ into a series of\npaintings, and thus held a poem to be of greater or lesser value,\naccording as it could or could not be translated into pictures by a\npainter. But if the rebellion were reasonable and victorious, this does\nnot mean that the arguments adopted and the theories made as required\nwere sound.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the theory of the union of the arts._\n\nAnother theory which is a corollary to that of the limits of the arts,\nfalls with them; that of the _union of the arts_. Granted different\narts, distinct and limited, the questions were asked: Which is the most\npowerful? Do we not obtain more powerful effects by uniting several? We\nknow nothing of this: we know only, in each individual case, that\ncertain given artistic intuitions have need of definite physical means\nfor their reproduction, and that other artistic intuitions have need of\nother physical means. We can obtain the effect of certain dramas by\nsimply reading them; others need declamation and scenic display: some\nartistic intuitions, for their full extrinsication, need words, song,\nmusical instruments, colours, statuary, architecture, actors; while\nothers are beautiful and complete in a single delicate sweep of the pen,\nor with a few strokes of the pencil. But it is false to suppose that\ndeclamation and scenic effects, and all the other things we have\nmentioned together, are _more powerful_ than simply reading, or than the\nsimple stroke with the pen and with the pencil; because each of these\nfacts or groups of facts has, so to say, a different object, and the\npower of the different means employed cannot be compared when the\nobjects are different.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Connexion of the activity of externalization with utility\n               and morality._\n\nFinally, it is only from the point of view of a clear and rigorous\ndistinction between the true and proper aesthetic activity, and the\npractical activity of externalization, that we can solve the involved\nand confused questions as to the relations between _art and utility_,\nand _art and morality_.\n\nThat art as art is independent alike of utility and of morality, as also\nof every volitional form, we have above demonstrated. Without this\nindependence, it would not be possible to speak of an intrinsic value of\nart, nor indeed to conceive an aesthetic science, which demands the\nautonomy of the aesthetic fact as a necessity of its existence.\n\nBut it would be erroneous to maintain that this independence of the\nvision or intuition or internal expression of the artist should be at\nonce extended to the practical activity of externalization and of\ncommunication, which may or may not follow the aesthetic fact. If art be\nunderstood as the externalization of art, then utility and morality have\na perfect right to deal with it; that is to say, the right one possesses\nto deal with one's own household.\n\nWe do not, as a matter of fact, externalize and fix all of the many\nexpressions and intuitions which we form in our mind; we do not declare\nour every thought in a loud voice, or write down, or print, or draw, or\ncolour, or expose it to the public gaze. _We select_ from the crowd of\nintuitions which are formed or at least sketched within us; and the\nselection is governed by selection of the economic conditions of life\nand of its moral direction. Therefore, when we have formed an intuition,\nit remains to decide whether or no we should communicate it to others,\nand to whom, and when, and how; all of which considerations fall equally\nunder the utilitarian and ethical criterion.\n\nThus we find the concepts of _selection_, of the _interesting_, of\n_morality_, of an _educational end_, of _popularity_, etc., to some\nextent justified, although these can in no wise be justified as imposed\nupon art as art, and we have ourselves denounced them in pure Aesthetic.\nError always contains an element of truth. He who formulated those\nerroneous aesthetic propositions had his eye on practical facts, which\nattach themselves externally to the aesthetic fact in economic and moral\nlife.\n\nBy all means, be partisans of a yet greater liberty in the vulgarization\nof the means of aesthetic reproduction; we are of the same opinion, and\nlet us leave the proposals for legislative measures, and for actions to\nbe instigated against immoral art, to hypocrites, to the ingenuous, and\nto idlers. But the proclamation of this liberty, and the fixation of its\nlimits, how wide soever they be, is always the affair of morality. And\nit would in any case be out of place to invoke that highest principle,\nthat _fundamentum Aesthetices_, which is the independence of art, in\norder to deduce from it the guiltlessness of the artist, who, in the\nexternalization of his imaginings, should calculate upon the unhealthy\ntastes of his readers; or that licenses should be granted to the hawkers\nwho sell obscene statuettes in the streets. This last case is the affair\nof the police; the first must be brought before the tribunal of the\nmoral conscience. The aesthetic judgment on the work of art has nothing\nto do with the morality of the artist, in so far as he is a practical\nman, nor with the precautions to be taken that art may not be employed\nfor evil purposes alien to its essence, which is pure theoretic\ncontemplation.\n\n\n\n\nXVI\n\nTASTE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ART\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _Aesthetic judgment. Its identity with aesthetic\n               reproduction._\n\nWhen the entire aesthetic and externalizing process has been completed,\nwhen a beautiful expression has been produced and fixed in a definite\nphysical material, what is meant by _judging it_? _To reproduce it in\noneself_, answer the critics of art, almost with one voice. Very good.\nLet us try thoroughly to understand this fact, and with that object in\nview, let us represent it schematically.\n\nThe individual A is seeking the expression of an impression, which he\nfeels or has a presentiment of, but has not yet expressed. Behold him\ntrying various words and phrases, which may give the sought-for\nexpression, which must exist, but which he does not know. He tries the\ncombination _m_, but rejects it as unsuitable, inexpressive, incomplete,\nugly: he tries the combination _n_, with a like result. _He does not see\nanything, or he does not see clearly_. The expression still flies from\nhim. After other vain attempts, during which he sometimes approaches,\nsometimes leaves the sign that offers itself, all of a sudden (almost as\nthough formed spontaneously of itself) he creates the sought-for\nexpression, and _lux facta est_. He enjoys for an instant aesthetic\npleasure or the pleasure of the beautiful. The ugly, with its\ncorrelative displeasure, was the aesthetic activity, which had not\nsucceeded in conquering the obstacle; the beautiful is the expressive\nactivity, which now displays itself triumphant.\n\nWe have taken this example from the domain of speech, as being nearer\nand more accessible, and because we all talk, though we do not all draw\nor paint. Now if another individual, whom we shall term B, desire to\njudge this expression and decide whether it be beautiful or ugly, he\n_must of necessity place himself at A's point of view_, and go through\nthe whole process again, with the help of the physical sign, supplied to\nhim by A. If A has seen clearly, then B (who has placed himself at A's\npoint of view) will also see clearly and will find this expression\nbeautiful. If A has not seen clearly, then B also will not see clearly,\nand will find the expression more or less ugly, _just as A did_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Impossibility of divergences._\n\nIt may be observed that we have not taken into consideration two other\ncases: that of A having a clear and B an obscure vision; and that of A\nhaving an obscure and B a clear vision. Philosophically speaking, these\ntwo cases are _impossible_.\n\nSpiritual activity, precisely because it is activity, is not a caprice,\nbut a spiritual necessity; and it cannot solve a definite aesthetic\nproblem, save in one way, which is the right way. Doubtless certain\nfacts may be adduced, which appear to contradict this deduction. Thus\nworks which seem beautiful to artists, are judged to be ugly by the\ncritics; while works with which the artists were displeased and judged\nimperfect or failures, are held to be beautiful and perfect by the\ncritics. But this does not mean anything, save that one of the two is\nwrong: either the critics or the artists, or in one case the artist and\nin another the critic. In fact, the producer of an expression does not\nalways fully realize what has happened in his soul. Haste, vanity, want\nof reflexion, theoretic prejudices, make people say, and sometimes\nothers almost believe, that works of ours are beautiful, which, if we\nwere truly to turn inwards upon ourselves, we should see ugly, as they\nreally are. Thus poor Don Quixote, when he had mended his helmet as well\nas he could with cardboard--the helmet that had showed itself to possess\nbut the feeblest force of resistance at the first encounter,--took good\ncare not to test it again with a well-delivered sword-thrust, but simply\ndeclared and maintained it to be (says the author) _por celada finisima\nde encaxe_. And in other cases, the same reasons, or opposite but\nanalogous ones, trouble the consciousness of the artist, and cause him\nto disapprove of what he has successfully produced, or to strive to undo\nand do again worse, what he has done well, in his artistic spontaneity.\nAn example of this is the _Gerusalemme conquistata_. In the same way,\nhaste, laziness, want of reflexion, theoretic prejudices, personal\nsympathies, or animosities, and other motives of a similar sort,\nsometimes cause the critics to proclaim beautiful what is ugly, and ugly\nwhat is beautiful. Were they to eliminate such disturbing elements, they\nwould feel the work of art as it really is, and would not leave to\nposterity, that more diligent and more dispassionate judge, to award the\npalm, or to do that justice, which they have refused.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Identity of taste and genius._\n\nIt is clear from the preceding theorem, that the judicial activity,\nwhich criticizes and recognizes the beautiful, is identical with that\nwhich produces it. The only difference lies in the diversity of\ncircumstances, since in the one case it is a question of aesthetic\nproduction, in the other of reproduction. The judicial activity is\ncalled _taste_; the productive activity is called _genius_: genius and\ntaste are therefore substantially _identical_.\n\nThe common remark, that the critic should possess some of the genius of\nthe artist and that the artist should possess taste, reveals a glimpse\nof this identity; or that there exists an active (productive) taste and\na passive (reproductive) taste. But a denial of this is contained in\nother equally common remarks, as when people speak of taste without\ngenius, or of genius without taste. These last observations are\nmeaningless, unless they be taken as alluding to quantitative\ndifferences. In this case, those would be called geniuses without taste\nwho produce works of art, inspired in their culminating parts and\nneglected and defective in their secondary parts, and those men of taste\nwithout genius, who succeed in obtaining certain isolated or secondary\neffects, but do not possess the power necessary for a vast artistic\nsynthesis. Analogous explanations can easily be given of other similar\npropositions. But to posit a substantial difference between genius and\ntaste, between artistic production and reproduction, would render\ncommunication and judgment alike inconceivable. How could we judge what\nremained extraneous to us? How could that which is produced by a given\nactivity be judged by a different activity? The critic will be a small\ngenius, the artist a great genius; the one will have the strength of\nten, the other of a hundred; the former, in order to raise himself to\nthe altitude of the latter, will have need of his assistance; but the\nnature of both must be the same. In order to judge Dante, we must raise\nourselves to his level: let it be well understood that empirically we\nare not Dante, nor Dante we; but in that moment of judgment and\ncontemplation, our spirit is one with that of the poet, and in that\nmoment we and he are one single thing. In this identity alone resides\nthe possibility that our little souls can unite with the great souls,\nand become great with them, in the universality of the spirit.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Analogy with the other activities._\n\nLet us remark in passing that what has been said of the aesthetic\n_judgment_ holds good equally for every other activity and for every\nother judgment; and that scientific, economic, and ethical criticism is\neffected in a like manner. To limit ourselves to this last, it is only\nif we place ourselves ideally in the same conditions in which he who\ntook a given resolution found himself, that we can form a judgment as to\nwhether his resolution were moral or immoral. An action would otherwise\nremain incomprehensible, and therefore impossible to judge. A homicide\nmay be a rascal or a hero: if this be, within limits, indifferent as\nregards the safety of society, which condemns both to the same\npunishment, it is not indifferent to him who wishes to distinguish and\nto judge from the moral point of view, and we cannot dispense with\nstudying again the individual psychology of the homicide, in order to\ndetermine the true nature of his deed, not merely in its judicial, but\nalso in its moral aspect. In Ethic, a moral taste or tact is sometimes\nreferred to, which answers to what is generally called moral conscience,\nthat is to say, to the activity itself of good-will.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of absolutism (intellectualism) and of aesthetic\n               relativism._\n\nThe explanation above given of aesthetic judgment or reproduction at\nonce affirms and denies the position of the absolutists and relativists,\nof those, that is to say, who affirm and of those who deny the existence\nof an absolute taste.\n\nThe absolutists, who affirm that they can judge of the beautiful, are\nright; but the theory on which they found their affirmation is not\nmaintainable. They conceive of the beautiful, that is, of aesthetic\nvalue, as of something placed outside the aesthetic activity; as if it\nwere a model or a concept which an artist realizes in his work, and of\nwhich the critic avails himself afterwards in order to judge the work\nitself. Concepts and models alike have no existence in art, for by\nproclaiming that every art can be judged only in itself, and has its own\nmodel in itself, they have attained to the denial of the existence of\nobjective models of beauty, whether they be intellectual concepts, or\nideas suspended in the metaphysical sky.\n\nIn proclaiming this, the adversaries, the relativists, are perfectly\nright, and accomplish a progress. However, the initial rationality of\ntheir thesis becomes in its turn a false theory. Repeating the old adage\nthat there is no accounting for tastes, they believe that aesthetic\nexpression is of the same nature as the pleasant and the unpleasant,\nwhich every one feels in his own way, and as to which there is no\ndisputing. But we know that the pleasant and the unpleasant are\nutilitarian and practical facts. Thus the relativists deny the\npeculiarity of the aesthetic fact, again confounding expression with\nimpression, the theoretic with the practical.\n\nThe true solution lies in rejecting alike relativism or psychologism,\nand false absolutism; and in recognizing that the criterion of taste is\nabsolute, but absolute in a different way from that of the intellect,\nwhich is developed by reason. The criterion of taste is absolute, with\nthe intuitive absoluteness of the imagination. Thus every act of\nexpressive activity, which is so really, will be recognized as\nbeautiful, and every fact in which expressive activity and passivity are\nfound engaged with one another in an unfinished struggle, will be\nrecognized as ugly.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of relative relativism._\n\nThere lies, between absolutists and relativists, a third class, which\nmay be called that of the relative relativists. These affirm the\nexistence of absolute values in other fields, such as Logic and Ethic,\nbut deny their existence in the field of Aesthetic. To them it appears\nnatural and justifiable to dispute about science and morality; because\nscience rests on the universal, common to all men, and morality on duty,\nwhich is also a law of human nature; but how, they say, can one dispute\nabout art, which rests on imagination? Not only, however, is the\nimaginative activity universal and belongs to human nature, like the\nlogical concept and practical duty; but we must oppose a capital\nobjection to this intermediary thesis. If the absolute nature of the\nimagination were denied, we should be obliged to deny also that of\nintellectual or conceptual truth, and, implicitly, of morality. Does not\nmorality presuppose logical distinctions? How could these be known,\notherwise than by expressions and words, that is to say, in imaginative\nform? If the absoluteness of the imagination were removed, spiritual\nlife would tremble to its base. One individual would no longer\nunderstand another, nor indeed his own self of a moment before, which,\nwhen considered a moment after, is already another individual.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Objection founded on the variation of the stimulus and\n               on the psychic disposition._\n\nNevertheless, variety of judgments is an indisputable fact. Men are at\nvariance in their logical, ethical, and economical appreciations; and\nthey are equally, or even more at variance in their aesthetic\nappreciations. If certain reasons detailed by us, above, such as haste,\nprejudices, passions, etc., may be held to lessen the importance of this\ndisagreement, they do not thereby annul it. We have been cautious, when\nspeaking of the stimuli of reproduction, for we said that reproduction\ntakes place, _if all the other conditions remain equal_. Do they remain\nequal? Does the hypothesis correspond to reality?\n\nIt would appear not. In order to reproduce several times an impression\nby employing a suitable physical stimulus, it is necessary that this\nstimulus be not changed, and that the organism remain in the same\npsychical conditions as those in which was experienced the impression\nthat it is desired to reproduce. Now it is a fact, that the physical\nstimulus is continually changing, and in like manner the psychological\nconditions.\n\nOil paintings grow dark, frescoes pale, statues lose noses, hands, and\nlegs, architecture becomes totally or partially a ruin, the tradition of\nthe execution of a piece of music is lost, the text of a poem is\ncorrupted by bad copyists or bad printing. These are obvious instances\nof the changes which daily occur in objects or physical stimuli. As\nregards psychological conditions, we will not dwell upon the cases of\ndeafness or blindness, that is to say, upon the loss of entire orders of\npsychical impressions; these cases are secondary and of less importance\ncompared with the fundamental, daily, inevitable, and perpetual changes\nof the society around us, and of the internal conditions of our\nindividual life. The phonic manifestations, that is, the words and\nverses of the Dantesque _Commedia_, must produce a very different\nimpression on a citizen engaged in the politics of the third Rome, to\nthat experienced by a well-informed and intimate contemporary of the\npoet. The Madonna of Cimabue is still in the Church of Santa Maria\nNovella; but does she speak to the visitor of to-day as she spoke to the\nFlorentines of the thirteenth century? Even though she were not also\ndarkened by time, would not the impression be altogether different? And\nfinally, how can a poem composed in youth make the same impression on\nthe same individual poet when he re-reads it in his old age, with his\npsychic dispositions altogether changed?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the division of signs into natural and\n               conventional._\n\nIt is true, that certain aestheticians have attempted a distinction\nbetween stimuli and stimuli, between _natural and conventional_ signs.\nThey would grant to the former a constant effect on all; to the latter,\nonly on a limited circle. In their belief, signs employed in painting\nare natural, while the words of poetry are conventional. But the\ndifference between the one and the other is only of degree. It has often\nbeen affirmed that painting is a language which all understand, while\nwith poetry it is otherwise. Here, for example, Leonardo placed one of\nthe prerogatives of his art, \"which hath not need of interpreters of\ndifferent languages as have letters,\" and in it man and brute find\nsatisfaction. He relates the anecdote of that portrait of the father of\na family, \"which the little grandchildren were wont to caress while they\nwere still in swaddling-clothes, and the dogs and cats of the house in\nlike manner.\" But other anecdotes, such as those of the savages who took\nthe portrait of a soldier for a boat, or considered the portrait of a\nman on horseback as furnished with only one leg, are apt to shake one's\nfaith in the understanding of painting by sucklings, dogs, and cats.\nFortunately, no arduous researches are necessary to convince oneself\nthat pictures, poetry, and every work of art, produce no effects save on\nsouls prepared to receive them. Natural signs do not exist; because they\nare all conventional in a like manner, or, to speak with greater\nexactitude, all are _historically conditioned_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The surmounting of variety._\n\nThis being so, how are we to succeed in causing the expression to be\nreproduced by means of the physical object? How obtain the same effect,\nwhen the conditions are no longer the same? Would it not, rather, seem\nnecessary to conclude that expressions cannot be reproduced, despite the\nphysical instruments made by man for the purpose, and that what is\ncalled reproduction consists in ever new expressions? Such would indeed\nbe the conclusion, if the variety of physical and psychic conditions\nwere intrinsically unsurmountable. But since the insuperability has none\nof the characteristics of necessity, we must, on the contrary, conclude:\nthat the reproduction always occurs, when we can replace ourselves in\nthe conditions in which the stimulus (physical beauty) was produced.\n\nNot only can we replace ourselves in these conditions, as an abstract\npossibility, but as a matter of fact we do so continually. Individual\nlife, which is communion with ourselves (with our past), and social\nlife, which is communion with our like, would not otherwise be possible.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Restorations and historical interpretation._\n\nAs regards the physical object, paleographers and philologists, who\n_restore_ to texts their original physiognomy, _restorers_ of pictures\nand of statues, and similar categories of workers, exert themselves to\npreserve or to give back to the physical object all its primitive\nenergy. These efforts certainly do not always succeed, or are not\ncompletely successful, for never, or hardly ever, is it possible to\nobtain a restoration complete in its smallest details. But the\nunsurmountable is only accidentally present, and cannot cause us to fail\nto recognize the favourable results which are nevertheless obtained.\n\n_Historical interpretation_ likewise labours to reintegrate in us\nhistorical conditions which have been altered in the course of history.\nIt revives the dead, completes the fragmentary, and affords us the\nopportunity of seeing a work of art (a physical object) as its author\nsaw it, at the moment of production.\n\nA condition of this historical labour is tradition, with the help of\nwhich it is possible to collect the scattered rays and cause them to\nconverge on one centre. With the help of memory, we surround the\nphysical stimulus with all the facts among which it arose; and thus we\nmake it possible for it to react upon us, as it acted upon him who\nproduced it.\n\nWhen the tradition is broken, interpretation is arrested; in this case,\nthe products of the past remain _silent_ for us. Thus the expressions\ncontained in the Etruscan or Messapian inscriptions are unattainable;\nthus we still hear discussions among ethnographers as to certain\nproducts of the art of savages, whether they be pictures or writings;\nthus archaeologists and prehistorians are not always able to establish\nwith certainty, whether the figures found on the ceramic of a certain\nregion, and on other instruments employed, be of a religious or of a\nprofane nature. But the arrest of interpretation, as that of\nrestoration, is never a definitely unsurmountable barrier; and the daily\ndiscoveries of historical sources and of new methods of better\nexploiting antiquity, which we may hope to see ever improving, link up\nbroken tradition.\n\nWe do not wish to deny that erroneous historical interpretation produces\nat times what we may term _palimpsests_, new expressions imposed upon\nthe antique, artistic imaginings instead of historical reproductions.\nThe so-called fascination of the past depends in part upon these\nexpressions of ours, which we weave into historical expressions. Thus in\nhellenic plastic art has been discovered the calm and serene intuition\nof life of those peoples, who feel, nevertheless, so poignantly, the\nuniversality of sorrow; thus has recently been discerned on the faces of\nthe Byzantine saints \"the terror of the millennium,\" a terror which is\nan equivoke, or an artificial legend invented by modern scholars. But\n_historical criticism_ tends precisely to circumscribe _vain imaginings_\nand to establish with exactitude the point of view from which we must\nlook.\n\nThus we live in communication with other men of the present and of the\npast; and we must not conclude, because sometimes, and indeed often, we\nfind ourselves face to face with the unknown or the badly known, that\nwhen we believe we are engaged in a dialogue, we are always speaking a\nmonologue; nor that we are unable even to repeat the monologue which, in\nthe past, we held with ourselves.\n\n\n\n\nXVII\n\nTHE HISTORY OF LITERATURE AND ART\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _Historical criticism in literature and art. Its\n               importance._\n\nThis brief exposition of the method by which is obtained reintegration\nof the original conditions in which the work of art was produced, and by\nwhich reproduction and judgment are made possible, shows how important\nis the function fulfilled by historical research concerning artistic and\nliterary works; that is to say, by what is usually called _historical\ncriticism_, or method, in literature and art.\n\nWithout tradition and historical criticism, the enjoyment of all or\nnearly all works of art produced by humanity, would be irrevocably lost:\nwe should be little more than animals, immersed in the present alone, or\nin the most recent past. Only fools despise and laugh at him who\nreconstitutes an authentic text, explains the sense of words and\ncustoms, investigates the conditions in which an artist lived, and\naccomplishes all those labours which revive the qualities and the\noriginal colouring of works of art.\n\nSometimes the depreciatory or negative judgment refers to the presumed\nor proved uselessness of many researches, made to recover the correct\nmeaning of artistic works. But, it must be observed, in the first place,\nthat historical research does not only fulfil the task of helping to\nreproduce and judge artistic works: the biography of a writer or of an\nartist, for example, and the study of the costume of a period, also\npossess their own interest, foreign to the history of art, but not\nforeign to other forms of history. If allusion be made to those\nresearches which do not appear to have interest of any kind, nor to\nfulfil any purpose, it must be replied that the historical student must\noften reconcile himself to the useful, but little glorious, office of a\ncataloguer of facts. These facts remain for the time being formless,\nincoherent, and insignificant, but they are preserves, or mines, for the\nhistorian of the future and for whomsoever may afterwards want them for\nany purpose. In the same way, books which nobody asks for are placed on\nthe shelves and are noted in the catalogues, because they may be asked\nfor at some time or other. Certainly, in the same way that an\nintelligent librarian gives the preference to the acquisition and to the\ncataloguing of those books which he foresees may be of more or better\nservice, so do intelligent students possess the instinct as to what is\nor may more probably be useful from among the mass of facts which they\nare investigating. Others, on the other hand, less well-endowed, less\nintelligent, or more hasty in producing, accumulate useless selections,\nrejections and erasures, and lose themselves in refinements and gossipy\ndiscussions. But this appertains to the economy of research, and is not\nour affair. At the most, it is the affair of the master who selects the\nsubjects, of the publisher who pays for the printing, and of the critic\nwho is called upon to praise or to blame the students for their\nresearches.\n\nOn the other hand, it is evident, that historical research, directed to\nilluminate a work of art by placing us in a position to judge it, does\nnot alone suffice to bring it to birth in our spirit: taste, and an\nimagination trained and awakened, are likewise presupposed. The greatest\nhistorical erudition may accompany a taste in part gross or defective, a\nlumbering imagination, or, as it is generally phrased, a cold, hard\nheart, closed to art. Which is the lesser evil?--great erudition and\ndefective taste, or natural good taste and great ignorance? The question\nhas often been asked, and perhaps it will be best to deny its\npossibility, because one cannot tell which of two evils is the less, or\nwhat exactly that means. The merely learned man never succeeds in\nentering into communication with the great spirits, and keeps wandering\nfor ever about the outer courts, the staircases, and the antechambers of\ntheir palaces; but the gifted ignoramus either passes by masterpieces\nwhich are to him inaccessible, or instead of understanding the works of\nart, as they really are, he invents others, with his imagination. Now,\nthe labour of the former may at least serve to enlighten others; but the\ningenuity of the latter remains altogether sterile. How, then, can we\nfail to prefer the conscientious learned man to the inconclusive man of\ntalent, who is not really talented, if he resign himself, and in so far\nas he resigns himself, to come to no conclusion?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Literary and artistic history. Its distinction from\n               historical criticism and from artistic judgement._\n\nIt is necessary to distinguish accurately _the history, of art and\nliterature_ from those historical labours which make use of works of\nart, but for extraneous purposes (such as biography, civil, religious,\nand political history, etc.), and also from historical erudition, whose\nobject is preparation for the Aesthetic synthesis of reproduction.\n\nThe difference between the first of these is obvious. The history of art\nand literature has the works of art themselves for principal subject;\nthe other branches of study call upon and interrogate works of art, but\nonly as witnesses, from which to discover the truth of facts which are\nnot aesthetic. The second difference to which we have referred may seem\nless profound. However, it is very great. Erudition devoted to rendering\nclear again the understanding of works of art, aims simply at making\nappear a certain internal fact, an aesthetic reproduction. Artistic and\nliterary history, on the other hand, does not appear until such\nreproduction has been obtained. It demands, therefore, further labour.\nLike all other history, its object is to record precisely such facts as\nhave really taken place, that is, artistic and literary facts. A man\nwho, after having acquired the requisite historical erudition,\nreproduces in himself and tastes a work of art, may remain simply a man\nof taste, or express at the most his own feeling, with an exclamation of\nbeautiful or ugly. This does not suffice for the making of a historian\nof literature and art. There is further need that the simple act of\nreproduction be followed in him by a second internal operation. What is\nthis new operation? It is, in its turn, an expression: the expression of\nthe reproduction; the historical description, exposition, or\nrepresentation. There is this difference, then, between the man of taste\nand the historian: the first merely reproduces in his spirit the work of\nart; the second, after having reproduced it, represents it historically,\nthus applying to it those categories by which, as we know, history is\ndifferentiated from pure art. Artistic and literary history is,\ntherefore, _a historical work of art founded upon one or more works of\nart_.\n\nThe denomination of artistic or literary critic is used in various\nsenses: sometimes it is applied to the student who devotes his services\nto literature; sometimes to the historian who reveals the works of art\nof the past in their reality; more often to both. By critic is sometimes\nunderstood, in a more restricted sense, he who judges and describes\ncontemporary literary works; and by historian, he who is occupied with\nless recent works. These are but linguistic usages and empirical\ndistinctions, which may be neglected; because the true difference lies\n_between the learned man, the man of taste, and the historian of art_.\nThese words designate, as it were, three successive stages of work, of\nwhich each is relatively independent of the one that follows, but not of\nthat which precedes. As we have seen, a man may be simply learned, yet\npossess little capacity for understanding works of art; he may indeed be\nboth learned and possess taste, yet be unable to write a page of\nartistic and literary history. But the true and complete historian,\nwhile containing in himself, as necessary pre-requisites, both the\nlearned man and the man of taste, must add to their qualities the gift\nof historical comprehension and representation.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The method of artistic and literary history._\n\nThe method of artistic and literary history presents problems and\ndifficulties, some common to all historical method, others peculiar to\nit, because they derive from the concept of art itself.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Critique of the problem of the origin of art._\n\nHistory is wont to be divided into the history of man, the history or\nnature, and the mixed history of both the preceding. Without examining\nhere the question of the solidity of this division, it is clear that\nartistic and literary history belongs in any case to the first, since it\nconcerns a spiritual activity, that is to say, an activity proper to\nman. And since this activity is its subject, the absurdity of\npropounding the historical _problem of the origin of art_ becomes at\nonce evident. We should note that by this formula many different things\nhave in turn been included on many different occasions. _Origin_ has\noften meant _nature_ or _disposition_ of the artistic fact, and here was\na real scientific or philosophic problem, the very problem, in fact,\nwhich our treatise has tried to solve. At other times, by origin has\nbeen understood the ideal genesis, the search for the reason of art, the\ndeduction of the artistic fact from a first principle containing in\nitself both spirit and nature. This is also a philosophical problem, and\nit is complementary to the preceding, indeed it coincides with it,\nthough it has sometimes been strangely interpreted and solved by means\nof an arbitrary and semi-fantastic metaphysic. But when it has been\nsought to discover further exactly in what way the artistic function was\n_historically formed_, this has resulted in the absurdity to which we\nhave referred. If expression be the first form of consciousness, how can\nthe historical origin be sought of what is _presupposed_ not to be a\nproduct of nature and of human history? How can we find the historical\ngenesis of that which is a category, by means of which every historical\ngenesis and fact are understood? The absurdity has arisen from the\ncomparison with human institutions, which have, in fact, been formed in\nthe course of history, and which have disappeared or may disappear in\nits course. There exists between the aesthetic fact and a human\ninstitution (such as monogamic marriage or the fief) a difference to\nsome extent comparable with that between simple and compound bodies in\nchemistry. It is impossible to indicate the formation of the former,\notherwise they would not be simple, and if this be discovered, they\ncease to be simple and become compound.\n\nThe problem of the origin of art, historically understood, is only\njustified when it is proposed to seek, not for the formation of the\nfunction, but where and when art has appeared for the first time\n(appeared, that is to say, in a striking manner), at what point or in\nwhat region of the globe, and at what point or epoch of its history;\nwhen, that is to say, not the origin of art, but its most antique or\nprimitive history, is the object of research. This problem forms one\nwith that of the appearance of human civilization on the earth. Data for\nits solution are certainly wanting, but there yet remains the abstract\npossibility, and certainly attempts and hypotheses for its solution\nabound.\n\n    [Sidenote] _History and the criterion of progress._\n\nEvery form of human history has the concept of _progress_ for\nfoundation. But by progress must not be understood the imaginary and\nmetaphysical _law of progress_, which should lead the generations of man\nwith irresistible force to some unknown destiny, according to a\nprovidential plan which we can logically divine and understand. A\nsupposed law of this sort is the negation of history itself, of that\naccidentality, that empiricity, that contingency, which distinguish the\nconcrete fact from the abstraction. And for the same reason, progress\nhas nothing to do with the so-called _law of evolution_. If evolution\nmean the concrete fact of reality which evolves (that is, which is\nreality), it is not a law. If, on the other hand, it be a law, it\nbecomes confounded with the law of progress in the sense just described.\nThe progress of which we speak here, is nothing but the _concept of\nhuman activity itself_, which, working upon the material supplied to it\nby nature, conquers obstacles and bends nature to its own ends.\n\nSuch conception of progress, that is to say, of human activity applied\nto a given material, is the _point of view_ of the historian of\nhumanity. No one but a mere collector of stray facts, a simple seeker,\nor an incoherent chronicler, can put together the smallest narrative of\nhuman deeds, unless he have a definite point of view, that is to say, an\nintimate personal conviction regarding the conception of the facts which\nhe has undertaken to relate. The historical work of art cannot be\nachieved among the confused and discordant mass of crude facts, save by\nmeans of this point of view, which makes it possible to carve a definite\nfigure from that rough and incoherent mass. The historian of a practical\naction should know what is economy and what morality; the historian of\nmathematics, what are mathematics; the historian of botany, what is\nbotany; the historian of philosophy, what is philosophy. But if he do\nnot really know these things, he must at least have the illusion of\nknowing them; otherwise he will never be able to delude himself that he\nis writing history.\n\nWe cannot delay here to demonstrate the necessity and the inevitability\nof this subjective criterion in every narrative of human affairs. We\nwill merely say that this criterion is compatible with the utmost\nobjectivity, impartiality, and scrupulosity in dealing with data, and\nindeed forms a constitutive element of such subjective criterion. It\nsuffices to read any book of history to discover at once the point of\nview of the author, if he be a historian worthy of the name and know his\nown business. There exist liberal and reactionary, rationalist and\ncatholic historians, who deal with political or social history; for the\nhistory of philosophy there are metaphysical, empirical, sceptical,\nidealist, and spiritualist historians. Absolutely historical historians\ndo not and cannot exist. Can it be said that Thucydides and Polybius,\nLivy and Tacitus, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, Giannone and Voltaire,\nwere without moral and political views; and, in our time, Guizot or\nThiers, Macaulay or Balbo, Ranke or Mommsen? And in the history of\nphilosophy, from Hegel, who was the first to raise it to a great\nelevation, to Ritter, Zeller, Cousin, Lewes, and our Spaventa, was there\none who did not possess his conception of progress and criterion of\njudgment? Is there one single work of any value in the history of\nAesthetic, which has not been written from this or that point of view,\nwith this or that bias (Hegelian or Herbartian), from a sensualist or\nfrom an eclectic point of view, and so on? If the historian is to escape\nfrom the inevitable necessity of taking a side, he must become a\npolitical and scientific eunuch; and history is not the business of\neunuchs. They would at most be of use in compiling those great tomes of\nnot useless erudition, _elumbis atque fracta_, which are called, not\nwithout reason, monkish.\n\nIf, then, the concept of progress, the point of view, the criterion, be\ninevitable, the best to be done is not to try and escape from them, but\nto obtain the best possible. Everyone strives for this end, when he\nforms his own convictions, seriously and laboriously. Historians who\nprofess to wish to interrogate the facts, without adding anything of\ntheir own to them, are not to be believed. This, at the most, is the\nresult of ingenuousness and illusion on their part: they will always add\nwhat they have of personal, if they be truly historians, though it be\nwithout knowing it, or they will believe that they have escaped doing\nso, only because they have referred to it by innuendo, which is the most\ninsinuating and penetrative of methods.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Non-existence of a unique line of progress in artistic\n               and literary history._\n\nArtistic and literary history cannot dispense with the criterion of\nprogress any more easily than other history. We cannot show what a given\nwork of art is, save by proceeding from a conception of art, in order to\nfix the artistic problem which the author of such work of art had to\nsolve, and by determining whether or no he have solved it, or by how\nmuch and in what way he has failed to do so. But it is important to note\nthat the criterion of progress assumes a different form in artistic and\nliterary history to that which it assumes (or is believed to assume) in\nthe history of science.\n\nThe whole history of knowledge can be represented by one single line of\nprogress and regress. Science is the universal, and its problems are\narranged in one single vast system, or complex problem. All thinkers\nweary themselves over the same problem as to the nature of reality and\nof knowledge: contemplative Indians and Greek philosophers, Christians\nand Mohammedans, bare heads and heads with turbans, wigged heads and\nheads with the black berretta (as Heine said); and future generations\nwill weary themselves with it, as ours has done. It would take too long\nto inquire here if this be true or not of science. But it is certainly\nnot true of art; art is intuition, and intuition is individuality, and\nindividuality is never repeated. To conceive of the history of the\nartistic production of the human race as developed along a single line\nof progress and regress, would therefore be altogether erroneous.\n\nAt the most, and working to some extent with generalizations and\nabstractions, it may be admitted that the history of aesthetic products\nshows progressive cycles, but each cycle has its own problem, and is\nprogressive only in respect to that problem. When many are at work on\nthe same subject, without succeeding in giving to it the suitable form,\nyet drawing always more nearly to it, there is said to be progress. When\nhe who gives to it definite form appears, the cycle is said to be\ncomplete, progress ended. A typical example of this would be the\nprogress in the elaboration of the mode of using the subject-matter of\nchivalry, during the Italian Renaissance, from Pulci to Ariosto. (If\nthis instance be made use of, excessive simplification of it must be\nexcused.) Nothing but repetition and imitation could be the result of\nemploying that same material after Ariosto. The result was repetition or\nimitation, diminution or exaggeration, a spoiling of what had already\nbeen achieved; in sum, decadence. The Ariostesque epigoni prove this.\nProgress begins with the commencement of a new cycle. Cervantes, with\nhis more open and conscious irony, is an instance of this. In what did\nthe general decadence of Italian literature at the end of the sixteenth\ncentury consist? Simply in having nothing more to say, and in repeating\nand exaggerating motives already found. If the Italians of this period\nhad even been able to express their own decadence, they would not have\nbeen altogether failures, but have anticipated the literary movement of\nthe Renaissance. Where the subject-matter is not the same, a progressive\ncycle does not exist. Shakespeare does not represent a progress as\nregards Dante, nor Goethe as regards Shakespeare. Dante, however,\nrepresents a progress in respect to the visionaries of the Middle Ages,\nShakespeare to the Elizabethan dramatists, Goethe, with _Werther_ and\nthe first part of _Faust_, in respect to the writers of the _Sturm und\nDrang_. This mode of presenting the history of poetry and art contains,\nhowever, as we have remarked, something of abstract, of merely\npractical, and is without rigorous philosophical value. Not only is the\nart of savages not inferior, as art, to that of civilized peoples,\nprovided it be correlative to the impressions of the savage; but every\nindividual, indeed every moment of the spiritual life of an individual,\nhas its artistic world; and all those worlds are, artistically,\nincomparable with one another.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Errors committed in respect to this law._\n\nMany have sinned and continue to sin against this special form of the\ncriterion of progress in artistic and literary history. Some, for\ninstance, talk of the infancy of Italian art in Giotto, and of its\nmaturity in Raphael or in Titian; as though Giotto were not quite\nperfect and complete, in respect to his psychic material. He was\ncertainly incapable of drawing a figure like Raphael, or of colouring it\nlike Titian; but was Raphael or Titian by any chance capable of creating\nthe _Matrimonio di San Francesco con la Povert\u00e0_, or the _Morte di San\nFrancesco_? The spirit of Giotto had not felt the attraction of the body\nbeautiful, which the Renaissance studied and raised to a place of\nhonour; but the spirits of Raphael and of Titian were no longer curious\nof certain movements of ardour and of tenderness, which attracted the\nman of the fourteenth century. How, then, can a comparison be made,\nwhere there is no comparative term?\n\nThe celebrated divisions of the history of art suffer from the same\ndefect. They are as follows: an oriental period, representing a\ndisequilibrium between idea and form, with prevalence of the second; a\nclassical, representing an equilibrium between idea and form; a\nromantic, representing a new disequilibrium between idea and form, with\nprevalence of the idea. There are also the divisions into oriental art,\nrepresenting imperfection of form; classical, perfection of form;\nromantic or modern, perfection of content and of form. Thus classic and\nromantic have also received, among their many other meanings, that of\nprogressive or regressive periods, in respect to the realization of some\nindefinite artistic ideal of humanity.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Other meanings of the word \"progress\" in respect to\n               Aesthetic._\n\nThere is no such thing, then, as an _aesthetic_ progress of humanity.\nHowever, by aesthetic progress is sometimes meant, not what the two\nwords coupled together really signify, but the ever-increasing\naccumulation of our historical knowledge, which makes us able to\nsympathize with all the artistic products of all peoples and of all\ntimes, or, as is said, to make our taste more catholic. The difference\nappears very great, if the eighteenth century, so incapable of escaping\nfrom itself, be compared with our own time, which enjoys alike Hellenic\nand Roman art, now better understood, Byzantine, mediaeval, Arabic, and\nRenaissance art, the art of the Cinque Cento, baroque art, and the art\nof the seventeenth century. Egyptian, Babylonian, Etruscan, and even\nprehistoric art, are more profoundly studied every day. Certainly, the\ndifference between the savage and civilized man does not lie in the\nhuman faculties. The savage has speech, intellect, religion, and\nmorality, in common with civilized man, and he is a complete man. The\nonly difference lies in that civilized man penetrates and dominates a\nlarger portion of the universe with his theoretic and practical\nactivity. We cannot claim to be more spiritually alert than, for\nexample, the contemporaries of Pericles; but no one can deny that we are\nricher than they--rich with their riches and with those of how many\nother peoples and generations besides our own?\n\nBy aesthetic progress is also meant, in another sense, which is also\nimproper, the greater abundance of artistic intuitions and the smaller\nnumber of imperfect or decadent works which one epoch produces in\nrespect to another. Thus it may be said that there was aesthetic\nprogress, an artistic awakening, at the end of the thirteenth or of the\nfifteenth centuries.\n\nFinally, aesthetic progress is talked of, with an eye to the refinement\nand to the psychical complications exhibited in the works of art of the\nmost civilized peoples, as compared with those of less civilized\npeoples, barbarians and savages. But in this case, the progress is that\nof the complex conditions of society, not of the artistic activity, to\nwhich the material is indifferent.\n\nThese are the most important points concerning the method of artistic\nand literary history.\n\n\n\n\nXVIII\n\nCONCLUSION:\n\nIDENTITY OF LINGUISTIC AND AESTHETIC\n\n\n    [Sidenote] _Summary of the inquiry._\n\nA glance over the path traversed will show that we have completed the\nentire programme of our treatise. We have studied the nature of\nintuitive or expressive knowledge, which is the aesthetic or artistic\nfact (I. and II.), and we have described the other form of knowledge,\nnamely, the intellectual, with the secondary complications of its forms\n(III.). Having done this, it became possible to criticize all erroneous\ntheories of art, which arise from the confusion between the various\nforms, and from the undue transference of the characteristics of one\nform to those of another (IV.), and in so doing to indicate the inverse\nerrors which are found in the theory of intellectual knowledge and of\nhistoriography (V.). Passing on to examine the relations between the\naesthetic activity and the other spiritual activities, no longer\ntheoretic but practical, we have indicated the true character of the\npractical activity and the place which it occupies in respect to the\ntheoretic activity, which it follows: hence the critique of the invasion\nof aesthetic theory by practical concepts (VI.). We have also\ndistinguished the two forms of the practical activity, as economic and\nethic (VII.), adding to this the statement that there are no other forms\nof the spirit beyond the four which we have analyzed; hence (VIII.) the\ncritique of every metaphysical Aesthetic. And, seeing that there exist\nno other spiritual forms of equal degree, therefore there are no\noriginal subdivisions of the four established, and in particular of\nAesthetic. From this arises the impossibility of classes of expressions\nand the critique of Rhetoric, that is, of the partition of expressions\ninto simple and ornate, and of their subclasses (IX.). But, by the law\nof the unity of the spirit, the aesthetic fact is also a practical fact,\nand as such, occasions pleasure and pain. This led us to study the\nfeelings of value in general, and those of aesthetic value, or of the\nbeautiful, in particular (X.), to criticize aesthetic hedonism in all\nits various manifestations and complications (XI.), and to expel from\nthe system of Aesthetic the long series of pseudo-aesthetic concepts,\nwhich had been introduced into it (XII.). Proceeding from aesthetic\nproduction to the facts of reproduction, we began by investigating the\nmode of fixing externally the aesthetic expression, with the view of\nreproduction. This is the so-called physically beautiful, whether it be\nnatural or artificial (XIII.). We then derived from this distinction the\ncritique of the errors which arise from confounding the physical with\nthe aesthetic side of things (XIV.). We indicated the meaning of\nartistic technique, that which is the technique serving for\nreproduction, thus criticizing the divisions, limits, and\nclassifications of the individual arts, and establishing the connections\nbetween art, economy, and morality (XV.). Because the existence of the\nphysical objects does not suffice to stimulate to the full aesthetic\nreproduction, and because, in order to obtain this result, it is\nnecessary to recall the conditions in which the stimulus first operated,\nwe have also studied the function of historical erudition, directed\ntoward the end of re-establishing our communication with the works of\nthe past, and toward the creation of a base for aesthetic judgment\n(XVI.). We have closed our treatise by showing how the reproduction thus\nobtained is afterwards elaborated by the intellectual categories, that\nis to say, by an excursus on the method of literary and artistic history\n(XVII.).\n\nThe aesthetic fact has thus been considered both in itself and in its\nrelations with the other spiritual activities, with the feelings of\npleasure and of pain, with the facts that are called physical, with\nmemory, and with historical elaboration. It has passed from the position\nof _subject_ to that of _object_, that is to say, from the moment of\n_its birth_, until gradually it becomes changed for the spirit into\n_historical argument_.\n\nOur treatise may appear to be somewhat meagre, when compared with the\ngreat volumes usually consecrated to Aesthetic. But it will not seem so,\nwhen it is observed that these volumes, as regards nine-tenths of their\ncontents, are full of matter which does not appertain to Aesthetic, such\nas definitions, either psychical or metaphysical, of pseudo-aesthetic\nconcepts (of the sublime, the comic, the tragic, the humorous, etc.), or\nof the exposition of the supposed Zoology, Botany, and Mineralogy of\nAesthetic, and of universal history judged from the aesthetic\nstandpoint. The whole history of concrete art and literature has also\nbeen dragged into those Aesthetics and generally mangled; they contain\njudgments upon Homer and Dante, upon Ariosto and Shakespeare, upon\nBeethoven and Rossini, Michelangelo and Raphael. When all this has been\ndeducted from them, our treatise will no longer be held to be too\nmeagre, but, on the contrary, far more copious than ordinary treatises,\nfor these either omit altogether, or hardly touch at all, the greater\npart of the difficult problems proper to Aesthetic, which we have felt\nit to be our duty to study.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Identity of Linguistic and Aesthetic._\n\nAesthetic, then, as the science of expression, has been here studied by\nus from every point of view. But there yet remains to justify the\nsub-title, which we have joined to the title of our book, _General\nLinguistic_, and to state and make clear the thesis that the science of\nart is that of language. Aesthetic and Linguistic, in so far as they are\ntrue sciences, are not two different sciences, but one single science.\nNot that there is a special Linguistic; but the linguistic science\nsought for, general Linguistic, _in so far as what it contains is\nreducible to philosophy_, is nothing but Aesthetic. Whoever studies\ngeneral Linguistic, that is to say, philosophical Linguistic, studies\naesthetic problems, and _vice versa_. _Philosophy of language and\nphilosophy of art are the same thing_.\n\nWere Linguistic a _different_ science from Aesthetic, it should not have\nexpression, which is the essentially aesthetic fact, for its object.\nThis amounts to saying that it must be denied that language is\nexpression. But an emission of sounds, which expresses nothing, is not\nlanguage. Language is articulate, limited, organized sound, employed in\nexpression. If, on the other hand, language were a _special_ science in\nrespect to Aesthetic, it would necessarily have for its object a\n_special class_ of expressions. But the inexistence of classes of\nexpression is a point which we have already demonstrated.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Aesthetic formulization of linguistic problems. Nature\n               of language._\n\nThe problems which Linguistic serves to solve, and the errors with which\nLinguistic strives and has striven, are the same that occupy and\ncomplicate Aesthetic. If it be not always easy, it is, on the other\nhand, always possible, to reduce the philosophic questions of Linguistic\nto their aesthetic formula.\n\nThe disputes as to the nature of the one find their parallel in those as\nto the nature of the other. Thus it has been disputed, whether\nLinguistic be a scientific or a historical discipline, and the\nscientific having been distinguished from the historical, it has been\nasked whether it belong to the order of the natural or of the\npsychological sciences, by the latter being understood empirical\nPsychology, as much as the science of the spirit. The same has happened\nwith Aesthetic, which some have looked upon as a natural science,\nconfounding aesthetic expression with physical expression. Others have\nlooked upon it as a psychological science, confounding expression in its\nuniversality, with the empirical classification of expressions. Others\nagain, denying the very possibility of a science of such a subject, have\nlooked upon it as a collection of historical facts. Finally, it has been\nrealized that it belongs to the sciences of activity or of values, which\nare the spiritual sciences.\n\nLinguistic expression, or speech, has often seemed to be a fact of\n_interjection_, which belongs to the so-called physical expressions of\nthe feelings, common alike to men and animals. But it was soon admitted\nthat an abyss yawns between the \"Ah!\" which is a physical reflex of\npain, and a word; as also between that \"Ah!\" of pain and the \"Ah!\"\nemployed as a word. The theory of the interjection being abandoned\n(jocosely termed the \"Ah! Ah!\" theory by German linguists), the theory\nof _association or convention_ appeared. This theory was refuted by the\nsame objection which destroyed aesthetic associationism in general:\nspeech is unity, not multiplicity of images, and multiplicity does not\nexplain, but presupposes the existence of the expression to explain. A\nvariant of linguistic associationism is the imitative, that is to say,\nthe theory of the onomatopoeia, which the same philologists deride under\nthe name of the \"bow-wow\" theory, after the imitation of the dog's bark,\nwhich, according to the onomatopoeists, gives its name to the dog.\n\nThe most usual theory of our times as regards language (apart from mere\ncrass naturalism) consists of a sort of eclecticism or mixture of the\nvarious theories to which we have referred. It is assumed that language\nis in part the product of interjections and in part of onomatopes and\nconventions. This doctrine is altogether worthy of the scientific and\nphilosophic decadence of the second half of the nineteenth century.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Origin of language and its development._\n\nWe must here note a mistake into which have fallen those very\nphilologists who have best penetrated the active nature of language.\nThese, although they admit that language was _originally a spiritual\ncreation_, yet maintain that it was largely increased later by\n_association_. But the distinction does not prevail, for origin in this\ncase cannot mean anything but nature or essence. If, therefore, language\nbe a spiritual creation, it will always be a creation; if it be\nassociation, it will have been so from the beginning. The mistake has\narisen from not having grasped the general principle of Aesthetic, which\nwe have noted: namely, that expressions already produced must redescend\nto the rank of impressions before they can give rise to new impressions.\nWhen we utter new words, we generally transform the old ones, varying or\nenlarging their meaning; but this process is not associative. It is\ncreative, although the creation has for material the impressions, not of\nthe hypothetical primitive man, but of man who has lived long ages in\nsociety, and who has, so to say, stored so many things in his psychic\norganism, and among them so much language.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Relation between Grammar and Logic._\n\nThe question of the distinction between the aesthetic and the\nintellectual fact has appeared in Linguistic as that of the relations\nbetween Grammar and Logic. This question has found two solutions, which\nare partially true: that of the indissolubility of Logic and Grammar,\nand that of their dissolubility. The complete solution is this: if the\nlogical form be indissoluble from the grammatical (aesthetic), the\ngrammatical is dissoluble from the logical.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Grammatical classes or parts of speech._\n\nIf we look at a picture which, for example, portrays a man walking on a\ncountry road, we can say: \"This picture represents a fact of movement,\nwhich, if conceived as volitional, is called _action_. And because every\nmovement implies _matter_, and every action a being that acts, this\npicture also represents either _matter_ or a _being_. But this movement\ntakes place in a definite place, which is a part of a given _star_ (the\nEarth), and precisely in that part of it which is called _terra-firma_,\nand more properly in a part of it that is wooded and covered with grass,\nwhich is called _country_, cut naturally or artificially, in a manner\nwhich is called _road_. Now, there is only one example of that given\nstar, which is called Earth: Earth is an _individual_. But\n_terra-firma_, _country_, _road_, are _classes or universals_, because\nthere are other terra-firmas, other countries, other roads.\" And it\nwould be possible to continue for a while with similar considerations.\nBy substituting a phrase for the picture that we have imagined, for\nexample, one to this effect, \"Peter is walking on a country road,\" and\nby making the same remarks, we obtain the concepts of _verb_ (motion or\naction), of _noun_ (matter or agent), of _proper noun_, of _common\nnouns_; and so on.\n\nWhat have we done in both cases? Neither more nor less than to submit to\nlogical elaboration what was first elaborated only aesthetically; that\nis to say, we have destroyed the aesthetical by the logical. But, as in\ngeneral Aesthetic, error begins when It is wished to return from the\nlogical to the aesthetical, and it is asked what is the expression of\nmovement, action, matter, being, of the general, of the individual,\netc.; thus in like manner with language, error begins when motion or\naction are called verb, being, or matter, noun or substantive, and when\nlinguistic categories, or _parts of speech_, are made of all these, noun\nand verb and so on. The theory of parts of speech is at bottom\naltogether the same as that of artistic and literary classes, already\ncriticized in the Aesthetic.\n\nIt is false to say that the verb or the noun is expressed in definite\nwords, truly distinguishable from others. Expression is an indivisible\nwhole. Noun and verb do not exist in themselves, but are abstractions\nmade by our destroying the sole linguistic reality, which is _the\nproposition_. This last is to be understood, not in the usual mode of\ngrammarians, but as an organism expressive of a complete meaning, from\nan exclamation to a poem. This sounds paradoxical, but is nevertheless a\nmost simple truth.\n\nAnd as in Aesthetic, the artistic productions of certain peoples have\nbeen looked upon as imperfect, owing to the error above mentioned,\nbecause the supposed kinds have seemed still to be indiscriminate or\nabsent with them; so, in Linguistic, the theory of the parts of speech\nhas caused the analogous error of dividing languages into formed and\nunformed, according to whether there appear in them or not some of those\nsupposed parts of speech; for example, the verb.\n\n    [Sidenote] _The individuality of speech and the classification of\n               languages._\n\nLinguistic also discovered the irreducible individuality of the\naesthetic fact, when it affirmed that the word is what is really spoken,\nand that two truly identical words do not exist. Thus were synonyms and\nhomonyms destroyed, and thus was shown the impossibility of really\ntranslating one word into another, from so-called dialect into so-called\nlanguage, and from a so-called mother-tongue into a so-called foreign\ntongue.\n\nBut the attempt to classify languages agrees ill with this correct view.\nLanguages have no reality beyond the propositions and complexes of\npropositions really written and pronounced by given peoples for definite\nperiods. That is to say, they have no existence outside the works of\nart, in which they exist concretely. What is the art of a given people\nbut the complex of all its artistic products? What is the character of\nan art (say, Hellenic art or Proven\u00e7al literature), but the complex\nphysiognomy of those products? And how can such a question be answered,\nsave by giving the history of their art (of their literature, that is to\nsay, of their language in action)?\n\nIt will seem that this argument, although possessing value as against\nmany of the wonted classifications of languages, yet is without any as\nregards that queen of classifications, the historico-genealogical, that\nglory of comparative philology. And this is certainly true. But why?\nPrecisely because the historico-genealogical method is not a\nclassification. He who writes history does not classify, and the\nphilologists themselves have hastened to say that the languages which\ncan be arranged in a historical series (those whose series have been\ntraced) are, not distinct and definite species, but a complex of facts\nin the various phases of its development.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Impossibility of a normative grammar._\n\nLanguage has sometimes been looked upon as an act of volition or of\nchoice. But others have discovered the impossibility of creating\nlanguage artificially, by an act of will. _Tu, Caesar, civitatem dare\npotes homini, verbo non poles!_ was once said to the Roman Emperor.\n\nThe aesthetic (and therefore theoretic) nature of expression supplies\nthe method of correcting the scientific error which lies in the\nconception of a (normative) _Grammar_, containing the rules of speaking\nwell. Good sense has always rebelled against this error. An example of\nsuch rebellion is the \"So much the worse for grammar\" of Voltaire. But\nthe impossibility of a normative grammar is also recognized by those who\nteach it, when they confess that to write well cannot be learned by\nrules, that there are no rules without exceptions, and that the study of\nGrammar should be conducted practically, by reading and by examples,\nwhich form the literary taste. The scientific reason of this\nimpossibility lies in what we have already proved: that a technique of\nthe theoretical amounts to a contradiction in terms. And what could a\n(normative) grammar be, but just a technique of linguistic expression,\nthat is to say, of a theoretic fact?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Didactic purposes._\n\nThe case in which Grammar is understood merely as an empirical\ndiscipline, that is to say, as a collection of groups useful for\nlearning languages, without any claim whatever to philosophic truth, is\nquite different. Even the abstractions of the parts of speech are in\nthis case both admissible and of assistance.\n\nMany books entitled treatises of Linguistic have a merely didactic\npurpose; they are simply scholastic manuals. We find in them, in truth,\na little of everything, from the description of the vocal apparatus and\nof the artificial machines (phonographs) which can imitate it, to\nsummaries of the most important results obtained by Indo-European,\nSemitic, Coptic, Chinese, or other philologies; from philosophic\ngeneralizations on the origin or nature of language, to advice on\ncalligraphy, and the arrangement of schedules for philological spoils.\nBut this mass of notions, which is here taught in a fragmentary and\nincomplete manner as regards the language in its essence, the language\nas expression, resolves itself into notions of Aesthetic. Nothing exists\noutside _Aesthetic_, which gives knowledge of the nature of language,\nand _empirical Grammar_, which is a pedagogic expedient, save the\n_History of languages_ in their living reality, that is, the history of\nconcrete literary productions, which is substantially identical with the\n_History of literature_.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Elementary linguistic facts or roots._\n\nThe same mistake of confusing the physical with the aesthetic, from\nwhich the elementary forms of the beautiful originate, is made by those\nwho seek for elementary aesthetic facts, decorating with that name the\ndivisions of the longer series of physical sounds into shorter series.\nSyllables, vowels, and consonants, and the series of syllables called\nwords which give no definite sense when taken alone, are not facts of\nlanguage, but simple physical concepts of sounds.\n\nAnother mistake of the same sort is that of roots, to which the most\nable philologists now accord but a very limited value. Having confused\nphysical with linguistic or expressive facts, and observing that, in the\norder of ideas, the simple precedes the complex, they necessarily ended\nby thinking that _the smaller_ physical facts were _the more simple_.\nHence the imaginary necessity that the most antique, primitive\nlanguages, had been monosyllabic, and that the progress of historical\nresearch must lead to the discovery of monosyllabic roots. But (to\nfollow up the imaginary hypothesis) the first expression that the first\nman conceived may also have had a mimetic, not a phonic reflex: it may\nhave been exteriorised, not in a sound but in a gesture. And assuming\nthat it was exteriorised in a sound, there is no reason to suppose that\nsound to have been monosyllabic rather than plurisyllabic. Philologists\nfrequently blame their own ignorance and impotence, if they do not\nalways succeed in reducing plurisyllabism to monosyllabism, and they\ntrust in the future. But their faith is without foundation, as their\nblame of themselves is an act of humility arising from an erroneous\npresumption.\n\nFurthermore, the limits of syllables, as those of words, are altogether\narbitrary, and distinguished, as well as may be, by empirical use.\nPrimitive speech, or the speech of the uncultured man, is _continuous_,\nunaccompanied by any reflex consciousness of the divisions of the word\nand of the syllables, which are taught at school. No true law of\nLinguistic can be founded on such divisions. Proof of this is to be\nfound in the confession of linguists, that there are no truly phonetic\nlaws of the hiatus, of cacophony, of diaeresis, of synaeresis, but\nmerely laws of taste and convenience; that is to say, _aesthetic_ laws.\nAnd what are the laws of _words_ which are not at the same time laws of\n_style_?\n\n    [Sidenote] _Aesthetic judgment and the model language._\n\nThe search for a _model language_, or for a method of reducing\nlinguistic usage to _unity_, arises from the misconception of a\nrationalistic measurement of the beautiful, from the concept which we\nhave termed that of false aesthetic absoluteness. In Italy, we call this\nquestion that of the _unity of the language_.\n\nLanguage is perpetual creation. What has been linguistically expressed\ncannot be repeated, save by the reproduction of what has already been\nproduced. The ever-new impressions give rise to continuous changes of\nsounds and of meanings, that is, to ever-new expressions. To seek the\nmodel language, then, is to seek the immobility of motion. Every one\nspeaks, and should speak, according to the echoes which things arouse in\nhis soul, that is, according to his impressions. It is not without\nreason that the most convinced supporter of any one of the solutions of\nthe problem of the unity of language (be it by the use of Latin, of\nfourteenth-century Italian, or of Florentine) feels a repugnance in\napplying his theory, when he is speaking in order to communicate his\nthoughts and to make himself understood. The reason for this is that he\nfeels that were he to substitute Latin, fourteenth-century Italian, or\nFlorentine speech for that of a different origin, but which answers to\nhis impressions, he would be falsifying the latter. He would become a\nvain listener to himself, instead of a speaker, a pedant in place of a\nserious man, a histrion instead of a sincere person. To write according\nto a theory is not really to write: at the most, it is _making\nliterature_.\n\nThe question of the unity of language is always reappearing, because,\nput as it is, there can be no solution to it, owing to its being based\nupon a false conception of what language is. Language is not an arsenal\nof ready-made arms, and it is not _vocabulary_, which, in so far as it\nis thought of as progressive and in living use, is always a cemetery,\ncontaining corpses more or less well embalmed, that is to say, a\ncollection of abstractions.\n\nOur mode of settling the question of the model language, or of the unity\nof the language, may seem somewhat abrupt, and yet we would not wish to\nappear otherwise than respectful towards the long line of literary men\nwho have debated this question in Italy for centuries. But those ardent\ndebates were, at bottom, debates upon aestheticity, not upon aesthetic\nscience, upon literature rather than upon literary theory, upon\neffective speaking and writing, not upon linguistic science. Their error\nconsisted in transforming the manifestation of a want into a scientific\nthesis, the need of understanding one another more easily among a people\ndialectically divided, in the philosophic search for a language, which\nshould be one or ideal. Such a search was as absurd as that other search\nfor a _universal language_, with the immobility of the concept and of\nthe abstraction. The social need for a better understanding of one\nanother cannot be satisfied save by universal culture, by the increase\nof communications, and by the interchange of thought among men.\n\n    [Sidenote] _Conclusion._\n\nThese observations must suffice to show that all the scientific problems\nof Linguistic are the same as those of Aesthetic, and that the truths\nand errors of the one are the truths and errors of the other. If\nLinguistic and Aesthetic appear to be two different sciences, this\narises from the fact that people think of the former as grammar, or as a\nmixture between philosophy and grammar, that is, an arbitrary mnemonic\nscheme. They do not think of it as a rational science and as a pure\nphilosophy of speech. Grammar, or something grammatical, also causes the\nprejudice in people's minds, that the reality of language lies in\nisolated and combinable words, not in living discourse among expressive\norganisms, rationally indivisible.\n\nThose linguists, or glottologists with philosophical endowments, who\nhave best fathomed questions of language, resemble (to employ a worn but\nefficacious figure) workmen piercing a tunnel: at a certain point they\nmust hear the voices of their companions, the philosophers of Aesthetic,\nwho have been piercing it from the other side. At a certain stage of\nscientific elaboration, Linguistic, in so far as it is philosophy, must\nbe merged in Aesthetic; and indeed it is merged in it, without leaving a\nresidue.\n\n\n\n\nHISTORICAL SUMMARY\n\nI\n\nAESTHETIC IDEAS IN GRAECO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY\n\n\nThe question, as to whether Aesthetic should be looked upon as ancient\nor modern, has often been discussed. The answer will depend upon the\nview taken of the nature of Aesthetic.\n\nBenedetto Croce has proved that Aesthetic is _the science of expressive\nactivity_. But this knowledge cannot be reached, until has been defined\nthe nature of imagination, of representation, of expression, or whatever\nwe may term that faculty which is theoretic, but not intellectual, which\ngives knowledge of the individual, but not of the universal.\n\nNow the deviations from this, the correct theory, may arise in two ways:\nby _defect_ or by _excess_. Negation of the special aesthetic activity,\nor of its autonomy, is an instance of the former. This amounts to a\nmutilation of the reality of the spirit. Of the latter, the substitution\nor superposition of another mysterious and non-existent activity is an\nexample.\n\nThese errors each take several forms. That which errs by defect may be:\n(_a_) pure hedonism, which looks upon art as merely sensual pleasure;\n(_b_) rigoristic hedonism, agreeing with (_a_), but adding that art is\nirreconcilable with the loftiest activities of man; (_c_) moralistic or\npedagogic hedonism, which admits, with the two former, that art is mere\nsensuality, but believes that it may not only be harmless, but of some\nservice to morals, if kept in proper subjection and obedience.\n\nThe error by excess also assumes several forms, but these are\nindeterminable _a priori_. This view is fully dealt with under the name\nof _mystic_, in the Theory and in the Appendix.\n\nGraeco-Roman antiquity was occupied with the problem in all these forms.\nIn Greece, the problem of art and of the artistic faculty arose for the\nfirst time after the sophistic movement, as a result of the Socratic\npolemic.\n\nWith the appearance of the word _mimesis_ or _mimetic_, we have a first\nattempt at grouping the arts, and the expression, allegoric, or its\nequivalent, used in defence of Homer's poetry, reminds us of what Plato\ncalled \"the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry.\"\n\nBut when internal facts were all looked upon as mere phenomena of\nopinion or feeling, of pleasure or of pain, of illusion or of arbitrary\ncaprice, there could be no question of beautiful or ugly, of difference\nbetween the true and the beautiful, or between the beautiful and the\ngood.\n\nThe problem of the nature of art assumes as solved those problems\nconcerning the difference between rational and irrational, material and\nspiritual, bare fact and value, etc. This was first done in the Socratic\nperiod, and therefore the aesthetic problem could only arise after\nSocrates.\n\nAnd in fact it does arise, with Plato, _the author of the only great\nnegation of art which appears in the history of ideas_.\n\nIs art rational or irrational? Does it belong to the noble region of the\nsoul, where dwell philosophy and virtue, or does it cohabit with\nsensuality and with crude passion in the lower regions? This was the\nquestion that Plato asked, and thus was the aesthetic problem stated for\nthe first time.\n\nHis Gorgias remarks with sceptical acumen, that tragedy is a deception,\nwhich brings honour alike to deceived and to deceiver, and therefore it\nis blameworthy not to know how to deceive and not to allow oneself to be\ndeceived. This suffices for Gorgias, but Plato, the philosopher, must\nresolve the doubt. If it be in fact deception, down with tragedy and the\nother arts! If it be not deception, then what is the place of tragedy in\nphilosophy and in the righteous life? His answer was that art or mimetic\ndoes not realize the ideas, or the truth of things, but merely\nreproduces natural or artificial things, which are themselves mere\nshadows of the ideas. Art, then, is but a shadow of a shadow, a thing of\nthird-rate degree. The artificer fashions the object which the painter\npaints. The artificer copies the divine idea and the painter copies him.\nArt therefore does not belong to the rational, but to the irrational,\nsensual sphere of the soul. It can serve but for sensual pleasure, which\ndisturbs and obscures. Therefore must mimetic, poetry, and poets be\nexcluded from the perfect Republic.\n\nPlato observed with truth, that imitation does not rise to the logical\nor conceptual sphere, of which poets and painters, as such, are, in\nfact, ignorant. But he _failed to realize_ that there could be any form\nof knowledge other than the intellectual.\n\nWe now know that Intuition lies on this side or outside the Intellect,\nfrom which it differs as much as it does from passion and sensuality.\n\nPlato, with his fine aesthetic sense, would have been grateful to anyone\nwho could have shown him how to place art, which he loved and practised\nso supremely himself, among the lofty activities of the spirit. But in\nhis day, no one could give him such assistance. His conscience and his\nreason saw that art makes the false seem the true, and therefore he\nresolutely banished it to the lower regions of the spirit.\n\nThe tendency among those who followed Plato in time was to find some\nmeans of retaining art and of depriving it of the baleful influence\nwhich it was believed to exercise. Life without art was to the\nbeauty-loving Greek an impossibility, although he was equally conscious\nof the demands of reason and of morality. Thus it happened that art,\nwhich, on the purely hedonistic hypothesis, had been treated as a\nbeautiful courtezan, became in the hands of the moralist, a pedagogue.\nAristophanes and Strabo, and above all Aristotle, dwell upon the\ndidactic and moralistic possibility of poetry. For Plutarch, poetry\nseems to have been a sort of preparation for philosophy, a twilight to\nwhich the eyes should grow accustomed, before emerging into the full\nlight of day.\n\nAmong the Romans, we find Lucretius comparing the beauties of his great\npoem to the sweet yellow honey, with which doctors are wont to anoint\nthe rim of the cup containing their bitter drugs. Horace, as so\nfrequently, takes his inspiration from the Greek, when he offers the\ndouble view of art: as courtezan and as pedagogue. In his _Ad Pisones_\noccur the passages, in which we find mingled with the poetic function,\nthat of the orator--the practical and the aesthetic. \"Was Virgil a poet\nor an orator?\" The triple duty of pleasing, moving, and teaching, was\nimposed upon the poet. Then, with a thought for the supposed\nmeretricious nature of their art, the ingenious Horace remarks that both\nmust employ the seductions of form.\n\nThe _mystic_ view of art appeared only in late antiquity, with Plotinus.\nThe curious error of looking upon Plato as the head of this school and\nas the Father of Aesthetic assumes that he who felt obliged to banish\nart altogether from the domain of the higher functions of the spirit,\nwas yet ready to yield to it the highest place there. The mystical view\nof Aesthetic accords a lofty place indeed to Aesthetic, placing it even\nabove philosophy. The enthusiastic praise of the beautiful, to be found\nin the _Gorgias_, _Philebus_, _Phaedrus_, and _Symposium_ is responsible\nfor this misunderstanding, but it is well to make perfectly clear that\nthe beautiful, of which Plato discourses in those dialogues, has nothing\nto do with the _artistically_ beautiful, nor with the mysticism of the\nneo-Platonicians.\n\nYet the thinkers of antiquity were aware that a problem lay in the\ndirection of Aesthetic, and Xenophon records the sayings of Socrates\nthat the beautiful is \"that which is fitting and answers to the end\nrequired.\" Elsewhere he says \"it is that which is loved.\" Plato likewise\nvibrates between various views and offers several solutions. Sometimes\nhe appears almost to confound the beautiful with the true, the good and\nthe divine; at others he leans toward the utilitarian view of Socrates;\nat others he distinguishes between what is beautiful In itself and what\npossesses but a relative beauty. At other times again, he is a hedonist,\nand makes it to consist of pure pleasure, that is, of pleasure with no\nshadow of pain; or he finds it in measure and proportion, or in the very\nsound, the very colour itself. The reason for all this vacillation of\ndefinition lay in Plato's exclusion of the artistic or mimetic fact from\nthe domain of the higher spiritual activities. The _Hippias major_\nexpresses this uncertainty more completely than any of the other\ndialogues. What is the beautiful? That is the question asked at the\nbeginning, and left unanswered at the end. The Platonic Socrates and\nHippias propose the most various solutions, one after another, but\nalways come out by the gate by which they entered in. Is the beautiful\nto be found in ornament? No, for gold embellishes only where it is in\nkeeping. Is the beautiful that which seems ugly to no man? But it is a\nquestion of being, not of seeming. Is it their fitness which makes\nthings seem beautiful? But in that case, the fitness which makes them\nappear beautiful is one thing, the beautiful another. If the beautiful\nbe the useful or that which leads to an end, then evil would also be\nbeautiful, because the useful may also end evilly. Is the beautiful the\nhelpful, that which leads to the good? No, for in that case the good\nwould not be beautiful, nor the beautiful good, because cause and effect\nare different.\n\nThus they argued in the Platonic dialogues, and when we turn to the\npages of Aristotle, we find him also uncertain and inclined to vary his\ndefinitions.[5] Sometimes for him the good and pleasurable are the\nbeautiful, sometimes it lies in actions, at others in things motionless,\nor in bulk and order, or is altogether undefinable. Antiquity also\nestablished canons of the beautiful, and the famous canon of\nPolycleitus, on the proportions of the human body, fitly compares with\nthat of later times on the golden line, and with the Ciceronian phrase\nfrom the Tusculan Disputations. But these are all of them mere empirical\nobservations, mere happy remarks and verbal substitutions, which lead to\nunsurmountable difficulties when put to philosophical test.\n\nOne important identification is absent in all those early attempts at\ntruth. The beautiful is never identified with art, and the artistic fact\nis always clearly distinguished from beauty, mimetic from its content.\nPlotinus first identified the two, and with him the beautiful and art\nare dissolved together in a passion and mystic elevation of the spirit.\nThe beauty of natural objects is the archetype existing in the soul,\nwhich is the fountain of all natural beauty. Thus was Plato (he said) in\nerror, when he despised the arts for imitating nature, for nature\nherself imitates the idea, and art also seeks her inspiration directly\nfrom those ideas whence nature proceeds. We have here, with Plotinus and\nwith Neoplatonism, the first appearance in the world of mystical\nAesthetic, destined to play so important a part in later aesthetic\ntheory.\n\nAristotle was far more happy in his attempts at defining Aesthetic as\nthe science of representation and of expression than in his definitions\nof the beautiful. He felt that some element of the problem had been\noverlooked, and in attempting in his turn a solution, he had the\nadvantage over Plato of looking upon the ideas as simple concepts, not\nas hypostases of concepts or of abstractions. Thus reality was more\nvivid for Aristotle: it was the synthesis of matter and form. He saw\nthat art, or mimetic, was a theoretic fact, or a mode of contemplation.\n\"But if Poetry be a theoretic fact, in what way is it to be distinguished\nfrom science and from historical knowledge?\" Thus magnificently does the\ngreat philosopher pose the problem at the commencement of his _Poetics_,\nand thus alone can it be posed successfully. We ask the same question in\nthe same words to-day. But the problem is difficult, and the masterly\nstatement of it was not equalled by the method of solution then\navailable. He made an excellent start on his voyage of discovery, but\nstopped half way, irresolute and perplexed. Poetry, he says, differs from\nhistory, by portraying the possible, while history deals with what has\nreally happened. Poetry, like philosophy, aims at the universal, but in a\ndifferent way, which the philosopher indicates as something more (_mallon\ntha katholon_) which differentiates poetry from history, occupied with the\nparticular (_malon tha kath ekaston_). What, then, is the possible, the\nsomething more, and the particular of poetry? Aristotle immediately falls\ninto error and confusion, when he attempts to define these words. Since\nart has to deal with the absurd and with the impossible, it cannot be\nanything rational, but a mere imitation of reality, in accordance with\nthe Platonic theory--a fact of sensual pleasure. Aristotle does not,\nhowever, attain to so precise a definition as Plato, whose erroneous\ndefinition he does not succeed in supplanting. The truth is that he\nfailed of his self-imposed task; he failed to discern the true nature of\nAesthetic, although he restated and re-examined the problem with such\nmarvellous acumen.\n\nAfter Aristotle, there comes a lull in the discussion, until Plotinus.\nThe _Poetics_ were generally little studied, and the admirable statement\nof the problem generally neglected by later writers. Antique psychology\nknew the fancy or imagination, as preserving or reproducing sensuous\nimpressions, or as an intermediary between the concepts and feeling: its\nautonomous productive activity was not yet understood. In the _Life of\nApollonius of Tyana_, Philostratus is said to have been the first to\nmake clear the difference between mimetic and creative imagination. But\nthis does not in reality differ from the Aristotelian mimetic, which is\nconcerned, not only with the real, but also with the possible. Cicero\ntoo, before Philostratus, speaks of a kind of exquisite beauty lying\nhidden in the soul of the artist, which guides his hand and art.\nAntiquity seems generally to have been entrammelled in the meshes of the\nbelief in mimetic, or the duplication of natural objects by the artist\nPhilostratus and the other protagonists of the imagination may have\nmeant to combat this error, but the shadows lie heavy until we reach\nPlotinus.\n\nWe find already astir among the sophists the question as to the nature\nof language. Admitting that language is a sign, are we to take that\nas signifying a spiritual necessity (_phusis_) or as a psychological\nconvention (_nomos_)? Aristotle made a valuable contribution to this\ndifficult question, when he spoke of a kind of proposition other than\nthose which predicate truth or falsehood, that is, logic. With him\n_euchae_ is the term proper to designate desires and aspirations,\nwhich are the vehicle of poetry and of oratory. (It must be remembered\nthat for Aristotle words, like poetry, belonged to mimetic.) The\nprofound remark about the third mode of proposition would, one would\nhave thought, have led naturally to the separation of linguistic\nfrom logic, and to its classification with poetry and art. But the\nAristotelian logic assumed a verbal and formal character, which set\nback the attainment of this position by many hundred years. Yet the\ngenius of Epicurus had an intuition of the truth, when he remarked\nthat the diversity of names for the same things arose, not from\narbitrary caprice, but from the diverse impression derived from the\nsame object. The Stoics, too, seem to have had an inkling of the\nnon-logical nature of speech, but their use of the word _lekton_\nleaves it doubtful whether they distinguished by it the linguistic\nrepresentation from the abstract concept, or rather, generically, the\nmeaning from the sound.\n\n[5] In the Appendix will be found further striking quotations from\n    and references to Aristotle.--(D.A.)\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nAESTHETIC IDEAS IN THE MIDDLE AGE AND IN THE RENAISSANCE\n\n\nWell-nigh all the theories of antique Aesthetic reappear in the Middle\nAges, as it were by spontaneous generation. Duns Scotus Erigena\ntranslated the Neoplatonic mysticism of the pseudo-Dionysus. The\nChristian God took the place of the chief Good or Idea: God, wisdom,\ngoodness, supreme beauty are the fountains of natural beauty, and these\nare steps in the stair of contemplation of the Creator. In this manner\nspeculation began to be diverted from the art fact, which had been so\nprominent with Plotinus. Thomas Aquinas followed Aristotle in\ndistinguishing the beautiful from the good, and applied his doctrine of\nimitation to the beauty of the second person of the Trinity (_in quantum\nest imago expressa Patris_). With the troubadours, we may find traces of\nthe hedonistic view of art, and the rigoristic hypothesis finds in\nTertullian and in certain Fathers of the Church staunch upholders. The\nretrograde Savonarola occupied the same position at a later period. But\nthe narcotic, moralistic, or pedagogic view mostly prevailed, for it\nbest suited an epoch of relative decadence in culture. It suited\nadmirably the Middle Age, offering at once an excuse for the new-born\nChristian art, and for those works of classical or pagan art which yet\nsurvived. Specimens of this view abound all through the Middle Age. We\nfind it, for instance, in the criticism of Virgil, to whose work were\nattributed four distinct meanings: literal, allegorical, moral, and\nanagogic. For Dante poetry was _nihil aliud quam fictio rhetorica in\nmusicaque posita_. \"If the vulgar be incapable of appreciating my inner\nmeaning, then they shall at least incline their minds to the perfection\nof my beauty. If from me ye cannot gather wisdom, at the least shall ye\nenjoy me as a pleasant thing.\" Thus spoke the Muse of Dante, whose\n_Convivio_ is an attempt to aid the understanding in its effort to grasp\nthe moral and pedagogic elements of verse. Poetry was the _gaia\nscienza_, \"a fiction containing many useful things covered or veiled.\"\n\nIt would be inexact to identify art in the Middle Age with philosophy\nand theology. Its pleasing falsity could be adapted to useful ends, much\nin the same way as matrimony excuses love and sexual union. This,\nhowever, implies that for the Middle Age the ideal state was celibacy;\nthat is, pure knowledge, divorced from art.\n\nThe only line of explanation that was altogether neglected in the Middle\nAge was the right one.\n\nThe _Poetics_ of Aristotle were badly rendered into Latin, from the\nfaulty paraphrase of Averroes, by one Hermann (1256). The nominalist and\nrealist dispute brought again into the arena the relations between\nthought and speech, and we find Duns Scotus occupied with the problem in\nhis _De modis significandi seu grammatica speculativa_. Abelard had\ndefined sensation as _confusa conceptio_, and with the importance given\nto intuitive knowledge, to the perception of the individual, of the\n_species specialissima_ in Duns Scotus, together with the denomination\nof the forms of knowledge as _confusae, indistinctae_, and _distinctae_,\nwe enter upon a terminology, which we shall see appearing again, big\nwith results, at the commencement of modern Aesthetic.\n\nThe doctrine of the Middle Age, in respect to art and letters, may thus\nbe regarded as of interest rather to the history of culture than to that\nof general knowledge. A like remark holds good of the Renaissance.\nTheories of antiquity are studied, countless treatises in many forms are\nwritten upon them, but no really new Ideas as regards aesthetic science\nappear on the horizon.\n\nWe find among the spokesmen of mystical Aesthetic in the thirteenth\ncentury such names as Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. Bembo\nand many others wrote on the Beautiful and on Love in the century that\nfollowed. The _Dialogi di Amore_, written in Italian by a Spanish Jew\nnamed Leone and published in 1535, had a European success, being\ntranslated into many languages. He talks of the universality of love and\nof its origin, of beauty that is grace, which delights the soul and\nimpels it to love. Knowledge of lesser beauties leads to loftier\nspiritual beauties. Leone called these remarks _Philographia_.\n\nPetrarch's followers versified similar intuitions, while others wrote\nparodies and burlesques of this style; Luca Paciolo, the friend of\nLeonardo, made the (false) discovery of the golden section, basing his\nspeculating upon mathematics; Michael Angelo established an empirical\ncanon for painting, attempting to give rules for imparting grace and\nmovement to figures, by means of certain arithmetical proportions;\nothers found special meanings in colours; while the Platonicians placed\nthe seat of beauty in the soul, the Aristotelians in physical qualities.\nAgostino Nifo, the Averroist, after some inconclusive remarks, is at\nlast fortunate enough to discover where natural beauty really dwells:\nits abode is the body of Giovanna d'Aragona, Princess of Tagliacozzo, to\nwhom he dedicates his book. Tasso mingled the speculations of the\n_Hippias major_ with those of Plotinus.\n\nTommaso Campanella, in his _Poetica_, looks upon the beautiful as\n_signum boni_, the ugly as _signum mali_. By goodness, he means Power,\nWisdom, and Love. Campanella was still under the influence of the\nerroneous Platonic conception of the beautiful, but the use of the word\n_sign_ in this place represents progress. It enabled him to see that\nthings in themselves are neither beautiful nor ugly.\n\nNothing proves more clearly that the Renaissance did not overstep the\nlimits of aesthetic theory reached in antiquity, than the fact that the\npedagogic theory of art continued to prevail, in the face of\ntranslations of the _Poetics_ of Aristotle and of the diffuse labours\nexpended upon that work. This theory was even grafted upon the\n_Poetics_, where one is surprised to find it. There are a few hedonists\nstanding out from the general trend of opinion. The restatement of the\npedagogic position, reinforced with examples taken from antiquity, was\ndisseminated throughout Europe by the Italians of the Renaissance.\nFrance, Spain, England, and Germany felt its influence, and we find the\nwriters of the period of Louis XIV. either frankly didactic, like Le\nBossu (1675), for whom the first object of the poet is to instruct, or\nwith La M\u00e9nardi\u00e8re (1640) speaking of poetry as \"cette science agr\u00e9able\nqui m\u00eale la gravit\u00e9 des pr\u00e9ceptes avec la douceur du langage.\" For the\nformer of these critics, Homer was the author of two didactic manuals\nrelating to military and political matters: the _Iliad_ and the\n_Odyssey_.\n\nDidacticism has always been looked upon as the Poetic of the\nRenaissance, although the didactic is not mentioned among the kinds of\npoetry of that period. The reason of this lies in the fact that for the\nRenaissance all poetry was didactic, in addition to any other qualities\nwhich it might possess. The active discussion of poetic theory, the\ncriticism of Aristotle and of Plato's exclusion of poetry, of the\npossible and of the verisimilar, if it did not contribute much original\nmaterial to the theory of art, yet at any rate sowed the seeds which\nafterwards germinated and bore fruit. Why, they asked with Aristotle, at\nthe Renaissance, does poetry deal with the universal, history with the\nparticular? What is the reason for poetry being obliged to seek\nverisimilitude? What does Raphael mean by the \"certain idea,\" which he\nfollows in his painting?\n\nThese themes and others cognate were dealt with by Italian and by\nSpanish writers, who occasionally reveal wonderful acumen, as when\nFrancesco Patrizio, criticizing Aristotle's theory of imitation,\nremarks: \"All languages and all philosophic writings and all other\nwritings would be poetry, because they are made of words, and words are\nimitations.\" But as yet no one dared follow such a clue to the\nlabyrinth, and the Renaissance closes with the sense of a mystery yet to\nbe revealed.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nSEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES\n\n\nThe seventeenth century is remarkable for the ferment of thought upon\nthis difficult problem. Such words as genius, taste, imagination or\nfancy, and feeling, appear in this literature, and deserve a passing\nnotice. As regards the word \"genius,\" we find the Italian \"ingegno\"\nopposed to the intellect, and Dialectic adorned with the attributes of\nthe latter, while Rhetoric has the advantage of \"ingegno\" in all its\nforms, such as \"concetti\" and \"acutezze.\" With these the English word\ningenious has an obvious connection, especially in its earlier use as\napplied to men of letters. The French worked upon the word \"ingegno\" and\nevolved from it in various associations the expressions \"esprit,\" \"beaux\nEsprits.\" The manual of the Spanish Jesuit, Baltasar Gracian, became\ncelebrated throughout Europe, and here we find \"ingegno\" described as\nthe truly inventive faculty, and from it the English word \"genius,\" the\nItalian \"genio,\" the French \"g\u00e9nie,\" first enter into general use.\n\nThe word \"gusto\" or taste, \"good taste,\" in its modern sense, also\nsprang into use about this time. Taste was held to be a judicial\nfaculty, directed to the beautiful, and thus to some extent distinct\nfrom the intellectual judgment. It was further bisected into active and\npassive; but the former ran into the definition of \"ingegno,\" the latter\ndescribed sterility. The word \"gusto,\" or taste as judgment, was in use\nin Italy at a very early period; and in Spain we find Lope di Vega and\nhis contemporaries declaring that their object is to \"delight the taste\"\nof their public. These uses of the word are not of significance as\nregards the problem of art, and we must return to Baltasar Gracian\n(1642) for a definition of taste as a special faculty or attitude of the\nsoul. Italian writers of the period echo the praises of this laconic\nmoralist, who, when he spoke of \"a man of taste,\" meant to describe what\nwe call to-day \"a man of tact\" in the conduct of life.\n\nThe first use of the word in a strictly aesthetic sense occurs in France\nin the last quarter of the seventeenth century. La Bruy\u00e8re writes in his\n_Caract\u00e8res_ (1688): \"Il y a dans l'art un point de perfection, comme de\nbont\u00e9 ou de maturit\u00e9 dans la nature: celui qui le sent et qui l'aime, a\nle go\u00fbt parfait; celui qui ne le sent pas, et qui aime au de\u00e7\u00e0 ou au\ndel\u00e0, a le go\u00fbt d\u00e9fectueux. Il y a donc un bon et un mauvais go\u00fbt, et\nl'on dispute des go\u00fbts avec fondement.\" Delicacy and variability or\nvariety were appended as attributes of taste. This French definition of\nthe Italian word was speedily adopted in England, where it became \"good\ntaste,\" and we find it used in this sense in Italian and German writers\nof about this period.\n\nThe words \"imagination\" and \"fancy\" were also passed through the\ncrucible in this century. We find the Cardinal Sforza-Pallavicino (1644)\nblaming those who look for truth or falsehood, for the verisimilar or\nfor historical truth, in poetry. Poetry, he holds, has to do with the\nprimary apprehensions, which give neither truth nor falsehood. Thus the\nfancy takes the place of the verisimilar of certain students of\nAristotle. The Cardinal continues his eloquence with the clinching\nremark that if the intention of poetry were to be believed true, then\nits real end would be falsehood, which is absolutely condemned by the\nlaw of nature and by God. The sole object of poetic fables is, he says,\nto adorn our intellect with sumptuous, new, marvellous, and splendid\nimaginings, and so great has been the benefits accruing from this to the\nhuman race, that poets have been rewarded with a glory superior to any\nother, and their names have been crowned with divine honours. This, he\nsays in his treatise, _Del Bene_, has been the just reward of poets,\nalbeit they have not been bearers of knowledge, nor have they manifested\ntruth.\n\nThis throwing of the bridle on the neck of Pegasus seemed to Muratori\nsixty years later to be altogether too risky a proceeding--although\nadvocated by a Prince of the Church! He reinserts the bit of the\nverisimilar, though he talks with admiration of the fancy, that\n\"inferior apprehensive\" faculty, which is content to \"represent\" things,\nwithout seeking to know if they be true or false, a task which it leaves\nto the \"superior apprehensive\" faculty of the intellect. The severe\nGravina, too, finds his heart touched by the beauty of poetry, when he\ncalls it \"a witch, but wholesome.\"\n\nAs early as 1578, Huarte had maintained that eloquence is the work of\nthe imagination, not of the intellect; in England, Bacon (1605)\nattributed knowledge to the intellect, history to memory, and poetry to\nthe imagination or fancy; Hobbes described the manifestations of the\nlatter; and Addison devoted several numbers of the _Spectator_ to the\nanalysis of \"the pleasures of the imagination.\"\n\nDuring the same period, the division between those who are accustomed \"\u00e0\njuger par le sentiment\" and those who \"raisonnent par les principes\"\nbecame marked in France, Du Bos (1719) is an interesting example of the\nupholder of the feelings as regards the production of art. Indeed, there\nis in his view no other criterion, and the feeling for art is a sixth\nsense, against which intellectual argument is useless. This French\nschool of thought found a reflex in England with the position assigned\nthere to emotion in artistic work. But the confusion of such words as\nimagination, taste, feeling, wit, shows that at this time there was a\nsuspicion that these words were all applicable to the same fact.\nAlexander Pope thus distinguished wit and judgment:\n\n  For wit and judgment often are at strife,\n  Though meant each other's aid like man and wife.\n\nBut there was a divergence of opinion as to whether the latter should be\nlooked upon as part of the intellect or not.\n\nThere was the same divergence of opinion as to taste and intellectual\njudgment. As regards the former, the opposition to the intellectual\nprinciple was reinforced in the eighteenth century by Kant in his\n_Kritik der Urtheilskraft_. But Voltaire and writers anterior to him\nfrequently fell back into intellectualist definitions of a word invented\nprecisely to avoid them. Dacier (1684) writes of taste as \"Une harmonie,\nun accord de l'esprit et de la raison.\" The difficulties surrounding a\ntrue definition led to the creation of the expression _non so che_, or\n_je ne sais quoi_, or _no se qu\u00e9_, which throws into clear relief the\nconfusion between taste and intellectual judgment.\n\nAs regards imagination and feeling, or sentiment, there was a strong\ntendency to sensualism. The Cardinal Sforza-Pallavicino talks of poetry\nas ignoring alike truth or falsehood and yet delighting the senses. He\napproves of the remark that poetry should make us \"raise our eyebrows,\"\nbut in later life this keen-eyed prince seems to have fallen back from\nthe brilliant intuition of his earlier years into the pedagogic theory.\nMuratori was convinced that fancy was entirely sensual, and therefore he\nposted the intellect beside it, \"to refrain its wild courses, like a\nfriend having authority.\" Gravina practically coincides in this view of\npoetic fancy, as a subordinate faculty, incapable of knowledge, fit only\nto be used by moral philosophy for the introduction into the mind of the\ntrue, by means of novelty and the marvellous.\n\nIn England, also, Bacon held poetry to belong to the fancy, and assigned\nto it a place between history and science. Epic poetry he awarded to the\nformer, \"parabolic\" poetry to the latter. Elsewhere he talks of poetry\nas a dream, and affirms that it is to be held \"rather as an amusement of\nthe intelligence than as a science.\" For him music, painting, sculpture,\nand the other arts are merely pleasure-giving. Addison reduced the\npleasures of the imagination to those caused by visible objects, or by\nideas taken from them. These pleasures he held to be inferior to those\nof the senses and less refined than those of the intellect. He looked\nupon imaginative pleasure as consisting in resemblances discovered\nbetween imitations and things imitated, between copies and originals, an\nexercise adapted to sharpen the spirit of observation.\n\nThe sensualism of the writers headed by Du Bos, who looked upon art as a\nmere pastime, like a tournament or a bull-fight, shows that the truth\nabout Aesthetic had not yet succeeded in emerging from the other\nspiritual activities. Yet the new words and the new views of the\nseventeenth century have great importance for the origins of Aesthetic;\nthey were the direct result of the restatement of the problem by the\nwriters of the Renaissance, who themselves took it up where Antiquity\nhad left it. These new words, and the discussions which arose from them,\nwere the demands of Aesthetic for its theoretical justification. But\nthey were not able to provide this justification, and it could not come\nfrom elsewhere.\n\nWith Descartes, we are not likely to find much sympathy for such studies\nas relate to wit, taste, fancy, or feelings. He ignored the famous _non\nso che_; he abhorred the imagination, which he believed to result from\nthe agitation of the animal spirits. He did not altogether condemn\npoetry, but certainly looked upon it as the _folle du logis_, which must\nbe strictly supervised by the reason. Boileau is the aesthetic\nequivalent of Cartesian intellectualism, Boileau _que la raison \u00e0 ses\nr\u00e8gles engage_, Boileau the enthusiast for allegory. France was infected\nwith the mathematical spirit of Cartesianism and all possibility of a\nserious consideration of poetry and of art was thus removed. Witness the\ndiatribes of Malebranche against the imagination, and listen to the\nItalian, Antonio Conti, writing from France in 1756 on the theme of the\nliterary disputes that were raging at the time: \"They have introduced\nthe method of M. Descartes into belles-lettres; they judge poetry and\neloquence independently of their sensible qualities. Thus they also\nconfound the progress of philosophy with that of the arts. The Abb\u00e9\nTerrasson says that the moderns are greater geometricians than the\nancients; therefore they are greater orators and greater poets.\" La\nMotte, Fontenelle, Boileau, and Malebranche carried on this battle,\nwhich was taken up by the Encyclopaedists, and when Du Bos published his\ndaring book, Jean Jacques le Bel published a reply to it (1726), in\nwhich he denied to sentiment its claim to judge of art. Thus\nCartesianism could not possess an Aesthetic of the imagination. The\nCartesian J.P. de Crousaz (1715) found the beautiful to consist in what\nis approved of, and thereby reduced it to ideas, ignoring the pleasing\nand sentiment.\n\nLocke was as intellectualist in the England of this period as was\nDescartes in France. He speaks of wit as combining ideas in an agreeable\nvariety, which strikes the imagination, while the intellect or judgment\nseeks for differences according to truth. The wit, then, consists of\nsomething which is not at all in accordance with truth and reason. For\nShaftesbury, taste is a sense or instinct of the beautiful, of order and\nproportion, identical with the moral sense and with its \"preconceptions\"\nanticipating the recognition of reason. Body, spirit, and God are the\nthree degrees of beauty. Francis Hutcheson proceeded from Shaftesbury\nand made popular \"the internal sense of beauty, which lies somewhere\nbetween sensuality and rationality and is occupied with discussing unity\nin variety, concord in multiplicity, and the true, the good, and the\nbeautiful in their substantial identity.\" Hutcheson allied the pleasure\nof art with this sense, that is, with the pleasure of imitation and of\nthe likeness of the copy to the original. This he looked upon as\nrelative beauty, to be distinguished from absolute beauty. The same view\ndominates the English writers of the eighteenth century, among whom may\nbe mentioned Reid, the head of the Scottish school, and Adam Smith.\n\nWith far greater philosophical vigour, Leibnitz in Germany opened the\ndoor to that crowd of psychic facts which Cartesian intellectualism had\nrejected with horror. His conception of reality as _continuous_ (_natura\nnon facit saltus_) left room for imagination, taste, and their\ncongeners. Leibnitz believed that the scale of being ascended from the\nlowliest to God. What we now term aesthetic facts were then identified\nwith what Descartes and Leibnitz had called \"confused\" knowledge, which\nmight become \"clear,\" but not distinct. It might seem that when he\napplied this terminology to aesthetic facts, Leibnitz had recognized\ntheir peculiar essence, as being neither sensual nor intellectual. They\nare not sensual for him, because they have their own \"clarity,\"\ndiffering from pleasure and sensual emotion, and from intellectual\n\"distinctio.\" But the Leibnitzian law of continuity and intellectualism\ndid not permit of such an interpretation. Obscurity and clarity are here\nto be understood as quantitative grades of a _single_ form of knowledge,\nthe distinct or intellectual, toward which they both tend and reach at a\nsuperior grade. Though artists judge with confused perceptions, which\nare clear but not distinct, these may yet be corrected and proved true\nby intellective knowledge. The intellect clearly and distinctly knows\nthe thing which the imagination knows confusedly but clearly. This view\nof Leibnitz amounts to saying that the realization of a work of art can\nbe perfected by intellectually determining its concept. Thus Leibnitz\nheld that there was only one true form of knowledge, and that all other\nforms could only reach perfection in that. His \"clarity\" is not a\nspecific difference; it is merely a partial anticipation of his\nintellective \"distinction.\" To have posited this grade is an important\nachievement, but the view of Leibnitz is not fundamentally different\nfrom that of the creators of the words and intuitions already studied.\nAll contributed to attract attention to the peculiarity of aesthetic\nfacts.\n\nSpeculation on language at this period revealed an equally determined\nintellectualist attitude. Grammar was held to be an exact science, and\ngrammatical variations to be explainable by the ellipse, by\nabbreviation, and by failure to grasp the typical logical form. In\nFrance, with Arnauld (1660), we have the rigorous Cartesian\nintellectualism; Leibnitz and Locke both, speculated upon this subject,\nand the former all his life nourished the thought of a universal\nlanguage. The absurdity of this is proved in this volume.\n\nA complete change of the Cartesian system, upon which Leibnitz based his\nown, was necessary, if speculation were ever to surpass the Leibnitzian\naesthetic. But Wolff and the other German pupils of Leibnitz were as\nunable to shake themselves free of the all-pervading intellectualism as\nwere the French pupils of Descartes.\n\nMeanwhile a young student of Berlin, named Alexander Amedeus Baumgarten,\nwas studying the Wolffian philosophy, and at the same time lecturing in\npoetry and Latin rhetoric. While so doing, he was led to rethink and\npose afresh the problem of how to reduce the precepts of rhetoric to a\nrigorous philosophical system. Thus it came about that Baumgarten\npublished in September 1735, at the age of twenty-one, as the thesis for\nhis degree of Doctor, an opuscule entitled, _Meditationes philosophicae\nde nonnullis ad po\u00e8ma pertinentibus_, and in it we find written\n_for the first time_ the word \"Aesthetic,\" as the name of a special\nscience. Baumgarten ever afterwards attached great importance to his\njuvenile discovery, and lectured upon it by request in 1742, at\nFrankfort-on-the-Oder, and again in 1749. It is interesting to know that\nin this way Emmanuel Kant first became acquainted with the theory of\nAesthetic, which he greatly altered when he came to treat of it in his\nphilosophy. In 1750, Baumgarten published the first volume of a more\nample treatise, and a second part in 1762. But illness, and death in\n1762, prevented his completing his work.\n\nWhat is Aesthetic for Baumgarten? It is the science of sensible\nknowledge. Its objects are the sensible facts (_aisthaeta_),\nwhich the Greeks were always careful to distinguish from the mental\nfacts (_noaeta_). It is therefore _scientia cognitionis\nsensitivae, theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre\ncogitandi, ars analogi rationis_. Rhetoric and Poetic are for him\nspecial cases of Aesthetic, which is a general science, embracing both.\nIts laws are diffused among all the arts, like the mariner's star\n(_cynosura quaedam_), and they must be always referred to in all cases,\nfor they are universal, not empirical or merely inductive (_falsa regula\npejor est quam nulla_). Aesthetic must not be confounded with\nPsychology, which supplies only suppositions. Aesthetic is an\nindependent science, which gives the rules for knowing sensibly, and is\noccupied with the perfection of sensible knowledge, which is beauty. Its\ncontrary is ugliness. The beauty of objects and of matter must be\nexcluded from the beauty of sensible knowledge, because beautiful\nobjects can be badly thought and ugly objects beautifully thought.\nPoetic representations are those which are confused or imaginative.\nDistinction and intellectuality are not poetic. The greater the\ndetermination, the greater the poetry; individuals absolutely determined\n(_omnimodo determinata_) are very poetical, as are images or fancies,\nand everything which refers to feeling. The judgment of sensible and\nimaginative representations is taste.\n\nSuch are, in brief, the truths which Baumgarten stated in his\n_Meditationes_, and further developed and exemplified in his\n_Aesthetica_. Close study of the two works above-mentioned leads to the\nconviction that Baumgarten did not succeed in freeing himself from the\nunity of the Leibnitzian monadology. He obtained from Leibnitz his\nconception of the poetic as consisting of the confused, but German\ncritics are wrong in believing that he attributed to it a positive, not\na negative quality. Had he really done this, he would have broken at a\nblow the unity of the Leibnitzian monad, and conquered the science of\nAesthetic.\n\nThis giant's step he did not take: he failed to banish the\ncontradictions of Leibnitz and of the other intellectualists. To posit a\n_perfection_ did not suffice. It was necessary to maintain it against\nthe _lex continui_ of Leibnitz and to proclaim its independence of all\nintellectualism. Aesthetic truths for Baumgarten were those which did\nnot seem altogether false or altogether true: in fact, the verisimilar.\nIf it were objected to Baumgarten that one should not occupy oneself\nwith what, like poetry, he defines as confused and obscure, he would\nreply that confusion is a condition of finding the truth, that we do not\npass at once from night to dawn. Thus he did not surpass the thought of\nLeibnitz in this respect. Poor Baumgarten was always in suspense lest he\nshould be held to occupy himself with things unworthy of a philosopher!\n\"How can you, a professor of philosophy, dare to praise lying and the\nmixture of truth and falsehood?\" He imagined that some such reproach\nmight be addressed to him on account of his purely philosophical\nspeculations, and true enough he actually received a criticism of his\ntheory, in which it was argued, that if poetry consisted of sensual\nperfection, then it was a bad thing for mankind. Baumgarten\ncontemptuously replied that he had not the time to argue with those\ncapable of confounding his _oratio perfecta sensitiva_ with an _oratio\nperfecte (omnino!) sensitiva_.\n\nThe fact about Baumgarten is that apart from baptizing the new science\nAesthetic, and apart from his first definitions, he does not stray far\nfrom the old ruts of scholastic thought. The excellent Baumgarten, with\nall his ardour and all his convictions, is a sympathetic and interesting\nfigure in the history of Aesthetic not yet formed, but in process of\nformation.\n\nThe revolutionary who set aside the old definitions of Aesthetic, and\nfor the first time revealed the true nature of art and poetry, is the\nItalian, Giambattista Vico.\n\nWhat were the ideas developed by Vico in his _Scienza nuova_ (1725)?\nThey were neither more nor less than the solution of the problem, posed\nby Plato, attempted in vain by Aristotle, again posed and again unsolved\nat the Renaissance.\n\nIs poetry a rational or an irrational thing? Is it spiritual or animal?\nIf it be spiritual, what is its true nature, and in what way does it\ndiffer from art and science?\n\nPlato, we know, banished poetry to the inferior region of the soul,\namong the animal spirits. Vico on the contrary raises up poetry, and\nmakes of it a period in the history of humanity. And since Vico's is an\nideal history, whose periods are not concerned with contingent facts,\nbut with spiritual forms, he makes of it a moment of the ideal history\nof the spirit, a form of knowledge. Poetry comes before the intellect,\nbut _after_ feeling. Plato had _confused_ it with feeling, and for that\nreason banished it from his Republic. \"Men _feel_,\" says Vico, \"before\nobserving, then they observe with perturbation of the soul, finally they\nreflect with the pure intellect,\" He goes on to say, that poetry being\ncomposed of passion and of feeling, the nearer it approaches to the\n_particular_, the more _true_ it is, while exactly the reverse is true\nof philosophy.\n\nImagination is independent and autonomous as regards the intellect. Not\nonly does the intellect fail of perfection, but all it can do is to\ndestroy it. \"The studies of Poetry and Metaphysic are _naturally\nopposed_. Poets are the feeling, philosophers the intellect of the human\nrace.\" The weaker the reason, the stronger the imagination. Philosophy,\nhe says, deals with abstract thought or universals, poetry with the\nparticular. Painters and poets differ only in their material. Homer and\nthe great poets appear in barbaric times. Dante, for instance, appeared\nin \"the renewed barbarism of Italy.\" The poetic ages preceded the\nphilosophical, and poetry is the father of prose, by \"necessity of\nnature,\" not by the \"caprice of pleasure.\" Fables or \"imaginary\nuniversals\" were conceived before \"reasoned or philosophical\nuniversals.\" To Homer, says Vico, belongs wisdom, but only poetic\nwisdom. \"His beauties are not those of a spirit softened and civilized\nby any philosophy.\"\n\nIf any one make poetry in epochs of reflexion, he becomes a child again;\nhe does not reflect with his intellect, but follows his fancy and dwells\nupon particulars. If the true poet make use of philosophic ideas, he\nonly does so that he may change logic into imagination.\n\nHere we have a profound statement of the line of demarcation between\nscience and art. _They cannot be confused again_.\n\nHis statement of the difference between poetry and history is a trifle\nless clear. He explains why to Aristotle poetry seemed more\nphilosophical than history, and at the same time he refutes Aristotle's\nerror that poetry deals with the universal, history with the particular.\nPoetry equals science, not because it is occupied with the intellectual\nconcept, but because, like science, it is ideal. A good poetical fable\nmust be all ideal: \"With the idea the poet gives their being to things\nwhich are without it. Poetry is all fantastic, as being the art of\npainting the idea, not icastic, like the art of painting portraits. That\nis why poets, like painters, are called divine, because in that respect\nthey resemble God the Creator.\" Vico ends by identifying poetry and\nhistory. The difference between them is posterior and accidental. \"But,\nas it is impossible to impart false ideas, because the false consists of\na vicious combination of ideas, so it is impossible to impart a\ntradition, which, though it be false, has not at first contained some\nelement of truth. Thus mythology appears for the first time, not as the\ninvention of an individual, but as the spontaneous vision of the truth\nas it appears to primitive man.\"\n\nPoetry and language are for Vico substantially identical. He finds in\nthe origins of poetry the origins of languages and letters. He believed\nthat the first languages consisted in mute acts or acts accompanied by\nbodies which had natural relations to the ideas that it was desired to\nsignify. With great cleverness he compared these pictured languages to\nheraldic arms and devices, and to hieroglyphs. He observed that during\nthe barbarism of the Middle Age, the mute language of signs must return,\nand we find it in the heraldry and blazonry of that epoch. Hence come\nthree kinds of languages: divine silent languages, heroic emblematic\nlanguages, and speech languages.\n\nFormal logic could never satisfy a man with such revolutionary ideas\nupon poetry and language. He describes the Aristotelian syllogism as a\nmethod which explains universals In their particulars, rather than\nunites particulars to obtain universals, looks upon Zeno and the sorites\nas a means of subtilizing rather than sharpening the intelligence, and\nconcludes that Bacon is a great philosopher, when he advocates and\nillustrates _induction_, \"which has been followed by the English to the\ngreat advantage of experimental philosophy.\" Hence he proceeds to\ncriticize mathematics, which, had hitherto always been looked upon as\nthe type of the _perfect science_.\n\nVico is indeed a revolutionary, a pioneer. He knows very well that he is\nin direct opposition to all that has been thought before about poetry.\n\"My new principles of poetry upset all that first Plato and then\nAristotle have said about the origin of poetry, all that has been said\nby the Patrizzi, by the Scaligers, and by the Castelvetri. I have\ndiscovered that It was through lack of human reason that poetry was born\nso sublime that neither the Arts, nor the Poetics, nor the Critiques\ncould cause another equal to it to be born, I say equal, and not\nsuperior.\" He goes as far as to express shame at having to report the\nstupidities of great philosophers upon the origin of song and verse. He\nshows his dislike for the Cartesian philosophy and its tendency to dry\nup the imagination \"by denying all the faculties of the soul which come\nto it from the body,\" and talks of his own time as of one \"which freezes\nall the generous quality of the best poetry and thus precludes it from\nbeing understood.\"\n\nAs regards grammatical forms, Vico may be described as an adherent of\nthe great reaction of the Renaissance against scholastic verbalism and\nformalism. This reaction brought back as a value the experience of\nfeeling, and afterwards with Romanticism gave its right place to the\nimagination. Vico, in his _Scienza nuova_, may be said to have been the\nfirst to draw attention to the imagination. Although he makes many\nluminous remarks on history and the development of poetry among the\nGreeks, his work is not really a history, but a science of the spirit or\nof the ideal. It is not the ethical, logical, or economic moment of\nhumanity which interests him, but the _imaginative_ moment. _He\ndiscovered the creative imagination_, and it may almost be said of the\n_Scienza nuova_ of Vico that it is Aesthetic, the discovery of a new\nworld, of a new mode of knowledge.\n\nThis was the contribution of the genius of Vico to the progress of\nhumanity: he showed Aesthetic to be an autonomous activity. It remained\nto distinguish the science of the spirit from history, the modifications\nof the human spirit from the historic vicissitudes of peoples, Aesthetic\nfrom Homeric civilization.\n\nBut although Goethe, Herder, and Wolf were acquainted with the _Scienza\nnuova_, the importance of this wonderful book did not at first dawn upon\nthe world. Wolf, in his prolegomena to Homer, thought that he was\ndealing merely with an ingenious speculator on Homeric themes. He did\nnot realize that the intellectual stature of Vico far surpassed that of\nthe most able philologists.\n\nThe fortunes of Aesthetic after Vico were very various, and the list of\naestheticians who fell back into the old pedagogic definition, or\nelaborated the mistakes of Baumgarten, is very long. Yet with C.H.\nHeydenreich in Germany and Sulzer in Switzerland we find that the truths\ncontained in Baumgarten have begun to bear fruit. J.J. Herder (1769) was\nmore important than these, and he placed Baumgarten upon a pedestal,\nthough criticizing his pretension of creating an _ars pulchre cogitandi_\ninstead of a simple _scientia de pulchro et pulchris philosophice\ncogitans_. Herder admitted Baumgarten's definition of poetry as _oratio\nsensitiva perfecta_, perfect sensitived speech, and this is _probably\nthe best definition of poetry that has ever been given_. It touches the\nreal essence of poetry and opens to thought the whole of the philosophy\nof the beautiful. Herder, although he does not cite Vico upon aesthetic\nquestions, yet praises him as a philosopher. His remarks about poetry as\n\"the maternal language of humanity, as the garden is more ancient than\nthe cultivated field, painting than writing, song than declamation,\nexchange than commerce,\" are replete with the spirit of the Italian\nphilosopher.\n\nBut despite similar happy phrases, Herder is philosophically the\ninferior of the great Italian. He is a firm believer in the Leibnitzian\nlaw of continuity, and does not surpass the conclusions of Baumgarten.\n\nHerder and his friend Hamann did good service as regards the philosophy\nof language. The French encyclopaedists, J.J. Rousseau, d'Alembert, and\nmany others of this period, were none of them able to get free of the\nidea that a word is either a natural, mechanical fact, or a sign\nattached to a thought. The only way out of this difficulty is to look\nupon the imagination as itself active and expressive in _verbal\nimagination_, and language as the language of _intuition_, not of the\nintelligence. Herder talks of language as \"an understanding of the soul\nwith itself.\" Thus language begins to appear, not as an arbitrary\ninvention or a mechanical fact, but as a primitive affirmation of human\nactivity, as a _creation_.\n\nBut all unconscious of the discoveries of Vico, the great mass of\neighteenth century writers try their hands at every sort of solution.\nThe Abb\u00e9 Batteux published in 1746 _Les Beaux-arts r\u00e9duits a un seul\nprincipe_, which is a perfect little bouquet of contradictions. The Abb\u00e9\nfinds himself confronted with difficulties at every turn, but with \"un\npeu d'esprit on se tire de tout,\" and when for instance he has to\nexplain artistic enjoyment of things displeasing, he remarks that the\nimitation never being perfect like reality, the horror caused by reality\ndisappears.\n\nBut the French were equalled and indeed surpassed by the English in\ntheir amateur Aesthetics. The painter Hogarth was one day reading in\nItalian a speech about the beauty of certain figures, attributed to\nMichael Angelo. This led him to imagine that the figurative arts depend\nupon a principle which consists of conforming to a given line. In 1745\nhe produced a serpentine line as frontispiece of his collection of\nengravings, which he described as \"the line of beauty.\" Thus he\nsucceeded in exciting universal curiosity, which he proceeded to satisfy\nwith his \"Analysis of Beauty.\" Here he begins by rightly combating the\nerror of judging paintings by their subject and by the degree of their\nimitation, instead of by their form, which is the essential in art. He\ngives his definition of form, and afterwards proceeds to describe the\nwaving lines which are beautiful and those which are not, and maintains\nthat among them all there is but one that is really worthy to be called\n\"the line of beauty,\" and one definite serpentine line \"the line of\ngrace.\" The pig, the bear, the spider, and the frog are ugly, because\nthey do not possess serpentine lines. E. Burke, with a like assurance in\nhis examples, was equally devoid of certainty in his general principles.\nHe declares that the natural properties of an object cause pleasure or\npain to the imagination, but that the latter also procures pleasure from\ntheir resemblance to the original. He does not speak further of the\nsecond of these, but gives a long list of the natural properties of the\nsensible, beautiful object. Having concluded his list, he remarks that\nthese are in his opinion the qualities upon which beauty depends and\nwhich are the least liable to caprice and confusion. But \"comparative\nsmallness, delicate structure, colouring vivid but not too much so,\" are\nall mere empirical observations of no more value than those of Hogarth,\nwith whom Burke must be classed as an aesthetician. Their works are\nspoken of as \"classics.\" Classics indeed they are, but of the sort that\narrive at no conclusion.\n\nHenry Home (Lord Kaimes) is on a level a trifle above the two just\nmentioned. He seeks \"the true principles of the beaux-arts,\" in order to\ntransform criticism into \"a rational science.\" He selects facts and\nexperience for this purpose, but in his definition of beauty, which he\ndivides into two parts, relative and intrinsic, he is unable to explain\nthe latter, save by a final cause, which he finds in the Almighty.\n\nSuch theories as the three above mentioned defy classification, because\nthey are not composed by any scientific method. Their authors pass from\nphysiological sensualism to moralism, from imitation of nature to\nfinalism, and to transcendental mysticism, without consciousness of the\nincongruity of their theses, at variance each with itself.\n\nThe German, Ernest Platner, at any rate did not suffer from a like\nconfusion of thought. He developed his researches on the lines of\nHogarth, but was only able to discover a prolongation of sexual pleasure\nin aesthetic facts. \"Where,\" he exclaims, \"is there any beauty that does\nnot come from the feminine figure, the centre of all beauty? The\nundulating line is beautiful, because it is found in the body of woman;\nessentially feminine movements are beautiful; the notes of music are\nbeautiful, when they melt into one another; a poem is beautiful, when\none thought embraces another with lightness and facility.\"\n\nFrench sensualism shows itself quite incapable of understanding\naesthetic production, and the associationism of David Hume is not more\nfortunate in this respect.\n\nThe Dutchman Hemsterhuis (1769) developed an ingenious theory, mingling\nmystical and sensualist theory with some just remarks, which afterwards,\nin the hands of Jacobi, became sentimentalism. Hemsterhuis believed\nbeauty to be a phenomenon arising from the meeting by the\nsentimentalism, which gives multiplicity, with the internal sense, which\ntends to unity. Consequently the beautiful will be that which presents\nthe greatest number of ideas in the shortest space of time. To man is\ndenied supreme unity, but here he finds approximative unity. Hence the\njoy arising from the beautiful, which has some analogy with the joy of\nlove.\n\nWith Winckelmann (1764) Platonism or Neo-platonism was vigorously\nrenewed. The creator of the history of the figurative arts saw in the\ndivine indifference and more than human elevation of the works of Greek\nsculpture a beauty which had descended from the seventh heaven and\nbecome incarnate in them. Mendelssohn, the follower of Baumgarten, had\ndenied beauty to God: Winckelmann, the Neoplatonician, gave it back to\nHim. He holds that perfect beauty is to be found only in God. \"The\nconception of human beauty becomes the more perfect in proportion as it\ncan be thought as in agreement with the Supreme Being, who is\ndistinguished from matter by His unity and indivisibility.\" To the other\ncharacteristics of supreme beauty, Winckelmann adds \"the absence of any\nsort of signification\" (Unbezeichnung). Lines and dots cannot explain\nbeauty, for it is not they alone which form it. Its form is not proper\nto any definite person, it expresses no sentiment, no feeling of\npassion, for these break up unity and diminish or obscure beauty.\nAccording to Winckelmann, beauty must be like a drop of pure water taken\nfrom the spring, which is the more healthy the less it has of taste,\nbecause it is purified of all foreign elements.\n\nA special faculty is required to appreciate this beauty, which\nWinckelmann is inclined to call intelligence, or a delicate internal\nsense, free of all instinctive passions, of pleasure, and of friendship.\nSince it becomes a question of perceiving something immaterial,\nWinckelmann banishes colour to a secondary place. True beauty, he says,\nis that of form, a word which describes lines and contours, as though\nlines and contours could not also be perceived by the senses, or could\nappear to the eye without any colour.\n\nIt is the destiny of error to be obliged to contradict itself, when it\ndoes not decide to dwell in a brief aphorism, in order to live as well\nas may be with facts and concrete problems. The \"History\" of Winckelmann\ndealt with historic concrete facts, with which it was necessary to\nreconcile the idea of a supreme beauty. His admission of the contours of\nlines and his secondary admission of colours is a compromise. He makes\nanother with regard to the principle of expression. \"Since there is no\nintermediary between pain and pleasure in human nature, and since a\nhuman being without these feelings is inconceivable, we must place the\nhuman figure in a moment of action and of passion, which is what is\ntermed expression in art.\" So Winckelmann studied expression after\nbeauty. He makes a third compromise between his one, indivisible,\nsupreme, and constant beauty and individual beauties. Winckelmann\npreferred the male to the female body as the most complete incarnation\nof supreme beauty, but he was not able to shut his eyes to the\nindisputable fact that there also exist beautiful bodies of women and\neven of animals.\n\nRaphael Mengs, the painter, was an intimate friend of Winckelmann and\nassociated himself with him in his search for a true definition of the\nbeautiful. His ideas were generally in accordance with those of\nWinckelmann. He defines beauty as \"the visible idea of perfection, which\nis to perfection what the visible is to the mathematical point.\" He\nfalls under the influence of the argument from design. The Creator has\nordained the multiplicity of beauties. Things are beautiful according to\nour ideas of them, and these ideas come from the Creator. Thus each\nbeautiful thing has its own type, and a child would appear ugly if it\nresembled a man. He adds to his remarks in this sense: \"As the diamond\nis alone perfect among stones, gold among metals, and man among living\ncreatures, so there is distinction in each species, and but little is\nperfect.\" In his _Dreams of Beauty_, he looks upon beauty as \"an\nintermediate disposition,\" which contains a part of perfection and a\npart of the agreeable, and forms a _tertium quid_, which differs from\nthe other two and deserves a special name. He names four sources of the\nart of painting: beauty, significant or expressive character, harmony,\nand colouring. The first of these he finds among the ancients, the\nsecond with Raphael, the third with Correggio, the fourth with Titian.\nMengs does not succeed in rising above this empiricism of the studio,\nsave to declaim about the beauty of nature, virtue, forms, and\nproportions, and indeed everything, including the First Cause, which is\nthe most beautiful of all.\n\nThe name of G.E. Lessing (1766) is well known to all concerned with art\nproblems. The ideas of Winckelmann reappear in Lessing, with less of a\nmetaphysical tinge. For Lessing, the end of art is the pleasing, and\nsince this is \"a superfluous thing,\" he thought that the legislator\nshould not allow to art the liberty indispensable to science, which\nseeks the truth, necessary to the soul. For the Greeks painting was, as\nit should always be, \"imitation of beautiful bodies.\" Everything\ndisagreeable or ill-formed should be excluded from painting. \"Painting,\nas clever imitation, may imitate deformity. Painting, as a fine art,\ndoes not permit this.\" He was more inclined to admit deformity in\npoetry, as there it is less shocking, and the poet can make use of it to\nproduce in us certain feelings, such as the ridiculous or the terrible.\nIn his _Dramaturgie_ (1767), Lessing followed the Peripatetics, and\nbelieved that the rules of Aristotle were as absolute as the theorems of\nEuclid. His polemic against the French school is chiefly directed to\nclaiming a place in poetry for the verisimilar, as against absolute\nhistorical exactitude. He held the universal to be a sort of mean of\nwhat appears in the individual, the catharsis was in his view a\ntransformation of the passions into virtuous dispositions, and he held\nthe duty of poetry to be inspiration of the love of virtue. He followed\nWinckelmann in believing that the expression of physical beauty was the\nsupreme object of painting. This beauty exists only as an ideal, which\nfinds its highest expression in man. Animals possess it to a slighter\nextent, vegetable and inanimate nature not at all. Those mistaken enough\nto occupy themselves with depicting the latter are imitating beauties\ndeprived of all ideal. They work only with eye and hand; genius has\nlittle if any share in their productions. Lessing found the physical\nideal to reside chiefly in form, but also in the ideal of colour, and in\npermanent expression. Mere colouring and transitory expression were for\nhim without ideal, \"because nature has not imposed upon herself anything\ndefinite as regards them.\" At bottom he does not care for colouring,\nfinding in the pen drawings of artists \"a life, a liberty, a delicacy,\nlacking to their pictures.\" He asks \"whether even the most wonderful\ncolouring can make up for such a loss, and whether it be not desirable\nthat the art of oil-painting had never been invented.\"\n\nThis \"ideal beauty,\" wonderfully constructed from divine quintessence\nand subtle pen and brush strokes, this academic mystery, had great\nsuccess. In Italy it was much discussed in the environment of Mengs and\nof Winckelmann, who were working there.\n\nThe first counterblast to their aesthetic Neo-platonism came from an\nItalian named Spalletti, and took the form of a letter addressed to\nMengs. He represents the _characteristic_ as the true principle of art.\nThe pleasure obtained from beauty is intellectual, and truth is its\nobject. When the soul meets with what is characteristic, and what really\nsuits the object to be represented, the work is held to be beautiful. A\nwell-made man with a woman's face is ugly. Harmony, order, variety,\nproportion, etc.--these are elements of beauty, and man enjoys the\nwidening of his knowledge before disagreeable things characteristically\nrepresented. Spalletti defines beauty as \"that modification inherent to\nthe object observed, which presents it, as it should appear, with an\ninfallible characteristic.\"\n\nThus the Aristotelian thesis found a supporter in Italy, some years\nbefore any protestation was heard in Germany. Louis Hirt, the historian\nof art (1797) observed that ancient monuments represented all sorts of\nforms, from the most beautiful and sublime to the most ugly and most\ncommon. He therefore denied that ideal beauty was the principle of art,\nand for it substituted the _characteristic_, applicable equally to gods,\nheroes, and animals.\n\nWolfgang Goethe, in 1798, forgetting the juvenile period, during which\nhe had dared to raise a hymn to Gothic architecture, now began seriously\nto seek a middle term between beauty and expression. He believed that he\nhad found it, in certain characteristic contents presenting to the\nartist beautiful shapes, which the artist would then develop and reduce\nto perfect beauty. Thus for Goethe at this period, the characteristic\nwas simply the _starting-point_, or framework, from which the beautiful\narose, through the power of the artist.\n\nBut these writers mentioned after J.B. Vico are not true philosophers.\nWinckelmann, Mengs, Hogarth, Lessing, and Goethe are great in other\nways. Meier called himself a historian of art, but he was inferior both\nto Herder and to Hamann. From J.B. Vico to Emmanuel Kant, European\nthought is without a name of great importance as regards this subject.\n\nKant took up the problem, where Vico had left it, not in the historical,\nbut in the ideal sense. He resembled the Italian philosopher, in the\ngravity and the tenacity of his studies in Aesthetic, but he was far\nless happy in his solutions, which did not attain to the truth, and to\nwhich he did not succeed in giving the necessary unity and\nsystematization. The reader must bear in mind that Kant is here\ncriticized solely as an aesthetician: his other conclusions do not enter\ndirectly into the discussion.\n\nWhat was Kant's idea of art? The answer is: the same in substance as\nBaumgarten's. This may seem strange to those who remember his sustained\npolemic against Wolf and the conception of beauty as confused\nperception. But Kant always thought highly of Baumgarten. He calls him\n\"that excellent analyst\" in the _Critique of Pure Reason_, and he used\nBaumgarten's text for his University lectures on Metaphysic. Kant looked\nupon Logic and Aesthetic as cognate studies, and in his scheme of\nstudies for 1765, and in the _Critique of Pure Reason_, he proposes to\ncast a glance at the Critique of Taste, that is to say, Aesthetic,\n\"since the study of the one is useful for the other and they are\nmutually illuminative.\" He followed Meier in his distinctions between\nlogical and aesthetic truth. He even quoted the Instance of the young\ngirl, whose face when distinctly seen, i.e. with a microscope, is no\nlonger beautiful. It is true, aesthetically, he said, that when a man is\ndead he cannot come to life, although this be opposed both to logical\nand to moral truth. It is aesthetically true that the sun plunges into\nthe sea, although that is not true logically or objectively.\n\nNo one, even among the greatest, can yet tell to what extent logical\ntruth should mingle with aesthetic truth. Kant believed that logical\ntruth must wear the habit of Aesthetic, in order to become _accessible_.\nThis habit, he thought, was discarded only by the rational sciences,\nwhich tend to depth. Aesthetic certainly is subjective. It is satisfied\nwith authority or with an appeal to great men. We are so feeble that\nAesthetic must eke out our thoughts. Aesthetic is a vehicle of Logic.\nBut there are logical truths which are not aesthetic. We must exclude\nfrom philosophy exclamations and other emotions, which belong to\naesthetic truth. For Kant, poetry is the harmonious play of thought and\nsensation, differing from eloquence, because in poetry thoughts are\nfitted to suggestions, in eloquence the reverse is true. Poetry should\nmake virtue and intellect visible, as was done by Pope in his _Essay on\nMan_. Elsewhere, he says frankly that logical perfection is the\nfoundation of all the rest.\n\nThe confirmation of this is found in his _Critique of Judgment_, which\nSchelling looked upon as the most important of the three _Critiques_,\nand which Hegel and other metaphysical idealists always especially\nesteemed.\n\nFor Kant art was always \"a sensible and imaged covering for an\nintellectual concept.\" He did not look upon art as pure beauty without a\nconcept. He looked upon it as a beauty adherent and fixed about a\nconcept. The work of genius contains two elements: imagination and\nintelligence. To these must be added taste, which combines the two. Art\nmay even represent the ugly in nature, for artistic beauty \"is not a\nbeautiful thing but a beautiful representation of a thing.\" But this\nrepresentation of the ugly has its limits in the arts (here Kant\nremembers Lessing and Winckelmann), and an absolute limit in the\ndisgusting and the repugnant, which kills the representation itself. He\nbelieves that there may be artistic productions without a concept, such\nas are flowers in nature, and these would be ornaments to frameworks,\nmusic without words, etc., etc., but since they represent nothing\nreducible to a definite concept, they must be classed, like flowers,\nwith free beauties. This would certainly seem to exclude them from\nAesthetic, which, according to Kant, should combine imagination and\nintelligence.\n\nKant is shut in with intellectualist barriers. A complete definition of\nthe _imagination_ is _wanting_ to his system. He does not admit that the\nimagination belongs to the powers of the mind. He relegates it to the\nfacts of sensation. He is aware of the reproductive and combinative\nimagination, but he does not recognize _fancy_ (_fantasia_), which is\nthe true productive imagination.\n\nYet Kant was aware that there exists an activity other than the\nintellective. Intuition is referred to by him as preceding intellective\nactivity and differing from sensation. He does not speak of it, however,\nin his critique of art, but in the first section of the _Critique of\nPure Reason_. Sensations do not enter the mind, until it has given them\n_form_. This is neither sensation nor intelligence. It is _pure\nintuition_, the sum of the _a priori_ principles of sensibility. He\nspeaks thus: \"There must, then, exist a science that forms the first\npart of the transcendental doctrine of the elements, distinct from that\nwhich contains the principles of pure thought and is called\ntranscendental Logic.\"\n\nWhat does he call this new science? He calls it _Transcendental\nAesthetic_, and refuses to allow the term to be used for the Critique of\nTaste, which could never become a science.\n\nBut although he thus states so clearly the necessity of a science of the\nform of the sensations, that is of _pure intuition_, Kant here appears\nto fall into grave error. This arises from _his inexact idea_ of the\n_essence of the aesthetic faculty or of art_, which, as we now know, is\npure intuition. He conceives the form of sensibility to be reducible to\nthe _two categories of space and time_.\n\nBenedetto Croce has shown that space and time are far from being\ncategories or functions: they are complex posterior formations. Kant,\nhowever, looked upon density, colour, etc., as material for sensations;\nbut the mind only observes colour or hardness when it has _already_\ngiven a form to its sensations. Sensations, in so far as they are _crude\nmatter_, are _outside_ the mind: they are a _limit_. Colour, hardness,\ndensity, etc., are _already_ intuitions. _They are the aesthetic\nactivity in its rudimentary manifestation._\n\nCharacterizing or qualifying imagination, that is, _aesthetic activity_,\nshould therefore _take the place occupied by the study of space and\ntime_ in the _Critique of Pure Reason_, and constitute the true\n_Transcendental Aesthetic_, prologue to Logic.\n\nHad Kant done this, he would have surpassed Leibnitz and Baumgarten; he\nwould have equalled Vico.\n\nKant did not identify the Beautiful with art. He established what he\ncalled \"the four moments of Beauty,\" amounting to a definition of it.\nThe two negative moments are, \"That is beautiful which pleases _without\ninterest_\"; this thesis was directed against the sensualist school of\nEnglish writers, with whom Kant had for a time agreed; and \"That is\nbeautiful which pleases without a concept,\" directed against the\nintellectualists. Thus he affirmed the existence of a spiritual domain,\ndistinct from that of organic pleasure, of the useful, the good, and the\ntrue. The two other moments are, \"That is beautiful which has the form\nof finality without the representation of an end,\" and \"That is\nbeautiful which is the object of universal pleasure.\" What is this\ndisinterested pleasure that we experience before pure colours, pure\nsounds, and flowers? Benedetto Croce replies that this mysterious domain\nhas no existence; that the instances cited represent, either instances\nof organic pleasure, or are artistic facts of expression.\n\nKant was less severe with the Neoplatonicians than with the two schools\nof thought above mentioned. His _Critique of Judgment_ contains some\ncurious passages, in one of which he gives his distinction of form from\nmatter: \"In music, the melody is the matter, harmony the form: in a\nflower, the scent is the matter, the shape or configuration the form.\"\nIn the other arts, he found that the design was the essential. \"Not what\npleases in sensation, but what is approved for its form, is the\nfoundation of taste.\"\n\nIn his pursuit of the phantom of a beauty, which is neither that of art\nnor of sensual pleasure, exempt alike from expression and from\nenjoyment, he became enveloped in inextricable contradictions. Little\ndisposed as he was to let himself be carried away by the imagination, he\nexpressed his contempt for philosopher-poets like Herder, and kept\nsaying and unsaying, affirming and then immediately criticizing his own\naffirmations as to this mysterious beauty. The truth is that _this\nmystery is simply his own individual uncertainty before a problem which\nhe could not solve_, owing to his having no clear idea of an activity of\nsentiment. Such an activity represented for him a logical contradiction.\nSuch expressions as \"necessary universal pleasure,\" \"finality without\nthe idea of end,\" are verbal proofs of his uncertainty.\n\nHow was he to emerge from this uncertainty, this contradiction? He fell\nback upon the concept of a base of subjective finality as the base of\nthe judgment of taste, that is of the subjective finality of nature by\nthe judgment. But nothing can be known or disclosed to the object by\nmeans of this concept, which is indeterminate in itself and not adapted\nfor knowledge. Its determining reason is perhaps situated in \"the\nsuprasensible substratum of humanity.\" Thus beauty becomes a symbol of\nmorality. \"The subjective principle alone, that is, the indeterminate\nidea of the suprasensible in us, can be indicated as the sole key to\nreveal this faculty, which remains unknown to us in its origin. Nothing\nbut this principle can make that hidden faculty comprehensible.\"\n\nKant had a tendency to mysticism, which this statement does not serve to\nconceal, but it was a mysticism without enthusiasm, a mysticism almost\nagainst the grain. His failure to penetrate thoroughly the nature of the\naesthetic activity led him to see double and even triple, on several\noccasions. Art being unknown to him in its essential nature, he invents\nthe functions of _space_ and _time_ and terms this _transcendental\naesthetic_; he develops the theory of the imaginative beautifying of the\nintellectual concept by genius; he is finally forced to admit a\nmysterious power of feeling, intermediate between the theoretic and the\npractical activity. This power is cognoscitive and non-cognoscitive,\nmoral and indifferent to morality, agreeable and yet detached from the\npleasure of the senses. His successors hastened to make use of this\nmysterious power, for they were glad to be able to find some sort of\njustification for their bold speculations in the severe philosopher of\nK\u00f6nigsberg.\n\nIn addition to Schelling and Hegel, for whom, as has been said, the\n_Critique of Judgment_ seemed the most important of the three Critiques,\nwe must now mention the name of a poet who showed himself as great in\nphilosophical as in aesthetic achievement.\n\n_Friedrich Schiller_ first elaborated that portion of the Kantian\nthought contained in the _Critique of Judgment_. Before any professional\nphilosopher, Schiller studied that sphere of activity which unites\nfeeling with reason. Hegel talks with admiration of this artistic\ngenius, who was also so profoundly philosophical and first announced the\nprinciple of reconciliation between life as duty and reason on the one\nhand, and the life of the senses and feeling on the other.\n\nTo Schiller belongs the great merit of having opposed the subjective\nidealism of Kant and of having made the attempt to surpass it.\n\nThe exact relations between Kant and Schiller, and the extent to which\nthe latter may have been influenced by Leibnitz and Herder, are of less\nimportance to the history of Aesthetic than the fact that Schiller\n_unified_ once for all art and beauty, which had been separated by Kant,\nwith his distinctions between adherent and pure beauty. Schiller's\nartistic sense must doubtless have stood him here in good stead.\n\nSchiller found a very unfortunate and misleading term to apply to the\naesthetic sphere. He called it the sphere of _play_ (Spiel). He strove\nto explain that by this he did not mean ordinary games, nor material\namusement. For Schiller, this sphere of play lay intermediate between\nthought and feeling. Necessity in art gives place to a free disposition\nof forces; mind and nature, matter and form are here reconciled. The\nbeautiful is life, but not physiological life. A beautiful statue may\nhave life, and a living man be without it. Art conquers nature with\nform. The great artist effaces matter with form. The less we are\nsensible of the material in a work of art, the greater the triumph of\nthe artist. The soul of the spectator should leave the magic sphere of\nart as pure and as perfect as when it left the hands of the Creator. The\nmost frivolous theme should be so treated that we can pass at once from\nit to the most rigorous, and _vice versa_. Only when man has placed\nhimself outside the world and contemplates it aesthetically, can he know\nthe world. While he is merely the passive receiver of sensations, he is\none with the world, and therefore cannot realize it. Art is\nindeterminism. With the help of art, man delivers himself from the yoke\nof the senses, and is at the same time free of any rational or moral\nduty: he may enjoy for a moment the luxury of serene contemplation.\n\nSchiller was well aware that the moment art is employed to teach morals\ndirectly, it ceases to be art. All other teachings give to the soul a\nspecial imprint. Art alone is favourable to all without prejudice. Owing\nto this indifference of art, it possesses a great educative power, by\nopening the path to morality without preaching or persuasion; without\ndetermining, it produces determinability. This was the main theme of the\ncelebrated \"Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man,\" which Schiller\nwrote to his patron the Duke of Holstein-Augustenburg. Here, and in his\nlectures at the University of Jena, it is clear that Schiller addresses\nhimself to a popular audience. He began a work, on scientific Aesthetic,\nwhich he intended to entitle \"Kallias,\" but unfortunately died without\ncompleting it. We possess only a few fragments, contained in his\ncorrespondence with his friend K\u00f6rner. K\u00f6rner did not feel satisfied\nwith the formula of Schiller, and asks for some more precise and\nobjective mark of the beautiful. Schiller tells him that he has found\nit, but what he had found we shall never know, as there is no document\nto inform us.\n\nThe fault of Schiller's aesthetic theory was its lack of precision. His\nartistic faculty enabled him to give unsurpassable descriptions of the\ncatharsis and of other effects of art, but he fails to give a precise\ndefinition of the aesthetic function. True, he disassociates it from\nmorality, yet admits that it may in a measure be associated with it. The\nonly formal activities that he recognizes are the moral and the\nintellectual, and he denies altogether (against the sensualists) that\nart can have anything to do with passion or sensuality. His intellectual\nworld consisted only of the logical and the intellectual, leaving out\nthe imaginative activity.\n\nWhat is art for Schiller? He admits four modes of relation between man\nand external things. They are the physical, the logical, the moral, and\nthe aesthetic. He describes this latter as a mode by which things affect\nthe whole of our different forces, without being a definite object for\nany one in particular. Thus a man may be said to please aesthetically,\n\"when he does so without appealing to any one of the senses directly,\nand without any law or end being thought of in connection with him.\"\nSchiller cannot be made to say anything more definite than this. His\ngeneral position was probably much like Kant's (save in the case above\nmentioned, where he made a happy correction), and he probably looked\nupon Aesthetic as a mingling of several faculties, as a play of\nsentiment.\n\nSchiller was faithful to Kant's teaching in its main lines, and his\nuncertainty was largely due to this. The existence of a _third sphere_\nuniting form and matter was for Schiller rather an ideal conformable to\nreason than a _definite_ activity; it was supposititious, rather than\neffective.\n\nBut the Romantic movement in literature, which was at that time gaining\nground, with its belief in a superhuman faculty called imagination, in\ngenius breaker of rules, found no such need for restraint. Schiller's\nmodest reserve was set aside, and with J.P. Richter we approach a\nmythology of the imagination. Many of his observations are, however,\njust, and his distinction between productive and reproductive\nimagination is excellent. How could humanity appreciate works of genius,\nhe asks, were it without some common measure? All men who can go as far\nas saying \"this is beautiful\" before a beautiful thing, are capable of\nthe latter. He then proceeds to establish to his own satisfaction\ncategories of the imagination, leading from simple talent to the supreme\nform of male genius in which all faculties flourish together: a faculty\nof faculties.\n\nThe Romantic conception of art is, in substance, that of idealist German\nphilosophy, where we find it in a more coherent and systematic form. It\nis the conception of Schelling, Solger, and Hegel.\n\nFichte, Kant's first great pupil, cannot be included with these, for his\nview of Aesthetic, largely influenced by Schiller, is transformed in the\nFichtian system to a moral activity, to a representation of the ethical\nideal. The subjective idealism of Fichte, however, generated an\nAesthetic: that of irony as the base of art. The I that has created the\nuniverse can also destroy it. The universe is a vain appearance, smiled\nat by the Ego its creator, who surveys it as an artist his work, from\nwithout and from above. For Friedrich Schlegel, art was a perpetual\nfarce, a parody of itself; and Tieck defined irony as a force which\nallows the poet to dominate his material.\n\nNovalis, that Romantic Fichtian, dreamed of a magical idealism, an art\nof creating by an instantaneous act of the Ego. But Schelling's \"system\nof transcendental idealism\" was the first great philosophical\naffirmation of Romanticism and of conscious Neo-platonism reborn in\nAesthetic.\n\nSchelling has obviously studied Schiller, but he brings to the problem a\nmind more purely philosophical and a method more exactly scientific. He\neven takes Kant to task for faultiness of method. His remarks as to\nPlato's position are curious, if not conclusive. He says that Plato\ncondemned the art of his time, because it was realistic and\nnaturalistic: like all antique art, it exhibited a _finite_ character.\nPlato's judgment would have been quite different had he known Christian\nart, of which the character is _infinity_.\n\nSchelling held firm to the fusion of art and beauty effected by\nSchiller, but he combated Winckelmann's theory of abstract beauty with\nits negative conception of the characteristic, assigning to art the\nlimits of the individual. Art is characteristic beauty; it is not the\nindividual, but the living conception of the individual. When the artist\nrecognizes the eternal idea in an individual, and expresses it\noutwardly, he transforms the individual into a world apart, into a\nspecies, into an eternal idea. Characteristic beauty is the fulness of\nform which slays form: it does not silence passion, but restrains it as\nthe banks of a river the waters that flow between them, but do not\noverflow.\n\nSchelling's starting-point is the criticism of teleological judgment, as\nstated by Kant in his third Critique. Teleology is the union of\ntheoretic with practical philosophy. But the system would not be\ncomplete, unless we could show the identity of the two worlds, theoretic\nand practical, in the subject itself. He must demonstrate the existence\nof an activity, which is at once unconscious as nature and conscious as\nspirit. This activity we find in Aesthetic, which is therefore \"the\ngeneral organ of philosophy, the keystone of the whole building.\"\n\nPoetry and philosophy alone possess the world of the ideal, in which the\nreal world vanishes. True art is not the impression of the moment, but\nthe representation of infinite life: it is transcendental intuition\nobjectified. The time will come when philosophy will return to poetry,\nwhich was its source, and on the new philosophy will arise a new\nmythology. Philosophy does not depict real things, but their ideas; so\ntoo, art. Those same ideas, of which real things are, as philosophy\nshows, the imperfect copies, reappear in art objectified as ideas, and\ntherefore in their perfection. Art stands nearest to philosophy, which\nitself stands nearest to the Idea, and therefore nearest to perfection.\nArt differs from philosophy only by its _specialization_: in all other\nways it is the ideal world in its most complete expression. The three\nIdeas of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty correspond to the three powers of\nthe ideal and of the real world. Beauty is not the universal whole,\nwhich is truth, nor is it the only reality, which is action: it is the\nperfect mingling of the two. \"Beauty exists where the real or particular\nis so adequate to its concept that this infinite thing enters into the\nfinite, and is contemplated in the concrete.\" Philosophy unites truth,\nmorality, and beauty, in what they possess in common, and deduces them\nfrom their unique Source, which is God. If philosophy assume the\ncharacter of science and of truth, although it be superior to truth, the\nreason for this lies in the fact that science and truth are simply the\nformal determination of philosophy.\n\nSchelling looked upon mythology as a necessity for every art. Ideas are\nGods, considered from the point of view of reality; for the essence of\neach is equal to God in a _particular_ form. The characteristics of all\nGods, including the Christian, are _pure limitation and absolute\nindivisibility_. Minerva has wisdom and strength, but lacks womanly\ntenderness; Juno has power and wisdom, but is without amorous charm,\nwhich she borrows with the girdle of Venus, who in her turn is without\nthe wisdom of Minerva. What would these Gods become without their\nlimitations? They would cease to be the objects of Fancy. Fancy is a\nfaculty, apart from the pure intellect and from the reason. Distinct\nfrom imagination, which develops the products of art, Fancy has\nintuitions of them, grasps them herself, and herself represents them.\nFancy is to imagination as intellectual intuition is to reason. Fancy,\nthen, is intellectual intuition in art. In the thought of Schelling,\nfancy, the new or artistic intuition, sister of intellectual intuition,\ncame to dominate alike the intellect and the old conception of the fancy\nand the imagination, in a system for which reason alone did not suffice.\n\nC.G. Solger followed Schelling and agreed with him in finding but little\ntruth in the theories of Kant, and especially of Fichte. He held that\ntheir dialectic had failed to solve the difficulty of intellectual\nintuition. He too conceived of fancy as distinct from imagination, and\ndivided the former into three degrees. Imagination he held to appertain\nto ordinary knowledge, \"which re-establishes the original intuition to\ninfinity.\" Fancy \"originates from the original antithesis in the idea,\nand so operates that the opposing elements which are separated from the\nidea become perfectly united in reality. By means of fancy, we are able\nto understand things more lofty than those of common knowledge, and in\nthem we recognize the idea itself as real. In art, fancy is the faculty\nof transforming the idea into reality.\"\n\nFor Solger as for Schelling, beauty belongs to the region of Ideas,\nwhich are inaccessible to common knowledge. Art is nearly allied to\nreligion, for as religion is the abyss of the idea, into which our\nconsciousness plunges, that it may become essential, so Art and the\nBeautiful resolve, in their way, the world of distinctions, the\nuniversal and the particular. Artistic activity is more than\ntheoretical: it is practical, realized and perfect, and therefore\nbelongs to practical, not to theoretic philosophy, as Kant wrongly\nbelieved. Since art must touch infinity on one side, it cannot have\nordinary nature for its object. Art therefore _ceases_ in the portrait,\nand this explains why the ancients generally chose Gods or Heroes as\nmodels for sculpture. Every deity, even in a limited and particular\nform, expresses a definite modification of the Idea.\n\nG.G.F. Hegel gives the same definition of art as Solger and Schelling,\nAll three were mystical aestheticians, and the various shades of\nmystical Aesthetic, presented by these three writers, are not of great\ninterest. Schelling forced upon art the abstract Platonic ideas, while\nHegel reduced it to the _concrete idea_. This concrete idea was for\nHegel the first and lowest of the three forms of the liberty of the\nspirit. It represented immediate, sensible, objectified knowledge; while\nReligion filled the second place, as representative consciousness with\nadoration, which is an element foreign to art alone. The third place was\nof course occupied by Philosophy, the free thought of the absolute\nspirit. Beauty and Truth are one for Hegel; they are united in the Idea.\nThe beautiful he defined as _the sensible appearance of the Idea_.\n\nSome writers have erroneously believed that the views of the three\nphilosophers above mentioned lead back to those of Baumgarten. But that\nis not correct. They well understood that art cannot be made a medium\nfor the expression of philosophic concepts. Not only are they opposed to\nthe moralistic and intellectualistic view, but they are its active\nopponents. Schelling says that aesthetic production is in its essence\nabsolutely free, and Hegel that art does not contain the universal as\nsuch.\n\nHegel accentuated the _cognoscitive_ character of art, more than any of\nhis predecessors. We have seen that he placed it with Philosophy and\nReligion in the sphere of the absolute Spirit. But he does not allow\neither to Art or to Religion any difference of function from that of\nPhilosophy, which occupies the highest place in his system. They are\ntherefore inferior, necessary, grades of the Spirit. Of what use are\nthey? Of none whatever, or at best, they merely represent transitory and\nhistorical phases of human life.\n\nThus we see that the tendency of Hegelianism is _anti-artistic_, as it\nis rationalistic and anti-religious.\n\nThis result of thought was a strange and a sad thing for one who loved\nart so fervently as Hegel. Our memories conjure up Plato, who also loved\nart well, and yet found himself logically obliged to banish the poet\nfrom his ideal Republic, after crowning him with roses. But the German\nphilosopher was as staunch to the (supposed) command of reason as the\nGreek, and felt himself obliged to announce the death of art. Art, he\nsays, occupies a lofty place in the human spirit, but not the most\nlofty, for it is limited to a restricted content and only a certain\ngrade of truth can be expressed in art. Such are the Hellenic Gods, who\ncan be transfused in the sensible and appear in it adequately. The\nChristian conception of truth is among those which cannot be so\nexpressed. The spirit of the modern world, and more precisely the spirit\nof our religion and rational development, seem to have gone beyond the\npoint at which art is the chief way of apprehending the Absolute. The\npeculiarity of artistic production no longer satisfies our highest\nneeds. Thought and reflexion have surpassed art, the beautiful. He goes\non to say that the reason generally given for this is the prevalence of\nmaterial and political interests. But the true reason is the inferiority\nin degree of art as compared with pure thought. Art is dead, and\nPhilosophy can therefore supply its complete biography.\n\nHegel's _Vorlesungen \u00dcber Aesthetik_ amounts therefore to a funeral\noration upon Art.\n\nRomanticism and metaphysical idealism had placed art, sometimes above\nthe clouds, sometimes within them, and believing that it was no good\nthere to anyone, Hegel provided a decent burial.\n\nNothing perhaps better shows how well this fantastic conception of art\nsuited the spirit of the time, than the fact that even the adversaries\nof Schelling, Solger, and Hegel either admit agreement with that\nconception, or find themselves involuntarily in agreement with it, while\nbelieving themselves to be very remote. They too are mystical\naestheticians.\n\nWe all know with what virulence Arthur Schopenhauer attacked and\ncombated Schelling, Hegel, and all the \"charlatans\" and \"professors\" who\nhad divided among them the inheritance of Kant.\n\nWell, Schopenhauer's theory of art starts, just like Hegel's, from the\ndifference between the abstract and the concrete concept, which is the\n_Idea_. Schopenhauer's ideas are the Platonic ideas, although in the\nform which he gives to them, they have a nearer resemblance to the Ideas\nof Schelling than to the Idea of Hegel.\n\nSchopenhauer takes much trouble to differentiate his ideas from\nintellectual concepts. He calls the idea \"unity which has become\nplurality by means of space and time. It is the form of our intuitive\napperception. The concept is, on the contrary, unity extracted from\nplurality by means of abstraction, which is an act of our intellect. The\nconcept may be called _unitas post rem_, the idea _unitas ante rem_.\"\n\nThe origin of this psychological illusion of the ideas or types of\nthings is always to be found in the changing of the empirical\nclassifications created for their own purposes by the natural sciences,\ninto living realities.\n\nThus each art has for its sphere a special category of ideas.\nArchitecture and its derivatives, gardening (and strange to say\nlandscape-painting is included with it), sculpture and animal-painting,\nhistorical painting and the higher forms of sculpture, etc., all possess\ntheir special ideas. Poetry's chief object is man as idea. Music, on the\ncontrary, does not belong to the hierarchy of the other arts. Schelling\nhad looked upon music as expressing the rhythm of the universe itself.\nFor Schopenhauer, music does not express ideas, but the _Will itself_.\n\nThe analogies between music and the world, between fundamental notes and\ncrude matter, between the scale and the scale of species, between melody\nand conscious will, lead Schopenhauer to the conclusion that music is\nnot only an arithmetic, as it appeared to Leibnitz, but indeed a\nmetaphysic: \"the occult metaphysical exercise of a soul not knowing that\nit philosophizes.\"\n\nFor Schopenhauer, as for his idealist predecessors, art is beatific. It\nis the flower of life; he who is plunged in artistic contemplation\nceases to be an individual; he is the conscious subject, pure, freed\nfrom will, from pain, and from time.\n\nYet in Schopenhauer's system exist elements for a better and a more\nprofound treatment of the problem of art. He could sometimes show\nhimself to be a lucid and acute analyst. For instance, he continually\nremarks that the categories of space and time are not applicable to art,\n_but only the general form of representation_. He might have deduced\nfrom this that art is the most immediate, not the most lofty grade of\nconsciousness, since it precedes even the ordinary perceptions of space\nand time. Vico had already observed that this freeing oneself from\nordinary perception, this dwelling in imagination, does not really mean\nan ascent to the level of the Platonic Ideas, but, on the contrary, a\nredescending to the sphere of immediate intuition, a return to\nchildhood.\n\nOn the other hand, Schopenhauer had begun to submit the Kantian\ncategories to impartial criticism, and finding the two forms of\nintuition insufficient, added a third, causality.\n\nHe also drew comparisons between art and history, and was more\nsuccessful here than the idealist excogitators of a philosophy of\nhistory. Schopenhauer rightly saw that history was irreducible to\nconcepts, that it is the contemplation of the individual, and therefore\nnot a science. Having proceeded thus far, he might have gone further,\nand realized that the material of history is always the particular in\nits particularity, that of art what is and always is identical. But he\npreferred to execute a variation on the general motive that was in\nfashion at this time.\n\nThe fashion of the day! It rules in philosophy as elsewhere, and we are\nnow about to see the most rigid and arid of analysts, the leader of the\nso-called _realist_ school, or school of _exact science_ in Germany in\nthe nineteenth century, plunge headlong into aesthetic mysticism.\n\nG.F. Herbart (1813) begins his Aesthetic by freeing it from the\ndiscredit attaching to Metaphysic and to Psychology. He declares that\nthe only true way of understanding art is to study particular examples\nof the beautiful and to note what they reveal as to its essence.\n\nWe shall now see what came of Herbart's analysis of these examples of\nbeauty, and how far he succeeded in remaining free of Metaphysic.\n\nFor Herbart, beauty consists of _relations_. The science of Aesthetic\nconsists of an enumeration of all the fundamental relations between\ncolours, lines, tones, thoughts, and will. But for him these relations\nare not empirical or physiological. They cannot therefore be studied in\na laboratory, because thought and the will form part of them, and these\nbelong as much to Ethics as to the external world. But Herbart\nexplicitly states that no true beauty is sensible, although sensation\nmay and does often precede and follow the intuition of beauty. There is\na profound distinction between the beautiful and the agreeable or\npleasant: the latter does not require a representation, while the former\nconsists in representations of relations, which are immediately followed\nby a judgment expressing unconditioned approval. Thus the merely\npleasurable becomes more and more indifferent, but the beautiful appears\nalways as of more and more permanent value. The judgment of taste is\nuniversal, eternal, immutable. The complete representation of the same\nrelations always carries with it the same judgment. For Herbart,\naesthetic judgments are the general class containing the sub-class of\nethical judgments. The five ethical ideas, of internal liberty, of\nperfection, of benevolence, of equity, and of justice, are five\naesthetic ideas; or better, they are aesthetic concepts applied to the\nwill in its relations.\n\nHerbart looked upon art as a complex fact, composed of an external\nelement possessing logical or psychological value, the content, and of a\ntrue aesthetic element, which is the form. Entertainment, instruction,\nand pleasure of all sorts are mingled with the beautiful, in order to\nobtain favour for the work in question. The aesthetic judgment, calm and\nserene in itself, may be accompanied by all sorts of psychic emotions,\nforeign to it. But the content is always transitory, relative, subject\nto moral laws, and judged by them. The form alone is perennial,\nabsolute, and free. The true catharsis can only be effected by\nseparating the form from the content. Concrete art may be the sum of two\nvalues, _but the aesthetic fact is form alone_.\n\nFor those capable of penetrating beneath appearances, the aesthetic\ndoctrines of Herbart and of Kant will appear very similar. Herbart is\nnotable as insisting, in the manner of Kant, on the distinction between\nfree and adherent beauty (or adornment as sensuous stimulant), on the\nexistence of pure beauty, object of necessary and universal judgments,\nand on a certain mingling of ethical with his aesthetic theory. Herbart,\nindeed, called himself \"a Kantian, but of the year 1828.\" Kant's\naesthetic theory, though it be full of errors, yet is rich in fruitful\nsuggestions. Kant belongs to a period when philosophy is still young and\npliant. Herbart came later, and is dry and one-sided. The romantics and\nthe metaphysical idealists had unified the theory of the beautiful and\nof art. Herbart restored the old duality and mechanism, and gave us an\nabsurd, unfruitful form of mysticism, void of all artistic inspiration.\n\nHerbart may be said to have taken all there was of false in the thought\nof Kant and to have made it into a system.\n\nThe beginning of the nineteenth century in Germany is notable for the\ngreat number of philosophical theories and of counter-theories, broached\nand rapidly discussed, before being discarded. None of the most\nprominent names in the period belong to philosophers of first-rate\nimportance, though they made so much stir in their day.\n\nThe thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher was obscured and misunderstood\namid those crowding mediocrities; yet it is perhaps the most interesting\nand the most noteworthy of the period.\n\nSchleiermacher looked upon Aesthetic as an altogether modern form of\nthought. He perceived a profound difference between the \"Poetics\" of\nAristotle, not yet freed from empirical precepts, and the tentative of\nBaumgarten in the eighteenth century. He praised Kant as having been the\nfirst to include Aesthetic among the philosophical disciplines. He\nadmitted that with Hegel it had attained to the highest pinnacle, being\nconnected with religion and with philosophy, and almost placed upon\ntheir level.\n\nBut he was dissatisfied with the absurdity of the attempt made by the\nfollowers of Baumgarten to construct a science or theory of sensuous\npleasure. He disapproved of Kant's view of taste as being the principle\nof Aesthetic, of Fichte's art as moral teaching, and of the vague\nconception of the beautiful as the centre of Aesthetic.\n\nHe approved of Schiller's marking of the moment of spontaneity in\nproductive art, and he praised Schelling for having drawn attention to\nthe figurative arts, as being less liable than poetry to be diverted to\nfalse and illusory moralistic ends. Before he begins the study of the\nplace due to the artistic activity in Ethic, he carefully excludes from\nthe study of Aesthetic all practical rules (which, being empirical, are\nincapable of scientific demonstration).\n\nFor Schleiermacher, the sphere of Ethic included the whole Philosophy of\nthe Spirit, in addition to morality. These are the two forms of human\nactivity--that which, like Logic, is the same in all men, and is called\nactivity of identity, and the activity of difference or individuality.\nThere are activities which, like art, are internal or immanent and\nindividual, and others which are external or practical. _The true work\nof art is the internal picture_. Measure is what differentiates the\nartist's portrayal of anger on the stage and the anger of a really angry\nman. Truth is not sought in poetry, or if it be sought there, it is\ntruth of an altogether different kind. The truth of poetry lies in\ncoherent presentation. Likeness to a model does not compose the merit of\na picture. Not the smallest amount of knowledge comes from art, which\nexpresses only the truth of a particular consciousness. Art has for its\nfield the immediate consciousness of self, which must be carefully\ndistinguished from the thought of the Ego. This last is the\nconsciousness of identity in the diversity of moments as they pass; the\nimmediate consciousness of self is the diversity itself of the moments,\nof which we should be aware, for life is nothing but the development of\nconsciousness. In this field, art has sometimes been confused with two\nfacts which accompany it there: these are sentient consciousness (that\nis, the feelings of pleasure and of pain) and religion. Schleiermacher\nhere alludes to the sensualistic aestheticians of the eighteenth\ncentury, and to Hegel, who had almost identified art and religion. He\nrefutes both points of view by pointing out that sentient pleasure and\nreligious sentiment, however different they may be from other points of\nview, are yet both determined by an objective fact; while art, on the\ncontrary, is free productivity.\n\nDream is the best parallel and proof of this free productivity. All the\nessential elements of art are found in dream, which is the result of\nfree thoughts and of sensible intuitions, consisting simply of images.\nBut dream, as compared with art, is chaotic: when measure and order is\nestablished in dream, it becomes art. Thoughts and images are alike\nessential to art, and to both is necessary ponderation, reflexion,\nmeasure, and unity, because otherwise every image would be confused with\nevery other image. Thus the moments of inspiration and of ponderation\nare both necessary to art.\n\nSchleiermacher's thought, so firm and lucid up to this point, begins to\nbecome less secure, with the discussion of typicity and of the extent to\nwhich the artist should follow Nature. He says that ideal figures, which\nNature would give, were she not impeded by external obstacles, are the\nproducts of art. He notes that when the artist represents something\nreally given, such as a portrait or a landscape, he renounces freedom of\nproduction and adheres to the real. In the artist is a double tendency,\ntoward the perfection of the type and toward the representation of\nnatural reality. He should not fall into the abstraction of the type,\nnor into the insignificance of empirical reality. Schleiermacher feels\nall the difficulty of such a problem as whether there be one or several\nideals of the human figure. This problem may be transferred to the\nsphere of art, and we may ask whether the poet is to represent only the\nideal, or whether he should also deal with those obstacles to it that\nimpede Nature in her efforts to attain. Both views contain half the\ntruth. To art belongs the representation of the ideal as of the real, of\nthe subjective and of the objective alike. The representation of the\ncomic, that is of the anti-ideal and of the imperfect ideal, belongs to\nthe domain of art. For the human form, both morally and physically,\noscillates between the ideal and caricature.\n\nHe arrives at a most important definition as to the independence of art\nin respect to morality. The nature of art, as of philosophic\nspeculation, excludes moral and practical effects. Therefore, _there is\nno other difference between works of art than their respective artistic\nperfection (Vollkommenheit in der Kunst)_. If we could correctly\npredicate volitional acts in respect of works of art, then we should\nfind ourselves admiring only those works which stimulated the will, and\nthere would thus be established a difference of valuation, independent\nof artistic perfection. The true work of art depends upon the degree of\nperfection with which the external in it agrees with the internal.\n\nSchleiermacher rightly combats Schiller's view that art is in any sense\na game. That, he says, is the view held by mere men of business, to whom\nbusiness alone is serious. But artistic activity is universal, and a man\ncompletely deprived of it unthinkable, although the difference here\nbetween man and man, is gigantic, ranging from the simple desire to\ntaste of art to the effective tasting of it, and from this, by infinite\ngradations, to productive genius.\n\nThe regrettable fact that Schleiermacher's thought has reached us only\nin an imperfect form, may account for certain of its defects, such as\nhis failure to eliminate aesthetic classes and types, his retention of a\ncertain residue of abstract formalism, his definition of art as the\nactivity of difference. Had he better defined the moment of artistic\nreproduction, realized the possibility of tasting the art of various\ntimes and of other nations, and examined the true relation of art to\nscience, he would have seen that this difference is merely empirical and\nto be surmounted. He failed also to recognize the identity of the\naesthetic activity, with language as the base of all other theoretic\nactivity.\n\nBut Schleiermacher's merits far outweigh these defects. He removed from\nAesthetic its _imperativistic_ character; he distinguished _a form of\nthought_ different from logical thought. He attributed to our science a\n_non-metaphysical, anthropological_ character. He _denied_ the concept\nof the beautiful, substituting for it _artistic perfection_, and\nmaintaining the aesthetic equality of a small with a great work of art,\nhe looked upon the aesthetic fact as an exclusively _human\nproductivity_.\n\nThus Schleiermacher, the theologian, in this period of metaphysical\norgy, of rapidly constructed and as rapidly destroyed systems,\nperceived, with the greatest philosophical acumen, what is really\ncharacteristic of art, and distinguished its properties and relations.\nEven where he fails to see clearly his way, he never abandons analysis\nfor mere guess-work.\n\nSchleiermacher, thus exploring the obscure region of the _immediate\nconsciousness_, or of the aesthetic fact, can almost be heard crying out\nto his straying contemporaries: _Hic Rhodus, hi salta_!\n\nSpeculation upon the origin and nature of language was rife at this time\nin Germany. Many theories were put forward, among the most curious being\nthat of Schelling, who held language and mythology to be the product of\na pre-human consciousness, allegorically expressed as the diabolic\nsuggestions which had precipitated the Ego from the infinite to the\nfinite.\n\nEven Wilhelm von Humboldt was unable to free himself altogether from the\nintellectualistic prejudice of the substantial identity and the merely\nhistorical and accidental diversity of logical thought and language. He\nspeaks of a _perfect_ language, broken up and diminished with the lesser\ncapacities of lesser peoples. He believed that language is something\nstanding outside the individual, independent of him, and capable of\nbeing revived by use. But there were two men in Humboldt, an old man and\na young one. The latter was always suggesting that language should be\nlooked upon as a living, not as a dead thing, as an activity, not as a\nword. This duality of thought sometimes makes his writing difficult and\nobscure. Although he speaks of an internal form of speech, he fails to\nidentify this with art as expression. The reason is that he looks upon\nthe word in too unilateral a manner, as a means of developing logical\nthought, and his ideas of Aesthetic are too vague and too inexact to\nenable him to discover their identity. Despite his perception of the\nprofound truth that poetry precedes prose, Humboldt gives grounds for\ndoubt as to whether he had clearly recognized and firmly grasped the\nfact that language is always poetry, and that prose (science) is a\ndistinction, not of aesthetic form, but of content, that is, of logical\nform.\n\nSteinthal, the greatest follower of Humboldt, solved his master's\ncontradictions, and in 1855 sustained successfully against the Hegelian\nBecker the thesis that words are necessary for thought. He pointed to\nthe deaf-mute with his signs, to the mathematician with his formulae, to\nthe Chinese language, where the figurative portion is an essential of\nspeech, and declared that Becker was wrong in believing that the\nSanskrit language was derived from twelve cardinal concepts. He showed\neffectively that the concept and the word, the logical judgment and the\nproposition, are not comparable. The proposition is not a judgment, but\nthe representation of a judgment; and all propositions do not represent\nlogical judgments. Several judgments can be expressed with one\nproposition. The logical divisions of judgments (the relations of\nconcepts) have no correspondence in the grammatical division of\npropositions. \"If we speak of a logical form of the proposition, we fall\ninto a contradiction in terms not less complete than his who should\nspeak of the angle of a circle, or of the periphery of a triangle.\" He\nwho speaks, in so far as he speaks, has not thoughts, but language.\n\nWhen Steinthal had several times solemnly proclaimed the independence of\nlanguage as regards Logic, and that it produces its forms in complete\nautonomy, he proceeded to seek the origin of language, recognizing with\nHumboldt that the question of Its origin is the same as that of its\nnature. Language, he said, belongs to the great class of reflex\nmovements, but this only shows one side of it, not its true nature.\nAnimals, like men, have reflex actions and sensations, though nature\nenters the animal by force, takes it by assault, conquers and enslaves\nit. With man is born language, because he is resistance to nature,\ngovernance of his own body, and liberty. \"Language is liberation; even\nto-day we feel that our soul becomes lighter, and frees itself from a\nweight, when we speak.\" Man, before he attains to speech, must be\nconceived of as accompanying all his sensations with bodily movements,\nmimetic attitudes, gestures, and particularly with articulate sounds.\nWhat is still lacking to him, that he may attain to speech? The\nconnexion between the reflex movements of the body and the state of the\nsoul. If his sentient consciousness be already consciousness, then he\nlacks the consciousness of consciousness; if it be already intuition,\nthen he lacks the intuition of intuition. In sum, he lacks the _internal\nform of language_. With this comes speech, which forms the connexion.\nMan does not choose the sound of his speech. This is given to him and he\nadopts it instinctively.\n\nWhen we have accorded to Steinthal the great merit of having rendered\ncoherent the ideas of Humboldt, and of having clearly separated\nlinguistic from logical thought, we must note that he too failed to\nperceive the _identity_ of the internal form of language, or \"intuition\nof the intuition,\" as he called it, with the aesthetic _imagination_.\nHerbart's psychology, to which Steinthal adhered, did not afford him any\nmeans for this identification. Herbart separated logic from psychology,\ncalling it a normative science; he failed to discern the exact limits\nbetween feeling and spiritual formation, psyche or soul, and spirit, and\nto see that one of these spiritual formations is logical thought or\nactivity, which is not a code of laws imposed from without. For Herbart,\nAesthetic, as we know, was a code of beautiful formal relations. Thus\nSteinthal, following Herbart in psychology, was bound to look upon Art\nas a beautifying of thought, Linguistic as the science of speech,\nRhetoric and Aesthetic as the science of beautiful speech.\n\nSteinthal never realized that to speak is to speak well or beautifully,\nunder penalty of _not_ speaking, and that the revolution which he and\nHumboldt had effected in the conception of language must inevitably\nreact upon and transform Poetic, Rhetoric, and Aesthetic.\n\nThus, despite so many efforts of conscientious analysis on the part of\nHumboldt and of Steinthal, the unity of language and of poetry, and the\nidentification of the science of language and the science of poetry\nstill found its least imperfect expression in the prophetic aphorisms of\nVico.\n\nThe philosophical movement in Germany from the last quarter of the\neighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth, notwithstanding\nits many errors, is yet so notable and so imposing with the philosophers\nalready considered, as to merit the first place in the European thought\nof that period. This is even more the case as regards Aesthetic than as\nregards philosophy in general.\n\nFrance was the prey of Condillac's sensualism, and therefore incapable\nof duly appreciating the spiritual activity of art. We hardly get a\nglimpse of Winckelmann's transcendental spiritualism in Quatrem\u00e8re de\nQuincy, and the frigid academics of Victor Cousin were easily surpassed\nby Theodore Jouffroy, though he too failed of isolating the aesthetic\nfact. French Romanticism defined literature as \"the expression of\nsociety,\" admired under German influence the grotesque and the\ncharacteristic, declared the independence of art in the formula of \"art\nfor art's sake,\" but did not succeed in surpassing philosophically the\nold doctrine of the \"imitation of nature.\" F. Schlegel and Solger indeed\nwere largely responsible for the Romantic movement in France--Schlegel\nwith his belief in the characteristic or _interesting_ as the principle\nof modern art, which led him to admire the cruel and the ugly; Solger\nwith his dialectic arrangement, whereby the finite or terrestrial\nelement is absorbed and annihilated in the divine and thus becomes the\ntragic, or _vice versa_, and the result is the comic. Rosenkranz\npublished in K\u00f6nigsberg an Aesthetic of the Ugly, and the works of\nVischer and Zeising abound in subtleties relating to the Idea and to its\nexpression in the beautiful and sublime. These writers conceived of the\nIdea as the Knight Purebeautiful, constrained to abandon his tranquil\nease through the machinations of the Ugly; the Ugly leads him into all\nsorts of disagreeable adventures, from all of which he eventually\nemerges victorious. The Sublime, the Comic, the Humorous, and so on, are\nhis Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena. Another version of their knight's\nadventures might be described as his conquest by his enemies, but at the\nmoment of conquest he transforms and irradiates his conquerors. To such\na mediocre and artificial mythology led the much-elaborated theory of\nthe Modifications of the Beautiful.\n\nIn England, the associationist psychology continued to hold sway, and\nshowed, with Dugald Stewart's miserable attempt at establishing two\nforms of association, its incapacity to rise to the conception of the\nimagination. With the poet Coleridge, England also showed the influence\nof German thought, and Coleridge elaborated with Wordsworth a more\ncorrect conception of poetry and of its difference from science. But the\nmost notable contribution in English at that period came from another\npoet, P.B. Shelley, whose _Defence of Poetry_ contains profound, though\nunsystematic views, as to the distinction between reason and\nimagination, prose and poetry, on primitive language, and on the poetic\npower of objectification.\n\nIn Italy, Francesco de Sanctis gave magnificent expression to the\nindependence of art. He taught literature in Naples from 1838 to 1848,\nin Turin and Zurich from 1850 to 1860, and after 1870 he was a professor\nin the University of Naples. His _Storia della letteratura italiana_ is\na classic, and in it and in monographs on individual writers he exposed\nhis doctrines.\n\nPrompted by a natural love of speculation, he began to examine the old\ngrammarians and rhetoricians, with a view to systematize them. But very\nsoon he proceeded to criticize and to surpass their theories. The cold\nrules of reason did not find favour with him, and he advised young men\nto go direct to the original works.\n\nThe philosophy of Hegel began to penetrate Italy, and the study of Vico\nwas again taken up. De Sanctis translated the _Logic_ of Hegel in\nprison, where the Bourbon Government had thrown him for his liberalism.\nBenard had begun his translation of the _Aesthetic_ of Hegel, and so\ncompletely in harmony was De Sanctis with the thought of this master,\nthat he is said to have guessed from a study of the first volume what\nthe unpublished volumes must contain, and to have lectured upon them to\nhis pupils. Traces of mystical idealism and of Hegelianism persist even\nin his later works, and the distinction, which he always maintained,\nbetween imagination and fancy certainly came to him from Hegel and\nSchelling. He held fancy alone to be the true poetic faculty.\n\nDe Sanctis absorbed all the juice of Hegel, but rejected the husks of\nhis pedantry, of his formalism, of his apriority.\n\nFancy for De Sanctis was not the mystical transcendental apperception of\nthe German philosophers, but simply the faculty of poetic synthesis and\ncreation, opposed to the imagination, which reunites details and always\nhas something mechanical about it. Faith and poetry, he used to say, are\nnot dead, but transformed. His criticism of Hegel amounted in many\nplaces to the correction of Hegel; and as regards Vico, he is careful to\npoint out, that when, in dealing with the Homeric poems, Vico talks of\ngeneric types, he is no longer the critic of art, but the historian of\ncivilization. De Sanctis saw that, _artistically_, Achilles must always\nbe Achilles, never a force or an abstraction.\n\nThus De Sanctis succeeded in keeping himself free from the Hegelian\ndomination, at a moment when Hegel was the acknowledged master of\nspeculation.\n\nBut his criticism extended also to other German aestheticians. By a\ncurious accident, he found himself at Zurich in the company of Theodore\nVischer, that ponderous Hegelian, who laughed disdainfully at the\nmention of poetry, of music, and of the decadent Italian race. De\nSanctis laughed at Vischer's laughter. Wagner appeared to him a\ncorrupter of music, and \"nothing in the world more unaesthetic than the\nAesthetic of Theodore Vischer.\" His lectures on Ariosto and Petrarch,\nbefore an international public at Zurich, were delivered with the desire\nof correcting the errors of these and of other German philosophers and\nlearned men. He gave his celebrated definitions of French and German\ncritics. The French critic does not indulge in theories: one feels\nwarmth of impression and sagacity of observation in his argument. He\nnever leaves the concrete; he divines the quality of the writer's genius\nand the quality of his work, and studies the man, in order to understand\nthe writer. His great fault is shown in substituting for criticism of\nthe actual art work a historical criticism of the author and of his\ntime. For the German, on the other hand, there is nothing so simple that\nhe does not contrive to distort and to confuse it. He collects shadows\naround him, from which shoot vivid rays. He laboriously brings to birth\nthat morsel of truth which he has within him. He would seize and define\nwhat is most fugitive and impalpable in a work of art. Although nobody\ntalks so much of life as he does, yet no one so much delights in\ndecomposing and generalizing it. Having thus destroyed the particular,\nhe is able to show you as the result of this process, final in\nappearance, but in reality preconceived and apriorist, one measurement\nfor all feet, one garment for all bodies.\n\nAbout this time he studied Schopenhauer, who was then becoming the\nfashion. Schopenhauer said of this criticism of De Sanctis: \"That\nItalian has absorbed me _in succum et sanguinem_.\" What weight did he\nattach to Schopenhauer's much-vaunted writings on art? Having exposed\nthe theory of Ideas, he barely refers to the third volume, \"which\ncontains an exaggerated theory of Aesthetic.\"\n\nIn his criticism of Petrarch, De Sanctis finally broke with metaphysical\nAesthetic, saying of Hegel's school that it believed the beautiful to\nbecome art when it surpassed form and revealed the concept or pure idea.\nThis theory and the subtleties derived from it, far from characterizing\nart, represent its contrary: the impotent velleity for art, which cannot\nslay abstractions and come in contact with life.\n\nDe Sanctis held that outside the domain of art all Is shapeless. The\nugly is of the domain of art, if art give it form. Is there anything\nmore beautiful than Iago? If he be looked upon merely as a contrast to\nOthello, then we are in the position of those who looked upon the stars\nas placed where they are to serve as candles for the earth.\n\nForm was for De Sanctis the word which should be inscribed over the\nentrance to the Temple of Art. In the work of art are form and content,\nbut the latter is no longer chaotic: the artist has given to it a new\nvalue, has enriched it with the gift of his own personality. But if the\ncontent has not been assimilated and made his own by the artist, then\nthe work lacks generative power: it is of no value as art or literature,\nthough as history or scientific document its value may be great. The\nGods of Homer's _Iliad_ are dead, but the _Iliad_ remains. Guelf and\nGhibelline have disappeared from Italy: not so the _Divine Comedy_,\nwhich is as vigorous to-day as when Dante first took pen in hand. Thus\nDe Sanctis held firmly to the independence of art, but he did not accept\nthe formula of \"art for art's sake,\" in so far as it meant separation of\nthe artist from life, mutilation of the content, art reduced to mere\ndexterity.\n\nFor De Sanctis, form was identical with imagination, with the artist's\npower of expressing or representing his artistic vision. This much must\nbe admitted by his critics. But he never attained to a clear definition\nof art. His theory of Aesthetic always remained a sketch: wonderful\nindeed, but not clearly developed and deduced. The reason for this was\nDe Sanctis' love of the concrete. No sooner had he attained from general\nideas a sufficient clarity of vision for his own purposes, than he\nplunged again into the concrete and particular. He did not confine his\nactivity to literature, but was active also in politics and in the\nprosecution and encouragement of historical studies.\n\nAs a critic of literature, De Sanctis is far superior to Sainte-Beuve,\nLessing, Macaulay, or Taine. Flaubert's genial intuition adumbrated what\nDe Sanctis achieved. In one of his letters to Georges Sand, Flaubert\nspeaks of the lack of an _artistic_ critic. \"In Laharpe's time,\ncriticism was grammatical; in the time of Sainte-Beuve and of Taine, it\nis historical. They analyse with great subtlety the historical\nenvironment in which the work appeared and the causes which have\nproduced it. But the _unconscious_ element In poetry? Whence does It\ncome? And composition? And style? And the point of view of the author?\nOf all that they never speak. For such a critic, great imagination and\ngreat goodness are necessary. I mean an ever-ready faculty of\nenthusiasm, and then _taste_, a quality so rare, even among the best,\nthat it is never mentioned.\"\n\nDe Sanctis alone fulfilled the conditions of Flaubert, and Italy has in\nhis writings a looking-glass for her literature unequalled by any other\ncountry.\n\nBut with De Sanctis, the philosopher of art, the aesthetician, is not so\ngreat as the critic of literature. The one is accessory to the other,\nand his use of aesthetic terminology is so inconstant that a lack of\nclearness of thought might be found in his work by anyone who had not\nstudied it with care. But his want of system is more than compensated by\nhis vitality, by his constant citation of actual works, and by his\nintuition of the truth, which never abandoned him. His writings bear the\nfurther charm of suggesting new kingdoms to conquer, new mines of\nrichness to explore.\n\nWhile the cry of \"Down with Metaphysic\" was resounding in Germany, and a\nfurious reaction had set in against the sort of Walpurgisnacht to which\nthe later Hegelians had reduced science and history, the pupils of\nHerbart came forward and with an insinuating air they seemed to say:\n\"What is this? Why, it is a rebellion against Metaphysic, the very thing\nour master wished for and tried to achieve, half a century ago! But here\nwe are, his heirs and successors, and we want to be your allies! An\nunderstanding between us will be easy. Our Metaphysic is in agreement\nwith the atomic theory, our Psychology with mechanicism, our Ethic and\nAesthetic with hedonism.\" Herbart, who died in 1841, would probably have\ndisdained and rejected his followers, who thus courted popularity and\ncheapened Metaphysic, putting a literal interpretation on his realities,\nhis ideas and representations, and upon all his most lofty\nexcogitations.\n\nThe protagonist of these neo-Herbartians was Robert Zimmermann. He\nconstructed his system of Aesthetic out of Herbart, whom he perverted to\nhis own uses, and even employed the much-abused Hegelian dialectic in\norder to introduce modifications of the beautiful into pure beauty. The\nbeautiful, he said, is a model which possesses greatness, fulness,\norder, correction, and definite compensation. Beauty appears to us in a\ncharacteristic form, as a copy of this model.\n\nVischer, against whom was directed this work of Zimmermann, found it\neasy to reply. He ridiculed Zimmermann's meaning of the symbol as the\nobject around which are clustered beautiful forms. \"Does an artist paint\na fox, simply that he may depict an object of animal nature. No, no, my\ndear sir, far from it. This fox is a symbol, because the painter here\nemploys lines and colours, in order to express something different from\nlines and colours. 'You think I am a fox,' cries the painted animal.\n'You are mightily mistaken; I am, on the contrary, a portmanteau, an\nexhibition by the painter of red, white, grey, and yellow tints.'\"\nVischer also made fun of Zimmermann's enthusiasm for the aesthetic value\nof the sense of touch. \"What joy it must be to touch the back of the\nbust of Hercules in repose! To stroke the sinuous limbs of the Venus of\nMilo or of the Faun of Barberini must give a pleasure to the hand equal\nto that of the ear as it listens to the puissant fugues of Bach or to\nthe suave melodies of Mozart.\" Vischer defined the formal Aesthetic of\nZimmermann as a queer mixture of mysticism and mathematic.\n\nLotze, in common with the great majority of thinkers, was dissatisfied\nwith Zimmermann, but could only oppose his formalism with a variety of\nthe old mystical Aesthetic. Who, he asked, could believe that the human\nform pleases only by its external proportions, regardless of the spirit\nwithin. Art, like beauty, should \"enclose the world of values in the\nworld of forms.\" This struggle between the Aesthetic of the content and\nthe Aesthetic of the form attained its greatest height in Germany\nbetween 1860 and 1870, with Zimmermann, Vischer, and Lotze as\nprotagonists.\n\nThese writers were followed by J. Schmidt, who in 1875 ventured to say\nthat both Lotze and Zimmermann had failed to see that the problem of\nAesthetic concerned, not the beauty or ugliness of the content or of the\nform as mathematical relations, but their representation; K\u00f6stlin, who\nerected an immense artificial structure with the materials of his\npredecessors modified; Schasler, who is interesting as having converted\nthe old Vischer to his thesis of the importance of the Ugly, as\nintroducing modifications into the beautiful and being the principle of\nmovement there. Vischer confesses that at one time he had followed the\nHegelian method and believed that in the essence of beauty is born a\ndisquietude, a fermentation, a struggle: the Idea conquers, hurls the\nimage into the unlimited, and the Sublime is born; but the image,\noffended in its finitude, declares war upon the Idea, and the Comic\nappears. Thus the fight is finished and the Beautiful returns to itself,\nas the result of these struggles. But now, he says, Schasler has\npersuaded him that the Ugly is the leaven which is necessary to all the\nspecial forms of the Beautiful.\n\nE. von Hartmann is in close relation with Schasler. His Aesthetic (1890)\nalso makes great use of the Ugly. Since he insists upon appearance as a\nnecessary characteristic of the beautiful, he considers himself\njustified in calling his theory concrete idealism. Hartmann considers\nhimself in opposition to the formalism of Herbart, inasmuch as he\ninsists upon the idea as an indispensable and determining element of\nbeauty. Beauty, he says, is truth, but it is not historical truth, nor\nscientific nor reflective truth: it is metaphysical and ideal. \"Beauty\nis the prophet of idealistic truth in an age without faith, hating\nMetaphysic, and acknowledging only realistic truth.\" Aesthetic truth is\nwithout method and without control: it leaps at once from the subjective\nappearance to the essence of the ideal. But in compensation for this, it\npossesses the fascination of conviction, which immediate intuition alone\npossesses. The higher Philosophy rises, the less need has she of passing\nthrough the world of the senses and of science: she approaches ever more\nnearly to art. Thus Philosophy starts on the voyage to the ideal, like\nBaedeker's traveller, \"without too much baggage.\" In the Beautiful is\nimmanent logicity, the microcosmic idea, the unconscious. By means of\nthe unconscious, the process of intellectual intuition takes place in\nit. The Beautiful is a mystery, because its root is in the Unconscious.\n\nNo philosopher has ever made so great a use of the Ugly as Hartmann. He\ndivides Beauty into grades, of which the one below is ugly as compared\nwith that above it. He begins with the mathematical, superior to the\nsensibly agreeable, which is unconscious. Thence to formal beauty of the\nsecond order, the dynamically agreeable, to formal beauty of the third\norder, the passive teleological; to this degree belong utensils, and\nlanguage, which in Hartmann's view is a dead thing, inspired with\nseeming life, only at the moment of use. Such things did the philosopher\nof the Unconscious dare to print in the country of a Humboldt during the\nlifetime of a Steinthal! He proceeds in his list of things beautiful,\nwith formal beauty of the fourth degree, which is the active or living\nteleological, with the fifth, which is that of species. Finally he\nreaches concrete beauty, or the individual microcosm, the highest of\nall, because the individual idea is superior to the specific, and is\nbeauty, no longer formal, but of content.\n\nAll these degrees of beauty are, as has been said, connected with one\nanother by means of the ugly, and even in the highest degree, which has\nnothing superior to it, the ugly continues its office of beneficent\ntitillation. The outcome of this ultimate phase is the famous theory of\nthe Modifications of the Beautiful. None of these modifications can\noccur without a struggle, save the sublime and the graceful, which\nappear without conflict at the side of supreme beauty. Hartmann gives\nfour instances: the solution is either immanent, logical,\ntranscendental, or combined. The idyllic, the melancholy, the sad, the\nglad, the elegiac, are instances of the immanent solution; the comic in\nall its forms is the logical solution; the tragic is the transcendental\nsolution; the combined form is found in the humorous, the tragi-comic.\nWhen none of these solutions is possible, we have the ugly; and when an\nugliness of content is expressed by a formal ugliness, we have the\nmaximum of ugliness, the true aesthetic devil.\n\nHartmann is the last noteworthy representative of the German\nmetaphysical school. His works are gigantic in size and appear\nformidable. But if one be not afraid of giants and venture to approach\nnear, one finds nothing but a big Morgante, full of the most commonplace\nprejudices, quite easily killed with the bite of a crab!\n\nDuring this period, Aesthetic had few representatives in other\ncountries. The famous conference of the Academy of Moral and Political\nSciences, held in Paris in 1857, gave to the world the \"Science du Beau\"\nof L\u00e9v\u00e8que. No one is interested in it now, but it is amusing to note\nthat L\u00e9v\u00e8que announced himself to be a disciple of Plato, and went on to\nattribute eight characteristics to the beautiful. These he discovered by\nclosely examining the lily! No wonder he was crowned with laurels! He\nproved his wonderful theory by instancing a child playing with its\nmother, a symphony of Beethoven, and the life of Socrates! One of his\ncolleagues, who could not resist making fun of his learned friend,\nremarked that he would be glad to know what part was played in the life\nof a philosopher by the normal vivacity of colour!\n\nThus German theory made no way in France, and England proved even more\nrefractory.\n\nJ. Ruskin showed a poverty, an incoherence, and a lack of system in\nrespect to Aesthetic, which puts him almost out of court. His was the\nvery reverse of the philosophic temperament. His pages of brilliant\nprose contain his own dreams and caprices. They are the work of an\nartist and should be enjoyed as such, being without any value for\nphilosophy. His theoretic faculty of the beautiful, which he held to be\ndistinct alike from the intelligence and from feeling, is connected with\nhis belief in beauty as a revelation of the divine intentions, \"the seal\nwhich God sets upon his works.\" Thus the natural beauty, which is\nperceived by the pure heart, when contemplating some object untouched by\nthe hand of man, is far superior to the work of the artist. Ruskin was\ntoo little capable of analysis to understand the complicated\npsychologico-aesthetic process taking place within him, as he\ncontemplated some streamlet, or the nest of some small bird.\n\nAt Naples flourished between 1861 and 1884 Antonio Tari, who kept\nhimself in touch with the movement of German thought, and followed the\nGerman idealists in placing Aesthetic in a sort of middle kingdom, a\ntemperate zone, between the glacial, inhabited by the Esquimaux of\nthought, and the torrid, dwelt in by the giants of action. He dethroned\nthe Beautiful, and put Aesthetic in its place, for the Beautiful is but\nthe first moment; the later ones are the Comic, the Humorous, and the\nDramatic. His fertile imagination found metaphors and similes in\neverything: for instance, he called the goat the Devil, opposed to the\nlamb, Jesus. His remarks on men and women are full of quaint fancies. He\ngranted to women grace, but not beauty, which resides in equilibrium.\nThis is proved by her falling down so easily when she walks; by her bow\nlegs, which have to support her wide hips, made for gestation; by her\nnarrow shoulders, and her opulent breast. She is therefore a creature\naltogether devoid of equilibrium!\n\nI wish that it were possible to record more of the sayings of the\nexcellent Tari, \"the last joyous priest of an arbitrary Aesthetic,\nsource of confusion.\"\n\nThe ground lost to the German school of metaphysicians was occupied\nduring the second half of the nineteenth century by the evolutionary and\npositivist metaphysicians, of whom Herbert Spencer is the most notable\nrepresentative. The peculiarity of this school lies in repeating at\nsecond or third hand certain idealist views, deprived of the element of\npure philosophy, given to them by a Schelling or a Hegel, and in\nsubstituting a quantity of minute facts and anecdotes, with a view to\nproviding the positivist varnish. These theories are dear to vulgar\nminds, because they correspond to inveterate religious beliefs, and the\nlustre of the varnish explains the good fortune of Spencerian positivism\nin our time. Another notable trait of this school is its barbaric\ncontempt for history, especially for the history of philosophy, and its\nconsequent lack of all link with the series composed of the secular\nefforts of so many thinkers. Without this link, there can be no fruitful\nlabour and no possibility of progress.\n\nSpencer is colossal in his ignorance of all that has been written or\nthought on the subject of Aesthetic (to limit ourselves to this branch\nalone). He actually begins his work on the Philosophy of Style with\nthese words: \"No one, I believe, has ever produced a complete theory of\nthe art of writing.\" This in 1852! He begins his chapter on aesthetic\nfeelings in the _Principles of Psychology_ by admitting that he has\nheard of the observation made by a German author, whose name he forgets\n(Schiller!), on the connexion between art and play. Had Spencer's\nremarks on Aesthetic been written in the eighteenth century, they might\nhave occupied a humble place among the first rude attempts at aesthetic\nspeculation, but appearing in the nineteenth century, they are without\nvalue, as the little of value they contain had been long said by others.\n\nIn his _Principles of Psychology_ Spencer looks upon aesthetic feelings\nas arising from the discharge of the exuberant energy of the organism.\nThis he divides into degrees, and believes that we attain complete\nenjoyment when these degrees are all working satisfactorily each on its\nown plane, and when what is painful in excessive activity has been\navoided. His degrees are sensation, sensation accompanied by\nrepresentative elements, perception accompanied by more complex elements\nof representation, then emotion, and that state of consciousness which\nsurpasses sensations and perceptions. But Spencer has no suspicion of\nwhat art really is. His views oscillate between sensualism and moralism,\nand he sees little in the whole art of antiquity, of the Middle Ages, or\nof modern times, which can be looked upon as otherwise than imperfect!\n\nThe Physiology of Aesthetics has also had its votaries in Great Britain,\namong whom may be mentioned J. Sully, A. Bain, and Allen. These at any\nrate show some knowledge of the concrete fact of art. Allen harks back\nto the old distinction between necessary and vital activities and\nsuperfluous activities, and gives a physiological definition, which may\nbe read in his _Physiological Aesthetics_. More recent writers also look\nupon the physiological fact as the cause of the pleasure of art; but for\nthem it does not alone depend upon the visual organ, and the muscular\nphenomena associated with it, but also on the participation of some of\nthe most important bodily functions, such as respiration, circulation,\nequilibrium, intimate muscular accommodation. They believe that art owes\nits origin to the pleasure that some prehistoric man must have\nexperienced in breathing regularly, without having to re-adapt his\norgans, when he traced for the first time on a bone or on clay regular\nlines separated by regular intervals.\n\nA similar order of physico-aesthetic researches has been made in\nGermany, under the auspices of Helmholtz, Br\u00fccke, and Stumpf. But these\nwriters have succeeded better than the above-mentioned, by restricting\nthemselves to the fields of optic and acoustic, and have supplied\ninformation as to the physical processes of artistic technique and as to\nthe pleasure of visual and auditive impressions, without attempting to\nmelt Aesthetic into Physic, or to deprive the former of its spiritual\ncharacter. They have even occasionally indicated the difference between\nthe two kinds of research. Even the degenerate Herbartians, converting\nthe metaphysical forms of their master into physiological phenomena,\nmade soft eyes at the new sensualists and aesthetico-physiologists.\n\nThe Natural Sciences have become in our day a sort of superstition,\nallied to a certain, perhaps unconscious, hypocrisy. Not only have\nchemical, physical, and physiological laboratories become a sort of\nSibylline grots, where resound the most extraordinary questions about\neverything that can interest the spirit of man, but even those who\nreally do prosecute their researches with the old inevitable method of\ninternal observation, have been unable to free themselves from the\nillusion that they are, on the contrary, employing _the method of the\nnatural sciences_.\n\nHippolyte Taine's Philosophy of Art represents such an illusion. He\ndeclares that when we have studied the diverse manifestations of art in\nall peoples and at all epochs, we shall then possess a complete\nAesthetic. Such an Aesthetic would be a sort of Botany applied to the\nworks of man. This mode of study would provide moral science with a\nbasis equally as sure as that which the natural sciences already\npossess. Taine then proceeds to define art without regard to the natural\nsciences, by analysing, like a simple mortal, what passes in the human\nsoul when brought face to face with a work of art. But what analysis and\nwhat definitions!\n\nArt, he says, is imitation, but of a sort that tries to express an\nessential characteristic. Thus the principal characteristic of a lion is\nto be \"a great carnivore,\" and we observe this characteristic in all its\nlimbs. Holland has for essential characteristic that of being a land\nformed of alluvial soil.\n\nNow without staying to consider these two remarkable instances, let us\nask, what is this essential characteristic of Taine? It is the same as\nthe ideas, types, or concepts that the old aesthetic teaching assigned\nto art as its object. Taine himself removes all doubt as to this, by\nsaying that this characteristic is what philosophers call the essence of\nthings, and for that reason they declare that the purpose of art is to\nmanifest things. He declares that he will not employ the word essence,\nwhich is technical. But he accepts and employs the thought that the word\nexpresses. He believes that there are two routes by which man can attain\nto the superior life: science and art. By the first, he apprehends\nfundamental laws and causes, and expresses them in abstract terms; by\nthe second, he expresses these same laws and causes in a manner\ncomprehensible to all, by appealing to the heart and feeling, as well as\nto the reason of man. Art is both superior and popular; it makes\nmanifest what is highest, and makes it manifest to all.\n\nThat Taine here falls into the old pedagogic theory of Aesthetic is\nevident. Works of art are arranged for him in a scale of values, as for\nthe aesthetic metaphysicians. He began by declaring the absurdity of all\njudgment of taste, \"\u00e0 chacun son go\u00fbt,\" but he ends by declaring that\npersonal taste is without value, that we must establish a common measure\nbefore proceeding to praise or blame. His scale of values is double or\ntriple. We must first fix the degree of importance of the\ncharacteristic, that is, the greater or less generality of the idea, and\nthe degree of good in it, that is to say, its greater or lesser moral\nvalue. These, he says, are two degrees of the same thing, strength, seen\nfrom different sides. We must also establish the degree of convergence\nof the effects, that is, the fulness of expression, the harmony between\nthe idea and the form.\n\nThis half-moral, half-metaphysical exposition is accompanied with the\nusual protestations, that the matter in hand is to be studied\nmethodically, analytically, as the naturalist would study it, that he\nwill try to reach \"a law, not a hymn.\" As if these protestations could\nabolish the true nature of his thought! Taine actually went so far as to\nattempt dialectic solutions of works of art! \"In the primitive period of\nItalian art, we find the soul without the body: Giotto. At the\nRenaissance, with Verrocchio and his school, we find the body without\nthe soul. With Raphael, in the sixteenth century, we find expression and\nanatomy in harmony: body and soul.\" Thesis, antithesis, synthesis!\n\nWith G.T. Fechner we find the like protestations and the like\nprocedure. He will study Aesthetic inductively, from beneath. He seeks\nclarity, not loftiness. Proceeding thus inductively, he discovers a long\nseries of laws or principles of Aesthetic, such as unity in variety,\nassociation and contrast, change and persistence, the golden mean, etc.\nHe exhibits this chaos with delight at showing himself so much of a\nphysiologist, and so inconclusive. Then he proceeds to describe his\nexperiments in Aesthetics. These consist of attempts to decide, for\ninstance, by methods of choice, which of certain rectangles of cardboard\nis the most agreeable, and which the most disagreeable, to a large\nnumber of people arbitrarily chosen. Naturally, these results do not\nagree with others obtained on other occasions, but Fechner knows that\nerrors correct themselves, and triumphantly publishes long lists of\nthese valuable experiments. He also communicates to us the shapes and\nmeasurements of a large number of pictures in museums, as compared with\ntheir respective subjects! Such are the experiments of physiological\naestheticians.\n\nBut Fechner, when he comes to define what beauty and what art really\nare, is, like everyone else, obliged to fall back upon introspection.\nBut his definition is trivial, and his comparison of his three degrees\nof beauty to a family is simply grotesque in its _na\u00efvet\u00e9_. He terms\nthis theory the eudemonistic theory, and we are left wondering why, when\nhe had this theory all cut and dried in his mind, he should all the same\ngive himself the immense trouble of compiling his tables and of\nenumerating his laws and principles, which do not agree with his theory.\nPerhaps it was all a pastime for him, like playing at patience, or\ncollecting postage-stamps?\n\nAnother example of superstition in respect to the natural sciences\nis afforded by Ernest Grosse. Grosse abounds in contempt for what\nhe calls speculative Aesthetic. Yet he desires a Science of Art\n(Kunstwissenschaft), which shall formulate its laws from those\nhistorical facts which have hitherto been collected.\n\nBut Grosse wishes us to complete the collection of historical evidence\nwith ethnographical and prehistoric materials, for we cannot obtain\nreally general laws of art from the exclusive study of cultivated\npeoples, \"just as a theory of reproduction exclusively based upon the\nform it takes with mammifers, must necessarily be imperfect!\"\n\nHe is, however, aware that the results of experiences among savages and\nprehistoric races do not alone suffice to furnish us with an equipment\nfor such investigations as that concerning the nature of Art, and, like\nany ordinary mortal, he feels obliged to interrogate, before starting,\nthe spirit of man. He therefore proceeds to define Aesthetic on\napriorist principles, which, he remarks, can be discarded when we shall\nhave obtained the complete theory, in like manner with the scaffolding\nthat has served for the erection of a house.\n\nWords! Words! Vain words! He proceeds to define Aesthetic as the\nactivity which in its development and result has the immediate value of\nfeeling, and is, therefore, an end in itself. Art is the opposite of\npractice; the activity of games stands intermediate between the two,\nhaving also its end in its own activity.\n\nThe Aesthetics of Taine and of Grosse have been called sociological.\nSeeing that any true definition of sociology as a science is impossible,\nfor it is composed of psychological elements, which are for ever\nvarying, we do not delay to criticize the futile attempts at definition,\nbut pass at once to the objective results attained by the sociologists.\nThis superstition, like the naturalistic, takes various forms in\npractical life. We have, for instance, Proudhon (1875), who would hark\nback to Platonic Aesthetic, class the aesthetic activity among the\nmerely sensual, and command the arts to further the cause of virtue, on\npain of judicial proceedings in case of contumacy.\n\nBut M. Guyau is the most important of sociological aestheticians. His\nworks, published in Paris toward the end of last century, and his\nposthumous work, entitled _Les probl\u00e8mes de l'Esth\u00e9tique contemporaine_,\nsubstitute for the theory of play, that of _life_, and the posthumous\nwork above-mentioned makes it evident that by life he means social life.\nArt is the development of social sympathy, but the whole of art does not\nenter into sociology. Art has two objects; the production of agreeable\nsensations (colours, sounds, etc.) and of phenomena of psychological\ninduction, which include ideas and feelings of a more complex nature\nthan the foregoing, such as sympathy for the personages represented,\ninterest, piety, indignation, etc. Thus art becomes the expression of\nlife. Hence arise two tendencies: one for harmony, consonance, for all\nthat delights the ear and eye; the other transforming life, under the\ndominion of art. True genius is destined to balance these two\ntendencies; but the decadent and the unbalanced deprive art of its\nsympathetic end, setting aesthetic sympathy against human sympathy. If\nwe translate this language into that with which we are by this time\nquite familiar, we shall see that Guyau admits an art that is merely\nhedonistic, and places above it another art, also hedonistic, but\nserving the ends of morality.\n\nM. Nordau wages war against the decadent and unbalanced, in much the\nsame manner as Guyau. He assigns to art the function of re-establishing\nthe integrity of life, so much broken up and specialized in our\nindustrial civilization. He remarks that there is such a thing as art\nfor art's sake, the simple expression of the internal states of the\nindividual, but it is the art of the cave-dweller.\n\nC. Lombroso's theory of genius as degeneration may be grouped with the\nnaturalistic theories. His argument is in essence the following. Great\nmental efforts, and total absorption in one dominant thought, often\nproduce physiological disorders or atrophy of important vital functions.\nNow these disorders often lead to madness; therefore, genius may be\nidentified with madness. This proof, from the particular to the general,\ndoes not follow that of traditional Logic. But with Lombroso, B\u00fcchner,\nNordau, and the like we have come to the boundary between specious and\nvulgar error. They confuse scientific analysis with historical research.\nSuch inquiries may have value for history, but they have none for\nAesthetic. Thus, too, A. Lang maintains that the doctrine of the origin\nof art as disinterested expression of the mimetic faculty is not\nconfirmed in what we know of primitive art, which is rather decorative\nthan expressive. But primitive art, which is a given fact to be\ninterpreted, cannot ever become its own criterion of interpretation.\n\nThe naturalistic misunderstanding has had a bad effect on linguistic\nresearches, which have not been carried out on the lofty plane to which\nHumboldt and Steinthal had brought them.\n\nMax M\u00fcller is popular and exaggerated. He fails clearly to distinguish\nthought from logical thought, although in one place he remarks that the\nformation of names has a more intimate connexion with wit than with\njudgment. He holds that the science of language is not historical, but\nnatural, because language is not the invention of man, altogether\nignoring the science of the spirit, philosophy, of which language is a\npart. For Max M\u00fcller, the natural sciences were the only sciences. The\nconsciousness of the science of the spirit becomes ever more obscured,\nand we find the philologist W.D. Whitney combating Max M\u00fcller's\n\"miracles\" and maintaining the separability of thought and speech.\n\nWith Hermann Paul (1880) we have an awakening of Humboldt's spirit. Paul\nmaintains that the origin of language is the speech of the individual\nman, and that a language has its origin every time it is spoken. Paul\nalso showed the fallacies contained in the _V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_ of\nSteinthal and Lazarus, demonstrating that there is no such thing as a\ncollective soul, and that there is no language save that of the\nindividual.\n\nW. Wundt (1886), on the other hand, commits the error of connecting\nlanguage with Ethnopsychology and other non-existent sciences, and\nactually terms the glorious doctrine of Herder and of Humboldt\n_Wundertheorie_, or theory of miracle, accusing them of mystical\nobscurity. Wundt confuses the question of the historical appearance of\nlanguage with that of its internal nature and genesis. He looks upon the\ntheory of evolution as having attained to its complete triumph, in its\napplication to organic nature in general, and especially to man. He has\nno suspicion whatever of the function of fancy, and of the true relation\nbetween thought and expression, between expression in the naturalistic,\nand expression in the spiritual and linguistic sense. He looks upon\nspeech as a specially developed form of psycho-physical vital\nmanifestations, of expressive animal movements. Language is developed\ncontinuously from such facts, and thus is explained how, \"beyond the\ngeneral concept of expressive movement, there is no specific quality\nwhich delimits language in a non-arbitrary manner.\"\n\nThus the philosophy of Wundt reveals its weak side, showing itself\nincapable of understanding the spiritual nature of language and of art.\nIn the _Ethic_ of the same author, aesthetic facts are presented as a\nmixture of logical and ethical elements, a special normative aesthetic\nscience is denied, and Aesthetic is merged in Logic and Ethic.\n\nThe neo-critical and neo-Kantian movement in thought was not able to\nmaintain the concept of the spirit against the hedonistic, moralistic,\nand psychological views of Aesthetic, in vogue from about the middle of\nlast century. Neo-criticism inherited from Kant his view as to the\nslight importance of the creative imagination, and appears indeed to have\nbeen ignorant of any form of knowledge, other than the intellective.\n\nKirchmann (1868) was one of the early adherents to psychological\nAesthetic, defining the beautiful as the idealized image of pleasure,\nthe ugly as that of pain. For him the aesthetic fact is the idealized\nimage of the real. Failing to apprehend the true nature of the aesthetic\nfact, Kirchmann invented a new psychological category of ideal or\napparent feelings, which he thought were attenuated images from those\nof real life.\n\nThe aged Theodore Fischer describes Aesthetic in his auto-criticism as\nthe union of mimetic and harmony, and the beautiful as the harmony of\nthe universe, which is never realized in fact, because it is infinite.\nWhen we think to grasp the beautiful, we experience that exquisite\nillusion, which is the aesthetic fact. Robert Fischer, son of the\nforegoing, introduced the word _Einf\u00fchlung_, to express the vitality\nwhich he believed that man inspired into things with the help of the\naesthetic process.\n\nE. Siebeck and M. Diez, the former writing in 1875, the latter in 1892,\nunite a certain amount of idealistic influence, derived from Kant and\nHerbart, with the merely empirical and psychological views that have of\nlate been the fashion. Diez, for instance, would explain the artistic\nfunction as the ideal of feeling, placing it parallel to science; the\nideal of thought, morality; the ideal of will and religion, the ideal of\nthe personality. But this ideal of feeling escapes definition, and we\nsee that these writers have not had the courage of their ideas: they\nhave not dared to push their thought to its logical conclusion.\n\nThe merely psychological and associationist view finds in Theodore Lipps\nits chief exponent. He criticizes and rejects a series of aesthetic\ntheories, such as those of play, of pleasure, of art as recognition of\nreal life, even if disagreeable, of emotionality, of syncretism, which\nattaches to art a number of other ends, in addition to those of play and\nof pleasure.\n\nThe theory of Lipps does not differ very greatly from that of Jouffroy,\nfor he assumes that artistic beauty is the sympathetic. \"Our ego,\ntransplanted, objectified, and recognized in others, is the object of\nsympathy. We feel ourselves in others, and others in us.\" Thus the\naesthetic pleasure is entirely composed of sympathy. This extends even\nto the pleasure derived from architecture, geometrical forms, etc.\nWhenever we meet with the positive element of human personality, we\nexperience this feeling of beatitude, which is the aesthetic emotion.\nBut the value of the personality is an ethical value: the whole sphere\nof ethic is included in it. Therefore all artistic or aesthetic pleasure\nis the enjoyment of something which has ethical value, but this value is\nnot an element of a compound, but the object of aesthetic intuition.\nThus is aesthetic activity deprived of all autonomous existence and\nreduced to a mere retainer of Ethic.\n\nC. Groos (1895) shows some signs of recognizing aesthetic activity as a\ntheoretic value. Feeling and intellect, he says, are the two poles of\nknowledge, and he recognizes the aesthetic fact as internal imitation.\nEverything beautiful belongs to aestheticity, but not every aesthetic\nfact is beautiful. The beautiful is the representation of sensible\npleasure, and the ugly of sensible displeasure. The sublime is the\nrepresentation of something powerful, in a simple form. The comic is the\nrepresentation of an inferiority, which provokes in us the pleasurable\nfeeling of \"superiority.\" Groos very wisely makes mock of the supposed\nfunction of the Ugly, which Hartmann and Schasler had inherited and\ndeveloped from a long tradition. Lipps and Groos agree in denying\naesthetic value to the comic, but Lipps, although he gives an excellent\nanalysis of the comic, is nevertheless in the trammels of his moralistic\nthesis, and ends by sketching out something resembling the doctrine of\nthe overcoming of the ugly, by means of which may be attained a higher\naesthetic and (sympathetic) value.\n\nLabours such as those of Lipps have been of value, since they have\ncleared away a number of errors that blocked the way, and restrained\nspeculation to the field of the internal consciousness. Similar is the\nmerit of E. V\u00e9ron's treatise (1883) on the double form of Aesthetic, in\nwhich he combats the academic view of the absolute beauty, and shows\nthat Taine confuses Art and Science, Aesthetic and Logic. He acutely\nremarks that if the object of art were to reveal the essence of things,\nthe greatest artists would be those who best succeeded in doing this,\nand the greatest works would all be _identical_; whereas we know that\nthe very opposite is the case. V\u00e9ron was a precursor of Guyau, and we\nseek for scientific system in vain in his book. V\u00e9ron looks upon art as\ntwo things: the one _decorative_, pleasing eye and ear, the other\n_expressive_, \"l'expression \u00e9mue de la personalit\u00e9 humaine.\" He thought\nthat decorative art prevailed in antiquity, expressive art in modern\ntimes.\n\nWe cannot here dwell upon the aesthetic theories of men of letters, such\nas that of E. Zola, developing his thesis of natural science and history\nmixed, which is known as that of the human document or as the\nexperimental theory, or of Ibsen and the moralization of the art\nproblem, as presented by him and by the Scandinavian school. Perhaps no\nFrench writer has written more profoundly upon art than Gustave\nFlaubert. His views are contained in his Correspondence, which has been\npublished. L. Tolsto\u00ef wrote his book on art while under the influence of\nV\u00e9ron and his hatred of the concept of the beautiful. Art, he says,\ncommunicates the feelings, as the word communicates the thoughts. But\nhis way of understanding this may be judged from the comparison which he\ninstitutes between Art and Science. According to this, \"Art has for its\nmission to make assimilable and sensible what may not have been\nassimilated in the form of argument. There is no science for science's\nsake, no art for art's sake. Every human effort should be directed\ntoward increasing morality and suppressing violence.\" This amounts to\nsaying that well-nigh all the art that the world has hitherto seen is\nfalse. Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Dante, Tasso,\nMilton, Shakespeare, Raphael, Michael Angelo, Bach, Beethoven, are all,\naccording to Tolsto\u00ef, \"false reputations, made by the critics.\"\n\nWe must also class F. Nietzsche with the artists, rather than with the\nphilosophers. We should do him an injustice (as with J. Ruskin) were we\nto express in intellectual terminology his aesthetic affirmations. The\ncriticism which they provoke would be too facile. Nowhere has Nietzsche\ngiven a complete theory of art, not even in his first book, _Die Geburt\nder Trag\u00f6die oder Griechentum und Pessimismus_. What seems to be theory\nthere, is really the confession of the feelings and aspirations of the\nwriter. Nietzsche was the last, splendid representative of the romantic\nperiod. He was, therefore, deeply preoccupied with the art problem and\nwith the relation of art to natural science and to philosophy, though he\nnever succeeded in definitely fixing those relations. From Romanticism,\nrather than from Schopenhauer, he gathered those elements of thought out\nof which he wove his conception of the two forms of art: the Apollonian,\nall serene contemplation, as expressed in the epic and in sculpture; the\nDionysa\u00efc, all tumult and agitation, as expressed in music and the\ndrama. These doctrines are not rigorously proved, and their power of\nresistance to criticism is therefore but slender, but they serve to\ntransport the mind to a more lofty spiritual level than any others of\nthe second half of the nineteenth century.\n\nThe most noteworthy thought on aesthetic of this period is perhaps to be\nfound among the aestheticians of special branches of the arts, and since\nwe know that laws relating only to special branches are not conceivable,\nthis thought may be considered as bearing upon the general theory of\nAesthetic.\n\nThe Bohemian critic E. Hanslick (1854) is perhaps the most important of\nthese writers. His work _On Musical Beauty_ has been translated into\nseveral languages. His polemic is chiefly directed against R. Wagner and\nthe pretension of finding in music a determined content of ideas and\nfeelings. He expresses equal contempt for those sentimentalists who\nderive from music merely pathological effects, passionate excitement, or\nstimulus for practical activity, in place of enjoying the musical works.\n\"If a few Phrygian notes sufficed to instil courage into the soldier\nfacing the enemy, or a Doric melody to assure the fidelity of a wife\nwhose husband was absent, then the loss of Greek music may cause pain to\ngenerals and to husbands, but aestheticians and composers will have no\nreason to deplore it.\" \"If every Requiem, every lamenting Adagio,\npossessed the power to make us sad, who would be able to support\nexistence in such conditions? But if a true musical work look upon us\nwith the clear and brilliant eyes of beauty, we feel ourselves bound by\nits invincible fascination, though its theme be all the sorrows of the\ncentury.\"\n\nFor Hanslick, the only end of music was form, or musical beauty. The\nfollowers of Herbart showed themselves very tender towards this\nunexpected and vigorous ally, and Hanslick, not to be behindhand in\npoliteness, returned their compliments, by referring to Herbart and to\nR. Zimmermann, in the later editions of his work, as having \"completely\ndeveloped the great aesthetic principle of form.\" Unfortunately Hanslick\nmeant something altogether different from the Herbartians by his use of\nthe word form. Symmetry, merely acoustic relations, and the pleasure of\nthe ear, did not constitute the musically beautiful for him. Mathematics\nwere in his view useless in the Aesthetic of music. \"Sonorous forms are\nnot empty, but perfectly full; they cannot be compared to simple lines\nenclosing a space; they are the spirit, which takes form, making its own\nbodily configuration. Music is more of a picture than is an arabesque;\nbut it is a picture of which the subject is inexpressible in words, nor\nis it to be enclosed in a precise concept. In music, there is a meaning\nand a connexion, but of a specially musical nature: it is a language\nwhich we speak and understand, but which it is impossible to translate.\"\nHanslick admits that music, if it do not render the quality of\nsentiments, renders their tone or dynamic side; it renders adjectives,\nif it fail to render substantives; if not \"murmuring tenderness\" or\n\"impetuous courage,\" at any rate the \"murmuring\" and the \"impetuous.\"\n\nThe essence of his book is contained in the negation that it is possible\nto separate form and content in music. \"Take any motive you will, and\nsay where form begins and content ends. Are we to call the sounds\ncontent? Very good, but they have already received form. What are we to\ncall form? Sounds again? But they are already form filled, that is to\nsay, possessing a content.\" These observations testify to an acute\npenetration of the nature of art. Hanslick's belief that they were\ncharacteristics peculiar to music, not common to every form of art,\nalone prevented him from seeing further.\n\nC. Fiedler, published in German (in 1887) an extremely luminous work on\nthe origin of artistic activity. He describes eloquently how the passive\nspectator seems to himself to grasp all reality, as the shows of life\npass before him; but at the moment that he tries to realize this\nartistically, all disappears, and leaves him with the emptiness of his\nown thoughts. Yet by concentration alone do we attain to expression; art\nis a language that we gradually learn to speak. Artistic activity is\nonly to be attained by limiting ourselves; it must consist of \"forms\nprecisely determined, tangible, sensibly demonstrable, precisely because\nit is spiritual.\" Art does not imitate nature, for what is nature, but\nthat vast confusion of perceptions and representations that were\nreferred to above? Yet in a sense art does imitate nature; it uses\nnature to produce values of a kind peculiar to itself. Those values are\ntrue visibility.\n\nFiedler's views correspond with those of his predecessor, Hanslick, but\nare more rigorously and philosophically developed. The sculptor A.\nHildebrand may be mentioned with these, as having drawn attention to the\nnature of art as architectonic rather than imitative, with special\napplication to the art of sculpture.\n\nWhat we miss with these and with other specialists, is a broad view of\nart and language, as one and the same thing, the inheritance of all\nhumanity, not of a few persons, specially endowed. H. Bergson in his\nbook on laughter (1900) falls under the same criticism. He develops his\ntheory of art in a manner analogous to Fiedler, and errs like him in\nlooking upon it as something different and exceptional in respect to the\nlanguage of every moment. He declares that in life the individuality of\nthings escapes us: we see only as much as suffices for our practical\nends. The influence of language aids this rude simplification: all but\nproper names are abstractions. Artists arise from time to time, who\nrecover the riches hidden beneath the labels of ordinary life.\n\nAmid the ruin of idealist metaphysics, is to be desired a healthy return\nto the doctrine of Baumgarten, corrected and enriched with the\ndiscoveries that have been made since his time, especially by\nromanticism and psychology. C. Hermann (1876) announced this return, but\nhis book is a hopeless mixture of empirical precepts and of metaphysical\nbeliefs regarding Logic and Aesthetic, both of which, he believes, deal\nnot with the empirical thought and experience of the soul, but with the\npure and absolute.\n\nB. Bosanquet (1892) gives the following definition of the beautiful, as\n\"that which has a characteristic or individual expressivity for the\nsensible perception, or for the imagination, subject to the conditions\nof general or abstract expressivity for the same means.\" The problem as\nposed by this writer by the antithesis of the two German schools of form\nand content, appears to us insoluble.\n\nThough De Sanctis left no school in Italy, his teaching has been cleared\nof the obscurities that had gathered round it during the last ten years;\nand the thesis of the true nature of history, and of its nature,\naltogether different from natural science, has been also dealt with in\nGermany, although its precise relation to the aesthetic problem has not\nbeen made clear. Such labours and such discussions constitute a more\nfavourable ground for the scientific development of Aesthetic than the\nstars of mystical metaphysic or the stables of positivism and of\nsensualism.\n\nWe have now reached the end of the inquiry into the history of aesthetic\nspeculation, and we are struck with the smallness of the number of those\nwho have seen clearly the nature of the problem. No doubt, amid the\ncrowd of artists, critics, and writers on other subjects, many have\nincidentally made very just remarks, and if all these were added to the\nfew philosophers, they would form a gallant company. But if, as Schiller\ntruly observed, the rhythm of philosophy consist in a withdrawal from\npublic opinion, in order to return to it with renewed vigour, it is\nevident that this withdrawal is essential, and indeed that in it lies\nthe whole progress of philosophy.\n\nDuring our long journey, we have witnessed grave aberrations from the\ntruth, which were at the same time attempts to reach it; such were the\nhedonism of the sophists and rhetoricians of antiquity, of the\nsensualists of the eighteenth and second half of the nineteenth\ncenturies; the moralistic hedonism of Aristophanes and the Stoics, of\nthe Roman eclectics, of the writers of the Middle Age and of the\nRenaissance; the ascetic and logical hedonism of Plato and the Fathers\nof the Church; the aesthetic mysticism of Plotinus, reborn to its\ngreatest triumphs, during the classic period of German thought.\n\nThrough the midst of these variously erroneous theories, that traverse\nthe field of thought in all directions, runs a tiny rivulet of golden\ntruth. Starting from the subtle empiricism of Aristotle, it flows in the\nprofound penetration of Vico to the nineteenth century, where it appears\nagain in the masterly analyses of Schleiermacher, Humboldt, and De\nSanctis.\n\nThis brief list shows that the science of Aesthetic is no longer to be\ndiscovered, but it also shows _that it is only at its beginning_.\n\nThe birth of a science is like the birth of a human being. In order to\nlive, a science, like a man, has to withstand a thousand attacks of all\nsorts. These appear in the form of errors, which must be extirpated, if\nthe science is not to perish. And when one set has been weeded, another\ncrops up; when these have been dealt with, the former errors often\nreturn. Therefore _scientific criticism_ is always necessary. No science\ncan repose on its laurels, complete, unchallenged. Like a human being,\nit must maintain its position by constant efforts, constant victories\nover error. The general errors which reveal a negation of the very\nconcept of art have already been dealt with in the Historical Summary.\nThe particular errors have been exposed in the Theory. They may be\ndivided under three heads: (i.) Errors as to the characteristic quality\nof the aesthetic fact, or (ii.) as to its specific quality, or (iii.) as\nto its generic quality. These are contradictions of the characteristics\nof intuition, of theoretic contemplation, and of spiritual activity,\nwhich constitute the aesthetic fact.\n\nThe principal bar to a proper understanding of the true nature of\nlanguage has been and still is Rhetoric, with the modern form it has\nassumed, as style. The rhetorical categories are still mentioned in\ntreatises and often referred to, as having definite existence among the\nparts of speech. Side by side with such phrases goes that of the double\nform, or metaphor, which implies that there are two ways of saying the\nsame thing, the one simple, the other ornate.\n\nKant, Herbart, Hegel, and many minor personages, have been shown to be\nvictims of the rhetorical categories, and in our own day we have writers\nin Italy and in Germany who devote much attention to them, such as R.\nBonghi and G. Gr\u00f6ber; the latter employs a phraseology which he borrows\nfrom the modern schools of psychology, but this does not alter the true\nnature of his argument. De Sanctis gave perhaps the clearest and most\nstimulating advice in his lectures on Rhetoric, which he termed\nAnti-rhetoric.\n\nBut even he failed to systematize his thought, and we may say that the\ntrue critique of Rhetoric can only be made from the point of view of the\naesthetic activity, which is, as we know, _one_, and therefore does not\ngive rise to divisions, and _cannot express the same content now in one\nform, now in another_. Thus only can we drive away the double monster of\nnaked form deprived of imagination, and of decorated form, which would\nrepresent something more than imagination. The same remarks apply to\nartistic and literary styles, and to their various laws or rules. In\nmodern times they have generally been comprised with rhetoric, and\nalthough now discredited, they cannot be said to have altogether\ndisappeared.\n\nJ.C. Scaliger may be entitled the protagonist of the unities in\ncomparatively modern times: he it was who \"laid the foundations of the\nclassical Bastille,\" and supplied tyrants of literature, like Boileau,\nwith some of their best weapons. Lessing opposed the French rules and\nrestrictions with German rules and restrictions, giving as his opinion\nthat Corneille and others had wrongly interpreted Aristotle, whose rules\ndid not really prevent Shakespeare from being included among correct\nwriters! Lessing undoubtedly believed in intellectual rules for poetry.\nAristotle was the tyrant, father of tyrants, and we find Corneille\nsaying \"qu'il est ais\u00e9 de s'accommoder avec Aristote,\" much in the same\nway as Tartuffe makes his \"accommodements avec le ciel.\" In the next\ncentury, several additions were made to the admitted styles, as for\ninstance the \"trag\u00e9die bourgeoise.\"\n\nBut these battles of the rules with one another are less interesting\nthan the rebellion against all the rules, which began with Pietro\nAretino in the sixteenth century, who makes mock of them in the\nprologues to his comedies. Giordano Bruno took sides against the makers\nof rules, saying that the rules came from the poetry, and \"therefore\nthere are as many genuses and species of true rules as there are genuses\nand species of true poets.\" When asked how the true poets are to be\nknown, he replies, \"by repeating their verses, which either cause\ndelight, or profit, or both.\" Guarini, too, said that \"the world judges\npoetry, and its sentence is without appeal.\"\n\nStrangely enough, it was priest-ridden Spain that all through the\nsixteenth and seventeenth centuries led the van of revolt against the\nrules and precepts of the grammarians. While Torquato Tasso remained the\nmiserable slave of grammarians unworthy to lick the dust from his feet,\nLope de Vega slyly remarked that when he wrote his comedies, he locked\nup the givers of precepts with six keys, that they might not reproach\nhim. J.B. Marino declared that he knew the rules better than all the\npedants in the world; \"but the true rule is to know when to break the\nrules, in accordance with the manners of the day and the taste of the\nage.\" Among the most acute writers of the end of the seventeenth century\nis to be mentioned Gravina, who well understood that a work of art must\nbe its own criterion, and said so clearly when praising a contemporary\nfor a work which did not enter any one of the admitted categories.\nUnfortunately Gravina did not clearly formulate his views.\n\nFrance of the eighteenth century produced several writers like Du Bos,\nwho declared that men will always prefer the poems that move them, to\nthose composed according to rule. La Motte combated the unities of place\nand time, and Batteux showed himself liberal in respect to rules.\nVoltaire, although he opposed La Motte and described the three unities\nas the three great laws of good sense, was also capable of declaring\nthat all styles but the tiresome are good, and that the best style is\nthat which is best used. In England we find Home in his _Elements of\nCriticism_ deriding the critics for asserting that there must be a\nprecise criterion for distinguishing epic poetry from all other forms of\ncomposition. Literary compositions, he held, melt into one another, just\nlike colours.\n\nThe literary movement of the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of\nthe nineteenth centuries attacked rules of all sorts. We will not dwell\nupon the many encounters of these periods, nor record the names of those\nthat conquered gloriously, or their excesses. In France the preface to\nthe _Cromwell_ of V. Hugo (1827), in Italy the _Lettera semiseria di\nGrisostomo_, were clarions of rebellion. The principle first laid down\nby A.W. Schlegel, that the form of compositions must be organic and not\nmechanic, resulting from the nature of the subject, from its internal\ndevelopment not from an external stamp, was enunciated in Italy. Art is\nalways a whole, a synthesis.\n\nBut it would be altogether wrong to believe that this empirical defeat\nof the styles and rules implied their final defeat in philosophy. Even\nwriters who were capable of dispensing with prejudice when judging works\nof art, once they spoke as philosophers, were apt to reassume their\nbelief in those categories which, empirically, they had discarded. The\nspectacle of these literary or rhetorical categories, raised by German\nphilosophers to the honours of philosophical deduction, is even more\namusing than that which afforded amusement to Home. The truth is that\nthey were unable to free their aesthetic systems of intellectualism,\nalthough they proclaimed the empire of the mystic idea. Schelling (1803)\nat the beginning, Hartmann (1890) at the end of the century, furnish a\ngood example of this head and tail.\n\nSchelling, in his Philosophy of Art, declares that, historically\nspeaking, the first place in the styles of poetry is due to Epic, but,\nscientifically speaking, it falls to Lyric. In truth, if poetry be the\nrepresentation of the infinite in the finite, then lyric poetry, in\nwhich prevails the finite, must be its first moment. Lyric poetry\ncorresponds to the first of the ideal series, to reflection, to\nknowledge; epic poetry corresponds to the second power, to action. This\nphilosopher finally proceeds to the unification of epic and lyric\npoetry, and from their union he deduces the dramatic form, which is in\nhis view \"the supreme incarnation of the essence and of the _in-se_ of\nevery art.\"\n\nWith Hartmann, poetry is divided into poetry of declamation and poetry\nfor reading. The first is subdivided into Epic, Lyric, and Dramatic; the\nEpic is divided into plastic epic, proper epic, pictorial epic, and\nlyrical epic; Lyric is divided into epical lyric, lyrical lyric, and\ndramatic lyric; Dramatic is divided into lyrical dramatic, epical\ndramatic, and dramatical dramatic. The second (readable poetry) is\ndivided into poetry which is chiefly epical, lyrical, and dramatic, with\nthe tertiary division of moving, comic, tragic, and humoristic; and\npoetry which can all be read at once, like a short story, or that\nrequires several sittings, like a romance.\n\nThese brief extracts show of what dialectic pirouettes and sublime\ntrivialities even philosophers are capable, when they begin to treat\nof the Aesthetic of the tragic, comic, and humorous. Such false\ndistinctions are still taught in the schools of France and Germany, and\nwe find a French critic like Ferdinand Bruneti\u00e8re devoting a whole\nvolume to the evolution of literary styles or classes, which he really\nbelieves to constitute literary history. This prejudice, less frankly\nstated, still infests many histories of literature, even in Italy.\n\nWe believe that the falsity of these rules of classes should be\nscientifically demonstrated. In our Theory of Aesthetic we have shown\nhow we believe that it should be demonstrated.\n\nThe proof of the theory of the limits of the arts has been credited to\nLessing, but his merit should rather be limited to having been the first\nto draw attention to the problem. His solution was false, but his\nachievement nevertheless great, in having posed the question clearly. No\none before him, in antiquity, in the Middle Age, or in modern times, had\nseriously asked: What is the value of the distinctions between the arts?\nWhich of them comes first? Which second? Leonardo da Vinci had declared\nhis personal predilection for painting, Michael Angelo for sculpture,\nbut the question had not been philosophically treated before Lessing.\n\nLessing's attention was drawn to the problem, through his desire to\ndisprove the assertions of Spence and of the Comte de Caylus, the former\nin respect to the close union between poetry and painting in antiquity,\nthe latter as believing that a poem was good according to the number of\nsubjects which it should afford the painter. Lessing argued thus:\nPainting manifests itself in space, poetry in time: the mode of\nmanifestation of painting is through objects which coexist, that of\npoetry through objects which are consecutive. The objects which coexist,\nor whose parts are coexistent, are called bodies. Bodies, then, owing to\ntheir visibility, are the true objects of painting. Objects which are\nconsecutive, or whose parts are consecutive, are called, in general,\nactions. Actions, then, are the suitable object of poetry. He admitted\nthat painting might represent an action, but only by means of bodies\nwhich make allusion to it; that poetry can represent bodies, but only by\nmeans of actions. Returning to this theme, he explained the action or\nmovement in painting as added by our imagination. Lessing was greatly\npreoccupied with the naturalness and the unnaturalness of signs, which\nis tantamount to saying that he believed each art to be strictly limited\nto certain modes of expression, which are only overstepped at the cost\nof coherency. In the appendix to his _Laoco\u00f6n_, he quotes Plutarch as\nsaying that one should not chop wood with a key, or open the door with\nan axe. He who should do so would not only be spoiling both those\nutensils, but would also be depriving himself of the utility of both. He\nbelieved that this applied to the arts.\n\nThe number of philosophers and writers who have attempted empirical\nclassifications of the arts is enormous: it ranges in comparatively\nrecent times from Lessing, by way of Schasler, Solger, and Hartmann, to\nRichard Wagner, whose theory of the combination of the arts was first\nmooted in the eighteenth century.\n\nLotze, while reflecting upon the futility of these attempts, himself\nadopts a method, which he says is the most \"convenient,\" and thereby\nincurs the censure of Schasler. This method is in fact suitable for his\nstudies in botany and in zoology, but useless for the philosophy of the\nspirit. Thus both these thinkers maintained Lessing's wrong principle as\nto the constancy, the limits, and the peculiar nature of each art.\n\nWho among aestheticians has criticized this principle? Aristotle had a\nglimpse of the truth, when he refused to admit that the distinction\nbetween prose and poetry lay in an external fact, the metre.\nSchleiermacher seems to have been the only one who was thoroughly aware\nof the difficulty of the problem. In analysis, indeed, he goes so far as\nto say that what the arts have in common is not the external fact, which\nis an element of diversity; and connecting such an observation as this\nwith his clear distinction between art and what is called technique, we\nmight argue that Schleiermacher looked upon the divisions between the\narts as non-existent. But he does not make this logical inference, and\nhis thought upon the problem continues to be wavering and undecided.\nNebulous, uncertain, and contradictory as is this portion of\nSchleiermacher's theory, he has yet the great merit of having doubted\nLessing's theory, and of having asked himself by what right are special\narts held to be distinct in art.\n\nSchleiermacher _absolutely denied the existence of a beautiful in\nnature_, and praised Hegel for having sustained this negation. Hegel did\nnot really deserve this praise, as his negation was rather verbal than\neffective; but the importance of this thesis as stated by Schleiermacher\nis very great, in so far as he denied the existence of an objective\nnatural beauty not produced by the spirit of man. This theory of the\nbeautiful in nature, when taken in a metaphysical sense, does not\nconstitute an error peculiar to aesthetic science. It forms part of a\nfallacious general theory, which can be criticized together with its\nmetaphysic.\n\nThe theory of aesthetic senses, that is, of certain superior senses,\nsuch as sight and hearing, being the only ones for which aesthetic\nimpressions exist, was debated as early as Plato. The _Hippias major_\ncontains a discussion upon this theme, which Socrates leads to the\nconclusion that there exist beautiful things, which do not reach us\nthrough impressions of eye or ear. But further than this, there exist\nthings which please the eye, but not the ear, and _vice versa_;\ntherefore the reason of beauty cannot be visibility or audibility, but\nsomething different from, yet common to both. Perhaps this question has\nnever been so acutely and so seriously dealt with as in this Platonic\ndialogue. Home, Herder, Hegel, Diderot, Rousseau, Berkeley, all dealt\nwith the problem, but in a more or less arbitrary manner. Herder, for\ninstance, includes touch with the higher aesthetic senses, but Hegel\nremoves it, as having immediate contact with matter as such, and with\nits immediate sensible qualities.\n\nSchleiermacher, with his wonted penetration, saw that the problem was\nnot to be solved so easily. He refuted the distinction between clear and\nconfused senses. He held that the superiority of sight and hearing over\nthe other senses lay in their free activity, in their capacity of an\nactivity proceeding from within, and able to create forms and sounds\nwithout receiving external impressions. The eye and the ear are not\nmerely means of perception, for in that case there could be no visual\nand no auditive arts. They are also functions of voluntary movements,\nwhich fill the domain of the senses. Schleiermacher, however, considered\nthat the difference was rather one of quantity, and that we should allow\nto the other senses a minimum of independence.\n\nThe sensualists, as we know, maintain that all the senses are aesthetic.\nThat is the hedonistic hypothesis, which has been dealt with and\ndisproved in this book. We have shown the embarrassment in which the\nhedonists find themselves, when they have dubbed all the senses\n\"aesthetic,\" or have been obliged to differentiate in an absurd manner\nsome of the senses from the others. The only way out of the difficulty\nlies in abandoning the attempt to unite orders of facts so diverse as\nthe representative form of the spirit and the conception of given\nphysical organs or of a given material of impressions.\n\nThe origin of classes of speech and of grammatical forms is to be found\nin antiquity, and as regards the latter, the disputes among the\nAlexandrian philosophers, the analogists, and the anomalists, resulted\nin logic being identified with grammar. Anything which did not seem\nlogical was excluded from grammar as a deviation. The analogists,\nhowever, did not have it all their own way, and grammar in the modern\nsense of the word is a compromise between these extreme views, that is,\nit contains something of the thought of Chrysippus, who composed a\ntreatise to show that the same thing can be expressed with different\nsounds, and of Apollonius Discolus, who attempted to explain what the\nrigorous analogists refused to admit into their schemes and\nclassifications. It is only of late years that we have begun to emerge\nfrom the superstitious reverence for grammar, inherited from the Middle\nAge. Such writers as Pott, in his introduction to Humboldt, and Paul in\nhis _Principien d. Sprachgeschichte_, have done good service in throwing\ndoubt upon the absolute validity of the parts of speech. If the old\nsuperstitions still survive tenaciously, we must attribute this partly\nto empirical and poetical grammar, partly to the venerable antiquity of\ngrammar itself, which has led the world to forget its illegitimate and\nturbid origin.\n\nThe theory of the relativity of taste is likewise ancient, and it would\nbe interesting to know whether the saying \"there's no accounting for\ntastes\" could be traced to a merely gustatory origin. In this sense, the\nsaying would be quite correct, as it is _quite wrong_ when applied to\naesthetic facts. The eighteenth century writers exhibit a piteous\nperplexity of thought on this subject. Home, for instance, after much\ndebate, decides upon a common \"standard of taste,\" which he deduces from\nthe necessity of social life and from what he calls \"a final cause.\" Of\ncourse it will not be an easy matter to fix this \"standard of taste.\" As\nregards moral conduct, we do not seek our models among savages, so with\nregard to taste, we must have recourse to those few whose taste has not\nbeen corrupted nor spoilt by pleasure, who have received good taste from\nnature, and have perfected it by education and by the practice of life.\nIf after this has been done, there should yet arise disputes, it will be\nnecessary to refer to the principles of criticism, as laid down in his\nbook by the said Home.\n\nWe find similar contradictions and vicious circles in the _Discourse on\nTaste_ of David Hume. We search his writings in vain for the distinctive\ncharacteristics of the man of taste, whose judgments should be final.\nAlthough he asserts that the general principles of taste are universal\nin human nature, and admits that no notice should be accorded to\nperversions and ignorance, yet there exist diversities of taste that are\nirreconcilable, insuperable, and blameless.\n\nBut the criticism of the sensualist and relativist positions cannot be\nmade from the point of view of those who proclaim the absolute nature of\ntaste and yet place it among the intellectual concepts. It has been\nshown to be impossible to escape from sensualism and relativity save by\nfalling into the intellectualist error. Muratori in the eighteenth\ncentury is an instance of this. He was one of the first to maintain the\nexistence of a rule of taste and of universal beauty. Andr\u00e9 also spoke\nof what appears beautiful in a work of art as being not that which\npleases at once, owing to certain particular dispositions of the\nfaculties of the soul and of the organs of the body, but that which has\nthe right of pleasing the reason and reflection through its own\nexcellence. Voltaire admitted an \"universal taste,\" which was\n\"intellectual,\" as did many others. Kant appeared, and condemned alike\nthe intellectualist and the sensualistic error; but placing the\nbeautiful in a symbol of morality, he failed to discover the imaginative\nabsoluteness of taste. Later speculative philosophy did not attach\nimportance to the question.\n\nThe correct solution was slow in making its way. It lies, as we know, in\nthe fact that to judge a work of art we must place ourselves in the\nposition of the artist at the time of production, and that to judge is\nto reproduce. Alexander Pope, in his _Essay on Criticism_, was among the\nfirst to state this truth:\n\n  A perfect judge will read each work of wit\n  With the same spirit that its author writ.\n\nRemarks equally luminous were made by Antonio Conti, Terrasson, and\nHeydenreich in the eighteenth century, the latter with considerable\nphilosophical development. De Sanctis gave in his adhesion to this\nformula, but a true theory of aesthetic criticism had not yet been\ngiven, because for such was necessary, not only an exact conception of\nnature in art, but also of the relations between the aesthetic fact and\nits historical conditions. In more recent times has been denied the\npossibility of aesthetic criticism; it has been looked upon as merely\nindividual and capricious, and historical criticism has been set up in\nits place. This would be better called a criticism of extrinsic\nerudition and of bad philosophical inspiration--positivist and\nmaterialist. The true history of literature will always require the\nreconstruction and then the judgment of the work of art. Those who have\nwished to react against such emasculated erudition have often thrown\nthemselves into the opposite extreme, that is, into a dogmatic,\nabstract, intellectualistic, or moralistic form of criticism.\n\nThis mention of the history of certain doctrines relating to Aesthetic\nsuffices to show the range of error possible in the theory. Aesthetic\nhas need to be surrounded by a vigilant and vigorous critical literature\nwhich shall derive from it and be at once its safeguard and its source\nof strength.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX\n\nI here add as an appendix, at the request of the author, a translation\nof his lecture which he delivered before the Third International\nCongress of Philosophy, at Heidelberg, on 2nd September 1908.\n\nThe reader will find that it throws a vivid light upon Benedetto Croce's\ngeneral theory of Aesthetic.\n\n\nPURE INTUITION AND THE LYRICAL CHARACTER OF ART.\n\n_A Lecture delivered at Heidelberg at the second general session of the\nThird International Congress of Philosophy._\n\nThere exists an _empirical_ Aesthetic, which although it admits the\nexistence of facts, called aesthetic or artistic, yet holds that they\nare irreducible to a single principle, to a rigorous philosophical\nconcept. It wishes to limit itself to collecting as many of those facts\nas possible, and in the greatest possible variety, thence, at the most,\nproceeding to group them together in classes and types. The logical\nideal of this school, as declared on many occasions, is zoology or\nbotany. This Aesthetic, when asked what art is, replies by indicating\nsuccessively single facts, and by saying: \"Art is this, and this, and\nthis too is art,\" and so on, indefinitely. Zoology and botany renew the\nrepresentatives of fauna and of flora in the same way. They calculate\nthat the species renewed amount to some thousand, but believe that they\nmight easily be increased to twenty or a hundred thousand, or even to a\nmillion, or to infinity.\n\nThere is another Aesthetic, which has been called hedonistic,\nutilitarian, moralistic, and so on, according to its various\nmanifestations. Its complex denomination should, however, be\n_practicism_, because that is precisely what constitutes its essential\ncharacter. This Aesthetic differs from the preceding, in the belief that\naesthetic or artistic facts are not a merely empirical or nominalistic\ngrouping together, but that all of them possess a common foundation. Its\nfoundation is placed in the practical form of human activity. Those\nfacts are therefore considered, either generically, as manifestations of\npleasure and pain, and therefore rather as economic facts; or, more\nparticularly, as a special class of those manifestations; or again, as\ninstruments and products of the ethical spirit, which subdues and turns\nto its own ends individual hedonistic and economic tendencies.\n\nThere is a third Aesthetic, the _intellectualist_, which, while also\nrecognizing the reducibility of aesthetic facts to philosophical\ntreatment, explains them as particular cases of logical thought,\nidentifying beauty with intellectual truth; art, now with the natural\nsciences, now with philosophy. For this Aesthetic, what is prized in art\nis what is learned from it. The only distinction that it admits between\nart and science, or art and philosophy, is at the most that of more or\nless, or of perfection and imperfection. According to this Aesthetic,\nart would be the whole mass of easy and popular truths; or it would be a\ntransitory form of science, a semi-science and a semi-philosophy,\npreparatory to the superior and perfect form of science and of\nphilosophy.\n\nA fourth Aesthetic there is, which may be called _agnostic_. It springs\nfrom the criticism of the positions just now indicated, and being guided\nby a powerful consciousness of the truth, rejects them all, because it\nfinds them too evidently false, and because it is too loth to admit that\nart is a simple fact of pleasure or pain, an exercise of virtue, or a\nfragmentary sketch of science and philosophy. And while rejecting them,\nit discovers, at the same time, that art is not now this and now that of\nthose things, or of other things, indefinitely, but that it has its own\nprinciple and origin. However, it is not able to say what this principle\nmay be, and believes that it is impossible to do so. This Aesthetic\nknows that art cannot be resolved into an empirical concept; knows that\npleasure and pain are united with the aesthetic activity only in an\nindirect manner; that morality has nothing to do with art; that it is\nimpossible to rationalize art, as is the case with science and\nphilosophy, and to prove it beautiful or ugly with the aid of reason.\nHere this Aesthetic is content to stop, satisfied with a knowledge\nconsisting entirely of negative terms.\n\nFinally, there is an Aesthetic which I have elsewhere proposed to call\n_mystic_. This Aesthetic avails itself of those negative terms, to\ndefine art as a spiritual form without a practical character, because it\nis theoretic, and without a logical or intellective form, because it is\na theoretic form, differing alike from those of science and of\nphilosophy, and superior to both. According to this view, art would be\nthe highest pinnacle of knowledge, whence what is seen from other points\nseems narrow and partial; art would alone reveal the whole horizon or\nall the abysses of Reality.\n\nNow, the five Aesthetics so far mentioned are not referable to\ncontingent facts and historical epochs, as are, on the other hand, the\ndenominations of Greek and Mediaeval Aesthetic, of Renaissance and\neighteenth-century Aesthetic, the Aesthetic of Wolff and of Herbart, of\nVico and of Hegel. These five are, on the contrary, mental attitudes,\nwhich are found in all periods, although they have not always\nconspicuous representatives of the kind that are said to become\nhistorical. Empirical Aesthetic is, for example, called Burke in the\neighteenth, Fechner in the nineteenth century; moralistic Aesthetic is\nHorace or Plutarch in antiquity, Campanella in modern times;\nintellectualist or logical Aesthetic is Cartesian in the seventeenth,\nLeibnitzian in the eighteenth, and Hegelian in the nineteenth century;\nagnostic Aesthetic is Francesco Patrizio at the Renaissance, Kant in the\neighteenth century; mystic Aesthetic is called Neoplatonism at the end\nof the antique world, Romanticism at the beginning of the nineteenth\ncentury, and if it be adorned during the former period with the name of\nPlotinus, in the latter it will bear the name of Schelling or of Solger,\nAnd not only are those attitudes and mental tendencies common to all\nepochs, but they are also all found to some extent developed or\nindicated in every thinker, and even in every man. Thus it is somewhat\ndifficult to classify philosophers of Aesthetic according to one or the\nother category, because each philosopher also enters more or less into\nsome other, or into all the other categories.\n\nNor can these five conceptions and points of view be looked upon as\nincreasable to ten or twenty, or to as many as desired, or that I have\nplaced them in a certain order, but that they could be capriciously\nplaced in another order. If this were so, they would be altogether\nheterogeneous and disconnected among themselves, and the attempt to\nexamine and criticize them would seem altogether desperate, as also\nwould be that of comparing one with the other, or of stating a new one,\nwhich should dominate them all. It is precisely thus that ordinary\nsceptics look upon various and contrasting scientific views. They group\nthem all in the same plane, and believing that they can increase them at\nwill, conclude that one is as good as another, and that therefore every\none is free to select that which he prefers from a bundle of falsehoods.\nThe conceptions of which we speak are definite in number, and appear in\na necessary order, which is either that here stated by me, or another\nwhich might be proposed, better than mine. This would be the necessary\norder, which I should have failed to realize effectively. They are\nconnected one with the other, and in such a way that the view which\nfollows includes in itself that which precedes it.\n\nThus, if the last of the five doctrines indicated be taken, which may be\nsummed up as the proposition that art is a form of the theoretic spirit,\nsuperior to the scientific and philosophic form--and if it be submitted\nto analysis, it will be seen that in it is included, in the first place,\nthe proposition affirming the existence of a group of facts, which are\ncalled aesthetic or artistic. If such facts did not exist, it is evident\nthat no question would arise concerning them, and that no\nsystematization would be attempted. And this is the truth of empirical\nAesthetic. But there is also contained in it the proposition: that the\nfacts examined are reducible to a definite principle or category of the\nspirit. This amounts to saying, that they belong either to the practical\nspirit, or to the theoretical, or to one of their subforms. And this is\nthe truth of practicist Aesthetic, which is occupied with the enquiry as\nto whether these ever are practical facts, and affirms that in every\ncase they are a special category of the spirit. Thirdly, there is\ncontained in it the proposition: that they are not practical facts, but\nfacts which should rather be placed near the facts of logic or of\nthought. This is the truth of intellectualistic Aesthetic. In the fourth\nplace, we find also the proposition; that aesthetic facts are neither\npractical, nor of that theoretic form which is called logical and\nintellective. They are something which cannot be identified with the\ncategories of pleasure, nor of the useful, nor with those of ethic, nor\nwith those of logical truth. They are something of which it is necessary\nto find a further definition. This is the truth of that Aesthetic which\nis termed agnostic or negative.\n\nWhen these various propositions are severed from their connection; when,\nthat is to say, the first is taken without the second, the second\nwithout the third, and so on,--and when each, thus mutilated, is\nconfined in itself and the enquiry which awaits prosecution is\narbitrarily arrested, then each one of these gives itself out as the\nwhole of them, that is, as the completion of the enquiry. In this way,\neach becomes error, and the truths contained in empiricism, in\npracticism, in intellectualism, in agnostic and in mystical Aesthetic,\nbecome, respectively, falsity, and these tendencies of speculation are\nindicated with names of a definitely depreciative colouring. Empiria\nbecomes empiricism, the heuristic comparison of the aesthetic activity\nwith the practical and logical, becomes a conclusion, and therefore\npracticism and intellectualism. The criticism which rejects false\ndefinitions, and is itself negative, affirms itself as positive and\ndefinite, becoming agnosticism; and so on.\n\nBut the attempt to close a mental process in an arbitrary manner is\nvain, and of necessity causes remorse and self-criticism. Thus it comes\nabout, that each one of those unilateral and erroneous doctrines\ncontinually tends to surpass itself and to enter the stage which follows\nit. Thus empiricism, for example, assumes that it can dispense with any\nphilosophical conception of art; but, since it severs art from\nnon-art--and, however empirical it be, it will not identify a\npen-and-ink sketch and a table of logarithms, as if they were just the\nsame thing, or a painting and milk or blood (although milk and blood\nboth possess colour)--thus empiricism too must at last resort to some\nkind of philosophical concept. Therefore, we see the empiricists\nbecoming, turn and turn about, hedonists, moralists, intellectualists,\nagnostics, mystics, and sometimes they are even better than mystics,\nupholding an excellent conception of art, which can only be found fault\nwith because introduced surreptitiously and without justification. If\nthey do not make that progress, it is impossible for them to speak in\nany way of aesthetic facts. They must return, as regards such facts, to\nthat indifference and to that silence from which they had emerged when\nthey affirmed the existence of these facts and began to consider them in\ntheir variety. The same may be said of all other unilateral doctrines.\nThey are all reduced to the alternative of advancing or of going back,\nand in so far as they do not wish to do either, they live amid\ncontradictions and in anguish. But they do free themselves from these,\nmore or less slowly, and thus are compelled to advance, more or less\nslowly. And here we discover why it is so difficult, and indeed\nimpossible, exactly to identify thinkers, philosophers, and writers with\none or the other of the doctrines which we have enunciated, because each\none of them rebels when he finds himself limited to one of those\ncategories, and it seems to him that he is shut up in prison. It is\nprecisely because those thinkers try to shut themselves up in a\nunilateral doctrine, that they do not succeed, and that they take a\nstep, now in one direction, now in another, and are conscious of being\nnow on this side, now on the other, of the criticisms which are\naddressed to them. But the critics fulfil their duty by putting them in\nprison, thus throwing into relief the absurdity into which they are led\nby their irresolution, or their resolution not to resolve.\n\nAnd from this necessary connection and progressive order of the various\npropositions indicated arise also the resolve, the counsel, the\nexhortation, to \"return,\" as they say, to this or that thinker, to this\nor that philosophical school of the past. Certainly, such returns are\nimpossible, understood literally; they are also a little ridiculous,\nlike all impossible attempts. We can never return to the past, precisely\nbecause it is the past. No one is permitted to free himself from the\nproblems which are put by the present, and which he must solve with all\nthe means of the present (which includes in it the means of the past).\nNevertheless, it is a fact that the history of philosophy everywhere\nresounds with cries of return. Those very people who in our day deride\nthe \"return to Hume\" or the \"return to Kant,\" proceed to advise the\n\"return to Schelling,\" or the \"return to Hegel.\" This means that we must\nnot understand those \"returns\" literally and in a material way. In\ntruth, they do not express anything but the necessity and the\nineliminability of the logical process explained above, for which the\naffirmations contained in philosophical problems appear connected with\none another in such a way that the one follows the other, surpasses it,\nand includes it in itself. Empiricism, practicism, intellectualism,\nagnosticism, mysticism, are _eternal stages of the search for truth_.\nThey are eternally relived and rethought in the truth which each\ncontains. Thus it would be necessary for him who had not yet turned his\nattention to aesthetic facts, to begin by passing them before his eyes,\nthat is to say, he must first traverse the empirical stage (about\nequivalent to that occupied by mere men of letters and mere amateurs of\nart); and while he is at this stage, he must be aroused to feel the want\nof a principle of explanation, by making him compare his present\nknowledge with the facts, and see if they are explained by it, that is\nto say, if they be utilitarian and moral, or logical and intellective.\nThen we should drive him who has made this examination to the\nconclusion, that the aesthetic activity is something different from all\nknown forms, a form of the spirit, which it yet remains to characterize.\nFor the empiricists of Aesthetic, intellectualism and moralism represent\nprogress; for the intellectualists, hedonistic and moralistic alike,\nagnosticism is progress and may be called Kant. But for Kantians, who\nare real Kantians (and not neo-Kantians), progress is represented by the\nmystical and romantic point of view; not because this comes after the\ndoctrine of Kant chronologically, but because it surpasses it ideally.\nIn this sense, and in this sense alone, we should now \"return\" to the\nromantic Aesthetic. We should return to it, because it is ideally\nsuperior to all the researches in Aesthetic made in the studies of\npsychologists, of physio-psychologists, and of psycho-physiologists of\nthe universities of Europe and of America. It is ideally superior to the\nsociological, comparative, prehistoric Aesthetic, which studies\nespecially the art of savages, of children, of madmen, and of idiots. It\nis ideally superior also to that other Aesthetic, which has recourse to\nthe conceptions of the genetic pleasure, of games, of illusion, of\nself-illusion, of association, of hereditary habit, of sympathy, of\nsocial efficiency, and so on. It is ideally superior to the attempts at\nlogical explanation, which have not altogether ceased, even to-day,\nalthough they are somewhat rare, because, to tell the truth, fanaticism\nfor Logic cannot be called the failing of our times. Finally, it is\nideally superior to that Aesthetic which repeats with Kant, that the\nbeautiful is finality without the idea of end, disinterested pleasure,\nnecessary and universal, which is neither theoretical nor practical, but\nparticipates in both forms, or combines them in itself in an original\nand ineffable manner. But we should return to it, bringing with us the\nexperience of a century of thought, the new facts collected, the new\nproblems that have arisen, the new ideas that have matured. Thus we\nshall return again to the stage of mystical and romantic Aesthetic, but\nnot to the personal and historical stage of its representatives. For in\nthis matter, at least, they are certainly inferior to us: they lived a\ncentury ago and therefore inherited so much the less of the problems and\nof the results of thought which day by day mankind laboriously\naccumulates.\n\nThey should return, but not to remain there; because, if a return to the\nromantic Aesthetic be advisable for the Kantians (while the idealists\nshould not be advised to \"return to Kant,\" that is to say, to a lower\nstage, which represents a recession), so those who come over, or already\nfind themselves on the ground of mystical Aesthetic, should, on the\nother hand be advised to proceed yet further, in order to attain to a\ndoctrine which represents a stage above it. This doctrine is that of the\n_pure intuition_ (or, what amounts to the same thing, of pure\nexpression); a doctrine which also numbers representatives in all times,\nand which may be said to be immanent alike in all the discourses that\nare held and in all the judgments that are passed upon art, as in all\nthe best criticism and artistic and literary history.\n\nThis doctrine arises logically from the contradictions of mystical\nAesthetic; I say, _logically_, because it contains in itself those\ncontradictions and their solution; although _historically_ (and this\npoint does not at present concern us) that critical process be not\nalways comprehensible, explicit, and apparent.\n\nMystical Aesthetic, which makes of art the supreme function of the\ntheoretic spirit, or, at least, a function superior to that of\nphilosophy, becomes involved in inextricable difficulties. How could art\never be superior to philosophy, if philosophy make of art its object,\nthat is to say, if it place art beneath itself, in order to analyse and\ndefine it? And what could this new knowledge be, supplied by art and by\nthe aesthetic activity, appearing when the human spirit has come full\ncircle, after it has imagined, perceived, thought, abstracted,\ncalculated, and constructed the whole world of thought and history?\n\nAs the result of those difficulties and contradictions, mystical\nAesthetic itself also exhibits the tendency, either to surpass its\nboundary, or to sink below its proper level. The descent takes place\nwhen it falls back into agnosticism, affirming that art is art, that is,\na spiritual form, altogether different from the others and ineffable; or\nworse, where it conceives art as a sort of repose or as a game; as\nthough diversion could ever be a category and the spirit know repose! We\nfind an attempt at overpassing its proper limit, when art is placed\nbelow philosophy, as inferior to it; but this overpassing remains a\nsimple attempt, because the conception of art as instrument of universal\ntruth is always firmly held; save that this instrument is declared less\nperfect and less efficacious than the philosophical instrument. Thus\nthey fall back again into intellectualism from another side.\n\nThese mistakes of mystical Aesthetic were manifested during the Romantic\nperiod in some celebrated paradoxes, such as those of _art as irony_ and\nof the _death of art_. They seemed calculated to drive philosophers to\ndesperation as to the possibility of solving the problem of the nature\nof art, since every path of solution appeared closed. Indeed, whoever\nreads the aestheticians of the romantic period, feels strongly inclined\nto believe himself at the heart of the enquiry and to nourish a\nconfident hope of immediate discovery of the truth. Above all, the\naffirmation of the theoretic nature of art, and of the difference\nbetween its cognitive method and that of science and of logic, is felt\nas a definite conquest, which can indeed be combined with other\nelements, but which must not in any case be allowed to slip between the\nfingers. And further, it is not true that all ways of solution are\nclosed, or that all have been attempted. There is at least one still\nopen that can be tried; and it is precisely that for which we resolutely\ndeclare ourselves: the Aesthetic of the pure intuition.\n\nThis Aesthetic reasons as follows:--Hitherto, in all attempts to define\nthe place of art, it has been sought, either at the summit of the\ntheoretic spirit, above philosophy, or, at least, in the circle of\nphilosophy itself. But is not the loftiness of the search the reason why\nno satisfactory result has hitherto been obtained? Why not invert the\nattempt, and instead of forming the hypothesis that art is _one of the\nsummits or the highest grade_ of the theoretic spirit, form the very\nopposite hypothesis, namely, that it is _one of the lower grades_, or\nthe lowest of all? Perhaps such epithets as \"lower\" and \"lowest\" are\nirreconcilable with the dignity and with the splendid beauty of art? But\nin the philosophy of the spirit, such words as lowest, weak, simple,\nelementary, possess only the value of a scientific terminology. All the\nforms of the spirit are necessary, and the higher is so only because\nthere is the lower, and the lower is as much to be despised or less to\nbe valued to the same extent as the first step of a stair is despicable,\nor of less value in respect to the topmost step.\n\nLet us compare art with the various forms of the theoretic spirit, and\nlet us begin with the sciences which are called _natural_ or _positive_.\nThe Aesthetic of pure intuition makes it clear that the said sciences\nare more _complex_ than History, because they presuppose historical\nmaterial, that is, collections of things that have happened (to men or\nanimals, to the earth or to the stars). They submit this material to a\nfurther treatment, which consists in the abstraction and systematization\nof the historical facts. _History_, then, is less complex than the\nnatural sciences. History further presupposes the world of the\nimagination and the pure philosophical concepts or categories, and\nproduces its judgments or historical propositions, by means of the\nsynthesis of the imagination with the concept. And _Philosophy_ may be\nsaid to be even less complex than History, in so far as it is\ndistinguished from the former as an activity whose special function it\nis to make clear the categories or pure concepts, neglecting, in a\ncertain sense at any rate, the world of phenomena. If we compare _Art_\nwith the three forms above mentioned, it must be declared inferior, that\nis to say, less complex than the _natural Sciences_, in so far as it is\naltogether without abstractions. In so far as it is without conceptual\ndeterminations and does not distinguish between the real and the unreal,\nwhat has really happened and what has been dreamed, it must be declared\ninferior to _History_. In so far as it fails altogether to surpass the\nphenomenal world, and does not attain to the definitions of the pure\nconcepts, it is inferior to _Philosophy_ itself. It is also inferior to\n_Religion_, assuming that religion is (as it is) a form of speculative\ntruth, standing between thought and imagination. Art is governed\nentirely by imagination; its only riches are images. Art does not\nclassify objects, nor pronounce them real or imaginary, nor qualify\nthem, nor define them. Art feels and represents them. Nothing more. Art\ntherefore is _intuition_, in so far as it is a mode of knowledge, not\nabstract, but concrete, and in so far as it uses the real, without\nchanging or falsifying it. In so far as it apprehends it immediately,\nbefore it is modified and made clear by the concept, it must be called\n_pure intuition_.\n\nThe strength of art lies in being thus simple, nude, and poor. Its\nstrength (as often happens in life) arises from its very weakness. Hence\nits fascination. If (to employ an image much used by philosophers for\nvarious ends) we think of man, in the first moment that he becomes aware\nof theoretical life, with mind still clear of every abstraction and of\nevery reflexion, in that first purely intuitive instant he must be a\npoet. He contemplates the world with ingenuous and admiring eyes; he\nsinks and loses himself altogether in that contemplation. By creating\nthe first representations and by thus inaugurating the life of\nknowledge, art continually renews within our spirit the aspects of\nthings, which thought has submitted to reflexion, and the intellect to\nabstraction. Thus art perpetually makes us poets again. Without art,\nthought would lack the stimulus, the very material, for its hermeneutic\nand critical labour. Art is the root of all our theoretic life. To be\nthe root, not the flower or the fruit, is the function of art. And\nwithout a root, there can be no flower and no fruit.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nSuch is the theory of art as pure intuition, in its fundamental\nconception. This theory, then, takes its origin from the criticism of\nthe loftiest of all the other doctrines of Aesthetic, from the criticism\nof mystical or romantic Aesthetic, and contains in itself the criticism\nand the truth of all the other Aesthetics. It is not here possible to\nallow ourselves to illustrate its other aspects, such as would be those\nof the identity, which it lays down, between intuition and expression,\nbetween art and language. Suffice it to say, as regards the former, that\nhe alone who divides the unity of the spirit into soul and body can have\nfaith in a pure act of the soul, and therefore in an intuition, which\nshould exist as an intuition, and yet be without its body, expression.\nExpression is the actuality of intuition, as action is of will; and in\nthe same way as will not exercised in action is not will, so an\nintuition unexpressed is not an intuition. As regards the second point,\nI will mention in passing that, in order to recognize the identity of\nart and language, it is needful to study language, not in its\nabstraction and in grammatical detail, but in its immediate reality, and\nin all its manifestations, spoken and sung, phonic and graphic. And we\nshould not take at hazard any proposition, and declare it to be\naesthetic; because, if all propositions have an aesthetic side\n(precisely because intuition is the elementary form of knowledge and is,\nas it were, the garment of the superior and more complex forms), all are\nnot _purely_ aesthetic, but some are philosophical, historical,\nscientific, or mathematical; some, in fact, of these are more than\naesthetic or logical; they are aestheticological. Aristotle, in his\ntime, distinguished between semantic and apophantic propositions, and\nnoted, that if all propositions be _semantic_, not all are _apophantic_.\nLanguage is art, not in so far as it is apophantic, but in so far as it\nis, generically, semantic. It is necessary to note in it the side by\nwhich it is expressive, and nothing but expressive. It is also well to\nobserve (though this may seem superfluous) that it is not necessary to\nreduce the theory of pure intuition, as has been sometimes done, to a\nhistorical fact or to a psychological concept. Because we recognize in\npoetry, as it were, the ingenuousness, the freshness, the barbarity of\nthe spirit, it is not therefore necessary to limit poetry to youth and\nto barbarian peoples. Though we recognize language as the first act of\ntaking possession of the world achieved by man, we must not imagine that\nlanguage is born _ex nihilo_, once only in the course of the ages, and\nthat later generations merely adopt the ancient instrument, applying it\nto a new order of things while lamenting its slight adaptability to the\nusage of civilized times. Art, poetry, intuition, and immediate\nexpression are the moment of barbarity and of ingenuousness, which\nperpetually recur in the life of the spirit; they are youth, that is,\nnot chronological, but ideal. There exist very prosaic barbarians and\nvery prosaic youths, as there exist poetical spirits of the utmost\nrefinement and civilization. The mythology of those proud, gigantic\nPatagonians, of whom our Vico was wont to discourse, or of those _bons\nHurons_, who were lately a theme of conversation, must be looked upon as\nfor ever superseded.\n\nBut there arises an apparently very serious objection to the Aesthetic\nof pure intuition, giving occasion to doubt whether this doctrine, if it\nrepresent progress in respect to the doctrines which have preceded it,\nyet is also a complete and definite doctrine as regards the fundamental\nconcept of art. Should it be submitted to a dialectic, by means of which\nit must be surpassed and dissolved into a more lofty point of view? The\ndoctrine of pure intuition makes the value of art to consist of its\npower of intuition; in such a manner that just in so far as pure and\nconcrete intuitions are achieved will art and beauty be achieved. But if\nattention be paid to judgments of people of good taste and of critics,\nand to what we all say when we are warmly discussing works of art and\nmanifesting our praise or blame of them, it would seem that what we seek\nin art is something quite different, or at least something more than\nsimple force and intuitive and expressive purity. What pleases and what\nis sought in art, what makes beat the heart and enraptures the\nadmiration, is life, movement, emotion, warmth, the feeling of the\nartist. This alone affords the supreme criterion for distinguishing true\nfrom false works of art, those with insight from the failures. Where\nthere are emotion and feeling, much is forgiven; where they are wanting,\nnothing can make up for them. Not only are the most profound thoughts\nand the most exquisite culture incapable of saving a work of art which\nis looked upon as _cold_, but richness of imagery, ability and certainty\nin the reproduction of the real, in description, characterization and\ncomposition, and all other knowledge, only serve to arouse the regret\nthat so great a price has been paid and such labours endured, in vain.\nWe do not ask of an artist instruction as to real facts and thoughts,\nnor that he should astonish us with the richness of his imagination, but\nthat he should have a _personality_, in contact with which the soul of\nthe hearer or spectator may be heated. A personality of any sort is\nasked for in this case; its moral significance is excluded: let it be\nsad or glad, enthusiastic or distrustful, sentimental or sarcastic,\nbenignant or malign, but it must be a soul. Art criticism would seem to\nconsist altogether in determining if there be a personality in the work\nof art, and of what sort. A work that is a failure is an incoherent\nwork; that is to say, a work in which no single personality appears, but\na number of disaggregated and jostling personalities, that is, really,\nnone. There is no further correct significance than this in the\nresearches that are made as to the verisimilitude, the truth, the logic,\nthe necessity, of a work of art.\n\nIt is true that many protests have been made by artists, critics, and\nphilosophers by profession, against the characteristic of _personality_.\nIt has been maintained that the bad artist leaves traces of his\npersonality in the work of art, whereas the great artist cancels them\nall. It has been further maintained that the artist should portray the\nreality of life, and that he should not disturb it with the opinions,\njudgments, and personal feelings of the author, and that the artist\nshould give the tears of things and not his own tears. Hence\n_impersonality_, not personality, has been proclaimed to be the\ncharacteristic of art, that is to say, the very opposite. However, it\nwill not be difficult to show that what is really meant by this opposing\nformula is the same as in the first case. The theory of impersonality\nreally coincides with that of personality in every point. The opposition\nof the artists, critics, and philosophers above mentioned, was directed\nagainst the invasion by the empirical and volitional personality of the\nartist of the spontaneous and ideal personality which constitutes the\nsubject of the work of art. For instance, artists who do not succeed in\nrepresenting the force of piety or of love of country, add to their\ncolourless imaginings declamation or theatrical effects, thinking thus\nto arouse such feelings. In like manner certain orators and actors\nintroduce into a work of art an emotion extraneous to the work of art\nitself. Within these limits, the opposition of the upholders of the\ntheory of impersonality was most reasonable. On the other hand, there\nhas also been exhibited an altogether irrational opposition to\npersonality in the work of art. Such is the lack of comprehension and\nintolerance evinced by certain souls for others differently constituted\n(of calm for agitated souls, for example).\n\nHere we find at bottom the claim of one sort of personality to deny that\nof another. Finally, it has been possible to demonstrate from among the\nexamples given of impersonal art, in the romances and dramas called\nnaturalistic, that in so far and to the extent that these are complete\nartistic works, they possess personality. This holds good even when this\npersonality lies in a wandering or perplexity of thought regarding the\nvalue to be given to life, or in blind faith in the natural sciences and\nin modern sociology.\n\nWhere every trace of personality was really absent, and its place taken\nby the pedantic quest for human documents, the description of certain\nsocial classes and the generic or individual process of certain\nmaladies, there the work of art was absent. A work of science of more or\nless superficiality, and without the necessary proofs and control,\nfilled its place. There is no upholder of impersonality but experiences\na feeling of fatigue for a work of the utmost exactitude in the\nreproduction of reality in its empirical sequence, or of industrious and\napathetic combination of images. He asks himself why such a work was\nexecuted, and recommends the author to adopt some other profession,\nsince that of artist was not intended for him.\n\nThus it is without doubt that if pure intuition (and pure expression,\nwhich is the same thing) are indispensable in the work of art, the\npersonality of the artist is equally indispensable. If (to quote the\ncelebrated words in our own way) the _classic_ moment of perfect\nrepresentation or expression be necessary for the work of art, the\n_romantic_ moment of feeling is not less necessary. Poetry, or art in\ngeneral, cannot be exclusively _ingenuous_ or _sentimental_; it must be\nboth ingenuous and sentimental. And if the first or representative\nmoment be termed _epic_, and the second, which is sentimental,\npassionate, and personal, be termed _lyric_, then poetry and art must be\nat once epic and lyric, or, if it please you better, _dramatic_. We use\nthese words here, not at all in their empirical and intellectualist\nsense, as employed to designate special classes of works of art,\nexclusive of other classes; but in that of elements or moments, which\nmust of necessity be found united in every work of art, how diverse\nsoever it may be in other respects.\n\nNow this irrefutable conclusion seems to constitute exactly that\nabove-mentioned apparently serious objection to the doctrine which\ndefines art as pure intuition. But if the essence of art be merely\ntheoretic--and it is _intuibility_--can it, on the other hand, be\npractical, that is to say, feeling, personality, and _passionality_? Or,\nif it be practical, how can it be theoretic? It will be answered that\nfeeling is the _content_, intuibility the _form_; but form and content\ndo not in philosophy constitute a duality, like water and its recipient;\nin philosophy content is form, and form is content. Here, on the other\nhand, form and content appear to be different from one another; the\ncontent is of one quality, the form of another. Thus art appears to be\nthe sum of two qualities, or, as Herbart used to say in his time, of\n_two values_. Accordingly we have an altogether unmaintainable\nAesthetic, as is clear from recent largely vulgarized doctrines of\nAesthetic as operating with the concept of the _infused personality_.\nHere we find, on the one hand, things intuible lying dead and soulless;\non the other, the artist's feeling and personality. The artist is then\nsupposed to put himself into things, by an act of magic, to make them\nlive and palpitate, love and adore. But if we start with the\n_distinction_, we can never again reach _unity_: the distinction\nrequires an intellectual act, and what the intellect has divided\nintellect or reason alone, not art or imagination, can reunite and\nsynthetize. Thus the Aesthetic of infusion or transfusion--when it does\nnot fall into the antiquated hedonistic doctrines of agreeable illusion,\nof games, and generally of what affords a pleasurable emotion; or of\nmoral doctrines, where art is a symbol and an allegory of the good and\nthe true;--is yet not able, despite its airs of modernity and its\npsychology, to escape the fate of the doctrine which makes of art a\nsemi-imaginative conception of the world, like religion. The process\nthat it describes is mythological, not aesthetic; it is a making of gods\nor of idols. \"To make one's gods is an unhappy art,\" said an old Italian\npoet; but if it be not unhappy, certainly it is not poetic and not\naesthetic. The artist does not make the gods, because he has other\nthings to do. Another reason is that, to tell the truth, he is so\ningenuous and so absorbed in the image that attracts him, that he cannot\nperform that act of abstraction and conception, wherein the image must\nbe surpassed and made the allegory of a universal, though it be of the\ncrudest description.\n\nThis recent theory, then, is of no use. It leads back to the\ndifficulties arising from the admission of two characteristics of art,\n_intuibility_ and _lyricism_, not unified. We must recognize, either\nthat the duality must be destroyed and proved illusory, _or_ that we\nmust proceed to a more ample conception of art, in which that of pure\nintuibility would remain merely secondary or particular. And to destroy\nand prove it illusory must consist in showing that here too form is\ncontent, and that pure intuition is _itself_ lyricism.\n\nNow, the truth is precisely this: _pure intuition is essentially\nlyricism_. All the difficulties concerning this question arise from not\nhaving thoroughly understood that concept, from having failed to\npenetrate its true nature and to explore its multiple relations. When we\nconsider the one attentively, we see the other bursting from its bosom,\nor better, the one and the other reveal themselves as one and the same,\nand we escape from the desperate trilemma, of either denying the lyrical\nand personal character of art, or of asserting that it is adjunctive,\nexternal and accidental, or of excogitating a new doctrine of Aesthetic,\nwhich we do not know where to find. In fact, as has already been\nremarked, what can pure intuition mean, but intuition pure of every\nabstraction, of every conceptual element, and, for this reason, neither\nscience, history, nor philosophy? This means that the content of the\npure intuition cannot be either an abstract concept, or a speculative\nconcept or idea, or a conceptualized, that is historicized,\nrepresentation. Nor can it be a so-called perception, which is a\nrepresentation intellectually, and so historically, discriminated. But\noutside logic in its various forms and blendings, no other psychic\ncontent remains, save that which is called appetites, tendencies,\nfeelings, and will. These things are all the same and constitute the\npractical form of the spirit, in its infinite gradations and in its\ndialectic (pleasure and pain). Pure intuition, then, since it does not\nproduce concepts, must represent the will in its manifestations, that is\nto say, it can represent nothing but _states of the soul_. And states of\nthe soul are passionality, feeling, personality, which are found in\nevery art and determine its lyrical character. Where this is absent, art\nis absent, _precisely because pure intuition is absent_, and we have at\nthe most, in exchange for it, _that reflex_, philosophical, historical,\nor scientific. In the last of these, passion is represented, not\nimmediately, but mediately, or, to speak exactly, it is no longer\nrepresented, but thought. Thus the origin of language, that is, its true\nnature, has several times been placed in _interjection_. Thus, too,\nAristotle, when he wished to give an example of those propositions which\nwere not _apophantic_, but generically _semantic_ (we should say, not\nlogical, but purely Aesthetic), and did not predicate the logically true\nand false, but nevertheless said something, gave as example invocation\nor prayer, _hae enchae_. He added that these propositions do not\nappertain to Logic, but to Rhetoric and Poetic. A landscape is a\nstate of the soul; a great poem may all be contained in an exclamation\nof joy, of sorrow, of admiration, or of lament. The more objective is a\nwork of art, by so much the more is it poetically suggestive.\n\nIf this deduction of lyricism from the intimate essence of pure\nintuition do not appear easily acceptable, the reason is to be sought in\ntwo very deep-rooted prejudices, of which it is useful to indicate here\nthe genesis. The first concerns the nature of the _imagination_, and its\nlikenesses to and differences from _fancy_. Imagination and fancy have\nbeen clearly distinguished thus by certain aestheticians (and among\nthem, De Sanctis), as also in discussions relating to concrete art: they\nhave held fancy, not imagination, to be the special faculty of the poet\nand the artist. Not only does a new and bizarre combination of images,\nwhich is vulgarly called _invention_, not constitute the artist, but _ne\nfait rien \u00e0 l'affaire_, as Alceste remarked with reference to the length\nof time expended upon writing a sonnet. Great artists have often\npreferred to treat groups of images, which had already been many times\nused as material for works of art. The novelty of these new works has\nbeen solely that of art or form, that is to say, of the new _accent_\nwhich they have known how to give to the old material, of the new way in\nwhich they have _felt_ and therefore _intuified_ it, thus creating _new\nimages_ upon the old ones. These remarks are all obvious and universally\nrecognized as true. But if mere imagination as such has been excluded\nfrom art, it has not therefore been excluded from the theoretic spirit.\nHence the disinclination to admit that a pure intuition must of\nnecessity express a state of the soul, whereas it may also consist, as\nthey believe, of a pure image, without a content of feeling. If we form\nan arbitrary image of any sort, _stans pede in uno_, say of a bullock's\nhead on a horse's body, would not this be an intuition, a pure\nintuition, certainly quite without any content of reflexion? Would one\nnot attain to a work of art in this way, or at any rate to an artistic\nmotive? Certainly not. For the image given as an instance, and every\nother image that may be produced by the imagination, not only is not a\npure intuition, but it is not a _theoretic_ product of any sort. It is a\nproduct of _choice_, as was observed in the formula used by our\nopponents; and choice is external to the world of thought and\ncontemplation. It may be said that imagination is a practical artifice\nor game, played upon that patrimony of images possessed by the soul;\nwhereas the fancy, the translation of practical into theoretical values,\nof states of the soul into images, is the _creation_ of that patrimony\nitself.\n\nFrom this we learn that an image, which is not the expression of a state\nof the soul, is not an image, since it is without any theoretical value;\nand therefore it cannot be an obstacle to the identification of lyricism\nand intuition. But the other prejudice is more difficult to eradicate,\nbecause it is bound up with the metaphysical problem itself, on the\nvarious solutions of which depend the various solutions of the aesthetic\nproblem, and _vice versa_. If art be intuition, would it therefore be\nany intuition that one might have of a _physical_ object, appertaining\nto _external nature_? If I open my eyes and look at the first object\nthat they fall upon, a chair or a table, a mountain or a river, shall I\nhave performed by so doing an aesthetic act? If so, what becomes of the\nlyrical character, of which we have asserted the necessity? If not, what\nbecomes of the intuitive character, of which we have affirmed the equal\nnecessity and also its identity with the former? Without doubt, the\nperception of a physical object, as such, does not constitute an\nartistic fact; but precisely for the reason that it is not a pure\nintuition, but a judgment of perception, and implies the application of\nan abstract concept, which in this case is physical or belonging to\nexternal nature. And with this reflexion and perception, we find\nourselves at once outside the domain of pure intuition. We could have a\npure perception of a physical object in one way only; that is to say, if\nphysical or external nature were a metaphysical reality, a truly real\nreality, and not, as it is, a construction or abstraction of the\nintellect. If such were the case, man would have an immediate intuition,\nin his first theoretical moment, both of himself and of external nature,\nof the spiritual and of the physical, in an equal degree. This\nrepresents the dualistic hypothesis. But just as dualism is incapable of\nproviding a coherent system of philosophy, so is it incapable of\nproviding a coherent Aesthetic. If we admit dualism, we must certainly\nabandon the doctrine of art as pure intuition; but we must at the same\ntime abandon all philosophy. But art on its side tacitly protests\nagainst metaphysical dualism. It does so, because, being the most\nimmediate form of knowledge, it is in contact with activity, not with\npassivity; with interiority, not exteriority; with spirit, not with\nmatter, and never with a double order of reality. Those who affirm the\nexistence of two forms of intuition--the one external or physical, the\nother subjective or aesthetic; the one cold and inanimate, the other\nwarm and lively; the one imposed from without, the other coming from the\ninner soul--attain without doubt to the distinctions and oppositions of\nthe vulgar (or dualistic) consciousness, but their Aesthetic is vulgar.\n\nThe lyrical essence of pure intuition, and of art, helps to make clear\nwhat we have already observed concerning the persistence of the\nintuition and of the fancy in the higher grades of the theoretical\nspirit, why philosophy, history, and science have always an artistic\nside, and why their expression is subject to aesthetic valuation. The\nman who ascends from art to thought does not by so doing abandon his\nvolitional and practical base, and therefore he too finds himself in a\nparticular _state of the soul_, the representation of which is intuitive\nand lyrical, and accompanies of necessity the development of his ideas.\nHence the various styles of thinkers, solemn or jocose, troubled or\ngladsome, mysterious and involved, or level and expansive. But it would\nnot be correct to divide intuition immediately into two classes, the one\nof _aesthetic_, the other of _intellectual_ or _logical_ intuitions,\nowing to the persistence of the artistic element in logical thought,\nbecause the relation of degrees is not the relation of classes, and\ncopper is copper, whether it be found alone, or in combination as\nbronze.\n\nFurther, this close connection of feeling and intuition in pure\nintuition throws much light on the reasons which have so often caused\nart to be separated from the theoretic and confounded with the practical\nactivity. The most celebrated of these confusions are those formulated\nabout the relativity of tastes and of the impossibility of reproducing,\ntasting, and correctly judging the art of the past, and in general the\nart of others. A life lived, a feeling felt, a volition willed, are\ncertainly impossible to reproduce, because nothing happens more than\nonce, and my situation at the present moment is not that of any other\nbeing, nor is it mine of the moment before, nor will be of the moment to\nfollow. But art remakes ideally, and ideally expresses my momentary\nsituation. Its image, produced by art, becomes separated from time and\nspace, and can be again made and again contemplated in its ideal-reality\nfrom every point of time and space. It belongs not to the _world_, but\nto the _superworld_; not to the flying moment, but to eternity. Thus\nlife passes, but art endures.\n\nFinally, we obtain from this relation between the intuition and the\nstate of the soul the criterion of exact definition of the _sincerity_\nrequired of artists, which is itself also an essential request. It is\nessential, precisely because it means that the artist must have a state\nof the soul to express, which really amounts to saying, that he must be\nan artist. His must be a state of the soul really experienced, not\nmerely imagined, because imagination, as we know, is not a work of\ntruth. But, on the other hand, the demand for sincerity does not go\nbeyond asking for a state of the soul, and that the state of soul\nexpressed in the work of art be a desire or an action. It is altogether\nindifferent to Aesthetic whether the artist have had only an aspiration,\nor have realized that aspiration in his empirical life. All that is\nquite indifferent in the sphere of art. Here we also find the\nconfutation of that false conception of sincerity, which maintains that\nthe artist, in his volitional or practical life, should be at one with\nhis dream, or with his incubus. Whether or no he have been so, is a\nmatter that interests his biographer, not his critic; it belongs to\nhistory, which separates and qualifies that which art does not\ndiscriminate, but represents.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nThis attitude of indiscrimination and indifference, observed by art in\nrespect to history and philosophy, is also foreshadowed at that place of\nthe _De interpretatione_ (_c_. 4), to which we have already referred, to\nobtain thence the confirmation of the thesis of the identity of art and\nlanguage, and another confirmation, that of the identity of lyric and\npure intuition. It is a really admirable passage, containing many\nprofound truths in a few short, simple words, although, as is natural,\nwithout full consciousness of their richness. Aristotle, then, is still\ndiscussing the said rhetorical and poetical propositions, semantic and\nnot apophantic, and he remarks that in them there rules no distinction\nbetween true and false: _to alaetheueion hae pseudeothai ouk\nhyparchei_. Art, in fact, is in contact with palpitating reality, but\ndoes not know that it is so in contact, and therefore is not truly in\ncontact. Art does not allow itself to be troubled with the abstractions\nof the intellect, and therefore does not make mistakes; but it does not\nknow that it does not make mistakes. If art, then (to return to what we\nsaid at the beginning), be the first and most ingenuous form of\nknowledge, it cannot give complete satisfaction to man's need to know,\nand therefore cannot be the ultimate end of the theoretic spirit. Art is\nthe dream of the life of knowledge. Its complement is waking, lyricism\nno longer, but the concept; no longer the dream, but the judgment.\nThought could not be without fancy; but thought surpasses and contains\nin itself the fancy, transforms the image into perception, and gives to\nthe world of dream the clear distinctions and the firm contours of\nreality. Art cannot achieve this; and however great be our love of art,\nthat cannot raise it in rank, any more than the love one may have for a\nbeautiful child can convert it into an adult. We must accept the child\nas a child, the adult as an adult.\n\nTherefore, the Aesthetic of pure intuition, while it proclaims\nenergetically the autonomy of art and of the aesthetic activity, is at\nthe same time averse to all _aestheticism_, that is, to every attempt at\nlowering the life of thought, in order to elevate that of fancy. The\norigin of aestheticism is the same as that of mysticism. Both proceed\nfrom a rebellion against the predominance of the abstract sciences and\nagainst the undue abuse of the principle of causation in metaphysic.\nWhen we pass from the stuffed animals of the zoological museums, from\nanatomical reconstructions, from tables of figures, from classes and\nsub-classes constituted by means of abstract characters, or from the\nfixation and mechanization of life for the ends of naturalistic science,\nto the pages of the poets, to the pictures of the painters, to the\nmelodies of the composers, when in fact we look upon life with the eye\nof the artist, we have the impression that we are passing from death to\nlife, from the abstract to the concrete, from fiction to reality. We are\ninclined to proclaim that only in art and in aesthetic contemplation is\ntruth, and that science is either charlatanesque pedantry, or a modest\npractical expedient. And certainly art has the superiority of its own\ntruth; simple, small, and elementary though it be, over the abstract,\nwhich, as such, is altogether without truth. But in violently rejecting\nscience and frantically embracing art, that very form of the theoretic\nspirit is forgotten, by means of which we can criticize science and\nrecognize the nature of art. Now this theoretic spirit, since it\ncriticizes science, is not science, and, as reflective consciousness of\nart, is not art. Philosophy, the supreme fact of the theoretic world,\nis forgotten. This error has been renewed in our day, because the\nconsciousness of the limits of the natural sciences and of the value of\nthe truth which belongs to intuition and to art, have been renewed. But\njust as, a century ago, during the idealistic and romantic period, there\nwere some who reminded the fanatics for art, and the artists who were\ntransforming philosophy, that art was not \"the most lofty form of\napprehending the Absolute\"; so, in our day, it is necessary to awaken\nthe consciousness of Thought. And one of the means for attaining this\nend is an exact understanding of the limits of art, that is, the\nconstruction of a solid Aesthetic.\n\n\nTHE END","title":"Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":98902}