{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_948/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_948","id":"gutenberg_948","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/948","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics","Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBenedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS\n(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)\nTranslated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes\n\n\n\nPART III: ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS\n\n\nMost writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem\nto be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural\nphenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to\nconceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a\nkingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows\nnature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,\nand that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute\nhuman infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature\nin general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man,\nwhich accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as\nusually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off\nthe weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more\nacutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a seer. Still there\nhas been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil and\nindustry I confess myself much indebted), who have written\nmany noteworthy things concerning the right way of life,\nand have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one,\nso far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the\nemotions, and the power of the mind against them for their\nrestraint.\n\nI do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he\nbelieved, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,\nstrove to explain human emotions by their primary causes,\nand, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind\nmight attain to absolute dominion over them. However,\nin my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a display\nof the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show\nin the proper place. For the present I wish to revert to\nthose, who would rather abuse or deride human emotions\nthan understand them. Such persons will, doubtless think\nit strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and\nfolly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid\nreasoning those matters which they cry out against as\nrepugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.\nHowever, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature,\nwhich can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always\nthe same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy\nand power of action; that is, nature's laws and ordinances,\nwhereby all things come to pass and change from one form\nto another, are everywhere and always the same; so that\nthere should be one and the same method of understanding\nthe nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's\nuniversal laws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger,\nenvy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this\nsame necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain\ndefinite causes, through which they are understood, and\npossess certain properties as worthy of being known as\nthe properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation\nin itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the\nnature and strength of the emotions according to the same\nmethod, as I employed heretofore in my investigations\nconcerning God and the mind. I shall consider human\nactions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though\nI were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.\n\n\nDEFINITIONS\n\nI. By an 'adequate' cause, I mean a cause through which\nits effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an\n'inadequate' or partial cause, I mean a cause through which,\nby itself, its effect cannot be understood.\n\nII. I say that we 'act' when anything takes place, either\nwithin us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate\ncause; that is (by the foregoing definition) when through\nour nature something takes place within us or externally\nto us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and\ndistinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we\nare passive as regards something when that something\ntakes place within us, or follows from our nature externally,\nwe being only the partial cause.\n\nIII. By 'emotion' I mean the modifications of the body,\nwhereby the active power of the said body is increased\nor diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas\nof such modifications.\n\nN.B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these\nmodifications, I then call the emotion an activity,\notherwise I call it a passion, or state wherein the mind\nis passive.\n\n\nPOSTULATES\n\nI. The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby\nits power of activity is increased or diminished, and also\nin other ways which do not render its power of activity\neither greater or less.\n\nN.B. This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and\nLemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.\n\nII. The human body can undergo many changes, and,\nnevertheless, retain the impressions or traces of objects\n(cf. II. Post. v.), and, consequently, the same images\nof things (see note II. xvii.).\n\n\nPROPOSITIONS\n\nI. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases\npassive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily\nactive, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is\nnecessarily passive.\n\n>>>>>Proof--In every human mind there are some\nadequate ideas, and some ideas that are fragmentary\nand confused (II. xl. note). Those ideas which are\nadequate in the mind are adequate also in God, inasmuch\nas he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl. Cor.),\nand those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise\n(by the same Cor.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he\ncontains in himself the essence of the given mind alone,\nbut as he, at the same time, contains the minds of other\nthings. Again, from any given idea some effect must\nnecessarily follow (I. xxxvi.); of this effect God is the\nadequate cause (III. Def. i.), not inasmuch as he is\ninfinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by\nthe given idea (II. ix.). But of that effect whereof God\nis the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which\nis adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the\nmind in question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Cor.).\nTherefore our mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas\n(III. Def. ii.), is in certain cases necessarily active;\nthis was our first point. Again, whatsoever necessarily\nfollows from the idea which is adequate in God, not by\nvirtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man\nonly, but by virtue of his containing, together with the\nmind of that one man, the minds of other things also,\nof such an effect (II. xi. Cor.) the mind of the given man\nis not an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus\n(III. Def. ii.) the mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate\nideas, is in certain cases necessarily passive; this was\nour second point. Therefore our mind, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--All modes of thinking have for their cause\nGod, by virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by\nvirtue of his being displayed under any other attribute (II.\nvi.). That, therefore, which determines the mind to thought\nis a mode of thought, and not a mode of extension; that\nis (II. Def. i.), it is not body. This was our first point.\nAgain, the motion and rest of a body must arise from\nanother body, which has also been determined to a state\nof motion or rest by a third body, and absolutely\neverything which takes place in a body must spring from\nGod, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some\nmode of extension, and not by some mode of thought\n(II. vi.); that is, it cannot spring from the mind, which\nis a mode of thought. This was our second point.\nTherefore body cannot determine mind, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--This is made more clear by what was said\nin the note to II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one\nand the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of\nthought, secondly, under the attribute of extension. Thus\nit follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical,\nwhether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the\nother; consequently the order of states of activity and\npassivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the\norder of states of activity and passivity in the mind.\nThe same conclusion is evident from the manner in which\nwe proved II. xii.\n\nNevertheless, though such is the case, and though there\nbe no further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe,\nuntil the fact is proved by experience, that men can be\ninduced to consider the question calmly and fairly, so firmly\nare they convinced that it is merely at the bidding of the\nmind, that the body is set in motion or at rest, or performs\na variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will\nor the exercise of thought. However, no one has hitherto\nlaid down the limits to the powers of the body, that is, no\none has as yet been taught by experience what the body\ncan accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far as\nshe is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gained\nsuch an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that\nhe can explain all its functions; nor need I call attention\nto the fact that many actions are observed in the lower\nanimals, which far transcend human sagacity, and\nthat somnambulists do many things in their sleep, which\nthey would not venture to do when awake: these instances\nare enough to show, that the body can by the sole laws\nof its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.\n\nAgain, no one knows how or by what means the mind\nmoves the body, nor how many various degrees of motion\nit can impart to the body, nor how quickly it can move it.\nThus, when men say that this or that physical action has\nits origin in the mind, which latter has dominion over the\nbody, they are using words without meaning, or are\nconfessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant\nof the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it.\n\nBut, they will say, whether we know or do not know the\nmeans whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at\nany rate, experience of the fact that unless the human mind\nis in a fit state to think, the body remains inert. Moreover,\nwe have experience, that the mind alone can determine\nwhether we speak or are silent, and a variety of similar\nstates which, accordingly, we say depend on the mind's\ndecree. But, as to the first point, I ask such objectors,\nwhether experience does not also teach, that if the body\nbe inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for\nthinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind\nsimultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no\npower of thinking, such as it possesses when the body\nis awake. Again, I think everyone's experience will\nconfirm the statement, that the mind is not at all times\nequally fit for thinking on a given subject, but according\nas the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by\nthe image of this or that object, so also is the mind more\nor less fitted for contemplating the said object.\n\nBut, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from\nthe laws of nature considered as extended substance,\nwe should be able to deduce the causes of buildings,\npictures, and things of that kind, which are produced\nonly by human art; nor would the human body, unless\nit were determined and led by the mind, be capable of\nbuilding a single temple. However, I have just pointed\nout that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's\npower, or say what can be concluded from a consideration\nof its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many\nthings being accomplished solely by the laws of nature,\nwhich they would never have believed possible except\nunder the direction of mind: such are the actions performed\nby somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their\nperformers when awake. I would further call attention\nto the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses\nin complexity all that has been put together by human art,\nnot to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that\nfrom nature, under whatever attribute she be considered,\ninfinite results follow. As for the second objection, I\nsubmit that the world would be much happier, if men were\nas fully able to keep silence as they are to speak.\nExperience abundantly shows that men can govern anything\nmore easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more\neasily than their appetites; when it comes about that many\n believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which\nwe moderately desire, because our desire for such can\neasily be controlled by the thought of something else\nfrequently remembered, but that we are by no means free\nin respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our\ndesire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of\nanything else. However, unless such persons had proved\nby experience that we do many things which we afterwards\nrepent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contrary\nemotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would\nbe nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all\nthings. Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it\ndesires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires\nto run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters\nfrom the free decision of his mind words which, when he\nis sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a\ndelirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others\nof like complexion, believe that they speak from the free\ndecision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to\nrestrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no\nless clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be\nfree, simply because they are conscious of their actions,\nand unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are\ndetermined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the\nmind are but another name for the appetites, and therefore\nvary according to the varying state of the body. Everyone\nshapes his actions according to his emotion, those who are\nassailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;\nthose who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed\nthis way or that. All these considerations clearly show that\na mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state,\nare simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which\nwe call decision, when it is regarded under and explained\nthrough the attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when\nit is regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced\nfrom the laws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more\nplainly in the sequel. For the present I wish to call attention\nto another point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision\nof the mind, unless we have a remembrance of having done\nso. For instance, we cannot say a word without remembering\nthat we have done so. Again, it is not within the free power\nof the mind to remember or forget a thing at will. Therefore\nthe freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the\npower of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers.\nBut when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak\nfrom a free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or, if we\ndo, it is by a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we\ndream that we are concealing something, and we seem to act\nfrom the same decision of the mind as that, whereby we keep\nsilence when awake concerning something we know. Lastly,\nwe dream that from the free decision of our mind we do\nsomething, which we should not dare to do when awake.\n\nNow I should like to know whether there be in the mind two\nsorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?\nIf our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily\nadmit, that the decision of the mind, which is believed to be\nfree, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory,\nand is nothing more than the affirmation, which an idea, by\nvirtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II. xlix.).\nWherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by\nthe same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing.\nTherefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence\nor act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do\nbut dream with their eyes open.\n\nIII. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate\nideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely\non inadequate ideas.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The first element, which constitutes the essence\nof the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent\nbody (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many\nother ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate\n(II. xxix. Cor., II. xxxviii. Cor.). Whatsoever therefore follows\nfrom the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate cause,\nthrough which it must be understood, must necessarily follow\neither from an adequate or from an inadequate idea. But in\nso far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily\npassive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely from\nadequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only passive in so\nfar as it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--Thus we see, that passive states are not\nattributed to the mind, except in so far as it contains something\ninvolving negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of\nnature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived\nthrough itself without other parts: I could thus show, that\npassive states are attributed to individual things in the same\nway that they are attributed to the mind, and that they cannot\notherwise be perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat\nof the human mind.\n\nIV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to\nitself.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for the\ndefinition of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but\ndoes not negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence\nof the thing, but does not take it away. So long therefore as\nwe regard only the thing itself, without taking into account\nexternal causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything\nwhich could destroy it. Q.E.D.\n\nV. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same\nobject, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other.\n\n>>>>>Proof--If they could agree together or co-exist in the same\nobject, there would then be in the said object something which\ncould destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is absurd,\ntherefore things, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nVI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in\nits own being.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Individual things are modes whereby the\nattributes of God are expressed in a given determinate manner\n(I. xxv.Cor.); that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express\nin a given determinate manner the power of God, whereby\nGod is and acts; now no thing contains in itself anything\nwhereby it can be destroyed, or which can take away its\nexistence (III. iv.); but contrariwise it is opposed to all that\ncould take away its existence (III. v.). Therefore, in so far as\nit can, and in so far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist\nin its own being. Q.E.D.\n\nVII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to\npersist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence\nof the thing in question.\n\n>>>>>Proof--From the given essence of any thing certain\nconsequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any\npower save such as necessarily follows from their nature as\ndetermined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing,\nor the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things,\nit acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or\nendeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,\nis nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in\nquestion. Q.E.D.\n\nVIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist\nin its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.\n\n>>>>>Proof--If it involved a limited time, which should determine\nthe duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that\npower whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist\nbeyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed; but\nthis (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore the endeavour wherewith a\nthing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise, since\n(III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already exists\nalways continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some external\ncause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.\n\nIX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and\nalso in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its\nbeing for an indefinite period, and of this endeavour it is conscious.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate\nand inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so far\nas it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the latter,\nit endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for an indefinite\ntime (III. viii.). Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is necessarily conscious\nof itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mind\nis therefore (III. vii.) conscious of its own endeavour.\n\n*****Note--This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is\ncalled \"will,\" when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it\nis called \"appetite\"; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence,\nfrom the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which\ntend to its preservation; and which man has thus been determined\nto perform.\n\nFurther, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except\nthat the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they\nare conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined:\n\"Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.\" It is thus plain from\nwhat has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long\nfor, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the\nother hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it,\nwish for it, long for it, or desire it.\n\nX. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot be\npostulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be\npostulated therein (III. v.). Therefore neither can the idea of such\na thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II. ix.\nCor.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing cannot be postulated\nas in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II. xi., xiii.) the first element,\nthat constitutes the essence of the mind, is the idea of the human\nbody as actually existing, it follows that the first and chief endeavour\nof our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body:\nthus, an idea, which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary\nto our mind, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nXI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power\nof activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps\nor hinders the power of thought in our mind.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II. xiv.\n\n*****Note--Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,\nand can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes\nto a state of lesser perfection. These passive states of transition\nexplain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By \"pleasure\"\ntherefore in the following propositions I shall signify \"a passive state\nwherein the mind passes to a greater perfection.\" By \"pain\" I shall\nsignify \"a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection.\"\nFurther, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind\ntogether I shall call \"stimulation\" (titillatio) or \"merriment\" (hilaritas),\nthe emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call \"suffering\" or\n\"melancholy.\" But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and\nsuffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more\naffected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts\nare alike affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the\nnote to Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no\nother primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other\nemotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I should\nlike here to explain at greater length Prop. x. of this part, in order\nthat we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another.\nIn the note to II. xvii. we showed that the idea, which constitutes\nthe essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as\nthe body itself exists. Again, it follows from what we pointed out\nin the Corollary to II. viii., that the present existence of our mind\ndepends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actual\nexistence of the body. Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and\nNote) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and\nremembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves the\nactual existence of the body. Whence it follows, that the present\nexistence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed,\nas soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the\nbody. Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this\nexistence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III. iv.), nor\nagain the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (by II. vi.)\nthe cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body,\nis not that the body began to exist; therefore, for the same\nreason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body,\nbecause the body ceases to exist; but (II. xvii.) this result\nfollows from another idea, which excludes the present\nexistence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and\nwhich is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence\nof our mind.\n\nXII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those\nthings, which increase or help the power of activity in the body.\n\n>>>>>Proof--So long as the human body is affected in a mode,\nwhich involves the nature of any external body, the human mind\nwill regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and consequently\n(II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an external body as\npresent, that is (II. xvii. Note), conceives it, the human body is\naffected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said external\nbody; thus so long as the mind conceives things, which increase\nor help the power of activity in our body, the body is affected in\nmodes which increase or help its power of activity (III. Post. i.);\nconsequently (III. xi.) the mind's power of thinking is for that\nperiod increased or helped. Thus (III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far\nas it can, endeavours to imagine such things. Q.E.D.\n\nXIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the\nbody's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, to\nremember things which exclude the existence of the first-named\nthings.\n\n>>>>>Proof--So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind\nalluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or\nconstrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue to\nconceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes\nthe present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as I have just shown),\nthe power of the mind and of the body is diminished, or constrained,\nuntil the mind conceives something else, which excludes the\nexistence of the former thing conceived: therefore the mind (III. ix.),\nas far as it can, will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter.\nQ.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--If the human body has once been affected by two\nbodies at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of\nthem, it will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.). But\nthe mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body\nthan the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Cor. ii.); therefore, if\nthe body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been once\naffected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is\nafterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the\nother.\n\nXV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain,\nor desire.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously\naffected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor\ndiminishes its power of activity, and the other does either increase\nor diminish the said power (III. Post. i.). From the foregoing\nproposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is afterwards\naffected by the former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis)\nneither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at\nthe same time affected by the latter, which does increase or\ndiminish its power of activity, that is (III. xi. note) it will be affected\nwith pleasure or pain. Thus the former of the two emotions will,\nnot through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or\npain. In the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thing\nmay be accidentally the cause of desire. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that\nthe mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the\nemotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note), according as\nthe power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished,\n&c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the mind may\ndesire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii. Cor.), in other\nwords (III. xiii. note), according as it may love or hate the same.\nQ.E.D.\n\n*****Note--Hence we understand how it may happen, that we\nlove or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known\nto us; merely, as a phrase is, from \"sympathy\" or \"antipathy.\" We\nshould refer to the same category those objects, which affect us\npleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other\nobjects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the\nnext Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to\nintroduce these terms \"sympathy\" and \"antipathy,\" wished to signify\nthereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we may\nbe permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest\nqualities.\n\nXVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given object\nhas some point of resemblance with another object which is wont\nto affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point of\nresemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we\nshall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The point of resemblance was in the object (by\nhypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus\n(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it will\nstraightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and\nconsequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point\nof resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of pleasure\nor pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although the point\nin which the two objects resemble one another be not the\nefficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first-named\nobject with love or hate. Q.E.D.\n\nXVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us\npainfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing which\nis wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure,\nwe shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall\nlove it.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause\nof pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with this\nemotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive that\nit has some point of resemblance to something else, which is wont\nto affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall\nwith an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it (III. xvi.); thus\nwe shall both hate and love the same thing. Q.E.D.\n\n\n*****Note--This disposition of the mind, which arises from two\ncontrary emotions, is called \"vacillation\"; it stands to the emotions\nin the same relation as doubt does to the imagination (II. xliv. note);\nvacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other, except as\ngreater differs from less. But we must bear in mind that I have\ndeduced this vacillation from causes, which give rise through\nthemselves to one of the emotions, and to the other accidentally.\nI have done this, in order that they might be more easily deduced\nfrom what went before; but I do not deny that vacillation of the\ndisposition generally arises from an object, which is the efficient\ncause of both emotions. The human body is composed\n(II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts of different nature,\nand may therefore (Ax. i. after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) be\naffected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body;\nand contrariwise, as one and the same thing can be affected in\nmany ways, it can also in many different ways affect one and\nthe same part of the body. Hence we can easily conceive, that\none and the same object may be the cause of many and\nconflicting emotions.\n\nXVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully\nby the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing\npresent.\n\n>>>>>Proof--So long as a man is affected by the image of\nanything, he will regard that thing as present, even though it be\nnon-existent (II. xvii. and Cor.), he will not conceive it as past\nor future, except in so far as its image is joined to the image\nof time past or future (II. xliv. note). Wherefore the image of\na thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether it be referred\nto time past, time future, or time present; that is (II. xvi. Cor.), the\ndisposition or emotion of the body is identical, whether the image\nbe of a thing past or future. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note I.--I call a thing past or future, according as we either\nhave been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according\nas we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has\nrecreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,\nor will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its\nexistence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which\nexcludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.) the\nbody is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way as if\nthe thing were actually present. However, as it generally happens\nthat those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so long as\nthey regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt about\nits issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the emotions which arise from\nsimilar images of things are not so constant, but are generally\ndisturbed by the images of other things, until men become assured\nof the issue.\n\n*****Note II.--From what has just been said, we understand what\nis meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and\nDisappointment. \"Hope\" is nothing else but \"an inconstant pleasure,\narising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do\nnot yet know the issue.\" \"Fear,\" on the other hand, is \"an inconstant\npain also arising from the image of something concerning which we\nare in doubt.\" If the element of doubt be removed from these\nemotions, hope becomes \"Confidence\" and fear becomes \"Despair.\"\nIn other words, \"Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of\nsomething concerning which we have hoped or feared.\" Again,\n\"Joy\" is \"Pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof\nwe have doubted the issue.\" \"Disappointment\" is \"the Pain opposed\nto Joy.\"\n\nXIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed\nwill feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to\nconceive those things which increase or help the body's power\nof activity (III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things\nwhich it loves. But conception is helped by those things which\npostulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered\nby those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);\ntherefore the images of things, which postulate the existence\nof an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive\nthe object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind\npleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the existence\nof an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental endeavour; in\nother words, affect the mind painfully. He, therefore, who\nconceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain,\n&c. Q.E.D.\n\nXX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will\nalso feel pleasure.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those\nthings, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's\npower of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III. xiii.\nnote), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the\nexistence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing, which\nexcludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the aforesaid\nmental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects the mind\npleasurably. Thus he who conceives that the object of his hate\nis destroyed will feel pleasure. Q.E.D.\n\nXXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected\npleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurably or\npainfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less\nin the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.)\nwhich postulate the existence of the object of love, help the\nmind's endeavour to conceive the said object. But pleasure\npostulates the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much\nthe more in proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater;\nfor it is (III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore\nthe image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental\nendeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover pleasurably,\nand so much the more, in proportion as this emotion may have\nbeen greater in the object of love. This was our first point.\nFurther, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it is to that\nextent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to the amount\nof pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who conceives,\nthat the object of his love is affected painfully, will himself be\naffected painfully, in proportion as the said emotion is greater\nor less in the object of love. Q.E.D.\n\nXXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some\nobject of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that\nthing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of\nour love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it.\n\n>>>>>Proof--He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object\nof our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is, if we\nconceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure\nor pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come\nto us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore\n(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object of\nour love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with love\nor hatred towards him. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of 'Pity,' which\nwe may define as 'pain arising from another's hurt.' What term\nwe can use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.\n\nWe will call the 'love towards him who confers a benefit on\nanother,' 'Approval;' and the 'hatred towards him who injures\nanother,' we will call 'Indignation.' We must further remark,\nthat we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as\nshown in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto\nregarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles\nourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval\non one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,\ncontrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.\n\nXXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfully\naffected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he thinks that the said\nobject is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of these\nemotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater\nor less in the object of hatred.\n\n>>>>>Proof--In so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected,\nit is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the strength of the\npain (III. xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.) who conceives, that\nsome object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure,\nto an extent proportioned to the amount of pain he conceives\nin the object of his hatred. This was our first point. Again,\npleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected\nthing (III. xi. note), in proportion as the pleasure is greater or\nless. If anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasurably\naffected, this conception (III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour\nto persist; in other words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be\npainfully affected. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and\nwithout any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop.\nxxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to\nhimself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like\nmanner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary\ncircumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only.\n\nXXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object\nof our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we\nconceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall feel\nlove towards him.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.\nxxii., which see.\n\n*****Note--These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable\nto 'envy,' which, accordingly, is nothing else but 'hatred, in so far\nas it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt,\nand to grieve at another's advantage.'\n\nXXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and\nconcerning what we love, everything that we can conceive\nto affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.\nContrariwise, we endeavour to negative everything, which\nwe conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object.\n\n>>>>>Proof--That, which we conceive to affect an object\nof our love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably\nor painfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as\nfar as possible, to conceive those things which affect us\npleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Cor.), it endeavours\nto regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III. xiii.), it\nendeavours to exclude the existence of such things as affect\nus painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm concerning\nourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever we\nconceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.\nQ.E.D.\n\nXXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate,\neverything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,\ncontrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything\nwhich we conceive to affect it pleasurably.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the\nforegoing proposition followed from III. xxi.\n\n*****Note--Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a\nman may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object,\nand, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling\nis called 'pride,' in reference to the man who thinks too highly\nof himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams\nwith his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things\nthat fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon\naccounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is\nunable to conceive anything which excludes their existence,\nand determines his own power of action. 'Pride,' therefore,\nis 'pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself.'\nAgain, the 'pleasure which arises from a man thinking too\nhighly of another' is called 'over-esteem.' Whereas the\n'pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man' is\ncalled 'disdain.'\n\nXXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like\nourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,\nto be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with\na like emotion (affectus).\n\n>>>>>Proof--The images of things are modifications of the\nhuman body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as\npresent to us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the\nideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time,\nthe nature of the external bodies as present. If, therefore,\nthe nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our\nbody, then the idea which we form of the external body will\ninvolve a modification of our own body similar to the\nmodification of the external body. Consequently, if we\nconceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any\nemotion, this conception will express a modification of our\nbody similar to that emotion. Thus, from the fact of\nconceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any\nemotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion.\nIf, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall,\nto that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar,\nemotion. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note I--This imitation of emotions, when it is referred\nto pain, is called \"compassion\" (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is\nreferred to desire, it is called \"emulation,\" which is nothing\nelse but \"the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact\nthat we conceive that others have the like desire.\"\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--This is proved from the last proposition in the\nsame manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--If we could hate it for this reason, we should\nrejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--That, which painfully affects the object of\nour pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing\nproposition); therefore, we shall endeavour to recall\neverything which removes its existence, or which destroys\nit (cf. III. xiii.); in other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire\nto destroy it, or we shall be determined for its destruction;\nthus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which\nwe pity. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note II--This will or appetite for doing good, which\narises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a\nbenefit, is called \"benevolence,\" and is nothing else but \"desire\narising from compassion.\" Concerning love or hate towards\nhim who has done good or harm to something, which we\nconceive to be like ourselves, see III. xxii. note.\n\nXXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we\nconceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to\nremove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly\nrepugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain.\n\n>>>>>Proof--We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive\nthat which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in\nother words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far\nas possible as present or actually existing. But the endeavour\nof the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and\nsimultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's\npower of action. (This is clear from II. vii. Cor. and II. xi.\nCor.). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its\nexistence, in other words (which by III. ix., note, come to the\nsame thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point.\nAgain, if we conceive that something, which we believed to\nbe the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we hate,\nis destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall, therefore\n(by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy the\nsame, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may not\nregard it as present; this was our second point. Wherefore\nwhatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nXXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we\nconceive men* to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we\nshall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink\nfrom.\n\n[*N.B. By \"men\" in this and the following propositions, I\nmean men whom we regard without any particular emotion.]\n\n>>>>>Proof--From the fact of imagining, that men love or\nhate anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).\nThat is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure\nor pain at the thing's presence. And so we shall endeavour to\ndo whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure,\netc. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone,\nsolely in order to please men, we call \"ambition,\" especially\nwhen we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we\ndo or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other\ncases it is generally called \"kindliness.\" Furthermore I give the\nname of \"praise\" to the \"pleasure, with which we conceive the\naction of another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us\";\nbut of \"blame\" to the \"pain wherewith we feel aversion to his\naction.\"\n\nXXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives\nas affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by\npleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in\nother words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the\nother hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as\naffecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain.\n\n>>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that he affects others\nwith pleasure or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be\naffected with pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II.\nxix. and xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications\nwhereby he is determined to action, it follows that he who\nconceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected\nwith pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in\nother words, he will regard himself with pleasure. And so\n\"mutatis mutandis\" in the case of pain. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by\nthe idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied\nby the idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in\nquestion will be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms\nlove and hatred are used in reference to external objects, we\nwill employ other names for the emotions now under discussion:\npleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause we will\nstyle \"Honour,\" and the emotion contrary thereto we will style\n\"Shame\": I mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain\narises from a man's belief, that he is being praised or blamed:\notherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external\ncause is called \"self-complacency,\" and its contrary pain is\ncalled \"repentance.\" Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Cor.)\nthat the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects\nothers, may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (III.\nxxv.) everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself\nthat which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it may\neasily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may\nimagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be\nan annoyance to all.\n\nXXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates\nanything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall\nthereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast\nlove, &c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks\nfrom something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations\nof soul.\n\n>>>>>Proof--From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone\nloves anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.):\nbut we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a\nnew cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered;\nhence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again,\nfrom the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from\nanything, we shall ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.).\nIf we assume that we at the same time love it, we shall then\nsimultaneously love it and shrink from it; in other words, we\nshall be subject to vacillation (III. xvii. note). Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--From the mere fact of our conceiving that another\nperson takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Cor.) we shall\nourselves love that thing and desire to take delight therein. But\nwe assumed that the pleasure in question would be prevented by\nanother's delight in its object; we shall, therefore, endeavour to\nprevent his possession thereof (III. xxviii.). Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--We thus see that man's nature is generally so\nconstituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies\nthose who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to\nhis own love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see\nthat from the same property of human nature, whence it follows\nthat men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and\nambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall\nfind that she entirely confirms what we have said; more especially\nif we turn our attention to the first years of our life. We find that\nchildren, whose body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium,\nlaugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying;\nmoreover, they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see\nothers doing, and to possess themselves of whatever they\nconceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the images of things\nare, as we have said, modifications of the human body, or\nmodes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by\nexternal causes to act in this or that manner.\n\nXXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour,\nas far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in return.\n\n>>>>>Proof--That which we love we endeavour, as far as we\ncan, to conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.). If the\nthing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it\npleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.). In other\nwords, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about,\nthat the thing should be affected with pleasure accompanied by\nthe idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note), that it should love\nus in return. Q.E.D.\n\nXXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a\nloved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our\ncomplacency.\n\n>>>>>Proof--We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to\nbring about, that what we love should love us in return: in other\nwords, that what we love should be affected with pleasure\naccompanied by the idea of ourself as cause. Therefore, in\nproportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected\nbecause of us, our endeavour will be assisted. --that is (III. xi.\nand note) the greater will be our pleasure. But when we take\npleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something similar\nto ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. xxx);\ntherefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a\nloved object to be affected, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nXXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins\nitself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself\nhas attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the\nloved object and with envy towards his rival.\n\n>>>>>Proof--In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved\nobject is well affected towards him, will be the strength of\nhis self-approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note),\nof his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour,\nas far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely\nbound to him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if\nhe thinks that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.).\nBut this endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by\nthe image of the loved object in conjunction with the image\nof him whom the loved object has joined to itself; therefore\n(III. xi. note) he will for that reason be affected with pain,\naccompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in\nconjunction with the image of his rival; that is, he will be\n(III. xiii.) affected with hatred towards the loved object\nand also towards his rival (III. xv. Cor.), which latter he\nwill envy as enjoying the beloved object. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--This hatred towards an object of love joined\nwith envy is called \"Jealousy,\" which accordingly is nothing\nelse but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined\nlove and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who\nis envied. Further, this hatred towards the object of love will\nbe greater, in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous\nman had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love of\nthe said object; and also in proportion to the feelings he had\npreviously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him,\nhe will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he\nconceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself\nhates: and also because he is compelled to associate the image\nof his loved one with the image of him whom he hates. This\ncondition generally comes into play in the case of love for a\nwoman: for he who thinks, that a woman whom he loves\nprostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not only because\nhis own desire is restrained, but also because, being compelled\nto associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame\nand the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks from her.\n\nWe must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved\nwith the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives\nhim pain as a lover, as I will now show.\n\nXXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken\ndelight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as\nwhen he first took delight therein.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction\nwith the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of\npleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it, in\nconjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other words,\nhe will desire to possess the object of his love under the same\ncircumstances as when he first took delight therein. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to\nbe missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.\nAs he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or\ncircumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he conceives\nit to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.\n\n*****This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence of\nthe object of love, is called \"Regret.\"\n\nXXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or\nlove, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power\nof activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes or\nconstrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in his\nown being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said endeavour:\nthus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed\nto removing that pain. But (by the definition of pain), in proportion\nas the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater\npart of man's power of activity; therefore the greater the pain,\nthe greater the power of activity employed to remove it; that is,\nthe greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring to\nremove it. Again, since pleasure (III. xi. note) increases or aids\na man's power of activity, it may easily be shown in like manner,\nthat a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than to\npreserve it, and his desire will be in proportion to the magnitude\nof the pleasure.\n\nLastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain\nand pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite,\nor desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in\nproportion to the hatred or love. Q.E.D.\n\nXXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so\nthat love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal,\nregard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and\nhis hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love.\n\n>>>>>Proof--If a man begins to hate that which he had loved,\nmore of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never\nloved it. For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man\nendeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.);\nhe does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and\nby affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is\ngreater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the\nendeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his\naffection (III. xxxiii.). Now these endeavours are constrained\nby hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Cor. and III. xxiii.);\nwherefore the love (III. xi. note) will for this cause also be\naffected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love has\nbeen greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by hatred,\nthere is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object;\nwherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain,\nor in other words, will hate it more than if he had never loved\nit, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love\nwas greater. Q.E.D.\n\nXXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an\ninjury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue\nto himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the\nsame law, seek to benefit him.\n\n>>>>>Proof--To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him\nas a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour\nto remove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, in\nother words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater thereby\n--and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not carrying\nout the injury, which he planned against the object of his hatred\n--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury (III. xxviii.),\nand the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be greater\nthan his former endeavour to do injury, and will therefore prevail\nover it, as we asserted. The second part of this proof proceeds\nin the same manner. Wherefore he who hates another, etc.\nQ.E.D.\n\n*****Note--By \"good\" I here mean every kind of pleasure,\nand all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our\nlongings, whatsoever they may be. By \"evil,\" I mean every kind\nof pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have\nshown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because we\ndeem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because\nwe desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink\nfrom; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,\njudges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,\nwhat is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a\nmiser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of\nmoney the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as\nglory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man\nnothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing\nmore painful than another's success. So every man, according\nto his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or\nuseless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that\nwhich he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is\ncalled \"timidity,\" which may accordingly be defined as \"the fear\nwhereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as\nfuture by encountering a lesser evil\" (III. xxviii.). But if the evil\nwhich he fears be shame, timidity becomes \"bashfulness.\"\nLastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the\nfear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,\nfear becomes \"consternation,\" especially if both the evils feared\nbe very great.\n\nXL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and\nbelieves that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate\nthat other in return.\n\n>>>>>Proof--He who conceives another as affected with\nhatred, will thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III.\nxxvii.), that is, with pain, accompanied by the idea of an\nexternal cause. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives no\ncause for this pain except him who is his enemy; therefore,\nfrom conceiving that he is hated by some one, he will be\naffected with pain, accompanied by the idea of his enemy;\nin other words, he will hate his enemy in return. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--He who thinks that he has given just cause for\nhatred will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but\nthis case (III. xxv.) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred\nmay also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to\ninjure the object of our hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore who\nconceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy\nas the cause of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with\npain or fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause;\nin other words, he will be affected with hatred towards his\nenemy, as I said above.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that another hates him, will\n(by the last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.)\nwill endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;\nhe will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).\nNow the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury\ndone to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to repay\nit in kind. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is\ncalled \"Anger;\" the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to\nourselves is called \"Revenge.\"\n\nXLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and\nbelieves that he has given no cause for such love, he will love\nthat other in return. (Cf. XIII. xv. Cor., and III. xvi.)\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as\nthe preceding one. See also the note appended thereto.\n\n*****Note--If he believes that he has given just cause for the\nlove, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is what\nmost often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its contrary\ntook place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by\nanother. (See note to preceding proposition.) This reciprocal\nlove, and consequently the desire of benefiting him who loves\nus (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is called\n\"gratitude\" or \"thankfulness.\" It thus appears that men are much\nmore prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--When a man loves something similar to himself,\nhe endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should\nbe loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.). Therefore he who has\nconferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which\nhe feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from the hope\nof honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will endeavour,\nas far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or to regard\nit as actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives\nsomething else, which excludes the existence of the said cause\nof honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.\n\nXLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on\nthe other hand be destroyed by love.\n\n>>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that an object of his hatred\nhates him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the\nformer hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.). But if, on\nthe other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him,\nhe will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,\nand (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his emotion.\nIn other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III. xli.), and\nnot to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be\ngreater or less in proportion to the emotion from which it arises.\nTherefore, if it be greater than that which arises from hatred,\nand through which the man endeavours to affect painfully the\nthing which he hates, it will get the better of it and banish the\nhatred from his mind. Q.E.D.\n\nXLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes\ninto love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not\npreceded it.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop.\nxxxviii. of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he\nwas wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of\nloving feels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love is added\nthe pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove\nthe pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the\nidea of the former object of hatred as cause.\n\n*****Note--Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate\nanything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying\nthis greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he should\nbe injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor long\nto be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will always\nendeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as far as\nhe can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a man should\ndesire to hate someone, in order that he might love him the more\nthereafter, he will always desire to hate him. For the strength of\nlove is in proportion to the strength of the hatred, wherefore the\nman would desire, that the hatred be continually increased more\nand more, and, for a similar reason, he would desire to become\nmore and more ill, in order that he might take a greater pleasure\nin being restored to health: in such a case he would always\nendeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.) is absurd.\n\nXLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates\nanything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that\nperson.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards\nhim who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that\nanyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as\naffected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain; consequently\nhe is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the\nhater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he will hate him who\nhates anything which he himself loves (III. xiii. note). Q.E.D.\n\nXLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by\nanyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the\npleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said\nstranger as cause, under the general category of the class or\nnation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual\nstranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This is evident from III. xvi.\n\nXLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is\ndestroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by\na certain pain in us.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This is evident from III. xxvii. For in so far as\nwe conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,\nwe ourselves feel pain.\n\n*****Note--This proposition can also be proved from the\nCorollary to II. xvii. Whenever we remember anything, even\nif it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, and\nthe body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far\nas the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined\nto regard it with pain; this determination, while the image of the\nthing in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance\nof other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing,\nbut is not destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so\nfar as the said determination is checked: for this reason the\njoy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated,\nevery time we remember that object of hatred. For, as we\nhave said, when the image of the thing in question, is aroused,\ninasmuch as it involves the thing's existence, it determines the\nman to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to\ndo, when it actually did exist. However, since he has joined\nto the image of the thing other images, which exclude its\nexistence, this determination to pain is forthwith checked, and\nthe man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place.\nThis is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and\ndelight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped.\nFor when men conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future,\nand are determined to fear it; this determination is checked\nafresh by the idea of freedom, which became associated with\nthe idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom:\nthis renders them secure afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.\n\nXLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed,\nif the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the\nlatter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause: and\nwill be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have\nbeen the sole cause of either emotion.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This Prop. is evident from the mere definition\nof love and hatred (III. xiii. note). For pleasure is called love\ntowards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply\nin so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the\nother. When this condition of causality is either wholly or partly\nremoved, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part\nvanishes. Q.E.D.\n\nXLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive\nto be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than\nif it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.\n\n>>>>>Proof--A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def.\nvii.) be perceived through itself without anything else. If, therefore,\nwe conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we shall therefore\n(III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall do so with the utmost\nlove or hatred that can arise from the given emotion. But if the\nthing which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by\nnecessity, we shall then (by the same Def. vii. Part I.) conceive\nit not as the sole cause, but as one of the causes of the emotion,\nand therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves\nto be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than\ntowards anything else: to this consideration we must add the\nimitation of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.\n\nL. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or\nfear.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as\nIII. xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.\n\n*****Note--Things which are accidentally the causes of hope\nor fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such\nomens are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions\nof hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of\npleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them\nwith love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as\nmeans towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as\nobstacles, or causes of that which we fear. It follows, further,\nfrom III. xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe\nreadily in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which\nwe fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above\nor below their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions,\nwhereby men are everywhere assailed. However, I do not\nthink it worth while to point out here the vacillations springing\nfrom hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these\nemotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear\nwithout hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further,\nin so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love\nor hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear\nwhat we have said concerning love and hatred.\n\nLI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object,\nand the same man may be differently affected at different times\nby the same object.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The human body is affected by external bodies\nin a variety of ways (II. Post. iii.). Two men may therefore be\ndifferently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.\nafter Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by one\nand the same object. Further (by the same Post.) the human\nbody can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;\nconsequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected\nat different times by one and the same object. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--We thus see that it is possible, that what one man\nloves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may\nnot fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he\nonce hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.\nAgain, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,\nwhat bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it follows\nthat men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions*, hence\nwhen we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely\nby the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid, others\ntimid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call a\nman \"intrepid,\" if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to\nfear; if I further take into consideration, that, in his desire to injure\nhis enemies and to benefit those whom he loves, he is not\nrestrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me,\nI shall call him \"daring.\" Again, a man will appear \"timid\" to me,\nif he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I\nfurther take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the\nfear of an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say\nthat he is \"cowardly;\" and in like manner will everyone pass\njudgment.\n[*This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine\nintellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.]\n\nLastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment,\ninasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his emotions,\nand inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or\npain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent, are often\npurely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things alluded\nto in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that a man may be at\none time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain,\naccompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easily\nunderstand what are \"Repentance\" and \"Self-complacency.\"\n\"Repentance\" is \"pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as\ncause;\" \"Self-complacency\" is \"pleasure, accompanied by the\nidea of one's self as cause,\" and these emotions are most intense\nbecause men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).\n\nLII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with\nothers, and which we do not conceive to have any property that\nis not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long,\nas an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar\nto itself.\n\n>>>>>Proof--As soon as we conceive an object which we have\nseen in conjunction with others, we at once remember those\nothers (II. xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the\ncontemplation of one object to the contemplation of another\nobject. And this is the case with the object, which we conceive\nto have no property that is not common to many. For we\nthereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which\nwe have not before seen in conjunction with other objects.\nBut when we suppose that we conceive an object something\nspecial, which we have never seen before, we must needs say\nthat the mind, while regarding that object, has in itself nothing\nwhich it can fall to regarding instead thereof; therefore it is\ndetermined to the contemplation of that object only. Therefore\nan object, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--This mental modification, or imagination of a\nparticular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called\n\"Wonder;\" but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called\n\"Consternation,\" because wonder at an evil keeps a man so\nengrossed in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no\npower to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the\nevil. If, however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence,\nindustry, or anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man,\nis thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is\ncalled \"Veneration;\" otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c.,\nbe what we wonder at, the emotion is called \"Horror.\" Again,\nif it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love,\nthat we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater\n(III. xii.), and when joined to wonder or veneration is called\n\"Devotion.\" We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope,\nconfidence, and the other emotions, as associated with wonder;\nand we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than\nthose which have obtained names in ordinary speech. Whence\nit is evident, that the names of the emotions have been applied\nin accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with\nan accurate knowledge of their nature.\n\nTo wonder is opposed \"Contempt,\" which generally arises\n from the fact that, because we see someone wondering at,\nloving, or fearing something, or because something, at first sight,\nappears to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love,\nfear, &c., we are, in consequence (III. xv. Cor. and III. xxvii.),\ndetermined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from the\npresence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing, we\nare compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of\nwonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the\nthing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities which\nare not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on the other\nhand, the presence of the object would cause it more particularly\nto regard that which is therein. As devotion springs from wonder\nat a thing which we love, so does \"Derision\" spring from contempt\nof a thing which we hate or fear, and \"Scorn\" from contempt of\nfolly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. Lastly, we can\nconceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c., in association\nwith contempt, and can thence deduce other emotions, which are\nnot distinguished one from another by any recognized name.\n\nLIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity,\nit feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the\ndistinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of\nactivity.\n\n>>>>>Proof--A man does not know himself except through the\nmodifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and xxiii.).\nWhen, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is thereby\nassumed to pass to a greater perfection, or (III. xi. note) to feel\npleasure; and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the\ndistinctness, wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own\npower of activity. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual\nessence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind obviously\nonly affirms that which the mind is and can do; not that which it\nneither is nor can do; therefore the mind endeavours to conceive\nonly such things as assert or affirm its power of activity. Q.E.D.\n\nLV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain\nthereat.\n\n>>>>>Proof--The essence of the mind only affirms that which\nthe mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to\nconceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last\nProp.). Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own\nweakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting\nto conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is\nchecked in its endeavour -- in other words (III. xi. note), it feels\npain. Q.E.D.\n\n<<<<>>>>Proof--Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or\n(III. xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby\na man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is\nchecked. But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,\nwhich cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a man\nwill not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the same\nthing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to another's\nnature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot be checked,\nnor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in some one\nunlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an one. But\nhe can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same nature\nas himself. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,\nwe venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,\n&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be\npeculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore,\nno more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall,\nor lions for being courageous.\n\nLVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire,\nand of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations\nof spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear,\n&c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.\n\n>>>>>Proof--Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions\ncompounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or\npassive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive\n(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so\nfar as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is, we\nare only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we conceive,\nor (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by an emotion,\nwhich involves the nature of our own body, and the nature of an\nexternal body. Wherefore the nature of every passive state must\nnecessarily be so explained, that the nature of the object whereby\nwe are affected be expressed. Namely, the pleasure, which\narises from, say, the object A, involves the nature of that object\nA, and the pleasure, which arises from the object B, involves\nthe nature of the object B; different, inasmuch as the causes\nwhence they arise are by nature different. So again the emotion\nof pain, which arises from one object, is by nature different from\nthe pain arising from another object, and, similarly, in the case\nof love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation, &c.\n\nThus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain, love,\nhatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are\naffected. Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far\nas it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any\ngiven modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore, according\nas a man is affected through external causes by this or that kind\nof pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words, according\nas his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so will his desire\nbe of one kind or another, and the nature of one desire must\nnecessarily differ from the nature of another desire, as widely\nas the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose. Thus there\nare as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of pleasure,\npain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown) there\nare as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects\nwhereby we are affected. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last\nproposition, must be very numerous, the chief are \"luxury,\"\n\"drunkenness,\" \"lust,\" \"avarice,\" and \"ambition,\" being merely\nspecies of love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions\nin a manner varying according to the object, with which they are\nconcerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,\n&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,\nvenery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so\nfar as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects\nwherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For\n\"temperance,\" \"sobriety,\" and \"chastity,\" which we are wont\nto oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions\nor passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which\nmoderates the last-named emotions. However, I cannot here\nexplain the remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are\nas numerous as the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it\nbe necessary. It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to\ndetermine the strength of the emotions, and the mind's power\nover them, to have a general definition of each emotion. It is\nsufficient, I repeat, to understand the general properties of the\nemotions and the mind, to enable us to determine the quality\nand extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking\nthe emotions. Thus, though there is a great difference between\nvarious emotions of love, hatred, or desire, for instance\nbetween love felt towards children, and love felt towards a wife,\nthere is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences,\nor to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions.\n\n LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion\nof another individual, only in so far as the essence of the one\nindividual differs from the essence of the other.\n\n>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which\nsee after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.). Nevertheless, we will\nprove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.\n\nAll emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain, as\ntheir definitions above given show. But desire is each man's\nnature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one individual\ndiffers from desire in another individual, only in so far as the\nnature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence\nof the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive states or\npassions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to persist\nin his being is increased or diminished, helped or hindered (III.\nxi. and note). But by the endeavour to persist in its being, in\nso far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction, we\nmean appetite and desire (III. ix. note); therefore pleasure and\npain are identical with desire or appetite, in so far as by\nexternal causes they are increased or diminished, helped or\nhindered, in other words, they are every man's nature; wherefore\nthe pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure\nand pain felt by another man, only in so far as the nature or\nessence of the one man differs from the essence of the other;\nconsequently, any emotion of one individual only differs, &c.\nQ.E.D.\n\n*****Note--Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals\nwhich are called irrational (for after learning the origin of mind\nwe cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's emotions,\nto the extent that brute nature differs from human nature. Horse\nand man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but\nthe desire of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human.\nSo also the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must\nneeds very according to the several natures. Thus, although each\nindividual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to\nhim wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content\nand rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said\nindividual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from\nthe joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs\nfrom the essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing\nproposition, that there is no small difference between the joy\nwhich actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a\nphilosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I\nhave treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as\nhe is passive. It remains to add a few words on those\nattributable to him in so far as he is active.\n\nLVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or\npassions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and\ndesire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.\n\n>>>>>Proof--When the mind conceives itself and its power\nof activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind necessarily\ncontemplates itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea\n(II. xliii). But the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas\n(II. xl. note ii.). Therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it is active\n(III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has clear and\ndistinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours\nto persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such an endeavour\nwe mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.); therefore,\ndesire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand,\nor (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.\n\nLIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active,\nthere are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire.\n\n>>>>>Proof--All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure,\nor pain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain\nwe mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or\nchecked (III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind\nfeels pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is\ndiminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions\ncan be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but\nonly emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)\nare attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D.\n\n*****Note--All actions following from emotion, which are\nattributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set\ndown to \"strength of character\" (\"fortitudo\"), which I divide\ninto \"courage\" (\"animositas\") and \"highmindedness\"\n(\"generositas\"). By \"courage\" I mean \"the desire whereby\nevery man strives to preserve his own being in accordance\nsolely with the dictates of reason.\" By \"highmindedness\" I\nmean \"the desire whereby every man endeavours, solely\nunder the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unite\nthem to himself in friendship.\" Those actions, therefore,\nwhich have regard solely to the good of the agent I set\ndown to courage, those which aim at the good of others I\nset down to highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety,\nand presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of courage;\ncourtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness.\n\nI think I have thus explained, and displayed through their primary\ncauses the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, which\narise from the combination of the three primary emotions, to wit,\ndesire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I have said,\nthat we are in many ways driven about by external causes, and\nthat like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to\nand fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I have said,\nthat I have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions, not all\nthat might be given. For, by proceeding in the same way as\nabove, we can easily show that love is united to repentance,\nscorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree from what has\nbeen said, that the emotions may be compounded one with\nanother in so many ways, and so many variations may arise\ntherefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However,\nfor my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most\nimportant; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be\nmore curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning\nlove, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a\nthing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,\nacquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another\nway, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind\nbegins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example,\nwhen we conceive something which generally delights us with\nits flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we\nare thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is\notherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus\notherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present\nbe stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to\neat it be stimulated also, the new disposition of the body\nwill feel repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently\nthe presence of the food which we formerly longed for will\nbecome odious. This revulsion of feeling is called \"satiety\"\nor weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward\nmodifications of the body observable in emotions, such,\nfor instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c.,\nfor these are attributable to the body only, without any\nreference to the mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions\nrequire to be supplemented in a few points; I will therefore\nrepeat them, interpolating such observations as I think should\nhere and there be added.\n\n\nDEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS\n\nI. \"Desire\" is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived,\nas determined to a particular activity by some given modification\nof itself.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--We have said above, in the note to\nProp. ix. of this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness\nthereof; further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far\nas it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own\npersistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that,\nstrictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite\nand desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite\nor not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order\nto avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from\nexplaining desire by appetite; but I have taken care to define\nit in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all\nthose endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by\nthe terms appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed,\nhave said, that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is\nconceived as determined to a particular activity; but from\nsuch a definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the\nmind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore,\nin order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it was\nnecessary to add, \"in so far as it is determined by some given\nmodification,\" &c. For, by a modification of man's essence,\nwe understand every disposition of the said essence, whether\nsuch disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solely\nunder the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute\nof extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously\nto both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I here\nmean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions,\nwhich vary according to each man's disposition, and are,\ntherefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according\nas a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not\nwhere to turn.\n\nII. \"Pleasure\" is the transition of a man from a less to a greater\nperfection.\n\nIII. \"Pain\" is the transition of a man from a greater to a less\nperfection.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--I say transition: for pleasure is not\nperfection itself. For, if man were born with the perfection\nto which he passes, he would possess the same, without the\nemotion of pleasure. This appears more clearly from the\nconsideration of the contrary emotion, pain. No one can\ndeny, that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection,\nand not in the less perfection itself: for a man cannot be\npained, in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree.\nNeither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a\ngreater perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas the\nemotion of pain is an activity; wherefore this activity can\nonly be the activity of transition from a greater to a less\nperfection--in other words, it is an activity whereby a man's\npower of action is lessened or constrained (cf. III. xi. note).\nI pass over the definitions of merriment, stimulation, melancholy,\nand grief, because these terms are generally used in reference\nto the body, and are merely kinds of pleasure or pain.\n\nIV. \"Wonder\" is the conception (imaginatio) of anything,\nwherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular\nconcept in question has no connection with other concepts\n(cf. III. lii. and note).\n\n^^^^^Explanation--In the note to II. xviii. we showed the\nreason, why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing,\nstraightway falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely,\nbecause the images of the two things are so associated and\narranged, that one follows the other. This state of association\nis impossible, if the image of the thing be new; the mind will\nthen be at a stand in the contemplation thereof, until it is\ndetermined by other causes to think of something else.\n\nThus the conception of a new object, considered in itself,\nis of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not\ninclude wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I\nshould so include it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind\narises from no positive cause drawing away the mind from\nother objects, but merely from the absence of a cause,\nwhich should determine the mind to pass from the\ncontemplation of one object to the contemplation of another.\n\nI, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions\n(as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure, pain, and\ndesire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is customary\nto speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitive\nones by different names, when they are referred to the objects\nof our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a definition\nof contempt.\n\nV. \"Contempt\" is the conception of anything which touches\nthe mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine\nthose qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it\n(cf. III. lii. note).\n\nThe definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for\nI am not aware that any emotions are named after them.\n\nVI. \"Love\" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external\ncause.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly\nthe essence of love; the definition given by those authors who\nsay that love is \"the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved\nobject\" expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,\nas such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,\nthey have been unable to acquire a true conception of its\nproperties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted\nto be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I\nsay that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to\nunite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by\n\"wish\" consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind\n(for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither\ndo I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when\nit is absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand;\nfor love can be conceived without either of these desires; but\nby \"wish\" I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on\naccount of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the\npleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.\n\nVII. \"Hatred\" is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external\ncause.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--These observations are easily grasped\nafter what has been said in the explanation of the preceding\ndefinition (cf. also III. xiii. note).\n\nVIII. \"Inclination\" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of\nsomething which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.\n\nIX. \"Aversion\" is pain, accompanied by the idea of something\nwhich is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).\n\nX. \"Devotion\" is love towards one whom we admire.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have\nshown, III. lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it\nhappens that the object of our wonder is often conceived\nby us, we shall cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the\nemotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love.\n\nXI. \"Derision\" is pleasure arising from our conceiving the\npresence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which\nwe hate.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we\nhate, we deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that\nextent rejoice (III. xx.). But since we assume that man hates\nthat which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question\nis not without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).\n\nXII. \"Hope\" is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea\nof something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent\ndoubt the issue.\n\nXIII. \"Fear\" is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of\nsomething past or future, whereof we to a certain extent\ndoubt the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).\n\n^^^^^Explanation--From these definitions it follows, that\nthere is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled\nwith hope. For he, who depends on hope and doubts\nconcerning the issue of anything, is assumed to conceive\nsomething, which excludes the existence of the said thing\nin the future; therefore he, to this extent, feels pain (cf. III.\nxix.); consequently, while dependent on hope, he fears\nfor the issue. Contrariwise he, who fears, in other words\ndoubts, concerning the issue of something which he hates,\nalso conceives something which excludes the existence of\nthe thing in question; to this extent he feels pleasure, and\nconsequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out as\nhe desires (III. xx.).\n\nXIV. \"Confidence\" is pleasure arising from the idea of\nsomething past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has\nbeen removed.\n\nXV. \"Despair\" is pain arising from the idea of something past\nor future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Thus confidence springs from hope, and\ndespair from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue\nof an event has been removed: this comes to pass, because\nman conceives something past or future as present and\nregards it as such, or else because he conceives other things,\nwhich exclude the existence of the causes of his doubt. For,\nalthough we can never be absolutely certain of the issue\nof any particular event (II. xxxi. Cor.), it may nevertheless\nhappen that we feel no doubt concerning it. For we have\nshown, that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the\nsame as to be quite certain of it (II. xlix. note). Thus it\nmay happen that we are affected by the same emotion\nof pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or future, as\nconcerning the conception of a thing present; this I have\nalready shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I refer\nthe reader.\n\nXVI. \"Joy\" is pleasure accompanied by the idea of\nsomething past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.\n\nXVII. \"Disappointment\" is pain accompanied by the idea\nof something past, which has had an issue contrary to our\nhope.\n\nXVIII. \"Pity\" is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which\nhas befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like\nourselves (cf. III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia)\nthere seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former\nterm is used in reference to a particular action, and the latter\nin reference to a disposition.\n\nXIX. \"Approval\" is love towards one who has done good to\nanother.\n\nXX. \"Indignation\" is hatred towards one who has done evil to\nanother.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--I am aware that these terms are employed\nin senses somewhat different from those usually assigned. But\nmy purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the\nnature of things. I therefore make use of such terms, as may\nconvey my meaning without any violent departure from their\nordinary signification. One statement of my method will suffice.\nAs for the cause of the above-named emotions see III. xxvii.\nCor. i., and III. xxii. note.\n\nXXI. \"Partiality\" is thinking too highly of anyone because of\nthe love we bear him.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, and\ndisparagement an effect of hatred: so that \"partiality\" may\nalso be defined as \"love, in so far as it induces a man to\nthink too highly of a beloved object.\" Contrariwise,\n\"disparagement\" may be defined as \"hatred, in so far as\nit induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object.\"\nCf. III. xxvi. note.\n\nXXIII. \"Envy\" is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be\npained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's\nevil fortune.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy,\nwhich, by doing some violence to the meaning of the word,\nmay therefore be thus defined:\n\nXXIV. \"Sympathy\" (misericordia) is love, in so far as it\ninduces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune,\nand pain at another's evil fortune.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to II.\nxxiv. and xxxii. These emotions also arise from pleasure\nor pain accompanied by the idea of something external, as\ncause either in itself or accidentally. I now pass on to other\nemotions, which are accompanied by the idea of something\nwithin as a cause.\n\nXXV. \"Self-approval\" is pleasure arising from a man's\ncontemplation of himself and his own power of action.\n\nXXVI. \"Humility\" is pain arising from a man's contemplation\nof his own weakness of body or mind.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Self-complacency is opposed to\nhumility, in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from\na contemplation of our own power of action; but, in so far\nas we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of\nany action which we believe we have performed by the free\ndecision of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we\nmay thus define:\n\nXXVII. \"Repentance\" is pain accompanied by the idea of\nsome action, which we believe we have performed by the\nfree decision of our mind.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have\nset forth in III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note.\nConcerning the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note.\nThis is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is\nnothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly\ncalled \"wrong,\" are followed by pain, and all those, which are\ncalled \"right,\" are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather\nfrom what has been said, that this depends in great measure\non education. Parents, by reprobating the former class of\nactions, and by frequently chiding their children because of\nthem, and also by persuading to and praising the latter class,\nhave brought it about, that the former should be associated\nwith pain and the latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by\nexperience. For custom and religion are not the same\namong all men, but that which some consider sacred others\nconsider profane, and what some consider honourable others\nconsider disgraceful. According as each man has been\neducated, he feels repentance for a given action or glories\ntherein.\n\nXXVIII. \"Pride\" is thinking too highly of one's self from\nself-love.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality,\nfor the latter term is used in reference to an external object,\nbut pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself.\nHowever, as partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the\neffect or property of \"self-love,\" which may therefore be\nthus defined, \"love of self or self-approval, in so far as it\nleads a man to think too highly of himself.\" To this emotion\nthere is no contrary. For no one thinks too meanly of\nhimself because of self-hatred; I say that no one thinks too\nmeanly of himself, in so far as he conceives that he is\nincapable of doing this or that. For whatsoever a man\nimagines that he is incapable of doing, he imagines this of\nnecessity, and by that notion he is so disposed, that he\nreally cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do.\nFor, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long\nis he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is\nit impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider\nsuch matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it\nconceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself;\nfor it may happen, that a man, sorrowfully regarding his\nown weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all\nmen, while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less\nthan of despising him. Again, a man may think too meanly\nof himself, if he deny of himself in the present something\nin relation to a future time of which he is uncertain. As,\nfor instance, if he should say that he is unable to form any\nclear conceptions, or that he can desire and do nothing but\nwhat is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that a man\nthinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive\nfear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,\nventure. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride\nan emotion which I will call self-abasement, for as from\nself-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs\nself-abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:\n\nXXIX. \"Self-abasement\" is thinking too meanly of one's\nself by reason of pain.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--We are nevertheless generally\naccustomed to oppose pride to humility, but in that case\nwe pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than\nto its nature. We are wont to call \"proud\" the man who\nboasts too much (III. xxx. note), who talks of nothing but\nhis own virtues and other people's faults, who wishes to\nbe first; and lastly who goes through life with a style and\npomp suitable to those far above him in station. On the\nother hand, we call \"humble\" the man who too often blushes,\nwho confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues,\nand who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of\nhis attire. However, these emotions, humility and\nself-abasement, are extremely rare. For human nature,\nconsidered in itself, strives against them as much as it can\n(see III. xiii., liv.); hence those, who are believed to be\nmost self-abased and humble, are generally in reality the\nmost ambitious and envious.\n\nXXX. \"Honour\" (gloria) is pleasure accompanied by the\nidea of some action of our own, which we believe to be\npraised by others.\n\nXXXI. \"Shame\" is pain accompanied by the idea of\nsome action of our own, which we believe to be blamed\nby others.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--On this subject see the note to III. xxx.\nBut we should here remark the difference which exists\nbetween shame and modesty. Shame is the pain following\nthe deed whereof we are ashamed. Modesty is the fear or\ndread of shame, which restrains a man from committing a\nbase action. Modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness,\nbut the latter is not an emotion, as I will duly show; however,\nthe names of the emotions (as I have remarked already)\nhave regard rather to their exercise than to their nature.\n\nI have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions\narising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to\ntreat of those which I refer to desire.\n\nXXXII. \"Regret\" is the desire or appetite to possess\nsomething, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing,\nand at the same time constrained by the remembrance\nof other things which exclude the existence of it.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--When we remember a thing, we are\nby that very fact, as I have already said more than once,\ndisposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it\nwere something present; but this disposition or endeavour,\nwhile we are awake, is generally checked by the images\nof things which exclude the existence of that which we\nremember. Thus when we remember something which\naffected us with a certain pleasure, we by that very fact\nendeavour to regard it with the same emotion of pleasure\nas though it were present, but this endeavour is at once\nchecked by the remembrance of things which exclude the\nexistence of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is,\nstrictly speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure,\nwhich arises from the absence of something we hate (cf.\nIII. xlvii. note). But, as the name regret seems to refer\nto desire, I set this emotion down, among the emotions\nspringing from desire.\n\nXXXIII. \"Emulation\" is the desire of something, engendered\nin us by our conception that others have the same desire.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--He who runs away, because he sees\nothers running away, or he who fears, because he sees\nothers in fear; or again, he who, on seeing that another man\nhas burnt his hand, draws towards him his own hand, and\nmoves his body as though his own were burnt; such an one\ncan be said to imitate another's emotion, but not to emulate\nhim; not because the causes of emulation and imitation are\ndifferent, but because it has become customary to speak\nof emulation only in him, who imitates that which we deem\nto be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to the cause of\nemulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note. The reason why this\nemotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from\nIII. xxxii. and note.\n\nXXXIV. \"Thankfulness\" or \"Gratitude\" is the desire or\nzeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit\nhim, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit\non us. Cf. III. xxxix. note and xl.\n\nXXXV. \"Benevolence\" is the desire of benefiting one whom\nwe pity. Cf. III. xxvii. note.\n\nXXXVI. \"Anger\" is the desire, whereby through hatred we\nare induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.\n\nXXXVII. \"Revenge\" is the desire whereby we are induced,\nthrough mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar\nfeelings, has injured us. (See III. xl. Cor. ii. and note.)\n\nXXXVIII. \"Cruelty\" or \"savageness\" is the desire, whereby\na man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--To cruelty is opposed clemency, which\nis not a passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man\nrestrains his anger and revenge.\n\nXXXIX. \"Timidity\" is the desire to avoid a greater evil,\nwhich we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. xxxix.\nnote.\n\nXL. \"Daring\" is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do\nsomething dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.\n\nXLI. \"Cowardice\" is attributed to one, whose desire is\nchecked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare\nto encounter.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else\nbut the fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to\nfear; hence I do not reckon it among the emotions springing\nfrom desire. Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it\nhere, because, in so far as we look to the desire, it is truly\nopposed to the emotion of daring.\n\nXLII. \"Consternation\" is attributed to one, whose desire of\navoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he\nfears.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Consternation is, therefore, a species\nof cowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises from\na double fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a\nfear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering, that\nhe is not able to remove the evil. I say bewildered, in so\nfar as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be\nconstrained by his amazement. I say wavering, in so far\nas we understand the said desire to be constrained by the\nfear of another evil, which equally torments him: whence\nit comes to pass that he knows not, which he may avert\nof the two. On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and III.\nlii. note. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.\nnote.\n\nXLIII. \"Courtesy,\" or \"deference\" (Humanitas seu\nmodestia), is the desire of acting in a way that should\nplease men, and refraining from that which should\ndisplease them.\n\nXLIV. \"Ambition\" is the immoderate desire of power.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Ambition is the desire, whereby all the\nemotions (cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and\nstrengthened; therefore this emotion can with difficulty be\novercome. For, so long as a man is bound by any desire,\nhe is at the same time necessarily bound by this. \"The best\nmen,\" says Cicero, \"are especially led by honour. Even\nphilosophers, when they write a book contemning honour,\nsign their names thereto,\" and so on.\n\nXLV. \"Luxury\" is excessive desire, or even love of living\nsumptuously.\n\nXLVI. \"Intemperance\" is the excessive desire and love\nof drinking.\n\nXLVII. \"Avarice\" is the excessive desire and love of riches.\n\nXLVIII. \"Lust\" is desire and love in the matter of sexual\nintercourse.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--Whether this desire be excessive or\nnot, it is still called lust. These last five emotions (as I have\nshown in III. lvi.) have on contraries. For deference is a\nspecies of ambition. Cf. III. xxix. note.\n\nAgain, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,\nand chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the\nmind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an\nambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,\ndrinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear\nare not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery.\nFor an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with\nfood and drink at another man's expense. An ambitious\nman will restrain himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his\nindulgences are secret; and if he lives among drunkards\nand debauchees, he will, from the mere fact of being\nambitious, be more prone to those vices. Lastly, a timid\nman does that which he would not. For though an\navaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,\ncast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain\navaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because\nhe cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of\nabstention, cease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are\nnot so much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c.,\nas with the appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore,\ncan be opposed to these emotions, but high-mindedness\nand valour, whereof I will speak presently.\n\nThe definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind\nI pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the\ncompounding of the emotions already described; secondly,\nbecause many of them have no distinctive names, which\nshows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have\nmerely a general knowledge of them. However, it is\nestablished from the definitions of the emotions, which we\nhave set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, or\npain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three;\nwherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names\nin accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens.\nIf we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions,\nand to what has been said concerning the nature of the\nmind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in so\nfar as they are referred to the mind only.\n\n\nGENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS\n\nEmotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a\nconfused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its\nbody, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi\nvis) greater or less than before, and by the presence of\nwhich the mind is determined to think of one thing rather\nthan another.\n\n^^^^^Explanation--I say, first, that emotion or passion\nof the soul is \"a confused idea.\" For we have shown that\nthe mind is only passive, in so far as it has inadequate or\nconfused ideas. (III. iii.) I say, further, \"whereby the mind\naffirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for\nexistence greater than before.\" For all the ideas of bodies,\nwhich we possess, denote rather the actual disposition of\nour own body (II. xvi. Cor. ii.) than the nature of an\nexternal body. But the idea which constitutes the reality\nof an emotion must denote or express the disposition of\nthe body, or of some part thereof, because its power of\naction or force for existence is increased or diminished,\nhelped or hindered. But it must be noted that, when I\nsay \"a greater or less force for existence than before,\" I\ndo not mean that the mind compares the present with\nthe past disposition of the body, but that the idea which\nconstitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something of\nthe body, which, in fact, involves more or less of reality\nthan before.\n\nAnd inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact\n(II. xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own\nbody, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the\nvery essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to\ngreater or less perfection, when it happens to affirm\nconcerning its own body, or any part thereof, something\ninvolving more or less reality than before.\n\nWhen, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind\nis increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind\nhad formed of its own body, or of some part thereof, an\nidea involving more or less of reality, than it had already\naffirmed concerning its own body. For the excellence of\nideas, and the actual power of thinking are measured by\nthe excellence of the object. Lastly, I have added \"by the\npresence of which the mind is determined to think of one\nthing rather than another,\" so that, besides the nature of\npleasure and pain, which the first part of the definition\nexplains, I might also express the nature of desire.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nEND OF PART III","title":"Ethics \u2014 Part 3","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":22580}