{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_971/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_971","id":"gutenberg_971","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/971","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics","Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBenedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS\n(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)\n\nTranslated by R. H. M. Elwes\n\n\n\n\n\nPART IV:  Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nHuman infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage:\nfor, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but\nlies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled,\nwhile seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse.\nWhy this is so, and what is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to\nshow in this part of my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well\nto make a few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection,\ngood and evil.\n\nWhen a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has brought it\nto perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, not only by\nhimself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks that he knows,\nthe intention and aim of its author. For instance, suppose anyone sees a\nwork (which I assume to be not yet completed), and knows that the aim\nof the author of that work is to build a house, he will call the work\nimperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he\nsees that it is carried through to the end, which its author had purposed\nfor it. But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen\nbefore, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he plainly\ncannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. Such seems to\nbe the primary meaning of these terms.\n\nBut, after men began to form general ideas, to think out types of\nhouses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to others,\nit came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw agree\nwith the general idea he had formed of the thing in question, and called\nimperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type,\neven though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea\nof its artificer.  This seems to be the only reason for calling natural\nphenomena, which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or\nimperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural, no\nless than of things artificial, and such ideas they hold as types,\nbelieving that Nature (who they think does nothing without an object)\nhas them in view, and has set them as types before herself. Therefore,\nwhen they behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to\nthe preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question,\nthey say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has left\nher work incomplete. Thus we see that men are wont to style natural\nphenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than\nfrom true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.\n\nNow we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does not work\nwith an end in view. For the eternal and infinite Being, which we call\nGod or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists. For\nwe have shown, that by the same necessity of its nature, whereby it\nexists, it likewise works (I:xvi.). The reason or cause why God or Nature\nexists, and the reason why he acts, are one and the same.  Therefore,\nas he does not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for\nthe sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is neither\norigin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final is nothing else\nbut human desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause\nof anything. For example, when we say that to be inhabited is the final\ncause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that a man,\nconceiving the conveniences of household life, had a desire to build a\nhouse. Wherefore, the being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as\na final cause, is nothing else but this particular desire, which is\nreally the efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause,\nbecause men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires.\nThey are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions\nand appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined\nto any particular desire. Therefore, the common saying that Nature\nsometimes falls short, or blunders, and produces things which are\nimperfect, I set down among the glosses treated of in the Appendix to\nPart 1.  Perfection and imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes\nof thinking, or notions which we form from a comparison among one\nanother of individuals of the same species; hence I said above\n(II:Def.vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing.\nFor we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one\ngenus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category of\nBeing, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong. Thus, in\nso far as we refer the individuals in nature to this category, and\ncomparing them one with another, find that some possess more of being or\nreality than others, we, to this extent, say that some are more perfect\nthan others. Again, in so far as we attribute to them anything implying\nnegation - as term, end, infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them\nimperfect, because they do not affect our mind so much as the things\nwhich we call perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency,\nor because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope of a\nthing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity of the nature\nof its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the\nnature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass.\n\nAs for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality in\nthings regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking, or\nnotions which we form from the comparison of things one with another.\nThus one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad, and\nindifferent. For instance, music is good for him that is melancholy,\nbad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is neither good nor\nbad.\n\nNevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be retained.\nFor, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human\nnature which we may hold in view, it will be useful for us to retain\nthe terms in question, in the sense I have indicated.\n\nIn what follows, then, I shall mean by, \"good\" that, which we\ncertainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type\nof human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by \"bad,\" that\nwhich we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the\nsaid type.  Again, we shall that men are more perfect, or more imperfect,\nin proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type.\nFor it must be specially remarked that, when I say that a man passes\nfrom a lesser to a greater perfection, or vice versa, I do not mean\nthat he is changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance,\na horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man,\nas by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that we conceive the\nthing's power of action, in so far as this is understood by its nature,\nto be increased or diminished. Lastly, by perfection in general I shall,\nas I have said, mean reality in other words, each thing's essence, in so\nfar as it exists, and operates in a particular manner, and without paying\nany regard to its duration. For no given thing can be said to be more\nperfect, because it has passed a longer time in existence. The duration\nof things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence of\nthings involves no fixed and definite period of existence; but everything,\nwhether it be more perfect or less perfect, will always be able to persist\nin existence with the same force wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in\nthis respect, all things are equal.\n\n\n\nDEFINITIONS.\n\nI. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.\n\nII. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance\nto us in the attainment of any good. (Concerning these terms see the\nforegoing preface towards the end.)\n\nIII. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regarding\ntheir essence only, we find nothing therein, which necessarily asserts\ntheir existence or excludes it.\n\nIV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while regarding the\ncauses whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether such causes\nbe determined for producing them.\n\n(In I:xxxiii.note.i., I drew no distinction between possible and\ncontingent, because there was in that place no need to distinguish\nthem accurately.)\n\nV. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in different\ndirections, though they are of the same kind, such as luxury and\navarice, which are both species of love, and are contraries, not\nby nature, but by accident.\n\nVI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present, and\npast, I explained in III:xviii.,notes.i.,&ii., which see.\n\n(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly conceive\ndistance of space or time up to a certain definite limit; that is, all\nobjects distant from us more than two hundred feet, or whose distance\nfrom the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive,\nseem to be an equal distance from us, and all in the same plane; so also\nobjects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present\nby a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all\nequally distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the\nsame moment of time.)\n\nVII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a desire.\n\nVIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is\n(III:vii.), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's\nnature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what\ncan only be understood by the laws of that nature.\n\n\n\nAXIOM.\n\nThere is no individual thing in nature, than which there is not\nanother more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given, there is\nsomething stronger whereby it can be destroyed.\n\n\n\nPROPOSITIONS.\nProp. I. No positive quality possessed by a\nfalse idea is removed by the presence of\nwhat is true, in virtue of its being true.\n\nProof.- Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which\ninadequate ideas involve (II:xxxv.), nor have they any positive\nquality on account of which they are called false (II:xxxiii.);   contrariwise, in so far as they\nare referred to God, they are true\n(II:xxxii.).  Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false\nidea were removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its\nbeing true, a true idea would then be removed by itself, which\n(IV:iii.) is absurd. Therefore, no positive quality possessed by a\nfalse idea, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- This proposition is more clearly understood from II:xvi.Coroll.ii.\nFor imagination is an idea, which indicates rather the present disposition\nof the human body than the nature of the external body; not indeed\ndistinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass, that the mind is\nsaid to err. For instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it\nis distant from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so\nlong as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true distance\nis known, the error is removed, but not the imagination; or, in other\nwords, the idea of the sun, which only explains tho nature of that\nluminary, in so far as the body is affected thereby: wherefore, though\nwe know the real distance, we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun\nto be near us. For, as we said in III:xxxv.note, we do not imagine the sun\nto be so near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because\nthe mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is\naffected thereby.  Thus, when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of\nwater are reflected into our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the\nwater, though we are aware of its real position; and similarly other\nimaginations, wherein the mind is deceived whether they indicate the\nnatural disposition of the body, or that its power of activity is\nincreased or diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish\nat its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an evil,\nthe fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the contrary also\nhappens, namely, that we fear an evil which will certainly come, and our\nfear vanishes when we hear false tidings; thus imaginations do not vanish\nat the presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but because\nother imaginations, stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the\npresent existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II:.xvii.\n\n\n\nProp. II. We are only passive, in so far as\nwe are apart of Nature, which cannot be\nconceived by itself without other parts.\n\nProof.- We are said to be passive, when something arises in us, whereof\nwe are only a partial cause (III:Def.ii.), that is (III:Def.i.), something\nwhich cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature. We are passive\ntherefore in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived\nby itself without other parts. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. III. The force whereby a man persists\nin existing is limited, and is infinitely\nsurpassed by the power of external causes.\n\nProof.-This is evident from the axiom of this part. For, when man is\ngiven, there is something else - say A - more powerful; when A is given,\nthere is something else - say B - more powerful than A, and so on to\ninfinity; thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other\nthing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. IV. It is impossible, that man should\nnot be a part of Nature, or that he should\nbe capable of undergoing no changes, save\nsuch as can be understood through his nature\nonly as their adequate cause.\n\nProof.- The power, whereby each particular thing, and consequently man,\npreserves his being, is the power of God or of Nature (I:xxiv.Coroll.);\nnot in so far as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be explained by\nthe actual human essence (III:vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far\nas it is explained through his own actual essence, is a part of the\ninfinite power of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof\n(I:xxxiv.). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible, that man\nshould undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through\nthe nature of man, it would follow that he would not be able to die, but\nwould always necessarily exist; this would be the necessary consequence\nof a cause whose power was either finite or infinite; namely, either of\nman's power only, inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself\nall changes which could spring from external causes; or of the infinite\npower of Nature, whereby all individual things would be so ordered, that\nman should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended\ntowards his own preservation. But the first alternative is absurd (by the\nlast Prop., the proof of which is universal, and can be applied to all\nindividual things). Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be\ncapable of undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely\nthrough his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as we have\nshown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from the infinite\npower of God, and consequently (I:xvi.) from the necessity of the divine\nnature, in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given\nman, the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of\nextension and thought must be deducible. It would therefore follow (I:xxi.)\nthat man is infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.\nIt is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any changes save\nthose whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a prey to\nhis passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of nature, and\nthat he accommodates himself thereto, as much as the nature of things\ndemands.\n\n\n\nProp. V. The power and increase of every\npassion, and its persistence in existing\nare not defined by the power, whereby we\nourselves endeavour to persist in existing,\nbut by the power of an external cause\ncompared with our own.\n\nProof.- The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our\nessence alone (III:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.), the power of\na passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we ourselves\nendeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in II:xvi.) must\nnecessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared\nwith our own. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. VI. The force of any passion or emotion\ncan overcome the rest of a man's activities or\npower, so that the emotion becomes obstinately\nfixed to him.\n\nProof.- The force and increase of any passion and its persistence in\nexisting are defined by the power of an external cause compared with\nour own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore (IV:iii.) it can overcome a\nman's power, &e. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. VII. An emotion can only be controlled\nor destroyed by another emotion contrary\nthereto, and with more power for controlling\nemotion.\n\nProof.- Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is an idea,\nwhereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existence\nthan before (cf. the general Definition of the Emotions at the end of\nPart III.) When, therefore, the mind is assailed by any emotion, the\nbody is at the same time affected with a modification whereby its power\nof activity is increased or diminished. Now this modification of the body\n(IV:v.) receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being;\nwhich force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II:vi.),\nin virtue of the body being affected with a modification contrary to\n(III:v.) and stronger than itself (IV.Ax.); wherefore (II:xii.) the mind\nis affected by the idea of a modification contrary to, and stronger than\nthe former modification, in other words, (by the general definition\nof the emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and\nstronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy the\nexistence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor\ncontrolled except by a contrary and stronger emotion. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, can\nonly be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of\nthe body contrary to, and stronger than, that which we are undergoing.\nFor the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an\nemotion contrary to, and stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the\ngeneral Definition of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification\nof the body contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we\nundergo.\n\n\n\nProp. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil\nis nothing else but the emotions of pleasure\nor pain, in so far as we are conscious\nthereof.\n\nProof.- We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or the\nreverse in preserving our being (IV:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.),\nwhen it increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of activity.\nThus, in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or\npain, we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil\nis nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily\nfollows from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II:xxii.). But this idea\nis united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body\n(II:xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction between this idea and\nthe emotion or idea of the modification of the body, save in conception\nonly. Therefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the\nemotion, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive\nthe cause to be with us at the present time,\nis stronger than if we did not conceive the\ncause to be with us.\n\nProof.- Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the mind regards\na thing as present (II:xvii.note), but which indicates the disposition of\nthe mind rather than the nature of the external thing (II:xvi.Coroll.ii).\nAn emotion is therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the\ndisposition of the body. But a conception (by II:xvii.) is stronger,\nso long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence\nof the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more\nintense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time,\nthan when we do not conceive the cause to be with us. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- When I said above in III:xviii. that we are affected by the image\nof what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived\nwere present, I expressly stated, that this is only true in so far as we\nlook solely to the image of the thing in question itself ; for the thing's\nnature is unchanged, whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny\nthat the image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other\nthings which exclude the present existence of the future object: I did\nnot expressly call attention to the fact, because I purposed to treat\nof the strength of the emotions in this part of my work.\n\nCorollary.- The image of something past or future, that is, of a thing\nwhich we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to the\nexclusion of time present, is, when other conditions are equal, weaker\nthan the image of something present; consequently an emotion felt towards\nwhat is past or future is less intense, other conditions being equal,\nthan an emotion felt towards something present.\n\n\n\nProp. X. Towards something future, which we\nconceive as close at hand, we are affected\nmore intensely, than if we conceive that\nits time for existence is separated from\nthe present by a longer interval; so too\nby the remembrance of what we conceive to\nhave not long passed away we are affected\nmore intensely, than if we conceive that\nit has long passed away.\n\nProof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or not long\npassed away, we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object\nless, than if its period of future existence were more distant from the\npresent, or if it had long passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the\nforegoing Prop.) we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- From the remarks made in IV:Def.vi. of this part it follows\nthat, if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than\nwe can define in conception, though their dates of occurrence be widely\nseparated one from the other, they all affect us equally faintly.\n\n\n\nProp. XI. An emotion towards that which\nwe conceive as necessary is, when other\nconditions are equal, more intense than\nan emotion towards that which impossible,\nor contingent, or non-necessary.\n\nProof.- In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we, to that\nextent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny a thing's\nexistence, in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary :xxxiii.note.i.);\nwherefore (IV.ix.) an emotion towards that which is necessary is, other\nconditions being equal, more intense than an emotion that which is\nnon-necessary. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XII. An emotion towards a thing,\nwhich we know not to exist at the present\ntime, and which we conceive as possible,\nis more intense, other conditions being\nequal, than an emotion towards a thing\ncontingent.\n\nProof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are affected\nby the conception of some further thing, which would assert the existence\nof the former (IV:Def.iii.); but, on the other hand, we (by hypothesis)\nconceive certain things, which exclude its present existence. But, in\nso far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future, we there by\nconceive things which assert its existence (IV:iv.), that is (III:xviii.),\nthings which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards something\npossible is more vehement. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist in the\npresent, and which we conceive as contingent, is far fainter, than if we\nconceive the thing to be present with us.\n\nProof.- Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist, is more\nintense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as future V:ix.Coroll.),\nand is much more vehement, than if the future time be conceived as far\ndistant from the present (IV:x.). Therefore an emotion towards a thing,\nwhose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present,\nis far fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is,\nnevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as contingent,\nwherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard as contingent,\nwill be far fainter, than if we conceived the thing to be present with us.\nQ.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent,\nwhich we know not to exist in the present, is,\nother conditions being equal, fainter than an\nemotion towards a thing past.\n\nProof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are not\naffected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the existence\nof the said thing (IV:Def.iii.), but, on the other hand (by hypothesis),\nwe conceive certain things excluding its present existence. But, in so\nfar as we conceive it in relation to time past, we are assumed to\nconceive something, which recalls the thing to memory, or excites the\nimage thereof (II:xviii.&Note), which is so far the same as regarding\nit as present (II:xvii.Coroll.). Therefore (IV:ix.) an emotion towards a\nthing contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is fainter,\nother conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a thing past. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil\ncannot check any emotion by virtue of being true,\nbut only in so far as it is considered as an emotion.\n\nProof.- An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a\ngreater or less force of existing than before (by the general Definition\nof the Emotions); therefore it has no positive quality, which can be\ndestroyed by the presence of what is true; consequently the knowledge\nof good and evil cannot, by virtue oi being true, restrain any emotion.\nBut, in so far as such knowledge is an emotion (IV:viii.) if it have\nmore strength for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able\nto restrain the given emotion. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XV. Desire arising from the\nknowledge of good and bad can be\nquenched or checked by many of the\nother desires arising from the\nemotions whereby we are assailed.\n\nProof.- From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it is an\nemotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the strength\nof which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises\n(III:xxxvii.). But, inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the\nfact of our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also\npresent with us, in so far as we are active (III:i.), and must therefore\nbe understood through our essence only (III:Def.ii.); consequently\n(III:vii.) its force and increase can be defined solely by human power.\nAgain, the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are\nstronger, in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore\ntheir force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external\ncauses, which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it\n(IV:iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more\nvehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and\nevil, and may, consequently, control or quench it. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge\nof good and evil, in so far as such knowledge\nregards what is future, may be more easily\ncontrolled or quenched, than the desire for\nwhat is agreeable at the present moment.\n\nProof.- Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future, is fainter\nthan emotion towards a thing that is present (IV:ix.Coroll.). But desire,\nwhich arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, though it be\nconcerned with things which are good at the moment, can be quenched\nor controlled by any headstrong desire (by the last Prop., the proof\nwhereof is of universal application). Wherefore desire arising from\nsuch knowledge, when concerned with the future, can be more easily\ncontrolled or quenched, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XVII. Desire arising from the true\nknowledge of good and evil, in so far as\nsuch knowledge is concerned with what is\ncontingent, can be controlled far more\neasily still, than desire for things\nthat are present.\n\nProof.- This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop. from\nIV:xii.Coroll.\n\nNote.- I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved by opinion\nmore readily than by true reason, why it is that the true knowledge of good\nand evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often yields to every kind of\npassion. This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:\n(Ov. Met. vii.20, \"Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.\")\n\n    The better path I gaze at and approve,\n\n   The worse - I follow.\"\nEcclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind, when he says,\n\"He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.\" I have not written the\nabove with the object of drawing the conclusion, that ignorance is more\nexcellent than knowledge, or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in\ncontrolling his emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power\nand the infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can\ndo in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I have said,\nthat in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity. The\npower of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately.\n\n\n\nProp. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is,\nother conditions being equal, stronger than\ndesire arising from pain.\n\nProof.- Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions, i.),\nthat is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his own\nbeing. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of\npleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the contrary, desire\narising from pain is, by the fact of pain being felt, diminished or\nhindered; hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be\ndefined by human power together with the power of an external cause,\nwhereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only.\nThus the former is the stronger of the two. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human infirmity\nand inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason.\nIt now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason,\nwhich of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason, and\nwhich of them are contrary thereto.\n\nBut, before I begin to prove my Propositions in detailed geometrical\nfashion, it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance, so that\neveryone may more readily grasp my meaning.\n\nAs reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands, that every\nman should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him - I mean,\nthat which is really useful to him, should desire everything which really\nbrings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavour\nas far as he can to preserve his own being. This is as necessarily true,\nas that a whole is greater than its part. (Cf. III:iv.)\n\nAgain, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the\nlaws of one's own nature (IV:Def.viii.), and as no one endeavours to\npreserve his own being, except in accordance with the laws of his own\nnature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour\nto preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in man's power\nof preserving, his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for\nits own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to\nus, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and lastly that\nsuicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by external causes repugnant to\ntheir nature. Further, it follows from Postulate iv. Part.II., that we can\nnever arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of\nour being or living, so as to have no relations with things\nwhich are outside ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that\nour intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could\nunderstand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things outside\nourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be desired.\nOf such none can be discerned more excellent, than those which are in\nentire agreement with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals\nof entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice\nas powerful as either of them singly.\n\nTherefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man - nothing,\nI repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for\nby men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds and\nbodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single\nbody, and that all should, with one consent, as far as they are able,\nendeavour to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is\nuseful to them all. Hence, men who are governed by reason - that is, who\nseek what is useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for\nthemselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,\nand, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their conduct.\n\nSuch are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus briefly to\nindicate, before beginning to prove them in greater detail. I have taken\nthis course, in order, if possible, to gain the attention of those who\nbelieve, that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful\nfor himself is the foundation of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.\n\nTherefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the case, I go\non to prove it by, the same method, as that whereby I have hitherto\nproceeded.\n\n\n\nProp. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his\nnature, necessarily desires or shrinks\nfrom that which he deems to be good or bad.\n\nProof.- The knowledge of good and evil is (IV:viii.) the emotion of\npleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof; therefore,\nevery man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks from\nwhat he thinks bad. Now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature\nor essence (Cf. the Definition of Appetite, III.ix.note, and Def. of\nthe Emotions, i.). Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his\nnature, desires the one, and shrinks from the other, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XX. The more every man endeavours,\nand is able to seek what is useful to him -\nin other words, to preserve his own being -\nthe more is he endowed with virtue; on the\ncontrary, in proportion as a man neglects\nto seek what is useful to him, that is, to\npreserve his own being, he is wanting in power.\n\nProof.- Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by man's essence\n(IV:Def.viii.), that is, which is defined solely by the endeavour made by\nman to persist in his own being. Wherefore, the more a man endeavours,\nand is able to preserve his own being, the more is he endowed with virtue,\nand, consequently (III:iv.&,vi.), in so far as a man neglects to\npreserve his own being, he is wanting in power. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or preserving his\nown being, unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his\nnature. No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, or otherwise\nthan under compulsion from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills\nhimself: which latter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for\ninstance, kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists\nround his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword, and\nforces him to turn the blade against his own heart; or, again, he may be\ncompelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins -\nthat is, to escape a greater evil by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly,\nlatent external causes may so disorder his imagination, and so affect his\nbody, that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof\nthe idea cannot exist in the mind (III:x.) But that a man, from the\nnecessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become non-existent, is\nas impossible as that something should be made out of nothing, as everyone\nwill see for himself, after a little reflection.\n\n\n\nProp. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed,\nto act rightly, and to live rightly, without\nat the same time wishing to be, act, and to\nlive - in other words, to actually exist.\n\nProof.- The proof of this proposition, or rather the proposition itself,\nis self-evident, and is also plain from the definition of desire. For the\ndesire of living, acting, &C., blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the\nEmotions, i.) the essence of man - that is (III:vii.), the endeavour\nmade by everyone to preserve his own being. Therefore, no one can\ndesire, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XXII. No virtue can be conceived\nas prior to this endeavour to preserve\none's own being.\n\nProof.- The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing\n(III:vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived as prior\nthereto, the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as\nprior to itself, which is obviously absurd. Therefore no virtue, &c.\nQ.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- The effort for self-preservation is the first and only\nfoundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing can be\nconceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.\n\n\n\nProp. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is\ndetermined to a particular action\nbecause he has inadequate ideas,\ncannot be absolutely said to act in\nobedience to virtue; he can only be\nso described, in so far as he is\ndetermined for the action because\nhe understands.\n\nProof.- In so far as a man is determined to an action through having\ninadequate ideas, he is passive (III:i.), that is (III:Def.i., &iii.),\nhe does something, which cannot be perceived solely through his essence,\nthat is (by IV:Def.viii.), which does not follow from his virtue. But,\nin so far as he is determined for an action because he understands, he\nis active; that is, he does something, which is perceived through his\nessence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience\nto virtue is in us the same thing as to act,\nto live, or to preserve one's being (these\nthree terms are identical in meaning) in\naccordance with the dictates of reason on the\nbasis of seeking what is useful to one's self.\n\nProof.- To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but\nto act according to the laws of one's own nature. But we only act, in\nso far as we understand (III:iii.) : therefore to act in obedience to\nvirtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's\nbeing in obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what is\nuseful for us (IV:xxii.Coroll.). Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his\nbeing for the sake of anything else.\n\nProof.- The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its\nbeing, is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself (III:vii.);\nfrom this alone, and not from the essence of anything else, it necessarily\nfollows (III:vi.) that everyone endeavours to preserve his being.\nMoreover, this proposition is plain from IV:xxii.Coroll., for if a man\nshould endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else, the\nlast-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue, which, by the\nforegoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in\nobedience to reason is nothing further\nthan to understand; neither does the mind,\nin so far as it makes use of reason, judge\nanything to be useful to it, save such\nthings as are conducive to understanding.\n\nProof.- The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but the essence\nof the thing in question (III:vii.), which, in so far as it exists such\nas it is, is conceived to have force for continuing in existence (III:vi.)\nand doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature (see the\nDef. of Appetite, II:ix.Note). But the essence of reason is nought else but\nour mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands (see the\ndefinition in II:xl.Note:ii.) ; therefore (III:xl.) whatsoever we endeavour\nin obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand. Again, since this\neffort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons,\nto preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this effort\nat understanding is (IV:xxii.Coroll.) the first and single basis of virtue,\nnor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior\nobject (IV:xxv.); on the other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons,\nwill not be able to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are\nconducive to understanding.\n\n\n\nProp. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly\ngood or evil, save such things as really\nconduce to understanding, or such as are\nable to hinder us from understanding.\n\nProof.- The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing beyond\nunderstanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself, save such\nthings as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing Prop.). But the\nmind (II:xli.&Note) cannot possess certainty concerning anything,\nexcept in so far as it has adequate ideas, or (what by II:xl.Note,\nis the same thing) in so far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing\nto be good or evil save such things as really conduce, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XXVIII. The mind's highest good is\nthe knowledge of God, and the mind's\nhighest virtue is to know God.\n\nProof.- The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God,\nthat is (I:Def.vi.), than a Being absolutely infinite, and without which\n(I:xv.) nothing can either be or be conceived; therefore (IV:xxvi.,\n&xxvii.), the mind's highest utility or (IV:Def.i.) good is the knowledge\nof God. Again, the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and\nonly to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. The\nmind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as we have already\nshown, the highest that the mind can understand is God; therefore the\nhighest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XXIX. No individual thing, which is\nentirely different from our own nature,\ncan help or check our power of activity, and\nabsolutely nothing can do us good or harm,\nunless it has something in common with our nature.\n\nProof.- The power of every individual thing, and consequently the power of\nman, whereby he exists and operates, can only be determined by an\nindividual thing (I:xxviii.), whose nature (II:vi.) must be understood\nthrough the same nature as that, through which human nature is conceived.\nTherefore our power of activity, however it be conceived, can be determined\nand consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual\nthing, which has something in common with us, but not by the power of\nanything, of which the nature is entirely different from our own; and\nsince we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain\n(IV:viii.), that is (III:xi.Note), which increases or diminishes, helps\nor hinders, our power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely,\ndifferent from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us\nthrough the quality which it has in common\nwith our nature, but it is bad for us in so\nfar as it is contrary to our nature.\n\nProof.- We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV:viii.), that\nis (by the Def., which see in III:xi.Note), when it diminishes or checks\nour power of action. Therefore, if anything were bad for us through that\nquality which it has in common with our nature, it would be able\nitself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature,\nwhich (III:iv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through\nthat quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand, in\nso far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown), in so far as\nit can diminish or check our power of action, it is contrary to our nature.\nQ.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony\nwith our nature, it is necessarily good.\n\nProof.- In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it cannot be\nbad for it. It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent.\nIf it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad, nothing will follow from\nits nature (IV:Def.i.), which tends to the preservation of our nature,\nthat is (by the hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing\nitself; but this (III:vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing is\nin harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing is in harmony\nwith our nature, so is it more useful or better for us, and vice versa, in\nproportion as a thing is more useful for us, so is it more in harmony with\nour nature. For, in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature, it\nwill necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto. If different,\nit can neither be good nor bad (IV:xxix.); if contrary, it will be contrary\nto that which is in harmony with our nature, that is, contrary to what is\ngood - in short, bad. Nothing, therefore, can be good, except in so far as\nit is in harmony with our nature; and hence a thing is useful, in proportion\nas it is in harmony with our nature, and vice versa. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey\nto passion, they cannot, in that respect,\nbe said to be naturally in harmony.\n\nProof. Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are understood to\nagree in power (III:vii.), not in want of power or negation, and\nconsequently not in passion (III:iii.Note); wherefore men, in so far as\nthey are a prey to their passions, cannot be said to be naturally in\nharmony. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- This is also self-evident; for, if we say that white and black only\nagree in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm that the do not\nagree in any respect. So, if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the\nfact that both are finite - wanting in power, not existing by the necessity\nof their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power of\nexternal causes - we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in\nno respect alike; therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in\nqualities which neither possess, really agree in no respect.\n\n\n\nProp. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature,\nin so far as they are assailed by those\nemotions, which are passions, or passive\nstates; and to this extent one and the\nsame man is variable and inconstant.\n\nProof.- The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely\nthrough our essence or nature (III:Def.i.&ii.), but it must be defined by\nthe power, that is (III:vii.), by the nature of external causes in\ncomparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as many kinds of\neach emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected\n(III:lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and the same\nobject (III:li), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly, that one and\nthe same man may be differently affected towards the same object, and may\ntherefore be variable and inconstant. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed\nby emotions which are passions, they can be\ncontrary one to another.\n\nProof.- A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's feeling pain,\nbecause he (Peter) possesses something similar to that which Paul hates\n(III:xvi.), or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also\nloves (III:xxxii.&Note), or for other causes (of which the chief are\nenumerated in III:lv.Note) ; it may therefore happen that Paul should hate\nPeter (Def. of Emotions: vii.), consequently it may easily happen also, that\nPeter should hate Paul in return, and that each should endeavour to do the\nother an injury, (III:xxxix.), that is (IV:xxx.), that they should be\ncontrary one to another. But the emotion of pain is always a passion\nor passive state (III:lix.); hence men, in so far as they are assailed by\nemotions which are passions, can be contrary one to another. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives that Peter\npossesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from this it seems, at first\nsight, to follow, that these two men, through both loving the same thing,\nand, consequently, through agreement of their respective natures, stand in\none another's way; if this were so, II:xxx. and II:xxxi. would be untrue.\nBut if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we shall see that the\ndiscrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not in one another's way in\nvirtue of the agreement of their natures, that is, through both loving the\nsame thing, but in virtue of one differing from the other. For, in so far\nas each loves the same thing, the love of each is fostered thereby\n(III:xxxi.), that is (Def. of the Emotions: vi.) the pleasure of each is\nfostered thereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are\nat variance through both loving the same thing, and through the agreement\nin their natures. The cause for their opposition lies, as I have said,\nsolely in the fact that they are assumed to differ. For we assume that\nPeter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession, while\nPaul has the idea of the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be\naffected with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus they\nwill be at variance one with another. We can easily show in like manner,\nthat all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences, and not on\nthe agreement between men's natures.\n\n\n\nProp. XXXV. In so far only as men live\nin obedience to reason, do they always\nnecessarily agree in nature.\n\nProof.- In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions, they\ncan be different in nature (IV:xxxiii.), and at variance one with another.\nBut men are only said to be active, in so far as they act in obedience to\nreason (III:iii.); therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so\nfar as it is defined by reason must (III:Def.ii.) be understood solely\nthrough human nature as its proximate cause. But, since every man by the\nlaws of his nature desires that which he deems good, and endeavours to\nremove that which he deems bad (IV:xix.); and further, since that which we,\nin accordance with reason, deem good or bad, necessarily is good\nor bad (II:xli.); it follows that men, in so far as they live in obedience\nto reason, necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for\nhuman nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV:xxxi.Coroll.);\nin other words, such things as are in harmony with each man's nature.\nTherefore, men in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily\nlive always in harmony one with another. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary I - There is no individual thing in nature, which is\nmore useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For that\nthing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his nature\n(IV:xxxi.Coroll.); that is, obviously, man. But man acts absolutely\naccording to the laws of his nature, when he lives in obedience to reason\n(III:Def.ii.), and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony\nwith the nature of another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among\nindividual things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in\nobedience to reason. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary II.- As every man seeks most that which is useful to him, so are\nmen most useful one to another. For the more a man seeks what is useful to\nhim and endeavours to preserve himself, the more is he endowed with virtue\n(IV:xx.), or, what is the same thing (IV:Def.viii.), the more is he endowed\nwith power to act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live\nin obedience to reason. But men are most in natural harmony, when they live\nin obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore (by the foregoing\nCoroll.) men will be most useful one to another, when each seeks most that\nwhich is useful to him. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- What we have just shown is attested by experience so conspicuously,\nthat it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: \"Man is to man a God.\" Yet it\nrarely happens that men live in obedience to reason, for things are so\nordered among them, that they are generally envious and troublesome one to\nanother. Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life,\nso that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general\nassent; in fact, men do derive from social life much more convenience than\ninjury. Let satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs, let\ntheologians rail, and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of\nuntutored rusticity, let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts;\nwhen all is said, they will find that men can provide for their wants much\nmore easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can they\nescape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not to say how much\nmore excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is, to study the actions of\nmen than the actions of beasts. But I will treat of this more at\nlength elsewhere.\n\n\n\nProp. XXXVI. The highest good of those\nwho follow virtue is common to all,\nand therefore all can equally rejoice\ntherein.\n\nProof.- To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason (IV:xxiv.),\nand whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is to understand\n(IV:xxvi.); therefore (IV:xxviii.) the highest good for those who follow\nafter virtue is to know God; that is (II:xlvii.&Note) a good which is\ncommon to all and can be possessed. by all men equally, in so far as they\nare of the same nature. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of those who\nfollow after virtue were not common to all? Would it not then follow, as\nabove (IV:xxxiv.), that men living in obedience to reason, that is\n(IV:xxxv.), men in so far as they agree in nature, would be at variance\none with another? To such an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not\naccidentally but from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good\nis common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man,\nin so far as defined by reason; and that a man could neither be, nor be\nconceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good. For\nit belongs to the essence of the human mind (II:xlvii.), to have an\nadequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.\n\n\n\nProp. XXXVII. The good which every man,\nwho follows after virtue, desires for\nhimself he will also desire for other\nmen, and so much the more, in proportion\nas he has a greater knowledge of God.\n\nProof.- Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most\nuseful to their fellow men (IV:xxxv;Coroll.i.); therefore (IV:xix.),\nwe shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavour to bring about that\nmen should live in obedience to reason. But the good which every man, in\nso far as he is guided by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue,\ndesires for himself, is to understand (IV:xxvi.); wherefore the good, which\neach follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also for others.\nAgain, desire, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is the very\nessence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.); now the essence of the\nmind consists in knowledge (III:xi.), which involves the knowledge of God\n(II:xlvii.), and without it (I:xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived;\ntherefore, in proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge\nof God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue, that\nother men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself. Q.E.D.\n\nAnother Proof.- The good, which a man desires for himself and loves, he\nwill love more constantly, if he sees that others love it also (III:xxxi.);\nhe will therefore endeavour that others should love it also; and as the\ngood in question is common to all, and therefore all can rejoice therein,\nhe will endeavour, for the same reason, to bring about that all should\nrejoice therein, and this he will do the more (III:xxxvii.), in proportion\nas his own enjoyment of the good is greater.\n\nNote 1- He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause others to love\nwhat he loves himself, and to make the rest of the world live according to\nhis own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is, therefore, hateful,\nespecially, to those who take delight in something different, and\naccordingly study and, by similar impulse, endeavour, to make men live in\naccordance with what pleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought\nby men under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be\npossessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love it are not\nconsistent in their intentions, but, while they delight to sing its praises,\nfear to be believed. But he, who endeavours to lead men by reason, does not\nact by impulse but courteously and kindly, and his intention is always\nconsistent. Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause\nin so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to\nReligion. The desire of well-doing, which is engendered by a life\naccording to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire, whereby a\nman living according to reason is bound to associate others with\nhimself in friendship, I call honour (Honestas); by honourable I mean\nthat which is praised by men living according to reason, and by base\nI mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship. I have also\nshown in addition what are the foundations of a state; and the difference\nbetween true ,virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I\nhave said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in\naccordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but man's\nallowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself,\nand to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general\ndisposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely\nin itself.\n\nSuch are the matters which I engaged to prove in IV:xviii., whereby it\nis plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather\non vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational\nquest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of\nassociating ourselves with our fellow men, but - not with beasts, or things,\nwhose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect\nto them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined\nby his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than\nbeasts have over men. Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is,\nthat we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,\ntreating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like\nours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions\n(III:Ivii.Note). It remains for me to explain what I mean by, just and\nunjust, sin and merit. On these points see the following note.\n\nNote II.- In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain praise and\nblame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.\n\nConcerning praise and blame I have spoken in III:xxix.Note: the time\nhas now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I must first say a few\nwords concerning man in the state of nature and in society.\n\nEvery man exists by sovereign natural right, and, consequently, by\nsovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the\nnecessity of his own nature; therefore by sovereign natural right every man\njudges what is good and what is bad, takes care of his own advantage\naccording to his own disposition (IV:xix. and IV:xx.), avenges the wrongs\ndone to him (III:xl.Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which he\nloves and to destroy - that which he hates (III:xxviii.). Now, if men lived\nunder the guidance of reason, everyone would remain in possession of this\nhis right, without any injury being done to his neighbour V:xxxv.Coroll.i.).\nBut seeing that they are a prey to their emotions, which far surpass human\npower or virtue (IV:vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and\nbeing at variance one with another (IV:xxxiii., xxxiv.), stand in need of\nmutual help (IV:xxxv.Note). Wherefore, in order that men may live together\nin harmony, and may aid one another, it is necessary that they should\nforego their natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain from\nall actions which can injure their fellow-men. The way in which this end\ncan be obtained, so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions\n(IV:iv.Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each\nother mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV:vii. and\nIII:xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only be restrained by an\nemotion stronger than, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting\ninjury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves.\n\nOn this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its own\nhand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and pronouncing\non good and evil; and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a\ngeneral rule of conduct, and to pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which\nis powerless in restraining emotion, but by threats (IV:xvii.Note). Such a\nsociety established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called\na State, while those who live under its protection are called citizens. We\nmay readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which\nby universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature\neveryone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his\ndisposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides\nwhat is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.\n\nIn the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only\nexist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent,\nand where everyone is bound to obey the State authority. Sin, then,\nis nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore punished by the right\nof the State only. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as merit,\ninasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the\nadvantages which a State provides.\n\nAgain, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent master of\nanything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be said to belong to\none man rather than another: all things are common to all. Hence, in the\nstate of nature, we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own,\nor to deprive a man of that which belongs to him; in other words, there is\nnothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such\nideas are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common\nconsent what belongs to one man and what to another.\n\nFrom all these considerations it is evident, that justice and\ninjustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes which\ndisplay the nature of the mind. But I have said enough.\n\n\n\nProp. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human\nbody, so as to render it capable of being\naffected in an increased number of ways, or\nof affecting external bodies in an increased\nnumber of ways, is useful to man ; and is so,\nin proportion as the body is thereby rendered\nmore capable of being affected or affecting\nother bodies in an increased number of ways;\ncontrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less\ncapable in this respect is hurtful to man.\n\nProof.- Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases\nalso the mind's capability of perception (II:xiv.); therefore, whatsoever\nthus disposes the body and thus renders it capable, is necessarily good or\nuseful (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); and is so in proportion to the extent to\nwhich it can render the body capable; contrariwise (II:xiv., IV:xxvi.,\nIV:xxvii.), it is hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less\ncapable. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about\nthe preservation of the proportion of\nmotion and rest, which the parts of\nthe human body mutually possess, is\ngood; contrariwise, whatsoever causes\na change in such proportion is bad.\n\nProof.- The human body needs many other bodies for its preservation\n(II:Post.iv.). But that which constitutes the specific reality (forma)\nof a human body is, that its parts communicate their several motions\none to another in a certain fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after\nII:xiii.). Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the\nproportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human body\nmutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the human body, and\nconsequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways\nand of affecting external bodies in many ways; consequently it is good\n(by the last Prop.). Again, whatsoever brings about a change in the\naforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another specific\ncharacter, in other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end,\nthough the point is indeed self-evident), to be destroyed, and\nconsequently totally incapable of being affected in an increased\nnumbers of ways; therefore it is bad. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the\nmind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I would here remark that I\nconsider that a body undergoes death, when the proportion of motion and\nrest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed. For I do\nnot venture to deny that a human body, while keeping the circulation of\nthe blood and other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to\nconsist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally different\nfrom its own. There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body\ndoes not die, unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience would seem to\npoint to the opposite conclusion. It sometimes happens, that a man\nundergoes such changes, that I should hardly call him the same. As I have\nheard tell of a certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness,\nand though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past\nlife, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had\nwritten to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up\nchild, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems\nincredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their\nnature so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has\nbeen an infant by the analogy of other men. However, I prefer to leave such\nquestions undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for\nraising new issues.\n\n\n\nProp. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's\nsocial life, or causes men to live\ntogether in harmony, is useful, whereas\nwhatsoever brings discord into a State is bad.\n\nProof.- For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony also causes\nthem to live according to reason (IV:xxxv.), and is therefore (IV:xxvi.\nand IV:xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason) whatsoever brings about\ndiscord is bad. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not\nbad but good: contrariwise, pain in\nitself is bad.\n\nProof.- Pleasure (III:xi.&Note) is emotion, whereby the body's power of\nactivity is increased or helped; pain is emotion, whereby the body's power\nof activity is diminished or checked; therefore (IV:xxxviii.) pleasure in\nitself is good, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive,\nbut is always good; contrariwise,\nMelancholy is always bad.\n\nProof.- Mirth (see its Def. in III:xi.Note) is pleasure. which, in so\nfar as it is referred to the body, consists in all parts of the body being\naffected equally: that is (III:xi.), the body's power of activity is\nincreased or aided in such a manner, that the several parts maintain their\nformer proportion of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good\n(IV. xxxix.), and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def. in\nthe same note to III:xi.Note) is pain, which, in so far as it is referred\nto the body, consists in the absolute decrease or hindrance of the body's\npower of activity; therefore (IV:xxxviii.) it is always bad. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive\nand bad; on the other hand, grief may be\ngood, in so far as stimulation or pleasure\nis bad.\n\nProof.- Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is pleasure, which,\nin so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some of its\nparts being affected more than the rest (see its Definition, III:xi.Note);\nthe power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of\nthe body (IV:vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus rendering\nit incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways: therefore\n(IV:xxxviii.) it may be bad. Again, grief, which is pain, cannot as such\nbe good (IV:xli.). But, as its force and increase is defined by the power\nof an external cause compared with our own (IV:v.), we can conceive\ninfinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion (IV:iii.);\nwe can, therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation,\nand preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's\ncapabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.\n\nProof.- Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause\n(Def_of_Emotions:vi.); therefore stimulation, accompanied by the idea of\nan external cause is love (III:xi.Note); hence love maybe excessive.\nAgain, the strength of desire varies in proportion to the emotion from\nwhich it arises (III:xxxvii.). Now emotion may overcome all the rest of\nmen's actions (IV:vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from the\nsame emotion, overcome all other desires, and become excessive, as we\nshowed in the last proposition concerning stimulation.\n\nNote.- Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived more easily\nthan it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby we are daily assailed,\nare generally referred to some part of the body which is affected more than\nthe rest; hence the emotions are generally excessive, and so fix the mind\nin the contemplation of one object, that it is unable to think of others;\nand although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions - and very few\nare found who are always assailed by one and the same - yet there are\ncases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed. We\nsometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that, although it be not\npresent, they think they have it before them; when this is the case with a\nman who is not asleep, we say he is delirious or mad; nor are those persons\nwho are inflamed with love, and who dream all night and all day about\nnothing but their mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for\nthey are made objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing but\ngain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but glory, they\nare not reckoned to be mad, because they are generally harmful, and are\nthought worthy of being hated. But, in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust,\n&c., are species of madness, though they may not be reckoned among diseases.\n\n\n\nProp. XLV. Hatred can never be good.\n\nProof.- When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.xxxix.),\nthat is (IV:xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that is bad.\nTherefore, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nN.B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred towards men.\n\nCorollary I.- Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and other emotions\nattributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are bad; this is evident from\nIII:xxxix. and IV:xxxvii.\n\nCorollary II.- Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base, and in\na State unjust. This also is evident from III:xxxix., and from the\ndefinitions of baseness and injustice in IV:xxxvii.Note.\n\nNote.- Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to be bad) and\nlaughter I recognize a great difference. For laughter, as also jocularity,\nis merely pleasure; therefore, so long as it be not excessive, it is in\nitself good (IV:xli.). Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself,\nsave grim and gloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate\none's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason, and\nhave convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else, save the\nenvious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort, nor sets down to my\nvirtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like, which axe signs of infirmity of\nspirit; on the contrary, the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected,\nthe greater the perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must\nwe necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use of what\ncomes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible (not to the point of\nsatiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is the part of a wise man. I say\nit is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate\nand pleasant food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty\nof growing plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,\nand the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to his\nneighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous parts, of\ndiverse nature, which continually stand in need of fresh and varied\nnourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of performing\nall the actions, which follow from the necessity of its own nature; and,\nconsequently, so that the mind may also be equally capable of -\nunderstanding many things simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees\nbest with our principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if\nthere be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is the\nbest, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for me to set\nforth the matter more clearly or in more detail.\n\n\n\nProp. XLVI. He, who lives under the\nguidance of reason, endeavours, as\nfar as possible, to render back love,\nor kindness, for other men's hatred,\nanger, contempt, &c., towards him.\n\nProof.- All emotions of hatred are bad (IV:xlv.Coroll.i.); therefore he who\nlives under the guidance of reason will endeavour, as far as possible, to\navoid being assailed by, such emotions (IV:xix.); consequently, he will\nalso endeavour to prevent others being so aspect (IV:xxxvii.). But hatred\nis increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love III:xliii.),\nso that hatred may pass into love (III:xliv.); therefore he who lives under\nthe guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is,\nwith kindness. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly, wretched.\nBut he, who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy\nand confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little\nneed of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through\nfailure, but through increase in their powers; all these consequences\nfollow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,\nthat I have no need to prove them in detail.\n\n\n\nProp. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear\ncannot be in themselves good.\n\nProof.- Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain. For fear is\npain (Def. of the  Emotions:xiii.), and hope (Def. of the Emotions,\nExplanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without fear; therefore (IV. xli.)\nthese emotions cannot be good in themselves, but only in so far as they\ncan restrain excessive pleasure (IV:xliii.). Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- We may add, that these emotions show defective knowledge and an\nabsence of power in the mind; for the same reason confidence, despair, joy,\nand disappointment are signs of a want of mental power. For although\nconfidence and joy are pleasurable emotions, they, nevertheless imply a\npreceding, pain, namely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to\nbe guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to free\nourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate fortune, directing\nour actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.\n\n\n\nProp. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem\nand disparagement are always bad.\n\nProof.- These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi., xxii.) are\nrepugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi., IV:xxvii.) bad. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. XLIX. Over-esteem is apt to\nrender its object proud.\n\nProof.- If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's sake,\nwe are apt to become elated (III:xli.), or to be pleasurably affected\nDef. of the Emotions:xxx.); the good which we hear of ourselves we readily\nbelieve (III:xxv.); and therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too\nhighly; in other words, we are apt to become proud. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. L. Pity, in a man who lives\nunder the guidance of reason, is in\nitself bad and useless.\n\nProof.- Pity (Def. of the Emotions:xviii.) is a pain, and therefore\n(IV:xli.) is in itself bad. The good effect which follows, namely, our\nendeavour to free the object of our pity from misery, is an action which\nwe desire to do solely at the dictation of reason (IV:xxxvii.); only at\nthe dictation of reason are we able to perform any action, which we know\nfor certain to be good (IV:xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under the\nguidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from the necessity\nof the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws\nand rules of nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or\ncontempt, nor will he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of\nhuman virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice.\nWe may add, that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by\nanother's sorrow or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets;\npartly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is\ngood, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this\nplace expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason. He\nwho is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion, is\nrightly styled inhuman, for (III: xxvii.) he seems unlike a man.\n\n\n\nProp. LI. Approval is not repugnant\nto reason, but can agree therewith\nand arise therefrom.\n\nProof.- Approval is love towards one who has done good to another (Def. of\nthe Emotions:xix.); therefore it may be referred to the mind, in so far as\nthe latter is active (III:lix.), that is (III:iii.), in so far as it -\nunderstands; therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nAnother Proof.- He, who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for\nothers the good which he seeks for himself (IV:xxxvii.); wherefore from\nseeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is\naided; in other words, he will feel pleasure (III:xi.Note) accompanied by\nthe idea of the benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions:xx.) is\nnecessarily evil (IV:xlv.); we may, however, remark that, when the\nsovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen\nwho has injured another, it should not be said to be indignant with the\ncriminal, for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense\nof duty to punish him.\n\n\n\nProp. LII. Self-approval may arise\nfrom reason, and that which arises\nfrom reason is the highest possible.\n\nProof.- Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of\nhimself and his own power of action (Def. of the Emotions:xxv.). But a\nman's true power of action - or virtue is reason herself (III:iii.), as\nthe said man clearly and distinctly contemplates her (II:xl., II:xliii.);\ntherefore self-approval arises from reason. Again, when a man is\ncontemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly or\nadequately, such things as follow from his power of action (III:Def.ii.),\nthat is (III:iii.), from his power of understanding; therefore in such\ncontemplation alone does the highest possible self-approval arise. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- Self-approval is in reality the highest object for which we can hope.\nFor (as we showed in IV:xxv.) no one endeavours to preserve his being for\nthe sake of any ulterior object, and, as this approval is more and more\nfostered and strengthened by praise (III:liii.Coroll.), and on the\ncontrary (III:lv.Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame\nbecomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life under\ndisgrace is almost unendurable.\n\n\n\nProp. LIII. Humility is not a virtue,\nor does not arise from reason.\n\nProof.- Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own\ninfirmities (Def. of the Emotions:xxvi.). But, in so far as a man knows\nhimself by true reason, he is assumed to understand his essence, that is,\nhis power (III:vii.). Wherefore, if a man in self-contemplation perceives\nany infirmity in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself,\nbut (III:lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked. But, if we\nassume that a man perceives his own infirmity by virtue of understanding\nsomething stronger than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines\nhis own power of activity, this is the same as saying that we conceive\nthat a man understands himself distinctly (IV:xxvi.), because (Land reads:\n\"Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur\"- which I have translated above. He -\nsuggests as alternative readings to `quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque'\n(= and that).) his power of activity is aided. Wherefore humility, or the\npain which arises from a man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does\nnot arise from the contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a\npassion. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue,\nor does not arise from reason ; but he\nwho repents of an action is doubly\nwretched or infirm.\n\nProof.- The first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing\none. The second part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in\nquestion (Def. of the Emotions:xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be\novercome, first, by evil desires; secondly, by pain.\n\nNote.- As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions,\nnamely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good\nthan harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction.\nFor, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they\nwould shrink from nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be\njoined and linked together in bonds of union?  The crowd plays the tyrant,\nwhen it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who\nconsulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended\nHumility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who are a prey to these\nemotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the\nguidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the\nblessed.\n\n\n\nProp. LV. Extreme pride or dejection\nindicates extreme ignorance of self.\n\nProof.- This is evident from Def. of the Emotions:xxviii. and xxix.\n\n\n\nProp. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection\nindicates extreme infirmity of spirit.\n\nProof.- The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation\n(IV:xxii.Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV:xxiv.). He, therefore,\nwho is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues,\nand consequently of all virtues. Again, to act virtuously is merely to\nact under the guidance of reason (IV:xxiv.): now he, that acts under the\nguidance of reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (III:xliii.).\nTherefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and consequently of\nall virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue; in other words\n(IV:Def.viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus extreme pride or dejection\nindicates extreme infirmity of spirit. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the\ndejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.\n\nNote.- Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride; for the\nlatter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a painful emotion, the\npleasurable is stronger than the painful (IV:xviii.).\n\n\n\nProp. LVII. The proud man delights in the\ncompany of flatterers and parasites,\nbut hates the company of the high-minded.\n\nProof.- Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation of himself\n(Def. of the Emotions:xxviii. and vi.); this estimation the proud man will\nendeavour to foster by all the means in his power (III:xiii.Note); he will\ntherefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose\ncharacter is too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the\ncompany of high-minded men, who value him according to his deserts. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results\nof pride, inasmuch as the proud are a, prey to all the emotions, though to\nnone of them less than to love and pity. I cannot, however, pass over in\nsilence the fact, that a man may be called proud from his underestimation\nof other people; and, therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as\npleasure arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider\nhimself superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite\nquality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising from the\nfalse opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows.\nSuch being the ease, we can easily see that a proud man is necessarily\nenvious (III:xli.Note), and only takes pleasure in the company, who fool\nhis weak mind to the top of his bent, and make him insane instead of\nmerely foolish.\n\nThough dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the dejected\nman very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch as his pain arises\nfrom a comparison between his own infirmity and other men's power or\nvirtue, it will be removed, or, in other words, he will feel pleasure, if\nhis imagination be occupied in contemplating other men's faults; whence\narises the proverb, \"The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers.\"\nContrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he thinks\nhimself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to envy as the\ndejected, they are specially keen in observing men's actions, with a\nview to fault-finding rather than correction, in order to reserve their\npraises for dejection, and to glory therein, though all the time with a\ndejected air. These effects follow as necessarily from the said emotion,\nas it follows from the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are\nequal to two right angles. I have already said that I call these and\nsimilar emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. The\nlaws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man is but\na part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should think that I have\nwished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather than\nthe nature and properties of things. For, as I said in the preface to the\nthird Part, I regard human emotions and their properties as on the same\nfooting with other natural phenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate\nthe power and ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully,\nas other things which we admire, and which we delight to contemplate.\nBut I pass on to note those qualities in the emotions, which bring\nadvantage to man, or inflict injury upon him.\n\n\n\nProp. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant\nto reason, but may arise therefrom.\n\nProof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions:xxx., and also from the\ndefinition of an honourable man (IV:xxxvii.Note.i.).\n\nNote.- Empty honour, as it is styled, is self- approval, fostered only by\nthe good opinion of the populace; when this good opinion ceases there\nceases also the self-approval, in other words, the highest object of each\nman's love (IV:lii.Note); consequently, he whose honour is rooted in\npopular approval must, day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in\norder to retain his reputation. For the populace is variable and\ninconstant, so that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers\naway. Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and readily\nrepresses the fame of others. The object of the strife being estimated as\nthe greatest of all goods, each combatant is seized with a fierce desire\nto put down his rivals in every possible way, till he who at last comes\nout victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having\ndone good to himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being\nnothing.\n\nThe points to note concerning shame (pudor) may easily be inferred\nfrom what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I will only\nadd that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good, in so\nfar as it shows, that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the\ndesire to live honourably; in the same way as suffering is good, as\nshowing that the injured part is not mortified. Therefore, though a man\nwho feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he, who is\nshameless, and has no desire to live honourably.\n\nSuch are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning the\nemotions of pleasure and pain; as for the desires, they are good or bad\naccording as they spring from good or evil emotions. But all, in so far\nas they are engendered in us by, emotions wherein the mind is passive,\nare blind (as is evident from what was said in IV:xliv.Note), and would\nbe useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance of\nreason only, as I will now briefly, show.\n\n\n\nProp. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we\nare determined by emotion wherein the mind\nis passive; we can be determined without\nemotion by reason.\n\nProof.- To act rationally, is nothing else (III:iii. and III:Def.ii.)\nbut to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity, of our\nnature {to persist} considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so\nfar as it diminishes or checks the power of action (IV:xli.); wherefore\nwe cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable\nto perform under the guidance of reason. Again, pleasure is bad only\nin so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV:xli., IV:xliii.);\ntherefore to this extent we could not be determined by, it to any action,\nwhich we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly, pleasure,\nin so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the\nfact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided); nor is the\nmind passive therein, except in so far as a man's power of action is not\nincreased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of\nhimself and his actions (III:iii., &Note).\n\nWherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a\nstate of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and\nhis own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions,\nto which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all\nemotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the\nEmotions:iv. explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions:i.) is nothing\nelse but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nAnother Proof.- A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises\nfrom one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action,\nconsidered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we pointed out in\nthe preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being sometimes good,\nsometimes bad; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad, or arises\nfrom some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV:xix.). Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of\nstriking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we\nmerely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and\nmoves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which\nis conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man,\nmoved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,\nthis result takes place (as we showed in Pt.II.), because one and the\nsame action can be associated with various mental images of things;\ntherefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same\naction by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is\nevident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is\npassive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us\nnow see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive,\nis called by us blind.\n\n\n\nProp. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure\nor pain, that is not attributable, to\nthe whole body, but only to one or certain\nparts thereof, is without utility in\nrespect to a man as a whole.\n\nProof.- Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a body, is so\nstrengthened by some external cause, that it prevails over the remaining\nparts (IV:vi.). This part will not endeavour to do away with its own\npowers, in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office;\nfor this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing\naway with its own powers, which (III:vi.) is absurd. The said part, and,\nconsequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its condition.\nWherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no\nutility in reference to a man as a whole. If it be assumed, on the other\nhand, that the part, A, be checked so that the remaining parts prevail,\nit may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no\nutility in respect to a man as a whole. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- As pleasure is generally (IV:xliv.Note) attributed to one part\nof the body, we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking\ninto consideration our health as a whole: to which it may be added, that\nthe desires which have most hold over us (IV:ix.) take account of the\npresent and not of the future.\n\n\n\nProp. LXI. Desire which springs from\nreason cannot be excessive.\n\nProof.- Desire (Def. of the Emotions:i.) considered absolutely is the\nactual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way\ndetermined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself.\nHence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III:iii.), which is\nengendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of\nman, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are\nadequately conceived through man's essence only (III:Def.ii.). Now, if\nsuch desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone\nwould be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can,\na manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives\na thing under the dictates of reason, it is\naffected equally, whether the idea be of a\nthing future, past, or present.\n\nProof.- Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it\nconceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II:xliv.Coroll.ii.),\nand is therefore affected with the same certitude (II:xliii.&Note).\nWherefore, whether the thing be present, past, or future, the mind\nconceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same\ncertitude; and whether the idea be of something present, past, or future,\nit will in all cases be equally true (II:xli.); that is, it will always\npossess the same properties of an adequate idea (II:Def.iv.); therefore, in\nso far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason, it is\naffected in the same manner, whether the idea be of a thing future, past,\nor present. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things,\nand could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should\ncontemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and\nthe mind would desire as though it were present the good which it\nconceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser\ngood in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and\nwould in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of\nevil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we can have but\na very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II:xxxi.) and the\nperiods of their existence (II:xliv.Note) we can only determine by\nimagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the\npresent. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is\nmerely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order\nof things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what\nis good or bad for us in the, present, is rather imaginary than real.\nTherefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such\nknowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be\nmore readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the\npresent time. (Cf. IV:xvi.)\n\n\n\nProp. LXIII. He who is led by fear,\nand does good in order to escape evil,\nis not led by reason.\n\nProof.- All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active,\nor in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire (III:lix.);\ntherefore, he who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil,\nis not led by reason.\n\nNote.- Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at vice than\nhow to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so\nto restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue,\nhave no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore\nit is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to\ntheir fellow-men.\n\nCorollary.- Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly,\nand shun evil indirectly.\n\nProof.- Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable\nemotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III:lix.), in other words, from\na pleasure which cannot be excessive (IV:lxi.), and not from pain;\nwherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good, not of evil\n(IV:viii.); hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and\nonly by implication shun evil. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a\nhealthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally\nshrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food, and thus\ngets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in fear of death,\nand desired directly to avoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal\nto death, not from hatred or anger but from love of the public\nwell-being, is guided solely by reason.\n\n\n\nProp. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is\nan inadequate knowledge.\n\nProof.- The knowledge of evil (IV:viii.) is pain, in so far as we are\nconscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection\n(Def. of the Emotions:iii.) and therefore cannot be understood through\nman's nature (III:vi.,& II:vii.); therefore it is a passive state\n(III.Def.ii.) which (III:iii.) depends on inadequate ideas; consequently\nthe knowledge thereof (II:xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is\ninadequate. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed only\nadequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.\n\n\n\nProp. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we\nshould pursue the greater of two goods and\nthe lesser of two evils.\n\nProof.- A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in\nreality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in so\nfar as we compare them one with another (see preface to this Part);\ntherefore, evil is in reality a lesser good; hence under the guidance of\nreason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the lesser evil\nas though it were the greater good, and we may shun the lesser good,\nwhich would be the cause of the greater evil. For the evil, which is\nhere called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really\nevil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter. Q.E.D.\n\n\n\nProp. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of\nreason, seek a greater good in the future\nin preference to a lesser good in the\npresent, and we may seek a lesser evil in\nthe present in preference to a greater evil\nin the future.\n\"Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro.\" (Van Vloten).  Bruder reads: \"Malum praesens minus, quod\ncausa est faturi alicujus mali.\" The last word of the latter is an obvious misprint, and is\ncorrected by the Dutch translator into \"majoris boni.\" (Pollock, p. 268, note.)\n\nProof.- If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future,\nit would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards\nwhat is present (IV:lxii.); wherefore, looking merely to reason, as in\nthis proposition we are assumed to do, there is no difference, whether\nthe greater good or evil be assumed as present, or assumed as future;\nhence (IV:lxv.) we may seek a greater good in the future in preference\nto a lesser good in the present, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in\nthe present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future,\nand we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause\nof a greater evil in the future. This Corollary is related to the\nforegoing Proposition as the Corollary to IV:lxv. is related to the\nsaid IV:lxv.\n\nNote.- If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out\nconcerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop. xviii.,\nwe shall readily see the difference between a man, who is led solely by\nemotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason. The former, whether\nwill or no, performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is\nhis own master and only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary\nimportance in life, and therefore chiefly, desires; wherefore I call the\nformer a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose disposition\nand manner of life it will be well to make a few observations.\n\n\n\nProp. LXVII. A free man thinks of death\nleast of all things; and his wisdom is\na meditation not of death but of life.\n\nProof.- A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is\nnot led by fear (IV:lxiii.), but who directly desires that which is good\n(IV:lxiii.Coroll.), in other words (IV:xxiv.), who strives to act, to live,\nand to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage;\nwherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom\nis a meditation of life. Q.E.D\n\n\n\nProp. LXVIII. If men were born free,\nthey would, so long as they remained free,\nform no conception of good and evil.\n\nProof.- I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who\nis born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore\n(IV:lxiv.Coroll.) he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good\nand evil being correlative) of good. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- It is evident, from IV:iv., that the hypothesis of this Proposition\nis false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the\nnature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite,\nbut only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence.\n\nThis, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to have\nbeen signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that\nnarrative no other power of God is conceived, save that whereby he\ncreated man, that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's\nadvantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being free, to eat of the\ntree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that, as soon as man should\nhave eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to\nlive. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in\nentire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in\nnature which could be more useful to him; but that after he believed the\nbeasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions\n(III:xxvii.), and to lose his freedom; this freedom was afterwards\nrecovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the\nidea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire for\nothers the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above\n(IV:xxxii.).\n\n\n\nProp. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen\nto be as great, when it declines dangers,\nas when it overcomes them.\n\nProof.- Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to\nitself, and possessing more power in restraining emotion (IV:vii.). But\nblind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as equally\ngreat (IV:v. and IV:iii.): hence, no less virtue or firmness is required\nin checking daring than in checking fear (III:lix.Note); in other words\n(Def. of the Emotions:xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,\nwhen he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat;\nor, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect\nto give battle or to retreat.\n\n Note.- What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained\nin III:lix.Note. By danger I mean everything, which can give rise to any\nevil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c.\n\n\n\nProp. LXX. The free man, who lives among the\nignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid\nreceiving favours from them.\n\nProof.- Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition\n(III:xxxix.Note); wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a benefit\non another, puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears to be\nestimated less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (III:xlii.). But\nthe free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship\n(IV:xxxvii.), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like\nvalue, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,\nand doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance.\nTherefore the free man, lest be should become hateful to the ignorant, or\nfollow their desires rather than reason, will endeavour, as far as he can,\nto avoid receiving their favours.\n\nNote.- I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they\nmen, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the most\nexcellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favours\nfrom them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind; we must,\ntherefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest we should have the\nappearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from\navaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for\noffence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in declining\nfavours, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy.\n\n\n\n\nProp. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly\ngrateful one to another.\n\nProof.- Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and\nassociated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship\n(IV:xxxv.,&Coroll.i.), only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal of\nlove, to confer benefits on each other (IV:xxxvii.), and, therefore,\nonly they are thoroughly grateful one to another. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire have for one\nanother, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure goodwill.\nMoreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as\nit generally shows, that a man is affected by excessive hatred, anger,\npride, avarice, &c. He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to\nreturn benefits, is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over\nby the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal\nhis thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one shows\na constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by an gifts be corrupted, to his\nown or the general hurt.\n\n\n\nProp. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently,\nbut always in good faith.\n\nProof.- If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a case where\nhe could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death?\nWould not his plan of self-preservation completely persuade him to deceive?\nThis may be answered by pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act\nthus, it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case\nreason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces,\nor to have laws in common, that is, not to. have any general laws, which is\nabsurd.\n\n\n\nProp. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason,\nis more free in a State, where he lives under\na general system of law, than in\nsolitude, where he is independent.\n\nProof.- The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey through fear\n(IV:Ixiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being\naccording to the dictates of reason, that is (IV:lxvi.Note), in so far\nas he endeavours to live in freedom, he desires to order his life\naccording to the general good (IV:xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we\nshowed in IV:xxxvii.Note.ii.), to live according to the laws of his\ncountry. Therefore the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom,\ndesires to possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true\nfreedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to courage and nobility\nof character (III:lix.Note). I do not think it worth while to prove\nseparately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he\nthat is strong hates no man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is\nindignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud.\nThese propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and\nreligion, are easily proved from IV:xxxvii. and IV:xlvi.; namely, that\nhatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for\nothers the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what\nwe drew attention to in the note to IV:I., and in other places; namely,\nthat the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things\nfollow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he\ndeems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him\nimpious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his\nown disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore\nhe strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and\nto remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger,\nenvy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above.\nThus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good,\nand to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of\nattaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove\nin the following Part.\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\nWhat have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been\narranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but has been set forth\npiece-meal, according as I thought each Proposition could most readily be\ndeduced from what preceded it. I propose, therefore, to rearrange my\nremarks and to bring them under leading heads.\n\nI. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our\nnature, that they can be understood either through it alone, as their\nproximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature, which cannot\nbe adequately conceived through itself without other individuals.\n\nII. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can\nbe understood through it alone, are those which are referred to the mind,\nin so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the\nremaining desires are only referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives\nthings inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined\nnot by the power of man, but by the power of things external to us:\nwherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter passions, for\nthe former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand, show\nour infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.\n\nIII. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power\nor reason, are always good. The rest maybe either good or bad.\n\nIV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the\nunderstanding or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's\nhighest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing\nelse but the contentment of spirit, which arises from the intuitive\nknowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is nothing else\nbut to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow\nfrom the necessity of his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason,\nthe ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all his\nfellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of\nhimself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence.\n\nV. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational life: and things\nare only good, in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the\nintellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. Contrariwise,\nwhatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason, and capability\nto enjoy the rational life, are alone called evil.\n\nVI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good,\nno evil can befall man except through external causes; namely, by virtue\nof man being a part of universal nature, whose laws human nature is\ncompelled to, obey, and to conform to in almost infinite ways.\n\nVII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of nature, or that\nhe should not follow her general order; but if he be thrown among\nindividuals whose nature is in harmony with his own, his power of action\nwill thereby be aided and fostered, whereas, if he be thrown among such as\nare but very little in harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to\naccommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.\n\nVIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be capable of\ninjuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life, we may\nendeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us; on the other hand,\nwhatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being, and\nenabling us to enjoy the rational life, we may appropriate to our use and\nemploy as we think best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign\nright of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.\n\nIX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing\nthan other individuals of the same species; therefore (cf. vii.) for man\nin the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life\nthere is nothing more useful than his fellow-man who is led by reason.\nFurther, as we know not anything among individual things which is more\nexcellent than a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of\nhis skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at last\nto live under the dominion of their own reason.\n\nX. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred, one\ntowards another, they are at variance, and are therefore to be feared in\nproportion, as they are more powerful than their fellows.\n\nXI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and high-mindedness.\n\nXII. It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life,\nto bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to\ngather them all into unity, and generally to do whatsoever serves to\nstrengthen friendship.\n\nXIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness. For men are\ndiverse (seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few),\nyet are they generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy.\nNo small force of character is therefore required to take everyone as he\nis, and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But\nthose who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at vice than\nin instilling virtue, and who break rather than strengthen men's\ndispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and others. Thus many from\ntoo great impatience of spirit, or from misguided religious zeal, have\npreferred to live among brutes rather than among men; as boys or youths,\nwho cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as\nsoldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in\npreference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father:\nsuffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as they may spite\ntheir parents.\n\nXIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in everything by their\nown lusts, yet their association in common brings many more advantages\nthan drawbacks. Wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they\nmay do us, and to strive to promote whatsoever serves to bring about\nharmony and friendship.\n\nXV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are attributable to\njustice, equity, and honourable living. For men brook ill not only what is\nunjust or iniquitous, but also what is reckoned disgraceful, or that a man\nshould slight the received customs of their society. For winning love those\nqualities are especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety\n(cf. IV:xxxvii.Notes.i., &.ii.; IV:xlvi.Note; and IV:lxxiii.Note).\n\nXVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such harmony is\ninsecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of spirit and moreover\nbelongs not to the exercise of reason: the same is true of compassion,\nthough this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to piety.\n\nXVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially such as have\nnot the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life. However, to give\naid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any\nprivate person. For the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate\nto meet such a call. Again, an individual man's resources of character\nare too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence\nproviding for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole,\nand has regard only to the general advantage.\n\nXVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our duty must be\nwholly different (cf. IV:lxx.Note; IV:lxxi. Note).\n\nXIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of generation arising\nfrom bodily beauty, and generally every sort of love, which owns anything\nsave freedom of soul as its cause, readily passes into hate; unless indeed,\nwhat is worse, it is a species of madness; and then it promotes discord\nrather than harmony (cf. III:xxxi.Coroll.).\n\nXX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony with\nreason, if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by\nbodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and to train them\nup wisely; and moreover, if the love of both, to wit, of the man and of\nthe woman, is not caused by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.\n\nXXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by means of the vile\noffence of slavishness or treachery. None are more readily taken with\nflattery than the proud, who wish to be first, but are not.\n\nXXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and\nreligion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet is he that\nabases himself most akin to the proud (IV:lvii.Note).\n\nXXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such matters as cannot\nbe hid. Further, as shame is a species of pain, it does not concern the\nexercise of reason.\n\nXXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed\nto justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion; and, although\nindignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity, yet is life\nbut lawless, where every man may pass judgment on another's deeds, and\nvindicate his own or other men's rights.\n\nXXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire of pleasing\nmen which is determined by reason, is attributable to piety (as we said\nin IV:xxxvii.Note.i.). But, if it spring from emotion, it is ambition,\nor the desire whereby, men, under the false cloak of piety, generally\nstir up discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows.\neither in word or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest\ngood, he, I say, will before all things strive to, win them over with\nlove: not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called\nafter his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his\nconversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and will be\ncareful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but he will dwell at\nlength on human virtue or power, and the way whereby it may be perfected.\nThus will men be stirred not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the\nemotion of joy, to endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in\nobedience to reason.\n\nXXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind\nwe may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or\nany sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides\nman, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to\npreserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt\nto our use as best we may.\n\nXXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to us, besides\nthe experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them, and\nfrom recombining their elements in different forms, is principally the\npreservation of the body; from this point of view, those things are most\nuseful which can so feed and nourish the body, that all its parts may\nrightly fulfil their functions. For, in proportion as the body is capable\nof being affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external\nbodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind capable of\nthinking (IV:xxxviii., IV:xxxix.). But there seem to be very few things\nof this kind in nature; wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we\nmust use many foods of diverse nature. For the human body is composed of\nvery many parts of different nature, which stand in continual need of\nvaried nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of\ndoing everything that can follow from its own nature, and consequently\nthat the mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.\n\nXXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of each\nindividual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one another mutual\naid. But money has furnished us with a token for everything: hence it is\nwith the notion of money, that the mind of the multitude is chiefly\nengrossed: nay, it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not\naccompanied with the idea of money as cause.\n\nXXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek money, not from\npoverty or to supply their necessary, wants, but because they, have\nlearned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring themselves to great\nsplendour. Certainly they nourish their bodies, according to custom, but\nscantily, believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on\nthe preservation of their body. But they who know the true use of money,\nand who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,\nlive content with little.\n\nXXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the various parts\nof the body, and enable them to perform their functions; and as pleasure\nconsists in an increase of, or aid to, man's power, in so far as he is\ncomposed of mind and body; it follows that all those things which bring\npleasure are good. But seeing that things do not work with the object of\ngiving us pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit\nour advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred to one\npart of the body more than to the other parts; therefore most emotions of\npleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at hand), and consequently the\ndesires arising therefrom, may become excessive. Moreover we may add that\nemotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present,\nnor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid.\n(IV:xliv.Note, and IV:lx.Note.)\n\nXXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as good all that\nbrings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we said\nabove (IV:xlv.Note), none but the envious take delight in my infirmity\nand trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected, the\ngreater is the perfection whereto we pass, and consequently the more do\nwe partake of the divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is\nregulated by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is\nled by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.\n\nAp.XXXII. (1) But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely\nsurpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an\nabsolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us.\nNevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us\nin contravention to the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are\nconscious, that we have done our duty, and that the power which we possess\nis not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;\nremembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we\nfollow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of\nthis, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other\nwords the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what\nbefalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavour to persist. For,\nin so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire anything save\nthat which is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything,\nsave to that which is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right\nunderstanding of these things, the endeavour of the better part of\nourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.\n\n\n\n\n\nEnd of Part IV","title":"Ethics \u2014 Part 4","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":22108}