{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_975/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_975","id":"gutenberg_975","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/975","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics","Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBenedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS\n(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)\n\nTranslated by R. H. M. Elwes\n\n\n\n\nPART V:  Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom\n\n\n\nPREFACE\nAt length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned\nwith the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the\npower of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions,\nand what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be\nable to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.\nIt is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the\nunderstanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body may\nbe so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions. The\nlatter question lies in the province of Medicine, the former in the province\nof Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the\nmind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its\ndominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we do\nnot possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown. Yet the\nStoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and\nthat we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled,\nby the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,\nthat no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them:\nand this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example (if I remember\nrightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog. For\nby long training it could be brought about, that the house-dog should become\naccustomed to hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares.\nTo this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the\nsoul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely,\nto that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is\nenabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also\nexternal objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in\nmotion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the\nmidst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the\nanimal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of the\nbrain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge\nthereon; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said\ngland, as there are different external objects which impel the animal\nspirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends\nthe gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once before\nby the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn\nreacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition\nwherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland.\nHe further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature\nto a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyone\ndesires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil of\nthe eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought of\nthe dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it would not have\nbrought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves\nto impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would\ndilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish to\ndilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or very\nnear objects. Lastly, he maintained that, although every motion of the\naforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular\nthought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of\nour life, yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with\nother thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'ame, I. 50.\nHe thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under\nproper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as\ndefined by him are \"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul,\nwhich are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)\nare produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the\nspirits.\" (Passion del l'ame,I.27.) But, seeing that we can join any motion\nof the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the\ndetermination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore,\nwe determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which\nwe wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which\nwe wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute\ndominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of this illustrious\nphilosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words); it is one\nwhich, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded\nfrom so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who\nhad stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow\nfrom self-evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not\nclearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the\nscholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities,\ncould maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace.\nWhat does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What\nclear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union\nwith a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him to\nexplain this union through its proximate cause. What clear and distinct\nconception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain\nparticle of extended matter? What clear and distinct conception has he got\nof thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended\nmatter? But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from\nbody, that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the\ntwo, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of\nthe whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know,\nwhat degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with\nwhat force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this\ngland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the\nanimal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have\nclosely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by\nphysical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind\nfirmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the\nmotions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become\nsuspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything\nexcept running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volition\nand motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the\nmind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one\ncannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may also\nadd, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so\nplaced that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also\nthat all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain.\nLastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its\nfreedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false.\nTherefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by\nthe understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the\nmind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have had\nexperience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from the\nsame basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to the\nmind's blessedness.\n\n\nAXIOMS.\nI. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change must\nnecessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, and continue\nuntil they cease to be contrary.\n\nII. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so far\nas its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause. (This\naxiom is evident from III.vii.)\n\n\nPROPOSITIONS.\n\nProp.I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged\nand associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or\nthe images of things precisely in the same way arranged and\nassociated in the body.\n\nProof.- The order and connection of ideas is the same (II:vii.) as the order\nand connection of things, and vice versa the order and connection of things\nis the same (II:vi.Coroll. and II:vii.) as the order and connection of\nideas. Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind\ntakes place according to the order and association of modifications of the\nbody (II:xviii.), so vice versa (III:ii.) the order and connection of\nmodifications of the body takes place in accordance with the manner, in\nwhich thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the\nmind. Q.E.D.\n\n\nPROP.II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,\nfrom the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other\nthoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause,\nand also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these\nemotions, be destroyed.\n\nProof.- That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure\nor pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of the\nEmotions:vi.,&vii.); wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality of\nlove or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those\nwhich arise therefrom are destroyed. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp.III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a\npassion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.\n\nProof.- An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the general\nDef. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a\ngiven emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so\nfar as it is referred to the mind only, by reason (II:xxi.,&Note); therefore\n(III:iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and the\nmind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known to\nus.\n\n\nProp.IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we\ncannot form some clear and distinct conception.\n\nProof.- Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived\nadequately (II:xxxviii.); therefore (II:xii.and Lemma. ii. after II:xiii.)\nthere is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and\ndistinct conception. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we cannot\nform some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a\nmodification of the body (by the general Def. of the Emotions), and must\ntherefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinct\nconception.\n\nNote.- Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed  by an effect\n(I:xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever\nfollows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II:xl.), it follows that\neveryone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and\nhis emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of\nbringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain\nthis result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as\nfar as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order\nthat the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those\nthings which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully\nacquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the\nthought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts;\nwhence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be\ndestroyed (V:ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to\narise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV:lxi.).\nFor it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man is\nsaid to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one\nand the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so\nconstituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own\nfashion (III:xxxi.Note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this\nappetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ\nfrom pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an\nactivity or virtue which is called piety (IV:xxxvii.Note.i. and second\nproof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far\nas they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited to\nvirtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all\ndesires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much\nfrom adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV:lix.). Than this remedy for the\nemotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in a\ntrue knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can\nbe devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of\nforming, adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III:iii.).\n\n\nProp.V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive\nsimply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is,\nother conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.\n\nProof.- An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greater\nthan one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III:xlix.), and,\nconsequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible,\nor contingent (IV:xi.). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else\nthan to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby\nit has been determined to action (II:xxxv.Note); therefore, an emotion\ntowards a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal,\ngreater than one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, or\ncontingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp.VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is\nless subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as\nnecessary.\n\nProof.- The mind understands all things to be necessary (I:xxix.) and to be\ndetermined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes;\ntherefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that\nit is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III:xlviii.)\nfeels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to\nparticular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the\ngreater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also\ntestifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the loss of any good is\nmitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not\nby any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an\ninfant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because it\npasses so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if most\npeople were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant,\neveryone would pity the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on\nas a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature;\nand we may note several other instances of the same sort.\n\n\nProp.VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if\nwe take account of time, are stronger than those, which are\nattributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.\n\nProof.- We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the emotion\nwherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body, being affected by\nanother emotion excluding the existence of the said thing (II:xvii.).\nWherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard as\nabsent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and\npower (IV:vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort\ncontrolled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its external\ncause (IV:ix.). But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily\nreferred to the common properties of things (see the def. of reason in\nII:xl.Note.ii.), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing\nto exclude their present existence), and which we always conceive in the\nsame manner (II:xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains\nthe same; and consequently (V:Ax.i.) emotions, which are contrary thereto\nand are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to adapt\nthemselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it; to\nthis extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp.VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of\nsimultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.\n\nProof.- Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few (III:vii.):\ntherefore (IV:v.), in proportion to the increased number of simultaneous\ncauses whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes stronger. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- This proposition is also evident from V:Ax.ii.\n\nProp.IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse\ncauses which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion\nitself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less\naffected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and\nequally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a\nsingle cause.\n\nProof-. An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind\nfrom being able to think (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); therefore, an emotion,\nwhereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at\nonce, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion, which so\nengrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one,\nthat it is unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.\nAgain, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III:vii.), consists\nsolely in thought (II:xi.), the mind is less passive in respect to an\nemotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard\nto an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation\nof a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this\nemotion (III:xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is\nless powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp.X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to\nour nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the\nmodifications of our body according to the intellectual order.\n\nProof.- The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (IV:xxx.),\nwhich are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding\n(IV:xxvii.). So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary\nto our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things\n(IV:xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear and\ndistinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II:xl.Note.ii. and\nII:xlvii.Note); consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging\nand associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual\norder. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily\nmodifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil\nemotions. For (V:vii.) a greater force is needed for controlling the\nemotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the\nintellectual order, than when they, are uncertain and unsettled. The best we\ncan do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our\nemotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical\nprecepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to the\nparticular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our\nimagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always\nready to our hand. For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life\n(IV:xlvi., & Note), that hatred should be overcome with love or high-\nmindedness, and not required with hatred in return. Now, that this precept\nof reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often\nthink over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in\nwhat manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness: we shall\nthus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which\naccordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us\n(II:xviii.). If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true\nadvantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and common\nfellowships; further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the\nresult of the right way of life (IV:lii.), and that men, no less than\neverything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such case I say\nthe wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a\nvery small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome; or, if the\nanger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will\nnevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far\nsooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As is\nindeed evident from V:vi.,V:vii.,V:viii. We should, in the same way, reflect\non courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life\nshould frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means\nwhereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and\novercome them. But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and\nconceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every\nindividual thing (IV:lxiii.Coroll. and III:lix.), in order that we may\nalways be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, if\na man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think over\nits right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby\nhe may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and\nthe fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except\nthrough a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the\nmost ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the\ndistinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger would\nfain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out the\nloudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world, are those\nwho most greedily covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is\ncommon to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.\nFor a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of\nwealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and\nshows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also\nof other people's riches. So, again, those who have been ill received by a\nwoman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other\nstock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,\ndirectly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart. Thus he who\nwould govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom\nstrives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their\ncauses, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true\nknowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to\ncarp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will\ndiligently observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not\ndifficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the most\npart, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason.\n\n\nProp.XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more\nobjects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and occupies\nthe mind more.\n\nProof.- In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to more\nobjects, so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered,\nall of which (by hypothesis) the mind contemplates simultaneously in\nassociation with the given emotion; therefore the emotion is more frequent,\nor is more often in full vigour, and (V:viii.) occupies the mind more.\nQ.E.D.\n\n\nProp.XII. The mental images of things are more easily\nassociated with the images referred to things which we clearly\nand distinctly understand, than with others.\n\nProof.- Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand, are either the\ncommon properties of things or deductions therefrom (see definition of\nReason, II:.xl.Note ii.), and are consequently (by the last Prop.) more\noften aroused in us. Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should\ncontemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with\nsomething else, and consequently (II:xviii.) that the images of the said\nthings should be more often associated with the images of these than with\nthe images of something else. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion\nas it is associated with a greater number of other images.\n\nProof.- In proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of\nother images, so (II:xviii.) are there more causes whereby it can be\naroused. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily\nmodifications or images of things may be referred to the\nidea of God.\n\nProof.- There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind may not form\nsome clear and distinct conception (V:iv.); wherefore it can bring it about,\nthat they should all be referred to the idea of God (I:xv.). Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself\nand his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion\nas he more understands himself and his emotions.\n\nProof.- He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions\nfeels pleasure (III:liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last Prop.)\naccompanied by the idea of God; therefore (Def. of the Emotions:vi.) such an\none loves God, and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion as\nhe more understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XVI. This love towards God must\nhold the chief place in the mind.\n\nProof.- For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body\n(V:xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V:v.); therefore (V:xi.), it must hold\nthe chief place in the mind. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XVII. God is without passions,\nneither is he affected by\nany emotion of pleasure or pain.\n\nProof.- All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true\n(II:xxxii.), that is (II:Def.iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general\nDef. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either\nto a greater or to a lesser perfection (I:xx.Coroll.ii.); therefore\n(by Def. of the Emotions:ii., &iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of\npleasure or pain.\n\nCorollary. Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (by\nthe foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain,\nconsequently (Def. of the Emotions:vi., &vii.) he does not love or hate\nanyone.\n\n\nProp.XVIII. No one can hate God.\n\nProof.- The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II:xlvi.,\nII:xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active\n(III:iii.) ; consequently (III:lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the\nidea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions:vii.), no one can hate\nGod. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.\n\nNote.- It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all\nthings, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make\nanswer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that\nextent (V:iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain\n(III:lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of\npain, we to that extent feel pleasure.\n\n\nProp. XIX. He, who loves God,\ncannot endeavour that God\nshould love him in return.\n\nProof.- For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V:xvii.Coroll.)\nthat God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desire\nto feel pain (III:xix.); which is absurd (III:xxviii.). Therefore, he who\nloves God, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the\nemotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered,\nin proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be\njoined to God by the same bond of love.\n\nProof.- This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for\nunder the guidance of reason (IV:xxviii.), it is common to all men\n(IV:xxxvi),and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV:xxxvii.);\ntherefore (Def. of the Emotions:xxiii), it cannot be stained by the\nemotion envy nor by, the emotion of jealousy, (V:xviii. see definition of\nJealousy, (III:xxxv. Note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more\nfostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice\ntherein. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- We can in the same way, show, that there is no emotion directly\ncontrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may\nconclude, that this love towards God is the most constant of all the\nemotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot be\ndestroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as\nit is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.\n    I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all\nthat the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it\nappears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:-\n\n  I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V:iv.Note).\n\n  II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an\nexternal cause, which we conceive confusedly (V:ii. and V:iv.Note).\n\n  III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to\nthings, which we distinctly understand, surpass those referred to what we\nconceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V:vii.).\n\n  IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications (Affectiones.\nCamerer reads affectus - emotions), are fostered, which have regard to the\ncommon properties of things or to God (V:ix., V:xi.).\n\n  V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate, one\nwith another, its own emotions (V:x.Note and V:xii., V:xiii., V:xiv.).\n\nBut, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better\nunderstood, it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by\nus strong, when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of\nanother, and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same\nemotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one\nwith another, and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion\nthan by another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a\ncomparison of our own power with the power of an external cause. Now the\npower of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its infirmity or passion\nis defined by the privation of knowledge only: it therefore follows, that\nthat mind is most passive, whose greatest part is made up of inadequate\nideas, so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states\nthan by its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose\ngreatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain\nas many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily\ncharacterized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which\ntell of human infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual\nunhealthiness; and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for\nsomething which is subject to many variations, and which we can never become\nmasters of. For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he\nloves it; neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in\nregard to things whereof no one can be really master.\n\nWe may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge,\nand especially that third kind of knowledge (II:xlvii.Note), founded on the\nactual knowledge of God, possesses over the emotions: if it does not\nabsolutely destroy them, in so far as they are passions (V:iii. and\nV:iv.Note); at any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the\nmind (V:xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable and\neternal (V:xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession (II:xlv.);\nneither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary\nlove; but it may grow from strength to strength, and may engross the greater\npart of the mind, and deeply penetrate it. And now I have finished with all\nthat concerns this present life: for, as I said in the beginning of this\nnote, I have briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. And\nthis everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has attended to\nwhat is advanced in the present note, and also to the definitions of the\nmind and its emotions, and, lastly, to Propositions III:i. and III:iii. It\nis now, therefore, time to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the\nduration of the mind, without relation to the body.\n\n\nProp. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything,\nor remember what is past, while the body endures.\n\nProof.- The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does\nit imagine the modifications of the body as actual, except while the body\nendures (II:viii.Coroll.); and, consequently (II:xxvi.), it does not imagine\nany body as actually existing, except while its own body endures. Thus it\ncannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II:xvii.Note),\nor remember things past, except while the body endures (see definition of\nMemory, II:xviii.Note). Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,\nwhich expresses the essence of this or that human body under\nthe form of eternity.\n\nProof.- God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that human\nbody, but also of its essence (I:xxv.). This essence, therefore, must\nnecessarily be conceived through the very essence of God (I:Ax.iv.), and be\nthus conceived by a certain eternal necessity (I:xvi.); and this conception.\nmust necessarily exist in God (II:iii.). Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely\ndestroyed with the body, but there remains of it\nsomething which is eternal.\n\nProof.- There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which expresses the\nessence of the human body (last Prop.), which, therefore, is necessarily\nsomething appertaining to the essence of the human mind (II:xiii.). But we\nhave not assigned to the human mind any, duration, definable by time, except\nin so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is\nexplained through duration, and may be defined by time - that is\n(II:viii.Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body\nendures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is conceived by\na certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God (last Prop.);\nthis something, which appertains to the essence of the mind, will\nnecessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form of\neternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking, which belongs to\nthe essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible\nthat we should remember that we existed before our body, for our body can\nbear no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in terms of\ntime, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know\nthat we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by\nunderstanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of\nthe mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than proofs.\nThus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we\nfeel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, under\nthe form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be\ndefined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can\nonly be said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed\ntime, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far\nonly has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, and\nconceiving them under the category of duration.\n\n\nProp. XXIV. The more we understand particular\nthings, the more do we understand God.\n\nProof.- This is evident from I:xxv.Coroll.\n\n\nProp. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind,\nand the highest virtue is to understand things\nby the third kind of knowledge.\n\nProof.- The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of\ncertain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things\n(see its definition III:xl.Note.ii.); and, in proportion as we understand\nthings more in this way, we better understand God (by the last Prop.);\ntherefore (IV:xxviii.) the highest virtue of the mind, that is IV:Def.viii.)\nthe power, or nature, or (III:vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to\nunderstand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is\nmore capable of understanding things by\nthe third kind of knowledge, it desires\nmore to understand things by that kind.\n\nProof.- This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the mind to be\ncapable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge, we, to that extent,\nconceive it as determined thus to conceive things; and consequently (Def. of\nthe Emotions:i.), the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more\ncapable thereof. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XXVII. From this third kind of\nknowledge arises the highest possible\nmental acquiescence.\n\nProof.- The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV:xxviii.), or to\nunderstand things by the third kind of knowledge (V:xxv.), and this virtue\nis greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of\nknowledge (V:xxiv.): consequently, he who knows things by this kind of\nknowledge passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore\n(Def. of the Emotions:ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasure\nbeing accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus (Def. of\nthe Emotions:xxv.), from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible\nacquiescence. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to\nknow things by the third kind of knowledge\ncannot arise from the first, but from the\nsecond kind of knowledge.\n\nProof.- This proposition is self-evident. For whatsoever we understand\nclearly and distinct we understand either through itself, or through that\nwhich is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and\ndistinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge\n(II:xl.Note.ii.) cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary, and\nconfused, and are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow\nfrom adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge;\ntherefore (Def. of the Emotions:i.), the desire of knowing things by the\nthird kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second\nkind. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands\nunder the form of eternity, it does not\nunderstand by virtue of conceiving the\npresent actual existence of the body,\nbut by virtue of conceiving the essence of\nthe body under the form of eternity.\n\nProof.- In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body,\nit to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time, and to\nthat extent only, has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time\n(V:xxi., II:xxvi.). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration\n(I:Def.viii. and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the\npower of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it possesses such\npower, because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the\nform of eternity (II:xliv.Coroll.ii.), and also because it is of the nature\nof the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity\n(V:xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the\nessence of mind (II:xiii.). Therefore this power of conceiving things under\nthe form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's\nconceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing\nin relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following\nfrom the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this\nsecond way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and\ntheir ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed\nin II:xlv.&Note, which see.\n\n\nProp. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body\nunder the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a\nknowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived\nthrough God.\n\nProof.- Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involves\nnecessary existence (I:Def.viii.). Therefore to conceive things under the\nform of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived\nthrough thp essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involve\nexistence through the essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it\nconceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent\nnecessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q.E.D.\n\n\nProp. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge\ndepends on the mind, as its formal cause,\nin so far as the mind itself is eternal.\n\nProof.- The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity,\nexcept in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity\n(V:xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V:xxi., V:xxiii.);\ntherefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses the\nknowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate\n(II:xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of\nknowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God\n(II:xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge\n(see Def. in II:xl.Note.ii.), whereof accordingly the mind (III:Def.i.), in\nso far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge.\nQ.E.D.\n\nNote.- In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of\nknowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of God; in\nother words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more\nclearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are\nalready certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things\nunder the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be\nmore readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind\nitself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under\nthe form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do\nwithout any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any\nconclusion, unless our premisses are plain.\n\n\nProp. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of\nknowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by\nthe idea of God as cause.\n\nProof.- From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental\nacquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions:xxv.), pleasure, and this\nacquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and\nconsequently (V:xxx.) the idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the\nintellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises pleasure\naccompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def. of the Emotions:vi.),\nthe love of God; not in so far as we imagine him as present (V:xxix.), but\nin so far as we understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the\nintellectual love of God.\n\n\nProp. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God,\nwhich arises from the third kind of knowledge,\nis eternal.\n\nProof.- The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V:xxxi., I:Ax.iii.);\ntherefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises therefrom is also\nnecessarily eternal. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing Prop.) no\nbeginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of love, just as though it\nhad arisen as we feigned in the Coroll. of the last Prop. Nor is there here\nany difference, except that the mind possesses as eternal those same\nperfections which we feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by\nthe idea of God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to\na greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the mind being\nendowed with perfection itself.\n\n\nProp. XXX.IV. The mind is, only while the body\nendures, subject to those emotions which are\nattributable to passions.\n\nProof. Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as\npresent (II:xvii.Note); yet this idea indicates rather the present\ndisposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing\n(II:xvi.Coroll.ii.). Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions)\nis imagination, in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the\nbody; therefore (V:xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures, subject\nto emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal.\n\nNote.- If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that they are\nindeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse\neternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory\nwhich they believe to remain after death.\n\n\nProp. XXXV. God loves himself with\nan infinite intellectual love.\n\nProof.- God is absolutely infinite (I:Def.vi.), that is (II:Def.vi.), the\nnature of God rejoices in infinite perfection; and such rejoicing is\n(II:iii.) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (I:xi. and I:Def.i.),\nthe idea of his own cause: now this is what we have (in V:xxxii.Coroll.)\ndescribed as intellectual love.\n\n\nProp. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is\nthat very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as\nhe is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through\nthe essence of the human mind regarded under the form of\neternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards\nGod is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.\n\nProof.- (1) This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the\nmind (V:xxxii.Coroll. and III:iii.); it is itself, indeed, an activity\nwhereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as cause\n(V:xxxii.&Coroll.); that is (I:xxv.Coroll. and II:xi.Coroll.), an activity\nwhereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human mind,\nregards himself accompanied by the idea of himself; therefore (by the last\nProp.), this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith God\nloves himself. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves\nman, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men, and the\nintellectual love of the mind towards God are identical.\n\nNote.- From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation,\nor blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the constant and eternal\nlove towards God, or in God's love towards men. This love or blessedness is,\nin the Bible, called Glory and not undeservedly. For whether this love be\nreferred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of\nspirit, which (Def. of the Emotions:xxv., and xxx.) is not really\ndistinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it is\n(V:xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term, accompanied by the idea\nof itself, and, in so far as it is referred to the mind, it is the same\n(V:xxvii.).\n\nAgain, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge, whereof\nthe beginning and the foundation is God (I:xv., &II:xlvii.Note), it becomes\nclear to us, in what manner and way our mind, as to its essence and\nexistence, follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I\nhave thought it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show\nby this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I have called\nintuitive or of the third kind (II:xl.Note.ii.), is potent, and more\npowerful than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge of the\nsecond kind. For, although in Part I showed in general terms, that all\nthings (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence\nand existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate and placed\nbeyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind so much, as when the\nsame conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some particular thing,\nwhich we say depends on God.\n\n\nProp. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature,\nwhich is contrary to this intellectual love,\nor which can take it away.\n\nProof.- This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the\nmind, in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of God as an\neternal truth (V:xxxiii. and V:xxix.). If, therefore, there should be\nanything which would be contrary to this love, that thing would be\ncontrary to that which is true; consequently, that, which should be able to\ntake away this love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious\nabsurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular things, in so far\nas they are regarded in relation to a given time and place: of this, I\nthink, no one can doubt.\n\n\nProp. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more\nthings by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less\nsubject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less\nfear of death.\n\nProof.- The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II:xi.); therefore, in\nproportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds\nof knowledge, the greater will be the part of it that endures (V:xxix. and\nV:xxiii.), and, consequently (by the last Prop.), the greater will be the\npart that is not touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature,\nor in other words, evil (IV:xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind\nunderstands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the\ngreater will be the part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently,\nless subject to emotions, &c. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- Hence we understand that point which I touched on in IV:xxxix.Note,\nand which I promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death becomes\nless hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is\ngreater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again,\nsince from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible\nacquiescence (V:xxvii.), it follows that the human mind can attain to\nbeing of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown to\nperish with the body (V:xxi.) should be of little importance when compared\nwith the part which endures. But I will soon treat of the subject at greater\nlength.\n\n\nProp. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable\nof the greatest number of activities, possesses\na mind whereof the greatest part is eternal.\n\nProof.- He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of\nactivities, is least agitated by those emotions which are evil (IV:xxxviii.)\nthat is (IV:xxx.), by those emotions which are contrary to our nature;\ntherefore (V:x.), he possesses the power of arranging and associating the\nmodifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and,\nconsequently, of bringing it about, that all the modifications of the body\nshould be referred to the idea of God; whence it will come to pass that\n(V:xv.) he will be affected with love towards God, which (V:xvi) must occupy\nor constitute the chief part of the mind; therefore (V:xxxiii.), such a man\nwill possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities,\nthere is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature, that they may be\nreferred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and\nwhereof the greatest or chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they\nshould scarcely fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more\nclearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of perpetual\nvariation, and, according as we are changed for the better or the worse, we\nare called happy or unhappy.\n\nFor he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse, is called\nunhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness, if we have been able to live\nthrough the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in\nreality, he, who, as in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable\nof very few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external\ncauses, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely conscious\nof itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who has a body capable of\nvery many activities, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is\nhighly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore,\nwe primarily endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so\nfar as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into something\nelse capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which is\nhighly conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and we desire so to\nchange it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become\ninsignificant, in comparison with its intellect, as I have already said in\nthe note to the last Proposition.\n\n\nProp. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses\nmore of perfection, so is it more active, and\nless passive; and, vice versa, in proportion as\nit is more active, so is it more perfect.\n\nProof.- In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it possesses more of\nreality (II:Def.vi.), and, consequently (III:iii.and Note), it is to that\nextent more active and less passive. This demonstration may be reversed, and\nthus prove that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more\nperfect. Q.E.D.\n\nCorollary.- Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures, be it\ngreat or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the\nmind (V:xiii. and V:xxix.) the understanding, through which alone we are\nsaid to act (III:iii.); the part which we have shown to perish is the\nimagination (V:xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III:iii.\nand general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it great or\nsmall, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set forth concerning\nthe mind, in so far as it is regarded without relation to the body; whence,\nas also from I:xxi. and other places, it is plain that our mind, in so far\nas it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by\nanother eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to\ninfinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and\ninfinite intellect of God.\n\n\nProp. XLI. Even if we did not know that\nour mind is eternal, we should still\nconsider as of primary importance piety\nand religion, and generally all things\nwhich, in Part IV., we showed to be\nattributable to courage and high-mindedness.\n\nProof.- The first and only, foundation of virtue, or the rule of right\nliving is (IV:xxii.Coroll. and IV:xxiv.) seeking one's own true interest.\nNow, while we determined what reason prescribes as useful, we took no\naccount of the mind's eternity, which has only become known to us in this\nFifth Part. Although we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal,\nwe nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage and high-\nmindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even if we were still\nignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the aforesaid precepts of\nreason in the first place. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- The general belief of the multitude seems to be different. Most\npeople seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey their\nlusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to live\naccording to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that\npiety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of\nmind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to\nreceive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety, and\nreligion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of\nbeing horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according\nto the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will\ncarry them.\n\nIf men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perishes\nwith the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches\nwho are broken down with the burden of piety, they would return to their own\ninclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, and\ndesiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me\nnot less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he can by\nwholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with\npoisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal\nor immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to live\nwithout the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth\nrefuting.\n\n\nProp. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue\nitself ; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our\nlusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able\nto control our lusts.\n\nProof.- Blessedness consists in love towards God (V:xxxvi. and Note), which\nlove springs from the third kind of knowledge (V:xxxii.Coroll.); therefore\nthis love (III:iii. and III:lix.) must be referred to the mind, in so far as\nthe latter is active; therefore (IV:Def.viii.) it is virtue itself.\nThis was our first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in\nthis divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand (V:xxxii.);\nthat is (V:iii.Coroll.), so much the more power has it over the emotions,\nand (V:xxxviii.) so much the less is it subject to those emotions\nwhich are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine\nlove or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since\nhuman power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the\nunderstanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because he\nhas controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his\nlusts arises from this blessedness itself. Q.E.D.\n\nNote.- I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind's\npower over the emotions and the mind's freedom. Whence it appears, how\npotent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is\ndriven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in\nvarious ways by external causes without ever gaining, the true acquiescence\nof his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of\nGod, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.\n\nWhereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at\nall disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of\nthings, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always\npossesses true acquiescence of his spirit.\n\nIf the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems\nexceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard,\nsince it is so seldom  found. How would it be possible, if salvation were\nready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it should\nbe by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are as\ndifficult as they are rare.\n\n\n\n\n\nEnd of Part V.","title":"Ethics \u2014 Part 5","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":10431}