{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_991/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_991","id":"gutenberg_991","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/991","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Free thought -- Early works to 1800","Philosophy","Philosophy and religion -- Early works to 1800","Political science -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Sentence Numbers, shown thus (1), have been added by volunteer.\n\n\n\n\nA Theologico-Political Treatise\n\nPart III - Chapters XI to XV\n\nby Baruch Spinoza\n\n\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS:\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI - An Inquiry whether the Apostles wrote their\nEpistles as Apostles and Prophets, or merely as Teachers,\nand an Explanation of what is meant by Apostle.\n\nThe epistles not in the prophetic style.\n\nThe Apostles not commanded to write or preach in particular places.\n\nDifferent methods of teaching adopted by the Apostles.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII - Of the true Original of the Divine Law,\nand wherefore Scripture is called Sacred, and the Word of God.\nHow that, in so far as it contains the Word of God,\nit has come down to us uncorrupted.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII - It is shown, that Scripture teaches only very Simple Doctrines,\nsuch as suffice for right conduct.\n\nError in speculative doctrine not impious - nor knowledge pious.\nPiety consists in obedience.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV - Definitions of Faith, the True Faith, and the Foundations\nof Faith, which is once for all separated from Philosophy.\n\nDanger resulting from the vulgar idea of faith.\n\nThe only test of faith obedience and good works.\n\nAs different men are disposed to obedience by different opinions,\nuniversal faith can contain only the simplest doctrines.\n\nFundamental distinction between faith and philosophy -\nthe key-stone of the present treatise.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV - Theology is shown not to be subservient to\nReason, nor Reason to Theology: a Definition of the reason\nwhich enables us to accept the Authority of the Bible.\n\nTheory that Scripture must be accommodated to Reason -\nmaintained by Maimonides - already refuted in Chapter vii.\n\nTheory that Reason must be accommodated to Scripture -\nmaintained by Alpakhar - examined.\n\nAnd refuted.\n\nScripture and Reason independent of one another.\n\nCertainty, of fundamental faith not mathematical but moral.\n\nGreat utility of Revelation.\n\n\nAuthor's Endnotes to the Treatise.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI - AN INQUIRY WHETHER THE APOSTLES WROTE THEIR\nEPISTLES AS APOSTLES AND PROPHETS, OR MERELY AS TEACHERS;\nAND AN EXPLANATION OF WHAT IS MEANT BY AN APOSTLE.\n\n\n(1) No reader of the New Testament can doubt that the Apostles were\nprophets; but as a prophet does not always speak by revelation, but only at\nrare intervals, as we showed at the end of Chap. I., we may fairly inquire\nwhether the Apostles wrote their Epistles as prophets, by revelation and\nexpress mandate, as Moses, Jeremiah, and others did, or whether only as\nprivate individuals or teachers, especially as Paul, in Corinthians xiv:6,\nmentions two sorts of preaching.\n\n(2) If we examine the style of the Epistles, we shall find it totally\ndifferent from that employed by the prophets.\n\n(3) The prophets are continually asserting that they speak by the command of\nGod: \"Thus saith the Lord,\" \"The Lord of hosts saith,\" \"The command of the\nLord,\" &c.; and this was their habit not only in assemblies of the prophets,\nbut also in their epistles containing revelations, as appears from the epistle\nof Elijah to Jehoram, 2 Chron. xxi:12, which begins, \"Thus saith the Lord.\"\n\n(4) In the Apostolic Epistles we find nothing of the sort. (5) Contrariwise,\nin I Cor. vii:40 Paul speaks according to his own opinion and in many\npassages we come across doubtful and perplexed phrase; such as, \"We think,\ntherefore,\" Rom. iii:28; \"Now I think,\" [Endnote 24],  Rom. viii:18, and so\non. (6) Besides these, other expressions are met with very different from\nthose used by the prophets. (7) For instance, 1 Cor. vii:6, \"But I speak\nthis by permission, not by commandment;\" \"I give my judgment as one that\nhath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful\" (1 Cor. vii:25), and so on\nin many other passages. (8) We must also remark that in the aforesaid\nchapter the Apostle says that when he states that he has or has\nnot the precept or commandment of God, he does not mean the precept or\ncommandment of God revealed to himself, but only the words uttered by Christ\nin His Sermon on the Mount. (9) Furthermore, if we examine the manner in\nwhich the Apostles give out evangelical doctrine, we shall see that it\ndiffers materially from the method adopted by the prophets. (10) The\nApostles everywhere reason as if they were arguing rather than prophesying;\nthe prophecies, on the other hand, contain only dogmas and commands. (11)\nGod is therein introduced not as speaking to reason, but as issuing decrees\nby His absolute fiat. (12) The authority of the prophets does not submit to\ndiscussion, for whosoever wishes to find rational ground for his arguments,\nby that very wish submits them to everyone's private judgment. (13) This\nPaul, inasmuch as he uses reason, appears to have done, for he says in 1\nCor. x:15, \"I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say.\" (14) The prophets,\nas we showed at the end of Chapter I., did not perceive what was revealed by\nvirtue of their natural reason, and though there are certain passages in the\nPentateuch which seem to be appeals to induction, they turn out, on nearer\nexamination, to be nothing but peremptory commands. (15) For instance, when\nMoses says, Deut. xxxi:27, \"Behold, while I am yet alive with you, this day\nye have been rebellious against the Lord; and how much more after\nmy death,\" we must by no means conclude that Moses wished to convince the\nIsraelites by reason that they would necessarily fall away from the worship\nof the Lord after his death; for the argument would have been false, as\nScripture itself shows: the Israelites continued faithful during the lives\nof Joshua and the elders, and afterwards during the time of Samuel, David,\nand Solomon. (16) Therefore the words of Moses are merely a moral\ninjunction, in which he predicts rhetorically the future backsliding of the\npeople so as to impress it vividly on their imagination. (17) I say that\nMoses spoke of himself in order to lend likelihood to his prediction, and\nnot as a prophet by revelation, because in verse 21 of the same chapter we\nare told that God revealed the same thing to Moses in different words, and\nthere was no need to make Moses certain by argument of God's prediction and\ndecree; it was only necessary that it should be vividly impressed on\nhis imagination, and this could not be better accomplished than by\nimagining the existing contumacy of the people, of which he had had frequent\nexperience, as likely to extend into the future.\n\n(18) All the arguments employed by Moses in the five books are to be\nunderstood in a similar manner; they are not drawn from the armoury of\nreason, but are merely modes of expression calculated to instil with\nefficacy, and present vividly to the imagination the commands of God.\n(19) However, I do not wish absolutely to deny that the prophets ever argued\nfrom revelation; I only maintain that the prophets made more legitimate use\nof argument in proportion as their knowledge approached more nearly to\nordinary knowledge, and by this we know that they possessed a knowledge\nabove the ordinary, inasmuch as they proclaimed absolute dogmas,\ndecrees, or judgments. (20) Thus Moses, the chief of the prophets, never\nused legitimate argument, and, on the other hand, the long deductions and\narguments of Paul, such as we find in the Epistle to the Romans, are in\nnowise written from supernatural revelation.\n\n(21) The modes of expression and discourse adopted by the Apostles in the\nEpistles, show very clearly that the latter were not written by revelation\nand Divine command, but merely by the natural powers and judgment of the\nauthors. (22) They consist in brotherly admonitions and courteous\nexpressions such as would never be employed in prophecy, as for instance,\nPaul's excuse in Romans xv:15, \"I have written the more boldly unto you in\nsome sort, my brethren.\"\n\n(23) We may arrive at the same conclusion from observing that we never read\nthat the Apostles were commanded to write, but only that they went\neverywhere preaching, and confirmed their words with signs. (24) Their\npersonal presence and signs were absolutely necessary for the conversion and\nestablishment in religion of the Gentiles; as Paul himself expressly states\nin Rom. i:11, \"But I long to see you, that I may impart to you some\nspiritual gift, to the end that ye may be established.\"\n\n(25) It may be objected that we might prove in similar fashion that the\nApostles did not preach as prophets, for they did not go to particular\nplaces, as the prophets did, by the command of God. (26) We read in\nthe Old Testament that Jonah went to Nineveh to preach, and at the\nsame time that he was expressly sent there, and told that he most preach.\n(27) So also it is related, at great length, of Moses that he went to Egypt\nas the messenger of God, and was told at the same time what he should say to\nthe children of Israel and to king Pharaoh, and what wonders he should work\nbefore them to give credit to his words. (28) Isaiah, Jeremiah, and\nEzekiel were expressly commanded to preach to the Israelites. Lastly, the\nprophets only preached what we are assured by Scripture they had received\nfrom God, whereas this is hardly ever said of the Apostles in the New\nTestament, when they went about to preach. (29) On the contrary, we find\npassages expressly implying that the Apostles chose the places where they\nshould preach on their own responsibility, for there was a difference\namounting to a quarrel between Paul and Barnabas on the subject (Acts xv:37,\n38). (30) Often they wished to go to a place, but were prevented, as Paul\nwrites, Rom. i:13, \"Oftentimes I purposed to come to you, but was let\nhitherto;\" and in I Cor. xvi:12, \"As touching our brother Apollos, I greatly\ndesired him to come unto you with the brethren, but his will was not at all\nto come at this time: but he will come when he shall have convenient time.\"\n\n(31) From these expressions and differences of opinion among the Apostles,\nand also from the fact that Scripture nowhere testifies of them, as of the\nancient prophets, that they went by the command of God, one might conclude\nthat they preached as well as wrote in their capacity of teachers, and not\nas prophets: but the question is easily solved if we observe the difference\nbetween the mission of an Apostle and that of an Old Testament prophet. (32)\nThe latter were not called to preach and prophesy to all nations, but to\ncertain specified ones, and therefore an express and peculiar mandate was\nrequired for each of them; the Apostles, on the other hand, were called to\npreach to all men absolutely, and to turn all men to religion. (33)\nTherefore, whithersoever they went, they were fulfilling Christ's\ncommandment; there was no need to reveal to them beforehand what they should\npreach, for they were the disciples of Christ to whom their Master Himself\nsaid (Matt. X:19, 20): \"But, when they deliver you up, take no thought\nhow or what ye shall speak, for it shall be given you in that same\nhour what ye shall speak.\" (34) We therefore conclude that the Apostles\nwere only indebted to special revelation in what they orally preached and\nconfirmed by signs (see the beginning of Chap. 11.); that which they taught\nin speaking or writing without any confirmatory signs and wonders\nthey taught from their natural knowledge. (See I Cor. xiv:6.) (35) We need\nnot be deterred by the fact that all the Epistles begin by citing the\nimprimatur of the Apostleship, for the Apostles, as I will shortly show,\nwere granted, not only the faculty of prophecy, but also the authority to\nteach. (36) We may therefore admit that they wrote their Epistles as\nApostles, and for this cause every one of them began by citing the Apostolic\nimprimatur, possibly with a view to the attention of the reader by asserting\nthat they were the persons who had made such mark among the faithful by\ntheir preaching, and had shown by many marvelous works that they were\nteaching true religion and the way of salvation. (37) I observe that what is\nsaid in the Epistles with regard to the Apostolic vocation and the Holy\nSpirit of God which inspired them, has reference to their former preaching,\nexcept in those passages where the expressions of the Spirit of God and the\nHoly Spirit are used to signify a mind pure, upright, and devoted to\nGod. (38) For instance, in 1 Cor. vii:40, Paul says: But she is happier if\nshe so abide, after my judgment, and I think also that I have the Spirit of\nGod.\" (39) By the Spirit of God the Apostle here refers to his mind, as\nwe may see from the context: his meaning is as follows: \"I account blessed\na widow who does not wish to marry a second husband; such is my opinion, for\nI have settled to live unmarried, and I think that I am blessed.\" (40) There\nare other similar passages which I need not now quote.\n\n(41) As we have seen that the Apostles wrote their Epistles solely by the\nlight of natural reason, we must inquire how they were enabled to teach by\nnatural knowledge matters outside its scope. (42) However, if we bear in\nmind what we said in Chap. VII. of this treatise our difficulty will vanish:\nfor although the contents of the Bible entirely surpass our understanding,\nwe may safely discourse of them, provided we assume nothing not told\nus in Scripture: by the same method the Apostles, from what they saw\nand heard, and from what was revealed to them, were enabled to form and\nelicit many conclusions which they would have been able to teach to men had\nit been permissible.\n\n(43) Further, although religion, as preached by the Apostles, does not come\nwithin the sphere of reason, in so far as it consists in the narration of\nthe life of Christ, yet its essence, which is chiefly moral, like the whole\nof Christ's doctrine, can readily be apprehended by the natural\nfaculties of all.\n\n(44) Lastly, the Apostles had no lack of supernatural illumination for the\npurpose of adapting the religion they had attested by signs to the\nunderstanding of everyone so that it might be readily received; nor for\nexhortations on the subject: in fact, the object of the Epistles is to teach\nand exhort men to lead that manner of life which each of the Apostles judged\nbest for confirming them in religion. (45) We may here repeat our former\nremark, that the Apostles had received not only the faculty of preaching the\nhistory, of Christ as prophets, and confirming it with signs, but also\nauthority for teaching and exhorting according as each thought best. (46)\nPaul (2 Tim. i:11), \"Whereunto I am appointed a preacher, and an apostle,\nand a teacher of the Gentiles;\" and again (I Tim. ii:7), \"Whereunto I am\nordained a preacher and an apostle (I speak the truth in Christ and lie\nnot), a teacher of the Gentiles in faith and verity.\" (47) These passages, I\nsay, show clearly the stamp both of the apostleship and the teachership:\nthe authority for admonishing whomsoever and wheresoever he pleased is\nasserted by Paul in the Epistle to Philemon, v:8: \"Wherefore, though I might\nbe much bold in Christ to enjoin thee that which is convenient, yet,\" &c.,\nwhere we may remark that if Paul had received from God as a prophet\nwhat he wished to enjoin Philemon, and had been bound to speak in his\nprophetic capacity, he would not have been able to change the command of God\ninto entreaties. (48) We must therefore understand him to refer to the\npermission to admonish which he had received as a teacher, and not as a\nprophet. (49) We have not yet made it quite clear that the Apostles might\neach choose his own way of teaching, but only that by virtue of their\nApostleship they were teachers as well as prophets; however, if we\ncall reason to our aid we shall clearly see that an authority to teach\nimplies authority to choose the method. (50) It will nevertheless be,\nperhaps, more satisfactory to draw all our proofs from Scripture; we are\nthere plainly told that each Apostle chose his particular method (Rom. xv:\n20): \"Yea, so have I strived to preach the gospel, not where Christ was\nnamed, lest I should build upon another man's foundation.\" (51) If\nall the Apostles had adopted the same method of teaching, and had all built\nup the Christian religion on the same foundation, Paul would have had no\nreason to call the work of a fellow-Apostle \"another man's foundation,\"\ninasmuch as it would have been identical with his own: his calling it\nanother man's proved that each Apostle built up his religious instruction on\ndifferent foundations, thus resembling other teachers who have each their\nown method, and prefer instructing quite ignorant people who have never\nlearnt under another master, whether the subject be science, languages, or\neven the indisputable truths of mathematics. (52) Furthermore, if we go\nthrough the Epistles at all attentively, we shall see that the Apostles,\nwhile agreeing about religion itself, are at variance as to the foundations\nit rests on. (53) Paul, in order to strengthen men's religion, and show them\nthat salvation depends solely on the grace of God, teaches that no one can\nboast of works, but only of faith, and that no one can be justified by works\n(Rom. iii:27,28); in fact, he preaches the complete doctrine of\npredestination. (54) James, on the other hand, states that man is justified\nby works, and not by faith only (see his Epistle, ii:24), and omitting all\nthe disputations of Paul, confines religion to a very few elements.\n\n(55) Lastly, it is indisputable that from these different grounds for\nreligion selected by the Apostles, many quarrels and schisms distracted the\nChurch, even in the earliest times, and doubtless they will continue so to\ndistract it for ever, or at least till religion is separated from\nphilosophical speculations, and reduced to the few simple doctrines taught\nby Christ to His disciples; such a task was impossible for the Apostles,\nbecause the Gospel was then unknown to mankind, and lest its novelty should\noffend men's ears it had to be adapted to the disposition of\ncontemporaries (2 Cor. ix:19, 20), and built up on the groundwork most\nfamiliar and accepted at the time. (56) Thus none of the Apostles\nphilosophized more than did Paul, who was called to preach to the Gentiles;\nother Apostles preaching to the Jews, who despised philosophy, similarly,\nadapted themselves to the temper of their hearers (see Gal. ii. 11), and\npreached a religion free from all philosophical speculations. (57) How blest\nwould our age be if it could witness a religion freed also from all the\ntrammels of superstition!\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII - OF THE TRUE ORIGINAL OF THE DIVINE LAW, AND\n WHEREFORE SCRIPTURE IS CALLED SACRED, AND THE WORD OF GOD.\n HOW THAT, IN SO FAR AS IT CONTAINS THE WORD OF GOD,\n IT HAS COME DOWN TO US UNCORRUPTED.\n\n(1) Those who look upon the Bible as a message sent down by God from Heaven\nto men, will doubtless cry out that I have committed the sin against the\nHoly Ghost because I have asserted that the Word of God is faulty,\nmutilated, tampered with, and inconsistent; that we possess it only in\nfragments, and that the original of the covenant which God made with the\nJews has been lost. (2) However, I have no doubt that a little reflection\nwill cause them to desist from their uproar: for not only reason but the\nexpressed opinions of prophets and apostles openly proclaim that God's\neternal Word and covenant, no less than true religion, is Divinely inscribed\nin human hearts, that is, in the human mind, and that this is the true\noriginal of God's covenant, stamped with His own seal, namely, the idea of\nHimself, as it were, with the image of His Godhood.\n\n(3) Religion was imparted to the early Hebrews as a law written down,\nbecause they were at that time in the condition of children, but afterwards\nMoses (Deut. xxx:6) and Jeremiah (xxxi:33) predicted a time coming when the\nLord should write His law in their hearts. (4) Thus only the Jews, and\namongst them chiefly the Sadducees, struggled for the law written on\ntablets; least of all need those who bear it inscribed on their hearts join\nin the contest. (5) Those, therefore, who reflect, will find nothing in what\nI have written repugnant either to the Word of God or to true religion and\nfaith, or calculated to weaken either one or the other: contrariwise, they\nwill see that I have strengthened religion, as I showed at the end of\nChapter X.; indeed, had it not been so, I should certainly have decided to\nhold my peace, nay, I would even have asserted as a way out of all\ndifficulties that the Bible contains the most profound hidden\nmysteries; however, as this doctrine has given rise to gross superstition\nand other pernicious results spoken of at the beginning of Chapter V., I\nhave thought such a course unnecessary, especially as religion stands in no\nneed of superstitious adornments, but is, on the contrary, deprived by such\ntrappings of some of her splendour.\n\n(6) Still, it will be said, though the law of God is written in the heart,\nthe Bible is none the less the Word of God, and it is no more lawful to say\nof Scripture than of God's Word that it is mutilated and corrupted. (7) I\nfear that such objectors are too anxious to be pious, and that they are in\ndanger of turning religion into superstition, and worshipping paper and ink\nin place of God's Word.\n\n(8) I am certified of thus much: I have said nothing unworthy of Scripture\nor God's Word, and I have made no assertions which I could not prove by most\nplain argument to be true. (9) I can, therefore, rest assured that I have\nadvanced nothing which is impious or even savours of impiety.\n\n(10) I confess that some profane men, to whom religion is a burden, may, from\nwhat I have said, assume a licence to sin, and without any reason, at the\nsimple dictates of their lusts conclude that Scripture is everywhere faulty and\nfalsified, and that therefore its authority is null; but such men are beyond\nthe reach of help, for nothing, as the proverb has it, can be said so rightly\nthat it cannot be twisted into wrong. (11) Those who wish to give rein to their\nlusts are at no loss for an excuse, nor were those men of old who possessed the\noriginal Scriptures, the ark of the covenant, nay, the prophets and apostles in\nperson among them, any better than the people of to-day. (12) Human nature, Jew\nas well as Gentile, has always been the same, and in every age virtue has been\nexceedingly rare.\n\n(13) Nevertheless, to remove every scruple, I will here show in what sense\nthe Bible or any inanimate thing should be called sacred and Divine;\nalso wherein the law of God consists, and how it cannot be contained in a\ncertain number of books; and, lastly, I will show that Scripture, in so far\nas it teaches what is necessary for obedience and salvation, cannot have\nbeen corrupted. (14) From these considerations everyone will be able to\njudge that I have neither said anything against the Word of God nor given\nany foothold to impiety.\n\n(15) A thing is called sacred and Divine when it is designed for promoting\npiety, and continues sacred so long as it is religiously used: if the users\ncease to be pious, the thing ceases to be sacred: if it be turned to base\nuses, that which was formerly sacred becomes unclean and profane. (16) For\ninstance, a certain spot was named by the patriarch Jacob the house of God,\nbecause he worshipped God there revealed to him: by the prophets the same\nspot was called the house of iniquity (see Amos v:5, and Hosea x:5), because\nthe Israelites were wont, at the instigation of Jeroboam, to sacrifice there\nto idols. (17) Another example puts the matter in the plainest light. (18)\nWords gain their meaning solely from their usage, and if they are arranged\naccording to their accepted signification so as to move those who read them\nto devotion, they will become sacred, and the book so written will be sacred\nalso. (19) But if their usage afterwards dies out so that the words have no\nmeaning, or the book becomes utterly neglected, whether from unworthy\nmotives, or because it is no longer needed, then the words and the book will\nlose both their use and their sanctity: lastly, if these same words be\notherwise arranged, or if their customary meaning becomes perverted into its\nopposite, then both the words and the book containing them become, instead\nof sacred, impure and profane.\n\n(20) From this it follows that nothing is in itself absolutely sacred, or\nprofane, and unclean, apart from the mind, but only relatively thereto. (21)\nThus much is clear from many passages in the Bible. (22) Jeremiah (to select\none case out of many) says (chap. vii:4), that the Jews of his time\nwere wrong in calling Solomon's Temple, the Temple of God, for, as he goes\non to say in the same chapter, God's name would only be given to the Temple\nso long as it was frequented by men who worshipped Him, and defended\njustice, but that, if it became the resort of murderers, thieves, idolaters,\nand other wicked persons, it would be turned into a den of malefactors.\n\n(23) Scripture, curiously enough, nowhere tells us what became of the Ark of\nthe Covenant, though there is no doubt that it was destroyed, or burnt\ntogether with the Temple; yet there was nothing which the Hebrews considered\nmore sacred, or held in greater reverence. (24) Thus Scripture is sacred,\nand its words Divine so long as it stirs mankind to devotion towards God:\nbut if it be utterly neglected, as it formerly was by the Jews, it becomes\nnothing but paper and ink, and is left to be desecrated or corrupted: still,\nthough Scripture be thus corrupted or destroyed, we must not say that the\nWord of God has suffered in like manner, else we shall be like the Jews, who\nsaid that the Temple which would then be the Temple of God had perished in\nthe flames. (25) Jeremiah tells us this in respect to the law, for he thus\nchides the ungodly of his time, \"Wherefore, say you we are masters, and the\nlaw of the Lord is with us? (26) Surely it has been given in vain, it is in\nvain that the pen of the scribes\" (has been made) - that is, you say\nfalsely that the Scripture is in your power, and that you possess the law of\nGod; for ye have made it of none effect.\n\n(27) So also, when Moses broke the first tables of the law, he did not by\nany means cast the Word of God from his hands in anger and shatter it - such\nan action would be inconceivable, either of Moses or of God's Word - he only\nbroke the tables of stone, which, though they had before been holy from\ncontaining the covenant wherewith the Jews had bound themselves in\nobedience to God, had entirely lost their sanctity when the covenant had\nbeen violated by the worship of the calf, and were, therefore, as liable to\nperish as the ark of the covenant. (28) It is thus scarcely to be wondered\nat, that the original documents of Moses are no longer extant, nor that the\nbooks we possess met with the fate we have described, when we consider that\nthe true original of the Divine covenant, the most sacred object of all, has\ntotally perished.\n\n(29) Let them cease, therefore, who accuse us of impiety, inasmuch as we\nhave said nothing against the Word of God, neither have we corrupted it, but\nlet them keep their anger, if they would wreak it justly, for the ancients\nwhose malice desecrated the Ark, the Temple, and the Law of God, and all\nthat was held sacred, subjecting them to corruption. (30) Furthermore,\nif, according to the saying of the Apostle in 2 Cor. iii:3, they possessed\n\"the Epistle of Christ, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the\nliving God, not in tables of stone, but in the fleshy tables of the heart,\"\nlet them cease to worship the letter, and be so anxious concerning it.\n\n(31) I think I have now sufficiently shown in what respect Scripture should\nbe accounted sacred and Divine; we may now see what should rightly be\nunderstood by the expression, the Word of the Lord; debar (the Hebrew\noriginal) signifies word, speech, command, and thing. (32) The causes for\nwhich a thing is in Hebrew said to be of God, or is referred to Him, have\nbeen already detailed in Chap. I., and we can therefrom easily gather what\nmeaning Scripture attaches to the phrases, the word, the speech, the\ncommand, or the thing of God. (33) I need not, therefore, repeat what I\nthere said, nor what was shown under the third head in the chapter on\nmiracles. (34) It is enough to mention the repetition for the better\nunderstanding of what I am about to say - viz., that the Word of the Lord\nwhen it has reference to anyone but God Himself, signifies that Divine law\ntreated of in Chap. IV.; in other words, religion, universal and catholic\nto the whole human race, as Isaiah describes it (chap. i:10), teaching that\nthe true way of life consists, not in ceremonies, but in charity, and a true\nheart, and calling it indifferently God's Law and God's Word.\n\n(35) The expression is also used metaphorically for the order of nature and\ndestiny (which, indeed, actually depend and follow from the eternal mandate\nof the Divine nature), and especially for such parts of such order as were\nforeseen by the prophets, for the prophets did not perceive future events as\nthe result of natural causes, but as the fiats and decrees of God. (36)\nLastly, it is employed for the command of any prophet, in so far as he had\nperceived it by his peculiar faculty or prophetic gift, and not by the\nnatural light of reason; this use springs chiefly from the usual prophetic\nconception of God as a legislator, which we remarked in Chap. IV.\n(37) There are, then, three causes for the Bible's being called\nthe Word of God: because it teaches true religion, of which God is the\neternal Founder; because it narrates predictions of future events as\nthough they were decrees of God; because its actual authors generally\nperceived things not by their ordinary natural faculties, but by a\npower peculiar to themselves, and introduced these things perceived,\nas told them by God.\n\n(37) Although Scripture contains much that is merely historical and can be\nperceived by natural reason, yet its name is acquired from its chief subject\nmatter.\n\n(38) We can thus easily see how God can be said to be the Author of the\nBible: it is because of the true religion therein contained, and not because\nHe wished to communicate to men a certain number of books. (39) We can also\nlearn from hence the reason for the division into Old and New Testament.\n(40) It was made because the prophets who preached religion before Christ,\npreached it as a national law in virtue of the covenant entered into under\nMoses; while the Apostles who came after Christ, preached it to all men as a\nuniversal religion solely in virtue of Christ's Passion: the cause for the\ndivision is not that the two parts are different in doctrine, nor that they\nwere written as originals of the covenant, nor, lastly, that the catholic\nreligion (which is in entire harmony with our nature) was new except in\nrelation to those who had not known it: \"it was in the world,\" as John the\nEvangelist says, \"and the world knew it not.\"\n\n(41) Thus, even if we had fewer books of the Old and New Testament than we\nhave, we should still not be deprived of the Word of God (which, as we have\nsaid, is identical with true religion), even as we do not now hold ourselves\nto be deprived of it, though we lack many cardinal writings such as the Book\nof the Law, which was religiously guarded in the Temple as the original of\nthe Covenant, also the Book of Wars, the Book of Chronicles, and many\nothers, from whence the extant Old Testament was taken and compiled. (42)\nThe above conclusion may be supported by many reasons.\n\n(43) I. Because the books of both Testaments were not written by express\ncommand at one place for all ages, but are a fortuitous collection of the\nworks of men, writing each as his period and disposition dictated. (44) So\nmuch is clearly shown by the call of the prophets who were bade to\nadmonish the ungodly of their time, and also by the Apostolic Epistles.\n\n(45) II. Because it is one thing to understand the meaning of Scripture\nand the prophets, and quite another thing to understand the meaning\n of God, or the actual truth. (46) This follows from what we said in\nChap. II. (47) We showed, in Chap. VI., that it applied to historic\nnarratives, and to miracles: but it by no means applies to questions\nconcerning true religion and virtue.\n\n(48) III. Because the books of the Old Testament were selected from many,\nand were collected and sanctioned by a council of the Pharisees, as we\nshowed in Chap. X. (49) The books of the New Testament were also chosen from\nmany by councils which rejected as spurious other books held sacred by many.\n(50) But these councils, both Pharisee and Christian, were not composed of\nprophets, but only of learned men and teachers. (51) Still, we must grant\nthat they were guided in their choice by a regard for the Word of God; and\nthey must, therefore, have known what the law of God was.\n\n(52) IV. Because the Apostles wrote not as prophets, but as teachers (see\nlast Chapter), and chose whatever method they thought best adapted for those\nwhom they addressed: and consequently, there are many things in the Epistles\n(as we showed at the end of the last Chapter) which are not necessary to\nsalvation.\n\n(53) V. Lastly, because there are four Evangelists in the New Testament, and\nit is scarcely credible that God can have designed to narrate the life of\nChrist four times over, and to communicate it thus to mankind. (54) For\nthough there are some details related in one Gospel which are not in\nanother, and one often helps us to understand another, we cannot thence\nconclude that all that is set down is of vital importance to us, and that\nGod chose the four Evangelists in order that the life of Christ might be\nbetter understood; for each one preached his Gospel in a separate\nlocality, each wrote it down as he preached it, in simple language, in\norder that the history of Christ might be clearly told, not with any view of\nexplaining his fellow-Evangelists.\n\n(55) If there are some passages which can be better, and more easily\nunderstood by comparing the various versions, they are the result of chance,\nand are not numerous: their continuance in obscurity would have impaired\nneither the clearness of the narrative nor the blessedness of mankind.\n\n(56) We have now shown that Scripture can only be called the Word\nof God in so far as it affects religion, or the Divine law; we must now\npoint out that, in respect to these questions, it is neither faulty,\ntampered with, nor corrupt. (57) By faulty, tampered with, and corrupt, I\nhere mean written so incorrectly, that the meaning cannot be arrived at by a\nstudy of the language, nor from the authority of Scripture. (58) I will not\ngo to such lengths as to say that the Bible, in so far as it contains the\nDivine law, has always preserved the same vowel-points, the same letters, or\nthe same words (I leave this to be proved by the Massoretes and other\nworshippers of the letter), I only, maintain that the meaning by which\nalone an utterance is entitled to be called Divine, has come down to us\nuncorrupted, even though the original wording may have been more often\nchanged than we suppose. (59) Such alterations, as I have said above,\ndetract nothing from the Divinity of the Bible, for the Bible would have\nbeen no less Divine had it been written in different words or a different\nlanguage. (60) That the Divine law has in this sense come down to us\nuncorrupted, is an assertion which admits of no dispute. (61) For from the\nBible itself we learn, without the smallest difficulty or ambiguity, that\nits cardinal precept is: To love God above all things, and one's neighbour\nas one's self. (62) This cannot be a spurious passage, nor due to a hasty\nand mistaken scribe, for if the Bible had ever put forth a different\ndoctrine it would have had to change the whole of its teaching, for this is\nthe corner-stone of religion, without which the whole fabric would fall\nheadlong to the ground. (63) The Bible would not be the work we have been\nexamining, but something quite different.\n\n(64) We remain, then, unshaken in our belief that this has always been the\ndoctrine of Scripture, and, consequently, that no error sufficient to\nvitiate it can have crept in without being instantly, observed by all; nor\ncan anyone have succeeded in tampering with it and escaped the discovery of\nhis malice.\n\n(65) As this corner-stone is intact, we must perforce admit the same of\nwhatever other passages are indisputably dependent on it, and are also\nfundamental, as, for instance, that a God exists, that He foresees all\nthings, that He is Almighty, that by His decree the good prosper and the\nwicked come to naught, and, finally, that our salvation depends solely on\nHis grace.\n\n(66) These are doctrines which Scripture plainly teaches throughout, and\nwhich it is bound to teach, else all the rest would be empty and baseless;\nnor can we be less positive about other moral doctrines, which plainly are\nbuilt upon this universal foundation - for instance, to uphold justice, to\naid the weak, to do no murder, to covet no man's goods, &c. (67) Precepts, I\nrepeat, such as these, human malice and the lapse of ages are alike\npowerless to destroy, for if any part of them perished, its loss would\nimmediately be supplied from the fundamental principle, especially the\ndoctrine of charity, which is everywhere in both Testaments extolled above\nall others. (68) Moreover, though it be true that there is no conceivable\ncrime so heinous that it has never been committed, still there is no one who\nwould attempt in excuse for his crimes to destroy the law, or introduce an\nimpious doctrine in the place of what is eternal and salutary; men's nature\nis so constituted that everyone (be he king or subject) who has committed a\nbase action, tries to deck out his conduct with spurious excuses, till he\nseems to have done nothing but what is just and right.\n\n(69) We may conclude, therefore, that the whole Divine law, as taught by\nScripture, has come down to us uncorrupted. (70) Besides this there are\ncertain facts which we may be sure have been transmitted in good faith. (71)\nFor instance, the main facts of Hebrew history, which were perfectly well\nknown to everyone. (72) The Jewish people were accustomed in former times to\nchant the ancient history of their nation in psalms. (73) The main facts,\nalso, of Christ's life and passion were immediately spread abroad through\nthe whole Roman empire. (74) It is therefore scarcely credible, unless\nnearly everybody consented thereto, which we cannot suppose, that\nsuccessive generations have handed down the broad outline of the Gospel\nnarrative otherwise than as they received it.\n\n(74) Whatsoever, therefore, is spurious or faulty can only have reference to\ndetails - some circumstances in one or the other history or prophecy\ndesigned to stir the people to greater devotion; or in some miracle, with a\nview of confounding philosophers; or, lastly, in speculative matters\nafter they had become mixed up with religion, so that some individual\nmight prop up his own inventions with a pretext of Divine authority.\n(75) But such matters have little to do with salvation, whether\nthey be corrupted little or much, as I will show in detail in the next\nchapter, though I think the question sufficiently plain from what I have\nsaid already, especially in Chapter II.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII - IT IS SHOWN THAT SCRIPTURE TEACHES ONLY VERY SIMPLE\n DOCTRINES, SUCH AS SUFFICE FOR RIGHT CONDUCT.\n\n(1) In the second chapter of this treatise we pointed out that the prophets\nwere gifted with extraordinary powers of imagination, but not of\nunderstanding; also that God only revealed to them such things as are very\nsimple - not philosophic mysteries, - and that He adapted His\ncommunications to their previous opinions. (2) We further showed in Chap. V.\nthat Scripture only transmits and teaches truths which can readily be\ncomprehended by all; not deducing and concatenating its conclusions from\ndefinitions and axioms, but narrating quite simply, and confirming its\nstatements, with a view to inspiring belief, by an appeal to experience as\nexemplified in miracles and history, and setting forth its truths in the\nstyle and phraseology which would most appeal to the popular mind (cf. Chap.\nVI., third division).\n\n(3) Lastly, we demonstrated in Chap. VIII. that the difficulty of\nunderstanding Scripture lies in the language only, and not in the\nabstruseness of the argument.\n\n(4) To these considerations we may add that the Prophets did not preach only\nto the learned, but to all Jews, without exception, while the Apostles were\nwont to teach the gospel doctrine in churches where there were public\nmeetings; whence it follows that Scriptural doctrine contains no lofty\nspeculations nor philosophic reasoning, but only very simple matters, such\nas could be understood by the slowest intelligence.\n\n(5) I am consequently lost in wonder at the ingenuity of those whom I have\nalready mentioned, who detect in the Bible mysteries so profound that they\ncannot be explained in human language, and who have introduced so many\nphilosophic speculations into religion that the Church seems like\nan academy, and religion like a science, or rather a dispute.\n\n(6) It is not to be wondered at that men, who boast of possessing\nsupernatural intelligence, should be unwilling to yield the palm of\nknowledge to philosophers who have only their ordinary faculties; still I\nshould be surprised if I found them teaching any new speculative\ndoctrine, which was not a commonplace to those Gentile philosophers whom, in\nspite of all, they stigmatize as blind; for, if one inquires what these\nmysteries lurking in Scripture may be, one is confronted with nothing but\nthe reflections of Plato or Aristotle, or the like, which it would\noften be easier for an ignorant man to dream than for the most accomplished\nscholar to wrest out of the Bible.\n\n(7) However, I do not wish to affirm absolutely that Scripture contains no\ndoctrines in the sphere of philosophy, for in the last chapter I pointed out\nsome of the kind, as fundamental principles; but I go so far as to say that\nsuch doctrines are very few and very simple. (8) Their precise nature and\ndefinition I will now set forth. (9) The task will be easy, for we know that\nScripture does not aim at imparting scientific knowledge, and, therefore, it\ndemands from men nothing but obedience, and censures obstinacy, but not\nignorance.\n\n(10) Furthermore, as obedience to God consists solely in love to our\nneighbour - for whosoever loveth his neighbour, as a means of obeying God,\nhath, as St. Paul says (Rom. xiii:8), fulfilled the law, - it follows that\nno knowledge is commended in the Bible save that which is necessary\nfor enabling all men to obey God in the manner stated, and without which\nthey would become rebellious, or without the discipline of obedience.\n\n(11) Other speculative questions, which have no direct bearing on this\nobject, or are concerned with the knowledge of natural events, do not affect\nScripture, and should be entirely separated from religion.\n\n(12) Now, though everyone, as we have said, is now quite able to see this\ntruth for himself, I should nevertheless wish, considering that the whole of\nReligion depends thereon, to explain the entire question more accurately and\nclearly. (13) To this end I must first prove that the intellectual\nor accurate knowledge of God is not a gift, bestowed upon all good men\nlike obedience; and, further, that the knowledge of God, required by Him\nthrough His prophets from everyone without exception, as needful to be\nknown, is simply a knowledge of His Divine justice and charity. (14) Both\nthese points are easily proved from Scripture. (15) The first plainly\nfollows from Exodus vi:2, where God, in order to show the singular grace\nbestowed upon Moses, says to him: \"And I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac,\nand unto Jacob by the name of El Sadai (A. V. God Almighty); but by my name\nJehovah was I not known to them\" - for the better understanding of which\npassage I may remark that El Sadai, in Hebrew, signifies the God who\nsuffices, in that He gives to every man that which suffices for him; and,\nalthough Sadai is often used by itself, to signify God, we cannot doubt that\nthe word El (God, {power, might}) is everywhere understood. (16)\nFurthermore, we must note that Jehovah is the only word found in Scripture\nwith the meaning of the absolute essence of God, without reference to\ncreated things. (17) The Jews maintain, for this reason, that this is,\nstrictly speaking, the only name of God; that the rest of the words used are\nmerely titles; and, in truth, the other names of God, whether they be\nsubstantives or adjectives, are merely attributive, and belong to Him, in\nso far as He is conceived of in relation to created things, or manifested\nthrough them. (18) Thus El, or Eloah, signifies powerful, as is well known,\nand only applies to God in respect to His supremacy, as when we call Paul an\napostle; the faculties of his power are set forth in an accompanying\nadjective, as El, great, awful, just, merciful, &c., or else all are\nunderstood at once by the use of El in the plural number, with a singular\nsignification, an expression frequently adopted in Scripture.\n\n(19) Now, as God tells Moses that He was not known to the patriarchs by the\nname of Jehovah, it follows that they were not cognizant of any attribute of\nGod which expresses His absolute essence, but only of His deeds and promises\nthat is, of His power, as manifested in visible things. (20) God does not\nthus speak to Moses in order to accuse the patriarchs of infidelity, but,\non the contrary, as a means of extolling their belief and faith, inasmuch\nas, though they possessed no extraordinary knowledge of God (such as\nMoses had), they yet accepted His promises as fixed and certain; whereas\nMoses, though his thoughts about God were more exalted, nevertheless doubted\nabout the Divine promises, and complained to God that, instead of the\npromised deliverance, the prospects of the Israelites had darkened.\n\n(21) As the patriarchs did not know the distinctive name of God, and as God\nmentions the fact to Moses, in praise of their faith and single-heartedness,\nand in contrast to the extraordinary grace granted to Moses, it follows, as\nwe stated at first, that men are not bound by, decree to have knowledge of\nthe attributes of God, such knowledge being only granted to a few of the\nfaithful: it is hardly worth while to quote further examples from Scripture,\nfor everyone must recognize that knowledge of God is not equal among all\ngood men. (22) Moreover, a man cannot be ordered to be wise any more than he\ncan be ordered to live and exist. (23) Men, women, and children are all\nalike able to obey by commandment, but not to be wise. If any tell us that\nit is not necessary to understand the Divine attributes, but that we must\nbelieve them simply, without proof, he is plainly trifling. (24) For what\nis invisible and can only be perceived by the mind, cannot be apprehended\nby any other means than proofs; if these are absent the object remains\nungrasped; the repetition of what has been heard on such subjects no more\nindicates or attains to their meaning than the words of a parrot or a puppet\nspeaking without sense or signification.\n\n(25) Before I proceed I ought to explain how it comes that we are often told\nin Genesis that the patriarchs preached in the name of Jehovah, this being\nin plain contradiction to the text above quoted. (26) A reference to what\nwas said in Chap. VIII. will readily explain the difficulty. (27) It was\nthere shown that the writer of the Pentateuch did not always speak of things\nand places by the names they bore in the times of which he was writing, but\nby the names best known to his contemporaries. (28) God is thus said in the\nPentateuch to have been preached by the patriarchs under the name of\nJehovah, not because such was the name by which the patriarchs knew\nHim, but because this name was the one most reverenced by the Jews.\n(29) This point, I say, must necessarily be noticed, for in Exodus it is\nexpressly stated that God was not known to the patriarchs by this name; and\nin chap. iii:13, it is said that Moses desired to know the name of God. (30)\nNow, if this name had been already known it would have been known to Moses.\n(31) We must therefore draw the conclusion indicated, namely, that the\nfaithful patriarchs did not know this name of God, and that the knowledge of\nGod is bestowed and not commanded by the Deity.\n\n(32) It is now time to pass on to our second point, and show that God\nthrough His prophets required from men no other knowledge of Himself than is\ncontained in a knowledge of His justice and charity - that is, of attributes\nwhich a certain manner of life will enable men to imitate. (33) Jeremiah\nstates this in so many words (xxii:15, 16): \"Did not thy father eat, and\ndrink, and do judgment and justice? and then it was well with him. (34) He\njudged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well with him: was not\nthis to know Me? saith the Lord.\" (35) The words in chap. ix:24 of the same\nbook are equally, clear. (36) \"But let him that glorieth glory in this, that\nhe understandeth and knoweth Me, that I am the Lord which exercise\nloving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth; for in these\nthings I delight, saith the Lord.\" (37) The same doctrine maybe gathered\nfrom Exod. xxxiv:6, where God revealed to Moses only those of His\nattributes which display the Divine justice and charity. (38) Lastly, we\nmay call attention to a passage in John which we shall discuss at more\nlength hereafter; the Apostle explains the nature of God (inasmuch as no\none has beheld Him) through charity only, and concludes that he who\npossesses charity possesses, and in very truth knows God.\n\n(39) We have thus seen that Moses, Jeremiah, and John sum up in a very short\ncompass the knowledge of God needful for all, and that they state it to\nconsist in exactly what we said, namely, that God is supremely just, and\nsupremely merciful - in other words, the one perfect pattern of the true\nlife. (40) We may add that Scripture nowhere gives an express definition of\nGod, and does not point out any other of His attributes which should be\napprehended save these, nor does it in set terms praise any others.\n(41) Wherefore we may draw the general conclusion that an intellectual\nknowledge of God, which takes cognizance of His nature in so far as it\nactually is, and which cannot by any manner of living be imitated by mankind\nor followed as an example, has no bearing whatever on true rules of conduct,\non faith, or on revealed religion; consequently that men may be in complete\nerror on the subject without incurring the charge of sinfulness. (42) We\nneed now no longer wonder that God adapted Himself to the existing opinions\nand imaginations of the prophets, or that the faithful held different ideas\nof God, as we showed in Chap. II.; or, again, that the sacred books speak\nvery inaccurately of God, attributing to Him hands, feet, eyes, ears, a\nmind, and motion from one place to another; or that they ascribe to Him\nemotions, such as jealousy, mercy, &c., or, lastly, that they describe\nHim as a Judge in heaven sitting on a royal throne with Christ on His\nright hand. (43) Such expressions are adapted to the understanding of the\nmultitude, it being the object of the Bible to make men not learned but\nobedient.\n\n(44) In spite of this the general run of theologians, when they come upon\nany of these phrases which they cannot rationally harmonize with the Divine\nnature, maintain that they should be interpreted metaphorically, passages\nthey cannot understand they say should be interpreted literally. (45) But if\nevery expression of this kind in the Bible is necessarily to be interpreted\nand understood metaphorically, Scripture must have been written, not for the\npeople and the unlearned masses, but chiefly for accomplished experts and\nphilosophers.\n\n(46) If it were indeed a sin to hold piously and simply the ideas about God\nwe have just quoted, the prophets ought to have been strictly on their guard\nagainst the use of such expressions, seeing the weak-mindedness of the\npeople, and ought, on the other hand, to have set forth first of all, duly\nand clearly, those attributes of God which are needful to be understood.\n\n(47) This they have nowhere done; we cannot, therefore, think that opinions\ntaken in themselves without respect to actions are either pious or impious,\nbut must maintain that a man is pious or impious in his beliefs only in so\nfar as he is thereby incited to obedience, or derives from them license\nto sin and rebel. (48) If a man, by believing what is true, becomes\nrebellious, his creed is impious; if by believing what is false he becomes\nobedient, his creed is pious; for the true knowledge of God comes not by\ncommandment, but by Divine gift. (49) God has required nothing from man but\na knowledge of His Divine justice and charity, and that not as necessary to\nscientific accuracy, but to obedience.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV - DEFINITIONS OF FAITH, THE FAITH, AND THE FOUNDATIONS\n OF FAITH, WHICH IS ONCE FOR ALL SEPARATED FROM PHILOSOPHY.\n\n(1) For a true knowledge of faith it is above all things necessary to\nunderstand that the Bible was adapted to the intelligence, not only of the\nprophets, but also of the diverse and fickle Jewish multitude. (2) This will\nbe recognized by all who give any thought to the subject, for they will see\nthat a person who accepted promiscuously everything in Scripture as being\nthe universal and absolute teaching of God, without accurately defining what\nwas adapted to the popular intelligence, would find it impossible to escape\nconfounding the opinions of the masses with the Divine doctrines, praising\nthe judgments and comments of man as the teaching of God, and\nmaking a wrong use of Scriptural authority. (3) Who, I say, does not\nperceive that this is the chief reason why so many sectaries teach\ncontradictory opinions as Divine documents, and support their contentions\nwith numerous Scriptural texts, till it has passed in Belgium into a\nproverb, geen ketter sonder letter - no heretic without a text? (4) The\nsacred books were not written by one man, nor for the people of a single\nperiod, but by many authors of different temperaments, at times extending\nfrom first to last over nearly two thousand years, and perhaps much longer.\n(5) We will not, however, accuse the sectaries of impiety because they have\nadapted the words of Scripture to their own opinions; it is thus that these\nwords were adapted to the understanding of the masses originally, and\neveryone is at liberty so to treat them if he sees that he can thus obey God\nin matters relating to justice and charity with a more full consent: but\nwe do accuse those who will not grant this freedom to their fellows,\nbut who persecute all who differ from them, as God's enemies, however\nhonourable and virtuous be their lives; while, on the other hand, they\ncherish those who agree with them, however foolish they may be, as God's\nelect. (6) Such conduct is as wicked and dangerous to the state as any that\ncan be conceived.\n\n(7) In order, therefore, to establish the limits to which individual freedom\nshould extend, and to decide what persons, in spite of the diversity of\ntheir opinions, are to be looked upon as the faithful, we must define faith\nand its essentials. (8) This task I hope to accomplish in the present\nchapter, and also to separate faith from philosophy, which is the chief aim\nof the whole treatise.\n\n(9) In order to proceed duly to the demonstration let us recapitulate the\nchief aim and object of Scripture; this will indicate a standard by which we\nmay define faith.\n\n(10) We have said in a former chapter that the aim and object of Scripture\nis only to teach obedience. (11) Thus much, I think, no one can question.\n(12) Who does not see that both Testaments are nothing else but schools for\nthis object, and have neither of them any aim beyond inspiring mankind with\na voluntary obedience? (13) For (not to repeat what I said in the last\nchapter) I will remark that Moses did not seek to convince the Jews by\nreason, but bound them by a covenant, by oaths, and by conferring benefits;\nfurther, he threatened the people with punishment if they should infringe\nthe law, and promised rewards if they should obey it.\n(14) All these are not means for teaching knowledge, but for inspiring\nobedience. (15) The doctrine of the Gospels enjoins nothing but simple\nfaith, namely, to believe in God and to honour Him, which is the same thing\nas to obey him. (16) There is no occasion for me to throw further light on\na question so plain by citing Scriptural texts commending obedience, such as\nmay be found in great numbers in both Testaments. (17) Moreover, the Bible\nteaches very clearly in a great many passages what everyone ought to do in\norder to obey God; the whole duty is summed up in love to one's neighbour.\n(18) It cannot, therefore, be denied that he who by God's command loves his\nneighbour as himself is truly obedient and blessed according to the law,\nwhereas he who hates his neighbour or neglects him is rebellious and\nobstinate.\n\n(19) Lastly, it is plain to everyone that the Bible was not written and\ndisseminated only for the learned, but for men of every age and race;\nwherefore we may rest assured that we are not bound by Scriptural command\nto believe anything beyond what is absolutely necessary for\nfulfilling its main precept.\n\n(20) This precept, then, is the only standard of the whole Catholic faith,\nand by it alone all the dogmas needful to be believed should be determined.\n(21) So much being abundantly manifest, as is also the fact that all other\ndoctrines of the faith can be legitimately deduced therefrom by reason\nalone, I leave it to every man to decide for himself how it comes to pass\nthat so many divisions have arisen in the Church: can it be from any other\ncause than those suggested at the beginning of Chap. VIII.? (22) It is these\nsame causes which compel me to explain the method of determining the dogmas\nof the faith from the foundation we have discovered, for if I\nneglected to do so, and put the question on a regular basis, I might justly\nbe said to have promised too lavishly, for that anyone might, by my showing,\nintroduce any doctrine he liked into religion, under the pretext that it was\na necessary means to obedience: especially would this be the case in\nquestions respecting the Divine attributes.\n\n(23) In order, therefore, to set forth the whole matter methodically, I will\nbegin with a definition of faith, which on the principle above given, should\nbe as follows:-\n\n(24) Faith consists in a knowledge of God, without which obedience to Him\nwould be impossible, and which the mere fact of obedience to Him implies.\n(25) This definition is so clear, and follows so plainly from what we have\nalready proved, that it needs no explanation. (26) The consequences involved\ntherein I will now briefly show.\n\n(27) (I.) Faith is not salutary in itself, but only in respect to the\nobedience it implies, or as James puts it in his Epistle, ii:17, \"Faith\nwithout works is dead\" (see the whole of the chapter quoted).\n\n(28) (II.) He who is truly obedient necessarily possesses true and saving\nfaith; for if obedience be granted, faith must be granted also, as the same\nApostle expressly says in these words (ii:18), \"Show me thy faith without\nthy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works.\" (29) So also\nJohn, I Ep. iv:7: \"Everyone that loveth is born of God, and knoweth\nGod: he that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is love.\" (30) From these\ntexts, I repeat, it follows that we can only judge a man faithful or\nunfaithful by his works. (31) If his works be good, he is faithful, however\nmuch his doctrines may differ from those of the rest of the faithful: if his\nworks be evil, though he may verbally conform, he is unfaithful. (32) For\nobedience implies faith, and faith without works is dead.\n\n(33) John, in the 13th verse of the chapter above quoted, expressly teaches\nthe same doctrine: \"Hereby,\" he says, \"know we that we dwell in Him and He\nin us, because He hath given us of His Spirit,\" i.e. love. (34) He had said\nbefore that God is love, and therefore he concludes (on his own received\nprinciples), that whoso possesses love possesses truly the Spirit of God.\n(35) As no one has beheld God he infers that no one has knowledge or\nconsciousness of God, except from love towards his neighbour, and also that\nno one can have knowledge of any of God's attributes, except this of love,\nin so far as we participate therein.\n\n(36) If these arguments are not conclusive, they, at any rate, show the\nApostle's meaning, but the words in chap. ii:3, 4, of the same Epistle are\nmuch clearer, for they state in so many words our precise contention: \"And\nhereby we do know that we know Him, if we keep His commandments. (37) He\nthat saith, I know Him, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar, and the\ntruth is not in him.\"\n\n(38) From all this, I repeat, it follows that they are the true enemies of\nChrist who persecute honourable and justice-loving men because they differ\nfrom them, and do not uphold the same religious dogmas as themselves: for\nwhosoever loves justice and charity we know, by that very fact, to be\nfaithful: whosoever persecutes the faithful, is an enemy to Christ.\n\n(39) Lastly, it follows that faith does not demand that dogmas should be\ntrue as that they should be pious - that is, such as will stir up the heart\nto obey; though there be many such which contain not a shadow of truth, so\nlong as they be held in good faith, otherwise their adherents are\ndisobedient, for how can anyone, desirous of loving justice and obeying God,\nadore as Divine what he knows to be alien from the Divine nature? (40)\nHowever, men may err from simplicity of mind, and Scripture, as we\nhave seen, does not condemn ignorance, but obstinacy. (41) This is the\nnecessary result of our definition of faith, and all its branches\nshould spring from the universal rule above given, and from the evident aim\nand object of the Bible, unless we choose to mix our own inventions\ntherewith. (42) Thus it is not true doctrines which are expressly required\nby the Bible, so much as doctrines necessary for obedience, and to confirm\nin our hearts the love of our neighbour, wherein (to adopt the words of\nJohn) we are in God, and God in us.\n\n(43) As, then, each man's faith must be judged pious or impious only in\nrespect of its producing obedience or obstinacy, and not in respect of its\ntruth; and as no one will dispute that men's dispositions are exceedingly\nvaried, that all do not acquiesce in the same things, but are ruled\nsome by one opinion some by another, so that what moves one to devotion\nmoves another to laughter and contempt, it follows that there can be no\ndoctrines in the Catholic, or universal, religion, which can give rise to\ncontroversy among good men. (44) Such doctrines might be pious to some and\nimpious to others, whereas they should be judged solely by their fruits.\n\n(45) To the universal religion, then, belong only such dogmas as are\nabsolutely required in order to attain obedience to God, and without which\nsuch obedience would be impossible; as for the rest, each man-seeing that\nhe is the best judge of his own character-should adopt whatever he thinks\nbest adapted to strengthen his love of justice. (46) If this were so, I\nthink there would be no further occasion for controversies in the Church.\n\n(47) I have now no further fear in enumerating the dogmas of universal faith\nor the fundamental dogmas of the whole of Scripture, inasmuch as they all\ntend (as may be seen from what has been said) to this one doctrine, namely,\nthat there exists a God, that is, a Supreme Being, Who loves justice and\ncharity, and Who must be obeyed by whosoever would be saved; that the\nworship of this Being consists in the practice of justice and love towards\none's neighbour, and that they contain nothing beyond the following\ndoctrines:-\n\n(48) I. That God or a Supreme Being exists, sovereignly just and merciful,\nthe Exemplar of the true life; that whosoever is ignorant of or\ndisbelieves in His existence cannot obey Him or know Him as a Judge.\n\n(49) II. That He is One. (50) Nobody will dispute that this doctrine is\nabsolutely necessary for entire devotion, admiration, and love towards God.\n(51) For devotion, admiration, and love spring from the superiority of one\nover all else.\n\n(52) III. That He is omnipresent, or that all things are open to Him, for if\nanything could be supposed to be concealed from Him, or to be unnoticed by,\nHim, we might doubt or be ignorant of the equity of His judgment as\ndirecting all things.\n\n(53) IV. That He has supreme right and dominion over all things, and that He\ndoes nothing under compulsion, but by His absolute fiat and grace. (54) All\nthings are bound to obey Him, He is not bound to obey any.\n\n(55) V. That the worship of God consists only in justice and charity, or\nlove towards one's neighbour.\n\n(56) VI. That all those, and those only, who obey God by their manner of\nlife are saved; the rest of mankind, who live under the sway of their\npleasures, are lost. (57) If we did not believe this, there would be no\nreason for obeying God rather than pleasure.\n\n(58) VII. Lastly, that God forgives the sins of those who repent. (59) No\none is free from sin, so that without this belief all would despair of\nsalvation, and there would be no reason for believing in the mercy of God.\n(60) He who firmly believes that God, out of the mercy and grace with which\nHe directs all things, forgives the sins of men, and who feels his love of\nGod kindled thereby, he, I say, does really know Christ according to the\nSpirit, and Christ is in him.\n\n(61) No one can deny that all these doctrines are before all things\nnecessary to be believed, in order that every man, without exception, may\nbe able to obey God according to the bidding of the Law above explained, for\nif one of these precepts be disregarded obedience is destroyed.\n(62) But as to what God, or the Exemplar of the true life, may be, whether\nfire, or spirit, or light, or thought, or what not, this, I say, has nothing\nto do with faith any more than has the question how He comes to be the\nExemplar of the true life, whether it be because He has a just and\nmerciful mind, or because all things exist and act through Him, and\nconsequently that we understand through Him, and through Him see what\nis truly just and good. (63) Everyone may think on such questions as he\nlikes.\n\n(64) Furthermore, faith is not affected, whether we hold that God is\nomnipresent essentially or potentially; that He directs all things by\nabsolute fiat, or by the necessity of His nature; that He dictates laws like\na prince, or that He sets them forth as eternal truths; that man obeys Him\nby virtue of free will, or by virtue of the necessity of the Divine decree;\nlastly, that the reward of the good and the punishment of the wicked is\nnatural or supernatural: these and such like questions have no bearing on\nfaith, except in so far as they are used as means to give us license to sin\nmore, or to obey God less. (65) I will go further, and maintain that every\nman is bound to adapt these dogmas to his own way of thinking, and to\ninterpret them according as he feels that he can give them his fullest and\nmost unhesitating assent, so that he may the more easily obey God with his\nwhole heart.\n\n(66) Such was the manner, as we have already pointed out, in which the faith\nwas in old time revealed and written, in accordance with the understanding\nand opinions of the prophets and people of the period; so, in like fashion,\nevery man is bound to adapt it to his own opinions, so that he may accept it\nwithout any hesitation or mental repugnance. (67) We have shown that faith\ndoes not so much require truth as piety, and that it is only quickening and\npious through obedience, consequently no one is faithful save by obedience\nalone. (68) The best faith is not necessarily possessed by him who displays\nthe best reasons, but by him who displays the best fruits of justice and\ncharity. (69) How salutary and necessary this doctrine is for a state, in\norder that men may dwell together in peace and concord; and how many and how\ngreat causes of disturbance and crime are thereby cut off, I leave everyone\nto judge for himself!\n\n(70) Before we go further, I may remark that we can, by means of what we\nhave just proved, easily answer the objections raised in Chap. I., when we\nwere discussing God's speaking with the Israelites on Mount Sinai. (71) For,\nthough the voice heard by the Israelites could not give those men any\nphilosophical or mathematical certitude of God's existence, it was yet\nsufficient to thrill them with admiration for God, as they already knew Him,\nand to stir them up to obedience: and such was the object of the display.\n(72) God did not wish to teach the Israelites the absolute attributes of His\nessence (none of which He then revealed), but to break down their hardness\nof heart, and to draw them to obedience: therefore He did not appeal to them\nwith reasons, but with the sound of trumpets, thunder, and lightnings.\n\n(73) It remains for me to show that between faith or theology, and\nphilosophy, there is no connection, nor affinity. (74) I think no one will\ndispute the fact who has knowledge of the aim and foundations of the two\nsubjects, for they are as wide apart as the poles.\n\n(75) Philosophy has no end in view save truth: faith, as we have abundantly\nproved, looks for nothing but obedience and piety. (76) Again, philosophy is\nbased on axioms which must be sought from nature alone: faith is based on\nhistory and language, and must be sought for only in Scripture and\nrevelation, as we showed in Chap. VII. (77) Faith, therefore, allows the\ngreatest latitude in philosophic speculation, allowing us without blame to\nthink what we like about anything, and only condemning, as heretics and\nschismatics, those who teach opinions which tend to produce obstinacy,\nhatred, strife, and anger; while, on the other hand, only considering\nas faithful those who persuade us, as far as their reason and faculties will\npermit, to follow justice and charity.\n\n(78) Lastly, as what we are now setting forth are the most important\nsubjects of my treatise, I would most urgently beg the reader, before I\nproceed, to read these two chapters with especial attention, and to take the\ntrouble to weigh them well in his mind: let him take for granted that I\nhave not written with a view to introducing novelties, but in order to do\naway with abuses, such as I hope I may, at some future time, at last see\nreformed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV - THEOLOGY IS SHOWN NOT TO BE SUBSERVIENT TO REASON,\n NOR REASON TO THEOLOGY: A DEFINITION OF THE REASON WHICH\n ENABLES US TO ACCEPT THE AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE.\n\n(1) Those who know not that philosophy and reason are distinct, dispute\nwhether Scripture should be made subservient to reason, or reason to\nScripture: that is, whether the meaning of Scripture should be made to\nagreed with reason; or whether reason should be made to agree with\nScripture: the latter position is assumed by the sceptics who deny the\ncertitude of reason, the former by the dogmatists. (2) Both parties are, as\nI have shown, utterly in the wrong, for either doctrine would require us to\ntamper with reason or with Scripture.\n\n(3) We have shown that Scripture does not teach philosophy, but merely\nobedience, and that all it contains has been adapted to the understanding\nand established opinions of the multitude. (4) Those, therefore, who wish to\nadapt it to philosophy, must needs ascribe to the prophets many ideas which\nthey never even dreamed of, and give an extremely forced interpretation to\ntheir words: those on the other hand, who would make reason and philosophy\nsubservient to theology, will be forced to accept as Divine utterances the\nprejudices of the ancient Jews, and to fill and confuse their mind\ntherewith. (5) In short, one party will run wild with the aid of reason,\nand the other will run wild without the aid of reason.\n\n(6) The first among the Pharisees who openly maintained that Scripture\nshould be made to agree with reason, was Maimonides, whose opinion we\nreviewed, and abundantly refuted in Chap. VIII.: now, although this writer\nhad much authority among his contemporaries, he was deserted on this\nquestion by almost all, and the majority went straight over to the\nopinion of a certain R. Jehuda Alpakhar, who, in his anxiety to avoid the\nerror of Maimonides, fell into another, which was its exact contrary. (7) He\nheld that reason should be made subservient, and entirely give way to\nScripture. (8) He thought that a passage should not be interpreted\nmetaphorically, simply because it was repugnant to reason, but only in the\ncases when it is inconsistent with Scripture itself - that is, with its\nclear doctrines. (9) Therefore he laid down the universal rule, that\nwhatsoever Scripture teaches dogmatically, and affirms expressly, must on\nits own sole authority be admitted as absolutely true: that there is no\ndoctrine in the Bible which directly contradicts the general tenour of\nthe whole: but only some which appear to involve a difference, for the\nphrases of Scripture often seem to imply something contrary to what has been\nexpressly taught. (10) Such phrases, and such phrases only, we may interpret\nmetaphorically.\n\n(11) For instance, Scripture clearly teaches the unity of God (see Deut.\nvi:4), nor is there any text distinctly asserting a plurality of gods; but\nin several passages God speaks of Himself, and the prophets speak of Him, in\nthe plural number; such phrases are simply a manner of speaking, and do not\nmean that there actually are several gods: they are to be explained\nmetaphorically, not because a plurality of gods is repugnant to reason, but\nbecause Scripture distinctly asserts that there is only one.\n\n(12) So, again, as Scripture asserts (as Alpakhar thinks) in Deut. iv:15,\nthat God is incorporeal, we are bound, solely by the authority of this text,\nand not by reason, to believe that God has no body: consequently we must\nexplain metaphorically, on the sole authority of Scripture, all those\npassages which attribute to God hands, feet, &c., and take them merely as\nfigures of speech. (13) Such is the opinion of Alpakhar. In so far as he\nseeks to explain Scripture by Scripture, I praise him, but I marvel that a\nman gifted with reason should wish to debase that faculty. (14) It is\ntrue that Scripture should be explained by Scripture, so long as we are in\ndifficulties about the meaning and intention of the prophets, but when we\nhave elicited the true meaning, we must of necessity make use of our\njudgment and reason in order to assent thereto. (15) If reason, however,\nmuch as she rebels, is to be entirely subjected to Scripture, I ask,\nare we to effect her submission by her own aid, or without her, and\nblindly? (16) If the latter, we shall surely act foolishly and\ninjudiciously; if the former, we assent to Scripture under the dominion of\nreason, and should not assent to it without her. (17) Moreover, I may ask\nnow, is a man to assent to anything against his reason? (18) What is denial\nif it be not reason's refusal to assent? (19) In short, I am astonished that\nanyone should wish to subject reason, the greatest of gifts and a light from\non high, to the dead letter which may have been corrupted by human malice;\nthat it should be thought no crime to speak with contempt of mind, the true\nhandwriting of God's Word, calling it corrupt, blind, and lost, while it is\nconsidered the greatest of crimes to say the same of the letter, which is\nmerely the reflection and image of God's Word. (20) Men think it pious\nto trust nothing to reason and their own judgment, and impious to doubt the\nfaith of those who have transmitted to us the sacred books. (21) Such\nconduct is not piety, but mere folly. And, after all, why are they so\nanxious? What are they afraid of? (22) Do they think that faith and religion\ncannot be upheld unless men purposely keep themselves in ignorance, and\nturn their backs on reason? (23) If this be so, they have but a timid trust\nin Scripture.\n\n(23) However, be it far from me to say that religion should seek to enslave\nreason, or reason religion, or that both should not be able to keep their\nsovereignity in perfect harmony. (24) I will revert to this question\npresently, for I wish now to discuss Alpakhar's rule.\n\n(26) He requires, as we have stated, that we should accept as true, or\nreject as false, everything asserted or denied by Scripture, and he further\nstates that Scripture never expressly asserts or denies anything which\ncontradicts its assertions or negations elsewhere. (27) The rashness of\nsuch a requirement and statement can escape no one. (28) For (passing over\nthe fact that he does not notice that Scripture consists of different books,\nwritten at different times, for different people, by different authors: and\nalso that his requirement is made on his own authority without\nany corroboration from reason or Scripture) he would be bound to show that\nall passages which are indirectly contradictory of the rest, can be\nsatisfactorily explained metaphorically through the nature of the language\nand the context: further, that Scripture has come down to us untampered\nwith. (29) However, we will go into the matter at length.\n\n(30) Firstly, I ask what shall we do if reason prove recalcitrant? (31)\nShall we still be bound to affirm whatever Scripture affirms, and to deny\nwhatever Scripture denies? (32) Perhaps it will be answered that Scripture\ncontains nothing repugnant to reason. (33) But I insist that it expressly\naffirms and teaches that God is jealous (namely, in the decalogue itself,\nand in Exod. xxxiv:14, and in Deut. iv:24, and in many other places), and I\nassert that such a doctrine is repugnant to reason. (34) It must, I suppose,\nin spite of all, be accepted as true. If there are any passages in\nScripture which imply that God is not jealous, they must be taken\nmetaphorically as meaning nothing of the kind. (35) So, also, Scripture\nexpressly states (Exod. xix:20, &c.) that God came down to Mount Sinai, and\nit attributes to Him other movements from place to place, nowhere\ndirectly stating that God does not so move. (36) Wherefore, we must take the\npassage literally, and Solomon's words (I Kings viii:27), \"But will God\ndwell on the earth? (37) Behold the heavens and earth cannot contain thee,\"\ninasmuch as they do not expressly state that God does not move from place to\nplace, but only imply it, must be explained away till they have no further\nsemblance of denying locomotion to the Deity. (38) So also we must believe\nthat the sky is the habitation and throne of God, for Scripture expressly\nsays so; and similarly many passages expressing the opinions of the prophets\nor the multitude, which reason and philosophy, but not Scripture, tell us to\nbe false, must be taken as true if we are to follow the guidance of our\nauthor, for according to him, reason has nothing to do with the matter. (39)\nFurther, it is untrue that Scripture never contradicts itself directly, but\nonly by implication. (40) For Moses says, in so many words (Deut. iv:24),\n\"The Lord thy God is a consuming fire,\" and elsewhere expressly denies that\nGod has any likeness to visible things. (Deut. iv. 12.) (41) If it be\ndecided that the latter passage only contradicts the former by implication,\nand must be adapted thereto, lest it seem to negative it, let us grant that\nGod is a fire; or rather, lest we should seem to have taken leave\nof our senses, let us pass the matter over and take another example.\n\n(42) Samuel expressly denies that God ever repents, \"for he is not a man\nthat he should repent\" (I Sam. xv:29). (43) Jeremiah, on the other hand,\nasserts that God does repent, both of the evil and of the good which He had\nintended to do (Jer. xviii:8-10). (44) What? (45) Are not these two\ntexts directly contradictory? (46) Which of the two, then, would our author\nwant to explain metaphorically? (47) Both statements are general, and each\nis the opposite of the other - what one flatly affirms, the other flatly,\ndenies. (48) So, by his own rule, he would be obliged at once to reject them\nas false, and to accept them as true.\n\n(49) Again, what is the point of one passage, not being contradicted by\nanother directly, but only by implication, if the implication is clear, and\nthe nature and context of the passage preclude metaphorical interpretation?\n(50) There are many such instances in the Bible, as we saw in Chap. II.\n(where we pointed out that the prophets held different and contradictory\nopinions), and also in Chaps. IX. and X., where we drew attention to the\ncontradictions in the historical narratives. (51) There is no need for me to\ngo through them all again, for what I have said sufficiently exposes the\nabsurdities which would follow from an opinion and rule such as we are\ndiscussing, and shows the hastiness of its propounder.\n\n(52) We may, therefore, put this theory, as well as that of Maimonides,\nentirely out of court; and we may take it for indisputable that theology is\nnot bound to serve reason, nor reason theology, but that each has her own\ndomain.\n\n(53) The sphere of reason is, as we have said, truth and wisdom; the sphere\nof theology, is piety and obedience. (54) The power of reason does not\nextend so far as to determine for us that men may be blessed through simple\nobedience, without understanding. (55) Theology, tells us nothing else,\nenjoins on us no command save obedience, and has neither the will nor the\npower to oppose reason: she defines the dogmas of faith (as we pointed out\nin the last chapter) only in so far as they may be necessary for obedience,\nand leaves reason to determine their precise truth: for reason is the\nlight of the mind, and without her all things are dreams and phantoms.\n\n(56) By theology, I here mean, strictly speaking, revelation, in so far as\nit indicates the object aimed at by Scripture namely, the scheme and manner\nof obedience, or the true dogmas of piety and faith. (57) This may truly be\ncalled the Word of God, which does not consist in a certain number of books\n(see Chap. XII.). (58) Theology thus understood, if we regard its precepts\nor rules of life, will be found in accordance with reason; and, if we look\nto its aim and object, will be seen to be in nowise repugnant thereto,\nwherefore it is universal to all men.\n\n(59) As for its bearing on Scripture, we have shown in Chap. VII. that the\nmeaning of Scripture should be gathered from its own history, and not from\nthe history of nature in general, which is the basis of philosophy.\n\n(60) We ought not to be hindered if we find that our investigation of the\nmeaning of Scripture thus conducted shows us that it is here and there\nrepugnant to reason; for whatever we may find of this sort in the Bible,\nwhich men may be in ignorance of, without injury to their charity, has, we\nmay be sure, no bearing on theology or the Word of God, and may, therefore,\nwithout blame, be viewed by every one as he pleases.\n\n(61) To sum up, we may draw the absolute conclusion that the Bible must not\nbe accommodated to reason, nor reason to the Bible.\n\n(62) Now, inasmuch as the basis of theology - the doctrine that man may be\nsaved by obedience alone - cannot be proved by reason whether it be true or\nfalse, we may be asked, Why, then, should we believe it? (63) If we do so\nwithout the aid of reason, we accept it blindly, and act foolishly and\ninjudiciously; if, on the other hand, we settle that it can be proved by\nreason, theology becomes a part of philosophy, and inseparable therefrom.\n(64) But I make answer that I have absolutely established that this basis of\ntheology cannot be investigated by the natural light of reason, or, at any\nrate, that no one ever has proved it by such means, and, therefore,\nrevelation was necessary. (65) We should, however, make use of our reason,\nin order to grasp with moral certainty what is revealed - I say, with moral\ncertainty, for we cannot hope to attain greater certainty than the\nprophets: yet their certainty was only, moral, as I showed in Chap. II.\n\n(66) Those, therefore, who attempt to set forth the authority of Scripture\nwith mathematical demonstrations are wholly in error: for the authority of\nthe Bible is dependent on the authority of the prophets, and can be\nsupported by no stronger arguments than those employed in old time by the\nprophets for convincing the people of their own authority. (67) Our\ncertainty on the same subject can be founded on no other basis than that\nwhich served as foundation for the certainty of the prophets.\n\n(68) Now the certainty of the prophets consisted (as we pointed out) in\nthese elements:-\n\n(69) (I.) A distinct and vivid imagination.\n\n(70) (II.) A sign.\n\n(71) (III.) Lastly, and chiefly, a mind turned to what is just and good.\nIt was based on no other reasons than these, and consequently they cannot\nprove their authority by any other reasons, either to the multitude whom\nthey addressed orally, nor to us whom they address in writing.\n\n(72) The first of these reasons, namely, the vivid imagination, could be\nvalid only for the prophets; therefore, our certainty concerning revelation\nmust, and ought to be, based on the remaining two - namely, the sign and the\nteaching. (73) Such is the express doctrine of Moses, for (in Deut. xviii.)\nhe bids the people obey the prophet who should give a true sign in the name\nof the Lord, but if he should predict falsely, even though it were in the\nname of the Lord, he should be put to death, as should also he who strives\nto lead away the people from the true religion, though he confirm his\nauthority with signs and portents. (74) We may compare with the above Deut.\nxiii. (75) Whence it follows that a true prophet could be distinguished from\na false one, both by his doctrine and by the miracles he wrought, for Moses\ndeclares such an one to be a true prophet, and bids the people trust him\nwithout fear of deceit. (76) He condemns as false, and worthy of death,\nthose who predict anything falsely even in the name of the Lord, or who\npreach false gods, even though their miracles be real.\n\n(77) The only reason, then, which we have for belief in Scripture or the\nwritings of the prophets, is the doctrine we find therein, and the\nsigns by which it is confirmed. (78) For as we see that the prophets extol\ncharity and justice above all things, and have no other object, we\nconclude that they did not write from unworthy motives, but because they\nreally thought that men might become blessed through obedience and faith:\nfurther, as we see that they confirmed their teaching with signs and\nwonders, we become persuaded that they did not speak at random, nor run riot\nin their prophecies. (79) We are further strengthened in our conclusion by\nthe fact that the morality they teach is in evident agreement with reason,\nfor it is no accidental coincidence that the Word of God which we find in\nthe prophets coincides with the Word of God written in our hearts. (80) We\nmay, I say, conclude this from the sacred books as certainly as did the Jews\nof old from the living voice of the prophets: for we showed in Chap. XII.\nthat Scripture has come down to us intact in respect to its doctrine and\nmain narratives.\n\n(81) Therefore this whole basis of theology and Scripture, though it does\nnot admit of mathematical proof, may yet be accepted with the approval of\nour judgment. (82) It would be folly to refuse to accept what is confirmed\nby such ample prophetic testimony, and what has proved such a comfort to\nthose whose reason is comparatively weak, and such a benefit to the state; a\ndoctrine, moreover, which we may believe in without the slightest peril or\nhurt, and should reject simply because it cannot be mathematically proved:\nit is as though we should admit nothing as true, or as a wise rule of life,\nwhich could ever, in any possible way, be called in question; or as though\nmost of our actions were not full of uncertainty and hazards.\n\n(83) I admit that those who believe that theology and philosophy are\nmutually contradictory, and that therefore either one or the other must be\nthrust from its throne - I admit, I say, that such persons are not\nunreasonable in attempting to put theology on a firm basis, and to\ndemonstrate its truth mathematically. (84) Who, unless he were desperate or\nmad, would wish to bid an incontinent farewell to reason, or to despise the\narts and sciences, or to deny reason's certitude? (85) But, in the\nmeanwhile, we cannot wholly absolve them from blame, inasmuch as they invoke\nthe aid of reason for her own defeat, and attempt infallibly to prove her\nfallible. (86) While they are trying to prove mathematically the\nauthority and truth of theology, and to take away the authority of natural\nreason, they are in reality only bringing theology under reason's dominion,\nand proving that her authority has no weight unless natural reason be at the\nback of it.\n\n(87) If they boast that they themselves assent because of the inward\ntestimony of the Holy Spirit, and that they only invoke the aid of reason\nbecause of unbelievers, in order to convince them, not even so can this meet\nwith our approval, for we can easily show that they have spoken either from\nemotion or vain-glory. (88) It most clearly follows from the last chapter\nthat the Holy Spirit only gives its testimony in favour of works, called by\nPaul (in Gal. v:22) the fruits of the Spirit, and is in itself really\nnothing but the mental acquiescence which follows a good action in our\nsouls. (89) No spirit gives testimony concerning the certitude of matters\nwithin the sphere of speculation, save only reason, who is mistress, as we\nhave shown, of the whole realm of truth. (90) If then they assert that they\npossess this Spirit which makes them certain of truth, they speak falsely,\nand according to the prejudices of the emotions, or else they are in great\ndread lest they should be vanquished by philosophers and exposed to public\nridicule, and therefore they flee, as it were, to the altar; but their\nrefuge is vain, for what altar will shelter a man who has outraged reason?\n(91) However, I pass such persons over, for I think I have fulfilled my\npurpose, and shown how philosophy should be separated from theology, and\nwherein each consists; that neither should be subservient to the other, but\nthat each should keep her unopposed dominion. (92) Lastly, as occasion\noffered, I have pointed out the absurdities, the inconveniences, and the\nevils following from the extraordinary confusion which has hitherto\nprevailed between the two subjects, owing to their not being properly\ndistinguished and separated. (93) Before I go further I would expressly\nstate (though I have said it before) that I consider the utility and the\nneed for Holy Scripture or Revelation to be very great. (94) For as we\ncannot perceive by the natural light of reason that simple obedience is the\npath of salvation [Endnote 25], and are taught by revelation only that it is\nso by the special grace of God, which our reason cannot attain, it follows\nthat the Bible has brought a very great consolation to mankind. (95) All\nare able to obey, whereas there are but very few, compared with the\naggregate of humanity, who can acquire the habit of virtue under the unaided\nguidance of reason. (96) Thus if we had not the testimony of Scripture, we\nshould doubt of the salvation of nearly all men.\n\nEnd of Part 3 - Chapters XI to XV.\n\n\n\n\nAUTHOR'S ENDNOTES TO THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nEndnote 24. (1) \"Now I think.\" (2) The translators render the {Greek}\nword \"I infer\", and assert that Paul uses it as synonymous with {a Greek\nword}. (3) But the former word has, in Greek, the same meaning as the Hebrew\nword rendered to think, to esteem, to judge. (4) And this signification\nwould be in entire agreement with the Syriac translation. (5) This Syriac\ntranslation (if it be a translation, which is very doubtful, for we know\nneither the time of its appearance, nor the translators and Syriac was the\nvernacular of the Apostles) renders the text before us in a way well\nexplained by Tremellius as \"we think, therefore.\"\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nEndnote 25. (1) \"That simple obedience is the path of salvation.\" (2)\nIn other words, it is enough for salvation or blessedness, that we should\nembrace the Divine decrees as laws or commands; there is no need to conceive\nthem as eternal truths. (3) This can be taught us by Revelation, not Reason,\nas appears from the demonstrations given in Chapter IV.\n\n\nEnd of Part III - Chapters XI to XV.","title":"A Theological-Political Treatise [Part III]","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":16378}