{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_992/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_992","id":"gutenberg_992","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/992","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Free thought -- Early works to 1800","Philosophy","Philosophy and religion -- Early works to 1800","Political science -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Sentence Numbers, shown thus (1), have been added by volunteer.\n\n\n\n\nA Theologico-Political Treatise\n\nPart IV of IV - Chapters XVI to XX\n\nby Baruch Spinoza\n\n\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS: Search strings are shown thus [16:x].\n                   Search forward and back with the same string.\n\n\n\n[16:0] CHAPTER XVI - Of the Foundations of a State;\n   of the Natural and  Civil Rights of Individuals;\n   and of the Rights of the Sovereign Power.\n\n[16:1]  In Nature right co-extensive with power.\n\n[16:2]  This principle applies to mankind in the state of Nature.\n\n[16:3]  How a transition from this state to a civil state is possible.\n\n[16:4]  Subjects not slaves.\n\n[16:5]  Definition of private civil right - and wrong.\n\n[16:6]  Of alliance.\n\n[16:7]  Of treason.\n\n[16:8]  In what sense sovereigns are bound by Divine law.\n\n[16:9]  Civil government not inconsistent with religion.\n\n\n\n[17:0]  CHAPTER XVII.- It is shown, that no one can or need\n   transfer all his Rights to the Sovereign Power. Of the\n   Hebrew Republic, as it was during  the lifetime of Moses,\n   and after his death till the foundation of the Monarchy;\n   and of its Excellence. Lastly, of the Causes why the\n   Theocratic Republic fell, and why it could hardly have\n   continued without Dissension.\n\n[17:1]  The absolute theory, of Sovereignty ideal - No one can\n        in fact transfer all his rights to the Sovereign power.\n        Evidence of this.\n\n[17:2]  The greatest danger in all States from within,\n        not without.\n\n[17:3]  Original independence of the Jews after the Exodus.\n\n[17:4]  Changed first to a pure democratic Theocracy.\n\n[17:5]  Then to subjection to Moses.\n\n[17:6]  Then to a Theocracy with the power divided\n        between the high priest and the captains.\n\n[17:7]  The tribes confederate states.\n\n[17:8]  Restraints on the civil power.\n\n[17:9]  Restraints on the people.\n\n[17:A]  Causes of decay involved in the constitution\n        of the Levitical priesthood.\n\n\n\n[18:0]  CHAPTER XVIII.- From the Commonwealth of the Hebrews and\n   their History certain Lessons are deduced.\n\n[18:1]  The Hebrew constitution no longer possible or desirable,\n        yet lessons may be derived from its history.\n\n[18:2]  As the danger of entrusting any authority in politics\n        to ecclesiastics - the danger of identifying\n        religion with dogma.\n\n[18:3]  The necessity of keeping all judicial power with\n        the sovereign - the danger  of changes in the\n        form of a State.\n\n[18:4]  This last danger illustrated from the history of\n        England - of Rome.\n\n[18:5]  And of Holland.\n\n\n\n[19:0] CHAPTER XIX -  It is shown that the Right\n   over Matters Spiritual lies wholly with the\n   Sovereign, and that the Outward Forms of\n   Religion should be in accordance with Public\n   Peace, if we would worship God aright.\n\n[19:1]  Difference between external and inward religion.\n\n[19:2]  Positive law established only by agreement.\n\n[19:3]  Piety furthered by peace and obedience.\n\n[19:4]  Position of the Apostles exceptional.\n\n[19:5]  Why Christian States, unlike the Hebrew,\n        suffer from disputes between the civil\n        and ecclesiastical powers.\n\n[19:6]  Absolute power in things spiritual of modern rulers.\n\n\n\n[20:0]  CHAPTER XX -  That in a Free State every man\nmay Think what he Likes, and Say what he Thinks.\n\n[20:1]  The mind not subject to State authority.\n\n[20:2]  Therefore in general language should not be.\n\n[20:3]  A man who disapproving of a law, submits his adverse opinion\n        to the judgment of the authorities, while acting in\n        accordance  with the law, deserves well of the State.\n\n[20:4]  That liberty of opinion is beneficial, shown from\n        the history of Amsterdam.\n\n[20:5]  Danger to the State of withholding it. -\n        Submission of the Author to the\n        judgment of his country's rulers.\n\n\n\n[Author's Endnotes] to the Treatise.\n\n\n\n\n\n[16:0] CHAPTER XVI - OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE; OF THE\nNATURAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS; AND OF THE\nRIGHTS OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER.\n\n(1) Hitherto our care has been to separate philosophy from theology, and to\nshow the freedom of thought which such separation insures to both. (2) It is\nnow time to determine the limits to which such freedom of thought and\ndiscussion may extend itself in the ideal state. (3) For the due\nconsideration of this question we must examine the foundations of a State,\nfirst turning our attention to the natural rights of individuals, and\nafterwards to religion and the state as a whole.\n\n(16:4) By the right and ordinance of nature, I merely mean those natural\nlaws wherewith we conceive every individual to be conditioned by nature, so\nas to live and act in a given way. (5) For instance, fishes are naturally\nconditioned for swimming, and the greater for devouring the less; therefore\nfishes enjoy the water, and the greater devour the less by sovereign natural\nright. [16:1] (6) For it is certain that nature, taken in the abstract, has\nsovereign right to do anything she can; in other words, her right is\nco-extensive with her power. (7) The power of nature is the power of God,\nwhich has sovereign right over all things; and, inasmuch as the power of nature\nis simply the aggregate of the powers of all her individual components, it\nfollows that every individual has sovereign right to do all that he can; in\nother words, the rights of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his\npower as it has been conditioned. (8) Now it is the sovereign law and right\nof nature that each individual should endeavour to preserve itself as it is,\nwithout regard to anything but itself; therefore this sovereign law and\nright belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and act according\nto its natural conditions. (9) We do not here acknowledge any\ndifference between mankind and other individual natural entities, nor\nbetween men endowed with reason and those to whom reason is unknown; nor\nbetween fools, madmen, and sane men. (10) Whatsoever an individual does by\nthe laws of its nature it has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it\nacts as it was conditioned by nature, and cannot act otherwise. [16:2] (11)\nWherefore among men, so long as they are considered as living under the sway\nof nature, he who does not yet know reason, or who has not yet acquired the\nhabit of virtue, acts solely according to the laws of his desire with as\nsovereign a right as he who orders his life entirely by the laws of reason.\n\n(16:12) That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that reason\ndictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also the ignorant\nand foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire dictates, or to\nlive according to the laws of desire. (13) This is identical with the\nteaching of Paul, who acknowledges that previous to the law - that is, so\nlong as men are considered of as living under the sway of nature, there is\nno sin.\n\n(16:14) The natural right of the individual man is thus determined, not by\nsound reason, but by desire and power. (15) All are not naturally\nconditioned so as to act according to the laws and rules of reason; nay, on\nthe contrary, all men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the\nright way of life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater part of their\nlife, even if they have been well brought up, has passed away. (16)\nNevertheless, they are in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve\nthemselves as far as they can by the unaided impulses of desire. (17) Nature\nhas given them no other guide, and has denied them the present power of\nliving according to sound reason; so that they are no more bound to live by\nthe dictates of an enlightened mind, than a cat is bound to live by the laws\nof the nature of a lion.\n\n(16:18) Whatsoever, therefore, an individual (considered as under the sway\nof nature) thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or\nimpelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to take\nfor himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or any\nother means; consequently he may regard as an enemy anyone who hinders\nthe accomplishment of his purpose.\n\n(16:19) It follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance of\nnature, under which all men are born, and under which they mostly live, only\nprohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: it does not\nforbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, any of\nthe means suggested by desire.\n\n(16:20) This we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the laws of\nhuman reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation; her\nlimits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal order of\nnature, wherein man is but a speck; it is by the necessity of this alone\nthat all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a particular\nway. (21) If anything, therefore, in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd,\nor evil, it is because we only know in part, and are almost entirely\nignorant of the order and interdependence of nature as a whole, and also\nbecause we want everything to be arranged according to the dictates of our\nhuman reason; in reality that which reason considers evil, is not evil in\nrespect to the order and laws of nature as a whole, but only in respect to\nthe laws of our reason.\n\n(16:22) Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live\naccording to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said, they\nhave men's true good for their object. (23) Moreover, everyone wishes to\nlive as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this would be\nquite impossible so long as everyone did everything he liked, and reason's\nclaim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger; there is no one\nwho is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred, anger, and deceit,\nand who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can. [16:3] (24) When we\nreflect that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must needs live\nmost miserably, as we clearly proved in Chap. V., we shall plainly see that\nmen must necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and\nwell as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally\nbelong to them as individuals, and their life should be no more conditioned\nby the force and desire of individuals, but by the power and will of the\nwhole body. (25) This end they will be unable to attain if desire be\ntheir only guide (for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a different\ndirection); they must, therefore, most firmly decree and establish that they\nwill be guided in everything by reason (which nobody will dare openly to\nrepudiate lest he should be taken for a madman), and will restrain any\ndesire which is injurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to all as\nthey would be done by, and that they will defend their neighbour's rights as\ntheir own.\n\n(16:26) How such a compact as this should be entered into, how ratified and\nestablished, we will now inquire.\n\n(27) Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever neglects\nanything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of gaining a\ngreater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does anyone endure an\nevil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or gaining a greater\ngood. (28) That is, everyone will, of two goods, choose that which he thinks\nthe greatest; and, of two evils, that which he thinks the least. (29) I say\nadvisedly that which he thinks the greatest or the least, for it does not\nnecessarily follow that he judges right. (30) This law is so deeply\nimplanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted among eternal truths\nand axioms.\n\n(16:31) As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated, no one\ncan honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all things\n[Endnote 26], and in general no one will abide by his promises, unless under\nthe fear of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. (32) An example\nwill make the matter clearer. (33) Suppose that a robber forces me to\npromise that I will give him my goods at his will and pleasure. (34) It is\nplain (inasmuch as my natural right is, as I have shown, co-extensive with\nmy power) that if I can free myself from this robber by stratagem, by\nassenting to his demands, I have the natural right to do so, and to pretend\nto accept his conditions. (35) Or again, suppose I have genuinely promised\nsomeone that for the space of twenty days I will not taste food or any\nnourishment; and suppose I afterwards find that was foolish, and cannot be\nkept without very great injury to myself; as I am bound by natural law and\nright to choose the least of two evils, I have complete right to break my\ncompact, and act as if my promise had never been uttered. (36) I say that I\nshould have perfect natural right to do so, whether I was actuated by true\nand evident reason, or whether I was actuated by mere opinion in thinking I\nhad promised rashly; whether my reasons were true or false, I should be in\nfear of a greater evil, which, by the ordinance of nature, I should strive\nto avoid by every means in my power.\n\n(16:37) We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid by its\nutility, without which it becomes null and void. (38) It is, therefore,\nfoolish to ask a man to keep his faith with us for ever, unless we also\nendeavour that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for\nthe violator more harm than good. (39) This consideration should have very\ngreat weight in forming a state. (40) However, if all men could be easily\nled by reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most useful for a\nstate, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit, for everyone\nwould keep most religiously to their compact in their desire for the chief\ngood, namely, the shield and buckler of the commonwealth. (41) However, it\nis far from being the case that all men can always be easily led by reason\nalone; everyone is drawn away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambition,\nenvy, hatred, and the like so engross the mind that, reason has no place\ntherein. (42) Hence, though men make promises with all the appearances of\ngood faith, and agree that they will keep to their engagement, no one can\nabsolutely rely on another man's promise unless there is something behind\nit. (43) Everyone has by nature a right to act deceitfully, and to break his\ncompacts, unless he be restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the\nfear of some greater evil.\n\n(16:44) However, as we have shown that the natural right of the individual\nis only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either\nwillingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he in\nso doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and further, that the\nSovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign power,\nwherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats of the\nuniversally feared punishment of death; such sovereign right he will\nretain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his will;\notherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger than he\nwill be bound unwillingly to obey him.\n\n(16:45) In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of\nnatural right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept - that is, if\neach individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the\nlatter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is,\nit will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone will be bound to\nobey, under pain of the severest punishment. (46) A body politic of this\nkind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which wields\nall its power as a whole. (47) The sovereign power is not restrained by any\nlaws, but everyone is bound to obey it in all things; such is the state of\nthings implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed over to it all\ntheir power of self-defence, or in other words, all their right. (48) For if\nthey had wished to retain any right for themselves, they ought to have taken\nprecautions for its defence and preservation; as they have not done so,\nand indeed could not have done so without dividing and consequently ruining\nthe state, they placed themselves absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign\npower; and, therefore, having acted (as we have shown) as reason and\nnecessity demanded, they are obliged to fulfil the commands of the sovereign\npower, however absurd these may be, else they will be public enemies, and\nwill act against reason, which urges the preservation of the state as a\nprimary duty. (49) For reason bids us choose the least of two evils.\n\n(16:50) Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion\nand will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light heart: for we\nhave shown that sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their will,\nso long as they have the full power to enforce it: if such power be lost\ntheir right to command is lost also, or lapses to those who have assumed it\nand can keep it. (51) Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to impose\nthoroughly irrational commands, for they are bound to consult their own\ninterests, and retain their power by consulting the public good and\nacting according to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says, \"violenta\nimperia nemo continuit diu.\" (52) No one can long retain a tyrant's sway.\n\n(16:53) In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared: for\nit is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it be a\nlarge one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the basis\nand aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and to bring\nmen as far as possible under the control of reason, so that they may live in\npeace and harmony: if this basis be removed the whole fabric falls to ruin.\n\n(16:54) Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty of\nsubjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to recognize no right\nsave that which it sanctions.\n\n[16:4] (55) It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects into\nslaves: for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like; but this\nidea is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away\nby his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act\naccordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent under the entire\nguidance of reason.\n\n(16:56) Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a certain\nsense, but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave, all depends on the\nobject of the action. (57) If the object of the action be the good of the\nstate, and not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and does\nhimself no good: but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole\npeople, and not that of the ruler, is the supreme law, obedience to the\nsovereign power does not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but a\nsubject. (58) Therefore, that state is the freest whose laws are founded on\nsound reason, so that every member of it may, if he will, be free [Endnote\n27]; that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason.\n\n(16:59) Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of their\nparents, are yet not slaves: for the commands of parents look generally to\nthe children's benefit.\n\n(60) We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between a slave, a\nson, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined. (61) A slave is one\nwho is bound to obey his master's orders, though they are given solely in\nthe master's interest: a son is one who obeys his father's orders, given\nin his own interest; a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign power,\ngiven for the common interest, wherein he is included.\n\n(16:62) I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a\ndemocracy: I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it to be of all\nforms of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual\nliberty. (63) In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he\nhas no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to the majority of a\nsociety, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain as they were in the state\nof nature, equals.\n\n(16:64) This is the only form of government which I have treated of at\nlength, for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of\nfreedom in a state.\n\n(65) I may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms of\ngovernment, for we may gather from what has been said whence their right\narises without going into its origin. (66) The possessor of sovereign power,\nwhether he be one, or many, or the whole body politic, has the sovereign\nright of imposing any commands he pleases: and he who has either\nvoluntarily, or under compulsion, transferred the right to defend him to\nanother, has, in so doing, renounced his natural right and is therefore\nbound to obey, in all things, the commands of the sovereign power; and will\nbe bound so to do so long as the king, or nobles, or the people preserve the\nsovereign power which formed the basis of the original transfer. (67) I need\nadd no more.\n\n[16:5] (68) The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed, we shall\nreadily be able to define private civil right, wrong, justice, and\ninjustice, with their relations to the state; and also to determine what\nconstitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason.\n\n(16:69) By private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man\npossesses to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the edicts of the\nsovereign power, and preserved only by its authority: for when a man has\ntransferred to another his right of living as he likes, which was only\nlimited by his power, that is, has transferred his liberty and power of\nself-defence, he is bound to live as that other dictates, and to trust to\nhim entirely for his defence. (70) Wrong takes place when a citizen, or\nsubject, is forced by another to undergo some loss or pain in contradiction\nto the authority of the law, or the edict of the sovereign power.\n\n(16:71) Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community: nor can it ever\naccrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the right to do\nwhat he likes. (72) It can only arise, therefore, between private persons,\nwho are bound by law and right not to injure one another. (73) Justice\nconsists in the habitual rendering to every man his lawful due: injustice\nconsists in depriving a man, under the pretence of legality, of what the\nlaws, rightly interpreted, would allow him. (74) These last are also called\nequity and iniquity, because those who administer the laws are bound to show\nno respect of persons, but to account all men equal, and to defend every\nman's right equally, neither envying the rich nor despising the poor.\n\n[16:6](75) The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of\navoiding war, or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each other no\nhurt, but on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises, each\nretaining his independence. (76) Such a covenant is valid so long as its\nbasis of danger or advantage is in force: no one enters into an engagement,\nor is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope of some accruing\ngood, or the fear of some evil: if this basis be removed the compact thereby\nbecomes void: this has been abundantly shown by experience. (77) For\nalthough different states make treaties not to harm one another, they always\ntake every possible precaution against such treaties being broken by the\nstronger party, and do not rely on the compact, unless there is a\nsufficiently obvious object and advantage to both parties in observing it.\n(78) Otherwise they would fear a breach of faith, nor would there be any\nwrong done thereby: for who in his proper senses, and aware of the right of\nthe sovereign power, would trust in the promises of one who has the will and\nthe power to do what he likes, and who aims solely at the safety and\nadvantage of his dominion? (79) Moreover, if we consult loyalty and\nreligion, we shall see that no one in possession of power ought to abide by\nhis promises to the injury of his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises\nwithout breaking the engagement he made with his subjects, by which both he\nand they are most solemnly bound. (80) An enemy is one who lives apart from\nthe state, and does not recognize its authority either as a subject or as an\nally. It is not hatred which makes a man an enemy, but the rights of the\nstate. (81) The rights of the state are the same in regard to him who\ndoes not recognize by any compact the state authority, as they are against\nhim who has done the state an injury: it has the right to force him as best\nit can, either to submit, or to contract an alliance.\n\n[16:7] (82) Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, who by\ncompact, either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights to the\nstate: a subject is said to have committed this crime when he has attempted,\nfor whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, or to place it in\ndifferent hands. (83) I say, has attempted, for if punishment were not to\novertake him till he had succeeded, it would often come too late, the\nsovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred already.\n\n(16:84) I also say, has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the\nsovereign power, and I recognize no difference whether such an attempt\nshould be followed by public loss or public gain. (85) Whatever be his\nreason for acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly condemned: in\nwar, everyone would admit the justice of his sentence. (86) If a man does\nnot keep to his post, but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his\ncommander, whatever may be his motive, so long as he acts on his own motion,\neven if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy, he is rightly\nput to death, because he has violated his oath, and infringed the rights of\nhis commander. (87) That all citizens are equally bound by these rights in\ntime of peace, is not so generally recognized, but the reasons for obedience\nare in both cases identical. (88) The state must be preserved and directed\nby the sole authority of the sovereign, and such authority and right have\nbeen accorded by universal consent to him alone: if, therefore, anyone else\nattempts, without his consent, to execute any public enterprise, even though\nthe state might (as we said) reap benefit therefrom, such person has none\nthe less infringed the sovereign\u2019s right, and would be rightly punished for\ntreason.\n\n(16:89) In order that every scruple may be removed, we may now answer the\ninquiry, whether our former assertion that everyone who has not the\npractice of reason, may, in the state of nature, live by sovereign natural\nright, according to the laws of his desires, is not in direct opposition to\nthe law and right of God as revealed. (90) For as all men absolutely\n(whether they be less endowed with reason or more) are equally bound by the\nDivine command to love their neighbour as themselves, it may be said that\nthey cannot, without wrong, do injury to anyone, or live according to their\ndesires.\n\n(16:91) This objection, so far as the state of nature is concerned, can be\neasily answered, for the state of nature is, both in nature and in time,\nprior to religion. (92) No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to\nGod [Endnote 28], nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason,\nbut solely by revelation confirmed by signs. (93) Therefore, previous to\nrevelation, no one is bound by a Divine law and right of which he is\nnecessarily in ignorance. (94) The state of nature must by no means be\nconfounded with a state of religion, but must be conceived as without\neither religion or law, and consequently without sin or wrong: this is how\nwe have described it, and we are confirmed by the authority of Paul. (95) It\nis not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the state of nature as\nprior to, and lacking the Divine revealed law and right; but in respect of\nfreedom also, wherewith all men are born endowed.\n\n(16:96) If men were naturally bound by the Divine law and right, or if the\nDivine law and right were a natural necessity, there would have been no need\nfor God to make a covenant with mankind, and to bind them thereto with an\noath and agreement.\n\n(16:97) We must, then, fully grant that the Divine law and right originated\nat the time when men by express covenant agreed to obey God in all things,\nand ceded, as it were, their natural freedom, transferring their rights to\nGod in the manner described in speaking of the formation of a state.\n\n(98) However, I will treat of these matters more at length presently.\n\n[16:8] (99) It may be insisted that sovereigns are as much bound by the\nDivine law as subjects: whereas we have asserted that they retain their\nnatural rights, and may do whatever they like.\n\n(16:100) In order to clear up the whole difficulty, which arises rather\nconcerning the natural right than the natural state, I maintain that\neveryone is bound, in the state of nature, to live according to Divine law,\nin the same way as he is bound to live according to the dictates of sound\nreason; namely, inasmuch as it is to his advantage, and necessary for his\nsalvation; but, if he will not so live, he may do otherwise at his own risk.\n(101) He is thus bound to live according to his own laws, not according to\nanyone else's, and to recognize no man as a judge, or as a superior in\nreligion. (102) Such, in my opinion, is the position of a sovereign, for he\nmay take advice from his fellow-men, but he is not bound to recognize any as\na judge, nor anyone besides himself as an arbitrator on any question of\nright, unless it be a prophet sent expressly by God and attesting his\nmission by indisputable signs. (103) Even then he does not recognize a man,\nbut God Himself as His judge.\n\n[16:9] (104) If a sovereign refuses to obey God as revealed in His law,\nhe does so at his own risk and loss, but without violating any civil or\nnatural right. (105) For the civil right is dependent on his own decree; and\nnatural right is dependent on the laws of nature, which latter are not\nadapted to religion, whose sole aim is the good of humanity, but to the\norder of nature - that is, to God's eternal decree unknown to us.\n\n(16:106) This truth seems to be adumbrated in a somewhat obscurer form by\nthose who maintain that men can sin against God's revelation, but not\nagainst the eternal decree by which He has ordained all things.\n\n(107) We may be asked, what should we do if the sovereign commands anything\ncontrary to religion, and the obedience which we have expressly vowed to\nGod? should we obey the Divine law or the human law? (108) I shall treat of\nthis question at length hereafter, and will therefore merely say now, that\nGod should be obeyed before all else, when we have a certain and\nindisputable revelation of His will: but men are very prone to error on\nreligious subjects, and, according to the diversity of their dispositions,\nare wont with considerable stir to put forward their own inventions, as\nexperience more than sufficiently attests, so that if no one were bound to\nobey the state in matters which, in his own opinion concern religion,\nthe rights of the state would be dependent on every man's judgment\nand passions. (109) No one would consider himself bound to obey laws framed\nagainst his faith or superstition; and on this pretext he might assume\nunbounded license. (110) In this way, the rights of the civil authorities\nwould be utterly set at nought, so that we must conclude that the sovereign\npower, which alone is bound both by Divine and natural right to preserve and\nguard the laws of the state, should have supreme authority for making any\nlaws about religion which it thinks fit; all are bound to obey its behests\non the subject in accordance with their promise which God bids them to keep.\n\n(16:111) However, if the sovereign power be heathen, we should either enter\ninto no engagements therewith, and yield up our lives sooner than transfer\nto it any of our rights; or, if the engagement be made, and our rights\ntransferred, we should (inasmuch as we should have ourselves transferred the\nright of defending ourselves and our religion) be bound to obey them, and to\nkeep our word: we might even rightly be bound so to do, except in those\ncases where God, by indisputable revelation, has promised His special aid\nagainst tyranny, or given us special exemption from obedience. (112) Thus we\nsee that, of all the Jews in Babylon, there were only three youths who were\ncertain of the help of God, and, therefore, refused to obey Nebuchadnezzar.\n(113) All the rest, with the sole exception of Daniel, who was beloved by\nthe king, were doubtless compelled by right to obey, perhaps thinking that\nthey had been delivered up by God into the hands of the king, and that the\nking had obtained and preserved his dominion by God's design. (114) On the\nother hand, Eleazar, before his country had utterly fallen, wished to give a\nproof of his constancy to his compatriots, in order that they might follow\nin his footsteps, and go to any lengths, rather than allow their right and\npower to be transferred to the Greeks, or brave any torture rather than\nswear allegiance to the heathen. (115) Instances are occurring every day in\nconfirmation of what I here advance. (116) The rulers of Christian\nkingdoms do not hesitate, with a view to strengthening their dominion, to\nmake treaties with Turks and heathen, and to give orders to their subjects\nwho settle among such peoples not to assume more freedom, either in\nthings secular or religious, than is set down in the treaty, or allowed by\nthe foreign government. (117) We may see this exemplified in the Dutch\ntreaty with the Japanese, which I have already mentioned.\n\n\n\n\n[17:0] CHAPTER XVII - IT IS SHOWN THAT NO ONE CAN, OR\nNEED, TRANSFER ALL HIS RIGHTS TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER.\nOF THE HEBREW REPUBLIC, AS IT WAS DURING THE LIFETIME\nOF MOSES, AND AFTER HIS DEATH, TILL THE FOUNDATION\nOF THE MONARCHY; AND   OF ITS EXCELLENCE. LASTLY, OF\nTHE CAUSES WHY THE THEOCRATIC REPUBLIC FELL, AND WHY\nIT COULD HARDLY HAVE CONTINUED WITHOUT DISSENSION.\n\n[17:1] (1) The theory put forward in the last chapter, of the universal\nrights of the sovereign power, and of the natural rights of the individual\ntransferred thereto, though it corresponds in many respects with actual\npractice, and though practice may be so arranged as to conform to it more\nand more, must nevertheless always remain in many respects purely ideal. (2)\nNo one can ever so utterly transfer to another his power and, consequently,\nhis rights, as to cease to be a man; nor can there ever be a power so\nsovereign that it can carry out every possible wish. (3) It will always be\nvain to order a subject to hate what he believes brings him advantage, or to\nlove what brings him loss, or not to be offended at insults, or not to wish\nto be free from fear, or a hundred other things of the sort, which\nnecessarily follow from the laws of human nature. (4) So much, I think, is\nabundantly shown by experience: for men have never so far ceded their power\nas to cease to be an object of fear to the rulers who received such power\nand right; and dominions have always been in as much danger from their own\nsubjects as from external enemies. (5) If it were really the case, that men\ncould be deprived of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any\nfurther influence on affairs [Endnote 29], except with the permission of the\nholders of sovereign right, it would then be possible to maintain with\nimpunity the most violent tyranny, which, I suppose, no one would for an\ninstant admit.\n\n(17:6) We must, therefore, grant that every man retains some part of his\nright, in dependence on his own decision, and no one else's.\n\n(7) However, in order correctly to understand the extent of the sovereign's\nright and power, we must take notice that it does not cover only those\nactions to which it can compel men by fear, but absolutely every action\nwhich it can induce men to perform: for it is the fact of obedience, not the\nmotive for obedience, which makes a man a subject.\n\n(17:8) Whatever be the cause which leads a man to obey the commands of the\nsovereign, whether it be fear or hope, or love of his country, or any other\nemotion - the fact remains that the man takes counsel with himself, and\nnevertheless acts as his sovereign orders. (9) We must not, therefore,\nassert that all actions resulting from a man's deliberation with himself are\ndone in obedience to the rights of the individual rather than the sovereign:\nas a matter of fact, all actions spring from a man's deliberation with\nhimself, whether the determining motive be love or fear of punishment;\ntherefore, either dominion does not exist, and has no rights over its\nsubjects, or else it extends over every instance in which it can prevail on\nmen to decide to obey it. (10) Consequently, every action which a subject\nperforms in accordance with the commands of the sovereign, whether such\naction springs from love, or fear, or (as is more frequently the case) from\nhope and fear together, or from reverence, compounded of fear and\nadmiration, or, indeed, any motive whatever, is performed in virtue of his\nsubmission to the sovereign, and not in virtue of his own authority.\n\n(17:11) This point is made still more clear by the fact that obedience does\nnot consist so much in the outward act as in the mental state of the person\nobeying; so that he is most under the dominion of another who with his whole\nheart determines to obey another's commands; and consequently the firmest\ndominion belongs to the sovereign who has most influence over the minds of\nhis subjects; if those who are most feared possessed the firmest dominion,\nthe firmest dominion would belong to the subjects of a tyrant, for they are\nalways greatly feared by their ruler. (12) Furthermore, though it is\nimpossible to govern the mind as completely as the tongue, nevertheless\nminds are, to a certain extent, under the control of the sovereign, for he\ncan in many ways bring about that the greatest part of his subjects should\nfollow his wishes in their beliefs, their loves, and their hates. (13)\nThough such emotions do not arise at the express command of the sovereign\nthey often result (as experience shows) from the authority of his power, and\nfrom his direction; in other words, in virtue of his right; we may,\ntherefore, without doing violence to our understanding, conceive men who\nfollow the instigation of their sovereign in their beliefs, their loves,\ntheir hates, their contempt, and all other emotions whatsoever.\n\n(17:14) Though the powers of government, as thus conceived, are sufficiently\nample, they can never become large enough to execute every possible wish of\ntheir possessors. (15) This, I think, I have already shown clearly enough.\n(16) The method of forming a dominion which should prove lasting I do not,\nas I have said, intend to discuss, but in order to arrive at the object I\nhave in view, I will touch on the teaching of Divine revelation to Moses in\nthis respect, and we will consider the history and the success of the Jews,\ngathering therefrom what should be the chief concessions made by sovereigns\nto their subjects with a view to the security and increase of their\ndominion.\n\n[17:2] (17) That the preservation of a state chiefly depends on the\nsubjects' fidelity and constancy in carrying out the orders they receive, is\nmost clearly taught both by reason and experience; how subjects ought to be\nguided so as best to preserve their fidelity and virtue is not so obvious.\n(18) All, both rulers and ruled, are men, and prone to follow after their\nlusts. (19) The fickle disposition of the multitude almost reduces those who\nhave experience of it to despair, for it is governed solely by emotions, not\nby reason: it rushes headlong into every enterprise, and is easily corrupted\neither by avarice or luxury: everyone thinks himself omniscient and wishes\nto fashion all things to his liking, judging a thing to be just or unjust,\nlawful or unlawful, according as he thinks it will bring him profit or loss:\nvanity leads him to despise his equals, and refuse their guidance: envy of\nsuperior fame or fortune (for such gifts are never equally distributed)\nleads him to desire and rejoice in his neighbour's downfall. (20) I need\nnot go through the whole list, everyone knows already how much crime\nresults from disgust at the present - desire for change, headlong anger,\nand contempt for poverty - and how men's minds are engrossed and kept\nin turmoil thereby.\n\n(17:21) To guard against all these evils, and form a dominion where no room\nis left for deceit; to frame our institutions so that every man, whatever\nhis disposition, may prefer public right to private advantage, this is the\ntask and this the toil. (22) Necessity is often the mother of invention, but\nshe has never yet succeeded in framing a dominion that was in less danger\nfrom its own citizens than from open enemies, or whose rulers did not fear\nthe latter less than the former. (23) Witness the state of Rome, invincible\nby her enemies, but many times conquered and sorely oppressed by her own\ncitizens, especially in the war between Vespasian and Vitellius. (24) (See\nTacitus, Hist. bk. iv. for a description of the pitiable state of the city.)\n\n(17:25) Alexander thought prestige abroad more easy to acquire than prestige\nat home, and believed that his greatness could be destroyed by his own\nfollowers. (26) Fearing such a disaster, he thus addressed his friends:\n\"Keep me safe from internal treachery and domestic plots, and I will front\nwithout fear the dangers of battle and of war. (27) Philip was more secure\nin the battle array than in the theatre: he often escaped from the hands of\nthe enemy, he could not escape from his own subjects. (28) If you think over\nthe deaths of kings, you will count up more who have died by the assassin\nthan by the open foe.\" (Q. Curtius, chap. vi.)\n\n(17:29) For the sake of making themselves secure, kings who seized the\nthrone in ancient times used to try to spread the idea that they were\ndescended from the immortal gods, thinking that if their subjects and the\nrest of mankind did not look on them as equals, but believed them to be\ngods, they would willingly submit to their rule, and obey their commands.\n(30) Thus Augustus persuaded the Romans that he was descended from \u00c6neas,\nwho was the son of Venus, and numbered among the gods. (31) \"He wished\nhimself to be worshipped in temples, like the gods, with flamens and\npriests.\" (Tacitus, Ann. i. 10.)\n\n(17:32) Alexander wished to be saluted as the son of Jupiter, not from\nmotives of pride but of policy, as he showed by his answer to the invective\nof Hermolaus: \"It is almost laughable,\" said he, \"that Hermolaus asked me to\ncontradict Jupiter, by whose oracle I am recognized. (33) Am I responsible\nfor the answers of the gods? (34) It offered me the name of son;\nacquiescence was by no means foreign to my present designs. (35) Would that\nthe Indians also would believe me to be a god! (36) Wars are carried through\nby prestige, falsehoods that are believed often gain the force of truth.\"\n(Curtius, viii,. Para. 8.) (37) In these few words he cleverly contrives to\npalm off a fiction on the ignorant, and at the same time hints at the motive\nfor the deception.\n\n(17:38) Cleon, in his speech persuading the Macedonians to obey their king,\nadopted a similar device: for after going through the praises of Alexander\nwith admiration, and recalling his merits, he proceeds, \"the Persians are\nnot only pious, but prudent in worshipping their kings as gods: for kingship\nis the shield of public safety,\" and he ends thus, \"I, myself, when the king\nenters a banquet hall, should prostrate my body on the ground; other men\nshould do the like, especially those who are wise\" (Curtius, viii.\nPara. 66). (39) However, the Macedonians were more prudent - indeed, it is\nonly complete barbarians who can be so openly cajoled, and can suffer\nthemselves to be turned from subjects into slaves without interests of their\nown. (40) Others, notwithstanding, have been able more easily to spread the\nbelief that kingship is sacred, and plays the part of God on the earth, that\nit has been instituted by God, not by the suffrage and consent of men; and\nthat it is preserved and guarded by Divine special providence and aid.\n(41) Similar fictions have been promulgated by monarchs, with the object of\nstrengthening their dominion, but these I will pass over, and in order to\narrive at my main purpose, will merely recall and discuss the teaching on\nthe subject of Divine revelation to Moses in ancient times.\n\n[17:3] (42) We have said in Chap. V. that after the Hebrews came up out of\nEgypt they were not bound by the law and right of any other nation, but were\nat liberty to institute any new rites at their pleasure, and to occupy\nwhatever territory they chose. (43) After their liberation from the\nintolerable bondage of the Egyptians, they were bound by no covenant to any\nman; and, therefore, every man entered into his natural right, and was free\nto retain it or to give it up, and transfer it to another. (44) Being, then,\nin the state of nature, they followed the advice of Moses, in whom they\nchiefly trusted, and decided to transfer their right to no human being, but\nonly to God; without further delay they all, with one voice, promised to\nobey all the commands of the Deity, and to acknowledge no right that He did\nnot proclaim as such by prophetic revelation. (45) This promise, or\ntransference of right to God, was effected in the same manner as we have\nconceived it to have been in ordinary societies, when men agree to divest\nthemselves of their natural rights. (46) It is, in fact, in virtue of a set\ncovenant, and an oath (see Exod. xxxiv:10), that the Jews freely, and not\nunder compulsion or threats, surrendered their rights and transferred them\nto God. (47) Moreover, in order that this covenant might be ratified\nand settled, and might be free from all suspicion of deceit, God did not\nenter into it till the Jews had had experience of His wonderful power by\nwhich alone they had been, or could be, preserved in a state of prosperity\n(Exod. xix:4, 5). (48) It is because they believed that nothing but\nGod's power could preserve them that they surrendered to God the natural\npower of self-preservation, which they formerly, perhaps, thought they\npossessed, and consequently they surrendered at the same time all their\nnatural right.\n\n[17:4] (49) God alone, therefore, held dominion over the Hebrews, whose state\nwas in virtue of the covenant called God's kingdom, and God was said to be\ntheir king; consequently the enemies of the Jews were said to be the enemies of\nGod, and the citizens who tried to seize the dominion were guilty of treason\nagainst God; and, lastly, the laws of the state were called the laws and\ncommandments of God. (50) Thus in the Hebrew state the civil and religious\nauthority, each consisting solely of obedience to God, were one and the same.\n(51) The dogmas of religion were not precepts, but laws and ordinances; piety\nwas regarded as the same as loyalty, impiety as the same as disaffection. (52)\nEveryone who fell away from religion ceased to be a citizen, and was, on that\nground alone, accounted an enemy: those who died for the sake of religion, were\nheld to have died for their country; in fact, between civil and religious law\nand right there was no distinction whatever. (53) For this reason the\ngovernment could be called a Theocracy, inasmuch as the citizens were not bound\nby anything save the revelations of God.\n\n(17:54) However, this state of things existed rather in theory than in\npractice, for it will appear from what we are about to say, that the\nHebrews, as a matter of fact, retained absolutely in their own hands the\nright of sovereignty: this is shown by the method and plan by which the\ngovernment was carried on, as I will now explain.\n\n(17:55) Inasmuch as the Hebrews did not transfer their rights to any other\nperson but, as in a democracy, all surrendered their rights equally, and\ncried out with one voice, \"Whatsoever God shall speak (no mediator or\nmouthpiece being named) that will we do,\" it follows that all were equally\nbound by the covenant, and that all had an equal right to consult the Deity,\nto accept and to interpret His laws, so that all had an exactly equal share\nin the government. [17:5] (56) Thus at first they all approached God\ntogether, so that they might learn His commands, but in this first\nsalutation, they were so thoroughly terrified and so astounded to hear God\nspeaking, that they thought their last hour was at hand: full of fear,\ntherefore, they went afresh to Moses, and said, \"Lo, we have heard God\nspeaking in the fire, and there is no cause why we should wish to die:\nsurely this great fire will consume us: if we hear again the voice of God,\nwe shall surely die. (57) Thou, therefore, go near, and hear all the words\nof our God, and thou (not God) shalt speak with us: all that God shall tell\nus, that will we hearken to and perform.\"\n\n(17:58) They thus clearly abrogated their former covenant, and absolutely\ntransferred to Moses their right to consult God and interpret His commands:\nfor they do not here promise obedience to all that God shall tell them, but\nto all that God shall tell Moses (see Deut. v:20 after the Decalogue, and\nchap. xviii:15, 16). (59) Moses, therefore, remained the sole promulgator\nand interpreter of the Divine laws, and consequently also the sovereign\njudge, who could not be arraigned himself, and who acted among the Hebrews\nthe part of God; in other words, held the sovereign kingship: he alone\nhad the right to consult God, to give the Divine answers to the\npeople, and to see that they were carried out. (60) I say he alone, for if\nanyone during the life of Moses was desirous of preaching anything in the\nname of the Lord, he was, even if a true prophet, considered guilty and a\nusurper of the sovereign right (Numb. xi:28) [Endnote 30]. (61) We may here\nnotice, that though the people had elected Moses, they could not rightfully\nelect Moses's successor; for having transferred to Moses their right of\nconsulting God, and absolutely promised to regard him as a Divine oracle,\nthey had plainly forfeited the whole of their right, and were bound to\naccept as chosen by God anyone proclaimed by Moses as his successor. (62) If\nMoses had so chosen his successor, who like him should wield the sole right\nof government, possessing the sole right of consulting God, and consequently\nof making and abrogating laws, of deciding on peace or war, of sending\nambassadors, appointing judges - in fact, discharging all the functions of a\nsovereign, the state would have become simply a monarchy, only differing\nfrom other monarchies in the fact, that the latter are, or should be,\ncarried on in accordance with God's decree, unknown even to the monarch,\nwhereas the Hebrew monarch would have been the only person to whom the\ndecree was revealed. (63) A difference which increases, rather than\ndiminishes the monarch's authority. (64) As far as the people in both cases\nare concerned, each would be equally subject, and equally ignorant of\nthe Divine decree, for each would be dependent on the monarch's words, and\nwould learn from him alone, what was lawful or unlawful: nor would the fact\nthat the people believed that the monarch was only issuing commands in\naccordance with God's decree revealed to him, make it less in subjection,\nbut rather more. [17:6] (65) However, Moses elected no such successor, but\nleft the dominion to those who came after him in a condition which could not\nbe called a popular government, nor an aristocracy, nor a monarchy, but a\nTheocracy. (66) For the right of interpreting laws was vested in one man,\nwhile the right and power of administering the state according to the\nlaws thus interpreted, was vested in another man (see Numb. xxvii:21)\n[Endnote 31].\n\n(17:67) In order that the question may be thoroughly understood, I will duly\nset forth the administration of the whole state.\n\n(68) First, the people were commanded to build a tabernacle, which should\nbe, as it were, the dwelling of God - that is, of the sovereign authority of\nthe state. (69) This tabernacle was to be erected at the cost of the whole\npeople, not of one man, in order that the place where God was consulted\nmight be public property. (70) The Levites were chosen as courtiers and\nadministrators of this royal abode; while Aaron, the brother of Moses, was\nchosen to be their chief and second, as it were, to God their King, being\nsucceeded in the office by his legitimate sons.\n\n(17:71) He, as the nearest to God, was the sovereign interpreter of the\nDivine laws; he communicated the answers of the Divine oracle to the people,\nand entreated God's favour for them. (72) If, in addition to these\nprivileges, he had possessed the right of ruling, he would have been neither\nmore nor less than an absolute monarch; but, in respect to government, he\nwas only a private citizen: the whole tribe of Levi was so completely\ndivested of governing rights that it did not even take its share with the\nothers in the partition of territory. (73) Moses provided for its support by\ninspiring the common people with great reverence for it, as the only tribe\ndedicated to God.\n\n(17:74) Further, the army, formed from the remaining twelve tribes, was\ncommanded to invade the land of Canaan, to divide it into twelve portions,\nand to distribute it among the tribes by lot. (75) For this task twelve\ncaptains were chosen, one from every tribe, and were, together with\nJoshua and Eleazar, the high priest, empowered to divide the land into\ntwelve equal parts, and distribute it by lot. (76) Joshua was chosen for the\nchief command of the army, inasmuch as none but he had the right to consult\nGod in emergencies, not like Moses, alone in his tent, or in the\ntabernacle, but through the high priest, to whom only the answers of God\nwere revealed. (77) Furthermore, he was empowered to execute, and cause the\npeople to obey God's commands, transmitted through the high priests; to\nfind, and to make use of, means for carrying them out; to choose as many\narmy captains as he liked; to make whatever choice he thought best; to\nsend ambassadors in his own name; and, in short, to have the entire control\nof the war. (78) To his office there was no rightful successor - indeed, the\npost was only filled by the direct order of the Deity, on occasions of\npublic emergency. (79) In ordinary times, all the management of peace and\nwar was vested in the captains of the tribes, as I will shortly point out.\n(80) Lastly, all men between the ages of twenty and sixty were ordered to\nbear arms, and form a citizen army, owing allegiance, not to its\ngeneral-in-chief, nor to the high priest, but to Religion and to God.\n(81) The army, or the hosts, were called the army of God, or the hosts of\nGod. (82) For this reason God was called by the Hebrews the God of Armies;\nand the ark of the covenant was borne in the midst of the army in important\nbattles, when the safety or destruction of the whole people hung upon the\nissue, so that the people might, as it were, see their King among them,\nand put forth all their strength.\n\n(17:83) From these directions, left by Moses to his successors, we plainly\nsee that he chose administrators, rather than despots, to come after him;\nfor he invested no one with the power of consulting God, where he liked and\nalone, consequently, no one had the power possessed by himself of ordaining\nand abrogating laws, of deciding on war or peace, of choosing men to fill\noffices both religious and secular: all these are the prerogatives of a\nsovereign. (84) The high priest, indeed, had the right of interpreting laws,\nand communicating the answers of God, but he could not do so when he liked,\nas Moses could, but only when he was asked by the general-in-chief of the\narmy, the council, or some similar authority. (85) The general-in-chief and\nthe council could consult God when they liked, but could only receive His\nanswers through the high priest; so that the utterances of God, as reported\nby the high priest, were not decrees, as they were when reported by Moses,\nbut only answers; they were accepted by Joshua and the council, and only\nthen had the force of commands and decrees.\n\n(17:86) The high priest, both in the case of Aaron and of his son Eleazar,\nwas chosen by Moses; nor had anyone, after Moses' death, a right to elect to\nthe office, which became hereditary. (87) The general-in-chief of the army\nwas also chosen by Moses, and assumed his functions in virtue of the\ncommands, not of the high priest, but of Moses: indeed, after the death of\nJoshua, the high priest did not appoint anyone in his place, and the\ncaptains did not consult God afresh about a general-in-chief, but each\nretained Joshua's power in respect to the contingent of his own tribe,\nand all retained it collectively, in respect to the whole army. (88) There\nseems to have been no need of a general-in-chief, except when they were\nobliged to unite their forces against a common enemy. (89) This occurred\nmost frequently during the time of Joshua, when they had no fixed dwelling.\nplace, and possessed all things in common. [17:7] (90) After all the tribes\nhad gained their territories by right of conquest, and had divided their\nallotted gains, they, became separated, having no longer their possessions\nin common, so that the need for a single commander ceased, for the\ndifferent tribes should be considered rather in the light of confederated\nstates than of bodies of fellow-citizens. (91) In respect to their God and\ntheir religion, they, were fellow-citizens; but, in respect to the rights\nwhich one possessed with regard to another, they were only confederated:\nthey, were, in fact, in much the same position (if one excepts the Temple\ncommon to all) as the United States of the Netherlands {or United States of\nAmerica}. (92) The division of property held in common is only another\nphrase for the possession of his share by each of the owners singly, and the\nsurrender by the others of their rights over such share. (93) This is why\nMoses elected captains of the tribes - namely, that when the dominion was\ndivided, each might take care of his own part; consulting God through the\nhigh priest on the affairs of his tribe, ruling over his army, building and\nfortifying cities, appointing judges, attacking the enemies of his own\ndominion, and having complete control over all civil and military affairs.\n(94) He was not bound to acknowledge any superior judge save God\n[Endnote 32], or a prophet whom God should expressly send. (95) If he\ndeparted from the worship of God, the rest of the tribes did not arraign him\nas a subject, but attacked him as an enemy. (95) Of this we have examples in\nScripture. (96) When Joshua was dead, the children of Israel (not a fresh\ngeneral-in-chief) consulted God; it being decided that the tribe of Judah\nshould be the first to attack its enemies, the tribe in question contracted\na single alliance with the tribe of Simeon, for uniting their forces, and\nattacking their common enemy, the rest of the tribes not being included in\nthe alliance (Judges i:1, 2, 3). (97) Each tribe separately made war against\nits own enemies, and, according to its pleasure, received them as subjects\nor allies, though it had been commanded not to spare them on any conditions,\nbut to destroy them utterly. (98) Such disobedience met with reproof from\nthe rest of the tribes, but did not cause the offending tribe to be\narraigned: it was not considered a sufficient reason for proclaiming a civil\nwar, or interfering in one another's affairs. (99) But when the tribe of\nBenjamin offended against the others, and so loosened the bonds of peace\nthat none of the confederated tribes could find refuge within its borders,\nthey attacked it as an enemy, and gaining the victory over it after three\nbattles, put to death both guilty and innocent, according to the laws of\nwar: an act which they subsequently bewailed with tardy repentance.\n\n(17:100) These examples plainly confirm what we have said concerning the\nrights of each tribe. (101) Perhaps we shall be asked who elected the\nsuccessors to the captains of each tribe; on this point I can gather no\npositive information in Scripture, but I conjecture that as the tribes were\ndivided into families, each headed by its senior member, the senior of all\nthese heads of families succeeded by right to the office of captain, for\nMoses chose from among these seniors his seventy coadjutors, who formed with\nhimself the supreme council. (102) Those who administered the government\nafter the death of Joshua were called elders, and elder is a very common\nHebrew expression in the sense of judge, as I suppose everyone knows;\nhowever, it is not very important for us to make up our minds on this point.\n(103) It is enough to have shown that after the death of Moses no one man\nwielded all the power of a sovereign; as affairs were not all managed by one\nman, nor by a single council, nor by the popular vote, but partly by one\ntribe, partly by the rest in equal shares, it is most evident that the\ngovernment, after the death of Moses, was neither monarchic, nor\naristocratic, nor popular, but, as we have said, Theocratic.\n(104) The reasons for applying this name are:\n\n(17:105) I. Because the royal seat of government was the Temple, and in\nrespect to it alone, as we have shown, all the tribes were fellow-citizens.\n\n(106) II. Because all the people owed allegiance to God, their supreme\nJudge, to whom only they had promised implicit obedience in all things.\n\n(17:107) III. Because the general-in-chief or dictator, when there was need\nof such, was elected by none save God alone. (108) This was expressly\ncommanded by Moses in the name of God (Deut. xix:15), and witnessed by the\nactual choice of Gideon, of Samson, and of Samuel; wherefrom we may conclude\nthat the other faithful leaders were chosen in the same manner, though it is\nnot expressly told us.\n\n(17:109) These preliminaries being stated, it is now time to inquire the\neffects of forming a dominion on this plan, and to see whether it so\neffectually kept within bounds both rulers and ruled, that the former were\nnever tyrannical and the latter never rebellious.\n\n(17:110) Those who administer or possess governing power, always try to\nsurround their high-handed actions with a cloak of legality, and to persuade\nthe people that they act from good motives; this they are easily able to\neffect when they are the sole interpreters of the law; for it is evident\nthat they are thus able to assume a far greater freedom to carry out their\nwishes and desires than if the interpretation if the law is vested in\nsomeone else, or if the laws were so self-evident that no one could be in\ndoubt as to their meaning. [17:8] (111) We thus see that the power of\nevil-doing was greatly curtailed for the Hebrew captains by the fact that the\nwhole interpretation of the law was vested in the Levites (Deut. xxi:5),\nwho, on their part, had no share in the government, and depended for all\ntheir support and consideration on a correct interpretation of the laws\nentrusted to them. (112) Moreover, the whole people was commanded to come\ntogether at a certain place every seven years and be instructed in the law\nby the high-priest; further, each individual was bidden to read the book of\nthe law through and through continually with scrupulous care. (Deut. xxxi:9,\n10, and vi:7.)\n\n(113) The captains were thus for their own sakes bound to take great care to\nadminister everything according to the laws laid down, and well known to all,\nif they wished to be held in high honour by the people, who would regard them\nas the administrators of God's dominion, and as God's vicegerents; otherwise\nthey could not have escaped all the virulence of theological hatred. (114)\nThere was another very important check on the unbridled license of the\ncaptains, in the fact, that the army was formed from the whole body, of the\ncitizens, between the ages of twenty and sixty, without exception, and that the\ncaptains were not able to hire any foreign soldiery. (115) This I say was very\nimportant, for it is well known that princes can oppress their peoples with the\nsingle aid of the soldiery in their pay; while there is nothing more formidable\nto them than the freedom of citizen soldiers, who have established the freedom\nand glory of their country, by their valour, their toil, and their blood. (116)\nThus Alexander, when he was about to make wax on Darius, a second time, after\nhearing the advice of Parmenio, did not chide him who gave the advice, but\nPolysperchon, who was standing by. (117) For, as Curtius says (iv. Para. 13),\nhe did not venture to reproach Parmenio again after having shortly before\nreproved him too sharply. (118) This freedom of the Macedonians, which he so\ndreaded, he was not able to subdue till after the number of captives enlisted\nin the army surpassed that of his own people: then, but not till then, he gave\nrein to his anger so long checked by the independence of his chief\nfellow-countrymen.\n\n(17:119) If this independence of citizen soldiers can restrain the princes\nof ordinary states who are wont to usurp the whole glory of victories, it\nmust have been still more effectual against the Hebrew captains, whose\nsoldiers were fighting, not for the glory of a prince, but for the glory of\nGod, and who did not go forth to battle till the Divine assent had been\ngiven.\n\n(17:120) We must also remember that the Hebrew captains were associated only\nby the bonds of religion: therefore, if any one of them had transgressed,\nand begun to violate the Divine right, he might have been treated by the\nrest as an enemy and lawfully subdued.\n\n(17:121) An additional check may be found in the fear of a new prophet\narising, for if a man of unblemished life could show by certain signs that\nhe was really a prophet, he ipso facto obtained the sovereign right to rule,\nwhich was given to him, as to Moses formerly, in the name of God, as\nrevealed to himself alone; not merely through the high priest, as in the\ncase of the captains. (122) There is no doubt that such an one would easily\nbe able to enlist an oppressed people in his cause, and by trifling signs\npersuade them of anything he wished: on the other hand, if affairs were well\nordered, the captain would be able to make provision in time; that the\nprophet should be submitted to his approval, and be examined whether he were\nreally of unblemished life, and possessed indisputable signs of his mission:\nalso, whether the teaching he proposed to set forth in the name of the Lord\nagreed with received doctrines, and the general laws of the country; if his\ncredentials were insufficient, or his doctrines new, he could lawfully be\nput to death, or else received on the captain's sole responsibility and\nauthority.\n\n(17:123) Again, the captains were not superior to the others in nobility or\nbirth, but only administered the government in virtue of their age and\npersonal qualities. (124) Lastly, neither captains nor army had any reason\nfor preferring war to peace. (125) The army, as we have stated, consisted\nentirely of citizens, so that affairs were managed by the same persons both\nin peace and war. (126) The man who was a soldier in the camp was a citizen\nin the market-place, he who was a leader in the camp was a judge in the law\ncourts, he who was a general in the camp was a ruler in the state. (127)\nThus no one could desire war for its own sake, but only for the sake of\npreserving peace and liberty; possibly the captains avoided change as far as\npossible, so as not to be obliged to consult the high priest and submit to\nthe indignity of standing in his presence.\n\n(17:128) So much for the precautions for keeping the captains within bounds.\n[17:9] (129) We must now look for the restraints upon the people: these,\nhowever, are very clearly indicated in the very groundwork of the social\nfabric.\n\n(17:130) Anyone who gives the subject the slightest attention, will see that\nthe state was so ordered as to inspire the most ardent patriotism in the\nhearts of the citizens, so that the latter would be very hard to persuade to\nbetray their country, and be ready to endure anything rather than\nsubmit to a foreign yoke. (131) After they had transferred their right\nto God, they thought that their kingdom belonged to God, and that they\nthemselves were God's children. (132) Other nations they looked upon as\nGod's enemies, and regarded with intense hatred (which they took\nto be piety, see Psalm cxxxix:21, 22): nothing would have been more\nabhorrent to them than swearing allegiance to a foreigner, and promising him\nobedience: nor could they conceive any greater or more execrable crime than\nthe betrayal of their country, the kingdom of the God whom they adored.\n\n(17:133) It was considered wicked for anyone to settle outside of the\ncountry, inasmuch as the worship of God by which they were bound could not\nbe carried on elsewhere: their own land alone was considered holy, the rest\nof the earth unclean and profane.\n\n(17:134) David, who was forced to live in exile, complained before Saul as\nfollows: \"But if they be the children of men who have stirred thee up\nagainst me, cursed be they before the Lord; for they have driven me out this\nday from abiding in the inheritance of the Lord, saying, Go, serve other\ngods.\" (I Sam. xxvi:19.) (135) For the same reason no citizen, as we should\nespecially remark, was ever sent into exile: he who sinned was liable to\npunishment, but not to disgrace.\n\n(17:136) Thus the love of the Hebrews for their country was not only\npatriotism, but also piety, and was cherished and nurtured by daily rites\ntill, like their hatred of other nations, it must have passed into their\nnature. (137) Their daily worship was not only different from that of other\nnations (as it might well be, considering that they were a peculiar people\nand entirely apart from the rest), it was absolutely contrary. (138) Such\ndaily reprobation naturally gave rise to a lasting hatred, deeply implanted\nin the heart: for of all hatreds none is more deep and tenacious than\nthat which springs from extreme devoutness or piety, and is itself cherished\nas pious. (139) Nor was a general cause lacking for inflaming such hatred\nmore and more, inasmuch as it was reciprocated; the surrounding nations\nregarding the Jews with a hatred just as intense.\n\n(17:140) How great was the effect of all these causes, namely, freedom from\nman's dominion; devotion to their country; absolute rights over all\nother men; a hatred not only permitted but pious; a contempt for their\nfellow-men; the singularity of their customs and religious rites; the\neffect, I repeat, of all these causes in strengthening the hearts of the\nJews to bear all things for their country, with extraordinary constancy and\nvalour, will at once be discerned by reason and attested by experience.\n(141) Never, so long as the city was standing, could they endure to remain\nunder foreign dominion; and therefore they called Jerusalem \"a rebellious\ncity\" (Ezra iv:12). (142) Their state after its reestablishment (which was a\nmere shadow of the first, for the high priests had usurped the rights of the\ntribal captains) was, with great difficulty, destroyed by the Romans, as\nTacitus bears witness (Hist. ii:4):- \"Vespasian had closed the war against\nthe Jews, abandoning the siege of Jerusalem as an enterprise difficult\nand arduous rather from the character of the people and the obstinacy of\ntheir superstition, than from the strength left to the besieged for meeting\ntheir necessities.\" (143) But besides these characteristics, which are\nmerely ascribed by an individual opinion, there was one feature\npeculiar to this state and of great importance in retaining the affections\nof the citizens, and checking all thoughts of desertion, or abandonment of\nthe country: namely, self-interest, the strength and life of all human\naction. (144) This was peculiarly engaged in the Hebrew state, for\nnowhere else did citizens possess their goods so securely, as did the\nsubjects of this community, for the latter possessed as large a share in the\nland and the fields as did their chiefs, and were owners of their plots of\nground in perpetuity; for if any man was compelled by poverty to sell his\nfarm or his pasture, he received it back again intact at the year of\njubilee: there were other similar enactments against the possibility of\nalienating real property.\n\n(17:145) Again, poverty was nowhere more endurable than in a country where\nduty towards one's neighbour, that is, one's fellow-citizen, was practised\nwith the utmost piety, as a means of gaining the favour of God the King.\n(146) Thus the Hebrew citizens would nowhere be so well off as in their own\ncountry; outside its limits they met with nothing but loss and disgrace.\n\n(17:147) The following considerations were of weight, not only in keeping\nthem at home, but also in preventing civil war and removing causes of\nstrife; no one was bound to serve his equal, but only to serve God, while\ncharity and love towards fellow-citizens was accounted the highest piety;\nthis last feeling was not a little fostered by the general hatred with which\nthey regarded foreign nations and were regarded by them. (148) Furthermore,\nthe strict discipline of obedience in which they were brought up, was a very\nimportant factor; for they were bound to carry on all their actions\naccording to the set rules of the law: a man might not plough when he liked,\nbut only at certain times, in certain years, and with one sort of beast at a\ntime; so, too, he might only sow and reap in a certain method and season -\nin fact, his whole life was one long school of obedience (see Chap. V. on\nthe use of ceremonies); such a habit was thus engendered, that conformity\nseemed freedom instead of servitude, and men desired what was commanded\nrather than what was forbidden. (149) This result was not a little aided by\nthe fact that the people were bound, at certain seasons of the year, to give\nthemselves up to rest and rejoicing, not for their own pleasure, but in\norder that they might worship God cheerfully.\n\n(17:150) Three times in the year they feasted before the Lord; on the\nseventh day of every week they were bidden to abstain from all work and to\nrest; besides these, there were other occasions when innocent rejoicing and\nfeasting were not only allowed but enjoined. (151) I do not think any better\nmeans of influencing men's minds could be devised; for there is no more\npowerful attraction than joy springing from devotion, a mixture of\nadmiration and love. (152) It was not easy to be wearied by constant\nrepetition, for the rites on the various festivals were varied and recurred\nseldom. (153) We may add the deep reverence for the Temple which all most\nreligiously fostered, on account of the peculiar rites and duties that they\nwere obliged to perform before approaching thither. (154) Even now, Jews\ncannot read without horror of the crime of Manasseh, who dared to place an\nidol in the Temple. (155) The laws, scrupulously preserved in the inmost\nsanctuary, were objects of equal reverence to the people. (156) Popular\nreports and misconceptions were, therefore, very little to be feared\nin this quarter, for no one dared decide on sacred matters, but all\nfelt bound to obey, without consulting their reason, all the commands given\nby the answers of God received in the Temple, and all the laws which God\nhad ordained.\n\n(17:157) I think I have now explained clearly, though briefly, the main\nfeatures of the Hebrew commonwealth. (158) I must now inquire into the\ncauses which led the people so often to fall away from the law, which\nbrought about their frequent subjection, and, finally, the complete\ndestruction of their dominion. (159) Perhaps I shall be told that it sprang\nfrom their hardness of heart; but this is childish, for why should this\npeople be more hard of heart than others; was it by nature?\n\n[17:A] (160) But nature forms individuals, not peoples; the latter are\nonly distinguishable by the difference of their language, their customs, and\ntheir laws; while from the two last - i.e., customs and laws, - it may arise\nthat they have a peculiar disposition, a peculiar manner of life, and\npeculiar prejudices. (161) If, then, the Hebrews were harder of heart than\nother nations, the fault lay with their laws or customs.\n\n(17:162) This is certainly true, in the sense that, if God had wished their\ndominion to be more lasting, He would have given them other rites and laws,\nand would have instituted a different form of government. (163) We can,\ntherefore, only say that their God was angry with them, not only, as\nJeremiah says, from the building of the city, but even from the founding of\ntheir laws.\n\n(17:164) This is borne witness to by Ezekiel xx:25: \"Wherefore I gave them\nalso statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not\nlive; and I polluted them in their own gifts, in that they caused to pass\nthrough the fire all that openeth the womb; that I might make them desolate,\nto the end that they might know that I am the Lord.\"\n\n(17:165) In order that we may understand these words, and the destruction of\nthe Hebrew commonwealth, we must bear in mind that it had at first been\nintended to entrust the whole duties of the priesthood to the firstborn, and\nnot to the Levites (see Numb. viii:17). (166) It was only when all the\ntribes, except the Levites, worshipped the golden calf, that the\nfirstborn were rejected and defiled, and the Levites chosen in their stead\n(Deut. x:8). (167) When I reflect on this change, I feel disposed to break\nforth with the words of Tacitus. (168) God's object at that time was not the\nsafety of the Jews, but vengeance. (169) I am greatly astonished that the\ncelestial mind was so inflamed with anger that it ordained laws, which\nalways are supposed to promote the honour, well-being, and security of a\npeople, with the purpose of vengeance, for the sake of punishment; so that\nthe laws do not seem so much laws - that is, the safeguard of\nthe people - as pains and penalties.\n\n(17:170) The gifts which the people were obliged to bestow on the Levites\nand priests - the redemption of the firstborn, the poll-tax due to the\nLevites, the privilege possessed by the latter of the sole performance of\nsacred rites - all these, I say, were a continual reproach to the people, a\ncontinual reminder of their defilement and rejection. (171) Moreover, we may\nbe sure that the Levites were for ever heaping reproaches upon them: for\namong so many thousands there must have been many importunate dabblers in\ntheology. (172) Hence the people got into the way of watching the acts of\nthe Levites, who were but human; of accusing the whole body of the faults of\none member, and continually murmuring.\n\n(17:173) Besides this, there was the obligation to keep in idleness men\nhateful to them, and connected by no ties of blood. (174) Especially would\nthis seem grievous when provisions were dear. What wonder, then, if in times\nof peace, when striking miracles had ceased, and no men of paramount\nauthority were forthcoming, the irritable and greedy temper of the people\nbegan to wax cold, and at length to fall away from a worship, which, though\nDivine, was also humiliating, and even hostile, and to seek after something\nfresh; or can we be surprised that the captains, who always adopt the\npopular course, in order to gain the sovereign power for themselves by\nenlisting the sympathies of the people, and alienating the high priest,\nshould have yielded to their demands, and introduced a new worship? (175) If\nthe state had been formed according to the original intention, the rights\nand honour of all the tribes would have been equal, and everything would\nhave rested on a firm basis. (176) Who is there who would willingly violate\nthe religious rights of his kindred? (177) What could a man desire more than\nto support his own brothers and parents, thus fulfilling the duties of\nreligion? (178) Who would not rejoice in being taught by them the\ninterpretation of the laws, and receiving through them the answers of God?\n\n(17:179) The tribes would thus have been united by a far closer bond, if all\nalike had possessed the right to the priesthood. (180) All danger would have\nbeen obviated, if the choice of the Levites had not been dictated by anger\nand revenge. (181) But, as we have said, the Hebrews had offended their God,\nWho, as Ezekiel says, polluted them in their own gifts by rejecting all that\nopeneth the womb, so that He might destroy them.\n\n(17:182) This passage is also confirmed by their history. As soon as the\npeople in the wilderness began to live in ease and plenty, certain men of no\nmean birth began to rebel against the choice of the Levites, and to make it\na cause for believing that Moses had not acted by the commands of God, but\nfor his own good pleasure, inasmuch as he had chosen his own tribe before\nall the rest, and had bestowed the high priesthood in perpetuity on his own\nbrother. (183) They, therefore, stirred up a tumult, and came to him, crying\nout that all men were equally sacred, and that he had exalted himself above\nhis fellows wrongfully. (184) Moses was not able to pacify them with\nreasons; but by the intervention of a miracle in proof of the faith, they\nall perished. (185) A fresh sedition then arose among the whole people, who\nbelieved that their champions had not been put to death by the judgment of\nGod, but by the device of Moses. (186) After a great slaughter, or\npestilence, the rising subsided from inanition, but in such a manner that\nall preferred death to life under such conditions.\n\n(17:187) We should rather say that sedition ceased than that harmony was\nre-established. (188) This is witnessed by Scripture (Deut. xxxi:21), where\nGod, after predicting to Moses that the people after his death will fall\naway from the Divine worship, speaks thus: \"For I know their imagination\nwhich they go about, even now before I have brought them into the land which\nI sware;\" and, a little while after (xxxi:27), Moses says: \"For I know thy\nrebellion and thy stiff neck: behold while I am yet alive with you this\nday, ye have been rebellious against the Lord; and how much more after my\ndeath!\"\n\n(17:189) Indeed, it happened according to his words, as we all know.\n(190) Great changes, extreme license, luxury, and hardness of heart grew up;\nthings went from bad to worse, till at last the people, after being\nfrequently conquered, came to an open rupture with the Divine right, and\nwished for a mortal king, so that the seat of government might be the Court,\ninstead of the Temple, and that the tribes might remain fellow-citizens in\nrespect to their king, instead of in respect to Divine right and the high\npriesthood.\n\n(17:191) A vast material for new seditions was thus produced, eventually\nresulting in the ruin of the entire state. Kings are above all things\njealous of a precarious rule, and can in nowise brook a dominion within\ntheir own. (192) The first monarchs, being chosen from the ranks of private\ncitizens, were content with the amount of dignity to which they had risen;\nbut their sons, who obtained the throne by right of inheritance, began\ngradually to introduce changes, so as to get all the sovereign rights into\ntheir own hands. (193) This they were generally unable to accomplish, so\nlong as the right of legislation did not rest with them, but with the high\npriest, who kept the laws in the sanctuary, and interpreted them to the\npeople. (194) The kings were thus bound to obey the laws as much as were the\nsubjects, and were unable to abrogate them, or to ordain new laws of equal\nauthority; moreover, they were prevented by the Levites from administering\nthe affairs of religion, king and subject being alike unclean. (195) Lastly,\nthe whole safety of their dominion depended on the will of one man, if that\nman appeared to be a prophet; and of this they had seen an example, namely,\nhow completely Samuel had been able to command Saul, and how easily, because\nof a single disobedience, he had been able to transfer the right of\nsovereignty to David. (196) Thus the kings found a dominion within their\nown, and wielded a precarious sovereignty.\n\n(17:197) In order to surmount these difficulties, they allowed other temples\nto be dedicated to the gods, so that there might be no further need of\nconsulting the Levites; they also sought out many who prophesied in the name\nof God, so that they might have creatures of their own to oppose to the true\nprophets. (198) However, in spite of all their attempts, they never\nattained their end. (199) For the prophets, prepared against every\nemergency, waited for a favourable opportunity, such as the beginning of a\nnew reign, which is always precarious, while the memory of the previous\nreign remains green. (200) At these times they could easily pronounce by\nDivine authority that the king was tyrannical, and could produce a champion\nof distinguished virtue to vindicate the Divine right, and lawfully to claim\ndominion, or a share in it. (201) Still, not even so could the prophets\neffect much. (202) They could, indeed, remove a tyrant; but there were\nreasons which prevented them from doing more than setting up, at great cost\nof civil bloodshed, another tyrant in his stead. (203) Of discords and civil\nwars there was no end, for the causes for the violation of Divine right\nremained always the same, and could only be removed by a complete\nremodelling of the state.\n\n(17:204) We have now seen how religion was introduced into the Hebrew\ncommonwealth, and how the dominion might have lasted for ever, if the just\nwrath of the Lawgiver had allowed it. (205) As this was impossible, it was\nbound in time to perish. (206) I am now speaking only of the first\ncommonwealth, for the second was a mere shadow of the first, inasmuch as the\npeople were bound by the rights of the Persians to whom they were subject.\n(207) After the restoration of freedom, the high priests usurped the rights\nof the secular chiefs, and thus obtained absolute dominion. (208) The\npriests were inflamed with an intense desire to wield the powers of the\nsovereignty and the high priesthood at the same time. (209) I have,\ntherefore, no need to speak further of the second commonwealth. (210)\nWhether the first, in so far as we deem it to have been durable, is capable\nof imitation, and whether it would be pious to copy it as far as possible,\nwill appear from what fellows. (211) I wish only to draw attention, as a\ncrowning conclusion, to the principle indicated already - namely, that it is\nevident, from what we have stated in this chapter, that the Divine right, or\nthe right of religion, originates in a compact: without such compact,\nnone but natural rights exist. (212) The Hebrews were not bound by their\nreligion to evince any pious care for other nations not included in the\ncompact, but only for their own fellow-citizens.\n\n\n\n\n[18:0] CHAPTER XVIII - FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE HEBREWS, AND\nTHEIR HISTORY,  CERTAIN POLITICAL DOCTRINES ARE DEDUCED.\n\n[18:1] (1) Although the commonwealth of the Hebrews, as we have conceived\nit, might have lasted for ever, it would be impossible to imitate it at the\npresent day, nor would it be advisable so to do. (2) If a people wished to\ntransfer their rights to God it would be necessary to make an express\ncovenant with Him, and for this would be needed not only the consent of\nthose transferring their rights, but also the consent of God. (3) God,\nhowever, has revealed through his Apostles that the covenant of God is no\nlonger written in ink, or on tables of stone, but with the Spirit of God in\nthe fleshy tables of the heart.\n\n(18:4) Furthermore, such a form of government would only be available for\nthose who desire to have no foreign relations, but to shut themselves up\nwithin their own frontiers, and to live apart from the rest of the world; it\nwould be useless to men who must have dealings with other nations; so that\nthe cases where it could be adopted are very few indeed.\n\n(18:5) Nevertheless, though it could not be copied in its entirety, it\npossessed many excellent features which might be brought to our notice, and\nperhaps imitated with advantage. (6) My intention, however, is not to write\na treatise on forms of government, so I will pass over most of such points\nin silence, and will only touch on those which bear upon my purpose.\n\n(18:7) God's kingdom is not infringed upon by the choice of an earthly ruler\nendowed with sovereign rights; for after the Hebrews had transferred their\nrights to God, they conferred the sovereign right of ruling on Moses,\ninvesting him with the sole power of instituting and abrogating laws in\nthe name of God, of choosing priests, of judging, of teaching, of\npunishing - in fact, all the prerogatives of an absolute monarch.\n\n(18:8) Again, though the priests were the interpreters of the laws, they had\nno power to judge the citizens, or to excommunicate anyone: this could only\nbe done by the judges and chiefs chosen from among the people. (9) A\nconsideration of the successes and the histories of the Hebrews will bring\nto light other considerations worthy of note. To wit:\n\n(18:9) I. That there were no religious sects, till after the high priests,\nin the second commonwealth, possessed the authority to make decrees, and\ntransact the business of government. (10) In order that such authority might\nlast for ever, the high priests usurped the rights of secular rulers, and\nat last wished to be styled kings. (11) The reason for this is ready to\nhand; in the first commonwealth no decrees could bear the name of the high\npriest, for he had no right to ordain laws, but only to give the answers of\nGod to questions asked by the captains or the councils: he had, therefore,\nno motive for making changes in the law, but took care, on the contrary, to\nadminister and guard what had already been received and accepted. (12) His\nonly means of preserving his freedom in safety against the will of the\ncaptains lay in cherishing the law intact. (13) After the high priests had\nassumed the power of carrying on the government, and added the rights of\nsecular rulers to those they already possessed, each one began both in\nthings religious and in things secular, to seek for the glorification of his\nown name, settling everything by sacerdotal authority, and issuing every\nday, concerning ceremonies, faith, and all else, new decrees which he sought\nto make as sacred and authoritative as the laws of Moses. (14) Religion thus\nsank into a degrading superstition, while the true meaning and\ninterpretation of the laws became corrupted. (15) Furthermore, while the\nhigh priests were paving their way to the secular rule just after the\nrestoration, they attempted to gain popular favour by assenting to\nevery demand; approving whatever the people did, however impious, and\naccommodating Scripture to the very depraved current morals. (16) Malachi\nbears witness to this in no measured terms: he chides the priests of his\ntime as despisers of the name of God, and then goes on with his invective as\nfollows (Mal ii:7, 8): \"For the priest's lips should keep knowledge,\nand they should seek the law at his mouth: for he is the messenger of\nthe Lord of hosts. (17) But ye are departed out of the way; ye have\ncaused many to stumble at the law, ye have corrupted the covenant of\nLevi, saith the Lord of hosts.\" (18) He further accuses them of interpreting\nthe laws according to their own pleasure, and paying no respect to God but\nonly to persons. (19) It is certain that the high priests were never so\ncautious in their conduct as to escape the remark of the more shrewd among\nthe people, for the latter were at length emboldened to assert that no\nlaws ought to be kept save those that were written, and that the decrees\nwhich the Pharisees (consisting, as Josephus says in his \"Antiquities,\"\nchiefly of the common people), were deceived into calling the traditions of\nthe fathers, should not be observed at all. (20) However this may be, we can\nin nowise doubt that flattery of the high priest, the corruption of religion\nand the laws, and the enormous increase of the extent of the last-named,\ngave very great and frequent occasion for disputes and altercations\nimpossible to allay. (21) When men begin to quarrel with all the ardour of\nsuperstition, and the magistracy to back up one side or the other, they can\nnever come to a compromise, but are bound to split into sects.\n\n(18:22) II. It is worthy of remark that the prophets, who were in a private\nstation of life, rather irritated than reformed mankind by their freedom of\nwarning, rebuke, and censure; whereas the kings, by their reproofs and\npunishments, could always produce an effect. (23) The prophets were often\nintolerable even to pious kings, on account of the authority they assumed\nfor judging whether an action was right or wrong, or for reproving the kings\nthemselves if they dared to transact any business, whether public or\nprivate, without prophetic sanction. (24) King Asa who, according to\nthe testimony of Scripture, reigned piously, put the prophet Hanani into a\nprison-house because he had ventured freely to chide and reprove him for\nentering into a covenant with the king of Armenia.\n\n(18:25) Other examples might be cited, tending to prove that religion\ngained more harm than good by such freedom, not to speak of the further\nconsequence, that if the prophets had retained their rights, great\ncivil wars would have resulted.\n\n(26) III. It is remarkable that during all the period, during which the\npeople held the reins of power, there was only one civil war, and that one\nwas completely extinguished, the conquerors taking such pity on the\nconquered, that they endeavoured in every way to reinstate them in their\nformer dignity and power. (27) But after that the people, little accustomed\nto kings, changed its first form of government into a monarchy, civil war\nraged almost continuously; and battles were so fierce as to exceed all\nothers recorded; in one engagement (taxing our faith to the utmost)\nfive hundred thousand Israelites were slaughtered by the men of Judah, and\nin another the Israelites slew great numbers of the men of Judah (the\nfigures are not given in Scripture), almost razed to the ground the walls of\nJerusalem, and sacked the Temple in their unbridled fury. (28) At length,\nladen with the spoils of their brethren, satiated with blood, they took\nhostages, and leaving the king in his well-nigh devastated kingdom, laid\ndown their arms, relying on the weakness rather than the good faith of their\nfoes. (29) A few years after, the men of Judah, with recruited strength,\nagain took the field, but were a second time beaten by the Israelites, and\nslain to the number of a hundred and twenty thousand, two hundred thousand\nof their wives and children were led into captivity, and a great booty again\nseized. (30) Worn out with these and similar battles set forth at length in\ntheir histories, the Jews at length fell a prey to their enemies.\n\n(18:31) Furthermore, if we reckon up the times during which peace prevailed\nunder each form of government, we shall find a great discrepancy. (32)\nBefore the monarchy forty years and more often passed, and once eighty years\n(an almost unparalleled period), without any war, foreign or civil. (33)\nAfter the kings acquired sovereign power, the fighting was no longer for\npeace and liberty, but for glory; accordingly we find that they all, with\nthe exception of Solomon (whose virtue and wisdom would be better displayed\nin peace than in war) waged war, and finally a fatal desire for power gained\nground, which, in many cases, made the path to the throne a bloody one.\n\n(18:34) Lastly, the laws, during the rule of the people, remained\nuncorrupted and were studiously observed. (35) Before the monarchy there\nwere very few prophets to admonish the people, but after the establishment\nof kings there were a great number at the same time. (36) Obadiah saved a\nhundred from death and hid them away, lest they should be slain with the\nrest. (37) The people, so far as we can see, were never deceived by false\nprophets till after the power had been vested in kings, whose creatures many\nof the prophets were. (38) Again, the people, whose heart was generally\nproud or humble according to its circumstances, easily corrected itself\nunder misfortune, turned again to God, restored His laws, and so freed\nitself from all peril; but the kings, whose hearts were always equally\npuffed up, and who could not be corrected without humiliation, clung\npertinaciously to their vices, even till the last overthrow of the city.\n\n[18:2] (39) We may now clearly see from what I have said:-\n\n(40) I. How hurtful to religion and the state is the concession to ministers\nof religion of any power of issuing decrees or transacting the business of\ngovernment: how, on the contrary, far greater stability is afforded, if the\nsaid ministers are only allowed to give answers to questions duly put\nto them, and are, as a rule, obliged to preach and practise the received and\naccepted doctrines.\n\n(18:41) II How dangerous it is to refer to Divine right matters merely\nspeculative and subject or liable to dispute. (42) The most tyrannical\ngovernments are those which make crimes of opinions, for everyone has an\ninalienable right over his thoughts - nay, such a state of things leads to\nthe rule of popular passion.\n\n(18:43) Pontius Pilate made concession to the passion of the Pharisees in\nconsenting to the crucifixion of Christ, whom he knew to be innocent. (44)\nAgain, the Pharisees, in order to shake the position of men richer than\nthemselves, began to set on foot questions of religion, and accused the\nSadducees of impiety, and, following their example, the vilest hypocrites,\nstirred, as they pretended, by the same holy wrath which they called zeal\nfor the Lord, persecuted men whose unblemished character and distinguished\nvirtue had excited the popular hatred, publicly denounced their opinions,\nand inflamed the fierce passions of the people against them.\n\n(18:45) This wanton licence being cloaked with the specious garb of\nreligion could not easily be repressed, especially when the sovereign\nauthorities introduced a sect of which they were not the head; they were\nthen regarded not as interpreters of Divine right, but as sectarians - that\nis, as persons recognizing the right of Divine interpretation assumed by the\nleaders of the sect. (46) The authority of the magistrates thus became of\nlittle account in such matters in comparison with the authority of sectarian\nleaders before whose interpretations kings were obliged to bow.\n\n(18:47) To avoid such evils in a state, there is no safer way, than to make\npiety and religion to consist in acts only - that is, in the practice of\njustice and charity, leaving everyone's judgment in other respects free.\n(48) But I will speak of this more at length presently.\n\n[18:3] (49) III. We see how necessary it is, both in the interests of the\nstate and in the interests of religion, to confer on the sovereign power the\nright of deciding what is lawful or the reverse. (50) If this right of\njudging actions could not be given to the very prophets of God without great\ninjury to the state and religion, how much less should it be entrusted to\nthose who can neither foretell the future nor work miracles! (51) But this\nagain I will treat of more fully hereafter.\n\n(18:52) IV. Lastly, we see how disastrous it is for a people unaccustomed\nto kings, and possessing a complete code of laws, to set up a monarchy. (53)\nNeither can the subjects brook such a sway, nor the royal authority submit\nto laws and popular rights set up by anyone inferior to itself. (54) Still\nless can a king be expected to defend such laws, for they were not framed to\nsupport his dominion, but the dominion of the people, or some council which\nformerly ruled, so that in guarding the popular rights the king would seem\nto be a slave rather than a master. (55) The representative of a new\nmonarchy will employ all his zeal in attempting to frame new laws, so\nas to wrest the rights of dominion to his own use, and to reduce the people\ntill they find it easier to increase than to curtail the royal prerogative.\n(56) I must not, however, omit to state that it is no less dangerous to\nremove a monarch, though he is on all hands admitted to be a tyrant. (57)\nFor his people are accustomed to royal authority and will obey no other,\ndespising and mocking at any less august control.\n\n(18:58) It is therefore necessary, as the prophets discovered of old, if one\nking be removed, that he should be replaced by another, who will be a tyrant\nfrom necessity rather than choice. (59) For how will he be able to endure\nthe sight of the hands of the citizens reeking with royal blood, and to\nrejoice in their regicide as a glorious exploit? (60) Was not the deed\nperpetrated as an example and warning for himself?\n\n(18:61) If he really wishes to be king, and not to acknowledge the people as\nthe judge of kings and the master of himself, or to wield a precarious sway,\nhe must avenge the death of his predecessor, making an example for his own\nsake, lest the people should venture to repeat a similar crime. (62) He will\nnot, however, be able easily to avenge the death of the tyrant by the\nslaughter of citizens unless he defends the cause of tyranny and approves\nthe deeds of his predecessor, thus following in his footsteps.\n\n(18:63) Hence it comes to pass that peoples have often changed their\ntyrants, but never removed them or changed the monarchical form of\ngovernment into any other.\n\n[18:4] (64) The English people furnish us with a terrible example of this\nfact. (65) They sought how to depose their monarch under the forms of law,\nbut when he had been removed, they were utterly unable to change the form of\ngovernment, and after much bloodshed only brought it about, that a new\nmonarch should be hailed under a different name (as though it had been a\nmere question of names); this new monarch could only consolidate his power\nby completely destroying the royal stock, putting to death the king's\nfriends, real or supposed, and disturbing with war the peace which might\nencourage discontent, in order that the populace might be engrossed with\nnovelties and divert its mind from brooding over the slaughter of the king.\n(66) At last, however, the people reflected that it had accomplished nothing\nfor the good of the country beyond violating the rights of the lawful king\nand changing everything for the worse. (67) It therefore decided to retrace\nits steps as soon as possible, and never rested till it had seen a\ncomplete restoration of the original state of affairs.\n\n(18:68) It may perhaps be objected that the Roman people was easily able to\nremove its tyrants, but I gather from its history a strong confirmation of\nmy contention. (69) Though the Roman people was much more than\nordinarily capable of removing their tyrants and changing their\nform of government, inasmuch as it held in its own hands the power of\nelecting its king and his successor, and being composed of rebels and\ncriminals had not long been used to the royal yoke (out of its six kings it\nhad put to death three), nevertheless it could accomplish nothing\nbeyond electing several tyrants in place of one, who kept it groaning under\na continual state of war, both foreign and civil, till at last it changed\nits government again to a form differing from monarchy, as in England, only\nin name.\n\n[18:5] (70) As for the United States of the Netherlands, they have never, as\nwe know, had a king, but only counts, who never attained the full rights of\ndominion. (71) The States of the Netherlands evidently acted as principals\nin the settlement made by them at the time of the Earl of Leicester's\nmission: they always reserved for themselves the authority to keep the\ncounts up to their duties, and the power to preserve this authority\nand the liberty of the citizens. (72) They had ample means of vindicating\ntheir rights if their rulers should prove tyrannical, and could impose\nsuch restraints that nothing could be done without their consent and\napproval.\n\n(18:73) Thus the rights of sovereign power have always been vested in the\nStates, though the last count endeavoured to usurp them. (74) It is\ntherefore little likely that the States should give them up, especially as\nthey have just restored their original dominion, lately almost lost.\n\n(18:75) These examples, then, confirm us in our belief, that every dominion\nshould retain its original form, and, indeed, cannot change it without\ndanger of the utter ruin of the whole state. (76) Such are the points I have\nhere thought worthy of remark.\n\n\n\n\n[19:0] CHAPTER XIX - IT IS SHOWN THAT THE RIGHT OVER MATTERS\n  SPIRITUAL LIES WHOLLY WITH THE SOVEREIGN, AND THAT\n  THE OUTWARD FORMS OF RELIGION SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE\n  WITH PUBLIC PEACE, IF WE WOULD OBEY GOD ARIGHT.\n\n(1) When I said that the possessors of sovereign power have rights over\neverything, and that all rights are dependent on their decree, I did not\nmerely mean temporal rights, but also spiritual rights; of the latter, no\nless than the former, they ought to be the interpreters and the\nchampions. (2) I wish to draw special attention to this point, and to\ndiscuss it fully in this chapter, because many persons deny that the right\nof deciding religious questions belongs to the sovereign power, and refuse\nto acknowledge it as the interpreter of Divine right. (3) They\naccordingly assume full licence to accuse and arraign it, nay, even to\nexcommunicate it from the Church, as Ambrosius treated the Emperor\nTheodosius in old time. (4) However, I will show later on in this chapter\nthat they take this means of dividing the government, and paving the\nway to their own ascendancy. (5) I wish, however, first to point out that\nreligion acquires its force as law solely from the decrees of the sovereign.\n(6) God has no special kingdom among men except in so far as He reigns\nthrough temporal rulers. [19:1] (7) Moreover, the rites of religion and the\noutward observances of piety should be in accordance with the public peace\nand well-being, and should therefore be determined by the sovereign power\nalone. (8) I speak here only of the outward observances of piety and the\nexternal rites of religion, not of piety, itself, nor of the inward worship\nof God, nor the means by which the mind is inwardly led to do homage to God\nin singleness of heart.\n\n(19:9) Inward worship of God and piety in itself are within the sphere of\neveryone's private rights, and cannot be alienated (as I showed at the end\nof Chapter VII.). (10) What I here mean by the kingdom of God is, I\nthink, sufficiently clear from what has been said in Chapter XIV.\n(11) I there showed that a man best fulfils God's law who worships Him,\naccording to His command, through acts of justice and charity; it follows,\ntherefore, that wherever justice and charity have the force of law and\nordinance, there is God's kingdom.\n\n(19:12) I recognize no difference between the cases where God teaches and\ncommands the practice of justice and charity through our natural faculties,\nand those where He makes special revelations; nor is the form of the\nrevelation of importance so long as such practice is revealed and becomes a\nsovereign and supreme law to men. (13) If, therefore, I show that justice\nand charity can only acquire the force of right and law through the rights\nof rulers, I shall be able readily to arrive at the conclusion (seeing that\nthe rights of rulers are in the possession of the sovereign), that religion\ncan only acquire the force of right by means of those who have the right to\ncommand, and that God only rules among men through the instrumentality of\nearthly potentates. (14) It follows from what has been said, that the\npractice of justice and charity only acquires the force of law through the\nrights of the sovereign authority; for we showed in Chapter XVI. that in the\nstate of nature reason has no more rights than desire, but that men living\neither by the laws of the former or the laws of the latter, possess rights\nco-extensive with their powers.\n\n(19:15) For this reason we could not conceive sin to exist in the state of\nnature, nor imagine God as a judge punishing man's transgressions; but we\nsupposed all things to happen according to the general laws of universal\nnature, there being no difference between pious and impious, between him\nthat was pure (as Solomon says) and him that was impure, because there was\nno possibility either of justice or charity.\n\n[19:2] (16) In order that the true doctrines of reason, that is (as we\nshowed in Chapter IV.), the true Divine doctrines might obtain absolutely\nthe force of law and right, it was necessary that each individual should\ncede his natural right, and transfer it either to society as a whole, or to\na certain body of men, or to one man. (17) Then, and not till then,\ndoes it first dawn upon us what is justice and what is injustice,\nwhat is equity and what is iniquity.\n\n(19:18) Justice, therefore, and absolutely all the precepts of reason,\nincluding love towards one's neighbour, receive the force of laws and\nordinances solely through the rights of dominion, that is (as we showed in\nthe same chapter) solely on the decree of those who possess the right to\nrule. (19) Inasmuch as the kingdom of God consists entirely in rights\napplied to justice and charity or to true religion, it follows that (as we\nasserted) the kingdom of God can only exist among men through the means of\nthe sovereign powers; nor does it make any difference whether religion be\napprehended by our natural faculties or by revelation: the argument is sound\nin both cases, inasmuch as religion is one and the same, and is equally\nrevealed by God, whatever be the manner in which it becomes known to men.\n\n(19:20) Thus, in order that the religion revealed by the prophets might have\nthe force of law among the Jews, it was necessary that every man of them\nshould yield up his natural right, and that all should, with one accord,\nagree that they would only obey such commands as God should\nreveal to them through the prophets. (21) Just as we have shown to take\nplace in a democracy, where men with one consent agree to live according to\nthe dictates of reason. (22) Although the Hebrews furthermore transferred\ntheir right to God, they were able to do so rather in theory than in\npractice, for, as a matter of fact (as we pointed out above) they\nabsolutely retained the right of dominion till they transferred it to Moses,\nwho in his turn became absolute king, so that it was only through him that\nGod reigned over the Hebrews. (23) For this reason (namely, that religion\nonly acquires the force of law by means of the sovereign power) Moses was\nnot able to punish those who, before the covenant, and consequently while\nstill in possession of their rights, violated the Sabbath (Exod. xvi:27),\nbut was able to do so after the covenant (Numb. xv:36), because everyone had\nthen yielded up his natural rights, and the ordinance of the\nSabbath had received the force of law.\n\n(19:24) Lastly, for the same reason, after the destruction of the Hebrew\ndominion, revealed religion ceased to have the force of law; for we cannot\ndoubt that as soon as the Jews transferred their right to the king of\nBabylon, the kingdom of God and the Divine right forthwith ceased. (25)\nFor the covenant wherewith they promised to obey all the utterances of God\nwas abrogated; God's kingdom, which was based thereupon, also ceased. (26)\nThe Hebrews could no longer abide thereby, inasmuch as their rights no\nlonger belonged to them but to the king of Babylon, whom (as we showed in\nChapter XVI.) they were bound to obey in all things. (27) Jeremiah (chap.\nxxix:7) expressly admonishes them of this fact: \"And seek the peace of the\ncity, whither I have caused you to be carried away captives, and pray unto\nthe Lord for it; for in the peace thereof shall ye have peace.\" (28) Now,\nthey could not seek the peace of the City as having a share in its\ngovernment, but only as slaves, being, as they were, captives; by\nobedience in all things, with a view to avoiding seditions, and by observing\nall the laws of the country, however different from their own. (29) It is\nthus abundantly evident that religion among the Hebrews only acquired the\nform of law through the right of the sovereign rule; when that rule was\ndestroyed, it could no longer be received as the law of a particular\nkingdom, but only as the universal precept of reason. (30) I say of reason,\nfor the universal religion had not yet become known by revelation. (31) We\nmay therefore draw the general conclusion that religion, whether revealed\nthrough our natural faculties or through prophets, receives the force of a\ncommand solely through the decrees of the holders of sovereign power; and,\nfurther, that God has no special kingdom among men, except in so far as He\nreigns through earthly potentates.\n\n(19:32) We may now see in a clearer light what was stated in Chapter IV.,\nnamely, that all the decrees of God involve eternal truth and necessity, so\nthat we cannot conceive God as a prince or legislator giving laws to\nmankind. (33) For this reason the Divine precepts, whether revealed through\nour natural faculties, or through prophets, do not receive immediately from\nGod the force of a command, but only from those, or through the mediation of\nthose, who possess the right of ruling and legislating. (34) It is only\nthrough these latter means that God rules among men, and directs human\naffairs with justice and equity.\n\n(19:35) This conclusion is supported by experience, for we find traces of\nDivine justice only in places where just men bear sway; elsewhere the same\nlot (to repeat, again Solomon's words) befalls the just and the unjust, the\npure and the impure: a state of things which causes Divine Providence to be\ndoubted by many who think that God immediately reigns among men, and\ndirects all nature for their benefit.\n\n[19:3] (36) As, then, both reason and experience tell us that the Divine\nright is entirely dependent on the decrees of secular rulers, it follows\nthat secular rulers are its proper interpreters. (37) How this is so we\nshall now see, for it is time to show that the outward observances of\nreligion, and all the external practices of piety should be brought into\naccordance with the public peace and well-being if we would obey God\nrightly. (38) When this has been shown we shall easily understand how the\nsovereign rulers are the proper interpreters of religion and piety.\n\n(19:39) It is certain that duties towards one's country are the highest that\nman can fulfil; for, if government be taken away, no good thing can last,\nall falls into dispute, anger and anarchy reign unchecked amid universal\nfear. (40) Consequently there can be no duty towards our neighbour which\nwould not become an offence if it involved injury to the whole state, nor\ncan there be any offence against our duty towards our neighbour, or anything\nbut loyalty in what we do for the sake of preserving the state. (41) For\ninstance: it is in the abstract my duty when my neighbour quarrels with me\nand wishes to take my cloak, to give him my coat also; but if it be thought\nthat such conduct is hurtful to the maintenance of the state, I ought to\nbring him to trial, even at the risk of his being condemned to death.\n\n(19:42) For this reason Manlius Torquatus is held up to honour, inasmuch as\nthe public welfare outweighed with him his duty towards his children. (43)\nThis being so, it follows that the public welfare is the sovereign law to\nwhich all others, Divine and human, should be made to conform. (44) Now, it\nis the function of the sovereign only to decide what is necessary for the\npublic welfare and the safety of the state, and to give orders accordingly;\ntherefore it is also the function of the sovereign only to decide the limits\nof our duty towards our neighbour - in other words, to determine how we\nshould obey God. (45) We can now clearly understand how the sovereign\nis the interpreter of religion, and further, that no one can obey God\nrightly, if the practices of his piety do not conform to the public welfare;\nor, consequently, if he does not implicitly obey all the commands of the\nsovereign. (46) For as by God's command we are bound to do our duty to all\nmen without exception, and to do no man an injury, we are also bound not\nto help one man at another's loss, still less at a loss to the whole state.\n(47) Now, no private citizen can know what is good for the state, except he\nlearn it through the sovereign power, who alone has the right to transact\npublic business: therefore no one can rightly practise piety or obedience to\nGod, unless he obey the sovereign power's commands in all things. (48) This\nproposition is confirmed by the facts of experience. (49) For if the\nsovereign adjudge a man to be worthy of death or an enemy, whether he be a\ncitizen or a foreigner, a private individual or a separate ruler, no subject\nis allowed to give him assistance. (50) So also though the Jews were\nbidden to love their fellow-citizens as themselves (Levit. xix:17, 18), they\nwere nevertheless bound, if a man offended against the law, to point him out\nto the judge (Levit. v:1, and Deut. xiii:8, 9), and, if he should be\ncondemned to death, to slay him (Deut. xvii:7).\n\n(19:51) Further, in order that the Hebrews might preserve the liberty they\nhad gained, and might retain absolute sway over the territory they had\nconquered, it was necessary, as we showed in Chapter XVII., that their\nreligion should be adapted to their particular government, and that they\nshould separate themselves from the rest of the nations: wherefore it was\ncommanded to them, \"Love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy\" (Matt. v:43),\nbut after they had lost their dominion and had gone into captivity in\nBabylon, Jeremiah bid them take thought for the safety of the state into\nwhich they had been led captive; and Christ when He saw that they would be\nspread over the whole world, told them to do their duty by all men without\nexception; all of which instances show that religion has always been made to\nconform to the public welfare. [19:4] (52) Perhaps someone will ask: By what\nright, then, did the disciples of Christ, being private citizens, preach\na new religion? (53) I answer that they did so by the right of the\npower which they had received from Christ against unclean spirits (see Matt.\nx:1). (54) I have already stated in Chapter XVI. that all are bound to obey\na tyrant, unless they have received from God through undoubted revelation a\npromise of aid against him; so let no one take example from the Apostles\nunless he too has the power of working miracles. (55) The point is brought\nout more clearly by Christ's command to His disciples, \"Fear not those who\nkill the body\" (Matt. x:28). (56) If this command were imposed on everyone,\ngovernments would be founded in vain, and Solomon's words (Prov. xxiv:21),\n\"My son, fear God and the king,\" would be impious, which they certainly are\nnot; we must therefore admit that the authority which Christ gave to His\ndisciples was given to them only, and must not be taken as an example for\nothers.\n\n(19:57) I do not pause to consider the arguments of those who wish to\nseparate secular rights from spiritual rights, placing the former under the\ncontrol of the sovereign, and the latter under the control of the universal\nChurch; such pretensions are too frivolous to merit refutation. (58) I\ncannot however, pass over in silence the fact that such persons are woefully\ndeceived when they seek to support their seditious opinions (I ask pardon\nfor the somewhat harsh epithet) by the example of the Jewish high priest,\nwho, in ancient times, had the right of administering the sacred offices.\n(59) Did not the high priests receive their right by the decree of Moses\n(who, as I have shown, retained the sole right to rule), and could they not\nby the same means be deprived of it? (60) Moses himself chose not only\nAaron, but also his son Eleazar, and his grandson Phineas, and bestowed on\nthem the right of administering the office of high priest. (61) This right\nwas retained by the high priests afterwards, but none the less were they\ndelegates of Moses - that is, of the sovereign power. (62) Moses, as we have\nshown, left no successor to his dominion, but so distributed his\nprerogatives, that those who came after him seemed, as it were, regents who\nadminister the government when a king is absent but not dead.\n\n(19:62) In the second commonwealth the high priests held their right\nabsolutely, after they had obtained the rights of principality in addition.\n(63) Wherefore the rights of the high priesthood always depended on the\nedict of the sovereign, and the high priests did not possess them till\nthey became sovereigns also. (64) Rights in matters spiritual always\nremained under the control of the kings absolutely (as I will show at the\nend of this chapter), except in the single particular that they were not\nallowed to administer in person the sacred duties in the Temple, inasmuch\nas they were not of the family of Aaron, and were therefore considered\nunclean, a reservation which would have no force in a Christian community.\n\n(19:65) We cannot, therefore, doubt that the daily sacred rites (whose\nperformance does not require a particular genealogy but only a special mode\nof life, and from which the holders of sovereign power are not excluded as\nunclean) are under the sole control of the sovereign power; no one,\nsave by the authority or concession of such sovereign, has the right or\npower of administering them, of choosing others to administer them, of\ndefining or strengthening the foundations of the Church and her doctrines;\nof judging on questions of morality or acts of piety; of receiving\nanyone into the Church or excommunicating him therefrom, or, lastly, of\nproviding for the poor.\n\n(19:66) These doctrines are proved to be not only true (as we have already\npointed out), but also of primary necessity for the preservation of religion\nand the state. (67) We all know what weight spiritual right and authority\ncarries in the popular mind: how everyone hangs on the lips, as it were, of\nthose who possess it. (68) We may even say that those who wield such\nauthority have the most complete sway over the popular mind.\n\n(19:69) Whosoever, therefore, wishes to take this right away from the\nsovereign power, is desirous of dividing the dominion; from such division,\ncontentions, and strife will necessarily spring up, as they did of old\nbetween the Jewish kings and high priests, and will defy all attempts to\nallay them. (70) Nay, further, he who strives to deprive the sovereign power\nof such authority, is aiming (as we have said), at gaining dominion for\nhimself. (71) What is left for the sovereign power to decide on, if this\nright be denied him? (72) Certainly nothing concerning either war or\npeace, if he has to ask another man's opinion as to whether what he\nbelieves to be beneficial would be pious or impious. (73) Everything would\ndepend on the verdict of him who had the right of deciding and judging what\nwas pious or impious, right or wrong.\n\n(19:74) When such a right was bestowed on the Pope of Rome absolutely, he\ngradually acquired complete control over the kings, till at last he himself\nmounted to the summits of dominion; however much monarchs, and especially\nthe German emperors, strove to curtail his authority, were it only by a\nhairsbreadth, they effected nothing, but on the contrary by their very\nendeavours largely increased it. (75) That which no monarch could accomplish\nwith fire and sword, ecclesiastics could bring about with a stroke of the\npen; whereby we may easily see the force and power at the command of the\nChurch, and also how necessary it is for sovereigns to reserve such\nprerogatives for themselves.\n\n(19:76) If we reflect on what was said in the last chapter we shall see that\nsuch reservation conduced not a little to the increase of religion and\npiety; for we observed that the prophets themselves, though gifted with\nDivine efficacy, being merely private citizens, rather irritated than\nreformed the people by their freedom of warning, reproof, and denunciation,\nwhereas the kings by warnings and punishments easily bent men to their will.\n(77) Furthermore, the kings themselves, not possessing the right in question\nabsolutely, very often fell away from religion and took with them nearly the\nwhole people. (78) The same thing has often happened from the same cause in\nChristian states.\n\n(19:79) Perhaps I shall be asked, \"But if the holders of sovereign power\nchoose to be wicked, who will be the rightful champion of piety? (80) Should\nthe sovereigns still be its interpreters?\" I meet them with the\ncounter-question, \"But if ecclesiastics (who are also human, and private\ncitizens, and who ought to mind only their own affairs), or if others whom\nit is proposed to entrust with spiritual authority, choose to be wicked,\nshould they still be considered as piety's rightful interpreters?\" (81) It\nis quite certain that when sovereigns wish to follow their own pleasure,\nwhether they have control over spiritual matters or not, the whole state,\nspiritual and secular, will go to ruin, and it will go much faster if\nprivate citizens seditiously assume the championship of the Divine rights.\n\n(19:82) Thus we see that not only is nothing gained by denying such rights\nto sovereigns, but on the contrary, great evil ensues. (83) For (as happened\nwith the Jewish kings who did not possess such rights absolutely) rulers are\nthus driven into wickedness, and the injury and loss to the state become\ncertain and inevitable, instead of uncertain and possible. (84) Whether we\nlook to the abstract truth, or the security of states, or the increase of\npiety, we are compelled to maintain that the Divine right, or the right of\ncontrol over spiritual matters, depends absolutely on the decree of the\nsovereign, who is its legitimate interpreter and champion. (85) Therefore\nthe true ministers of God's word are those who teach piety to the people in\nobedience to the authority of the sovereign rulers by whose decree it has\nbeen brought into conformity with the public welfare.\n\n[19:5] (86) There remains for me to point out the cause for the frequent\ndisputes on the subject of these spiritual rights in Christian states;\nwhereas the Hebrews, so far as I know, never, had any doubts about the\nmatter. (87) It seems monstrous that a question so plain and vitally\nimportant should thus have remained undecided, and that the secular rulers\ncould never obtain the prerogative without controversy, nay, nor without\ngreat danger of sedition and injury to religion. (88) If no cause for this\nstate of things were forthcoming, I could easily persuade myself that all I\nhave said in this chapter is mere theorizing, or a kind of speculative\nreasoning which can never be of any practical use. (89) However, when we\nreflect on the beginnings of Christianity the cause at once becomes\nmanifest. (90) The Christian religion was not taught at first by kings, but\nby private persons, who, against the wishes of those in power, whose\nsubjects they were, were for a long time accustomed to hold meetings in\nsecret churches, to institute and perform sacred rites, and on their own\nauthority to settle and decide on their affairs without regard to the state,\n(91) When, after the lapse of many years, the religion was taken up by the\nauthorities, the ecclesiastics were obliged to teach it to the emperors\nthemselves as they had defined it: wherefore they easily gained recognition\nas its teachers and interpreters, and the church pastors were looked upon as\nvicars of God. (92) The ecclesiastics took good care that the Christian\nkings should not assume their authority, by prohibiting marriage to the\nchief ministers of religion and to its highest interpreter. (93) They\nfurthermore elected their purpose by multiplying the dogmas of religion to\nsuch an extent and so blending them with philosophy that their chief\ninterpreter was bound to be a skilled philosopher and theologian, and to\nhave leisure for a host of idle speculations: conditions which could only be\nfulfilled by a private individual with much time on his hands.\n\n(19:94) Among the Hebrews things were very differently arranged: for their\nChurch began at the same time as their dominion, and Moses, their absolute\nruler, taught religion to the people, arranged their sacred rites, and chose\ntheir spiritual ministers. (95) Thus the royal authority carried very great\nweight with the people, and the kings kept a firm hold on their spiritual\nprerogatives.\n\n(19:96) Although, after the death of Moses, no one held absolute sway, yet\nthe power of deciding both in matters spiritual and matters temporal was in\nthe hands of the secular chief, as I have already pointed out. (97) Further,\nin order that it might be taught religion and piety, the people was bound to\nconsult the supreme judge no less than the high priest (Deut. xvii:9, 11).\n(98) Lastly, though the kings had not as much power as Moses, nearly the\nwhole arrangement and choice of the sacred ministry depended on their\ndecision. (99) Thus David arranged the whole service of the Temple (see 1\nChron. xxviii:11, 12, &c.); from all the Levites he chose twenty-four\nthousand for the sacred psalms; six thousand of these formed the\nbody from which were chosen the judges and proctors, four thousand were\nporters, and four thousand to play on instruments (see 1 Chron. xxiii:4, 5).\n(100) He further divided them into companies (of whom he chose the chiefs),\nso that each in rotation, at the allotted time, might perform the sacred\nrites. (101) The priests he also divided into as many companies; I will not\ngo through the whole catalogue, but refer the reader to 2 Chron. viii:13,\nwhere it is stated, \"Then Solomon offered burnt offerings to the Lord . . .\n. . after a certain rate every day, offering according to the commandments\nof Moses;\" and in verse 14, \"And he appointed, according to the order\nof David his father, the courses of the priests to their service . . . .\n. . for so had David the man of God commanded.\" (102) Lastly, the historian\nbears witness in verse 15: \"And they departed not from the commandment of\nthe king unto the priests and Levites concerning any matter, or\nconcerning the treasuries.\"\n\n[19:6] (103) From these and other histories of the kings it is abundantly\nevident, that the whole practice of religion and the sacred ministry\ndepended entirely on the commands of the king.\n\n(19:104) When I said above that the kings had not the same right as Moses to\nelect the high priest, to consult God without intermediaries, and to condemn\nthe prophets who prophesied during their reign; I said so simply because the\nprophets could, in virtue of their mission, choose a new king and give\nabsolution for regicide, not because they could call a king who offended\nagainst the law to judgment, or could rightly act against him [Endnote 33].\n\n(19:105) Wherefore if there had been no prophets who, in virtue of a special\nrevelation, could give absolution for regicide, the kings would have\npossessed absolute rights over all matters both spiritual and temporal.\n(106) Consequently the rulers of modern times, who have no prophets and\nwould not rightly be bound in any case to receive them (for they are not\nsubject to Jewish law), have absolute possession of the spiritual\nprerogative, although they are not celibates, and they will always retain\nit, if they will refuse to allow religious dogmas to be unduly multiplied or\nconfounded with philosophy.\n\n\n\n\n[20:0] CHAPTER XX - THAT IN A FREE STATE EVERY MAN\n   MAY THINK WHAT HE LIKES, AND SAY WHAT HE THINKS.\n\n[20:1] (1) If men's minds were as easily controlled as their tongues, every\nking would sit safely on his throne, and government by compulsion would\ncease; for every subject would shape his life according to the intentions of\nhis rulers, and would esteem a thing true or false, good or evil, just or\nunjust, in obedience to their dictates. (2) However, we have shown already\n(Chapter XVII.) that no man's mind can possibly lie wholly at the\ndisposition of another, for no one can willingly transfer his natural right\nof free reason and judgment, or be compelled so to do. (3) For this\nreason government which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical,\nand it is considered an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights\nof subjects, to seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or\nrejected as false, or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of\nGod. (4) All these questions fall within a man's natural right, which he\ncannot abdicate even with his own consent.\n\n(20:5) I admit that the judgment can be biassed in many ways, and to an\nalmost incredible degree, so that while exempt from direct external control\nit may be so dependent on another man's words, that it may fitly be said to\nbe ruled by him; but although this influence is carried to great lengths, it\nhas never gone so far as to invalidate the statement, that every man's\nunderstanding is his own, and that brains are as diverse as palates.\n\n(20:6) Moses, not by fraud, but by Divine virtue, gained such a hold over\nthe popular judgment that he was accounted superhuman, and believed to speak\nand act through the inspiration of the Deity; nevertheless, even he could\nnot escape murmurs and evil interpretations. (7) How much less then can\nother monarchs avoid them! (8) Yet such unlimited power, if it exists at\nall, must belong to a monarch, and least of all to a democracy, where the\nwhole or a great part of the people wield authority collectively. (9) This\nis a fact which I think everyone can explain for himself.\n\n(20:10) However unlimited, therefore, the power of a sovereign may be,\nhowever implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law and religion, it can\nnever prevent men from forming judgments according to their intellect, or\nbeing influenced by any given emotion. (11) It is true that it has the right\nto treat as enemies all men whose opinions do not, on all subjects, entirely\ncoincide with its own; but we are not discussing its strict rights, but its\nproper course of action. (12) I grant that it has the right to rule in the\nmost violent manner, and to put citizens to death for very trivial causes,\nbut no one supposes it can do this with the approval of sound judgment. (13)\nNay, inasmuch as such things cannot be done without extreme peril to itself,\nwe may even deny that it has the absolute power to do them, or,\nconsequently, the absolute right; for the rights of the sovereign are\nlimited by his power.\n\n[20:2] (14) Since, therefore, no one can abdicate his freedom of judgment\nand feeling; since every man is by indefeasible natural right the master of\nhis own thoughts, it follows that men thinking in diverse and contradictory\nfashions, cannot, without disastrous results, be compelled to speak only\naccording to the dictates of the supreme power. (15) Not even the most\nexperienced, to say nothing of the multitude, know how to keep silence. (16)\nMen's common failing is to confide their plans to others, though there be\nneed for secrecy, so that a government would be most harsh which deprived\nthe individual of his freedom of saying and teaching what he thought; and\nwould be moderate if such freedom were granted. (17) Still we cannot deny\nthat authority may be as much injured by words as by actions; hence,\nalthough the freedom we are discussing cannot be entirely denied to\nsubjects, its unlimited concession would be most baneful; we must,\ntherefore, now inquire, how far such freedom can and ought to be conceded\nwithout danger to the peace of the state, or the power of the rulers; and\nthis, as I said at the beginning of Chapter XVI., is my principal object.\n(18) It follows, plainly, from the explanation given above, of the\nfoundations of a state, that the ultimate aim of government is not to\nrule, or restrain, by fear, nor to exact obedience, but contrariwise, to\nfree every man from fear, that he may live in all possible security; in\nother words, to strengthen his natural right to exist and work without\ninjury to himself or others.\n\n(20:19) No, the object of government is not to change men from rational\nbeings into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to develope their minds\nand bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled; neither\nshowing hatred, anger, or deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealousy and\ninjustice. (20) In fact, the true aim of government is liberty.\n\n(20:21) Now we have seen that in forming a state the power of making laws\nmust either be vested in the body of the citizens, or in a portion of them,\nor in one man. (22) For, although men's free judgments are very diverse, each\none thinking that he alone knows everything, and although complete unanimity\nof feeling and speech is out of the question, it is impossible to preserve\npeace, unless individuals abdicate their right of acting entirely on their\nown judgment. [20:3] (23) Therefore, the individual justly cedes the right\nof free action, though not of free reason and judgment; no one can act\nagainst the authorities without danger to the state, though his feelings and\njudgment may be at variance therewith; he may even speak against them,\nprovided that he does so from rational conviction, not from fraud, anger, or\nhatred, and provided that he does not attempt to introduce any change on his\nprivate authority.\n\n(20:24) For instance, supposing a man shows that a law is repugnant to sound\nreason, and should therefore be repealed; if he submits his opinion to the\njudgment of the authorities (who, alone, have the right of making and\nrepealing laws), and meanwhile acts in nowise contrary to that law, he has\ndeserved well of the state, and has behaved as a good citizen should; but if\nhe accuses the authorities of injustice, and stirs up the people against\nthem, or if he seditiously strives to abrogate the law without their\nconsent, he is a mere agitator and rebel.\n\n(20:25) Thus we see how an individual may declare and teach what he\nbelieves, without injury to the authority of his rulers, or to the public\npeace; namely, by leaving in their hands the entire power of legislation as\nit affects action, and by doing nothing against their laws, though he\nbe compelled often to act in contradiction to what he believes, and\nopenly feels, to be best.\n\n(20:26) Such a course can be taken without detriment to justice and\ndutifulness, nay, it is the one which a just and dutiful man would adopt.\n(27) We have shown that justice is dependent on the laws of the authorities,\nso that no one who contravenes their accepted decrees can be just, while the\nhighest regard for duty, as we have pointed out in the preceding chapter, is\nexercised in maintaining public peace and tranquillity; these could not be\npreserved if every man were to live as he pleased; therefore it is no less\nthan undutiful for a man to act contrary to his country's laws, for if the\npractice became universal the ruin of states would necessarily follow.\n\n(20:28) Hence, so long as a man acts in obedience to the laws of his rulers,\nhe in nowise contravenes his reason, for in obedience to reason he\ntransferred the right of controlling his actions from his own hands to\ntheirs. (29) This doctrine we can confirm from actual custom, for in a\nconference of great and small powers, schemes are seldom carried\nunanimously, yet all unite in carrying out what is decided on, whether they\nvoted for or against. (30) But I return to my proposition.\n\n(20:31) From the fundamental notions of a state, we have discovered how a\nman may exercise free judgment without detriment to the supreme power: from\nthe same premises we can no less easily determine what opinions would be\nseditious. (32) Evidently those which by their very nature nullify the\ncompact by which the right of free action was ceded. (33) For instance, a\nman who holds that the supreme power has no rights over him, or that\npromises ought not to be kept, or that everyone should live as he pleases,\nor other doctrines of this nature in direct opposition to the\nabove-mentioned contract, is seditious, not so much from his actual opinions\nand judgment, as from the deeds which they involve; for he who maintains\nsuch theories abrogates the contract which tacitly, or openly, he made with\nhis rulers. (34) Other opinions which do not involve acts violating the\ncontract, such as revenge, anger, and the like, are not seditious, unless\nit be in some corrupt state, where superstitious and ambitious persons,\nunable to endure men of learning, are so popular with the multitude\nthat their word is more valued than the law.\n\n(20:35) However, I do not deny that there are some doctrines which, while\nthey are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and falsehoods, are\nyet propounded and published with unworthy motives. (36) This question we\nhave discussed in Chapter XV., and shown that reason should nevertheless\nremain unshackled. (37) If we hold to the principle that a man's loyalty to\nthe state should be judged, like his loyalty to God, from his actions only -\nnamely, from his charity towards his neighbours; we cannot doubt that the\nbest government will allow freedom of philosophical speculation no less than\nof religious belief. (38) I confess that from such freedom inconveniences\nmay sometimes arise, but what question was ever settled so wisely that no\nabuses could possibly spring therefrom? (39) He who seeks to regulate\neverything by law, is more likely to arouse vices than to reform them. (40)\nIt is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even though it be in itself\nharmful. (41) How many evils spring from luxury, envy, avarice, drunkenness,\nand the like, yet these are tolerated - vices as they are - because they\ncannot be prevented by legal enactments. (42) How much more then should free\nthought be granted, seeing that it is in itself a virtue and that it cannot\nbe crushed! (43) Besides, the evil results can easily be checked, as I will\nshow, by the secular authorities, not to mention that such freedom\nis absolutely necessary for progress in science and the liberal arts: for no\nman follows such pursuits to advantage unless his judgment be entirely free\nand unhampered.\n\n(20:44) But let it be granted that freedom may be crushed, and men be so\nbound down, that they do not dare to utter a whisper, save at the bidding of\ntheir rulers; nevertheless this can never be carried to the pitch of making\nthem think according to authority, so that the necessary consequences would\nbe that men would daily be thinking one thing and saying another, to the\ncorruption of good faith, that mainstay of government, and to the fostering\nof hateful flattery and perfidy, whence spring stratagems, and the\ncorruption of every good art.\n\n(20:45) It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech, for the more\nrulers strive to curtail freedom of speech, the more obstinately are\nthey resisted; not indeed by the avaricious, the flatterers, and other\nnumskulls, who think supreme salvation consists in filling their stomachs\nand gloating over their money-bags, but by those whom good education, sound\nmorality, and virtue have rendered more free. (46) Men, as generally\nconstituted, are most prone to resent the branding as criminal of opinions\nwhich they believe to be true, and the proscription as wicked of that which\ninspires them with piety towards God and man; hence they are ready to\nforswear the laws and conspire against the authorities, thinking it not\nshameful but honourable to stir up seditions and perpetuate any sort of\ncrime with this end in view. (47) Such being the constitution of human\nnature, we see that laws directed against opinions affect the generous\nminded rather than the wicked, and are adapted less for coercing criminals\nthan for irritating the upright; so that they cannot be maintained without\ngreat peril to the state.\n\n(20:48) Moreover, such laws are almost always useless, for those who hold\nthat the opinions proscribed are sound, cannot possibly obey the law;\nwhereas those who already reject them as false, accept the law as a kind of\nprivilege, and make such boast of it, that authority is powerless to repeal\nit, even if such a course be subsequently desired.\n\n(20:49) To these considerations may be added what we said in Chapter XVIII.\nin treating of the history of the Hebrews. (50) And, lastly, how many\nschisms have arisen in the Church from the attempt of the authorities to\ndecide by law the intricacies of theological controversy! (51) If men were\nnot allured by the hope of getting the law and the authorities on their\nside, of triumphing over their adversaries in the sight of an applauding\nmultitude, and of acquiring honourable distinctions, they would not strive\nso maliciously, nor would such fury sway their minds. (52) This is taught\nnot only by reason but by daily examples, for laws of this kind prescribing\nwhat every man shall believe and forbidding anyone to speak or write to the\ncontrary, have often been passed, as sops or concessions to the anger of\nthose who cannot tolerate men of enlightenment, and who, by such harsh and\ncrooked enactments, can easily turn the devotion of the masses into fury and\ndirect it against whom they will. (53) How much better would it be\nto restrain popular anger and fury, instead of passing useless laws,\nwhich can only be broken by those who love virtue and the liberal arts, thus\nparing down the state till it is too small to harbour men of talent. (54)\nWhat greater misfortune for a state can be conceived then that honourable\nmen should be sent like criminals into exile, because they hold diverse\nopinions which they cannot disguise? (55) What, I say, can be more hurtful\nthan that men who have committed no crime or wickedness should, simply\nbecause they are enlightened, be treated as enemies and put to death, and\nthat the scaffold, the terror of evil-doers, should become the arena where\nthe highest examples of tolerance and virtue are displayed to the\npeople with all the marks of ignominy that authority can devise?\n\n(20:56) He that knows himself to be upright does not fear the death of a\ncriminal, and shrinks from no punishment; his mind is not wrung with\nremorse for any disgraceful deed: he holds that death in a good cause\nis no punishment, but an honour, and that death for freedom is glory.\n\n(20:57) What purpose then is served by the death of such men, what example\nin proclaimed? the cause for which they die is unknown to the idle and the\nfoolish, hateful to the turbulent, loved by the upright. (58) The only\nlesson we can draw from such scenes is to flatter the persecutor, or else to\nimitate the victim.\n\n(20:58) If formal assent is not to be esteemed above conviction, and if\ngovernments are to retain a firm hold of authority and not be compelled to\nyield to agitators, it is imperative that freedom of judgment should be\ngranted, so that men may live together in harmony, however diverse, or\neven openly contradictory their opinions may be. (59) We cannot doubt that\nsuch is the best system of government and open to the fewest objections,\nsince it is the one most in harmony with human nature. (60) In a democracy\n(the most natural form of government, as we have shown in Chapter XVI.)\neveryone submits to the control of authority over his actions, but not over\nhis judgment and reason; that is, seeing that all cannot think alike, the\nvoice of the majority has the force of law, subject to repeal if\ncircumstances bring about a change of opinion. (61) In proportion as the\npower of free judgment is withheld we depart from the natural\ncondition of mankind, and consequently the government becomes more\ntyrannical.\n\n[20:4] (62) In order to prove that from such freedom no inconvenience\narises, which cannot easily be checked by the exercise of the sovereign\npower, and that men's actions can easily be kept in bounds, though their\nopinions be at open variance, it will be well to cite an example. (63) Such\nan one is not very, far to seek. (64) The city of Amsterdam reaps the fruit\nof this freedom in its own great prosperity and in the admiration of all\nother people. (65) For in this most flourishing state, and most splendid\ncity, men of every nation and religion live together in the greatest\nharmony, and ask no questions before trusting their goods to a\nfellow-citizen, save whether he be rich or poor, and whether he generally\nacts honestly, or the reverse. (66) His religion and sect is considered of\nno importance: for it has no effect before the judges in gaining or losing\na cause, and there is no sect so despised that its followers, provided that\nthey harm no one, pay every man his due, and live uprightly, are deprived\nof the protection of the magisterial authority.\n\n(20:67) On the other hand, when the religious controversy between\nRemonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants began to be taken up by politicians\nand the States, it grew into a schism, and abundantly showed that laws\ndealing with religion and seeking to settle its controversies are much more\ncalculated to irritate than to reform, and that they give rise to extreme\nlicence: further, it was seen that schisms do not originate in a love of\ntruth, which is a source of courtesy and gentleness, but rather in an\ninordinate desire for supremacy, (68) From all these considerations it is\nclearer than the sun at noonday, that the true schismatics are those who\ncondemn other men's writings, and seditiously stir up the quarrelsome masses\nagainst their authors, rather than those authors themselves, who generally\nwrite only for the learned, and appeal solely to reason. (69) In fact, the\nreal disturbers of the peace are those who, in a free state, seek to curtail\nthe liberty of judgment which they are unable to tyrannize over.\n\n(20:70) I have thus shown:-\n\n(71) I. That it is impossible to deprive men of the liberty of saying what\nthey think.\n\n(72) II. That such liberty can be conceded to every man without injury\nto the rights and authority of the sovereign power, and that every man\nmay retain it without injury to such rights, provided that he does not\npresume upon it to the extent of introducing any new rights into the\nstate, or acting in any way contrary, to the existing laws.\n\n(20:73) III. That every man may enjoy this liberty without detriment to the\npublic peace, and that no inconveniences arise therefrom which cannot easily\nbe checked.\n\n(74) IV. That every man may enjoy it without injury to his allegiance.\n\n(75) V. That laws dealing with speculative problems are entirely useless.\n\n(76) VI. Lastly, that not only may such liberty be granted without prejudice\nto the public peace, to loyalty, and to the rights of rulers, but that it is\neven necessary, for their preservation. (77) For when people try to take it\naway, and bring to trial, not only the acts which alone are capable of\noffending, but also the opinions of mankind, they only succeed in\nsurrounding their victims with an appearance of martyrdom, and raise\nfeelings of pity and revenge rather than of terror. (78) Uprightness and\ngood faith are thus corrupted, flatterers and traitors are encouraged, and\nsectarians triumph, inasmuch as concessions have been made to their\nanimosity, and they have gained the state sanction for the doctrines of\nwhich they are the interpreters. (79) Hence they arrogate to themselves the\nstate authority and rights, and do not scruple to assert that they have been\ndirectly chosen by God, and that their laws are Divine, whereas the laws of\nthe state are human, and should therefore yield obedience to the laws of God\n- in other words, to their own laws. (80) Everyone must see that this is not\na state of affairs conducive to public welfare. (81) Wherefore, as we have\nshown in Chapter XVIII., the safest way for a state is to lay down the rule\nthat religion is comprised solely in the exercise of charity and justice,\nand that the rights of rulers in sacred, no less than in secular matters,\nshould merely have to do with actions, but that every man should think what\nhe likes and say what he thinks.\n\n(20:82) I have thus fulfilled the task I set myself in this treatise.\n[20:5] (83) It remains only to call attention to the fact that I have\nwritten nothing which I do not most willingly submit to the examination and\napproval of my country's rulers; and that I am willing to retract anything\nwhich they shall decide to be repugnant to the laws, or prejudicial to the\npublic good. (84) I know that I am a man, and as a man liable to error, but\nagainst error I have taken scrupulous care, and have striven to keep in\nentire accordance with the laws of my country, with loyalty, and with\nmorality.\n\nEnd of Part 4 of 4.\n\n\n\n\nAUTHOR'S ENDNOTES TO THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\n[Endnote 26]. (1) \"No one can honestly promise to forego the right which\nhe has over all things.\" (2) In the state of social life, where general\nright determines what is good or evil, stratagem is rightly distinguished as\nof two kinds, good and evil. (3) But in the state of Nature, where every man\nis his own judge, possessing the absolute right to lay down laws for\nhimself, to interpret them as he pleases, or to abrogate them if he thinks\nit convenient, it is not conceivable that stratagem should be evil.\n\n[Endnote 27]. (1) \"Every member of it may, if he will, be free.\" (2)\nWhatever be the social state a man finds himself in, he may be free. (3)\nFor certainly a man is free, in so far as he is led by reason. (4) Now\nreason (though Hobbes thinks otherwise) is always on the side of peace,\nwhich cannot be attained unless the general laws of the state be respected.\n(5) Therefore the more he is free, the more constantly will he respect the\nlaws of his country, and obey the commands of the sovereign power to which\nhe is subject.\n\n[Endnote 28]. (1) \"No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to\nGod.\" (2) When Paul says that men have in themselves no refuge, he speaks as\na man: for in the ninth chapter of the same epistle he expressly teaches\nthat God has mercy on whom He will, and that men are without excuse, only\nbecause they are in God's power like clay in the hands of a potter, who out\nof the same lump makes vessels, some for honour and some for dishonour, not\nbecause they have been forewarned. (3) As regards the Divine natural law\nwhereof the chief commandment is, as we have said, to love God, I have\ncalled it a law in the same sense, as philosophers style laws those general\nrules of nature, according to which everything happens. (4) For the love of\nGod is not a state of obedience: it is a virtue which necessarily exists in\na man who knows God rightly. (5) Obedience has regard to the will of a\nruler, not to necessity and truth. (6) Now as we are ignorant of the nature\nof God's will, and on the other hand know that everything happens solely by\nGod's power, we cannot, except through revelation, know whether God wishes\nin any way to be honoured as a sovereign.\n\n(7) Again; we have shown that the Divine rights appear to us in the light of\nrights or commands, only so long as we are ignorant of their cause: as soon\nas their cause is known, they cease to be rights, and we embrace them no\nlonger as rights but as eternal truths; in other words, obedience passes\ninto love of God, which emanates from true knowledge as necessarily as\nlight emanates from the sun. (8) Reason then leads us to love God, but\ncannot lead us to obey Him; for we cannot embrace the commands of God as\nDivine, while we are in ignorance of their cause, neither can we rationally\nconceive God as a sovereign laying down laws as a sovereign.\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\n\n[Endnote 29]. (1) \"If men could lose their natural rights so as to be\nabsolutely unable for the future to oppose the will of the sovereign\" (2)\nTwo common soldiers undertook to change the Roman dominion, and did change\nit. (Tacitus, Hist. i:7.)\n\n[Endnote 30]. (1) See Numbers xi. 28. In this passage it is written that\ntwo men prophesied in the camp, and that Joshua wished to punish them. (2)\nThis he would not have done, if it had been lawful for anyone to deliver the\nDivine oracles to the people without the consent of Moses. (3) But Moses\nthought good to pardon the two men, and rebuked Joshua for exhorting him to\nuse his royal prerogative, at a time when he was so weary of reigning, that\nhe preferred death to holding undivided sway (Numb. xi:14). (4) For he made\nanswer to Joshua, \"Enviest thou for my sake? (5) Would God that all the\nLord's people were prophets, and that the Lord would put His spirit upon\nthem.\" (6) That is to say, would God that the right of taking counsel of God\nwere general, and the power were in the hands of the people. (7) Thus Joshua\nwas not mistaken as to the right, but only as to the time for using it, for\nwhich he was rebuked by Moses, in the same way as Abishai was rebuked by\nDavid for counselling that Shimei, who had undoubtedly been guilty of\ntreason, should be put to death. (8) See 2 Sam. xix:22, 23.\n\n[Endnote 31]. (1) See Numbers xxvii:21. (2) The translators of the Bible\nhave rendered incorrectly verses 19 and 23 of this chapter. (3) The passage\ndoes not mean that Moses gave precepts or advice to Joshua, but that he made\nor established him chief of the Hebrews. (4) The phrase is very frequent in\nScripture (see Exodus, xviii:23; 1 Sam. xiii:15; Joshua i:9; 1 Sam.\nxxv:80).\n\n[Endnote 32] (1) \"There was no judge over each of the captains save\nGod.\" (2) The Rabbis and some Christians equally foolish pretend that the\nSanhedrin, called \"the great\" was instituted by Moses. (3) As a matter of\nfact, Moses chose seventy colleagues to assist him in governing, because he\nwas not able to bear alone the burden of the whole people; but he\nnever passed any law for forming a college of seventy members; on the\ncontrary he ordered every tribe to appoint for itself, in the cities which\nGod had given it, judges to settle disputes according to the laws which he\nhimself had laid down. (4) In cases where the opinions of the judges\ndiffered as to the interpretation of these laws, Moses bade them take\ncounsel of the High Priest (who was the chief interpreter of the law), or of\nthe chief judge, to whom they were then subordinate (who had the right of\nconsulting the High Priest), and to decide the dispute in accordance with\nthe answer obtained. (5) If any subordinate judge should assert, that he was\nnot bound by the decision of the High Priest, received either directly or\nthrough the chief of his state, such an one was to be put to death (Deut.\nxvii:9) by the chief judge, whoever he might be, to whom he was a\nsubordinate. (6) This chief judge would either be Joshua, the supreme\ncaptain of the whole people, or one of the tribal chiefs who had been\nentrusted, after the division of the tribes, with the right of consulting\nthe high priest concerning the affairs of his tribe, of deciding on peace or\nwar, of fortifying towns, of appointing inferior judges, &c. (7) Or, again,\nit might be the king, in whom all or some of the tribes had vested their\nrights.\n\n(8) I could cite many instances in confirmation of what I here advance. (9) I\nwill confine myself to one, which appears to me the most important of all. (10)\nWhen the Shilomitish prophet anointed Jeroboam king, he, in so doing, gave him\nthe right of consulting the high priest, of appointing judges, &c. (11) In fact\nhe endowed him with all the rights over the ten tribes, which Rehoboam retained\nover the two tribes. (12) Consequently Jeroboam could set up a supreme council\nin his court with as much right as Jehoshaphat could at Jerusalem (2 Chron.\nxix:8). (13) For it is plain that neither Jeroboam, who was king by God's\ncommand, nor Jeroboam's subjects, were bound by the Law of Moses to accept the\njudgments of Rehoboam, who was not their king. (14) Still less were they under\nthe jurisdiction of the judge, whom Rehoboam had set up in Jerusalem as\nsubordinate to himself. (15) According, therefore, as the Hebrew dominion was\ndivided, so was a supreme council set up in each division. (16) Those who\nneglect the variations in the constitution of the Hebrew States, and confuse\nthem all together in one, fall into numerous difficulties.\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\n\n[Endnote 33]. (1) I must here bespeak special attention\nfor what was said in Chap. XVI. concerning rights.\n\n\nEnd of Part IV Endnotes.","title":"A Theological-Political Treatise [Part IV]","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":28255}