{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_Counsels_and_Maxims_Chapter_III/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_Counsels_and_Maxims_Chapter_III","id":"wikisource_Counsels_and_Maxims_Chapter_III","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Counsels_and_Maxims/Chapter_III","summary":null,"tags":["Pages_with_translator","Subpages"],"text":"OUR RELATION TO OTHERS.\n\nSECTION 21.\n\nIn making his way through life, a man will find it useful to be ready and able to do two things: to look ahead and to overlook: the one will protect him from loss and injury, the other from disputes and squabbles.\n\nNo one who has to live amongst men should absolutely discard any person who has his due place in the order of nature, even though he is very wicked or contemptible or ridiculous. He must accept him as an unalterable fact\u2014unalterable, because the necessary outcome of an eternal, fundamental principle; and in bad cases he should remember the words of Mephistopheles: es muss auch solche Kaeuze geben\u2014there must be fools and rogues in the world. If he acts otherwise, he will be committing an injustice, and giving a challenge of life and death to the man he discards. No one can alter his own peculiar individuality, his moral character, his intellectual capacity, his temperament or physique; and if we go so far as to condemn a man from every point of view, there will be nothing left him but to engage us in deadly conflict; for we are practically allowing him the right to exist only on condition that he becomes another man\u2014which is impossible; his nature forbids it.\n\nSo if you have to live amongst men, you must allow everyone the right to exist in accordance with the character he has, whatever it turns out to be: and all you should strive to do is to make use of this\ncharacter in such a way as its kind and nature permit, rather than to hope for any alteration in it, or to condemn it off-hand for what it is. This is the true sense of the maxim\u2014Live and let live. That, however, is a task which is difficult in proportion as it is right; and he is a happy man who can once for all avoid having to do with a great many of his fellow creatures.\n\nThe art of putting up with people may be learned by practicing patience on inanimate objects, which, in virtue of some mechanical or general physical necessity, oppose a stubborn resistance to our freedom of action\u2014a form of patience which is required every day. The patience thus gained may be applied to our dealings with men, by accustoming ourselves to regard their opposition, wherever we\nencounter it, as the inevitable outcome of their nature, which sets itself up against us in virtue of the same rigid law of necessity as governs the resistance of inanimate objects. To become indignant at their conduct is as foolish as to be angry with a stone because it rolls into your path. And with many people the wisest thing you can do, is to resolve to make use of those whom you cannot alter.\n\nSECTION 22.\n\nIt is astonishing how easily and how quickly similarity,\nor difference of mind and disposition, makes itself felt between one\nman and another as soon as they begin to talk: every little trifle\nshows it. When two people of totally different natures are conversing,\nalmost everything said by the one will, in a greater or less degree,\ndisplease the other, and in many cases produce positive annoyance;\neven though the conversation turn upon the most out-of-the-way\nsubject, or one in which neither of the parties has any real interest.\nPeople of similar nature, on the other hand, immediately come to feel\na kind of general agreement; and if they are cast very much in the\nsame mould, complete harmony or even unison will flow from their\nintercourse.\n\nThis explain two circumstances. First of all, it shows why it is that\ncommon, ordinary people are so sociable and find good company wherever\nthey go. Ah! those good, dear, brave people. It is just the contrary\nwith those who are not of the common run; and the less they are so,\nthe more unsociable they become; so that if, in their isolation, they\nchance to come across some one in whose nature they can find even\na single sympathetic chord, be it never so minute, they show\nextraordinary pleasure in his society. For one man can be to another\nonly so much as the other is to him. Great minds are like eagles, and\nbuild their nest in some lofty solitude.\n\nSecondly, we are enabled to understand how it is that people of like\ndisposition so quickly get on with one another, as though they were\ndrawn together by magnetic force\u2014kindred souls greeting each other\nfrom afar. Of course the most frequent opportunity of observing this\nis afforded by people of vulgar tastes and inferior intellect, but\nonly because their name is legion; while those who are better off in\nthis respect and of a rarer nature, are not often to be met with: they\nare called rare because you can seldom find them.\n\nTake the case of a large number of people who have formed themselves\ninto a league for the purpose of carrying out some practical object;\nif there be two rascals among them, they will recognize each other as\nreadily as if they bore a similar badge, and will at once conspire\nfor some misfeasance or treachery. In the same way, if you can\nimagine\u2014per impossible\u2014a large company of very intelligent and\nclever people, amongst whom there are only two blockheads, these two\nwill be sure to be drawn together by a feeling of sympathy, and each\nof them will very soon secretly rejoice at having found at least one\nintelligent person in the whole company. It is really quite curious\nto see how two such men, especially if they are morally and\nintellectually of an inferior type, will recognize each other at first\nsight; with what zeal they will strive to become intimate; how affably\nand cheerily they will run to greet each other, just as though they\nwere old friends;\u2014it is all so striking that one is tempted to\nembrace the Buddhist doctrine of metempsychosis and presume that they\nwere on familiar terms in some former state of existence.\n\nStill, in spite of all this general agreement, men are kept apart who\nmight come together; or, in some cases, a passing discord springs up\nbetween them. This is due to diversity of mood. You will hardly\never see two people exactly in the same frame of mind; for that is\nsomething which varies with their condition of life, occupation,\nsurroundings, health, the train of thought they are in at the moment,\nand so on. These differences give rise to discord between persons of\nthe most harmonious disposition. To correct the balance properly, so\nas to remove the disturbance\u2014to introduce, as it were, a uniform\ntemperature,\u2014is a work demanding a very high degree of culture. The\nextent to which uniformity of mood is productive of good-fellowship\nmay be measured by its effects upon a large company. When, for\ninstance, a great many people are gathered together and presented with\nsome objective interest which works upon all alike and influences them\nin a similar way, no matter what it be\u2014a common danger or hope, some\ngreat news, a spectacle, a play, a piece of music, or anything of that\nkind\u2014you will find them roused to a mutual expression of thought,\nand a display of sincere interest. There will be a general feeling\nof pleasure amongst them; for that which attracts their attention\nproduces a unity of mood by overpowering all private and personal\ninterests.\n\nAnd in default of some objective interest of the kind I have\nmentioned, recourse is usually had to something subjective. A bottle\nof wine is not an uncommon means of introducing a mutual feeling of\nfellowship; and even tea and coffee are used for a like end.\n\nThe discord which so easily finds its way into all society as an\neffect of the different moods in which people happen to be for the\nmoment, also in part explains why it is that memory always idealizes,\nand sometimes almost transfigures, the attitude we have taken up at\nany period of the past\u2014a change due to our inability to remember all\nthe fleeting influences which disturbed us on any given occasion.\nMemory is in this respect like the lens of a camera obscura: it\ncontracts everything within its range, and so produces a much finer\npicture than the actual landscape affords. And, in the case of a man,\nabsence always goes some way towards securing this advantageous light;\nfor though the idealizing tendency of the memory requires times to\ncomplete its work, it begins it at once. Hence it is a prudent thing\nto see your friends and acquaintances only at considerable intervals\nof time; and on meeting them again, you will observe that memory has\nbeen at work.\n\nSECTION 23.\n\nNo man can see over his own height. Let me explain what I mean.\n\nYou cannot see in another man any more than you have in yourself; and\nyour own intelligence strictly determines the extent to which he comes\nwithin its grasp. If your intelligence is of a very low order, mental\nqualities in another, even though they be of the highest kind,\nwill have no effect at all upon you; you will see nothing in their\npossessor except the meanest side of his individuality\u2014in other\nwords, just those parts of his character and disposition which are\nweak and defective. Your whole estimate of the man will be confined to\nhis defects, and his higher mental qualities will no more exist for\nyou than colors exist for those who cannot see.\n\nIntellect is invisible to the man who has none. In any attempt to\ncriticise another's work, the range of knowledge possessed by the\ncritic is as essential a part of his verdict as the claims of the work\nitself.\n\nHence intercourse with others involves a process of leveling down. The\nqualities which are present in one man, and absent in another, cannot\ncome into play when they meet; and the self-sacrifice which this\nentails upon one of the parties, calls forth no recognition from the\nother.\n\nConsider how sordid, how stupid, in a word, how vulgar most men\nare, and you will see that it is impossible to talk to them without\nbecoming vulgar yourself for the time being. Vulgarity is in this\nrespect like electricity; it is easily distributed. You will then\nfully appreciate the truth and propriety of the expression, to make\nyourself cheap; and you will be glad to avoid the society of people\nwhose only possible point of contact with you is just that part of\nyour nature of which you have least reason to be proud. So you will\nsee that, in dealing with fools and blockheads, there is only one way\nof showing your intelligence\u2014by having nothing to do with them. That\nmeans, of course, that when you go into society, you may now and then\nfeel like a good dancer who gets an invitation to a ball, and on\narriving, finds that everyone is lame:\u2014with whom is he to dance?\n\nSECTION 24.\n\nI feel respect for the man\u2014and he is one in a\nhundred\u2014who, when he is waiting or sitting unoccupied, refrains from\nrattling or beating time with anything that happens to be handy,\u2014his\nstick, or knife and fork, or whatever else it may be. The probability\nis that he is thinking of something.\n\nWith a large number of people, it is quite evident that their power of\nsight completely dominates over their power of thought; they seem to\nbe conscious of existence only when they are making a noise; unless\nindeed they happen to be smoking, for this serves a similar end. It is\nfor the same reason that they never fail to be all eyes and ears for\nwhat is going on around them.\n\nSECTION 25.\n\nLa Rochefoucauld makes the striking remark that it is\ndifficult to feel deep veneration and great affection for one and the\nsame person. If this is so, we shall have to choose whether it is\nveneration or love that we want from our fellow-men.\n\nTheir love is always selfish, though in very different ways; and the\nmeans used to gain it are not always of a kind to make us proud. A\nman is loved by others mainly in the degree in which he moderates\nhis claim on their good feeling and intelligence: but he must act\ngenuinely in the matter and without dissimulation\u2014not merely out of\nforbearance, which is at bottom a kind of contempt. This calls to mind\na very true observation of Helvetius: the amount of intellect necessary to please us, is a most accurate measure of the amount of intellect we have ourselves. With these remarks as premises, it is easy to draw the conclusion.\n\nNow with veneration the case is just the opposite; it is wrung from\nmen reluctantly, and for that very reason mostly concealed. Hence, as\ncompared with love, veneration gives more real satisfaction; for it is\nconnected with personal value, and the same is not directly true\nof love, which is subjective in its nature, whilst veneration is\nobjective. To be sure, it is more useful to be loved than to be\nvenerated.\n\nSECTION 26.\n\nMost men are so thoroughly subjective that nothing really\ninterests them but themselves. They always think of their own case\nas soon as ever any remark is made, and their whole attention is\nengrossed and absorbed by the merest chance reference to anything\nwhich affects them personally, be it never so remote: with the result\nthat they have no power left for forming an objective view of things,\nshould the conversation take that turn; neither can they admit any\nvalidity in arguments which tell against their interest or their\nvanity. Hence their attention is easily distracted. They are so\nreadily offended, insulted or annoyed, that in discussing any\nimpersonal matter with them, no care is too great to avoid letting\nyour remarks bear the slightest possible reference to the very worthy\nand sensitive individuals whom you have before you; for anything you\nmay say will perhaps hurt their feelings. People really care about\nnothing that does not affect them personally. True and striking\nobservations, fine, subtle and witty things are lost upon them: they\ncannot understand or feel them. But anything that disturbs their petty\nvanity in the most remote and indirect way, or reflects prejudicially\nupon their exceedingly precious selves\u2014to that, they are most\ntenderly sensitive. In this respect they are like the little dog whose\ntoes you are so apt to tread upon inadvertently\u2014you know it by the\nshrill bark it sets up: or, again, they resemble a sick man covered\nwith sores and boils, with whom the greatest care must be taken to\navoid unnecessary handling. And in some people this feeling reaches\nsuch a pass that, if they are talking with anyone, and he exhibits, or\ndoes not sufficiently conceal, his intelligence and discernment, they\nlook upon it as a downright insult; although for the moment they hide\ntheir ill will, and the unsuspecting author of it afterwards ruminates\nin vain upon their conduct, and racks his brain to discover what he\ncould possibly have done to excite their malice and hatred.\n\nBut it is just as easy to flatter and win them over; and this is why\ntheir judgment is usually corrupt, and why their opinions are swayed,\nnot by what is really true and right, but by the favor of the party or\nclass to which they belong. And the ultimate reason of it all is, that\nin such people force of will greatly predominates over knowledge; and\nhence their meagre intellect is wholly given up to the service of the\nwill, and can never free itself from that service for a moment.\n\nAstrology furnishes a magnificent proof of this miserable subjective\ntendency in men, which leads them to see everything only as bearing\nupon themselves, and to think of nothing that is not straightway made\ninto a personal matter. The aim of astrology is to bring the motions\nof the celestial bodies into relation with the wretched Ego and to\nestablish a connection between a comet in the sky and squabbles and\nrascalities on earth.\n\nSECTION 27.\n\nWhen any wrong statement is made, whether in public or\nin society, or in books, and well received\u2014or, at any rate, not\nrefuted\u2014that that is no reason why you should despair or think there\nthe matter will rest. You should comfort yourself with the reflection\nthat the question will be afterwards gradually subjected to\nexamination; light will be thrown upon it; it will be thought over,\nconsidered, discussed, and generally in the end the correct view will\nbe reached; so that, after a time\u2014the length of which will depend\nupon the difficulty of the subject\u2014everyone will come to understand\nthat which a clear head saw at once.\n\nIn the meantime, of course, you must have patience. He who can see\ntruly in the midst of general infatuation is like a man whose watch\nkeeps good time, when all clocks in the town in which he lives are\nwrong. He alone knows the right time; but what use is that to him?\nfor everyone goes by the clocks which speak false, not even excepting\nthose who know that his watch is the only one that is right.\n\nSECTION 28.\n\nMen are like children, in that, if you spoil them, they\nbecome naughty.\n\nTherefore it is well not to be too indulgent or charitable with\nanyone. You may take it as a general rule that you will not lose a\nfriend by refusing him a loan, but that you are very likely to do\nso by granting it; and, for similar reasons, you will not readily\nalienate people by being somewhat proud and careless in your\nbehaviour; but if you are very kind and complaisant towards them, you\nwill often make them arrogant and intolerable, and so a breach will\nensue.\n\nThere is one thing that, more than any other, throws people absolutely\noff their balance\u2014the thought that you are dependent upon them. This\nis sure to produce an insolent and domineering manner towards you.\nThere are some people, indeed, who become rude if you enter into any\nkind of relation with them; for instance, if you have occasion to\nconverse with them frequently upon confidential matters, they soon\ncome to fancy that they can take liberties with you, and so they try\nand transgress the laws of politeness. This is why there are so few\nwith whom you care to become more intimate, and why you should avoid\nfamiliarity with vulgar people. If a man comes to think that I am more\ndependent upon him than he is upon me, he at once feels as though I\nhad stolen something from him; and his endeavor will be to have his\nvengeance and get it back. The only way to attain superiority in\ndealing with men, is to let it be seen that you are independent of\nthem.\n\nAnd in this view it is advisable to let everyone of your\nacquaintance\u2014whether man or woman\u2014feel now and then that you\ncould very well dispense with their company. This will consolidate\nfriendship. Nay, with most people there will be no harm in\noccasionally mixing a grain of disdain with your treatment of them;\nthat will make them value your friendship all the more. Chi non istima vien stimato, as a subtle Italian proverb has it\u2014to disregard is to win regard. But if we really think very highly of a person, we should conceal it from him like a crime. This is not a very gratifying\nthing to do, but it is right. Why, a dog will not bear being treated\ntoo kindly, let alone a man!\n\nSECTION 29.\n\nIt is often the case that people of noble character and\ngreat mental gifts betray a strange lack of worldly wisdom and a\ndeficiency in the knowledge of men, more especially when they are\nyoung; with the result that it is easy to deceive or mislead them; and\nthat, on the other hand, natures of the commoner sort are more ready\nand successful in making their way in the world.\n\nThe reason of this is that, when a man has little or no experience,\nhe must judge by his own antecedent notions; and in matters demanding\njudgment, an antecedent notion is never on the same level as\nexperience. For, with the commoner sort of people, an antecedent\nnotion means just their own selfish point of view. This is not the\ncase with those whose mind and character are above the ordinary; for\nit is precisely in this respect\u2014their unselfishness\u2014that they differ\nfrom the rest of mankind; and as they judge other people's thoughts\nand actions by their own high standard, the result does not always\ntally with their calculation.\n\nBut if, in the end, a man of noble character comes to see, as the\neffect of his own experience, or by the lessons he learns from others,\nwhat it is that may be expected of men in general,\u2014namely, that\nfive-sixths of them are morally and intellectually so constituted\nthat, if circumstances do not place you in relation with them, you had\nbetter get out of their way and keep as far as possible from having\nanything to do with them,\u2014still, he will scarcely ever attain an\nadequate notion of their wretchedly mean and shabby nature: all his\nlife long he will have to be extending and adding to the inferior\nestimate he forms of them; and in the meantime he will commit a great\nmany mistakes and do himself harm.\n\nThen, again, after he has really taken to heart the lessons that have\nbeen taught him, it will occasionally happen that, when he is in the\nsociety of people whom he does not know, he will be surprised to\nfind how thoroughly reasonable they all appear to be, both in their\nconversation and in their demeanor\u2014in fact, quite honest, sincere,\nvirtuous and trustworthy people, and at the same time shrewd and\nclever.\n\nBut that ought not to perplex him. Nature is not like those bad\npoets, who, in setting a fool or a knave before us, do their work so\nclumsily, and with such evident design, that you might almost\nfancy you saw the poet standing behind each of his characters, and\ncontinually disavowing their sentiments, and telling you in a tone of\nwarning: This is a knave; that is a fool; do not mind what he says.\nBut Nature goes to work like Shakespeare and Goethe, poets who\nmake every one of their characters\u2014even if it is the devil\nhimself!\u2014appear to be quite in the right for the moment that they\ncome before us in their several parts; the characters are described so\nobjectively that they excite our interest and compel us to sympathize\nwith their point of view; for, like the works of Nature, every one\nof these characters is evolved as the result of some hidden law\nor principle, which makes all they say and do appear natural and\ntherefore necessary. And you will always be the prey or the plaything\nof the devils and fools in this world, if you expect to see them going\nabout with horns or jangling their bells.\n\nAnd it should be borne in mind that, in their intercourse with others,\npeople are like the moon, or like hunchbacks; they show you only one\nof their sides. Every man has an innate talent for mimicry,\u2014for\nmaking a mask out of his physiognomy, so that he can always look as\nif he really were what he pretends to be; and since he makes his\ncalculations always within the lines of his individual nature, the\nappearance he puts on suits him to a nicety, and its effect is\nextremely deceptive. He dons his mask whenever his object is to\nflatter himself into some one's good opinion; and you may pay just as\nmuch attention to it as if it were made of wax or cardboard, never\nforgetting that excellent Italian proverb: non e si tristo cane che non meni la coda,\u2014there is no dog so bad but that he will wag his tail.\n\nIn any case it is well to take care not to form a highly favorable\nopinion of a person whose acquaintance you have only recently made,\nfor otherwise you are very likely to be disappointed; and then you\nwill be ashamed of yourself and perhaps even suffer some injury.\nAnd while I am on the subject, there is another fact that deserves\nmention. It is this. A man shows his character just in the way in\nwhich he deals with trifles,\u2014for then he is off his guard. This will\noften afford a good opportunity of observing the boundless egoism of\nman's nature, and his total lack of consideration for others; and\nif these defects show themselves in small things, or merely in his\ngeneral demeanor, you will find that they also underlie his action in\nmatters of importance, although he may disguise the fact. This is an\nopportunity which should not be missed. If in the little affairs of\nevery day,\u2014the trifles of life, those matters to which the rule de minimis non applies,\u2014a man is inconsiderate and seeks only what is advantageous or convenient to himself, to the prejudice of others' rights; if he appropriates to himself that which belongs to all alike,\nyou may be sure there is no justice in his heart, and that he would be\na scoundrel on a wholesale scale, only that law and compulsion bind\nhis hands. Do not trust him beyond your door. He who is not afraid\nto break the laws of his own private circle, will break those of the\nState when he can do so with impunity.\n\nIf the average man were so constituted that the good in him outweighed\nthe bad, it would be more advisable to rely upon his sense of justice,\nfairness, gratitude, fidelity, love or compassion, than to work upon\nhis fears; but as the contrary is the case, and it is the bad that\noutweighs the good, the opposite course is the more prudent one.\n\nIf any person with whom we are associated or have to do, exhibits\nunpleasant or annoying qualities, we have only to ask ourselves\nwhether or not this person is of so much value to us that we can put\nup with frequent and repeated exhibitions of the same qualities in a\nsomewhat aggravated form. In case of an affirmative answer to this\nquestion, there will not be much to be said, because talking is very\nlittle use. We must let the matter pass, with or without some notice;\nbut we should nevertheless remember that we are thereby exposing\nourselves to a repetition of the offence. If the answer is in the\nnegative, we must break with our worthy friend at once and forever; or\nin the case of a servant, dismiss him. For he will inevitably repeat\nthe offence, or do something tantamount to it, should the occasion\nreturn, even though for the moment he is deep and sincere in his\nassurances of the contrary. There is nothing, absolutely nothing,\nthat a man cannot forget,\u2014but not himself, his own character. For\ncharacter is incorrigible; because all a man's actions emanate from an\ninward principle, in virtue of which he must always do the same thing\nunder like circumstances; and he cannot do otherwise. Let me refer to\nmy prize essay on the so-called Freedom of the Will, the perusal\nof which will dissipate any delusions the reader may have on this\nsubject.\n\nTo become reconciled to a friend with whom you have broken, is a form\nof weakness; and you pay the penalty of it when he takes the first\nopportunity of doing precisely the very thing which brought about\nthe breach; nay, he does it the more boldly, because he is secretly\nconscious that you cannot get on without him. This is also applicable\nto servants whom you have dismissed, and then taken into your service\nagain.\n\nFor the same reason, you should just as little expect people to\ncontinue to act in a similar way under altered circumstances. The\ntruth is that men alter their demeanor and sentiments just as fast as\ntheir interest changes; and their design in this respect is a bill\ndrawn for short payment that the man must be still more short-sighted\nwho accepts the bill without protesting it. Accordingly, suppose you\nwant to know how a man will behave in an office into which you think\nof putting him; you should not build upon expectations, on his\npromises or assurances. For, even allowing that he is quite sincere,\nhe is speaking about a matter of which he has no knowledge. The only\nway to calculate how he will behave, is to consider the circumstances\nin which he will be placed, and the extent to which they will conflict\nwith his character.\n\nIf you wish to get a clear and profound insight\u2014and it is very\nneedful\u2014into the true but melancholy elements of which most men are\nmade, you will find in a very instructive thing to take the way they\nbehave in the pages of literature as a commentary to their doings in\npractical life, and vice versa. The experience thus gained will be\nvery useful in avoiding wrong ideas, whether about yourself or about\nothers. But if you come across any special trait of meanness or\nstupidity\u2014in life or in literature,\u2014you must be careful not to let\nit annoy or distress you, but to look upon it merely as an addition to\nyour knowledge--a new fact to be considered in studying the character\nof humanity. Your attitude towards it will be that of the mineralogist\nwho stumbles upon a very characteristic specimen of a mineral.\n\nOf course there are some facts which are very exceptional, and it is\ndifficult to understand how they arise, and how it is that there come\nto be such enormous differences between man and man; but, in general,\nwhat was said long ago is quite true, and the world is in a very bad\nway. In savage countries they eat one another, in civilized they\ndeceive one another; and that is what people call the way of the\nworld! What are States and all the elaborate systems of political\nmachinery, and the rule of force, whether in home or in foreign\naffairs,\u2014what are they but barriers against the boundless iniquity\nof mankind? Does not all history show that whenever a king is firmly\nplanted on a throne, and his people reach some degree of prosperity,\nhe uses it to lead his army, like a band of robbers, against adjoining\ncountries? Are not almost all wars ultimately undertaken for purposes\nof plunder? In the most remote antiquity, and to some extent also in\nthe Middle Ages, the conquered became slaves,\u2014in other words, they\nhad to work for those who conquered them; and where is the difference\nbetween that and paying war-taxes, which represent the product of our\nprevious work?\n\nAll war, says Voltaire, is a matter of robbery; and the Germans should\ntake that as a warning.\n\nSECTION 30.\n\nNo man is so formed that he can be left entirely to\nhimself, to go his own ways; everyone needs to be guided by a\npreconceived plan, and to follow certain general rules. But if this is\ncarried too far, and a man tries to take on a character which is not\nnatural or innate in him, but it artificially acquired and evolved\nmerely by a process of reasoning, he will very soon discover that\nNature cannot be forced, and that if you drive it out, it will return\ndespite your efforts:\u2014\n\nNaturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret.\n\nTo understand a rule governing conduct towards others, even to\ndiscover it for oneself and to express it neatly, is easy enough; and\nstill, very soon afterwards, the rule may be broken in practice. But\nthat is no reason for despair; and you need not fancy that as it is\nimpossible to regulate your life in accordance with abstract ideas\nand maxims, it is better to live just as you please. Here, as in all\ntheoretical instruction that aims at a practical result, the first\nthing to do is to understand the rule; the second thing is to learn\nthe practice of it. The theory may be understood at once by an effort\nof reason, and yet the practice of it acquired only in course of time.\n\nA pupil may learn the various notes on an instrument of music, or the\ndifferent positions in fencing; and when he makes a mistake, as he\nis sure to do, however hard he tries, he is apt to think it will be\nimpossible to observe the rules, when he is set to read music at sight\nor challenged to a furious duel. But for all that, gradual practice\nmakes him perfect, through a long series of slips, blunders and fresh\nefforts. It is just the same in other things; in learning to write and\nspeak Latin, a man will forget the grammatical rules; it is only\nby long practice that a blockhead turns into a courtier, that a\npassionate man becomes shrewd and worldly-wise, or a frank person\nreserved, or a noble person ironical. But though self-discipline of\nthis kind is the result of long habit, it always works by a sort of\nexternal compulsion, which Nature never ceases to resist and sometimes\nunexpectedly overcomes. The difference between action in accordance\nwith abstract principles, and action as the result of original,\ninnate tendency, is the same as that between a work of art, say a\nwatch\u2014where form and movement are impressed upon shapeless and inert\nmatter\u2014and a living organism, where form and matter are one, and each\nis inseparable from the other.\n\nThere is a maxim attributed to the Emperor Napoleon, which expresses\nthis relation between acquired and innate character, and confirms what\nI have said: everything that is unnatural is imperfect;\u2014a rule of\nuniversal application, whether in the physical or in the moral sphere.\nThe only exception I can think of to this rule is aventurine, a\nsubstance known to mineralogists, which in its natural state cannot\ncompare with the artificial preparation of it.\n\nAnd in this connection let me utter a word of protest against any and\nevery form of affectation. It always arouses contempt; in the first\nplace, because it argues deception, and the deception is cowardly,\nfor it is based on fear; and, secondly, it argues self-condemnation,\nbecause it means that a man is trying to appear what he is not, and\ntherefore something which he things better than he actually is. To\naffect a quality, and to plume yourself upon it, is just to confess\nthat you have not got it. Whether it is courage, or learning, or\nintellect, or wit, or success with women, or riches, or social\nposition, or whatever else it may be that a man boasts of, you may\nconclude by his boasting about it that that is precisely the direction\nin which he is rather weak; for if a man really possesses any faculty\nto the full, it will not occur to him to make a great show of\naffecting it; he is quite content to know that he has it. That is the\napplication of the Spanish proverb: herradura que chacolotea clavo le falta\u2014a clattering hoof means a nail gone. To be sure, as I said at\nfirst, no man ought to let the reins go quite loose, and show himself\njust as he is; for there are many evil and bestial sides to our nature\nwhich require to be hidden away out of sight; and this justifies the\nnegative attitude of dissimulation, but it does not justify a\npositive feigning of qualities which are not there. It should also be\nremembered that affectation is recognized at once, even before it is\nclear what it is that is being affected. And, finally, affectation\ncannot last very long, and one day the mask will fall off. Nemo potest personam diu ferre fictam, says Seneca; ficta cito in naturam suam recidunt\u2014no one can persevere long in a fictitious character; for nature will soon reassert itself.\n\nSECTION 31.\n\nA man bears the weight of his own body without knowing it,\nbut he soon feels the weight of any other, if he tries to move it; in\nthe same way, a man can see other people's shortcoming's and vices,\nbut he is blind to his own. This arrangement has one advantage: it\nturns other people into a kind of mirror, in which a man can see\nclearly everything that is vicious, faulty, ill-bred and loathsome in\nhis own nature; only, it is generally the old story of the dog barking\nat is own image; it is himself that he sees and not another dog, as he\nfancies.\n\nHe who criticises others, works at the reformation of himself. Those\nwho form the secret habit of scrutinizing other people's general\nbehavior, and passing severe judgment upon what they do and leave\nundone, thereby improve themselves, and work out their own perfection:\nfor they will have sufficient sense of justice, or at any rate enough\npride and vanity, to avoid in their own case that which they condemn\nso harshly elsewhere. But tolerant people are just the opposite,\nand claim for themselves the same indulgence that they extend to\nothers\u2014hanc veniam damus petimusque vicissim. It is all very well\nfor the Bible to talk about the mote in another's eye and the beam in\none's own. The nature of the eye is to look not at itself but at other\nthings; and therefore to observe and blame faults in another is a\nvery suitable way of becoming conscious of one's own. We require a\nlooking-glass for the due dressing of our morals.\n\nThe same rule applies in the case of style and fine writing. If,\ninstead of condemning, you applaud some new folly in these matters,\nyou will imitate it. That is just why literary follies have such vogue\nin Germany. The Germans are a very tolerant people--everybody can see\nthat! Their maxim is\u2014Hanc veniam damns petimusque vicissim.\n\nSECTION 32.\n\nWhen he is young, a man of noble character fancies that\nthe relations prevailing amongst mankind, and the alliances to which\nthese relations lead, are at bottom and essentially, ideal in their\nnature; that is to say, that they rest upon similarity of disposition\nor sentiment, or taste, or intellectual power, and so on.\n\nBut, later on, he finds out that it is a real foundation which\nunderlies these alliances; that they are based upon some material\ninterest. This is the true foundation of almost all alliances: nay,\nmost men have no notion of an alliance resting upon any other basis.\nAccordingly we find that a man is always measured by the office he\nholds, or by his occupation, nationality, or family relations--in a\nword, by the position and character which have been assigned him\nin the conventional arrangements of life, where he is ticketed and\ntreated as so much goods. Reference to what he is in himself, as a\nman\u2014to the measure of his own personal qualities\u2014is never made\nunless for convenience' sake: and so that view of a man is something\nexceptional, to be set aside and ignored, the moment that anyone finds\nit disagreeable; and this is what usually happens. But the more of\npersonal worth a man has, the less pleasure he will take in these\nconventional arrangements; and he will try to withdraw from the sphere\nin which they apply. The reason why these arrangements exist at all,\nis simply that in this world of ours misery and need are the chief\nfeatures: therefore it is everywhere the essential and paramount\nbusiness of life to devise the means of alleviating them.\n\nSECTION 33.\n\nAs paper-money circulates in the world instead of real\ncoin, so, is the place of true esteem and genuine friendship, you have\nthe outward appearance of it\u2014a mimic show made to look as much like\nthe real thing as possible.\n\nOn the other hand, it may be asked whether there are any people who\nreally deserve the true coin. For my own part, I should certainly pay\nmore respect to an honest dog wagging his tail than to a hundred such\ndemonstrations of human regard.\n\nTrue and genuine friendship presupposes a strong sympathy with the\nweal and woe of another\u2014purely objective in its character and quite\ndisinterested; and this in its turn means an absolute identification\nof self with the object of friendship. The egoism of human nature is\nso strongly antagonistic to any such sympathy, that true friendship\nbelongs to that class of things\u2014the sea-serpent, for instance,\u2014with\nregard to which no one knows whether they are fabulous or really exist\nsomewhere or other.\n\nStill, in many cases, there is a grain of true and genuine friendship\nin the relation of man to man, though generally, of course, some\nsecret personal interest is at the bottom of them\u2014some one among the\nmany forms that selfishness can take. But in a world where all is\nimperfect, this grain of true feeling is such an ennobling influence\nthat it gives some warrant for calling those relations by the name of\nfriendship, for they stand far above the ordinary friendships that\nprevail amongst mankind. The latter are so constituted that, were you\nto hear how your dear friends speak of you behind your back, you would\nnever say another word to them.\n\nApart from the case where it would be a real help to you if your\nfriend were to make some great sacrifice to serve you, there is no\nbetter means of testing the genuineness of his feelings than the way\nin which he receives the news of a misfortune that has just happened\nto you. At that moment the expression of his features will either show\nthat his one thought is that of true and sincere sympathy for you; or\nelse the absolute composure of his countenance, or the passing trace\nof something other than sympathy, will confirm the well-known maxim\nof La Rochefoucauld: Dans l'adversite de nos meilleurs amis, nous trouvons toujours quelque chose qui ne nous deplait pas. Indeed, at such a moment, the ordinary so-called friend will find it hard to suppress the signs of a slight smile of pleasure. There are few ways\nby which you can make more certain of putting people into a good humor\nthan by telling them of some trouble that has recently befallen you,\nor by unreservedly disclosing some personal weakness of yours. How\ncharacteristic this is of humanity!\n\nDistance and long absence are always prejudicial to friendship,\nhowever disinclined a man may be to admit. Our regard for people whom\nwe do not see\u2014even though they be our dearest friends\u2014gradually\ndries up in the course of years, and they become abstract notions;\nso that our interest in them grows to be more and more\nintellectual,\u2014nay, it is kept up only as a kind of tradition; whilst\nwe retain a lively and deep interest in those who are constantly\nbefore our eyes, even if they be only pet animals. This shows how\nmuch men are limited by their senses, and how true is the remark that\nGoethe makes in Tasso about the dominant influence of the present\nmoment:\u2014\n\nDie Gegenwart ist eine maechtige Goettin\n\nFriends of the house are very rightly so called; because they are\nfriends of the house rather than of its master; in other words, they\nare more like cats than dogs.\n\nYour friends will tell you that they are sincere; your enemies are\nreally so. Let your enemies' censure be like a bitter medicine, to be\nused as a means of self-knowledge.\n\nA friend in need, as the saying goes, is rare. Nay, it is just the\ncontrary; no sooner have you made a friend than he is in need, and\nasks for a loan.\n\nSECTION 34.\n\nA man must be still a greenhorn in the ways of the world, if he imagines that he can make himself popular in society by exhibiting intelligence and discernment. With the immense majority of people, such qualities excite hatred and resentment, which are rendered all the harder to bear by the fact that people are obliged to suppress\u2014even from themselves\u2014the real reason of their anger.\n\nWhat actually takes place is this. A man feels and perceives that the person with whom he is conversing is intellectually very much his superior.\n\nHe thereupon secretly and half unconsciously concludes that his interlocutor must form a proportionately low and limited estimate of his abilities. That is a method of reasoning\u2014an enthymeme\u2014which rouses the bitterest feelings of sullen and rancorous hatred. And so Gracian is quite right in saying that the only way to win affection from people is to show the most animal-like simplicity of demeanor\u2014para ser bien quisto, el unico medio vestirse la piel del mas simple de los brutos.\n\nTo show your intelligence and discernment is only an indirect way of reproaching other people for being dull and incapable. And besides, it is natural for a vulgar man to be violently agitated by the sight of opposition in any form; and in this case envy comes in as the secret cause of his hostility. For it is a matter of daily observation that people take the greatest pleasure in that which satisfies their vanity; and vanity cannot be satisfied without comparison with others. Now, there is nothing of which a man is prouder than of intellectual ability, for it is this that gives him his commanding place in the animal world. It is an exceedingly rash thing to let any one see that you are decidedly superior to him in this respect, and to let other people see it too; because he will then thirst for vengeance, and generally look about for an opportunity of taking it by means of insult, because this is to pass from the sphere of intellect to that of will\u2014and there, all are on an equal footing as regards the feeling of hostility. Hence, while rank and riches may always reckon upon deferential treatment in society, that is something which intellectual ability can never expect; to be ignored is the greatest favor shown to it; and if people notice it at all, it is because they regard it as a piece of impertinence, or else as something to which its possessor has no legitimate right, and upon which he dares to pride himself; and in retaliation and revenge for his conduct, people secretly try and humiliate him in some other way; and if they wait to do this, it is only for a fitting opportunity. A man may be as humble as possible in his demeanor, and yet hardly ever get people to overlook his crime in standing intellectually above them. In the Garden of Roses, Sadi makes the remark:\u2014You should know that foolish people are a hundredfold more averse to meeting the wise than the wise are indisposed for the company of the foolish.\n\nOn the other hand, it is a real recommendation to be stupid. For just as warmth is agreeable to the body, so it does the mind good to feel its superiority; and a man will seek company likely to give him this feeling, as instinctively as he will approach the fireplace or walk in the sun if he wants to get warm. But this means that he will be disliked on account of his superiority; and if a man is to be liked, he must really be inferior in point of intellect; and the same thing holds good of a woman in point of beauty. To give proof of real and unfeigned inferiority to some of the people you meet\u2014that is a very difficult business indeed!\n\nConsider how kindly and heartily a girl who is passably pretty will welcome one who is downright ugly. Physical advantages are not thought so much of in the case of man, though I suppose you would rather a little man sat next to you than one who was bigger than yourself. This is why, amongst men, it is the dull and ignorant, and amongst women, the ugly, who are always popular and in request. It is likely to be said of such people that they are extremely good-natured, because every one wants to find a pretext for caring about them\u2014a pretext which will blind both himself and other people to the real reason why he likes them. This is also why mental superiority of any sort always tends to isolate its possessor; people run away from him out of pure hatred, and say all manner of bad things about him by way of justifying their action. Beauty, in the case of women, has a similar effect: very pretty girls have no friends of their own sex, and they even find it hard to get another girl to keep them company. A handsome woman should always avoid applying for a position as companion, because the moment she enters the room, her prospective mistress will scowl at her beauty, as a piece of folly with which, both for her own and for her daughter's sake, she can very well dispense. But if the\ngirl has advantages of rank, the case is very different; because rank, unlike personal qualities which work by the force of mere contrast, produces its effect by a process of reflection; much in the same way as the particular hue of a person's complexion depends upon the prevailing tone of his immediate surroundings.\n\nSECTION 35.\n\nOur trust in other people often consists in great measure\nof pure laziness, selfishness and vanity on our own part: I say\nlaziness, because, instead of making inquiries ourselves, and\nexercising an active care, we prefer to trust others; selfishness,\nbecause we are led to confide in people by the pressure of our own\naffairs; and vanity, when we ask confidence for a matter on which we\nrather pride ourselves. And yet, for all that, we expect people to be\ntrue to the trust we repose in them.\n\nBut we ought not to become angry if people put no trust in us: because\nthat really means that they pay honesty the sincere compliment of\nregarding it as a very rare thing,\u2014so rare, indeed, as to leave us in\ndoubt whether its existence is not merely fabulous.\n\nSECTION 36.\n\nPoliteness,\u2014which the Chinese hold to be a cardinal\nvirtue,\u2014is based upon two considerations of policy. I have explained\none of these considerations in my Ethics; the other is as\nfollows:\u2014Politeness is a tacit agreement that people's miserable\ndefects, whether moral or intellectual, shall on either side be\nignored and not made the subject of reproach; and since these defects\nare thus rendered somewhat less obtrusive, the result is mutually\nadvantageous.\n\nIt is a wise thing to be polite; consequently, it is a stupid thing\nto be rude. To make enemies by unnecessary and willful incivility,\nis just as insane a proceeding as to set your house on fire. For\npoliteness is like a counter--an avowedly false coin, with which it is\nfoolish to be stingy. A sensible man will be generous in the use\nof it. It is customary in every country to end a letter with\nthe words:\u2014your most obedient servant\u2014votre tres-humble serviteur\u2014suo devotissimo servo_. (The Germans are the only people who suppress the word servant\u2014Diener\u2014because, of course, it is not true!) However, to carry politeness to such an extent as to damage\nyour prospects, is like giving money where only counters are expected.\n\nWax, a substance naturally hard and brittle, can be made soft by the\napplication of a little warmth, so that it will take any shape you\nplease. In the same way, by being polite and friendly, you can make\npeople pliable and obliging, even though they are apt to be crabbed\nand malevolent. Hence politeness is to human nature what warmth is to\nwax.\n\nOf course, it is no easy matter to be polite; in so far, I mean, as it\nrequires us to show great respect for everybody, whereas most people\ndeserve none at all; and again in so far as it demands that we should\nfeign the most lively interest in people, when we must be very glad\nthat we have nothing to do with them. To combine politeness with pride\nis a masterpiece of wisdom.\n\nWe should be much less ready to lose our temper over an\ninsult,\u2014which, in the strict sense of the word, means that we have\nnot been treated with respect,\u2014if, on the one hand, we have not such\nan exaggerated estimate of our value and dignity\u2014that is to say, if\nwe were not so immensely proud of ourselves; and, on the other hand,\nif we had arrived at any clear notion of the judgment which, in his\nheart, one man generally passes upon another. If most people resent\nthe slightest hint that any blame attaches to them, you may imagine\ntheir feelings if they were to overhear what their acquaintance say\nabout them. You should never lose sight of the fact that ordinary\npoliteness is only a grinning mask: if it shifts its place a little,\nor is removed for a moment, there is no use raising a hue and cry.\nWhen a man is downright rude, it is as though he had taken off all his\nclothes, and stood before you in puris naturalibus. Like most men in\nthis condition, he does not present a very attractive appearance.\n\nSECTION 37.\n\nYou ought never to take any man as a model for what you\nshould do or leave undone; because position and circumstances are in\nno two cases alike, and difference of character gives a peculiar,\nindividual tone to what a man does. Hence duo cum faciunt idem, non est idem\u2014two persons may do the same thing with a different result. A man should act in accordance with his own character, as soon as he has carefully deliberated on what he is about to do.\n\nThe outcome of this is that originality cannot be dispensed with in\npractical matters: otherwise, what a man does will not accord with\nwhat he is.\n\nSECTION 38.\n\nNever combat any man's opinion; for though you reached the\nage of Methuselah, you would never have done setting him right upon\nall the absurd things that he believes.\n\nIt is also well to avoid correcting people's mistakes in conversation,\nhowever good your intentions may be; for it is easy to offend people,\nand difficult, if not impossible, to mend them.\n\nIf you feel irritated by the absurd remarks of two people whose\nconversation you happen to overhear, you should imagine that you are\nlistening to a dialogue of two fools in a comedy. Probatum est.\n\nThe man who comes into the world with the notion that he is really\ngoing to instruct in matters of the highest importance, may thank his\nstars if he escapes with a whole skin.\n\nSECTION 39.\n\nIf you want your judgment to be accepted, express it\ncoolly and without passion. All violence has its seat in the will;\nand so, if your judgment is expressed with vehemence, people will\nconsider it an effort of will, and not the outcome of knowledge, which\nis in its nature cold and unimpassioned. Since the will is the primary\nand radical element in human nature, and intellect merely supervenes\nas something secondary, people are more likely to believe that the\nopinion you express with so much vehemence is due to the excited state\nof your will, rather than that the excitement of the will comes only\nfrom the ardent nature of your opinion.\n\nSECTION 40.\n\nEven when you are fully justified in praising yourself,\nyou should never be seduced into doing so. For vanity is so very\ncommon, and merit so very uncommon, that even if a man appears to be\npraising himself, though very indirectly, people will be ready to lay\na hundred to one that he is talking out of pure vanity, and that he\nhas not sense enough to see what a fool he is making of himself.\n\nStill, for all that, there may be some truth in Bacon's remark that,\nas in the case of calumny, if you throw enough dirt, some of it will\nstick, so it it also in regard to self-praise; with the conclusion\nthat self-praise, in small doses, is to be recommended.\n\nSECTION 41.\n\nIf you have reason to suspect that a person is telling you\na lie, look as though you believed every word he said. This will give\nhim courage to go on; he will become more vehement in his assertions,\nand in the end betray himself.\n\nAgain, if you perceive that a person is trying to conceal something\nfrom you, but with only partial success, look as though you did not\nbelieve him, This opposition on your part will provoke him into\nleading out his reserve of truth and bringing the whole force of it to\nbear upon your incredulity.\n\nSECTION 42.\n\nYou should regard all your private affairs as secrets,\nand, in respect of them, treat your acquaintances, even though you\nare on good terms with them, as perfect strangers, letting them know\nnothing more than they can see for themselves. For in course of time,\nand under altered circumstances, you may find it a disadvantage that\nthey know even the most harmless things about you.\n\nAnd, as a general rule, it is more advisable to show your intelligence\nby saying nothing than by speaking out; for silence is a matter\nof prudence, whilst speech has something in it of vanity. The\nopportunities for displaying the one or the other quality occur\nequally often; but the fleeting satisfaction afforded by speech is\noften preferred to the permanent advantage secured by silence.\n\nThe feeling of relief which lively people experience in speaking aloud\nwhen no one is listening, should not be indulged, lest it grow into a\nhabit; for in this way thought establishes such very friendly terms\nwith speech, that conversation is apt to become a process of thinking\naloud. Prudence exacts that a wide gulf should be fixed between what\nwe think and what we say.\n\nAt times we fancy that people are utterly unable to believe in the\ntruth of some statement affecting us personally, whereas it never\noccurs to them to doubt it; but if we give them the slightest\nopportunity of doubting it, they find it absolutely impossible\nto believe it any more. We often betray ourselves into revealing\nsomething, simply because we suppose that people cannot help noticing\nit,\u2014just as a man will throw himself down from a great height because\nhe loses his head, in other words, because he fancies that he cannot\nretain a firm footing any longer; the torment of his position is so\ngreat, that he thinks it better to put an end to it at once. This is\nthe kind of insanity which is called acrophobia.\n\nBut it should not be forgotten how clever people are in regard\nto affairs which do not concern them, even though they show no\nparticularly sign of acuteness in other matters. This is a kind of\nalgebra in which people are very proficient: give them a single fact\nto go upon, and they will solve the most complicated problems. So,\nif you wish to relate some event that happened long ago, without\nmentioning any names, or otherwise indicating the persons to whom you\nrefer, you should be very careful not to introduce into your narrative\nanything that might point, however distantly, to some definite fact,\nwhether it is a particular locality, or a date, or the name of some\none who was only to a small extent implicated, or anything else that\nwas even remotely connected with the event; for that at once gives\npeople something positive to go upon, and by the aid of their talent\nfor this sort of algebra, they will discover all the rest. Their\ncuriosity in these matters becomes a kind of enthusiasm: their will\nspurs on their intellect, and drives it forward to the attainment\nof the most remote results. For however unsusceptible and different\npeople may be to general and universal truths, they are very ardent in\nthe matter of particular details.\n\nIn keeping with what I have said, it will be found that all those\nwho profess to give instructions in the wisdom of life are specially\nurgent in commending the practice of silence, and assign manifold\nreasons why it should be observed; so it is not necessary for me to\nenlarge upon the subject any further. However, I may just add one or\ntwo little known Arabian proverbs, which occur to me as peculiarly\nappropriate:\u2014\n\nDo not tell a friend anything that you would conceal from an enemy.\n\nA secret is in my custody, if I keep it; but should it escape me, it is I who am the prisoner.\n\nThe tree of silence bears the fruit of peace.\n\nSECTION 43.\n\nMoney is never spent to so much advantage as when you have\nbeen cheated out of it; for at one stroke you have purchased prudence.\n\nSECTION 44.\n\nIf possible, no animosity should be felt for anyone. But\ncarefully observe and remember the manner in which a man conducts\nhimself, so that you may take the measure of his value,\u2014at any\nrate in regard to yourself,\u2014and regulate your bearing towards\nhim accordingly; never losing sight of the fact that character\nis unalterable, and that to forget the bad features in a man's\ndisposition is like throwing away hard-won money. Thus you will\nprotect yourself against the results of unwise intimacy and foolish\nfriendship.\n\nGive way neither to love nor to hate, is one-half of worldly wisdom:\nsay nothing and believe nothing, the other half. Truly, a world\nwhere there is need of such rules as this and the following, is one\nupon which a man may well turn his back.\n\nSECTION 45.\n\nTo speak angrily to a person, to show your hatred by\nwhat you say or by the way you look, is an unnecessary\nproceeding\u2014dangerous, foolish, ridiculous, and vulgar.\n\nAnger and hatred should never be shown otherwise than in what you do;\nand feelings will be all the more effective in action, in so far\nas you avoid the exhibition of them in any other way. It is only\ncold-blooded animals whose bite is poisonous.\n\nSECTION 46.\n\nTo speak without emphasizing your words\u2014parler sans accent\u2014is an old rule with those who are wise in the world's ways. It means that you should leave other people to discover what it is\nthat you have said; and as their minds are slow, you can make your\nescape in time. On the other hand, to emphasize your meaning\u2014parler\navec accent\u2014is to address their feelings; and the result is always\nthe opposite of what you expect. If you are polite enough in your\nmanner and courteous in your tone there are many people whom you may\nabuse outright, and yet run no immediate risk of offending them.","title":"Counsels and Maxims/Chapter III","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":10561}