{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_Culture_vs_Copyright_Chapter_6/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_Culture_vs_Copyright_Chapter_6","id":"wikisource_Culture_vs_Copyright_Chapter_6","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Culture_vs._Copyright/Chapter_6","summary":null,"tags":["Subpages"],"text":"CHAPTER 6\n\nThree Models\n\nA remark from a post on the DMCA-discuss list from June 5, 2003\nreads: \u201cTake copyright away and guess what? Somebody is going\nto undercut YOU in price because they can make cheap copies, and\nthus, YOU won\u2019t make any money at all!\u201d \u201cYOU\u201d there referred to\nan author who had spent a number of years writing a novel.\n\nHow can I respond to the above assertion? I want to start my deliberations on this subject with yet another quote: \u201cIf art teaches anything (to the artist, in the first place), it is the privateness of the\nhuman condition. Being the most ancient as well as the most literal\nform of private enterprise, it fosters in a man, knowingly or\nunwittingly, a sense of his uniqueness, of individuality, of\nseparateness\u2014thus turning him from a social animal into an\nautonomous \u2018I\u2019\u201d (Joseph Brodsky, Nobel Lecture, 1987). This gives\nus direction for further analysis.\n\nIf a work of art, according to Brodsky, is a private enterprise, it is obviously of a different nature than a regular business. The artist\u2019s \u201cbusiness\u201d is to foster a sense of uniqueness in humans.\nWhen we regard art as art, we must take into account its nature. We\nmust remember and take seriously the fact that art is not determined\nor driven by rewards or punishments, profits or losses. On the other\nhand, we know that business does develop around art. In this case\nwe must take into account and apply relevant laws. Hence, we have\nto determine what part of an artwork, where and when, may be\ntraded and what part of it, where and when, must be just shared.\n\nIf we uphold this approach\u2014that is, if we try to follow the precise nature of our subject\u2014then there is hope that we will get\nthe most from art in terms of both creativity and business. This also\nmeans that we can resolve and forget all of the problems caused by the monster called \u201cexclusive rights\u201d which result from the mixing\nof subjects of different natures.\n\n\u201cSomebody is going to undercut the price\u201d\u2014what is so tragic\nabout this when we talk business? It is a simple question. What is the\nhonest answer? \u201cOK.\u201d It would be OK for any other branch of\nbusiness. It would be OK in publishing too. So why would publishers\n(through copyright) want to mutually restrict each other from\nprofiting? Yet another question: If an author simply sells his work to\na publisher, how does copyright help him? Does it not?\n\nWell, I have hinted more than once that I am not satisfied with\nthe commonly accepted speculations about exclusive rights,\nregardless of how long those speculations have been around.\n\nOptions for Governing Culture\n\nIn order to understand what is happening in the regulation of\ncultural affairs and what could ideally happen, I have framed three\noptions for analysis: (1) no regulation at all, (2) the current type of\nregulation and (3) an ideal regulation, corresponding to the nature\nof culture. These are: Self-tuning, Copyright, and Authoright.\n\nSelf-tuning\n\nThis means there is no copyright nor any other specific regulation of\ncultural affairs. There is a rather close historical precedent for this\nsituation. In Jacobinian France, for a short period of time (until 1793) all\nroyal publishing privileges were abolished. It would be very helpful to\nfind out what exactly was going on with book market in France at that\ntime. And earlier there was a somewhat similar situation in Great Britain\nwhen royal privileges were, for a certain period of time, ignored by\nsmall printers, causing big ones to press for a law like the Statute of\nAnne. What was going on in that market? Such a study merits research.\n\nCopyright\n\nThis is the universal publishing monopoly. It is the ownership, similar\nto private property, which is imposed upon cultural phenomena. This\nregime was introduced despite public outcry in Great Britain in 1710.\n\nI will discuss it more below.\nAuthoright\n\nThis is when a work of art is free to use without restriction, and\nindividual authors and publishers have the universal right to\nattribution. Such a law does not yet exist, although its partial and\ntwisted implementations, like public domain, have occurred.\n\nMethod of the Research\n\nIt became clear in my previous deliberations and discussions with\nthe students that the nature of creativity is the same in different areas\nof human activity. Based on that conclusion, I presume that neither\ngenre nor kind of art nor historical time nor any other technicality\nplays a vital role in the reality I am now going to scrutinize. That\nis, analyzed scenarios, in their essential features, can equally apply\nto any creator at any time in any area of human activity. I examine\nfundamental points, such that my analysis would be the same for\na music composer or painter or inventor or any other creator in the\neighteenth or twenty-first or thirtieth century. Obviously, cases\ndiffer in detail, but details and nuances are not my priority here. So,\nI have chosen a writer in the eighteenth century who is looking for\na publisher. His situation is analyzed in the scenarios below.\n\nSelf-tuning\n\nAs stated previously, cultural affairs that are not regulated by\na specific law are the subject of this section.\n\nScenarios\n\nOur author has to shop for a publisher. He may never find one, thus\nend of story.\nSuppose he finds a publisher. He may conduct preliminary\nnegotiations before having his book published. Suppose his work is\naccepted. The author will be paid a certain amount of money. If the\nsum is considerable in the author\u2019s view, there\u2019s a happy ending.\nIf the publisher wants exclusivity, he may pay more and put it in their contract. Naturally, this exclusivity is effective only until\nthe work is published, because, with no regulation in the field,\nanyone can use it after the first publishing.\n\nIf the publisher does not want exclusivity, the author may take\na copy of the manuscript to another publisher and get paid by both.\n\nWhat happens after publication? That depends on the\nacceptance of the work by the public. Generally, the author gets\nmore and more exposure as long as other publishers reprint and sell\nhis work. And they do this as long as it earns money. In doing so,\nthey all promote the author regardless of their intentions.\n\nDoes second-hand publishing (reprinting of a published work)\nprovide incentives to the author? It may. For example, if a publisher\nwants to develop a brand, he may compensate the author in order to\nbe the author\u2019s announced sponsor. Would any publisher do this?\nSome may be tempted to do so because this marketing strategy is\nnot worse than any other.\n\nIf the author is well-accepted, his next work will be sold at a higher\nprice. Publishers will compete for the opportunity to publish it first.\nObviously, being the first in this environment means being a brand.\nWhat if the very first publisher robs the author; say he does not\ngive any written promise, takes the work, and publishes it under\nsome other name? This does not change the situation much,\nbecause the author can take the work to another publisher and\nexpose the first one as a fraud. Moreover, if the first work earns a\nconsiderable amount, a second one will not be stolen because other\npublishers will come forward in order to publish it. Thanks to Selftuning\u2014that is to say, thanks to the no-exclusive-rights situation\u2014\nsooner or later the real author will become known. Also,\ncorresponding outcomes for the author, the publisher-thief, and the\nentire artistic and publishing community will result. Particularly,\nthe author may turn to the courts and sue the publisher for breach of\ncontract. For this scenario, the author would need another copy of\nthe work and a witness to his agreement with the publisher-thief.\nSuch measures can effectively secure any work from theft.\n\nNow, suppose the first work does not earn anything; this means\nthe work was not admired. In this case, the entire scenario starts\n\nover with his next work.\nSummary\n\nFor the first summary, let us stress that as long as this model creates\na highly competitive environment, publishers have to fight to\ndevelop brand names. A publisher may achieve this by trying to:\n(a) always be first, (b) offer the best in terms of quality to the\npublic, or (c) sponsor authors instead of \u201cfreeloading,\u201d thereby\nproviding additional incentives to authors.\n\nIt is noteworthy that as far as all works are accessible to all\npublishers, the success of an author depends solely on his talent. If\nan author lacks talent, no one suffers but the author.\n\nActually, I used to think that no-regulation environment would\nbe much worse than it appears now. It looks as if it could result in a\nfairly self-tuned market that would be extremely challenging for all\nparties. It is unlikely that any work of art may escape unnoticed in\nthis environment.\n\nA Historical Excursus\n\nThe Self-tuning model is based entirely on contractual law. If this\nmodel were in place, publishers with considerable economic power\nwould eventually plot to contract authors and publish in a\ncopyright-like manner. That is, they would try to get rid of\ncompetition and secure their portfolios and revenues for a certain\nperiod of time. The next step would be an attempt to gain\ngovernment support for that \u201ccopyright-like manner\u201d in order to\nhinder authors from dictating conditions. This is what happened in\nGreat Britain with the Statute of Queen Anne in 1710.\n\nFor about two hundred years before that, the Crown had resisted\nthe demands of licensed scribes (and later big printers) to limit\nprinting and restrict the spread of the printing press. In 1710, the\nCrown was eager to get rid of anonymous pamphlet writers; this\ndesire by the government for effectual censorship coincided with big\nprinters\u2019 thirst for easy money. That mutual interest brought about\nthe Statute of Anne. It is ironic that the same law in its basic features\nwas later adopted in the U.S. in order to provide for \u201cthe progress of\nscience and useful arts.\u201d The question is, how could the same mechanism work in such a\ncontradictory fashion\u2014to back both monopolies for the \u201cbig guys\u201d\nand provide incentives for the smallest ones, the \u201cstarving artists?\u201d\nAcross centuries and among countries, publishing monopolies\n\nhave clearly proven to be useful only to governments and big\npublishers. The pretext proffered to the public is that said\nmonopolies protect authors, promote creativity, develop culture, etc.\nHas this ever been proven in reality? The answer is: No. Much\nspeculation has been produced but never any proof.\n\nPublishing Monopoly or Copyright\n\nWhile analyzing below how copyright works, I am going to determine\nthe differences between the two models.\n\nScenarios\n\nWell, our author has to shop for a publisher. He may never find one,\nthus end of story.\n\nSuppose he finds a publisher. He may conduct preliminary\nnegotiations before having his book published. Suppose his work is\naccepted. The author will be paid a certain amount of money. If the\nsum is considerable, there is a happy ending. There is no difference\nfrom Self-tuning so far.\n\nIf the publisher wants exclusive rights or a monopoly, he may\npay more. This monopoly will last for the period of time determined\nby law; this is the first difference from the Self-tuning model.\nIf the publisher does not want exclusive rights, the author can\ntake a copy of the manuscript to another publisher and get paid by\nboth. However, this is not likely to happen, because nowadays the\nidea of exclusivity is ingrained in people\u2019s minds. Due to a\ncopyright-driven \u201cbusiness model,\u201d no publisher would accept a\nwork if it is being handled by another publisher.\n\nWhat happens after publication? This depends on how well the\nwork is accepted by the public. The author gets exposure depending on the marketing efforts and abilities of his sole publisher. This\nis the second difference from the Self-tuning model. The author\u2019s\nnext work may garner more money if the first one became famous.\nIn this case, publishers compete for the opportunity to be the first in\nline\u2014if the author did not sell the rights in advance.\n\nThere is another circumstance fostered by the legally enforced\nprinting monopoly: having secured a certain amount of work for a\nprolonged amount of time, a publisher may not be interested in\nbuying another book. This is the third difference. Or he may buy it\nnot in order to publish it, but to prevent competitors from doing so\u2014\nthe fourth difference. In any case, this is exactly what big publishers\nhave fought for: easier lives at the expense of the public and authors.\nThis is how the printing monopoly strips authors of potential income\ninstead of providing it. The latter phenomenon affects an author in yet\nanother way. The author, condemned to selling his work to just one\npublisher, has to consider this dilemma and make adjustments to his\nwork. This trend plainly undermines creativity\u2014the fifth difference.\nThis last feature of the copyright-driven environment is of specific\ninterest because it directly contradicts the proclaimed goal of exclusive\nrights: to provide for \u201cthe progress of science and useful arts.\u201d\n\nWhat if a publisher robs the author: he does not give any written\nassurance, takes the work and publishes it under another name?\nThis changes the situation dramatically. Having exclusive rights,\nthe publisher can prevent other publishers from acquiring the work\nand thus is assured that no one ever learns who the real author is\n\u2014the sixth difference.\n\nHowever, this variant can result in a poor reputation for the\npublisher-thief. Moreover, the author may turn to the courts and\nsue the publisher under copyright law\u2014the seventh difference. But\nagain, if the theft is not proven, the author has lost his work forever.\n\nAnother new feature requires explanation. Remember, because of\nthe very nature of art, we, the audience, develop personal relationships\nwith a work of art. We noted earlier that these relationships are, in fact,\nvery similar in nature to those with real people. The only difference\nis the consequences. If a desired work of art is not accessible, no\nsubstitute would suffice. If you want to read the Bible, only the Bible\nwill do; if you want The Lord of the Rings, then you want only The Lord of the Rings. It is a personal issue. Yes, in practice, if you cannot get the\nartistic work that you want, you may find some \u201csubstitute,\u201d but this\nwould be as upsetting as substituting a good friend with someone else.\nThis means that a publishing monopoly of a book is, in fact, as effective\nas if this book were the only book on the market. Thus, copyright\ncauses prices to be raised to the maximum level possible\u2014the eighth\ndifference. Like with a casual monopoly, this feature hinders public\naccess to distributed works and thus negatively affects the market.\n\nA quite unexpected development within the copyright-driven\nenvironment is the promotion of effective plagiarism\u2014the ninth\ndifference. How is this possible? Normal plagiarism cannot survive\nwithin the Self-tuning model because the public is acutely sensitive to\nit, and no publisher would risk his brand while any original work\nis at his disposal. On the contrary, selling a book similar to a best\nseller is particularly tempting within the copyright-driven\nenvironment. In order to do so, one only need provide measured\nformal differences from the best seller. What is it if not plagiarism?\nSome publishers prefer to buy plagiarized work instead of buying\nsomething genuinely new with an uncertain sales projection. Hence, we\nhave one more blow to creativity caused by the publishing\nmonopoly a.k.a. copyright.\n\nYet another consequence of copyright is that, having a portfolio to\nprofit from for years to come, publishers are compelled to prolong\ncurrent public predilection for the arts. Publishers must therefore try to\ninfluence audiences in order to achieve this\u2014the tenth difference. They\nneed to discourage the promotion of new ideas, new aesthetic\napproaches to arts, new kinds of arts, new genres, and so forth.\nMoreover, by investing money in this impediment, publishers are\ndriven to promote \u201cnew\u201d works to fit the same old picture, thus\ncontributing again for the third time in the suppression of creativity.\n\nNow let us get back to the author. Suppose the first work does\nnot earn any money, which means the author has not become well-liked. The entire story starts over with the next work. However, it is\nharder for the author to start over in an environment poisoned by\npublishing monopolies; publishers with established portfolios would\nnot risk working with an unsuccessful author. It would not matter\nwhether he were a misunderstood genius or someone who just failed to convince a powerful publisher to market his work. On the other\nhand, a publisher with exclusive rights is interested in promoting the\nwork, no matter how bad it is\u2014this is the eleventh difference\nfrom the Self-tuning model.\n\nSummary\n\nI used to think that the copyright model was not as pathetic as it\nappears now. It appears to be totally disruptive for any normal market\ndevelopment. A toxic copyright-driven environment pressures a\ncreator to give in to the tastes of publishers. It compromises creativity\nin at least three ways, as seen above. Copyright promotes effective\nplagiarism. In this monopoly-based environment, any work of art\nmay disappear unnoticed, regardless of how brilliant it is. High prices\nsuppress the book and art markets\u2019 normal development.\n\nThis last trend causes tension in the industry and spurs attempts to\nextend the initial monopoly even further in order to restore vanishing\nprofits. Actually, such attempts manifest themselves even before the\nmarket shrinks. As long as the idea of monopoly is considered proper,\nrights holders desire it and religiously fight to extend it.\n\nThe copyright trick amazes me more and more. It adversely\naffects culture and civilization in many ways, while it helps big\npublishers to more easily go about their business. It is noteworthy\nthat nobody even knows whether \u201ceasily\u201d means more profitable or\njust the opposite!\n\nAuthoright\n\nI want to reiterate some of the guidelines of this really simple model.\nWe saw that the Self-tuning model provides a good framework\nfor cultural and culture-related business development. Still, the\nauthor\u2019s well-being is uncertain because publishers are not required\nto attribute. Thus, it seems to make sense for society to require\nattribution. What about other features of this model? Based on the\nideas presented in previous chapters, I assume the following:\n\nThe natural law of culture that results in its normal development is ultimate freedom.\n\nNo cultural phenomenon can be owned.\n\nOnly a material thing with a cultural phenomenon inscribed within it can be owned.\n\nThe cultural equivalent of physical stealing is lying.\n\nCultural phenomena are produced in an individual mind or in the free communication among individuals.\n\nCulture, when governed according to its nature, rewards authors, publishers, and society as a whole to a much greater degree than under current law.\n\nHence, the main features determining Authoright are:\n\nNo entity of any kind may control or regulate in any way the copying, sharing, distribution, performance or another public use of an idea, work of art or any other cultural phenomena.\n\nMost importantly, there must not be any restriction in the creation of derivatives or any other artistic use of a work.\n\nEvery author has the eternal and inalienable right of attribution.\n\nAn author may sell his works, but not his \u201crights.\u201d\n\nA publisher or any other entity may pay an author for the right to be named his sponsor.\n\nNo company, organization, or group entity of any kind or nature other than the actual author of a creative work may be considered the author.\n\nThe source of a work must be attributed in every public use of the work.\n\nAny sponsor of an author, a single work or a single publication deserves attribution.\n\nThe full text of the Authoright can be found in the Addendum.\n\nBelow the differences between models will be highlighted. Scenarios\n\nOur author has to shop for a publisher. He may never find one,\nthus end of story. However, we have to note this kind of outcome\nis less probable here (and within Self-tuning as well) than in the\nenvironment poisoned by publishing monopolies. Since it is much\nmore difficult to secure a monopolized portfolio for a considerable\ntime, it is vital for a publisher to be the first to find a new work or\ndiscover a new author\u2014this the first difference from copyright.\n\nSuppose he finds a publisher. He may conduct preliminary\nnegotiations before having his book published. The author will be\npaid a certain amount of money. If the sum is considerable, there is\na happy ending. It is noteworthy that this kind of ending is more\nprobable here because there are no exclusive rights. An author and\nhis new work are now more valuable for many reasons\u2014the second\ndifference from copyright. The first reason is that he is free to sell his\nwork to as many publishers as he wants. The second reason is that\nonly individual authors can claim authorship. The third reason is that\nthe best way for a publisher to develop a brand is to be the first to\nget the work.\n\nIf the publisher wants exclusivity (until the work is published)\nhe may pay more. The same story happens within other models. The\ndifference lies in time frame only, and this affects publishing only.\nWe saw that copyright causes nothing but negative results here.\n\nIf the publisher does not want exclusivity, the author may take\na copy of the manuscript to another publisher and get paid by both.\nAgain, this is not likely to happen under copyright just because it is\nagainst copyright-driven \u201ccommon sense.\u201d\n\nWhat happens after publication? That depends on the acceptance\nof the work by the public. Generally, the author gets more and more\nexposure as long as other publishers reprint and sell his or her work.\nThey do this while it earns money. Thus, the entire competitive\npublishing community promotes the author\u2014the third difference. If\na second-hand publisher wants to develop a brand, he may pay the\nauthor in order to be the author\u2019s announced sponsor\u2014the fourth\ndifference. The last two features have a more powerful effect within\nAuthoright, as contrasted with Self-tuning, because attribution is mandatory here. More important is that an author would now be\nreally free to create and would have no need to adjust to anyone\u2019s\ntaste; only his inner interlocutors would dictate what he writes.\nHaving his name protected by law and the work promoted by the\nentire publishing community, the author knows that he will be judged\nby the public for his work and talent only\u2014the fifth difference from\ncopyright.\n\nDoes second-hand publishing provide any incentive to the\nauthor? It can. For example, if a publisher wants to develop a brand,\nhe may pay the author to be the author\u2019s announced sponsor. Will\njust any publisher do this? Some will, for this marketing idea is not\nworse than any other.\n\nIf the author is well-accepted, his subsequent work will be sold at\na higher price. Publishers will compete for the ability to get the next\none first. Being the first means being a brand; publishers must be\nquite fast to grab any new work in Authoright-driven environment.\nThis is significant in terms of incentives for authors\u2014the sixth\ndifference from copyright.\n\nWhat if the very first publisher robs the author, does not give any\nwritten promise, takes the work and publishes it under some other\nname? This does not change the situation much, because the author\ncan take the work to another publisher and expose the fraudulent\none. Now, if the first (stolen) work earns considerable money, a\nsubsequent one will not be stolen because other publishers will act\nin order to get it.\n\nThe case of the stolen work results in a poor reputation for\nthe thief, so he must take this into account. The author may turn\nto the courts and sue the publisher under Authoright law\u2014this is\nthe seventh difference from copyright. (Authoright also differs here\nfrom Self-tuning, where the author can use only contractual law.) It\nis worth noting that under Authoright an author can sue for theft of\nname only. What is important is that even if theft happened and even\nif it is not proven, the author may compete with the publisher-thief\u2014\nthe eighth difference from copyright.\n\nWe have previously discussed how, because of the very nature\nof art, the audience develops a personal relationship with a work\nof art. We know that such a relationship is similar to one with real people. The two differ only in regards to the resulting consequences. Additionally, regarding access to a desirable work of art, no substitution suffices. We already concluded that because of that feature, a printing monopoly on one book allows the rights holder to raise the price as if this book were the only one on the market. This is impossible within the Authoright environment, where a work of art is accessible for everyone to copy and use in any way possible from the very moment of its first publication\u2014the ninth difference.\n\nAs seen previously, another quite unexpected development within the copyright model is the promotion of actual plagiarism cloaked in hypocrisy (the rationale is that it is feasible to promote and sell something similar to a best seller, providing carefully measured differences are incorporated). This would not work within the Selftuning and Authoright models because the public is acutely sensitive to plagiarism, and no publisher would risk his reputation while all original works are at his disposal. Again, while copyright promotes plagiarism and compromises creativity, Authoright promotes creativity and makes plagiarism impossible. It spurs a natural drive to create or acquire original works\u2014the tenth difference.\n\nAuthoright eliminates the possibility of another negative consequence of copyrights: the publisher\u2019s motivation to discourage the development of audiences\u2014the eleventh difference. Insofar as publishers cannot secure a portfolio longer than necessary for the preparation of a work for publication, they have no interest in stagnating public taste. In this environment everybody seeks out new work, and it is profitable to have the public inclined to and capable of understanding anything new. It would be in the publishers\u2019 best interest to encourage the public to learn new aesthetic principles, genres and so forth.\n\nNow suppose the first work does not earn any money, which means the author has not become well-liked. The entire story starts over with the next work. A new start is likely to be easier in the Authoright environment, where the publishers and the public are in an ongoing hunt for new work and authors\u2014the twelfth difference. After all, the only things which truly matter within Authoright are a work\u2019s brilliance and the author\u2019s talent.\n\nThree Models: Summary\n\nIn general, the Authoright model includes the advantages of both the\nSelf-tuning and the copyright models while having none of their\ndisadvantages:\n\nUnder Authoright, as under Self-tuning, an author is more likely to find his first publisher if he is unique. And vice versa (unlike under copyright), an author is less likely to find a first publisher if he just replicates a well-selling author.\n\nWithin Authoright, as within Self-tuning, an author is a more valuable asset than with copyright and thus always has a chance of getting paid more from the very beginning.\n\nUnlike any other environment, it is impossible under Authoright for any entities other than individual authors to claim authorship. This specific feature puts an author into the center of a culture-related marketplace.\n\nAs within Self-tuning, Authorighted work gets promoted by the entire competitive publishing community. Under copyright, however, the promotion of a work is restricted to the goodwill and real abilities of one publisher or another rights holder. Moreover, under Authoright, promotion of a work automatically means promotion of its author and depends entirely on his talent.\n\nSimilar to Self-tuning, Authoright allows an author to sell his work, either literally fixed in some media or in the form of sponsorship, as many times as possible. With copyright, he is actually condemned to a one-time or otherwise limited sale. Any entity may sponsor an author in any environment but this cannot be really used with copyright for two reasons: first, the commercial and other public usage of a work of art is extremely limited; second, the rights holder is usually in full control of the work and may not be interested in promoting a sponsor. This may be useful under Self-tuning but to a lesser degree because attribution is not required.\n\nOn the other hand, even within Self-tuning, an author\u2019s name is protected at least twice. First, unwritten, academic-like standards for attribution have to emerge. Second, it is in the publisher\u2019s best interest to attribute a work to its known author. Theft may occur, as discussed, at the very first public appearance of an author\u2019s work. However, this is not profitable in the long run because the author\u2019s name becomes a stamp of quality. If, nonetheless, theft does happen, there are certain protections which are even more effective than copyright law. Needless to say, the same mechanisms work under Authoright.\n\nUnder Authoright, as under Self-tuning, the more talented and unique an author is, the more he gets promoted. On the contrary, under copyright the author is pushed to follow best-selling examples, that is to say, to plagiarize.\n\nUnder Authoright, as under Self-tuning, an author is not limited in learning from others. On the contrary, under copyright, an author cannot freely learn and build upon the works of others. He is pushed to artistic naivety.\n\nUnder both copyright and Authoright, an author can legally protect his name. Under Self-tuning, however, he has to use nonspecific laws. This feature does not amount to a considerable advantage for Authoright; the author can just more easily protect his name. As I said earlier, it is likely that unwritten self-enforced rules will emerge as they have in academia. This feature may, however, become significant during the shift to Authoright because of more than three hundred years of total disrespect for authorship fueled by copyright.\n\nUnder Authoright, as with Self-tuning, if a publisher steals an author\u2019s work, the author can still compete with the thief. On the contrary, under copyright, a work, if stolen and not recovered in the courts, is lost forever.\n\nAs under Self-tuning, under Authoright, markets are flooded with works of art along a spectrum of content, quality, and price. Under copyright, market development is limited at least twice: first, by direct publisher regulation, and second, by monopolistic pricing.\n\nWithin Self-tuning and Authoright, a work is promoted by any publisher willing to make money from it. It is exposed regardless of the financial or other abilities of specific publishers. Within copyright, however, exposure of a work depends on only one publisher. Hence, the author is naturally forced to look for a big publisher, which means that copyright also enforces regular monopolies. This trend once again back-fires on the author, forcing him to bow down to the tastes of a big publisher in order to be published, promoted, and paid. Thus, the author\u2019s dilemma in the copyright-driven environment is in fact: \u201cmore money means less creativity.\u201d\n\nUnder Self-tuning, as with Authoright, an author is discouraged from committing plagiarism, while he is encouraged to do so under copyright. Where there is no publishing monopoly and all works are accessible to all publishers, publishers are naturally driven to go after the best and acquire them by all means necessary. Conversely, under copyright a publisher retains his portfolio for a prolonged amount of time. This portfolio is at the heart of the copyright business. Here, a big publisher may invest big money into the promotion of a work. Others are tempted to follow; they will try to buy something similar to gain some profit. There is no sense of urgency by publishers to find the \u201cbest.\u201d The only urgent need is to get something sufficiently different from a best seller and monopolize it. Plagiarism is encouraged and reveals itself in false diversity when the market is flooded by imitations that mimic greatly promoted works. We should emphasize that under copyright, only well-promoted works, not the best ones, are imitated.\n\nUnder Authoright and Self-tuning, derivatives are allowed without restriction as a natural way for culture to develop. On the contrary, a creator\u2019s freedom to build upon earlier works is suppressed under copyright, while a plagiarist can easily measure the level of formal difference and follow all necessary formalities to be published.\n\nUnder Self-tuning and Authoright, publishers are interested in public development while under copyright publishers are interested in the obstruction of public development.\n\nConclusions\n\nAll positive speculation about copyrights, patents and other exclusive rights looks somewhat rational on the surface but actually works in the exact opposite way.\n\nAuthoright, which governs cultural affairs according to the nature of culture, creates highly competitive, aggressively growing markets with the omnipotent and omnipresent drive towards novelty and provides competitive incentives for authors and publishers.","title":"Culture vs. Copyright/Chapter 6","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":5510}