{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_Intellectual_Virtue_Signaling_and_Non_Expert_Credibility/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_Intellectual_Virtue_Signaling_and_Non_Expert_Credibility","id":"wikisource_Intellectual_Virtue_Signaling_and_Non_Expert_Credibility","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Intellectual_Virtue_Signaling_and_(Non)Expert_Credibility","summary":null,"tags":["2025_works","CC_attribution_4.0","Incomplete_texts","Journal_articles","Philosophy","Research_articles"],"text":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2025) 118\u2013134 \u00a9 The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge\nUniversity Press on behalf of The American Philosophical Association. This is an Open Access article, distributed under\nthe terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits\nunrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.\n\nDOI:10.1017/apa.2024.3\n\nIntellectual Virtue Signaling and (Non)Expert Credibility\n\nABSTRACT: In light of the complexity of some important matters, the best epistemic strategy for laypersons is often to rely heavily on the judgments of subject matter experts. However, given the contentiousness of some issues and the existence of fake experts, determining who to trust from the lay perspective is no simple matter. One proposed approach is for laypersons to attend to displays of intellectual virtue as indicators of expertise. I argue that this strategy is likely to fail, as non-experts often display apparent intellectual virtues while legitimate experts often display apparent intellectual vices. Then, I argue that this challenge is dif\ufb01cult to overcome, as experts who attempt to better exhibit apparent intellectual virtues would likely compromise their own reliability in the process. Finally, I discuss two conclusions\u2014one more optimistic and one more pessimistic\u2014that one might draw concerning the role of intellectual virtue in the identi\ufb01cation of experts.\n\nKEYWORDS: autonomy, experts, intellectual virtue, open-mindedness, virtue signaling\n\nIntroduction\n\nIn many domains of inquiry, the most truth-conducive strategy for laypersons is to\ndefer to relevant experts, at least when there is a consensus among them. This\npoint underscores the importance of laypersons being able to identify the relevant\nexperts in various domains. This is a notoriously dif\ufb01cult task, especially in those\ncases in which there exists substantial controversy about target questions.\nMoreover, allegations of conspiratorial activity on the part of putative experts\nmay complicate laypersons\u2019 identi\ufb01cation of reliable sources.\n\nIn section one, I recount strategies that have been identi\ufb01ed to facilitate laypersons\u2019 identi\ufb01cations of relevant experts. In the process, I offer some critical remarks concerning some of the proposed strategies. Then, in section two, I draw attention to a neglected complication in the identi\ufb01cation of experts. In short, non-expert sources often outperform legitimate experts in displays of intellectual virtue. Insofar as laypersons rely on displays of intellectual virtue as credibility cues, they can be expected to misallocate trust. In section three, I consider the extent to which the problem identi\ufb01ed here can be solved. I argue that the challenge is severe, as attempts by experts to increase their perceived credibility by signaling intellectual virtue would either be insincere and often counterproductive or would reduce their effectiveness qua experts. This is because good intellectual practice often con\ufb02icts with what, from the lay perspective, seems to be good\nintellectual practice. I conclude with some brief remarks on how this challenge\nmight in principle be met.\n\n1. The Identi\ufb01cation of Experts\n\nFollowing Alvin Goldman, I de\ufb01ne an expert in a domain as:\n\n[S]omeone who possesses an extensive fund of knowledge (true belief)\nand a set of skills or methods for apt and successful deployment of\nthis knowledge to new questions in the domain. (2001:\u00a092)\n\nSo construed, expertise is an objective matter of actual and potential reliability. It is\nthus possible, on the present approach, that those widely regarded as experts are not\nlegitimate experts. For example, it is in principle possible that an astrophysicist with\nan excellent reputation, credentials, and professional positions to his name is only an\napparent expert. Likewise, it is possible in principle on the present approach that\nsome individuals lacking the trappings of expertise are experts nonetheless. How\nregularly the trappings of expertise are misaligned with actual expertise will\ndepend on the integrity of the processes by which reputation, credentials and the\nlike are awarded, individuals\u2019 opportunities to pursue the trappings of expertise,\nindividuals\u2019 interest in doing so, and so on. Thus, for some examples, nepotism\nand other forms of favoritism, as well as discriminatory practices, can cause\nmisalignments between legitimate expertise and the markers of expertise.\n\nBecause expertise is an objective matter, and actual expertise may in principle\ndepart from perceived expertise, the identi\ufb01cation of legitimate experts is a\nnon-trivial task. In some cases, the identi\ufb01cation of legitimate experts is not\nnecessary for truth-conducive epistemic reliance on others. For example, the\nproposition that Finland exists is, at least for most people, believed to be based on\nthe testimony of others. However, because there is virtually no disagreement\nconcerning this proposition, truth-conducive social epistemic reliance on others\ndoes not require distinguishing between experts and non-experts. For a broad\nrange of other questions, however, there exists substantial disagreement that\ncomplicates the epistemic policy of deference to experts. Notably, while many\nsocial epistemologists have focused on cases of disagreement among putative\nexperts bearing the trappings of expertise\u2014disputes between professional\nscientists, for example\u2014the challenge is broader than this. In addition to\ndisagreements within epistemic institutions, propositions that are widely accepted\nwithin such institutions are often challenged from without. For example,\nproponents of alternative medicine regularly challenge orthodox medical claims\nand practices. The challenge facing the layperson is thus not merely to select\nsources among putative experts bearing similar institutional status, but to select\namong a broader range of claimants to objective expertise.\n\nLet us turn to some proposed strategies for selecting well, several of which\nwere offered in a pioneering article by Goldman (2001). The \ufb01rst strategy\ndiscussed by Goldman is the direct evaluation of the content of experts\u2019\narguments. For present purposes, I take this strategy to be a non-starter. We\nare chie\ufb02y interested in those cases in which a layperson is not practically\ncapable of reliably evaluating the cases for and against various claims. The\ninability to do so is, after all, the reason for which the layperson must identify\nthe right expert(s) to which to defer.\n\nEven if laypersons cannot meaningfully assess the content of experts\u2019 arguments,\nthey might be better positioned to assess the delivery of experts\u2019 arguments. For\nexample, Goldman suggests that laypersons might reasonably treat dialectical\nsuperiority\u2014understood as effectiveness in responding to opponents\u2019 arguments\u2014\nas an indicator of relative expertise (2001:\u00a095). Notably, effectiveness in\nresponding here cannot be understood to require responding with sound\narguments, as the layperson is not positioned to evaluate this property of arguments.\n\nAccording to Goldman, dialectical superiority is only a non-conclusive indicator\nof relative expertise. Unfortunately, even this diagnosis may be too optimistic. First,\nit is only rarely that laypersons have the opportunity to assess the relative dialectical\nskills of supposed experts, at least if such skills are interpreted narrowly as\nmanifesting in debate contexts. Such debates occur relatively infrequently, in part\nfor reasons discussed below. What is more, in debate contexts, dialectical\nsuperiority is often arguably an indicator that one\u2019s arguments are unsound. To\nsee this, imagine a debate between a representative of the \ufb02at Earth conspiracy\ntheory and a representative of the scienti\ufb01c orthodoxy. For the \ufb02at Earther,\npreparation for such a debate is a relatively easy matter. There are a limited\nnumber of widely-cited scienti\ufb01c grounds for accepting that the Earth is roughly\nspherical. The \ufb02at Earther need not develop sound counterarguments to these\u2014\nonly arguments that will likely appear plausible to laypersons. In contrast, the\northodox scientist\u2019s job is much more dif\ufb01cult. Because there is no sound basis on\nwhich the \ufb02atness of the Earth might be defended, the \ufb02at Earther can only rely on\nunsound arguments. There is virtually no limit to the number of unsound\narguments that might be offered in favor of the \ufb02at Earth view. Admittedly, as an\nanonymous referee has helpfully pointed out, proponents of the \ufb02at Earth theory\nand other conspiracy theories tend to have favored arguments for their views. It\nmight thus be thought that dialectical superiority can be demonstrated by\npreparing responses to such widely-cited arguments. The challenge for this\napproach, however, is that any such response is likely to be met by some further\n(likely ad-hoc) rejoinder that need not be constrained by the facts and thus for\nwhich it will be dif\ufb01cult to prepare. The orthodox scientist is thus likely to be\nsurprised by certain arguments and may struggle to address these in a timely\nmanner. Thus, while we might hope that legitimate experts would outperform\npretenders in the context of debate, there is reason to expect that, even and\nperhaps especially when the pretender represents an especially absurd view, he or\nshe will have the upper hand.\n\nOne might also hope to assess relative expertise by consideration of dialectical\nskills in a broader sense, where these may be manifested outside of the context of structured debate. For example, one might think that exchanges between putative\nexperts on social media or in blogs afford the opportunity to compare the ease\nand comprehensiveness with which the parties address the arguments put forward\nby their counterparts. One challenge for this suggestion is that, in contrast to\nwatching a single debate, following the twists and turns in such a dialectic will\nrequire signi\ufb01cant investment on the part of laypersons. Another is that, in such\ncontexts, generating fake displays of dialectical skills that nonetheless impress\nlaypersons will be relatively easy. Inauthentic experts may generate what they\npresent as decisive refutations of their opponents\u2019 positions, and indeed might use\nlarge language models and other external resources to generate what appear to be\ncredible arguments. By hypothesis, laypersons cannot assess the quality of these\narguments directly and so, without access to information about the ways in which\nparties to a dialectic achieve dialectical superiority\u2014or some counterfeit form of\nthis\u2014laypersons will likely be led astray.\n\nConsider next some social strategies by which Goldman suggests expertise might\nbe assessed. The \ufb01rst is by directly assessing the degree of putative expert support for\nvarious positions. Other things being equal, concurrence with the judgments of other\nputative experts speaks in favor of a given person\u2019s claim to expertise, and to the\nreliability of that person\u2019s claims. Second, one might consider credentials\u2014\nincluding degrees, awards, publication histories, and professional roles\u2014as a\nmeasure of others\u2019 attitudes toward a given supposed expert. Roughly,\nachievement of various credentials indicates others\u2019 con\ufb01dence in a given person\u2019s\nclaims to expertise.\n\nThe effectiveness of these social strategies will depend on various factors. First,\nappeal to further putative expert judgments will be sound only insofar as those\nputative experts are themselves reliable. Moreover, as Goldman notes, a lack of\nindependence among putative experts signi\ufb01cantly reduces the added value of the\nappeal to numbers. Additionally, there are good reasons to doubt the reliability\nof some credentials as indicators of expertise. As Neil Levy (2022a: chap. 5)\nemphasizes, there exist a broad range of phony credentialing institutions that\neffectively compromise the signi\ufb01cance of credentials. While experts themselves\nmay be able to reliably distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate\ncredentialing institutions, laypersons will likely \ufb01nd this far more challenging.\n\nA further strategy suggested by Goldman is to consider putative experts\u2019 likely\ninterests and biases. Other things being equal, the judgments of a putative expert\nwhose interests align with the advancement of a claim carry less weight than those\nof a putative expert with little or no interest in the matter. Likewise, indications of\nbias on the part of putative experts indicate that their judgments should be given\nrestricted signi\ufb01cance. The strategy of assessing putative expert interests and biases\nhas the advantage of being relatively tractable for non-experts. For example,\nwhereas climate data and arguments based on such data are likely to be obscure\nfrom the perspective of the layperson, the motivation that those with connections\nto the fossil fuel industry have for pushing climate change denialism is easy to grasp. Nonetheless, this strategy is complicated by the existence of conspiracy\ntheories that distort lay perceptions of the interests of putative authorities. For\nexample, critics of the expert consensus can and do claim that proponents of the\nconsensus are driven by perverse \ufb01nancial incentives.\n\nThe \ufb01nal strategy Goldman suggests is to consider the track records of putative\nexperts. As Goldman notes, laypersons are often positioned to assess the accuracy\nof claims in given expert domains in the long run, even if they are not positioned\nto assess those claims when they are initially made. This is especially true when\nthose claims take the form of predictions, the bases for which may be obscure, but\nthe (non)realizations of which are readily observable.\n\nThe effectiveness of this latter strategy is heavily domain-dependent. Whereas\nthose in the business of short-term predictions\u2014meteorologists, for example\u2014can\nquickly prove themselves through the success of their predictions, other domains\nafford considerably fewer opportunities for predictions assessable by laypersons.\nSome domains\u2014history being a case in point\u2014may simply admit of fewer\npredictions. Others, like climate science, often make predictions that are highly\ncomplex, assessable only in the long term, or some combination of these. Thus,\nthe track records of certain experts may be dif\ufb01cult or impossible to assess from\nthe lay perspective.\n\nDavid Matheson (2005) builds on Goldman\u2019s discussion of dialectical superiority\nwith two further considerations accessible to laypersons. One such consideration is\nthe ability of putative experts to \u201cmanage evidence\u201d\u2014that is, to:\n\n[R]elate distinct pieces of ostensive evidence both to each other and to\nthe question concerning which they are relevant; or, alternatively, an\nability to see how the various pieces of ostensive evidence in one\u2019s\npossession \ufb01t together into one coherent whole, relevant to the\nquestion at hand. (D. Matheson 2005: 154)\n\nThis ability, which we might call explanatory superiority, re\ufb02ects an underlying\nunderstanding of the relevant subject matter and the connections between various\npieces of evidence pertaining to the issue.\n\nOne concern for the appeal to explanatory superiority is that some putative\nexperts may exploit spurious connections to create the false appearance of strong\nevidence management. Consider, for example, the conspiracy theorist that weaves\ntogether a grand but highly misleading narrative to account for the available\nevidence and its signi\ufb01cance. Notably, epistemologists studying conspiracy\ntheories have drawn attention to the prominent role that errant data\u2014data either\nunexplained by or con\ufb02icting with of\ufb01cial accounts\u2014play in conspiracy theories\n(Keeley 1999). In short, conspiracy theorists often draw attention to small\nanomalies to challenge of\ufb01cial accounts and to support alternatives. For example,\nthose promoting the conspiracy theory that the moon landing was a hoax point to\nthe fact that, in the famous photo depicting the American \ufb02ag on the surface\nof the moon, the \ufb02ag appears to \ufb02utter despite the absence of wind on the surface\nof the moon. More generally, conspiracy theories often involve connecting the\ndots\u2014that is, drawing connections between unrelated facts and events\u2014a point re\ufb02ected in the tendency of conspiracy theorists to locate illusory patterns in noise\n(van Prooijen, Douglas, and De Inocencio 2018). The risk, then, is that appeals to\nexplanatory superiority\u2014or, more accurately, what is perceived by laypersons to\nbe explanatory superiority\u2014may systematically favor conspiracy theorists over\ntheir rivals.\n\nLet us turn to a \ufb01nal strategy, also suggested by Matheson (2005). Matheson\nsuggests that laypersons may assess the reliability of putative experts by, in part,\nattending to their willingness to seriously consider opposing positions and\nrecalcitrant evidence and to own up to past mistakes. Roughly, then, Matheson\nsuggests that laypersons ought to attend to the open-mindedness and humility of\nputative experts in order to facilitate judgments of reliability. Matheson speaks of\nthis suggestion in terms of evaluations of the moral superiority of putative experts.\nBecause open-mindedness and humility have been extensively discussed as\nintellectual virtues, I will discuss this strategy in terms of intellectual virtue\nsuperiority.\n\nThis \ufb01nal suggestion from Matheson has some immediate appeal. First, it is\nplausible that laypersons can and do attend to displays of intellectual character,\nand sometimes treat these as indicators of reliability. Second, the strategy appears\nsound on its face. If putative experts are not willing to seriously engage with\nalternatives, it seems that they would be unlikely to correct false beliefs. Similarly,\nif experts do not own up to past mistakes, they are less likely to learn from those\npast mistakes. Thus, the intellectual virtues of open-mindedness and humility\nwould seem to facilitate reliability. Moreover, the possession or lack of such\nvirtues seems on the face of things to be accessible to laypersons. One need not be\nan expert to see that a putative expert is highly dismissive of alternatives or fails to\nacknowledge past mistakes. The strategy of considering putative experts\u2019\nintellectual virtues thus seems very promising on its face, at least as a supplement\nto the other strategies considered above. However, beginning in the next section, I\nargue that the attempt to assess expertise by attending to displays of intellectual\nvirtue is likely to lead laypersons astray. I then argue that this problem is not\neasily solved.\n\nTo conclude this section, it is worth emphasizing that the strategies discussed,\nincluding attention to intellectual virtue superiority, need not be construed simply\nas strategies for making one-to-one comparisons between individual putative\nexperts. In addition to comparing individuals, these strategies might be used to\nmake comparisons between communities. For example, a layperson might\nassign greater credence to explanations offered by large communities that,\ncollectively, exhibit dialectical and explanatory superiority relative to rival\ncommunities. Moreover, insofar as collectives can themselves exhibit intellectual\nvirtues and vices, as discussed by Miranda Fricker (2010), Alessandra Tanesini\n(2023), and myself (Harris 2021), it is possible in principle for laypersons to\nassign credibility to collectives according to the intellectual characters of these\ncommunities. More generally, the challenge of identifying experts need not be\nconstrued as a challenge of sorting between individuals, but can also be\nunderstood as the challenge of determining how to assess the relative credibility\nof collectives.\n\n2. Intellectual Virtue Signaling\n\nBeginning in this section, I argue that attempts to locate experts by using displays of\nintellectual virtue are likely to go awry. The basic concern resembles many of those\nraised for the strategies discussed in the previous section. There, I noted that many\ntechniques for identifying experts can misleadingly suggest the reliability of\nnon-experts, and indeed of the especially unreliable, while calling into doubt the\nreliability of legitimate experts. For example, dialectical superiority may favor\nthose that are not constrained by the truth. Similarly, attending to displays of\nintellectual virtue as signs of expertise is likely to lead laypersons astray. This is\nfor two interconnected reasons.\n\nThe \ufb01rst and more basic concern is that unreliable persons often put on\nostentatious displays of what appear to be, but need not actually be, intellectual\nvirtues. Levy (2023) has coined the term intellectual virtue signaling to capture\nthis practice. Levy understands intellectual virtue signaling as an analog of moral\nvirtue signaling, which is de\ufb01ned as \u201cmoral talk ostensibly about some state of\naffairs or action that is designed in part to draw attention to the person doing the\nsignaling\u201d (Levy 2023: 312). In short, moral virtue signalers aim not\u2014or not\nexclusively\u2014to do good, but to seem good. Likewise, intellectual virtue signalers\nmay or may not actually possess intellectual virtues but aim at least in part to\nseem as if they do.\n\nIt may be objected that this de\ufb01nition is excessively\nbroad, as being partly\nmotivated to seem good is extremely common and thus the present de\ufb01nition\nwould overdiagnose instances of behavior as virtue signaling (cf. Tosi and\nWarmke 2020: 20). In their work on moral virtue signaling\u2014moral\ngrandstanding, in their terminology\u2014Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke (2020)\noffer a useful test meant to indicate more clearly when an act involves moral\ngrandstanding. On their view, an act counts as a case of moral grandstanding only\nif the actor would be disappointed to learn that the audience was not impressed\nby the moral qualities displayed by the act (Hill and Fanciullo 2023: 4; Tosi and\nWarmke 2020:\u00a019). I have some reservations about using proneness to\ndisappointment as a measure of the strength of one\u2019s desires. When one enters a\nlottery, one may very strongly desire to win, even though one will not be\ndisappointed if one does not win. This is because, while one wants to win, one\nexpects not to win. More generally, disappointment seems to depend on both the\nstrength of one\u2019s desires and on one\u2019s expectations. Still, I think Tosi and\nWarmke\u2019s test offers at least a good heuristic for distinguishing between cases that\ndo and do not involve virtue signaling. If one \ufb01nds Tosi and Warmke\u2019s test\ninadequate, alternative ways of distinguishing between moral grandstanding (or\nvirtue signaling) and cases in which one is merely partly motivated by concerns\nabout one\u2019s reputation, without thereby virtue signaling, are available. Evan Westra (2021), for example, writes that virtue signaling occurs just when one\u2019s\nmotivation to contribute to public moral discourse is only secondary to one\u2019s\ndesire for recognition. We might understand this to mean that, if the agent\u2019s\nmotivations were at odds then, other things being equal, the desire for recognition\nwould win out. This would be a relatively strong condition on virtue signaling.\nAlternatively, one might say that an act amounts to virtue signaling if one\u2019s desire\nfor recognition is a difference-maker, in the sense that one would not have\nperformed the act if one lacked the desire for recognition. Because my aim here is\nnot to analyze virtue signaling, I will remain neutral between these approaches.\n\nCatharine Saint-Croix (forthcoming) discusses intellectual virtue signaling in\nterms of epistemic virtue signaling. As Saint-Croix emphasizes, intellectual virtue\nsignaling may, but need not, consist in an attempt to display a particular virtue. In\nsome cases, one might aim to present oneself as having a particular intellectual\nvirtue. For example, one might boast of one\u2019s consumption of newspapers\nrepresenting a range of ideological perspectives as a way of signaling one\u2019s\nopen-mindedness. However, intellectual virtue signaling might also consist in\nattempts to convey a general impression of intellectual superiority, independent of\nany particular intellectual virtue. Consider, for example, the smug use of the\nphrase \u201cI don\u2019t own a television.\u201d Because I am concerned here with the prospects\nof using displays of speci\ufb01c intellectual virtue as indicators of reliability, I focus on\ncases in which individuals or collectives aim to present themselves as having\nspeci\ufb01c intellectual virtues.\nWith this point in mind, let us consider how the above approaches might be\napplied to derive different accounts of intellectual virtue signaling in particular.\nOn one possible view, one engages in virtue signaling only if one does so with a\ndesire to be recognized as possessing intellectual virtue that is suf\ufb01ciently strong\nthat one will be disappointed if this desire is not satis\ufb01ed. As the discussion above\nanticipates, this approach is complicated by the fact that proneness to\ndisappointment plausibly depends on both the strength of desire and one\u2019s\nexpectations. One might strongly hope to impress an audience with one\u2019s display\nof intellectual virtue but, because one anticipates a tough crowd, not expect to\nimpress the audience in this way. In such a case, it seems plausible that one might\nbe engaging in intellectual virtue signaling even though one would not be\ndisappointed by failure to achieve recognition as intellectually virtuous. On an\nalternative approach, one\u2019s desire to be recognized as intellectually virtuous must\nbe stronger than the other motivating desires behind one\u2019s actions. For example,\nif one posts a long social media thread about a foreign con\ufb02ict and is motivated in\npart by the desire to inform one\u2019s followers, but desires even more strongly to be\nrecognized as intellectually virtuous by those followers, then, on this second\napproach, one engages in intellectual virtue signaling. Finally, to illustrate the\nthird approach, we might imagine some individual who has some motivation to\ninform her followers by way of a social media thread, but whose desire to do so is\nnot suf\ufb01ciently strong, by itself, to bring her to do so. On the third approach, her posting of the threat will constitute intellectual virtue signaling if she posts it only\nbecause her desire to inform is supplemented by a desire for recognition as an\nintellectually virtuous person\u2014that is, if her latter desire is a difference-maker\nwith respect to whether she performs the action in question.\n\nMy aim here is not to defend any particular account of virtue signaling, and is\ninstead to argue that the practice of virtue signaling complicates one proposed\nstrategy for identifying experts. Thus, I will not attempt a decisive argument for\nany of these approaches here. However, it is worth noting that, with the aim of\nassessing the effects of intellectual virtue signaling in mind, there is some reason to\nfavor a relatively demanding account of the desire for recognition. If we suppose\nthat acts may constitute intellectual virtue signaling in virtue of just any attendant\ndesire for recognition as intellectually virtuous, then intellectual virtue signaling is\nrampant\u2014indeed I confess that I might be engaging in some right now (cf. Levy\n2023, 320\u201321)! Thus, it may be preferable to favor a relatively demanding desire\nfor recognition condition so that the resultant de\ufb01nition better accords with\ninstances that would be recognizable as intellectual virtue signaling. In any case, I\nwill focus below on cases in which the desire for recognition as virtuous is\nespecially strong. The thesis of this article might thus be framed in terms of the\neffects of intellectual virtue signaling, or a particularly egregious subclass of it,\ndepending on one\u2019s favored approach to the desire for recognition condition.\n\nLevy\u2019s core example of intellectual virtue signaling is the practice, familiar on\nsocial media, of non-experts offering lengthy and typically heterodox takes on a\nwide variety of hot topics. Thus, for example, the same person might offer what\nseem to be nuanced and skeptical takes on events ranging from domestic\neconomic matters, foreign wars, and global pandemics. In so doing, that person\nputs on a display of apparent intelligence, intellectual courage, and autonomy\n(Levy 2023, 316). Insofar as this display is effective, the intellectual virtue signaler\nis likely to draw attention away from legitimate experts, to cause confusion about\nwho possesses legitimate expertise, and, in this way, to generate broader confusion\nabout the truth (Levy 2023, 320). As Levy emphasizes, the latter problem arises in\npart because the intellectual virtue signaler is incentivized to offer heterodox\njudgments as a means of maximizing the attention they receive. Especially on\nsocial media, one\u2019s takes must be hot to garner attention. Here, I focus on how\nintellectual virtue signaling can complicate the process of identifying experts\naccording to the strategy Matheson (2005) suggests, and the extent to which this\nchallenge can be solved.\n\nLevy focuses on the signaling of intelligence, courage, and autonomy. Let us turn\nto a further virtue that has received considerable philosophical attention in recent\nyears (Battaly 2018b; 2018a): the virtue of open-mindedness (Bland 2022; Levy\n2022b; Riggs 2010). As a \ufb01rst pass, to be open-minded is to be willing to take\nseriously alternatives to one\u2019s own views. As we will see below, this initial gloss on\nopen-mindedness is overly simple, but it will suf\ufb01ce for now. I focus here on\nopen-mindedness because the exploitative signaling of this virtue appears to be\nparticularly prevalent. Thus, for example, it is commonplace for conspiracy\ntheorists to signal their possession of this virtue by refusing to take for granted\nof\ufb01cial accounts of events, by attending to a broad range of possibilities, by challenging representatives of the orthodoxy to debates, and so on. Thus, for\nexample, while many would refuse to take seriously the possibility that the\nSeptember 11 attacks were a false \ufb02ag, conspiracy theorists proclaiming a\ncommitment to open-mindedness might well treat this possibility as worth\ninvestigating.\n\nNotably, while conspiracy theorists outwardly display a commitment to\nopen-mindedness, it is not clear that these displays are indicative of their actual\npractices. For example, some empirical evidence indicates that open-mindedness is\nnegatively correlated with belief in conspiracy theories (Swami et al. 2014). While\nthe empirical evidence is far from conclusive, it is at least not obvious that\nconspiracy theorists\u2019 commitment to open-mindedness is genuine. This is\nespecially true of promoters of conspiracy theories\u2014those that broadcast and\noften pro\ufb01t from broadcasting conspiracy theories\u2014as opposed to those merely\ntaken in by them. At a minimum, we might say that displays of open-mindedness\nare signals of reliability too easily feigned to be useful in discerning genuine experts.\n\nThe same is true of other displays of intellectual virtue, for example the virtue of\nintellectual autonomy. On the face of it, intellectual autonomy is the tendency to\nthink for oneself. Elizabeth Fricker, for example, writes that the intellectually\nautonomous person \u201ctakes no one else\u2019s word for anything, but accepts only what\nshe has found out for herself, relying only on her own cognitive faculties and\ninvestigative and inferential powers\u201d (E. Fricker 2006). As with open-mindedness,\nthis initial gloss on intellectual autonomy is arguably too simple and will be\ncomplicated below. Intellectual autonomy, so construed, is plausibly the chief\nvirtue of conspiracy theorists, and \u201cthink for yourself,\u201d \u201cdo your own research,\u201d\nand related slogans are regularly repeated by conspiracy theorists (Ballantyne,\nCelniker, and Dunning 2022; Buzzell and Rini 2023; Levy 2022c).\n\nNotably, promoters of conspiracy theories do not simply display the virtue of\nepistemic autonomy in their own practice. Rather, conspiracy theorists counsel\nthat others ought to think for themselves. Such advice indicates the absence of an\nagenda, and therefore encourages trust in conspiracy theory promoters. As with\nopen-mindedness, there is little reason to think that conspiracy theorists are\nactually more epistemically autonomous than others, or that exhortations to think\nfor oneself represent a sincere commitment to the promotion of epistemic\nautonomy. As to the former point, empirical research indicates that conspiracy\ntheorists treat others\u2019 judgments as evidence in much the same way that\nnon-conspiracy theorists do (Altay et al. 2023). As to the latter, the exhortation to\nthink for oneself is regularly accompanied by the presentation of misleading\nevidence favoring foregone conspiratorial conclusions.\n\nThus far in this section, I have argued that the strategy of identifying experts by\nattending to displays of intellectual virtue is easily exploitable by those that fake\ndisplays of intellectual virtue. My core examples have been conspiracy theorists\nand, in particular, conspiracy theory promoters. However, the point generalizes to\na range of other non-experts. Proponents of young earth creationism, for example,\nregularly challenge orthodox evolutionary biologists to debates\u2014in displays of\napparent open-mindedness. Similarly, promoters of alternative medical practices\noften bemoan that their positions are not given a fair hearing alongside those of orthodox medicine and encourage individuals to explore alternative medicine for\nthemselves.\n\nThese examples hint at a second concern for attention to displays of intellectual\nvirtue as indicators of expertise. In short, legitimate experts often fail to display\nintellectual virtues in ways corresponding to displays by their counterparts and,\nindeed, often seem to display intellectual vices. Proponents of evolution by natural\nselection often refuse to engage with creationists, and even discourage others from\ndoing so (Etchells 2014). Similarly, many mainstream scientists and other\nepistemic authorities refuse to publicly engage with conspiracy theories and their\npromoters (Lee 2023), and recommend that others do the same. Indeed, it has\nbeen argued that the failure of experts to engage seriously with apparent evidence\nagainst their views contributes to the creation and spread of conspiracy theories\n(Brooks forthcoming). Moreover, legitimate experts often seem to shun epistemic\nautonomy, both in themselves and others. If the conspiracist mantra is \u201cthink for\nyourself\u201d that of many experts is to \u201ctrust the science.\u201d\n\nInsofar as a layperson uses displays of apparent intellectual virtue as cues of\nreliability, that person is likely to be led systematically astray. This is not only\nbecause non-experts regularly engage in ostentatious displays of apparent\nintellectual virtue, but also because legitimate experts often seem to behave\nnon-virtuously and, indeed, intellectually viciously. In fact, certain practices\u2014for\nexample conspiracists\u2019 and creationists\u2019 challenging of scientists to debates\u2014serve\nsimultaneously to signal virtue and to seemingly expose the vices of their\ncounterparts. It might, however, seem that the problem identi\ufb01ed here is easily\nsolved, at least in part. All it would take is for legitimate experts to more\ndeliberately display intellectual virtue. They might, for example, go to greater\nlengths to engage in debates with representatives of alternative views, thereby\ndisplaying open-mindedness. Similarly, they might display a respect for epistemic\nautonomy by eschewing reliance on other putative experts and by encouraging\nlaypersons to consider, explore and weigh the evidence for themselves. In the next\nsection, however, I argue that such shifts in practice would often do more harm\nthan good.\n\n3. The Limits of Virtue\n\nOn the face of things, the suggestion that genuine experts can address the problem\ndescribed above by displaying greater intellectual virtue seems like win-win.\nGreater open-mindedness, humility, and intellectual autonomy on the part of\nexperts would make such experts easier to identify, while also improving the\nquality of their inquiries. Or so one might think. However, this suggestion is\noverly optimistic. As I argue in this section, greater displays of intellectual virtue\nwould either be insincere and counterproductive or would reduce the ability of\nexperts to provide genuine valuable information.\n\nSuppose, \ufb01rst, that experts merely pretend to be intellectually virtuous\u2014that is, that they inauthentically signal intellectual virtue. One way they might do so is by emulating those non-experts that signal commitment to epistemic autonomy. Experts might, for example, encourage laypersons to do their own research. To facilitate this, experts might release more data without offering their own\ninterpretations of the data. While such a shift might encourage greater trust in\ngenuine experts, any such victory would be pyrrhic. Unless experts offer their own\ninterpretations, increased trust in actual experts would do little to improve the\nepistemic situations of laypersons. Moreover, expert exhortations to do one\u2019s own\nresearch would likely do more harm than good. This is because, as a general rule,\n\u201cdo your own research\u201d is a bad epistemic policy for laypersons to follow\n(Huemer 2005). Laypersons are distinguished, in large part, by their lack of\nexpertise\u2014which is likely to include the inability to reliably interpret relevant data\nin expert domains. Admittedly, some laypersons could develop the needed\nexpertise to reliably interpret data in certain expert domains. However, even in\nthis case, they would remain non-experts in other domains. Moreover, insofar as\nthe development of expertise enables former laypersons to reach the same\njudgments already reached by experts, this process would involve a redundancy of\nexpertise.\n\nSuppose, alternatively, that experts work to actually embody the sorts of virtues\ndescribed above, including open-mindedness, humility, and epistemic autonomy.\nThat is, suppose that experts themselves opt to be more open-minded, humbler,\nand more epistemically autonomous. A given scienti\ufb01c expert might, for example,\ndisplay greater autonomy by refusing to take for granted the \ufb01ndings of other\nscientists, and opting instead to, as the conspiracy theorist exhorts, do her own\nresearch. In so doing, the scientist might display her intellectual virtue to\nlaypersons, thereby showing herself to be reliable. There are at least two severe\nproblems with this suggestion. The \ufb01rst is practical. A scientist who proposed to\nrepeat research already conducted by others would struggle to attract funding for\ndoing so. The latter, and perhaps more serious concern, is that such a scientist\nwould be unable to get far without relying on the results of others. As\nepistemologists have emphasized, we are pervasively epistemically dependent on\nothers (Hardwig 1985), such that laypersons and experts alike owe much of their\nknowledge to others. In the context of science, in particular, a refusal to depend\non others would serve only to stunt the progress of science, as effort would be\nwasted on attempts to individually do what has already been done by others.\n\nConsider, next, the virtues of humility and open-mindedness. An expert might\ndemonstrate a commitment to such virtues by, for example, engaging in debates\nwith those holding heterodox views, by hearing out proponents of those views,\nand by testing a broad range of alternatives. For example, during the COVID-19\npandemic, medical experts might have demonstrated these virtues by debating\nproposed alternative treatments, giving their attention to those promoting such\nalternatives, and indeed putting proposed alternatives to the test. In so doing, they might have attracted the trust of those that, like some critics of mainstream views\nabout the pandemic, claimed that proper scientists are willing to question everything.\n\nOne problem in this case is that doing such things would be, by and large, a waste\nof time. A second problem is that, if experts strive to be genuinely open-minded by,\nfor example, giving equal hearing to ideas long thought to be non-credible by the\nbroader community, some are likely to be led astray. At best, they will waste their\ntime re-learning what they have already learned from others. At worst, they will\nthemselves form mistaken judgments. The broader problem is that there is little\nreason to expect that the qualities that laypersons think promote good science\nactually do so. The traits that would make one a trusted science communicator are\nnot necessarily the same traits that would make one a good scientist. Because\nscienti\ufb01c progress depends in large part on the division of labor, scienti\ufb01c success\nis often promoted by dependency, closed-mindedness, arrogance, and other traits\nthat, while perhaps damaging at the individual level, promote the exploration and\nthorough consideration of a broad but limited range of reasonable alternatives at\nthe collective level. The preceding point resembles in broad strokes the point,\nmade by a variety of authors (Hull 1997; Kitcher 1995; Smart 2018), that\nsuccessful science does not depend on individual scientists being motivated to\ncontribute to the development of collective knowledge. Instead, as has been said\nof markets, some suggest that the structure of science harnesses private vice into\ncollective bene\ufb01ts\u2014in this case shared knowledge. Rather than focusing broadly\non the relation between the motives of scientists and the success of science, I focus\nhere instead on how the lack of speci\ufb01c virtues among individuals and collectives\nmay serve the collective epistemic good among practitioners in expert domains.\n\nIt may be objected that the apparent tension between epistemic virtue on the part\nof experts and collective success within expert domains that I have emphasized here is\ncontingent on an overly general and perhaps na\u00efve conception of epistemic virtue.\nFor example, one might say that open-mindedness is not, as I have de\ufb01ned it\nabove, best captured simply in terms of a willingness to take seriously alternatives\nto one\u2019s views. The open-minded person need not take seriously just any\npreposterous view that happens to come to his or her attention. Rather, the\nopen-minded person need only be open to a relatively narrow set of possibilities\nthat meet some threshold of plausibility. Similarly, one might say that the virtue of\nautonomy does not require its possessor to eschew reliance on others. Instead, one\nmight say, the virtue of intellectual autonomy is consistent with reliance on others,\nso long as that reliance is re\ufb02ective of one\u2019s own good judgments as to who to rely\nupon, and how and when to rely upon them (J. Matheson 2021, 182\u201383).\nAlternatively, one might say that the mistake is to think of epistemic autonomy as\na virtue at all, at least when this virtue is not regulated by the additional virtue of\nepistemic interdependence (Battaly 2021).\n\nThese alternatives raise interesting questions as to what makes a virtue a virtue.\nPerhaps, one might say, the cases highlighted here suggest that whether a given\ntrait constitutes a virtue is dependent on its effects. This view, which is endorsed by some virtue responsibilists (Zagzebski 1996, pt. II), would account for why there\nare limits to the alternatives that an open-minded person would countenance. It\nwould also account for why autonomy\u2014if understood to involve non-reliance on\nothers\u2014is no virtue.\n\nI do not aim to determine here whether this approach to the epistemic virtues is to\nbe preferred to a simpler one. Instead, what I want to highlight here is that\u2014even if\nepistemic virtues are best construed along the relatively complex lines suggested here\n\u2014there is little reason to expect ordinary members of the public to have such a\nsophisticated account of the virtues. What individuals do to signal their own\nintellectual virtue, and what acts individuals interpret as indicative of intellectual\nvirtue, will depend on the norms operative in their speci\ufb01c social epistemic\ncontexts (cf. Saint-Croix forthcoming). Suppose, for example, that one puts on a\ndisplay of not believing anything based on the word of others. Even if this is not a\ngenuine indicator of epistemic autonomy, and indeed even if intellectual\nautonomy is not a virtue at all, such an act might be undertaken in the hopes of\nindicating one\u2019s intellectual virtues, and might be interpreted by others as doing\nso. Thus, even if we suppose that deference to those who actually possess\nintellectual virtues would be a reliable belief-forming strategy, mistaken\nconceptions of what the intellectual virtues involve, and indeed what the virtues\nare, will likely lead laypersons to trust those who lack genuine intellectual virtues.\nBy a similar token, misunderstandings about intellectual virtue may lead\nlaypersons to distrust those who exhibit genuine intellectual virtues. Even if there\nis in fact no tension between virtue on the part of experts and success in expert\ndomains, individuals untutored in virtue epistemology are likely to perceive such a\ntension.\n\nLet us illustrate the preceding points with an example. Given the assumption that\nmembers of the public treat displays of apparent virtue and vice as a basis on which\nto apportion trust, the mere appearance of such a tension is suf\ufb01cient to result in\nmisallocations of trust. If the conspiracist podcaster displays traits that ordinary\npersons perceive to be illustrative of virtue, while the legitimate expert displays\ntraits that ordinary persons perceive to be illustrative of vice, then, even if these\nperceptions rest on a misunderstanding of the epistemic virtues, the public will\nplace too much trust in the podcaster and too little trust in the legitimate expert.\nMore generally, when laypersons use intellectual virtue as a marker of expertise,\nthe best they can do is identify those that seem, from the lay perspective, to be\nvirtuous. As I have argued, the attempt to identify legitimate experts using such\ncues is likely to lead laypersons astray.\n\n4. Concluding Remarks\n\nLaypersons cannot be expected to competently form judgments about matters in\nexpert domains without guidance by legitimate experts. Thus, laypersons require\nstrategies for identifying legitimate experts. Any such strategy must be both\nreliable and accessible for individuals lacking in domain knowledge. On the face of things, the identi\ufb01cation of legitimate experts through assessment of cognitive\ncharacter seems like a promising strategy insofar as it is both feasible and\ncontinuous with familiar practices of character assessment. However, as I have\nargued here, such a strategy is likely to go systematically awry\u2014as displays of\napparent intellectual virtue are not reliably correlated with\u2014and may indeed be\nnegatively correlated with\u2014actual expertise. One might, on this basis, draw one\nof at least two different conclusions.\n\nThe \ufb01rst, perhaps more pessimistic conclusion, is that attention to displays of\nintellectual virtue is, at best, useless as a strategy for identifying legitimate\nexperts. One tempted by this conclusion might argue that laypersons would be\nbetter served by learning about how, for example, the structure of science can\nallow science to succeed in spite of, and indeed perhaps because of, the vices\nof scientists. In this way, laypersons might be brought to trust a consensus\nreached by scientists, even if they do not regard individual scientists as worthy\nof trust.\n\nA more optimistic conclusion is that, if the identi\ufb01cation of experts through\nattention to the virtues and vices of putative experts is to succeed, it will\nrequire laypersons to adopt a more sophisticated approach to the virtues along\nthe lines of the one sketched in section three. Laypersons must learn, perhaps\nby being taught, that pretenders to expertise sometimes look fair, while feeling\nfoul. While ambitious, it is perhaps not unrealistic that laypersons might learn\nthis lesson. Certain outward displays look like signs of friendliness, but most\nof us have learned that such displays do not reliably indicate the good\ncharacter of used car salesmen and the like. Likewise, laypersons might learn\nthat ostentatious displays of willingness to debate, to consider alternatives, to\ntake nothing for granted, to think for oneself, and so on, need not indicate the\npossession of epistemic intellectual virtues, properly understood. Through the\ndevelopment of more sophisticated understandings of the intellectual virtues\nand their indicators, the viability of this strategy for identifying experts might\nbe increased.\n\nThese conclusions need not be regarded as entirely incompatible alternatives.\nGiven that even experts are fallible and otherwise \ufb02awed, reliance on the collective\nand institutional virtues of expert domains is often a surer strategy than trust in\nparticular individuals. At the same time, given our social natures, it would likely\nbe unrealistic to expect laypersons to eschew relations of personalized trust\ntoward putative experts altogether. Consequently, the best path forward for\nlaypersons searching for truth in expert domains is likely a combination of\ndefeasible trust in persons that display genuine intellectual virtues, and reliance on\nthe collective and institutional virtues of expert domains to constrain and harness\nthe negative inclinations of individuals.\n\nKEITH RAYMOND HARRIS\n\nUNIVERSITY OF VIENNA\n\nkeithraymondharris@gmail.com\n\nReferences\n\nAltay, Sacha, Nera, Kenzo, Ejaz, Waqas, Sch\u00f6pfer, C\u00e9line, and Tomas, Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric. 2023. \u201cConspiracy Believers Claim to Be Free Thinkers but (Under)Use Advice like Everyone Else.\u201d British Journal of Social Psychology, May, bjso.12655. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12655.\n\nAnvari, Farid, and Lakens, Dani\u00ebl. 2018. \u201cThe Replicability Crisis and Public Trust in Psychological Science.\u201d Comprehensive Results in Social Psychology 3 (3): 266\u201386. https://doi.org/10.1080/23743603.2019.1684822.\n\nBallantyne, Nathan, Celniker, Jared B., and Dunning, David. 2022. \u201c\u2018Do Your Own Research.\u2019\u201d Social Epistemology 0 (0): 1\u201316. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2146469.\n\nBattaly, Heather. 2018a. \u201cClosed-Mindedness and Dogmatism.\u201d Episteme 15 (3): 261\u201382. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.22.\n\nBattaly, Heather. 2018b. \u201cCan Closed-Mindedness Be an Intellectual Virtue?\u201d Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 84 (November): 23\u201345. https://doi.org/10.1017/S135824611800053X.\n\nBattaly, Heather. 2021. \u201cIntellectual Autonomy and Intellectual Interdependence.\u201d In Epistemic Autonomy, by Matheson, Jonathan and Lougheed, Kirk, 1st ed., 153\u201372. 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Cambridge University Press.\n\nThis work is released under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, which allows free use, distribution, and creation of derivatives, so long as the license is unchanged and clearly noted, and the original author is attributed.\n\nPublic domainPublic domainfalsefalse","title":"Intellectual Virtue Signaling and (Non)Expert Credibility","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":8226}