{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_Nietzsche_the_thinker_Notes/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_Nietzsche_the_thinker_Notes","id":"wikisource_Nietzsche_the_thinker_Notes","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nietzsche_the_thinker/Notes","summary":null,"tags":["Subpages"],"text":"NOTES\n\nCHAPTER I\n\naThere is this modicum of truth in the extravagant statement of the Encyclopedia Britannica, art. \"Nietzsche,\" \"Revolt against the whole civilized [sic] environment in which he was brought up is the keynote of Nietzsche's literary career.\" On the other hand, R. M. Meyer finds in him a reflection of the voluntaristic tendency, both theoretical and practical, of the nineteenth century.\" This is accordingly Nietzsche's point of\ndeparture: there are beings who 'will.' At Descartes' proposition, 'I think'\u2014he had to shrug his shoulders critically. For not in vain is Nietzsche a child of the time, in which Treitschke reduced all politics to will to power\u2014and Bismarck lived Treitschke's politics. Not in vain a child of the time, for which 'willing' was equivalent to 'willing to effect,' 'willing to create'; in which young Disraeli declared, 'What I teach I will accomplish'; in which men of force (Kraftnaturen) like Gambetta, Lassalle, Mazzini, Garibaldi had vital influence on tens of thousands\" (Nietzsche, sein Leben imd seine Werke, pp. 679-80). Cf. also August Dorner, Pessimismus, Nietzsche und Naturalismus, p. 191.\n\nb As to the political movement of the Germans, see pp. 466-7 of this volume.\n\nc He said the same of Schopenhauer, adding, \"The Germans have no finger for us, they have in general no fingers, only paws.\" Cf., as to his differences with German idealists, Werke, XIII, 337-8, \u00a7 838.\n\nd As to German soldiers, see the discriminating article by Julius Bab\nin Die Hilfe, December 31, 1915, \"Friedrich Nietzsche und die deutsche Gegenwart.\" Stephen Graham is of the opinion (he says \"sure\") that\n\"many British soldiers who have rifles on their shoulders today have\nlearned of Nietzsche and have a warm place in their hearts for him\"\n(Russia and the World, 1915, p. 138).\n\ne Havelock Ellis and the late William Wallace published valuable\nshort studies of Nietzsche at an early date.\n\nf Cf. Karl Jo\u00ebl, Nietzsche und die Romantik, p. 328; Henri Lichtenberger, La Philosophie de Nietzsche, pp. 83 ff.; R. Richter, Friedrich Nietzsche, sein Leben und sein Werk (2d ed.), pp. 91 ff.; H. Vaihinger,\nNietzsche als Philosoph, p. 16; Ernst Horneffer, Nietzsches letztes Schaffen, p. 20; August Dorner, op. cit., pp. 118, 122 n.; R. H. Gr\u00fctzmacher, Nietzsche, ein akademisches Publikum, pp. 49-52; H. H\u00f6ffding,\nModerne Philosophen, p. 145; R. M. Meyer, op. cit., passim. For an\ninstance of arbitrary judgment in the matter, see George Saintsbury's\nThe Later Nineteenth Century, p. 244; History of Criticism, pp. 582-4.\nHouston Stewart Chamberlain (Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, I, xxv) even says that Nietzsche became a victim of madness,\nwhen he fell away from Wagner! More reasonable, or at least reasoned,\nconjectures appear in Theobald Ziegler's Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 20, and\nP. J. M\u00f6bius' Nietzsche, passim. On the other hand, William Wallace\nand Havelock Ellis saw the facts as they were at the outset. A statement of Julius Kaftan, a not over-friendly critic who was with Nietzsche\nin Sils-Maria for three weeks in the late summer of 1888, is interesting:\n\"I have during the whole time never perceived any trace whatever of\nan incipient mental derangement.\" At the same time, Nietzsche himself\nappears to have had a foreboding at times of some sort of a collapse, writing once to a friend, \"The fearful and almost unceasing sufferings\nof my life allow me to long for the end, and according to some indications\nthe stroke of the brain that will release me (der erl\u00f6sende Hirnschlag)\nis near enough to warrant my hope. So far as torture and renunciation\nare concerned, I may measure the life of my last years with that of any\nascetic of any time\" (I am unable to locate this letter, and borrow the\nquotation from Richard Beyer, Nietzsches Versuch einer Umwerthung alter Werthe, pp. 34-5).\n\ng Havelock Ellis (Affirmations, p. 11) quotes this. Some years later\n(1876), Edouard Schur\u00e9 saw him in Bayreuth and describes his impression as follows: \"In talking with him I was struck by the superiority\nof his intellect and by the strangeness of his physiognomy. A broad\nforehead, short hair brushed back, the prominent cheekbones of the Slav.\nThe heavy, drooping mustache and the bold cut of the face would have\ngiven him the aspect of a cavalry officer, if there had not been something\nat once timid and haughty in his air. The musical voice and slow speech\nindicated the artist's organization, while the circumspect meditative carriage was that of a philosopher. Nothing more deceptive than the apparent calm of his expression. The fixed eye revealed the painful travail\nof thought. It was at once the eye of an acute observer and of a fanatical\nvisionary. The double character of the gaze produced a disquieted and\ndisquieting expression, all the more so since it seemed to be always fixed\non a single point. In moments of effusion the gaze was softened to a\ndream-like sweetness, but soon became hostile again. His whole appearance had the distant air, the discreet and veiled disdain which often\ncharacterizes aristocrats of thought\" (Revue des deux mondes, August 15,\n1895, pp. 782-3).\n\nh It is Nietzsche's own story, as narrated by P. Deussen, Erinnerungen an F. Nietzsche, p. 24.\n\ni Cf. M\u00f6bius, op. cit., p. 50. See, however, R. H. Gr\u00fctzmacher, op. cit., pp. 16, 17. R. Freiherr von Seydlitz, who knew Nietzsche well,\nsays, \"One thing was lacking in him which accompanies the 'great\nman' as ordinarily understood: he had no dark, ignoble sides to his\nnature\u2014not even 'sensual coarseness'\" (Der neue deutsche Rundschau,\nJune, 1899, p. 627).\n\nj H. L. Mencken says that Nietzsche \"fell in love\" with Frauein\nLou Salom\u00e9, and \"pursued her over half of Europe when she fled\" (The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 42) . Both of these statements are\nexaggerations. Meyer, the best all-round authority on Nietzsche, remarks\nthat there is no indication of warmer feelings in the case than those of\nfriendship, and that Nietzsche thought of her rather as a wife for his\nfriend Paul R\u00e9e (op. cit., p. 168). Nietzsche did once (spring of 1876)\nmake an offer of marriage to a young Dutch woman, but she was already\nengaged (the letters are given by Meyer, op. cit., 156-9). See further a\nsummary of Nietzsche's various views, and half-formed wishes, on the\nsubject of marriage for himself, by Richter, op. cit., p. 59.\n\nk I have to borrow here from Riehl, op. cit., p. 23. Cf. the apt\nremarks of A. Wolf, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 23.\n\nl Meyer ascribes it in part to the influence of R\u00e9e (op. cit., p. 153\u2014cf. the fuller discussion of the subject, pp. 295-300, where Meyer questions the inference often drawn that Nietzsche was naturally unsystematic) .\n\nm So in a letter to Georg Brandes, April 10, 1888, referring to some\nunspecified year in the past. Meyer (op. cit., p. 161) says that there\nwere 118 sick days in 1879. After the autumn of 1881, Nietzsche did\nbetter\u2014for in 1888 he said that in the previous six years he had never had\nduring each year less than five or more than fifteen bad days (so his\nsister, Werke, pocket ed., VI, xxviii).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER II\n\na So M\u00f6bius, op. cit., p. 28; Ziegler, op. cit., p. 113.\n\nb What Nietzsche thought of style is hinted at in his remark that\nthe only way to improve one's style is to improve one's thought (The Wanderer etc., \u00a7 131; cf. Meyer's admirable remarks, op. cit., p. 628).\nAt the same time, there is no doubt that he had fine feeling in this\ndirection. Jo\u00ebl compares him with Goethe, finding him greater in so\nfar as he is more conscious\u2014Goethe's style flowing like nature, Nietzsche's\nbeing more art (op. cit., pp. 359-61). Even Saintsbury, after referring\nto Nietzsche's mention of Leopardi, Emerson, Merim\u00e9e, and Landor as\nthe four masters of prose in the nineteenth century, says that he is to\nbe put along with them (op. cit., p. 245) . Nietzsche's style\u2014in one\nparticular, at least\u2014might be described as seductive, like Newman's in\nthe Apologia and many of the Sermons: for the moment at least you\nwould like to believe what he says. On the other hand, Meyer notes his\noccasional slips and negligences of style, and the tastelessness of some\nof the word-constructions in Zarathustra (op. cit., pp. 624, 416).\n\nc Cf. Rudolph Eisler, Nietzsches Erkenntnisstheorie und Metaphysik;\nFriedrich Rittelmeyer, Friedrich Nietzsche und das Erkenntnissproblem;\nSiegbert Flemming, Nietzsches Metaphysik und ihr Verh\u00e4ltniss zu Erkenntnisstheorie und Ethik; also special articles, such as \"Friedrich Nietzsches Erkenntnisstheorie,\" by P. Mauritius Demuth, Philosophischea Jahrbuch (G\u00f6rres-Gesellschaft), October, 1913. Ren\u00e9 Berthelot makes an\nextended critical examination of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge in Un romantisme utilitaire. Vol. I, pp. 33-193.\n\nd Cf. Meyer's view, op. cit., pp. 293, 298, 306, 378, and Ziegler's\n(\"more thinker than poet\"), op. cit., p. 21. On the other hand, Heinrich\nWeinel says, \"Whoever allows himself to be persuaded that he [Nietzsche]\nis a man of strict science will observe with astonishment how easy to\nrefute Nietzsche is, how full of leaps and contradictions his thinking is,\neven when one clearly separates the epochs of his activity\" (Ibsen, Bj\u00f6rnson, Nietzsche, pp. 13, 14). Similarly, Oswald K\u00fclpe, \"The sterner\nphilosophical disciplines, such as logic and the theory of knowledge,\nNietzsche touched upon only casually, and never gave himself up to their\nproblems with original interest; and in the other branches, which he\nliked to cultivate, such as metaphysics and ethics, he has no exact results\nto offer. We cannot, therefore, call him a philosopher\" (Philosophy of the Present in Germany, p. 128). It must be freely conceded that Nietzsche gives us little in the form of strict science, also that he published\n\"no exact results\"; whether this prevents his being a substantially consistent thinker with a tolerably definite outcome of thought, is another\nquestion.\n\ne A. K. Rogers strangely misconceives Nietzsche at this point (Philosophical Review, January, 1912, p. 39).\n\nf So Kurt Breysig, Jahrbuch f\u00fcr Gesetzgebung, II (1896), p. 20;\ncontrast Meyer's explanations, op. cit., p. 448.\n\ng Cf. Paul Lanzky's account of Nietzsche's habits, as given in D.\nHal\u00e9vy's La Vie de Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric Nietzsche, p. 305.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER III\n\na Among philologists he refers to the \"renowned Lobeck\" in particular. His own view of Dionysus is set forth in The Birth of Tragedy,\nand he notes that Burckhardt, whom he calls the profoundest connoisseur\n(Kenner) of Greek culture then living, afterwards added to his Cultur der Griechen [the published title is Griechische Kulturgeschichte] a section on the phenomenon, with the implication that Burckhardt had been more\nor less influenced by him. I may add that Nietzsche's intimate friend,\nwith whom, however, he eventually had a falling out, Erwin Rohde, developed a similar view, with great wealth of scholarly detail in his Psyche,\npublished after Nietzsche's collapse and with no reference to him.\n\nb See North American Review, August, 1915, p. 202; cf. letters to\nDeussen and Peter Gast, Briefe, I, 536; IV, 426.\n\nc See Freiherr von Seydlitz's article, Neue deutsche Rundschau, June,\n1899, p. 622.\n\nd Cf . Lou Andreas-Salom\u00e9 (Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken, p.\n16) on loneliness and suffering as two great features of Nietzsche's\ndestiny, which became more strongly marked as he approached his end, and\nwere at once a necessity and a choice. On his early loneliness, see letters\nto Erwin Rohde from Leipzig and Basel (1869), Briefe, II, 135, 156.\n\ne Cf. the lines from \"Aus hohen Bergen,\" appended to Beyond Good and Evil:\n\n\"Ihr alten Freunde! Seht! Nun blickt ihr bleich,\n\nVoll Lieb' und Grausen!\n\nNein, geht! Z\u00fcrnt nicht! Hier\u2014k\u00f6nntet ihr nicht hausen:\n\nHier zwischen fernsten Eis- und Felsenreich\u2014\n\nHier muss man J\u00e4ger sein und gemsengleich.\"\n\nf Nietzsche's wish to communicate himself, to be heard (if not for\ndisciples in the literal sense) appears in Werke, XIV, 355-6, 381, 393.\nHe even expresses a wish for disciples in a letter to Peter Gast, August 26,\n1883, and speaks of his writings as bait which he had used to this end.\nHis longing for friends, who should really share his thoughts, is touchingly evidenced in \"Aus hohen Bergen,\" appended to Beyond Good and Evil.\n\ng Nietzsche says (in a letter to Brandes, November 29, 1888), that he\nwrites in Ecce Homo with \"Cynismus\"\u2014i.e., cold-blooded indifference to\nwhat others will think of him. He also says (to Gast, November 26, 1888)\nthat the book is full of jokes and malice (reich an Scherzen und Bosheiten) .\n\nh At this point Emily Hamblen is mistaken in her excellent little\nbook, Friedrich Nietzsche and his New Gospel, p. 11. It is the general\nimpression\u2014cf. A. G. Gardiner, \"In the end Nietzsche became his own\nSuperman. His autobiographical Ecce Homo was a grotesque exaltation\nof his own achievements, etc.\" (The War Lords, p. 257) .\n\ni I omit discussion of the claims about his books, his style, his discovery of the significance of Dionysus in Greek life and the meaning of\nthe tragic\u2014also about himself as a psychologist and the moral quality\nof his thinking. To consider some of them to any purpose would require\nmore knowledge than I possess. As to Ecce Homo, the reader will consult\nprofitably Raoul Richter's chapter, \"Nietzsche's Ecce Homo, ein Dokument der Selbsterkenntniss und Selbstverkenntniss,\" in his Essays.\n\nj The present war shows perhaps nothing more clearly than that\nnational or racial feelings are now the dominant ones in mankind\u2014a\nhuman aim does not yet exist (cf., on this point, later, p. 344).\n\nk A translation of Brandes' early epoch-making essay, \"Aristocratic Radicalism\" (1889) , appears with other matter in a volume, Friedrich Nietzsche (London and New York, 1914). Karl Jo\u00ebl seems to leave out\nof account these constant ideas or tendencies in speaking of Nietzsche's\nimpulse to change in the way he does (op. cit., pp. 169, 320, 329). I may\nadd that Lou Andreas-Salom\u00e9 finds as constant his views on (or at least\nhis sense of problems as to) the Dionysiac, decadence, the unseasonable\n(Unzeitgem\u00e4ss), and the culture of genius.\n\nl See letter to Brandes, Briefe, III, 322; Werke, 327, \u00a7 800. Cf. Ecce Homo, II, \u00a7 3; The Antichristian, \u00a7 5. A special monograph, \"Pascal et Nietzsche,\" by Henry Bauer, with an introduction by Henri Lichtenberger, appeared in the Revue Germanique, January, 1914.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\na Cf. Ludwig Stein, Deutsche Rundschau, March, 1893, p. 402; M. A.\nM\u00fcgge, Nietzsche, His Life and Works, ix; Nietzsche's Werke (pocket\ned.), III, XIV.\n\nb So Lou Andreas-Salom\u00e9, op. cit., p. 8.\n\nc All is contained in Vols. I, IX, X of the 8vo ed. and the greater\npart in Vols. I, II, of the pocket ed. As to the mental history of\nNietzsche before the date of The Birth of Tragedy, see E. Windrath's\nFriedrich Nietzsches geistige Entwicklung bis zur Entstehung der Geburt der Trag\u00f6die (Beilage zum Jahresbericht, 1912-3, des H. Herz Gymnasium,\nHamburg, 1913).\n\nd \"Philosophy in the Tragic Period of the Greeks,\" sect. 3; cf. a\nlater remark, Dawn of Day, \u00a7 244. Nietzsche once puts it strongly, \"An\nindiscriminate impulse for knowledge is like an indiscriminate sexual\nimpulse\u2014a sign of commonness\"!\n\ne He uses the terms \"Richter,\" \"Gesetzgeber,\" \"Wertmesser\"\u2014cf .\n\"Schopenhauer as Educator,\" sects. 3 and 6. Later we shall find him\nconjecturing that the original meaning of \"Mensch\" was \"one who\nmeasures.\"\n\nf \"Philosophy in the Tragic Period etc.,\" sect. 3. Cf. an implied\ndefinition in Human, All-too-Human, \u00a7 436, \"one who has chosen for his\ntask the most general knowledge and the valuation of existence as a\nwhole.\" Later, when he comes to read existence in terms of change and\nbecoming, he defines philosophy as \"the most general form of history, as\nan attempt to describe somehow the Heraclitean becoming and to abbreviate it in sign-language, to translate it, as it were, into a sort of\nostensible being and give it a name\" (quoted by Meyer, op. cit., pp. 579,\n580). Nietzsche remarks, \"To make philosophy purely a matter of\nscience (like Trendelenburg) is to throw the musket into the corn-field\"\n(Werke, X, 299, \u00a7 55).\n\ng Cf . the manner in which the philosopher, and Heraclitus in particular, are spoken of, \"Philosophy in the Tragic Period etc.,\" sect. 8;\nnote also the tone of Werke, X, 299, \u00a7 56.\n\nh The \"horrible (entsetzliche) struggle for existence\" is often referred to; cf. Werke, IX, 146. See Dorner's general representation of\nNietzsche's view on this point (op. cit., 189-91).\n\ni Cf. Birth of Tragedy, sect. 16 (\"eternal life\"), sect. 17 (\"another\nworld\"), sect. 21 (\"another being\"); \"Schopenhauer as Educator,\"\nsect. 5 (\"something beyond our individual existence\"). I have elaborated\nthis view and some of its consequences in an article, \"An Introductory\nWord on Nietzsche,\" Harvard Theological Review, October, 1913.\n\nj He dissents from the view of Socrates and the rationalism that\nfollowed in his wake, proceeding as it did on the theory that man can not\nonly know, but can correct existence (Birth of Tragedy, sect. 15; cf. the\ninterpretation of Hamlet's inability to act, sect. 7); he also remarks on\nthe unfortunate consequences in modern times of the idea that all may be\nhappy on the earth (sect. 18), and says in speaking of the effort to help\nout nature and correct the rule of folly and mischance, \"It is, to be sure,\na striving that leads to deep and heartfelt resignation, for what and\nhow much can be bettered, whether in particular or in general!\" (\"Schopenhauer as Educator,\" sect. 3) .\n\nk Cf. a memorandum, \"When Friedrich August Wolf asserted the necessity of slavery in the interests of a culture, it was one of the strong\nthoughts of my great predecessor, which others are too feeble to lay hold\nof\" (Werke, IX, 268, \u00a7 216).\n\nl That genuine art does not spring from instincts for luxury, and\nthat a new birth of it in the modern world is to be expected rather from\na society freed from luxury, is asserted in Werke, X, 459, \u00a7 367 (here\nNietzsche refers to the idea of the curse of gold which underlies Wagner's\n\"Ring of the Nibelungen \"). Art undergoes degeneration when it is a\nmeans of diversion simply (Birth of Tragedy, sects. 22, 24). Nietzsche\ndraws a satirical picture of the modern arts and of the society that calls\nfor them, in \"Richard Wagner at Bayreuth,\" sect. 8. All the same he\nadmits that art is not for the time of actual struggle (ibid., sect. 4).\n\nm C. W. Super, International Journal of Ethics, January, 1913, p. 178.\n\nn This in lectures at Basel, as reported by Malwida von Meysenbug,\nDer Lebensabend einer Idealisten, p. 50.\n\no A later observation of Nietzsche's is of interest in this connection:\n\"Perhaps I know best why it is man alone who laughs; he alone suffers\nso deeply that he had to invent laughter. The most unhappy and melancholy animal is, as is reasonable, the cheerfullest \" (Will to Power, \u00a7 91).\nNietzsche thinks that the current impression of Greek cheerfulness comes\nlargely by way of Christianity, which encountered a decadent Greece and\nwas offended by its lightness and superficiality. This kind of \"cheerfulness,\" however, was a poor counterpart to the high serenity of men\nlike \u00c6schylus, and the determining influence in it was the masses, or\nold-time slaves, who wished for little else than enjoyment and felt no\nresponsibilities, being without either great memories or great hopes\n(Birth of Tragedy, sect. 11). The great epoch of Greece to Nietzsche's\nmind was from Hesiod to \u00c6schylus (see Jo\u00ebl's discussion of the subject\nin op. cit., pp. 297-315). In English the general view of Nietzsche and\nBurckhardt finds expression in W. L. Courtney's The Idea of Tragedy\n(1900). There are echoes of Burckhardt's view in W. G. Sumner's Folkways, pp. 104-5.\n\np Nietzsche remarks on the contrast between a chorus of Apollo, in\nwhich the maidens preserve their separate identity and keep their civil\nnames, and a dithyrambic chorus of Dionysus, in which each one's civic\nconnection and social position are entirely forgotten (Birth of Tragedy,\nsect. 8) .\n\nq See the wonderful description, half picture and half interpretation,\nof the Dionysus festival (Birth of Tragedy, close of sect. 1); cf. Erwin\nRohde's Psyche, II, 17 n.\n\nr Cf., in this connection, Walter Pater, Greek Studies, pp. 41-3, 36;\nErwin Rohde, op. cit., II, 116 n.; Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed., art.\n\"Dionysus\"; J. A. Symonds, The Greek Poets, II, 145-6.\n\ns Rites and ceremonies which we should regard as coming under the\nhead of sexual excesses seem to have characterized the beginnings of the\nDionysus worship in Greece, as they did the celebrations in oriental\ncountries from which the worship originally came; but in time the Greek\nworship became a more chastened thing.\n\nt Birth of Tragedy, beginning of sect. 17. Nietzsche thinks that this\nDionysiac experience has been widespread in the world (though of course\nunder other names), that in the German Middle Ages singing and dancing\ncrowds ever increasing in number were borne from place to place under\nthe same impulse (the St. John's and St. Vitus' dancers being kindred\nto the Bacchic choruses of the Greeks), that the phenomena can be traced\nback as far as Babylon and the orgiastic Sacaea\u2014and he adds, with\nreference to those who dismiss them as \"folk-diseases\" with a smile of\ncontempt or pity prompted by a consciousness of their own superior\nhealth, that they do not surmise what a cadaverous and ghostly aspect their very \"health\" presents, when the glowing light of the Dionysian\nrevelers rushes past them (ibid., sect. 1).\n\nu Nietzsche even says that from the nature of art as ordinarily conceived (Apollinic art), tragic art cannot be honestly derived, the pleasure\nconnected with the latter being pleasure in the annihilation of beautiful\nforms, even the fairest, while Apollinic art strives (by its appropriate\nmeans, picture and story) to eternalize them. Tragedy and music alike\nare born of another realm. See The Birth of Tragedy, sects. 16 and 25.\nMeyer remarks that it is doubtful whether Dionysus can be described as\na \"Kunstgott\": \"he became that first for Nietzsche\" (op. cit., p. 248).\n\nv Nietzsche draws attention to Euripides' description in the \"Bacch\u00e6\"\nof Archilochus (the first lyric, as contrasted to epic, poet among the\nGreeks), who, a drunken reveler, sinks down and falls asleep on the\nhigh mountains under the midday sun, when the dream-god comes to\nhim and touches him with the laurel\u2014as if to show that the lyric (i.e.,\nessentially Dionysiac) outpourings of love and hate, though so different\nfrom the calm and measured movements of epic art, may yet win\nApollinic consecration (Birth of Tragedy, sect. 6).\n\nw This particularly holds of the first great tragic dramatist,\n\u00c6schylus. As to the ancient view of \u00c6schylus as Dionysus-inspired\n(the view, e.g., of Pausanias, Athenaeus, and Quintilian), see Symonds,\nop. cit., I, 373-4. Plato regarded poetic inspiration as akin to madness\n(\"Ph\u00e6drus\"); \"all good poets compose their beautiful poems not as\nworks of art, but because they are inspired and possessed\" (\"Ion\"),\nthe analogy in \"Ion\" being the behavior of Bacchantes under the influence\nof Dionysus. Symonds cites the phrase \"con furie,\" with which Italians\nsometimes describe the manner of production of a Tintoretto or a Michael\nAngelo (op. cit., II, 394-5).\n\nx Nietzsche remarks on the different type of language used by the\ncharacters in the dialogue from that of the chorus\u2014it is clear, firm,\nalmost like that of Homer, i.e., Apollinic, not turgid, glowing, Dionysiac\n(Birth of Tragedy, end of sect. 8). Symonds appears to note the same\ncontrast (without giving it this interpretation), in saying, \"When the\nAthenians developed tragedy, they wrote their iambics in pure Attic, but\nthey preserved a Dorian tone in their choruses \" (op. cit., I, 305) .\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER V\n\na \"Matter itself is only given as sensation\" (Werke, 1st ed., X, 429);\nthis after saying that the development of matter into a thinking subject\nis \"impossible.\" Cf. the comment on Democritus' \"enormous petitio principii\" (ibid., X, 114). I cannot locate these passages in the second\nedition of the Werke, from which I ordinarily quote.\n\nb It is not contradictory to this when Nietzsche speaks, as he sometimes does, of picturing (vorstellen) as an action of the brain\u2014this is\nmerely a part of the ordinary empirical view of things; cf. the guarded\nlanguage as to Anaxagoras, in \"Philosophy in the Tragic Period etc.,\"\nsect. 15, and also the express statement, \"The sensation is not the result\nof the cell, but the cell is the result of the sensation, i.e., an artistic\nprojection, an image\" (Werke, IX, 194).\n\nc I have indicated some of the main points of Schopenhauer's metaphysics in the following articles: \"Schopenhauer's Type of Idealism\"\n(The Monist, January, 1911), \"Schopenhauer's Contact with Pragmatism\"\n(Philosophical Review, March, 1910), \"Schopenhauer's Contact with\nTheology\" (Harvard Theological Review, July, 1911).\n\nd Nietzsche speaks of the \"Ur-Einen\" repeatedly in The Birth of Tragedy; the subjectivity of time and space, hence of succession and number, is also asserted in \"On Truth and Falsehood in the Extra-moral\nSense\" (Werke, X, 201-2).\n\ne The feeling comes to expression repeatedly in The Birth of Tragedy;\nalso in \"Schopenhauer as Educator,\" and \"Richard Wagner in Bayreuth.\"\n\nf This view makes the background of The Birth of Tragedy (see particularly sects. 4 and 5). Cf. also Werke, IX, 192-4; XII, 169, \u00a7 349;\nand the \"Attempt at Self-criticism,\" prefixed to the later edition of The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche appears to think that the World-Will projects\nspace and time with the picture, so that these forms are not, strictly\nspeaking, merely our own (cf. an express remark, Werke, IX, 107, \u00a7 64).\nAs stated in the quotation made in the text, we may divine our real nature\nas projections of the World-Will, figures in his dream, but it is no more\nnecessary that we should do so, than that the painted warriors on a\ncanvas should be conscious of the battle in which they there take part\n(Birth of Tragedy, end of sect. 5). It appears that Nietzsche had speculative moods even as a boy. \"At the age of twelve, I thought out for\nmyself a wonderful Trinity: namely, God the Father, God the Son, and\nGod the Devil. My reasoning was that God, thinking of himself, created the\nsecond person of the God-head; but that, in order to be able to think of\nhimself, he had to think of his antithesis, and so create him.\u2014In this\nway, I began philosophizing\" (Werke, XIV, 347, \u00a7 201).\n\ng Since though the world is a picture, not a reality, and has only an\nillusory being (Schein), like figures in a dream, it springs from the\ndeepest need of its Creator as a suffering being, Nietzsche finds the will\nto illusion deeper, \"more metaphysical,\" than the will to truth; it is,\nindeed, just the truth or reality (i.e., itself) that the World-Will wants\nto get away from (and does get away from in turning itself into a picture\nto contemplate). And it is the same desire for an illusory picture-world\nthat gives birth, he holds, to art in man (see the \"Preface to Richard\nWagner\" prefixed to The Birth of Tragedy, where art is called the \"true\nmetaphysical activity of life\". The will to truth comes thus to be in\na way anti-natural: \"to will to know, when it is just illusion that is\nthe redemptive thing (die Erl\u00f6sung)\u2014what an inversion\"! See Werke,\nXIV, 366, \u00a7 236; 369, \u00a7 240 (these being later comments on The Birth of Tragedy). Not only is it naive to think that we can get out of the\nworld of illusion, but, if it were possible, the escape would be undesirable:\nlife in illusion is the goal. Nietzsche accordingly calls his philosophy\nan inverted Platonism\u2014the further we get from real being, the better,\nfairer, purer (Werke, IX, 109, \u00a7 168; X, 160, \u00a7 126; IX, 190, \u00a7 133).\n\nh Cf. the striking language of C. J. Keyser, \"Not in the ground of\nneed, not in bent and painful toil, but in the deep-centered play-instinct\nof the world, in the joyous mood of the eternal Being, which is always\nyoung, science has her origin and root\" (\"Mathematics,\" a pamphlet) .\nThe peculiarity of Nietzsche's view is that he assigns a motive to the\nplay, viz., dissatisfaction and pain. The idea of the world as a dream\nor play or game, and of ourselves as figures or players in it (cf. Werke,\nXIII, 207, \u00a7 471; 282, \u00a7 685) appears also in J. H. Newman's Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. IV, p. 221. Newman, however, distinguished\n\"our real eternal existence\" from this temporal form, while to Nietzsche,\nas to Schopenhauer, \"real eternal existence\" belongs to the \"World-Will\" alone.\n\ni I confess that I can make no sense out of such a view. The thought\nof pain is of course different from pain itself (as different as any\nthought is from an experience), but that pain may be in itself something\ndifferent from what we feel is to me a proposition without meaning\u2014pain is feeling and nothing else (which is not saying that it may not\nhave physiological or other conditions, which are not pain). Cf. William\nJames, \"No one pretends that pain as such only appears like pain, but in itself is different, for to be as a mental experience is only to appear\nto some one\" (A Pluralistic Universe, p. 198; as to feeling in general,\nsee his Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 151) . One may question whether\nNietzsche's view was not a logical inference rather than a direct observation.\n\nj The fragment appears in Nietzsche's Briefe, I, 343 ff. Cf. the letters\nto von Gersdorff (1866), ibid., p. 49; to Paul Deussen, ibid., p. 101; and\nRichter's general account of the matter, op. cit., pp. 152-3; also Richter's\nreference to the subject in his Der Skepticismus in der Philosophie, II,\n463-4.\n\nk Friedrich Rittelmeyer thinks that Nietzsche continued to hold to\nthe main points of the Schopenhauerian metaphysics for five years after\nthe \"Critique of the Schopenhauerian Philosophy,\" his criticism being\ndirected only to details (Friedrich Nietzsche und das Erkenntnissproblem,\npp. 7, 8).\n\nl It is difficult here to get the right word. Nietzsche repeats Schopenhauer's views as to the inapplicability of the category of \"causality\" in\nthis connection (Werke, X, 193), and yet his constant underlying presupposition is that there are things outside ourselves, which in some way\naffect us. We receive (empfangen) the stimuli (Reisse)\u2014this is the way\nin which he always speaks.\n\nm Cf. Helmholtz, \"So far as the characteristic quality of our sensation\ninforms of the peculiar nature of the outer influence that excites it, it\nmay pass as a sign of it, but not as a copy.\u2026 A sign need have no\nsort of resemblance to that of which it is the sign. The relation between\nthe two consists simply in the fact that the same object under the same\nconditions elicits the same sign\" (Physiologische Optik, \u00a7 26).\n\nn F. H. Bradley, in his Principles of Logic, protested against the reduction of the universe to an \"unearthly ballet of bloodless categories,\"\nand Schopenhauer still earlier had referred to Hegel's \"Ballet der Selbstbewegung der Begriffe\" (Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, \u00a7 34) .\n\no Nietzsche had perhaps noted Schiller's line, \"Wage du zu irren und zu traumen,\" which Lange quotes (Geschichte des Materialismus, II, 513).\nSchiller had also said,\n\n\"Nur der Irrthum ist das Leben\n\nUnd das Wissen ist der Tod.\"\n\np If the ordinary person replies to Bishop Berkeley's arguments about\nmatter, \"It is no matter what Bishop Berkeley says,\" he is quite right:\nit is no matter\u2014to him, and he probably does better to keep to his\ninstinctive views.\n\nq Cf. a passage in William James's Principles of Psychology, I, 288-9,\nending, \"Other sculptors, other statues from the same stone! Other\nminds, other worlds from the same monotonous and inexpressive chaos!\nMy world is but one of a million alike imbedded, alike real to those who\nmay abstract them. How different must be the worlds in the mind of\neel, cuttle-fish, or crab!\"\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\na Cf. \"Schopenhauer etc.,\" sect. 1, as to what education may do:\nwhile it cannot change the \"wahre Ursinn und Grundstoff\" of our being,\nit may free it of weeds, rubbish, and vermin, bring it light and air and\nrain, and so complete the work of stepmotherly nature.\n\nb Cf. the statement of his four rules of controversial warfare in Ecce Homo, I, \u00a7 7. The passage, though written much later, throws such an\nimportant light on his general psychology and history that I quote it in\nfull: \"War is another matter. I am warlike in my way. To attack is one of my instincts. Ability to be hostile, hostility\u2014this perhaps presupposes a strong nature, in any case it is conditioned in the make-up of every strong nature. Such a nature needs oppositions, consequently it seeks opposition: aggressive pathos belongs as necessarily to strength as revengefulness and rancor (Rach- und Nachgef\u00fchl) to weakness. Woman for example, is revengeful: it goes with her weakness, as does also her sensibility to others' needs.\u2014The strength of the aggressor has a kind of measure in the opposition he needs: all growth shows itself in the seeking out of a powerful opponent\u2014or problem; for a philosopher, who is warlike, challenges also problems to a duel. The task is to overcome, not oppositions in general, but those which require the enlistment of all one's force, suppleness, and mastery in arms\u2014equal opponents. Equality with the enemy\u2014first presupposition of an honest duel. Where one despises, one can not wage war; where one commands, where one sees something beneath one, one has no war to wage.\u2014My war-practice may be summed up in four propositions. First, I attack only those things that are victorious\u2014on occasion I wait till they are victorious. Second, I attack only things against which I should find no allies, where I stand alone\u2014where I compromise myself alone.\u2026 I have never taken a step publicly, which did not compromise me: that is my criterion of right acting. Third, I never attack persons,\u2014I use the person only as a strong magnifying-glass, by which to make a general, but elusive and impalpable evil visible. So I attacked David Strauss, more exactly the success of an old man's weak book in the circles of German 'culture'\u2014I thereby caught this culture in the act.\u2026 So I attacked Wagner, more exactly the falseness, the mongrel instincts (die Instinkt-Halbschl\u00e4chtigkeit) of our culture which confuses the super-refined with the opulent, the latest with the great. Fourth, I attack only things where every personal difference is excluded, where there is no background of sorry experiences. On the contrary, attacking is with me a proof of good will, and, on occasion, of gratitude. I honor, I distinguish, when I connect my name with that of a cause, a person: for or against\u2014it is all the same. When I make war on Christianity, this is allowable, because I have had nothing unfortunate and obstructive from that quarter\u2014the most earnest Christians have ever been kindly disposed to me. I myself, an opponent of Christianity de rigueur, am far from charging to the individual what is the fatal result of past ages.\"\n\nc It must be admitted that later on\u2014in his second period\u2014Nietzsche does occasionally use \"Selbstsucht\" in a eulogistic sense. His attitude then becomes one of sweeping criticism toward his early views, and particularly toward whatever could be regarded as high-flown and extravagant,\u2014and he puts a certain selfishness at the root of all actions. All the same, he admits that there are different kinds and grades of it, and in connection with Siegfried speaks of \"der h\u00f6chsten Selbstsucht\" (using \"Selbstigkeit\" a few lines further on\u2014see Joyful Science, \u00a7 99). On the other hand, even \"Selbstisch\" is used with an unfavorable shade of meaning in Mixed Opinions etc., \u00a7 91.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\na What would be possible if all men's needs were met by the direct bounty of nature (as is sometimes supposed to be the case in tropical regions), or if machinery could take the place of labor, is another question. Nietzsche recognizes the higher uses of machinery, and in general takes a somewhat broader view of the subject later on (see pp. 133, 440).\n\nb See J. E. Cabot's A Memoir of Ralph Waldo Emerson, p. 450. No doubt other motives co-operated in leading Emerson to make the experiment, but I think that the one mentioned in the text was the underlying\none.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\na The connection which music may have with a man's deeper mood\nand attitude to life as a whole is shown in an avowal made by Schumann\nto Mendelssohn after hearing the latter play one of Bach's chorals: \"Were\nlife deprived of all trust, of all faith, this simple choral would restore all\nto me.\"\n\nb Whether Wagner really held to the full Nietzschean (Schopenhauerian) view of the relation of words to music is open to question, but\nNietzsche thought so at this time. Cf. The Birth of Tragedy, sect. 16;\n\"Richard Wagner etc.,\" sects. 5, 8, 9; Genealogy of Morals, III, \u00a7 5.\n\nc All this is important to bear in mind in connection with Nietzsche's\nlater criticism of Wagner (particularly in \"The Case of Wagner\"), of\nwhich, for reasons of space, I shall not be able to give any detailed\naccount.\n\nd He wrote to Erwin Rohde, January 28, 1872, \"I have closed an\nalliance with Wagner. You can have no idea how near we are now to one\nanother, and how our plans fit together\" (Briefe, II, 285).\n\ne A \"Culturgeschichte des griechischen Volkes,\" in which all his philological studies were to culminate. He returned to the idea in 1875, planning systematic courses of lectures to cover seven years. See Richter, op. cit., p. 57.\n\nf Ziegler says that Nietzsche was ready to give up his professorship for\nthis purpose (op. cit., p. 65; cf. Drews, op. cit., p. 159; Richter, op. cit.,\np. 58 n.), and Drews adds that he had some idea of founding a new kind\nof educational institution (op. cit., pp. 45-6). We find him speaking in\n\"We Philologists\" of establishing a great center for the production of\nbetter men as the task of the future, and of educating the educators for\nsuch work\u2014although the first ones must educate themselves, and it was\nfor these he wrote (Werke, X, 415-9). Cf. Ernst Weber, Die p\u00e4dagogishen Gedanken des jungen Nietzsche, im Zusammenhang mit seiner Welt- und Lebens-Anschauung.\n\ng The offense given to purely philological circles by The Birth of Tragedy found marked expression in Wilamowitz-M\u00f6llendorf's Zukunftsphilologie, Eine Erwiderung auf Friedrich Nietzsches Geburt der Trag\u00f6die.\nTo this Erwin Rohde replied with another brochure, Afterphilologie, Bendschreiben eines Philologen an Richard Wagner\u2014Wagner having come\nto the defense of Nietzsche in a public letter. See the summary of the\ncontroversy in Richter, op. cit., pp. 43-4.\n\nh This, however, was not printed at the time, being regarded by\nWagner circles as not sufficiently diplomatic (see Briefe, IIa, 217 ff.,\nwhere it is given, and Richter, op. cit., p. 43) .\n\ni Nietzsche had complained, Easter, 1873, that the Germans were not\nsubscribing to the Bayreuth project, and to the question Why? he answered that the educated Philistine (Bildungs-Philister) had become contented, and had lost the sense for what was great. Strauss was a typical\nrepresentative of the new state of mind, and this was the principal reason\nfor the attack on him. See Werke (pocket ed.), II, xxxii-iii.\n\nj Paul Elmer More disposes of the break\u2014\"quarrel,\" as he terms it\u2014very simply: it was at bottom due to \"the clashing of two insanely jealous\negotisms\" (Nietzsche, p. 75).\n\nk It is possible, even probable, that Nietzsche was unjust to Wagner\nin this interpretation; see Richter's admirable account of the whole\nmatter, op. cit., p. 52 flf.; also Drews' discriminations, op. cit., p. 188 ff.\n\nl As to the real Wagner, see Henri Lichtenberger's two books, Wagner\n(in the series, \"Les Ma\u00eetres de la Musique\") , and Richard Wagner, Po\u00e8te et Penseur. Rare sympathy and understanding for both Nietzsche and\nWagner mark this author's writings. See also Edouard Schure's article in\nthe Revue des deux mondes, August 15, 1895.\n\nm In a late letter to Strindberg he even speaks\u2014confusedly, we must\nthink\u2014of illness as leading to a cessation of the relations with Wagner\n(see North American Review, August, 1913, p. 195).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\na See the warning addressed to young readers, Werke (pocket ed.),\nIll, 442, \u00a7 19.\n\nb Cf. Mixed Opinions etc., \u00a7 211; also Lou Andreas-Salom\u00e9's remarks\non the general character of this period, op. cit., p. 90.\n\nc August Horneffer (Nietzsche als Moralist und Schriftsteller, p. 22)\nthinks that moral criticism (moralische Bedenken) was really Nietzsche's\nstarting point, citing Nietzsche's own language in the preface, \u00a7 3, to\nGenealogy of Morals, but that he did not venture to follow the impulse\nat first, owing to aversion to the subject in the circles about him and the\nindifference of the general public to the older moralists of that type\u2014a\ncontributory factor being that his own thoughts were not ripe and had\nno definite direction. Accordingly, when later, i.e., with the period we\nare now considering, he appeared as a moralist, all the world was surprised and disgusted.\n\nd He echoes Goethe's estimate of reason and science as the highest\ncapacity of man (Human, etc., \u00a7 265) . Nothing is more urgent than\nknowing, and keeping oneself continuously in condition to do so thoroughly (ibid., \u00a7 288). See in particular the remarks on the scientific man\nof the type of Aristotle (ibid., \u00a7 264) .\n\ne This perhaps not entirely from lack of will. Later on, as we shall\nsee, he planned an extensive course of study in the natural sciences, and he\nnow remarks that every one ought to master at least one science thoroughly, so as to know what scientific method means and how necessary is\nthe utmost circumspection\u2014recommending this especially to women\n(Human, etc., 635). Perhaps an exception should be made to the language\nof the text, so far as Nietzsche had specialized in Greek philology. Had\nhe remained faithful to this specialty and not been drawn into the general\nfield of philosophy and ethics, he might have produced something of the\nfirst rank in it. Richter says, \"I am convinced that had Nietzsche held\non to philology and his professional work, he might have become an historian of Greek culture in great style and of great authority\" (op. cit.,\np. 58).\n\nf Cf. Nietzsche's own language on the hesitating, intermediate character of this period, Dawn of Day, \u00a7 30.\n\ng Nietzsche, however, speaks of the friendly extravagance of the inscription (letter to Rohde, Briefe, II, 549) .\n\nh Nietzsche writes to Rohde in the above-mentioned letter (of June,\n1878): \"By the way, always seek out myself in my book [Human, All-too-Human] and not friend R\u00e9e. I am proud to have discovered his\nsplendid qualities and intentions, but he has not had the slightest influence on the conception of my 'philosophia in nuce'; this was finished\nand in good part committed to paper, when I made his nearer acquaintance in the autumn of 1876\" [perhaps the word \"conception\" is significant, the statement not being really inconsistent with indebtedness to\nR\u00e9e for help in detail]. An account of the intellectual relations of\nNietzsche to R\u00e9e is given in the preface (\u00a7 4; cf. \u00a7 7) to Genealogy of Morals. Wagner did not like R\u00e9e, who was a Jew, and warned Nietzsche\nin Sorrento against him (see Drews, op. cit., p. 221). Richter has an\nextended discriminating note on the relations between Nietzsche and R\u00e9e\n(op. cit., pp. 163-4).\n\ni Ziegler appears to me to exaggerate when he speaks of a \"ganz fundamentale Wandlung\" (op. cit., p. 76); he says later himself that\nthe change was \"angebahnt.\" Riehl speaks simply of a \"grosse Losl\u00f6sung\" (op. cit., p. 59). There can be no doubt that the change\nappeared great, even to those who knew Nietzsche well (cf. what Rohde\nwrote, as quoted in Bernoulli's Franz Overbeck und Nietzsche, I, 261).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER X\n\na Cf. a striking passage quoted by Riehl (op. cit., p. 68) which I\ncannot locate: \"How strong the metaphysical need is \u2026 may be gathered from the fact that even when a free man has got rid of all metaphysical belief, art in its highest manifestations easily causes a reverberation (Miterklingen) of the long silent or even broken metaphysical\nstrings. If one becomes conscious of this, one feels a deep twinge of\nthe heart and longs for a return of the object he has lost, whether it\nbe called religion or metaphysics. In such moments a man's intellectual\ncharacter is put to the proof.\"\n\nb Cf. Dawn of Day, \u00a7 540, where he even calls it a piece of pedantry\nto distinguish between learning by study and natural endowment, though\nhe admits that Michael Angelo distinguished in this way (in contrasting\nRaphael with himself), and that learning is not altogether a matter of\nwill: one must be able to learn.\n\nc In Mixed Opinions etc., \u00a7 213, however, Nietzsche gives precedence in\neducation to drawing and painting over music; and in The Wanderer etc.,\n\u00a7 167, he has other depreciatory references to music, even saying that\nthe Greeks gave it a secondary place\u2014that is, aside from the Pythagoreans, who invented the five-year silence and did not invent dialectics\u2014something for which he now has more respect than in his first period.\nThis view of the Greeks, if at all reconcilable with his earlier view, is\nonly so if he has the later (decadent) Greeks in mind, or at least the\nGreeks, so far as they loved discussion and strife.\n\nd Cf. Human, etc., \u00a7 292, \"No honey is sweeter than that of knowledge\"; this aphorism closes with the ejaculation, \"Toward the light\u2014thy last movement; an exultant cry of knowing\u2014thy last sound.\" On\nthe other hand, Nietzsche is not unaware of the losses or dangers to\nwhich men of science are subject\u2014on the side of active will they are\napt to be weakened, and they may lose their highest power and bloom\nearlier than the poetic natures (Mixed Opinions etc., \u00a7 206).\n\ne Cf. another description of one who has a \"free\" mind about life\n(Human, etc., \u00a7 287): though at first he loves and hates, and forgets\nnothing, he comes in time neither to hate existence nor to love it, but\nto lie above it, now with the eye of joy, now with that of sorrow, like\nnature herself with her alternating summer and autumn moods.\n\nf Cf. the picture of the \"Don Juan of Knowledge,\" Dawn of Day,\n\u00a7 327: the objects he gains fail to hold his love, but he enjoys the adventure, the pursuit, and the intrigues; he pursues the highest and remotest\nstars of knowledge, till at last there is nothing more to seek, unless it\nbe the abode of pain, and perhaps even that will disappoint him like\neverything else. Even during Nietzsche's student days at Bonn, he had\nwritten his sister (June 11, 1865), \"Do we then in our study seek rest,\npeace, happiness? No, only truth, and even if it were in the highest\ndegree horrible and ugly\" (Briefe, V, 113).\n\ng Cf. the striking description of the manner of life of one who devotes\nhimself to knowledge, Human, etc., \u00a7 291. Nietzsche thinks it new in\nhistory to make knowledge something more than a means\u2014even among\nthe Greeks it was a means to virtue, as among Christians a means to\nthe soul's salvation (Joyful Science, \u00a7 123).\n\nh Cf. Mixed Opinions etc., \u00a7 369: \"There is a weariness of the finest\nand more cultivated minds, for whom the best that earth offers has\nbecome empty.\" See also, in the course of study of the psychology of the\nApostle Paul, the appreciation of the religious idealism of ancient Israel,\nDawn of Day, \u00a7 68. As to the lack of intellectual warrant, however, for\nthe positions of religion, see Human, etc., \u00a7\u00a7 110, 111, and the extreme\nstatements of Dawn of Day, \u00a7\u00a7 95, 464.\n\ni Nietzsche is sometimes scarcely just either to religion or to metaphysics, showing, for instance, a strange lack of comprehension (strange\nparticularly for one who knew Schopenhauer) of the Christian \"Seelennoth,\" which sighs over inner corruption and craves salvation (Human, etc., \u00a7 27; Dawn of Day, \u00a7 57); he even speaks of the flattening and\nexternalizing of the religious life which followed in the wake of the\nRenaissance as something to be looked upon with joy (Human, etc.,\n\u00a7 237) . However, in another passage, \"In honor of the homines religiosi\"\n(Joyful Science, \u00a7 350), he virtually qualifies the last-named judgment,\nsaying that the struggle against the church was partly the struggle of\nthe commoner, more self-satisfied, and superficial natures against the\ngraver and deeper ones.\n\nj See a wonderful passage continuing this line of thought (Joyful Science, \u00a7 277) , and concluding, \"In fact something plays with us now\nand then\u2014dear accident: it takes us on occasion by the hand, and the\nwisest Providence could conceive no more beautiful music than our foolish\nhand succeeds in making.\"\n\nk A legitimate use of the term \"soul\" is as covering those inner\nmotions which come easy to one and hence are accomplished gladly and\nwith grace; a man passes as soulless when these motions come hard and\nwith effort (Dawn of Day, \u00a7 311). On the \"soul\" as an inner quantity\nin general, see Genealogy etc., II, \u00a7 16.\n\nl Compare a similar view, worked out with convincing thoroughness,\nby the late Edmund Montgomery in his Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization. Nietzsche has interesting comments on\ndreams as interpretations of bodily, particularly nervous states (Human, etc., \u00a7 13; Dawn of Day, \u00a7 119; Will to Power, \u00a7 479); if the dreams\nchange, the conditions being the same, it is because varying impulses are\nin turn dominant in us (Joyful Science, \u00a7 119). Will, in the conscious\nsense, is, equally with consciousness in general, a secondary phenomenon\n(Dawn of Day, \u00a7 124). At the same time he seems to regard something\nakin to thought as belonging to the very nature of man, making the\nsingular statement, \"Man, like every living creature, thinks continually,\nbut does not know it\" (Meyer, op. cit., p. 359, quotes this from Joyful Science, but I cannot place it; cf. note gg, p. 500 of this volume).\n\nm The contrasted requisites for describing and explaining are mentioned in Dawn of Day, \u00a7 428. Apparently Nietzsche held to the a priori\nnature of the causal idea\u2014at least Joyful Science, \u00a7 98, looks that way.\n\nn It must be admitted that an express and clear reconciling statement (such as one finds, for example, in Montgomery's book just alluded\nto) Nietzsche does not make.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\na Nietzsche also differs from Kant and Schopenhauer in that while\nthey accept the feeling of responsibility at its face value, and argue unhesitatingly from it as a premise to free will as a conclusion, he subjects the feeling to critical scrutiny. See particularly Human, etc., \u00a7 39,\nand Richter's comments (op. cit., p. 177).\n\nb Cf., for example, chap, ix of J. Cotter Morison's Service of Man.\nNietzsche's attitude is also much like Spinoza's; cf. Genealogy of Morals,\nII, \u00a7 15, and Richter, op. cit., pp. 347-8.\n\nc How impulses of praise and blame arise is interestingly, if one-sidedly, set forth in Dawn of Day, \u00a7 140.\n\nd Cf. Genealogy of Morals, III, \u00a7 16; Twilight of the Idols, I, \u00a7 10;\nWill to Power, \u00a7\u00a7 233, 235. Emerson's remark may be quoted, \"The less\nwe have to do with our sins the better. No man can afford to waste his\nmoments in compunctions\" (\"Swedenborg\" in Representative Men).\n\ne This is a later statement (Zarathustra, II, xx), but in harmony\nwith the view now. The analysis made of revenge there is interesting:\nwe are impotent to change the injury since it belongs to the past, and\nyet we wish to assert our power and get even with it, and so we inflict\npain, i.e., do a senseless thing rather than nothing.\n\nf Cf. a later reference to Plato's \"Timaeus\" (Werke, XIV, 318,\n\u00a7 154): \"very interesting is Plato's 'Timaeus,' p. 86: mental illness\noccasioned by a defective state of the body; the task of educators and\nstates is to heal at this point. If the cure is not accomplished in time,\neducators and states, not the sick, to be held responsible.\"\n\ng Cf., on this general subject, Dietrich H. Kerler's Nietzsche und die Vergeltungsidee (zur Strafrechtsreform).\n\nh Richter (op. cit., p. 177) notes that these motives are now treated\nas interchangeable by Nietzsche, though they are so different. Pleasure\n(in the broad elastic sense) is undoubtedly the more fundamental one,\nand Nietzsche himself gives preservation a secondary place later on.\n\ni Nietzsche goes far in his exaltation of reason at this time, as contrasted with the relative depreciation of it earlier. He even asks whether\nit is not the head that binds men together (for advantage), and the\nheart (blind gropings of love and hate) that sunders them (Mixed Opinions etc., \u00a7 197; cf. The Wanderer etc., \u00a7 41). \"Besonnenheit\" is\ncalled the virtue of virtues (The Wanderer etc., \u00a7 294; cf. \u00a7 189). He\nquestions whether feelings are the original element in us, suggesting that\njudgments often lie behind them, though this may be forgotten and the\nfeelings pass on as instinctive inheritances; so temperament in many\nmen may owe its origin to good or bad intellectual habits\u2014if not in\nthemselves, then in their ancestors (Dawn of Day, \u00a7\u00a7 247, 35). Once\nhe admits, however, that aversion may be more ultimate than the reasons\ngiven for it (ibid., \u00a7 358). See on the subject, Riehl, op. cit., p. 65;\nRichter, op. cit., p. 178.\n\nj Occasionally (e.g. Human, etc., \u00a7 49) Nietzsche refers to \"unegoistic\" impulses, and this leads Ziegler (op. cit., p. 86) to the view that\nhe recognized a double source of human action; but in such cases, I take\nit, he simply relapses into ordinary methods of speech. In Human, etc.,\n\u00a7 48, after using the term \"unegoistic,\" he says that the word is never\nto be understood strictly, but simply as a convenient form of expression\n(eine Erleichterung des Ausdrucks).\n\nk Nietzsche gives still other statements of the stages through which\nmorality passes. For example, according to The Wanderer etc., \u00a7 44,\nmorality was at first and at bottom a means of preserving the community or of keeping it on a certain level, the motives appealed to being\nfear and hope\u2014with perhaps the added fear of an hereafter and a hell;\nlater, it becomes the command of a God (cf. the \"Mosaic law\"), and\nlater still an absolute law; at length a morality of inclination, of taste\narrives\u2014and finally one of insight, which transcends the whole circle of\nillusionary motives, yet is aware that for ages mankind could have had no others. See further statements in Human, etc., \u00a7 94; The Wanderer etc.,\n\u00a7 64, and Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 32.\n\nl At this time Nietzsche assigns to forgetfulness a great r\u00f4le in the\ndevelopment or transformation of moral conceptions. See as to justice.\nHuman, etc., \u00a7 92, and even as to intellectual scrupulousness. Mixed Opinions etc., \u00a7 26, and generally, The Wanderer etc., \u00a7 206.\n\nm Cf., as to motives in returning kindnesses, The Wanderer etc., \u00a7 256;\nin beneficence, ibid., \u00a7 253; Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 194; and the general\nirony of Dawn of Day, \u00a7\u00a7 385, 523; Joyful Science, \u00a7 88. Nietzsche questions, however, whether vanity should be condemned to the extent that it\nordinarily is (The Wanderer etc., \u00a7\u00a7 60, 181)\u2014see the fine analysis, with\nreasons why vanity should be tenderly treated, in Zarathustra, II, xxi;\nstill he has no real love for it (Joyful Science, \u00a7\u00a7 87, 263, 283). Instances of his irony toward moral airs and pretensions may be found\nin Joyful Science, \u00a7\u00a7 27, 88, 214; Dawn of Day, \u00a7\u00a7 310, 419\u2014see The Wanderer etc., \u00a7\u00a7 14, 304, as to man's taking himself as the end of\nexistence.\n\nIn criticism of this kind, no doubt the French moralists such as\nMontaigne, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruy\u00e8re, Fontenelle, Vauvenargues,\nand Chamfort served more or less as models. He says that their\nwritings have more real thought in them than all the books of German\nphilosophers put together\u2014that they continue the spirit of the Renaissance and of the Greco-Roman world (The Wanderer etc., \u00a7 214). He\neven has words of recognition for Helvetius (ibid., \u00a7 216), though later\non he reflects on him, together with Bentham (Beyond Good and Evil,\n\u00a7 228) . He does not pass over Rousseau and notes his influence on\nKant\u2014Rousseau was in part the author of the moral revival which\nspread over Europe at the end of the eighteenth century; the revival,\nhowever, contributed little to the understanding of moral phenomena,\nand had rather, from this point of view, an injurious and retrogressive\ninfluence (The Wanderer etc., \u00a7 216).\n\nn Cf. Dawn of Day, \u00a7 516, and Zarathustra's sayings, \" Physician,\nhelp thyself: so dost thou help thy patient too\" (Zarathustra, I, xxii,\n\u00a7 2); \"If thou hast a suffering friend, be a resting-place to his suffering,\nbut, as it were, a hard bed, a camp bed; so shalt thou serve him best\"\n(ibid., II, iii).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\na Simmel (op. cit., chap, i) finds a fundamental difference between\nSchopenhauer and Nietzsche in their respective attitudes to evolution\nas a process in time; see also Meyer's comments (op. cit., p. 275), and\nNietzsche's own reference to Schopenhauer in Beyond Good and Evil,\n\u00a7 204.\n\nb Schopenhauer, it may be observed, never radically changed in his\nphilosophical views, knew no evolution\u2014once precipitated (and at a\ncomparatively early time in his life), the views remained fixed.\n\nc We scarcely think of the \"blessing of labor\" just where it would\nbe an unquestionable blessing, namely for one who, having inherited a\ncompetence, is without sufficient intellect to know how to use the leisure\nit gives (Joyful Science, \u00a7 359). The principal benefit of labor is in\nkeeping common natures and officials, business people, soldiers, and\nthe like, from being idle, just as it is the principal objection to socialism\nthat it wants to create idleness for common natures\u2014for the idle common\nindividual becomes a burden to himself and to the world (Werke, XI,\n367, \u00a7 555).\n\nd Nietzsche's picture of the \"great men of industry\" may seem\noverdrawn and probably was not based on much personal observation, but Charles Francis Adams remarks in his recently published autobiography (Charles Francis Adams, 1835-1915: An autobiography, p. 196):\n\"I have known, and known tolerably well, a good many 'successful' men\u2014'big' financially\u2014men famous during the last half century; and a less\ninteresting crowd I do not care to encounter. Not one that I have ever\nknown would I care to meet again, either in this world or the next; nor\nis one of them associated in my mind with the idea of humor, thought,\nor refinement. A set of mere money-makers and traders, they were\nessentially unattractive and uninteresting.\"\n\ne Nietzsche's earliest reference (i.e., in his first, semi-metaphysical\nperiod) to the doctrines of the French Revolution was uncomplimentary\u2014they were an un-German, superficial, and unmetaphysical philosophy of\nthe Romanic order (Werke, IX, 161). He thinks that the Revolution\nwould have been much tamer and no such seduction for men of intellect\nas it proved to be, had not Chamfort cast in his lot with it (Joyful Science, \u00a7 95; cf . \u00a7 350). He, however, speaks with unstinted admiration\nof Carnot, \"the soldier and the republican,\" calling him \"great, brave,\nsimple, silent\" (Dawn of Day, \u00a7 167).\n\nf Nietzsche views democracy in other aspects on which I have not\nspace to dwell. But I may note what he says of its influence on music.\nHe finds German music more European than any other, since it alone\nreflects the changed European spirit; in Italian operas we still hear\nchoruses of servants and soldiers, not of the people. Explicable also in\nthis way is a kind of middle-class attitude of jealousy toward noblesse,\nparticularly toward esprit and elegance, which is observable in German\nmusic; it is no longer music like that of Goethe's singer before the\ncastle-gate, which pleases the hall and the king. Beethoven represents\nthe new tendency, who, as compared with Goethe (one thinks of their\nencounter at Teplitz) appears like half-barbarism alongside of culture, the\npeople alongside of the noble class. Nietzsche even raises the question\nwhether the increasing contempt of melody among Germans is not a\ndemocratic symptom (Unart) and an after-effect of the Revolution\u2014melody being akin to law-abidingness, as contrasted with the revolutionary spirit of change. See Joyful Science, \u00a7 103.\n\ng Alfred Fouill\u00e9e (Nietzsche et l'Immoralisme, p. 11) notes that a\nGerman writer (Gistrow) has tried to make a place for Nietzsche's ideas\nunder evolutionary socialism.\n\nh He once goes so far as to describe the socialists as angry with the\ncommandment, \"Thou shalt not steal,\" and wishing to have it read\ninstead, \"Thou shalt not own\" (The Wanderer etc., \u00a7 285). In Human, etc., \u00a7 460, there is a picture of \"the great man of the masses,\" which\nis displeasing enough. After considering in still another passage (Dawn of Day, \u00a7 188) the tendency to drunkenness among the people, he asks\ndubiously whether we are to intrust politics to them, and his sister tells\nus that he was angry with the socialist leaders because they did not\ncontend with all their might against the excessive use of alcohol among\nthe workers, since it was a worse enemy to them than all else which\nthey counted hostile (Werke, pocket ed., V, xix; cf. xx).\n\ni Nietzsche even thinks that for the time being at least culture on\na military basis stands high above all so-called industrial culture\u2014soldiers and their leaders having still a much higher relation to each\nother than workers and their employers; he sets down industrial culture\nin its present form as the lowest (gemeinste) form of existence that\nhas ever been, expressly disagreeing with Herbert Spencer. \"Here\nworks simply the law of necessity: men want to live and have to sell\nthemselves, but they despise the one who exploits this necessity and\nbuys them\" (Joyful Science, \u00a7 40; Werke, XI, 369, \u00a7 557).\n\nj Even a European style of dress, as distinguished from national styles, is developing (The Wanderer etc., \u00a7 215). It is principally differences of language that prevent our perception of what is going on,\nwhich is really the vanishing of the national and the production of the\nEuropean man (Werke, XI, 134, \u00a7 425). Meyer (op. cit., p. 663) remarks\nthat Madame de Sta\u00ebl was the first to light upon the conception of the\n\"European spirit.\"\n\nk Carl Lory (Nietssche als Geschichtsphilosoph, p. 27) considers some\nof the expectations mentioned in the text fantastic; but what are they\ncompared to a suggestion, or rather question, whether we might not\nsucceed in controlling the movement of our planet, or in migrating, at\nour utmost need, to another, which is made by a presumably sober English-man? So L. T. Hobhouse's Development and Purpose, as reviewed in Mind,\nJuly, 1913, p. 384.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\na Cf. also the spirit of Human, etc., \u00a7 291, and the description of the\nideal of the philosopher's life (\"poverty, chastity, humility\") in\nGenealogy etc., III, \u00a7 8. Dr. Paneth, of Vienna, who saw Nietzsche much\nin Nice during the winter of 1883-4, wrote as follows of him:\n\n\"His small room is bare and inhospitable-looking; it certainly has\nnot been chosen with a view either to ease or comfort, but solely on\naccount of economy. It has no stove, no carpet, and no daintiness, and\nwhen I was there it was bitterly cold. Nietzsche was exceedingly friendly.\nThere was nothing of false pathos or of the prophet about him, although\nI had expected it from his last work; on the contrary, he behaved in\nquite a harmless and natural way, and we began a commonplace conversation about the climate and dwellings. Then he told me, but without\nthe slightest affectation or assumption, how he had always felt that a\ntask had been laid upon him, and that he intended to perform it to the\nutmost of his power, as far as his eyes would permit him. Just fancy,\nthis man lives all alone and is half blind. In the evening he can never\nwork at anything. There are many contradictions in Nietzsche, but he\nis a downright honest man, and possesses the utmost strength of will\nand effort. I asked him whether he would like me to draw the attention\nof the public to him on the occasion of the third part of Zarathustra.\nHe would not object, he said, but he did not seem to like the idea. Such\na contempt for every extra aid to success, such a freedom from all self-advertisement is impressive. He is absolutely convinced of his mission,\nand of his future fame; this belief gives him strength to bear all his\nmisfortunes, his bodily sufferings, even his poverty. Of one thing I am\ncertain, Nietzsche is chiefly a man of sentiment.\" (I borrow the passage\nfrom M\u00fcgge's Nietzsche, His Life and Work, 3d ed., p. 74.)\n\nb It is from the standpoint of a larger and higher idea of philosophy\nthat he now criticises English philosophy\u2014see the references to Bacon,\nHobbes, Hume, and Locke, in contrast with Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 252.\n\nc Real philosophers are here distinguished from philosophical laborers, whose work\u2014that of explicating and systematizing existing and\npast valuations\u2014is secondary, however useful. Cf. also Will to Power,\n\u00a7 421.\n\nd Nietzsche, though valuing Hegel more highly than Schopenhauer\ndid (cf. the comments on Schopenhauer's \"unintelligent rage\" against\nhim. Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 204) , speaks critically of his grandiose\nattempt to persuade us of the divinity of existence with the help of the\nsixth sense, the \"historical sense,\" thereby delaying the victory of the\nSchopenhauerian atheistic view, Joyful Science, \u00a7 357.\n\ne He contrasts this with Romantic pessimism, such as he finds in the Schopenhauerian philosophy and in Wagnerian music. After what has\nbeen said in the text, no inconsistency will be felt, when, in claiming to\nbe (with the possible exception of Heraclitus) the first \"tragic philosopher,\" he adds, \"that is, the extremest antithesis and antipodes of\na pessimistic philosopher\" (Ecce Homo, III, i, \u00a7 3).\n\nf In writing to Brandes of the new prefaces to his earlier works, he\nsays that they may perhaps throw some light on him, \"supposing that\nI am not dark in myself (dark in and for myself), as obscurrissimus obscurorum virorum.\u2026 This were possible\" (Briefe, III, 275).\n\ng Nietzsche's singular double attitude to the world is daringly stated\nin the last two lines of a verse, which may be put into rough prose thus:\n\n\"I will be wise because it pleases me to be so,\n\nAnd not because anybody else commands it.\n\nI praise God, because He made the world\n\nAs stupidly as possible.\"\n\n(Werke, pocket ed., VI, 427.)\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\na I am not sure whether Will to Power, \u00a7 545, expresses a view of\nspace inconsistent with that stated in the text or not; and whether\nWerke, XII, 48, \u00a7 118, also expresses a discordant view of time. On\nmore than one ultimate metaphysical point, varying statements linger\nin such fragmentary notes as we have, and a final definitive word, which\nwould put an end to our uncertainty, is lacking.\n\nb Walther Lob deals with \"eternal recurrence\" from the \"scientific\"\npoint of view, and presents objections to it, in the Deutsche Rundschau,\nNovember, 1908. I may add that Nietzsche regards the general mechanical view as useful for purposes of investigation and discovery, but\nimperfect and provisional (Will to Power, \u00a7 1066).\n\nc Nietzsche argues that if recurrence did not take place, this would\nbe something inexplicable by accident and a contrary intention would\nhave to be presupposed\u2014an intention embodied in the structure of the\nforces. In other words, either recurrence or an arbitrary God! See\nWerke, XII, 56-7, \u00a7\u00a7 103, 105.\n\nd I give also, with his kind permission, W. B. Smith's translation\n(originally printed in Poet Lore, 1905, XVI, iii, 91):\n\n\"\"O Man! Give ear!\n\nWhat saith the midnight deep and drear?\n\nFrom sleep, from sleep,\n\nI woke and from a dream profound;\u2014\n\nThe world is deep.\n\nAnd deeper than the day can sound.\n\nDeep is its woe\u2014,\n\nJoy\u2014deeper still than heart's distress.\n\nWoe saith. Forgo!\n\nBut joy wills Everlastingness,\n\nWills deep, deep Everlastingness.\"\n\ne The shepherd into whose throat the serpent (the idea of \"eternal\nrecurrence \") has crawled, bites its head off at the instigation of Zarathustra and spits it out\u2014and laughs, laughed as man has never laughed\nbefore (Zarathustra, III, ii, \u00a7 2; in xiii, \u00a7 2, it is Zarathustra who has\nthe experience). Zarathustra chants love for eternity (III, xvi); his\ndisciples, too, after a festival with him, are lifted up, ready to live, and\nto live again. \"Was that life?\" will I say to death, \"Well! once\nagain!\" (IV, xix, \u00a7 1). I take it that not the bare idea of return, but the idea with its complex of consequences, the idea as a luminous whole,\nis what is referred to in the passage cited in the text.\n\nf G. Chatterton-Hill quite misconceives Nietzsche's meaning in speaking of eternal life as wished for, \"because only in eternity can the\nplentitude of its [life's] expansion be realized\" (op. cit., p. 71).\n\ng For example, by O. K\u00fclpe, Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland, pp. 61-2; Meyer, op. cit., p. 207; F. Rittelmeyer, Friedrich Nietzsche und die Religion, p. 67; A. Fouill6\u00e9, Revue Philosophique,\nLXVI (1909), p. 527.\n\nh Nietzsche even has an early remark to the following effect: \"The\nwhole process of the world's history goes on as if free will and responsibility existed. We have here a necessary moral presupposition, a category\nof our action. That strict causality, which we can quite well grasp conceptually, is not a necessary category. The demands (Consequenz) of\nlogic are inferior to the demands of the thinking which accompanies\naction\" (Werke, IX, 188, \u00a7 129).\n\ni See Meyer, op. cit., pp. 381 ff.; Simmel (with an apparently conclusive mathematical demonstration), op. cit., p. 250 n.; Richter (with\na reference to Cantor's doctrine of the different powers of all quantities),\nop. cit., pp. 276, 326-7. Dorner, however, who, though not sympathetic,\nmeans to be just, and gives us, in general, criticism of Nietzsche worthy\nof the great theologian, appears to take a circular course of things for\ngranted, in case there is a fixed and constant quantity of force (op. cit.,\np. 190).\n\nj Vaihinger (Die Philosophie des Als Ob, p. 789 n), commenting on\nthis remark, suggests that O. Ewald (Nietzsches Lehre in ihren Grundbegriffen) and Simmel may be right in thinking that Nietzsche held to\n\"eternal return\" as a \"pedagogical, regulative idea,\" rather than dogmatically.\n\nk See the letter to Rohde, July 15, 1882 (Briefe, II, 566). Cf. Lou\nAndreas-Salom\u00e9, op. cit., pp. 140-2, 224; Richter, op cit., pp. 64, 276;\nDrews, op. cit., p. 326; Ziegler, op. cit., p. 132.\n\nl A. W. Benn, says that Nietzsche \"plagiarized\" the doctrine from\nthe Stoics (The Greek Philosophers, 2d ed., p. 335 n.).\n\nm It is singular that Nietzsche does not notice what would ordinarily\nbe counted a defect in his view, namely, that no conscious continuity\nbetween this life and the next is asserted\u2014we do not remember our\nprevious existence and presumably in our future state shall have no\nrecollection of this. The average man has little concern about a future\nindividual, who, however like him, is not himself, i.e., a continuation of\nhis present consciousness. I can only suggest that here too Nietzsche must\nhave judged others by himself. To him, if the lives were identical, if\nthere was an absolute repetition of the same thing, it was of small moment\nwhether there was a thread of memory connecting them or not. That\nthe same commonplace thing should be eternally repeating itself\u2014this\nirrespective of anything else, was what depressed him, as it was the\npossibility of an eternal repetition of sublime things that lifted him up.\nFor the moment he, as it were, became pure speculative intelligence, intent\nonly to know whether anything going on in the universe was worth while.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\na It is sometimes said that the same stimulus, applied to different\nsense organs, gives rise to correspondingly different sensations\u2014so H.\nWildon Carr, Philosophical Review, May, 1914, p. 257.\n\nb Cf. the early remark before quoted: \"The sensation is not the result of the cell, but the cell is the result of the sensation, i.e., an artistic\nprojection, an image\" (Werke, IX, 194). Of the complications in such\na view from the physiological standpoint Nietzsche is well aware\u2014see\nBeyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 15.\n\nc Nietzsche finds nothing really unchangeable in the world of\nchemistry\u2014e.g., it is superficial to say that things so different as diamond,\ngraphite, and coal are the same, simply because they have a common\nchemical substance and there is no loss in weight in the process of transformation (Will to Power, \u00a7 623).\n\nd As to the pure ideality of straight lines, circles, numbers, see\nHuman, etc., \u00a7\u00a7 11, 18, 19; Werke, XIV, 34, \u00a7 68; 42-3, \u00a7 81; also p. 320\n(the objects of mathematics \"do not exist\").\n\ne The \"I\" is also spoken of as an attempt to simplify our infinitely\ncomplicated nature (Werke, XI, 291, \u00a7 335), and again as the result of\na doubling process, as when we say \"the lightning lightens\" (ibid.,\nXIV, 329, \u00a7 164).\n\nf Even to a theologian like Heinrich Weinel, the soul is no longer\na thing, a \"simple and hence imperishable substance,\" such as science\nbefore Kant strove to demonstrate (op. cit., p. 6). Nietzsche finds as\nlittle \"one soul\" as \"two souls\" in our breast, rather \"many mortal\nsouls\" (Werke, XIV, 37, \u00a7 75).\n\ng As to the falsity of the outer world, Nietzsche sometimes uses\nstrong language, but it is exact from his point of view: it is a \"product\nof fantasy,\" a \"world of phantoms,\" \"poetry,\" \"the primitive poetry of\nmankind\" (Werke, XII, 36, \u00a7 69; 170, \u00a7 351; Dawn of Day, \u00a7 118). He\nthinks that whatever may be our philosophical standpoint [ordinary\nrealism he hardly considers as a philosophical standpoint], this falsity\n(Irrth\u00fcmlichkeit) is the surest and solidest thing we can still lay hold\nof (Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 34). Riehl asks (op. cit., p. 130) how we\ncan speak of falsity, if we do not know the truth; but one is a negative,\nthe other a positive judgment\u2014Nietzsche himself observes that the destruction of an illusion does not of itself give us the truth, but may\nsimply make the field of our ignorance wider (Werke, XIII, 138, \u00a7 318;\nWill to Power, \u00a7 603). The illusoriness of the physical world has been\noften asserted, e.g., by Hume, of whom Norman Kemp Smith says,\n\"Hume's argument rests throughout on the supposition that perishing\nsubjective states are the only possible objects of mind, and that it is\nthese perishing states which natural belief constrains us to regard as\nindependent existence. Such belief is obviously, on the above interpretation, sheer illusion and utterly false\" (Mind, April, 1905, pp. 169, 170).\nSee also Ralph Barton Perry's admirable statement of Hume's view,\nPresent Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 138-9. It is curious that Nietzsche\nrefers rarely to Hume, and but twice to a critical point in his philosophy,\nviz., his conception of causality (Werke, XIV, 27, \u00a7 49; XVI, 51). His\ngeneral view, however, might well receive the epithet, \"psychologism\"\nwith which Perry characterizes Hume's view\u2014or even a stronger and\nstill more barbarous one, viz., \"biographism,\" for he says, \"Man may\nreach out as far as he will with his knowledge and seem to himself as\nobjective as possible\u2014in the end he gets nothing from it but his own\nbiography\" (Human, etc., \u00a7 513).\n\nh Simplification is spoken of as \"the chief need\" of organic existence,\nWerke, XII, 46, \u00a7 83; cf. 10, \u00a7 18. On the illusion of identity, see ibid.,\nXIV, 22, \u00a7 38; 33, \u00a7 66; 35, \u00a7 70. Nietzsche had maintained early in his\ncareer that logic rested on presuppositions to which nothing in the actual\nworld corresponds, e.g., that of the likeness of things, and that of the\nidentity of the same thing at different points of time (Human, etc., \u00a7 11;\nThe Wanderer etc., \u00a7 12; Werke, XI, 179, \u00a7 65).\n\ni Error (i.e., opinions born of subjective need and posited as objective realities) is, indeed, so much in possession of the field and has become\nso inwrought into the human constitution, that truth, even when it is\nborn, can hardly live save in combination with it, being too forceless of\nitself (Werke, XII, 47, \u00a7 85; cf. XIV, 269, \u00a7 40, where is the strong\nstatement, \"as bloom belongs to the apple, so does falsehood belong to\nlife\"). Error of a certain sort is even spoken of as a presupposition of\nknowledge, e.g., ideas of \"being,\" \"identity,\" \"substance,\" \"permanence,\"\nthe \"unconditioned\"; they are all \"logical fictions\" (Werke, XII, 23,\n\u00a7 39; 24, \u00a7 41; 46, \u00a7 82; 48, \u00a7 89; 208, \u00a7 442; XIV, 29, \u00a7 53; 31, \u00a7 59;\nBeyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 4) , but at the same time standards by which\nwe measure and judge things. Though we have discovered our errors, we\nare often none the less obliged to act according to them and as if we\nbelieved them (Werke, XIII, 224, \u00a7 284)\u2014they are imbedded in language\nand we cannot get rid of them (Werke, XI, 180, \u00a7 69; The Wanderer etc.,\n\u00a7 11). Nietzsche himself frequently speaks of sensible phenomena as independent realities, like the rest of us.\n\nj Knowledge (in this sense) may be something that only the philosopher, who is conceived of as the strongest type of man, can endure;\nNietzsche distinguishes between what is necessary for the philosopher\nand for most men (Werke, XV, 1st ed., 294 ff).\n\nk At the same time there is a note of pathos in saying this. It\nappears also in the exclamation, \"Ah! we must embrace untruth, and\nnow the error becomes lie and the lie a condition of life\"! (Werke, XII,\n48, \u00a7 87). He had said earlier, \"A question lies heavy on the tongue\nand does not wish to be articulate: can man consciously hold to untruth,\nand, if he must, is not death preferable?\" (Human, etc., \u00a7 34). I need\nscarcely say that Nietzsche does not mean that all illusions or errors\nare beneficial\u2014he notes that some may be harmful, even if they make\nhappy for a time (cf. Will to Power, \u00a7\u00a7 453-4).\n\nl How far a view of this sort resembles Pragmatism, I leave to those\nbetter acquainted with the latter than I to say. Ren\u00e9 Berthelot, while\nremarking that Nietzsche did not know the term Pragmatism, calls him\nthe first to perceive distinctly a great part of the ideas currently so\ndesignated (Un romantisme utilitaire, p. 33; see, however, A. W. Moore's\ncritical comment, Philosophical Review, November, 1912, pp. 707-9).\nRichard M\u00fcller-Frienfels finds expressed in Nietzsche \"the thoughts\nwhich have grown into a system as Pragmatism in America, as Humanism in England, and which in Germany has much that is kindred to\nthem, above all in the biological theory of knowledge of Mach, Avenarius,\nJerusalem, Simmel, Vaihinger, and others\" (Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie, April, 1913, pp. 339-58). W. Eggenschwyler, on the other\nhand, emphasizes the contrasts between Nietzsche and James's views in\nan article, \"War Nietzsche Pragmatist?\" (ibid., October, 1912, pp. 35-47).\n\nm See Will to Power, \u00a7 503, where it is said that the whole apparatus\nof so-called knowledge is an apparatus for abstracting and simplifying\u2014its aim being not knowledge proper, but acquiring control. So practical\ninterpretation is distinguished from explanation in ibid., \u00a7 604; and ordinary logic is treated as a falsifying process (proceeding as it does on\nthe supposition of identical cases)\u2014it does not come from a will to truth\n(ibid., \u00a7 512). At other times he departs from this strict conception\nof knowledge. In one place he even denies that there is any pure,\nwill-less subject of knowledge (Genealogy etc., III, \u00a7 12); and in another\nhe calls it a fatal mistake to posit a peculiar impulse to knowledge\n(which goes blindly after truth, without reference to advantage or\ninjury), and then to separate from it the whole world of practical\ninterests (Will to Power, \u00a7 423). But the inconsistencies are no greater\nthan in his varying views of truth, and in effect correspond to them.\nNietzsche does not reach a definitive position here, any more than at some other points in his thinking; in the main, however, he holds to the\nold theoretic meanings of knowledge and truth, simply urging that it\nis difficult, if not impossible, to attain knowledge and truth actually.\n\nn Nietzsche is skeptical of the objective character of what goes by\nthe name of history\u2014it is more interpretation than fact (Werke, XIII,\n64, \u00a7 158; XIV, 146, \u00a7 303; Philologica, I, 329).\n\no Cf. Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 12, where the new psychologist, after\nputting an end to superstition about the soul and falling into a new\ndesert and mistrust, is described as learning at last to invent and, who\nknows? perhaps to find.\n\np Richter (op. cit., p. 282) refers to a passage (Werke, XV, 1st ed.,\np. 295), in which Nietzsche speaks of our not receiving, but ourselves\npositing sense-perceptions. But the perceptions, I take it, are to be distinguished from the stimuli (Reize) that give rise to them\u2014the former\nwe do produce, but the latter we receive. The point with Nietzsche is\nthat our sensations or sense-perceptions are not impressions (hence copies,\nor at least as much like the original as the image which a die leaves in\nthe wax is to the die)\u2014that we actively create them. See Nietzsche's early\ndiscussion of the subject, summarize ante, pp. 50-1; also a late utterance quoted by Meyer (op. cit., p. 589), \"In all perception \u2026 what\nessentially happens is an action, still more exactly an imposing of forms\n(Formen-Aufzwingen): only the superficial speak of 'impressions.'\"\n\nq Cf., as to deductions from moral needs, reflections on Kant, Will to Power, \u00a7 410; on Hegel, ibid., \u00a7 416; on philosophers in general,\nBeyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 6; Will to Power, \u00a7 412. As to conclusions\nfrom needs of happiness, comfort, etc., see Will to Power, \u00a7\u00a7 425, 36,\n171-2, 455; Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 210; Genealogy etc., I, \u00a7 1; III, \u00a7 24.\nNietzsche even calls the \"desirable\" a canon without meaning in relation\nto the world as a totality (Will to Power, \u00a7\u00a7 709, 711). Nor are clearness\nand irrefutableness really marks or standards of truth. To hold that\nclearness proves truth is childishness\u2014unclear ideas may be nearer truth\n(ibid., \u00a7 358). As to irrefutableness, see ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 535, 541.\n\nr In Will to Power, \u00a7 598, the idea that there is no truth (called the\nnihilistic belief) is treated as a recreation for the warrior of knowledge\nwho is ever in struggle with ugly truths\u2014with the implication, then,\nthat after the recreation he will go on with the struggle.\n\ns Cf. Will to Power, \u00a7 604 (there is no datum, everything being fluid,\nunseizable, the most permanent thing being our opinions). In one place\n(Werke, XIII, 49, \u00a7 120) he even proposes\u2014following, I imagine, the\nextreme views of Lange\u2014to do away with the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves (cf. Vaihinger's summary statement of\nLange's views, Die Philosophie des Als Ob, pp. 756-7).\n\nt Cf. Dorner's happy statement of Nietzsche's view: \"In this actual\nworld there are no individuals, no species, and, strictly speaking, also\nno wills, but only actions and reactions, centers of action and reaction,\nand the word 'world' signifies only the total aspect of these actions\"\n(op. cit., pp. 137).\n\nu See the striking summary paragraph, Will to Power, \u00a7 567: Each\ncenter of force has its perspective for the rest of the world, i.e., its quite\ndefinite valuation and way of acting and resisting. The \"apparent\nworld\" reduces itself to specific sorts of action proceeding from such\ncenters. The \"world\" is only a word for the total play of such actions.\nReality consists in just this particular sort of action and reaction of\neach individual to the whole. There hence remains no shadow of right\nto speak here of appearance. There is no \"other,\" no \"true,\" no essential being\u2014therewith would be designated a world without action and\nreaction. The contrast between the apparent and the \"true\" world hence\nbecomes the contrast between \"world\" and \"nothing.\" Cf. also ibid., \u00a7 708 (becoming in not appearance; it is perhaps the world of being that\nis appearance).\n\nv By will Nietzsche means not so much a fixed entity or faculty, as\na moving point\u2014he speaks of \"Willens-Punktationen\" that continually\nincrease or lose their power (ibid., \u00a7 715). Again, though a who that\nfeels pleasure and wills power (i.e., a single subject) is not necessary,\nthere must be contrasts, oppositions, and so relative unities (ibid., \u00a7 693).\nWhen Nietzsche rejects will as illusion (cf. Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 19),\nRichter remarks that he has in mind the consciously aiming will, conceived as something simple (op. cit., p. 225). On the other hand, Nietzsche uses will distinctly in the sense of something that selects and accomplishes (Will to Power, \u00a7 662) , and expressly dissents from Schopenhauer's view of the will as desire and impulse merely\u2014will, he says, deals\nwith ordinary impulses as their master (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 84, 95, 260, 668). Still\nhe does occasionally speak of will to power as desire (ibid., \u00a7 619). Ultimately it is neither a being or a becoming, but a pathos\u2014from which a\nbecoming or an action results (ibid., \u00a7 635; cf. Werke, XIII, 210, \u00a7 483).\n\nw I am compelled to borrow here from Riehl (op. cit., p. 60). Indeed,\nNietzsche still says that the view that every object seen from within is a\nsubject, belongs to the past (Will to Power, \u00a7 474; he probably means\na conscious subject, or else uses subject in the technical sense already\ncriticised). On the other hand, in ibid., \u00a7 658, he speaks of \"thinking,\nfeeling, willing in all that lives,\" and in Zarathustra, IV, xi, he comes\nnear popular animism in speaking of the pine tree as reaching after\npower, commanding, victorious, etc.\u2014though the language may be taken\nas poetical.\n\nx Julius Bahnsen, an early follower of Schopenhauer, seems to have\nhad a similar view, reality being taken by him as \"a living antagonism\nof mutually crossing forces or acts of will\" (Der Widerspruch, I, 436) .\nThe term \"Voluntarism,\" Rudolf Eisler says, was first used by Ferdinand\nT\u00f6nnies in 1883, Paulsen in 1892 having brought it into currency (zur Geltung); cf. Eisler's W\u00f6rterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe, art.,\n\"Voluntarismus\" Wundt's view, as stated by K\u00fclpe (Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland, 3d ed., pp. 102-3), and also the reasoning\nby which he arrives at it, are in general like Nietzsche's: \"All ideas\n(Vorstellungen) of objects rest on an effect that the will experiences;\nit suffers in that it is affected, and it is [in turn] active in that the\nsuffering stirs it to an idea-producing activity. The object, however,\nthat affects the ego is in itself unknown. We can only infer from our\nexperience that what causes (erregt) suffering must itself be acting.\nSince there is absolutely no other activity known to us than that of\nour will, we can trace our suffering back only to some foreign will, and\nso what happens in general to the reciprocal action of different wills.\nThe world may therefore be interpreted as the totality of will-activities,\nwhich in the course of their determination of one another \u2026 come to\narrange themselves in a developmental series of will-unities of varied\ncontent.\"\n\ny If we bear this in mind, we may to a certain extent explain Nietzsche's apparently contradictory views as to the place of conscious will\nin man (and in the world in general). He uses \"will\" sometimes in\nthe sense of conscious will, in which sense it is not universal or elementary\n(cf. Dawn of Day, \u00a7 124), but again as practically identical with natural\nforces, the urge and inner ground of all life and activity. In his view,\nconsciousness plays little part in physiological adaptations and organization\u2014it is a fitful, broken, atomistic thing at best and more a resultant\nthan a cause (cf. Will to Power, \u00a7\u00a7 523, 526). It comes when there is\nneed of it, and is used by deeper forces that may in turn dispense with\nit, when it has done its work. It is these deeper forces that are will proper (i.e., something commanding, imperative, bent on rule), the same\nin nature as in man. I do not mean that considerations of this sort meet\nall difficulties: some of his contradictions are perhaps incapable of resolution, e.g., that between a mechanistic and a teleological view of life.\nNietzsche is now inclined in one way and now in another (cf. Werke,\nXIV, 353, \u00a7 215, with Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 36; Werke, XIII, 170,\n\u00a7 392; Will to Power, \u00a7 712). Still his drift as a whole, and indeed the\nparticular significance of his doctrine of will to power, are antimechanistic. In ibid., \u00a7 712, he almost suggests the Bergsoniau view,\n\"Absolute exclusion of mechanism and matter: both only forms of expression for the lower stages, the least spiritual shape that the will to\npower takes\" (\"die entgeistigste Form des Affekts, des 'Willena zur Macht'\"). Had Nietzsche lived longer, he might have produced an\narticulated view to this effect.\n\nz It must be admitted that \u00a7\u00a7 563, 565 of Will to Power derive quality\nfrom differences of quantity, the contradiction being only obviated if\n\"quality\" here means something different from what it does in \u00a7 564,\nnamely, a more or less \u00e6sthetic valuation, a human idiosyncrasy. It\nmust be remembered that the grouping of paragraphs in Will to Power\nis the work of a later editor.\n\naa This does not mean that Nietzsche did not recognize the influence\nof environment\u2014see his remarks on the shaping of races, Werke, XIV,\n233, \u00a7 787. All the same, \"the psychology of these M. Flauberts is\nin summa false: they see always simply the action of the outer world\nand the ego being formed (quite as Taine?),\u2014they know only the weak\nin will, in whom desire takes the place of will\" (ibid., XIV, 199, \u00a7 391).\nAgain, \"The theory of environment, now the Parisian theory par excellence, is itself a proof of a fateful disgregation of personality\" (ibid.,\nXIV, 215, \u00a7 434). Cf. Dorner's comment, op. cit., p. 139.\n\nbb The sexual instinct is viewed in Will to Power, \u00a7 680, not as a\nmere necessity for the race, but as an expression of the strength or power\nof the individual, a maximal expression of power, which is superficially\ninconsistent with the view of propagation as the result of limited power\nexpressed in ibid., \u00a7 654.\n\ncc Nietzsche argues against Darwinism that the utility of an organ\ndoes not explain its rise, since during the greater part of the time it was\nforming, it may neither have preserved the individual nor been useful to\nhim, least of all in the struggle with outer conditions and enemies (Will to Power, \u00a7 647; cf. Genealogy etc., II, \u00a7 12, where it is explained that\nthe origin of a thing may have nothing to do with the use to which it\nis put by a superior power).\n\ndd There is no mechanical necessity in the relation of the parts of an\norganism\u2014much may be commanded that cannot be fully performed;\nhence, strain, e.g., of the stomach (Werke, XIII, 170, \u00a7 392; cf. 172,\n\u00a7 394).\n\nee The statement in the paragraph cited, \"not 'increase of consciousness,' but heightening of power is the end,\" may possibly be directed\nagainst Fouill\u00e9e, who also put will at the basis of things, but \"will for\nconsciousness\" (according to A. Lalande, Philosophical Review, May,\n1912, p. 294).\n\nff Nietzsche thinks that in a way pleasure rests on pain, being the\nsense of an obstacle that has been overcome. If the pleasure is to be\ngreat, the pain must be long, the tension of the bow extreme (Will to Power, \u00a7 658; cf. \u00a7\u00a7 661, 694, 699). Pain, while different from pleasure,\nis not then its exact opposite; in will to pleasure, there is involved will\nto pain (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 490, 505, 669). He even goes so far as to say, \"in\nitself there is no pain\" (ibid., \u00a7 699); Schopenhauer had asserted the\nrelativity of pain, but to the will (not necessarily to the intellect). Nietzsche does not think that pleasure and pain cause anything, being\nsimply accompaniments of processes that would go on without them\n(ibid., \u00a7 478). In accordance with this general view of the nature and\nnecessity of pain, is a remark to the effect that the simple unsatisfaction\nof our impulses (hunger, sex, or the impulse to move) contains nothing\nto lower our pitch\u2014rather works to stimulate us (ibid.', \u00a7\u00a7 697, 702).\nThere are two kinds of pain, one that acts as a stimulus to the sense\nof power, another that arises after the expenditure of power; and to\nthese correspond two kinds of pleasure, one such as we have in going\nto sleep in a state of exhaustion, the other the pleasure of victory (ibid.,\n\u00a7 703).\n\ngg Nietzsche even speaks of a \"thinking\" [i.e., the equivalent of our\nthinking] in the pre-organic world and calls it an enforcing of forms\nthere, as in the case of the crystal. In our thinking the essential thing is\nthe putting of new material into old schemata (= Procrustes bed)\n(Will to Power', \u00a7 499).\n\nhh Cf. Nietzsche's own statement: \"To become artist (creating), saint\n(loving), and philosopher (knowing) in one person\u2014my practical aim\"\n(Werke, XII, 213, \u00a7 448). The passage is perhaps reminiscent of his\nearly aspiration, but this changed in form more than in substance. He\nsays, indeed, in Ecce Homo (preface, \u00a7 2) that he is a disciple of Dionysus\nand would rather be a satyr than a saint, but he here means by \"saint\"\none who turns his back on life. Even asceticism Nietzsche did not altogether discountenance, but the sort he favors was in the interests of life,\nnot against it. Those whom he regards as the supreme type of men\npractise this kind of asceticism and find their pleasure in it (The Antichristian, \u00a7 57). In speaking of the future \"lords of the earth\" (who\nare to replace God for men and win the unconditional confidence of the\nruled) he emphasizes first \"their new sanctity (Heiligkeit), their renunciation of happiness and comfort\" (Werke, pocket ed., VII, 486, \u00a7 36).\nPurity and renunciation (of some kind) are the essential elements in\nthe concept of the saint (cf. the sympathetic portrayal of the saint as\nrepresenting the highest instinct of purity in Beyond Good and Evil,\n\u00a7 271, also Genealogy etc., I, \u00a7 6; and the description of the redemptive\nman of great love and great contempt, who must sometime come, at the\nclose of \u00a7 24 of Genealogy etc., II).\n\nii With this view of will to power as the essence of the world,\naccident may be looked at from a new point of view. It is true that each\ncenter of power lives and acts in the midst of a realm of the accidental;\nbut this accident itself turns out to be the action of other centers of\npower. Accident really means then no more than that my will to power\nis crossed by somebody else's will to power. It would seem to follow\nthen that if the power of the world could be organized, accident would\ndisappear. Nietzsche does not draw the conclusion, and perhaps would\nhave regarded such a consummation undesirable; but the conclusion\nseems inevitable.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\na In another way the variety and freedom of individual opinion is,\nto Nietzsche, an advantage (cf. the tone of Werke, XI, 196, \u00a7 102; 371-2,\n\u00a7 566). The greater the range of difference, the more likelihood of finding\nat last a view that may unite mankind again (cf. the striking language\nwith which he describes the competition of all egos to find the thought\nthat will stand over mankind as its star, Werke, XII, 360, \u00a7 679).\n\nb Fouill\u00e9e remarks that Guyau felt the same as Nietzsche as to the\nneed of a critique of morality, and that he himself had criticised Kant\non this score (in his Critiques des syst\u00e8mes de morale contemporaine, 1883), as had Renouvier and Charles Secr\u00e9tan before him\u2014see his Nietzsche et l'Immoralisme, pp. 54-5.\n\nc E. and A. Horneffer refer to Wundt, Liebmann, and Riehl, as well\nas Kant, Schopenhauer, and Lotze, as holding that morality is something\nwell-established and known\u2014the only questions open being as to its\nformulation or the basis to be given to it (Das klassische Ideal, pp.\n213-8). A recent writer on Nietzsche speaks of \"moral axioms\" (H. L.\nStewart, Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany, pp. 87, 107) .\n\nd A passage from Emerson may be quoted here: \"Now shall we,\nbecause a good nature inclines us to virtue's side, say, there are no\ndoubts and lie for the right? Is life to be led in a brave or in a cowardly\nmanner, and is not the satisfaction of the doubts essential to all manliness?\nIs the name of virtue to be a barrier to that which is virtue?\" (\"Montaigne,\" in Representative Men).\n\ne William James once confessed something of this feeling to me. The\nfact that morality (as ordinarily understood) is something customary,\nplays a part, no doubt, in rendering it uninteresting, Nietzsche remarking\nthat what is expected, usual, neutral for the feelings, makes the greater\npart of what the people calls its Sittlichkeit (Werke, XI, 212, \u00a7 133).\n\nf Cf., for example, the qualifications he makes in offering his etymological derivation of moral terms in Genealogy of Morals, I, and what\nis implied in speaking of the need of essays under university auspices\non the subject (in the note at the close); also the admission of the\nconjectural nature of his views as to the connection of guilt and suffering (ibid., II, \u00a7 6), the origin of \"bad conscience\" (ibid., II, \u00a7 16),\nand the connection of \"guilt\" and \"duty\" with religious presuppositions\n(ibid., II, \u00a7 21). I have already noted the significance of the full title\nof the Genealogy of Morals, namely, Zur Genealogie der Moral. H. L.\nStewart, in attacking Nietzsche for incompetence and \"incredible self-confidence,\" hardly bears these things in mind (op. cit., pp. 43-4).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\na Nietzsche remarks that we cannot solve the problem of the worth\nof life in general, because, for one thing, we cannot take a position outside\nlife (Twilight of the Idols, v, \u00a7 5; cf. ii, \u00a7 2).\n\nb Cf. Simmel's comments, op. cit., p. 231; also as he is quoted in\nNietzsche's Werke (pocket ed.), V, xxxii. See also Ziegler, op. cit., pp.\n180-1, and A. W. Benn, International Journal of Ethics, October, 1908,\np. 19. Nietzsche's sister recognizes that it would have been better if he\nhad used expressions like \"amoralisch,\" \"Amoralismus\" (Werke', pocket\ned., IX, XXV) . On the other hand, Nietzsche became somewhat indifferent to misconceptions of his meaning, and said late in life, with a\nbit of malice, that it had become his habit not to write anything that\ndid not bring those \"in a hurry\" to despair (preface, \u00a7 5, to Dawn of Day; cf. Werke, XIV, 359, \u00a7 225).\n\nc This is not inconsistent with the view that the mores to which\nobedience is given may have originated more or less with ruling persons\nin the distant past, in accordance with the possible suggestions of\nWerke, XIII, 190, \u00a7 421. It is said there, in a discussion of punishment\nconsidered as a reaction of the powerful, that before the morality of\nthe mos (whose canon is \"everything traditional must be honored\")\nstands the morality of the ruling person (whose canon is that \"the\nruler alone shall be honored\"). \"Before\" here may mean in time or\nin rank and authority\u2014I think the latter. Only if it means \"earlier\nin time,\" is there basis for Willard Huntington Wright's view that\nmorality, as understood by Nietzsche, \"implies the domination of certain classes which, in order to inspire reverence in arbitrary dictates, have\ninvested their codes with an authority other than a human one \" (What Nietzsche Taught, p. 89)\u2014I know no other passage which looks that\nway. Morality, in the general sense now under consideration, does not\nspring, in Nietzsche's estimation, from the dominance of any class, but\nfrom the necessities of group-life. Indeed, so far as the dominating\nclass shape a morality, it is, as will appear later, one of their own, more\nor less different from that of the group at large.\n\nd Mos or Sitte is thereby differentiated from habit as it may exist\namong animals (see Wundt's Ethics, Engl. tr., I, 131; of. also p. 156,\nwhere habit, usage, and Sitte are distinguished) .\n\ne Sophocles, for example, describes them in language approaching to\naccuracy when he says in the \"Antigone,\"\n\n\"\"They are not of today nor yesterday,\n\nBut live for ever, nor can man assign\n\nWhen first they sprang into being;\"\n\nhe passes into superstition when he assigns to them a Divine origin. It\nis to be noted, too, that Sophocles distinguishes them from a prince's\n\"edicts.\"\n\nf Cf. implications of this sort in Werke, IX, 154; Human, etc., \u00a7 99;\nThe Wanderer etc., \u00a7 40; Mixed Opinions etc., \u00a7 89; also Genealogy of Morals, II, \u00a7 8 (where buying and selling are said to be older than the\nbeginnings of social organization), and II, \u00a7 16 (where, in developing a\ntheory of \"bad conscience,\" a wild state of man, before individuals came\nunder the ban of society and peace, is spoken of). It may be noted that\nAristotle spoke of the \"clanless, lawless, heartless man,\" as described\nby Homer (Politics, I, ii). Nietzsche appears to have in mind formless,\nroving populations (Genealogy etc., II, \u00a7 17).\n\ng Only so can I reconcile passages cited in the preceding note with\nthe view now to be developed. But for the citations from Genealogy etc.,\none might conjecture that the idea of a pre-social state belonged to\nNietzsche's earlier periods alone; he now even speaks of the social origin\nand meaning of our impulses and affects\u2014there is no \"state of nature\"\nfor them (Werke, XIII, 112, \u00a7 224). Dewey and Tufts say, \"Psychologically the socializing process is one of building up a social self. Imitation and suggestion \u2026 are the aids in building up such a self\" (op. cit., p. 11), that is, they too postulate a hypothetical self, not yet social,\nto start with.\n\nh The group-connection of an individual appeared also in the fact\nthat one member of a group might be attacked for the offense of another\nmember, though he himself had no part in it, and that, on the other hand,\nthe guilt of an individual was felt by the group as its own (Dawn of Day, \u00a7 9; cf. Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., pp. 28-9).\n\ni Cf. the striking language, in entire agreement with the primitive\nview, of the late Father Tyrrell (\"A much-abused Letter\"): \"In such\na man [a truly social individual] the general mind and outlook supplants\nthe personal and private; the general ends, interests, and affections\nabsorb and transcend the particular; and, as an active member of the\nsocial organism, his internal and external energies are reinforced by\nthose of the whole community, which acts with him and through him.\"\nH. L. Stewart is misled in saying that Nietzsche attributed \"herd-morality\" to a late epoch of decadence and failed to recognize the fact\nof primitive gregariousness (op. cit., pp. 44-6).\n\nj Ren\u00e9 Berthelot remarks that since a large part of the content of\nthe moral conscience of individuals is constituted by the collective interest\nof the social group to which they belong, it follows that in order that\nthere may be no contradiction of duties, there should be society, but\nnot societies, or that different social groups should not be in conflict. \"But to speak exactly, society does not exist; what exists is societies,\nthat is to say different groupings in which individuals find themselves\nunited. To speak of society simply is to use the manner of speech of\nan attorney-general, not that of a man of science or of a philosopher\"\n(Un romantisme utilitaire, I, 181).\n\nk Cf. a striking picture of man's dread of isolation in early times\nand its moral significance: \"To be alone, to feel detached, neither to\nobey nor to rule, to have the signification of an individual\u2014this was\nthen no pleasure, rather a punishment: one was condemned 'to be an\nindividual.' To be free in thinking was discomfort itself. While we\nfeel law and regulation as compulsion and loss, formerly egoism was the\npainful thing, a real misery. To be oneself, to value according to one's\nown weight and measure\u2014for this there was no taste. Inclinations of\nsuch an order were felt as something insane, since every distress and\nevery fear were associated with being alone. Then 'free will' had bad\nconscience for a very near neighbor; and the unfreer a man was in his\nconduct, the more flock-instinct and not personal judgment expressed itself\nin it, the more moral did he feel himself to be\" (Joyful Science, \u00a7 117).\nCf. the general remarks on man's need of social recognition by William\nJames, Psychology, I, 293.\n\nl Cf. the remark of William James, \"The impulse to pray is a\nnecessary consequence of the fact that whilst the innermost of the empirical selves of a man is a Self of the social sort, it yet can find its\nonly adequate Socius in an ideal world\" (op. cit., I, 316).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\na Nietzsche in writing to Brandes (see Werke, pocket ed., IX, xxvii)\nsays that many words have with him particular shades of meaning\n(Salzen), but in this case he does little more than conform to current\nGerman usage.\n\nb Cf. the reference (Dawn of Day, \u00a7 9) to those who depart from\ntradition, prompted by motives like those which originally led to its\nestablishment, viz., the group's good; also the line,\n\n\"Strange to the people, and yet useful to the people\"\n\nin \"Scherz, List und Rache,\" \u00a7 49 (prefixed to Joyful Science); still\nagain the description of the Schopenhauer type of man and reformer in\n\"Schopenhauer as Educator,\" sect. 4.\n\nc Cf. William Blake's view of evil as one of the pair of wedded contraries without which there is no progression (Works, ed. by E. J. Ellis\nand W. B. Yeats, II, 63); also the views of Jacob B\u00f6hme as given by\nKarl Jo\u00ebl (op. cit., pp. 194-5). Lou Andreas-Salom\u00e9 happily states Nietzsche's position (op. cit., pp. 199-200). See further, Will to Power, \u00a7\u00a7 1015,\n1017, 1019. From a slightly different point of view Nietzsche says\n(Werke, XII, 86, \u00a7 168) , \"We \u00e6stheticians of the highest order would\nnot miss also crimes and vice and torments of the soul and errors\u2014and\na society of the wise would probably create for itself an evil (b\u00f6se)\nworld in addition. I mean that it is no argument against the \u00e6sthetic\nnature (K\u00fcnstlerschaft) of God that evil and pain exist\u2014however,\nagainst His 'goodness.' But what is goodness? The disposition to help\nand do good to, which just so far presupposes those for whom things\ngo badly, and who are bad (schlecht)\"!\n\nd Cf. what he wrote a friend in 1881, \"It grieves me to hear that\nyou suffer, that anything is lacking to you, that you have lost some one\u2014although in my case suffering and deprivation belong to the normal and\nnot, as for you, to the unnecessary and irrational side of existence\"\n(quoted by Lou Andreas-Salom\u00e9, op. cit., p. 16). Cf. a letter to Brandes, Briefe, III, 302; also Werke, XIII, 219, \u00a7 469. Matthew Arnold's\n\"Stanzas in memory of Edward Quillinan\" and the passage in Newman's Parochial and Plain Sermons beginning \"A smooth and easy life\"\n(Vol. V, p. 337) may also be referred to here.\n\ne Dawn of Day, \u00a7 354. Cf. the striking poems, \"To Grief\" and \"To\nLife,\" by Lou Andreas-Salom\u00e9, reproduced in Hal\u00e9vy's La Vie de Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric Nietzsche, pp. 251 and 254; the first was dedicated to Nietzsche (summer\nof 1882), the second set to music by Nietzsche (the music and a translation of the words are given at the close of Vol. XVII of the English ed.\nof the Works) .\n\nf Montaigne is frank: \"Let the philosophers say what they will, the\nmain thing at which we all aim, even in virtue itself, is pleasure. It\npleases me to rattle in their ears this word, which they so nauseate to\nhear, etc.\" (Essays, I, xix) .\n\ng Cf. Werke, XII, 90, \u00a7 177; 87, \u00a7 171 (where love and cruelty are\nsaid to be not opposites, but discoverable always in the firmest and best\nnatures\u2014e.g., in the Christian God, a being very wise and excogitated\nwithout moral prejudices); also Will to Power, \u00a7 852.\n\nh Along the lines of the \"theodicy\" referred to earlier (pp. 233-4)\nNietzsche says, \"Whoever believes in good and evil [i.e., as strictly antithetical], can never treat evil as a means to good; and every teleological\nworld-view becomes impossible which does not break absolutely with\nmorality\" (Werke, XIII, 126, \u00a7 287).\n\ni Nietzsche has a hard saying as to the classical type of character,\nasking \"Whether the moral monstra [those in whom the 'good' impulses\nare alone developed] are not of necessity romanticists, in word and\ndeed,\" something of \"evil\" being required in the make-up of the classical\ntype (Will to Power, \u00a7 848).\n\nj Cf. Mabel Atkinson on vices as the outgrown virtues of our animal\nancestry (International Journal of Ethics, April, 1908, p. 302).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XIX\n\na See Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 260; Genealogy etc., I, \u00a7 16. Richter\nthinks that it was just this diversity and contrariety of moral judgments\ntoday that led Nietzsche to the hypothesis of original class moralities\n(op. cit., p. 314).\n\nb Cf. the New Testament passage (James i, 27) where one of the\nmarks of \"pure\" religion is said to be keeping oneself \"unspotted from\nthe world,\" and Matthew Arnold's description of the \"children of the\nSecond Birth,\" the \"small transfigured band\"\n\n\"Whose one bond is, that all have been\n\nUnspotted by the world.\"\n\nin \"Stanzas in Memory of Oberman.\"\n\nc Emile Faguet (En lisant Nietzsche, pp. 327-8) makes the criticism\nthat there are not merely these two moralities, but an indefinite number.\nRiehl (op. cit., p. 117) reflects on Nietzsche in the same way. But this\nis superficial. Nietzsche explicitly recognizes the numerous types, and\nsimply singles out those that seem to him most important.\n\nd Schopenhauer in his Grundlage der Moral used the term \"slave\nmorality\" for that which is practised in obedience to a command (such\nas Kant posited).\n\ne N. Awxentieff (Kultur-ethisches Ideal Nietzsches, p. 104), thinks\nthat the primitive group was, according to Nietzsche's view (he cites\nJoyful Science, \u00a7 23), a completely indifferentiated mass, homogeneous\nthroughout; but this is an exaggerated statement. It is true that Nietzsche's \"great individuals\" are a late product of social evolution, but individuals sufficiently marked off to lead and rule have characterized\nevery stage of society, at least above the hunting and nomadic.\n\nf Dewey and Tufts say, \"The term good, when used in our judgments\nupon others (as in a 'good' man), may have a different history [from\nthat in the economic sphere]. As has been noted, it may come from class\nfeeling; or from the praise we give to acts as they immediately please.\nIt may be akin to noble, or fine, or admirable\" (op. cit., p. 184). This\nis a beginning along the line of distinctions and refinements such as\nNietzsche's, but only a beginning. On the other hand, H\u00f6ffding thinks\nthat the doctrine of master- and slave-morality was falsely derived (op. cit., pp. 142, 156). It may be added that Nietzsche does not always use\n\"gut und schlecht\" and \"gut und b\u00f6se\" in the special senses described\nin the text, but sometimes quite generally.\n\ng Further descriptions of the subject-class and their type of morality\nmay be found in Werke, XIV, 67, \u00a7 133, and Genealogy etc., I, \u00a7 14. In\nBeyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 260, they are spoken of as the \"subjugated,\noppressed, suffering, unfree, uncertain of themselves and weary.\" In\nZarathustra, IV, xiii, \u00a7 3, their virtues are described as resignation,\nmodesty, prudence, and industry.\n\nh Cf. the striking paragraph. Human, etc., \u00a7 81, on the difference in\nstandpoint and feeling between the doer of an injury and the sufferer\nfrom it.\n\ni Wundt remarks, \"Language is the oldest witness to the course of\ndevelopment of all human ideas. Hence it is to language that we must\nput our first questions in investigating the origin of moral ideas\" (op. cit., I, 23). On the other hand, Westermarck discards all questions of\netymology as irrelevant to the subject, adding, \"The attempt to apply\nthe philological method to an examination of moral concepts has, in\nmy opinion, proved a failure\u2014which may be seen from Mr. Bayne's book\non 'The Idea of God and the Moral Sense in the Light of Language'\"\n(Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, I, 133)\u2014apparently a large\nconclusion from a slight premise.\n\nj Riehl says that this \"class\" view of Nietzsche's is not a new one\u2014Paul R\u00e9e having advanced it in Die Entstehung des Gewissens (1885\u2014Beyond Good and Evil appeared in the same year, but Genealogy of Morals\ntwo years later), and having been able to cite as authorities P. E. M\u00fcller,\nGrote, and Welcker. Nietzsche, in the preface to Genealogy etc., refers\nonly to R\u00e9e's earlier work, Der Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen\n(1877), but Lou Andreas-Salom\u00e9 appears to be of the opinion that he\nwas none the less indebted to R\u00e9e, through conversations had with him\nwhile the latter was preparing Die Entstehung des Gewissens (op. cit.,\npp. 189-90). Ziegler traces Nietzsche's view back to Leopold Schmidt's\nEthik der alten Griechen (1882).\n\nk Welcker (quoted by Grote, History of Greece, II, 419 ff.) remarks\nthat by this time the political or class senses of \"good\" and \"bad\"\nhad fallen into desuetude.\n\nl Riehl argues that a process, which is supposed to be typical, ought\nalways to be met with under similar circumstances, and asks, \"But\nwhere among the Greeks is the 'slave-morality' to be found along with\ntheir master-morality\" (op. cit., p. 119)? The argument is plausible, but\nslightly wooden, for tendencies may exist even if the conditions are not\npresent which allow them to go into effect. Even so, there are not\nwanting signs that something like a \"slave-morality\" showed its beginnings in Greece. If what Callicles says in Plato's \"Gorgias\" relates at\nall to matter of fact, the mass did sometimes endeavor to put through\ntheir own point of view and make laws and moral distinctions in their\nown interest. This \"accomplished Athenian gentleman,\" as Jowett speaks\nof him\u2014at least a representative of the old order and out of humor with his time\u2014gives it as his opinion that it is the weaker and more numerous\nmass who are making the laws and making them for their own advantage,\ndistributing praise and blame, too, from the standpoints of their own\ninterests; they go counter to old ideas of what is just and right and\nwill have nothing of the superior privileges of superior men; equality is\ntheir watchword; for one to have more than others (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd,\ntranslated, in misleading fashion, \"dishonesty\" by Jowett) is in their\neyes shameful and unjust (\"Gorgias,\" pp. 483-4). That Callicles did not\noppose law, but that kind of law, is indicated by his questioning whether\nwhat a rabble of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps\nfor their physical strength, gather to impose, are laws (489).\n\nm Really the later type of prophets, for the first ones \"were probably\nlittle more than frenzied seers\" (so C. H. Toy, History of the Religion of Israel, p. 34\u2014see e.g., I Samuel xix, 24) .\n\nn \"The words anav, sweet, and ani, poor, both springing from the\nsame root signifying modest, become in this limited world of a fanatical\npeople synonymous. The concepts poor, afflicted, oppressed, mild, resigned, pious are no longer distinguished, and the words which properly\nsignify poor (dal, ebion) become equivalent to holy men, friends of God.\nThe anavim or hasidim form the elect of humanity; they are the sweet\nof the world, the righteous, the upright, the pious. The Hebrew words\n(asir, gadol, avis) become designations of blame; the rich, the merry,\nthe bold mocker (lec) are for the pious objects of the most furious hate\"\n(Wilhelm Weigand, Friedrich Nietzsche, ein psychologischer Versuch, pp.\n58-9).\n\no Occasionally Christian scholars themselves read between the lines.\nFor example, Weinel, after mentioning the fact that Christianity in its\nfirst period lived among the lower strata of the Roman Empire, says,\n\"We must grant that from many an early Christian writing there speaks\nnot the contempt of a higher ideal for what is impure and common, but\nthe hate of the oppressed and trampled upon, the persecuted and exploited. One need only read the Apocalypse of John or the Epistle of\nJames.\" He adds, however, that this was contrary to the principle and\nword of Jesus (op. cit., p. 179).\n\np In Human, etc., \u00a7 45, Nietzsche had held that our present morality\ngrew up among the ruling races and classes. The later view developed\nin the text is contradictory\u2014we may perhaps say that he came to see\nthe present moral situation more distinctly; but the difference may be\npartly owing to the fact that in the passage cited he conceives of the\nsubject-classes or races as mere heaps of individuals without fellow-feeling, afraid and suspicious of every one.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XX\n\na At the same time Nietzsche remarks that the air of gloom and\nseverity usually investing duties may lessen, or even pass away. When\nduty ceases to be hard to us, when after long practice it changes into\na pleasant inclination and a need, then the rights of others to which\nour duties, now our inclinations, correspond, become something different,\nnamely, occasions for agreeable sensations. When the Quietists no longer\nexperienced anything oppressive in their Christianity and found only\npleasure in God, they took for their motto \"All for the glory of God \":\nwhatever they then did it was sacrifice no longer\u2014the motto might equally\nhave been \"All for our pleasure\"! To demand that duty shall always\nbe burdensome (l\u00e4stig)\u2014as Kant does\u2014means that it shall never become\nhabit and custom (Dawn of Day, \u00a7 339).\n\nb The state, for instance, did not arise in contract, rather in violence, but its rights come in time to be recognized, and duties to it too (cf.\nGenealogy etc., II, \u00a7 17).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XXI\n\na In another passage (Will to Power, \u00a7 738) he speaks differently,\n\"Every power which prohibits and knows how to awaken fear in the\nperson whom the prohibition affects, produces 'bad conscience' (that is,\nan impulse to something with a consciousness of the dangerousness of\nsatisfying it and of the necessity thence of secrecy, by-ways, precaution).\nEvery prohibition produces a worse character, in those who do not willingly\nobey it, but are only forced.\" But here \"bad conscience\" is little more\nthan fear.\n\nb The worth of Nietzsche's analysis of the general idea of a moral\norder is sometimes recognized in theological circles. Weinel gives up the\nidea, remarking, \"Actually this form of faith in God occupies the whole\nforeground of our religious teaching, so that not only the pastor and the\nreligious teacher \u2026 but also professors of philosophy and of theology, regard it as the Christian conception. And even our 'atheists,'\nwho no longer believe in God, think that they can still believe in the\nphantom of this 'moral world-order.' But it is a phantom, and Nietzsche\nhas recognized it as such rightly, and perhaps with more penetration\nthan any one else in our whole generation\" (op. cit., p. 197).\n\nc The idea that there must be wrong somewhere to account for suffering is given a curious turn by those who charge up their troubles to\nother people and find a certain easement thereby. Nietzsche notes the\nway in which socialists and modern decadents generally hold the upper\nclasses or the Jews or the social order or the system of education responsible for the state in which they find themselves: they want to fasten\nguilt somewhere (Will to Power, \u00a7 765). One thinks of Matthew Arnold's\nsubtle line,\n\n\"With God and Fate to rail at, suffering easily.\"\n\nd Nietzsche dissents also from the metaphysical manipulation of\n\"ought,\" which makes it a means of reaching a transcendental order of\nthings, i.e., \"transcendental freedom\" in the Kantian and Schopenhauerian sense (Will to Power, \u00a7 584; Twilight of the Idols, v, \u00a7 6).\n\ne It is true that Nietzsche has occasional satirical reflections on the\nimpulse to obey; cf., on the Germans, Dawn of Day, \u00a7 207; Werke, XIII,\n344-5, \u00a7 855; and, generally, Werke, XI, 214-5, \u00a7 141; Joyful Science, \u00a7 5.\nAnd there can be no question that the impulse to command ranks higher\nthan that to obey. All the same, he recognizes the organic place of\nobedience in the scheme of things.\n\nf In what seems a similar spirit John Dewey finds distinctions between men vanishing, when their common \"birth and destiny in nature\"\nis remembered. Democracy appears in his eyes accordingly as \"neither\na form of government nor a social philosophy, but a metaphysic of the\nrelation of man and his experience to nature\" (Hibbert Journal, July,\n1911, pp. 777-8). This is democracy with a vengeance!\n\ng Cf. the language to the working-class of an American socialist poet\n(Arthur Giovanitti):\n\n\"Think, think! while breaks in you the dawn.\n\nCrouched at your feet the world lies still.\n\nIt has no power but your brawn.\n\nIt has no wisdom but your will.\n\nBeyond your flesh and mind and blood.\n\nNothing there is to live and do.\n\nThere is no man, there is no God,\n\nThere is not anything but you.\"\n\nh In Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 23, he says that there are a hundred\ngood reasons why any one should keep away from his circle of ideas who\n\u2014can! \"We others are the exception and the danger, who never dare\nbe the rule\" (Joyful Science, \u00a7 76; cf. Dawn of Day, \u00a7 507). Interesting\nin this connection is an enumeration of ways in which antiquity may\nand may not be useful to us now: for example, it is not for young\npeople; it is not for direct imitation; it is approachable only for few\u2014and morals should comprise some kind of police regulations here, as it\nshould also against bad pianists who play Beethoven (Werke, X, 412,\n\u00a7 273).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XXII\n\na The word \"altruism\" is called an \"Italian hybrid\" by a writer\non Nietzsche in the Quarterly Review (October, 1896, pp. 314-5); according to the Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, it was invented by Comte.\n\nb Cf . Nietzsche's language: \"What is done from love is always beyond\ngood and evil\" (Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 153); \"Jesus said to his Jewish\nfollowers, 'the law was for servants\u2014love God, as I love him, as his son!\nwhat is morality to us'!\" (ibid., \u00a7 164); \"What is done from love is not\nmoral but religious\" (Werke, XII, 289, \u00a7 296); and the description of\nthe feeling of Paul and the first Christians, \"all morality, all obeying\nand doing, fails to produce the feeling of power and freedom which love\nproduces\u2014from love one does nothing bad (Schlimmes), one does much\nmore than one would do from obedience and virtuous principle\" (Will to Power, \u00a7 176).\n\nc F. Rittelmeyer, commenting on the fact that Goethe's egoism led\nhim to refuse the importunities of strangers, says, \"That Goethe could\nhave committed no greater crime against humanity than to have sacrificed\nhimself to such importunate people, and in this way failed to have produced his immortal works, is not thought of\" (Friedrich Nietzsche und die Religion, p. 93).\n\nd This by J. M. Warbeke, Harvard Theological Review, July, 1909,\np. 368. Cf. Richard Beyer, Nietzsches Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe, p. 21, and even H. Scheffauer, Quarterly Review, July, 1913,\np. 170.\n\ne Paul Elmer More thinks that for a right understanding of Nietzsche\nwe must find his place in the debate between egotism (sic) and sympathy, self-interest and benevolence, which has been going on for two\ncenturies, and devotes nearly a third of his little book already cited\n(pp. 19-47) to an historical review of the contest as it has been waged\nin England, mentioning Rousseau, Kant, and Schleiermacher briefly at\nthe close. But it is a mistake to range Nietzsche baldly on the side of\negoism against sympathy, self-interest against benevolence; he really\nleaves that wearisome controversy behind. His problem is pity, and pity\nparticularly as viewed by Schopenhauer. Curiously enough, the author\ndoes not even mention Schopenhauer in the connection. In saying the\nabove I do not forget that Nietzsche opposed the overemphasis on sympathy and altruism characteristic of our time. Comte, he remarks,\n\"with his celebrated formula vivre pour autrui has in fact outchristianized Christianity\" (Dawn of Day, \u00a7 132). \"Our socialists are decadents,\nbut also Mr. Herbert Spencer is a decadent\u2014he sees in the triumph of\naltruism something desirable\" (Twilight etc., IX, \u00a7 37; cf. Joyful Science,\n\u00a7 373). \"We are no humanitarians; we should never dare allow ourselves to speak of our 'love to mankind'\u2014for this one like us is not\nactor enough or not Saint-Simonist enough, or Frenchman enough!\"\n(Joyful Science, \u00a7 377). He even regards the modern softening of manners\nas a result of decline, speaking of our \"morals of sympathy, which might be called l'impressionisme morale,\" as one more expression of the physiological oversensitiveness, peculiar to everything that is decadent; in contrast, \"strong times, superior cultures, see in pity, in 'love of neighbors,'\nin deficiency of personality and self-feeling, something despicable\" (Twilight etc., ix, \u00a7 37) . All this, however, does not mean that Nietzsche\nfailed to recognize the due place of sympathy and altruism in normal\nsocial life.\n\nf Hans B\u00e9lart remarks that when Nietzsche criticises morality and\ncomes to the conclusion that it is the danger of dangers, we must remember that it was above all the morality of his great teacher Schopenhauer\nwhich he had in mind\u2014a morality that emphasized the impulses of self-denial and self-sacrifice, and so gilded them and deified them and made\nmetaphysical use of them (verjenseitigt), that they became absolute\nvalues, from the standpoint of which he turned against life and even\nhimself. Further, as Nietzsche viewed matters, this doctrine of denial\nand asceticism was closely interwoven with Christianity, and it was on\nthis account that he turned against Christianity (Nietzsches Metaphysik,\npp. 1-3). The antithesis of morality\u2014this type of morality\u2014to life might\nbe stated as follows: in the last analysis life lives off other life, but\nmorality leads us to identify ourselves with other life; so far then as we\ndo this, the will to assert ourselves on our own account tends to vanish\u2014with a complete identification the basis of individual existence would\ndisappear.\n\ng So Carl Lory, Nietzsche als Geschichtsphilosoph, p. 22. Nietzsche\nhad said in \"Richard Wagner in Bayreuth\" (sect. 5) that one could not\nbe happy with suffering everywhere about one. This and the first three\ncitations in the text belong to the first period of his life, but as they\nare only in keeping with later utterances, it seems allowable to use them\nhere.\n\nh This to von Gersdorff, May 26, 1876 (Briefe, I, 379). He wrote to\nMalwida von Meysenbug, March 24, 1875, \"I have wished that I could\ndaily do some good thing to others. This autumn I proposed to myself\nto begin each morning by asking, Is there no one to whom thou couldst\ndo some good today? \u2026 I vex too many men by my writings, not to\nfeel obliged to attempt to make it up to them somehow\" (quoted in\nMeyer's Nietzsche, p. 666) .\n\ni In \"The Use and Harm of History,\" sect. 2, those who pass through\nlife \"pitiful and helpful\" are spoken of with honor, as well as other\ntypes. Soft, benevolent, pitiful feelings are classed among the good\nthings once counted bad (schlimme) things in Genealogy etc., III, \u00a7 9.\nIn Dawn of Day, \u00a7 136, pity is even recognized as a self-preservative power\nfor certain individuals (e.g., those Hindus who find the aim of all intellectual activity in coming to know human misery) since it takes them\naway from themselves, banishes fear and numbness (Erstarrung), and\nincites to words and actions.\n\nj Nietzsche recognizes that this is its normal character. \"With alms\none maintains the situation that makes the motive to alms. One gives\nthen not from pity, for this would not wish to continue the situation\"\n(Werke, XI, 227, \u00a7172\u2014italics mine). Dewey and Tufts are hardly\nright in suggesting that Nietzsche overlooks \"the reaction of sympathy\nto abolish the source of suffering\" (op. cit., p. 370 n).\n\nk Weinel makes the following admission: \"Let us ask ourselves if\nwe wish to be pitied by others, if we find an attitude of this sort toward\nus pleasing? \u2026 Even if Nietzsche's course in following up the most\nsecret feelings of one who pities is dictated by suspicion, and his thought\nor scent takes him too far, it is still true that the noblest type of soul\ncannot show pity without feeling some kind of superiority and placing\nhimself over against the other as the giving party\" (op. cit., pp. 172-3).\n\nl Sometimes he makes distinctions on the subject. \"'On n'est bon que par la piti\u00e9: il faut done qu'il y ait quelque piti\u00e9 dans tous nos sentiments'\u2014so sounds morality at present! And how has this come about?\u2014That the man of sympathetic, disinterested, publicly useful, gregarious\nactions is now felt to be the moral man, is perhaps the most general effect\nand change of mind which Christianity has produced in Europe; although\nit was neither its intention nor its doctrine\" (Dawn of Day, 132\u2014the\nitalics are mine) .\n\nm So a writer whom Dolson quotes (op. cit., p. 100). The Encyclopedia Britannica, art. \"Ethics,\" calls Nietzsche \"the most orthodox exponent of Darwinian ideas in their application to ethics.\" It seems to\nbe the general view, even Frank Thilly saying, \"Nietzsche made this\ntheory the basis of his new ethics\" (Philosophical Review, March, 1916,\np. 190).\n\nn Cf., e.g., Will to Power, \u00a7\u00a7 70, 647-52, 684, 685; Twilight etc., ix,\n\u00a7 14. One who wishes a discriminating treatment of the subject cannot\ndo better than read pp. 219-38 of Richter's Friedrich Nietzsche. Simmel,\nin \"Fr. Nietzsche, eine moralphilosophische Silhouette\" (Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie, 1906), and Oskar Ewald in Nietzsches Lehre in ihren Grundbegriffen, deny specifically Darwinian elements in the theory of the\nsuperman, though Simmel's view appears to be somewhat modified in his\nSchopenhauer und Nietzsche (1907\u2014see p. 5).\n\no The loftier elevation, where pity is transcended, is portrayed in\nthese lines:\n\n\"\n\n\"Destined, O star, for radiant path.\n\nNo claim on thee the darkness hath!\n\nRoll on in bliss through this, our age!\n\nIts trouble ne'er shall thee engage!\n\nIn furthest worlds thy beams shall glow:\n\nPity, as sin, thou must not know!\n\nBe pure: that duty's all you owe.\"\n\nThe transation is Thomas Common's\u2014the original, with the title,\n\"Sternen-Moral,\" being \u00a7 63 of \"Scherz, List und Rache,\" prefixed to\nJoyful Science. Similar sentiment is expressed in Beyond Good and Evil,\n\u00a7\u00a7 271, 284; Will to Power, \u00a7 985.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XXIII\n\na Vernon Lee says in Vital Lies, \"Make no use of 'vital lies,' they are\nvital and useful only when they are accepted as vital truths\"\u2014as if\nbeing \"accepted as vital truths\" was inconsistent with their being\n\"lies\"!\n\nb Paul Carus does not interpret Nietzsche's attitude to truth and\nscience very finely when he says that \"he expressed the most sovereign\ncontempt for science,\" was \"too proud to submit to anything, even to\ntruth,\" or \"to recognize the duty of inquiring,\" and rejected \"with disdain\" the \"methods of the intellect\" (Nietzsche and Other Exponents of Individualism, pp. 5-8).\n\nc Even Dolson (op. cit., p. 96), but not William Wallace (op. cit.,\npp. 533-4), who, however, hardly does justice to the full import of Nietzsche's skepticism.\n\nd Cf. Richter's lucid statement: \"In the realms of values there are\nno true and no false ideas, in the time-honored sense of agreement or\ndisagreement of an idea with its object. For there are here no objects,\nknown as existing, but only something not existing in advance, namely,\ngoals or ends (Ziele) which are arbitrarily created by an act of will. And for this creative act there is in turn no other regulative than the\nindividual will\" (op. cit., p. 211).\n\ne The high place which Nietzsche gives to justice appears notably in\nGenealogy etc., II, \u00a7 1; Will to Power, \u00a7 967; Werke, XIV, 80, \u00a7 158.\nHe admits, indeed, that we can hardly be just to ideals which are\ndifferent from our own (cf. Werke, XII, 136, \u00a7263), and that there is a\nnatural antinomy, even in a philosopher, between strong love and hate\nand justice or fairness (Will to Power, \u00a7976).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XXIV\n\na Zarathustra says (II, ii), \"If there were Gods, how could I endure\nto be no God?\" It is easy to scoff at such a saying, but if we go beneath\nthe surface, we see that it is only an extravagant way of expressing the\ndeeply-felt obligation to be like God which is at the root of the saying\nof Jesus. See the illuminating remarks of Simmel, op. cit., pp. 204-5.\n\nb Cf. the early statement in \"Schopenhauer as Educator,\" sect. 6,\nbeginning, \"I see something higher and more human above me than I\nmyself am\" (quoted in full on p. 61). In a way the impulse rested on\na need\u2014a pressing need in his case, familiar with the tragic view of\nthings as he was\u2014the need of something joy-producing: \"Love to men?\nBut I say, Joy in men! and that this may not be irrational, we must\nhelp produce what will give joy\"\u2014hence select, seek out, and further those\nwho do, or may, and let the misshapen and degenerate die out (Werke, XI,\n247-8, \u00a7213).\n\nc No one has developed this general view with greater thoroughness\nthan Edmund Montgomery (see his Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization, and numerous articles in Mind and The Monist).\nMontgomery writes as a biologist, with at the same time the broader\noutlook and the penetration of the philosopher.\n\nd See the general line of considerations in Werke, XIII, 181, \u00a7 412.\nDolson says that the existence of the altruistic instincts was \"admitted,\"\nbut \"deplored\" by Nietzsche\u2014\"one must conquer them\" (op. cit., p. 100).\nThis, as a broad statement, is distinctly a mistake. Altruism is only\ndeplored when exercised in a certain way. She is also mistaken in saying\nthat the higher man in sacrificing himself sacrifices \"only that side of\nhis nature that finds expression in self-sacrifice\" (p. 101)\u2014he may\nsacrifice himself altogether, giving up his life.\n\ne Cf. A. W. Benn, International Journal of Ethics, October, 1908, pp.\n19-21. But when Benn suggests that Nietzsche was prevented from accepting utilitarianism by the pervading skeptical and negative cast of his\nintellect, aggravated by the use of drugs and solitary habits, he is hardly\nsagacious.\n\nf For Nietzsche's various and varying views of pleasure and happiness, cf. Werke, XI, 219, \u00a7153; XIV, 88, \u00a7177; Will to Power, \u00a7260\n(where the point is that happiness may be reached in opposite ways,\nand hence is no basis for ethics); Zarathustra, prologue, \u00a7 5 (a description\nof the happiness of a degenerate type of man); Dawn of Day, \u00a7 339;\nWerke, XII, 148, \u00a7 295; Will to Power, \u00a7 260 (habit, necessity, and our\nown valuations of things factors in determining pleasure and pain);\nWerke, XIII, 208-9, \u00a7 477 (happiness as distinguished from enjoyment,\nGenuss); Dawn of Day, \u00a7 108 (the happiness of different stages of development incomparable with one another, being neither higher nor lower,\nbut simply peculiar).\n\ng H. Goebel and E. Antrim do not take this into account when they\nspeak (among other things) of the \"right of the individual to obey absolutely all the instincts and impulses of his nature,\" as \"Nietzscheanism\" (Monist, July, 1899, p. 571). Nietzsche also expresses himself in this\nway: \"The opposite of the heroic ideal is the ideal of all-round development\u2014and a beautiful opposite and one very desirable, but only an ideal\nfor men good from the bottom up (e.g., Goethe).\" This was written for\nLou Andreas-Salom\u00e9, and is quoted by her (op. cit., p. 25).\n\nh Cf. in this connection the striking remarks on the modern educated\nman, even including Goethe (after all kein Olympier\"!) in Will to Power,\n\u00a7 883; cf. 881. Nietzsche's thought is that while the great men must\nhave many sides and a variety of powers, these must all be yoked together\nin the service of a supreme aim. See also the comments in \"Schopenhauer as Educator,\" sect. 2, on two contrasted ideals of education.\n\ni A similar shade of antithetical meaning appears in what Zarathustra says to the higher men who come to him, \"Better despair than\nsurrender [i.e., to the small people with small virtues and policies, who\nare lords of today]. And truly I love you, because you know not how\nto live today. So do you live\u2014best!\" (Zarathustra, IV, xii, \u00a7 3). Heinrich\nScharren puts the distinction in this way: \"Not life as existence in\ngeneral is the supreme value to Nietzsche, but life as will to power\"\n(Nietzsches Stellung zum Eudamonismus, p. 47).\n\nj Dorner (op. cit., p. 152) calls it a contradiction to turn a pure\nprinciple of nature into a principle of value. Valuing is indeed a distinct\nact of the mind, and an end as such has no independent existence, being\nwholly relative to the mind and will that set it, but why may not the\nmind give supreme value to something actually existing (or developing)?\n\nk Cf. a general critical reflection: \"Individualism is a modest and\nas yet unconscious sort of 'will to power'; the individual thinks it\nenough to liberate himself from the superior power of society (whether\nstate or church). He puts himself in opposition not as person, but\npurely as individual; he stands for individuals in general as against the\ncollectivity. This means that instinctively he puts himself on the same\nplane with every individual; what he contends for, he contends for not\non behalf of himself as a person, but as the representative of individuals\nagainst the whole\" (Will to Power, \u00a7784). What Nietzsche means by\n\"persons\" will appear later.\n\nl See Simmel, op. cit., pp. 233-4; cf. p. 245 (\"That this doctrine\nshould be taken for a frivolous egoism, a sanctioning of Epicurean unbridledness, belongs to the most astonishing illusions in the history of\nmorals\"\u2014the illusion is shared in striking manner by Paul Carus, op. cit., pp. 34, 61, 104, 138). So G. A. Tienes, \"No ordinary egoist can\nappeal to Nietzsche with even an appearance of right\" (Nietzsches Stelltmg zu den Grundfragen der Ethik genetisch dargestellt, p. 30).\nErnst Horneffer also has discriminating remarks on the subject, Vortr\u00e4ge \u00fcber Nietzsche, pp. 80-1; and Carl Lory, Nietzsche als Geschichtsphilosoph, p. 22. As to Stirner, see Richter, op. cit., pp. 345-7; Riehl,\nop. cit., p. 86; Meyer, op. cit., pp. 89-90; Dolson, op. cit., p. 95; Ziegler,\nop. cit., pp. 154, 157; R. H. Gr\u00fctzmacher, op. cit., p. 170. A special literature has arisen as to the relation of Stirner to Nietzsche\u2014cf. Robert\nSchellwein, Max Stirner und Friedrich Nietzsche (1892); A. L\u00e9vy, Stirner et Nietzsche (Paris, 1904). It appears doubtful whether Nietzsche had\nread Stirner's book (Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum); if he had, its\ninfluence upon him is inappreciable. Of the Greek Sophists it may be\nsaid that Nietzsche unquestionably has points of view in common with\nthem (see his own comment on them, Will to Power, \u00a7\u00a7428-9), but this\nshould not obscure for us the differences. A convenient book for the study\nof Nietzsche's relation to the early Greek thinkers in general, the Sophists\nincluded, is Richard Oehler's Nietzsche und die Vorsokratiker. I may also\nmention Max Wiesenthal, Friedrich Nietzsche und die griechische Sophistik,\nand Benedict Lachmann, Protagoras, Nietzsche, Stirner.\n\nUnquestionably the best general treatment of Nietzsche's positive\nethics thus far is Richter's, op. cit., pp. 199-268 (see particularly pp. 210 ff.,\n239 ff.).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XXV\n\na Cf., for example, \"Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,\" sect. 11 (\"Who\nof you is ready to renounce power, knowing and feeling that power is\nevil\"?); sect. 8 (reflections on Wagner's own early temptation to seek\nfor \"power and glory\"); Human, etc., \u00a7 588 (\"We hate the arrogance of\nthe great man, not so far as he feels his power, but because he wants to\nfeel it only in injuring others, domineering over them and seeing how\nfar they will stand it\"); ibid., \u00a7261 (on the pride and tyrannical tendencies of the early Greek philosophers).\n\nb A more pertinent incident in this connection is mentioned by his\nsister, namely the feeling aroused in him as he witnessed a train of\nGerman cavalry, artillery, and infantry advancing to the front during the\nFranco-Prussian war. He was deeply stirred, and many years afterward\nsaid to his sister, \"I felt that the strongest and highest will to life does\nnot come to expression in a pitiful struggle for existence, but as a will\nfor combat, a will for power and supremacy \" (Werke, pocket ed., IX,\nxi). Cf. the comments on the incident by Miss Hamblen (op. cit., pp.\n46-7), who, however, appears to me to exaggerate in speaking of the\ndoctrine as a \"revelation\" or \"intuition.\"\n\nc It is true that a different idea of nature as involving order and law\nappears in Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 188. There is also an early suggestion (\"David Strauss etc.,\" sect. 7) of the possibility of developing an\nethics along the lines of Darwin's conception of nature, where the strong\nhave the mastery (a suggestion which Nietzsche is popularly supposed to\nhave carried out eventually himself\u2014on this point, see pp. 310, 401, 437).\nIn quite another sense, the highest type of man is once spoken of as a\ncopy of nature, namely in the prodigality with which he overflows, exercising much reason in details, but prodigal as a whole and indifferent to\nconsequences (Werke, XIV, 335, \u00a7 178; cf. Twilight etc., ix, \u00a7 44).\n\nd The articles appeared in The Atlantic Monthly, that of James in\nthe number for October, 1880. The latter is reproduced in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (pp. 216-54).\n\ne Riehl criticises: \"This monotonous power! more power! Power\nover what, we ask, and above all, power for what?\" (op. cit., p. 124).\nWould he say the same of \"life\"? Is it monotonous, save to the weary,\nto speak of life, and more life? Would one ask of life, \"for what\"? Has\nit a purpose beyond itself and its own utmost development? Yet to Nietzsche power and will to it are the concrete and foundation meaning of life.\nI may add that as power, or will to power is to Nietzsche the ultimate\nreality of things, it has no origin (Will to Power, \u00a7 690), and can have\nno outside legitimation (cf. Werke, XI, 20, \u00a7 114; XII, 207, \u00a7 441; XIII,\n198, \u00a7 436; VII, pocket ed., 485, \u00a7 34).\n\nf Cf. Emerson to the effect that power is rarely found in the right\nstate for an article of commerce, but oftener in the supersaturation or\nexcess which makes it dangerous and destructive, and yet that it cannot\nbe spared, and must be had in that form, and absorbents provided to take\noff its edge (\"Power,\" in Conduct of Life).\n\ng That Nietzsche himself felt the difficulty keenly is shown in Will to Power, \u00a7 685; cf. Werke, XIV, 218, \u00a7 440. F. C. S. Schiller, in commenting on a similar passage (Will to Power, \u00a7 864) , says, \"The candor\nof the admission that the 'strong' are in reality the weaker, does not\nseem to leave much substance in Nietzsche's advocacy of the strong-man\ndoctrine\" (Quarterly Review, January, 1913, p. 157).\n\nh The paradox that the weak in combination, by making laws against\nthe strong, prove themselves the stronger, plays its part in the argument\nof Socrates against Callicles in Plato's \"Gorgias\" (488). One feels in\nreading the dialogue that Socrates is the greater dialectician, but that\nit is chiefly a verbal victory which he wins over Callicles, who really has\nin mind a strong type of man, yet is not able to express himself clearly and\nperhaps has not thought out his meaning anyway.\n\ni Richter remarks on the vagueness of the concept (op. cit., p. 325);\ncf. Fouill\u00e9e, Nietzsche et l'Immoralisme, II, chap. 1, and F. C. S. Schiller,\nQuarterly Review, January, 1915, p. 157 (\"He never unambiguously explains what he means by 'strength' and seems to have no consistent\nnotion of it\"). But is not the vagueness of the concept partly owing to\nthe fact that, like all abstractions, it gets its real meaning in concrete\ninstances, and a more or less varied meaning as the instances differ?\n\nj So far as he attempts an explanation of the world in terms of will\n(or wills) to power, it is only, to use a happy expression of Richter's, a\nmetaphysics of the first degree; what the real and ultimate nature of\npower (and will to it) is, he leaves undetermined, perhaps viewing it as\nan unnecessary question.\n\nk Not that the possibilities of progress are infinite. The total amount\nof force, energy, or power (they are equivalent expressions to Nietzsche)\nin the world, however great, is limited, and the combinations it can\nmake and the heights it can attain, however far beyond anything we\nknow now, have their limits too. When then the end is reached, power\ncan only turn on itself, dissolve the fabrics it has made, and allow the\nplay to begin again (cf. Will to Power, \u00a7 712; Zarathustra, III, xiii, \u00a7 2;\nJoyful Science, \u00a7 111). It is Heraclitus' \u00c6on, or the great \"world-child Zeus,\" \u03c0\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd over again (cf. \"Philosophy in the Tragic\nPeriod of the Greeks,\" sects. 7, 8; Will to Power, \u00a7 797).\n\nl As to the inner mechanics of the evolution of higher sorts of power\nfrom lower, I am not able to make out a clear consistent view in Nietzsche. He sometimes speaks as if the higher powers seized on the lower\nand subjugated them, being presumably then independent existences\nthemselves (the kinship being only that all are alike forms of power);\nand yet he generally uses the language of strict evolution. Perhaps,\neven if there are eternally different kinds of power, this is not inconsistent with the higher being spiritualizations of the lower, rather than\nof a different substance.\n\nm Mind, for instance, may have its ascendancy over matter, just\nbecause it is a spiritualization of the same energy that is in matter (this\naside from the fact that matter may be itself only statable ultimately in\nenergetic terms).\n\nn It can only be said in charity that even those \"who know\" cannot\nin this age of the world be expected to know everything, especially when\nthe subject is so strange and multiform a thinker as Nietzsche. I give\nonly a few of the many instances of hasty judgment:\u2014The superman\n\"will strive to become like the 'blonde Beastie' of the old German forests,\netc.\" (J. M. Warbeke, Harvard Theological Review, July, 1909, p. 373);\nNietzsche's speculations, \"if ever they come to be acted upon, would\ndissolve society as we understand it and bring us back to the 'dragons\nof the prime'\" (Bennett Hume, London Quarterly Review, October, 1900,\np. 338); \"'We have now at last,' says Nietzsche, 'arrived at the brink\nof the period when wickedness shall prevail again, as it did in the good\nold heroic times when the strong man scalped, and stole, and lied, and\ncheated, and abducted'\" (Oswald Crauford, Nineteenth Century, October,\n1900, p. 604); \"One must \u2026 get back once more to a primitive naturalness in which man is a magnificent blond beast, etc.\" (H. T. Peck,\nBookman, September, 1898, p. 30); \"imagined as Nietzsche describes him, he [the \u00dcbermensch] reels back into the beast\" (Encyclopedia Britannica, art. \"Ethics\"). So A. S. Pringle Pattison speaks of this\n\"wild beast theory of ethics,\" and finds Nietzsche's message to be \"Back\ntherefore to instinct, to 'the original text' of man\" (Man's Place in the Cosmos, 2d ed., p. 317). C. C. Everett, rarum nomen among American\nphilosophical writers, who indeed expresses his perfect agreement with\nNietzsche's doctrine that the desire of power is the fundamental element\nof life, the only question being what kind of a self is asserted, finds\nNietzsche's point of view practically \"identical with that of a robber-baron of the Middle Ages\" (Essays Theological and Literary, pp. 124-9).\nG. Lowes Dickinson, in commenting on Nietzsche's view that power is\nthe only thing that man will care to pursue, says that a man who has\na right to such opinions would in our society become a great criminal,\nan active revolutionary, or an anarchist (Justice and Liberty, pp. 14-19)\u2014a dictum the stranger, since the author himself says later, \"Moral\nforce in the end is the only force\" (p. 217).\n\no Riehl says, \"The already proverbial 'blond beast' is not an ideal\nof Nietzsche's, but his symbol for man as he was before culture was\ndeveloped, the man of nature\u2014his symbol for a pre-historic, pre-moral\nfact, and what appeared so attractive to him was the still unbroken\nforce of nature there, not its bestiality\" (op. cit., p. 159)\u2014a statement\nwhich only needs correction in so far as Nietzsche had in mind not\nprimitive man in general, but the primitive Aryans. See also Berthelot's\narticle, \"Nietzsche,\" in the Grande Encyclop\u00e9die (a notable contrast to\nthe meager misleading article under the same heading in the Encyclopedia Britannica). Thilly remarks, \"He [Nietzsche] does not wish to\nbring back the 'blond beast' of early times\" (Popular Science Monthly,\nDecember, 1905, p. 721).\n\np \"Manners,\" in Society and Solitude. Of a similar temper is the\nremark (in connection with certain political agitations before our Civil\nWar): \"If it be only a question between the most civil and the most\nforcible, I lean to the last. These Hoosiers and Suckers are really better\nthan the snivelling opposition. Their wrath is at least of a bold and\nmanly sort.\"\n\nq Meyer, while speaking of it as remarkable that the \"blond beast,\"\nwho is this and nothing more, is wanting among the \"higher men,\"\nwhose hypertrophy of single traits is portrayed in the Fourth Part of\nZarathustra, adds that after all it is not remarkable, since he is really\nno higher man, but only the condition or presupposition (Vorbedingung)\nof one (op. cit., p. 435). What in part misleads the reader is the apparent gusto with which Nietzsche describes the violence of the \"blond\nbeast\" in the first of the two passages cited in the text. In a similar\nway Weinel charges Nietzsche with a thirst for blood, or at least with\nchampioning an impulse of that sort, because he portrays with astonishing and, for the moment, sympathetic penetration the psychology of the\n\"pale criminal\" (op. cit., p. 183; cf. Zarathustra, I, vi). But Nietzsche\nalmost always becomes a part (for the time) of that which he describes\u2014that is, he tries to take an inside view of it. Actually, however, ordinary\ndeeds of blood were as repulsive to him as to any one, and he counsels\nno uncertain methods in dealing with them\u2014his views of civil punishment really deserve special treatment.\n\nr The following are some of the trying passages: Zarathustra, III,\nxii, 4, \"A right which thou canst seize upon, thou shalt not allow to be\ngiven thee.\" Of this it can only be said that Zarathustra is here speaking\nto his disciples, who are to take his ideal from the mountain-top down into\nthe world, and that truth and moral commandments and the right to\nrule do not necessarily rest upon the general assent. Will to Power,\n\u00a7\u00a7 735, 736, the tenor of which is that the weak and sickly may have their one moment of strength in a crime and that this may be a justification of their existence; also, that the really great in history have been\ncriminals, breaking, as they had need, with custom, conscience, duty\u2014knowing the danger of it, yet willing the great end and therefore the\nmeans (cf. also Werke, XIV, 78, \u00a7 153). As to the first point (cf. also\nWerke, XI, 250, \u00a7216), the view is not unlike Browning's in \"The\nStatue and the Bust\":\n\n\"I hear your approach\u2014'But delay was beat\n\nFor their end was a crime.'\u2014Oh, a crime will do\n\nAs well, I reply, to serve for a test.\n\nAs a virtue golden through and through.\"\n\n(Cf. also Nietzsche's reference to Dostoiewsky's testimony as to the\nstrong characters he met with in prison, Will to Power, \u00a7 233). In\njudging the second point, it may not be beside the mark to say that\n\"crime\" is a legal category, that \"conscience\" is a psychological phenomenon not necessarily squaring with the truth of things, that \"duty\"\nmeans felt duty, which may not be what one really ought to do (supposing that there is any objective standard)\u2014does not the Talmud say\nthat there is \"a time to serve the Lord by breaking his commandments?\"\nBeyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 158, \"To our strongest impulse, the tyrant\nwithin us, not only our reason subjects itself, but also our conscience; \"\nalso Werke, XIII, p. 209, \u00a7 482, \"No one is held in check by principles.\"\nThese are primarily statements of fact, and the truth of them is a\nquestion for psychologists. It may be said, however, that the last statement cannot possibly mean that man's thoughts, his general principles,\nmay not influence his conduct, Nietzsche giving too many instances of\na contrary view (cf. Werke, XII, 64, \u00a7 117, quoted ante, p. 175). What\nperhaps, Nietzsche really had in mind was that \"principles,\" taken\nabstractly and out of relation to the psychological driving forces, are\nineffectual\u2014somewhat as Fichte said, \"Man can only will what he\nloves,\" or as J. R. Seeley spoke of the expulsive power of a new affection.\nWill to Power, \u00a7 788, \"to give back to the b\u00f6sen man good conscience\u2014has this been my involuntary concern? and indeed to the b\u00f6sen man, so\nfar as he is the strong man\"? This is perhaps the most shocking\npassage to the ordinary reader, but hardly to one acquainted with Nietzsche's thought and use of language. The b\u00f6se man is one who is bent\non injury or destruction and inspires fear; such men are necessary to\nthe world's progress, in Nietzsche's estimation\u2014both malevolent and\nbenevolent impulses having their part to play. Nietzsche has no wish\nto give good conscience to the bad (schlechten) man.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XXVI\n\na The problem is, of course, highly accentuated for Christianity, since\nto it Almighty Power has made man, and might apparently have given\nequal energy to all.\n\nb This does not mean that historical conditions determine them, but\nsimply make them possible. Against the former view Nietzsche strongly\nprotests\u2014see ante, p. 355, and Nietzsche's Werke, XII, 189-3, \u00a7 412;\nXIV, 215-6; Twilight etc., ix, \u00a7 44. According to Wilhelm Ostwald, many\nmore potential great men are born than actually become so (Grosse M\u00e4nner, p. iii) .\n\nc Cf. D. G. Mason's remarks about Beethoven: \"He was wilful; but\nit was the wilfulness of a man who knew that he had a great work to\ndo and that he understood how to do it better than any one else\" (A B C Guide to Music, p. 127). When some one told Beethoven that a certain\nharmony in one of his pieces was \"not allowed,\" he answered, \"Very\nwell, then I allow it\" (ibid., p. 127).\n\nd A somewhat similar point of view appears to be taken by Frank\nGranger in his Historical Sociology. Nietzsche remarks that in seeking\nto determine the end of man we are apt to consider him generically,\nleaving individuals and their peculiarities out of account\u2014but he asks,\nmay not each individual be regarded as an attempt to reach a higher\ngenus than men, in virtue of his most individual qualities? (Werke, XI,\n238, \u00a7 194).\n\ne The prevailing functional view of man finds expression in F. H.\nBradley's Ethical Studies, \"We have found ourselves, when we have\nfound our station and its duties, our function as an organ in the social\norganism\" (p. 148). Bradley even says, \"To wish to be better than\nthe world is already to be on the threshold of immorality\"; further,\n\"We should consider whether the encouraging oneself in having opinions\nof one's own, in the sense of thinking differently from the world on moral\nsubjects, be not, in any person other than a heaven-born prophet, sheer\nself-conceit\" (p. 180 f.). This is sufficiently strong.\n\nf From this high point of view, \"a man as he ought to be\" sounds\nas absurd to Nietzsche as a \"tree as it ought to be\" (Will to Power,\n\u00a7 334). Cf. Emerson: \"Those who by eminence of nature are out of\nreach of your rewards, let such be free of the city and above the law.\nWe confide them to themselves; let them do with us as they will. Let\nnone presume to measure the irregularities of Michael Angelo and\nSocrates by village scales\" (\"Plato,\" in Representative Men). Interesting to note in this connection is the peculiar way in which Nietzsche\ntakes up the early Greek philosophers\u2014his effort being to bring out\nwhat in each system is a piece of personality and hence belongs to the\n\"irrefutable and undiscussable\" (preface to \"Philosophy in the Tragic\nPeriod of the Greeks,\" Werke, IX, 5-6).\n\ng Cf. the striking description of Sigismondo Castromediano, Duke of\nMarciano, in G. M. Trevelyan's Garibaldi and the Thousand, pp. 55-6;\nand a saying of Maxim Gorky's, \"Nothing is so deadly to the soul as\nthe desire to please people.\"\n\nh In this connection, another \"hard saying\" may be mentioned: \"A\ngreat man: one who feels that he has a right to sacrifice men as a field-marshal does\u2014not in the service of an 'idea,' but because he will rule\"\n(Werke, XIV, 65-6, \u00a7130). If a feeling of this kind can anywise be\njustified, it is only as we remember that, to Nietzsche, the great man is\nhimself the highest idea\u2014the supreme values being not outside him, but\nincorporated in him (cf. Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 199). A kindred \"hard\nsaying\" is, \"Do you say, it is the good cause that Sanctifies war? I\nsay to you, it is good war that sanctifies every cause\" (Zarathustra,\nI, x). The thought is plainly that putting forth supreme energy is itself\nthe greatest good. \"'What is good?' you ask. To be brave is good. Let\nlittle maidens say, 'Good is what is pretty and moving'\" (ibid., I, x).\n\ni One thinks of Marc Antony's relations with Cleopatra, in contrast\nwith those of a really great man, C\u00e6sar.\n\nj To this side of Nietzsche's view Berthelot hardly does justice in\nhis admirable critical study, Un romantisme utilitaire (Vol. 1).\n\nk Ecce Homo, III, vii, \u00a7 2. In America, \"gentleman\" has become\nlittle more than a synonym for a certain refinement of manners, chiefly\nof the mild and altruistic sort. Emerson has the old strong conception\nwhen he says, \"God knows that all sorts of gentlemen knock at the\ndoor; but whenever used in strictness, and with any emphasis, the name\nwill be found to point at original energy.\u2026 The famous gentlemen\nof Asia and Europe have been of this strong type; Saladin, Sapor, the Cid, Julius C\u00e6sar, Scipio, Alexander, Pericles, and the lordliest personages\" (Essay on \"Manners\").\n\nl It is a curious reflection on the state of culture in America that\nscholars as well as others sometimes take these magnates as exemplifications of Nietzsche's \"superman\" (cf . Wilbur M. Urban, Atlantic Monthly,\nDecember, 1912, p. 789).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XXVII\n\na Meyer (op. cit., p. 451 ff.) raises the question whether by superman\nNietzsche had in mind individuals or a collectivity. In a sense one might\nanswer, both: his primary thought was of a certain type of man, irrespective of whether there were one or many of them. Yet however many,\nthey would be more or less independent of one another: a compact society\n(Heerde) of supermen is inconceivable (self-contradictory).\n\nb Theobald Ziegler, of Strasburg, remarks with a certain complacency\nthat he was the first professor of philosophy to take up Nietzsche in a\nSeminar, and that his students, all Nietzsche-worshipers at the beginning,\nwere at the end Nietzschean no more (Der Turnhahn, June, 1914, p. 643).\nBut it may be questioned whether average university students are capable\nof really grasping Nietzsche, so that accepting or rejecting him means\nlittle in their case. He is for those who have philosophical training and\nripe powers of reflection to start with\u2014for men (in every sense of the\nword).\n\nc Werke, XIII, 347, \u00a7 859. Luther, Niebuhr, Bismarck are given as\ninstances. Cf., on a healthy peasant, rude, shrewd, stubborn, enduring,\nas the superior type, Zarathustra, IV, iii; also, on the possibility that\nthere is today among the people, and particularly among peasants, more\nrelative superiority of taste and tact for reverence than among the\nnewspaper-reading half-world of intellect, the educated (Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 263).\n\nd Cf. Werke, XII, 410; 368, \u00a7 718; XIV, 263, \u00a7 10. In speaking of\naristocracy, Nietzsche says that he has not in mind the prefix \"von\"\nand the Gotha Calendar\u2014an intercalation for the benefit of \"Esel\" (Will to Power, \u00a7 942). None the less, he holds that aristocracies in general\nare a fruit of time and training (Joyful Science, \u00a7 40; Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 213); and Ziegler thinks that in admitting this, he becomes\nreactionary and plays into the hands of the Junker (Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 144)\u2014but surely one may admit the potency of descent and yet allow\nthat the family-process may have a beginning and alas! a degenerate\nending.\n\ne As to the carelessness of men of genius in marrying, see what\nimmediately follows the passage from Zarathustra quoted in the text;\nalso Werke, XI, 131, \u00a7 418; Dawn of Day, \u00a7\u00a7 150-1. The plaint is as old\nas Theognis that while with horses and asses and goats the attempt is\nmade to perfect the breed, in the case of man marriage for money spoils\nthe race.\n\nf There is even a late utterance of Nietzsche apologizing for nationalism, so far as it is a means of preserving the fighting spirit and continuing the strong type of man (Will to Power, \u00a7 729; cf . Werke, XIII,\n358, \u00a7 882).\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII\n\na One of the first American publicists to see the natural connection\nof democracy with an advanced labor-program (if not socialism) was\nWayne MacVeagh (see his article \"Democracy and Law,\" New Englander, January, 1887). I may add that the democracy that marks itself off from socialism is apt to be the theory of strong, self-sufficient individuals, as against the natural tendency of the mass, who only become strong by combination and organization.\n\nb Nietzsche admits that socialists may deceive themselves about this, and may even, to put through their ideas, deceive others\u2014the preaching of altruism in the ultimate interest of individual egoism being one of the commonest falsifications of the nineteenth century. Cf. the searching essay of Bernard Bosanquet, \"The Antithesis between Individualism and Socialism, philosophically considered,\" in The Civilization of Christendom. In another passage (Will to Power, \u00a7 757), Nietzsche says that modern socialism will in the end produce a secular counterpart of Jesuitism\u2014every man becoming a tool and nothing else, and he adds, \"for what purpose is not yet discovered\" [he means, of course, \"for what rational purpose,\" since making oneself a tool for an organization that simply protects the tools hardly rises to that dignity]; cf., on this point, the close of Chapter XI of this book.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XXIX\n\na In Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 219, an order of rank is spoken of even among things, and not merely among men, and there is a Rangordnung of spiritual states (ibid., 257; cf., however, the reservation in Will to Power, \u00a7 931), of problems (Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 213), of values (Will to Power, \u00a7 1006), of moralities (Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 228)\u2014not to speak of the fact that a morality of any kind involves a Rangordnung, something commanding on one side and something obeying on the other (Werke, XIII, 105, \u00a7 246).\n\nb The \"Law of Manu\" contemplated four classes, the priestly, military and political, commercial and agricultural, and a serving-class (Sudras)\u2014see Twilight etc., vii, \u00a7 3, and the extended notes on the \"Law of Manu,\" Werke, XIV, 117-30 (cf. 246-7). In one of his classifications (Werke, XII, 411), Nietzsche himself distinguishes a special slave-class, though according to his prevailing view the third class themselves have the general slave-characteristics. It should be added that the Hindu priestly class corresponds in a general way to Nietzsche's first class; he particularly notes that the Brahmans named kings, though standing apart from political life themselves (Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 61).\n\nc The upper caste in India was priestly, as noted above, and we understand how Nietzsche could refer to \"the ruling class of priests, nobles, thinkers [indifferently] in earlier times\" (Werke, XI, 374). Zarathustra, after berating priests and calling them enemies, says, \"but my blood is related to theirs, and I wish withal to have it honored in theirs\" (Zarathustra, II, iv) .\n\nd Cf. the general saying, \"To execute what is great is difficult, but more difficult still is to command what is great\" (Zarathustra, II, xxii). I recall an inscription on the gravestone of Schnorr von Carolsfeld in Mariathal, near Brixlegg, in Austria: quo altior gradus eo difficilius officium.\n\ne Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 29. I give the whole passage: \"It is something for the fewest to be independent\u2014it is a privilege for the strong. And he who attempts it even with the best right, but without being compelled, proves that he is probably not only strong, but audacious to the point of wantonness. He ventures into a labyrinth, he multiplies a thousandfold the dangers that life of itself brings in its train; of these not the least is that no one sees how and where he loses his way, becomes isolated and torn to pieces by some cave-Minotaur of conscience. Supposing that he goes to ruin, it happens so far from the understanding of men that they have no feeling or sympathy for him\u2014and he cannot go back any more, he cannot even go back to men's sympathy any more \"! Cf. a passage quoted by Meyer (op. cit., p. 587), which I cannot locate: \"How much of truth one can bear without degenerating, is his [the philosopher's] measure. Just so, how much happiness\u2014just so, how much freedom and power!\"\n\nf Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a741. I quote practically the whole of this passage: \"We must give proofs to ourselves that we are fitted for independence and command; and this in season. We must not avoid our tests, though they are perhaps the most dangerous game we can play, and in the last instance are only tests that have ourselves for witness and no other judge. For example: Not to hang on a person, even one most loved\u2014every person is a prison, also a corner. Not to hang on a fatherland, even if it be one most suffering and necessitous\u2014it is already less difficult to loosen one's heart from a victorious fatherland. Not to hang on a compassion, even if it be one for higher men into whose extraordinary suffering and helplessness chance has allowed us to glance. Not to hang on a science, even if it entices us with most precious discoveries apparently reserved for just us. Not to hang on one's own emancipation, on that blissful sense of the far and unfamiliar which the bird has that flies ever higher, in order to see ever more beneath it\u2014the danger of one with wings. Not to hang on our own virtues and become as a whole a sacrifice to some part of us, e.g., to 'our hospitality'\u2014the danger of dangers for high-natured and opulent souls, who are prodigal with themselves almost to the point of unconcern and carry the virtue of liberality so far that it becomes a vice. We must know how to preserve ourselves: strongest test of independence.\" Cf. as to the preliminary self-training of the ruler, Werke (pocket ed.), VII, 484, \u00a7\u00a7 23-4, 27-8.\n\ng Will to Power, \u00a7 713. It is curious to find a counterpart of this conception in the older, shall I say? profounder, theological view of the world as a scene of trial, in which, while many are called, few are chosen. The \"chosen,\" however, as viewed by Christianity, are perfect members of the flock, supreme exemplars of the social virtues, while Nietzsche's \"chosen\" are those who stand more or less aloof from the flock, acting according to their own, not social law, as autonomous as God, indeed the human counterpart of God.\n\nh Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 287. Cf. Will to Power, \u00a7 940: \"Higher than 'thou oughtst' stands 'I will' (heroes); higher than 'I will' stands 'I am' (the Greek Gods).\" Also Human, etc., \u00a7 210: \"Born aristocrats of the mind are not too eager; their creations appear and fall from the tree on a quiet autumn night without being hastily craved, pushed, or crowded by new growths. The unceasing wish to create is common and shows jealousy, envy, ambition. If one is something, one really needs to produce nothing\u2014and all the same does very much. Beyond the 'productive' man there is a still higher species.\" Nietzsche cites the remark of Plutarch that no noble-born youth, in seeing the Zeus in Pisa, would wish to become even a Phidias, or, if he saw the Hera in Argos, would wish to become even a Polyclet; and that quite as little would he desire to be Anacreon, Philetas, or Archilochus, whatever delight he took in their poems (Werke, IX, 150). Great men protect artists, poets, and those who are masters in any direction, but do not confuse themselves with them (Will to Power, \u00a7 943). Perhaps it is in this exaltation of being above action that the secret (or a part of it) lies of Nietzsche's relatively low estimate of Carlyle and his hero-worship. On the other hand, Emerson (Essay on \"Character\") uses a legend which perfectly illustrates Nietzsche's thought: \"O Iole! how did you know that Hercules was a god?\" \"Because,\" answered Iole, \"I was content the moment my eyes fell on him. When I beheld Theseus, I desired that I might see him offer battle, or at least guide his horses\nin the chariot-race; but Hercules did not wait for a contest; he conquered whether he stood or walked or sat, or whatever he did.\"\n\ni Beyond Good and Evil, \u00a7 258. Cf. Will to Power, \u00a7 898, where after\nspeaking of the equalizing process (Ausgleichung) going on in modern\ndemocratic society, he says, \"This equalized species needs, as soon as it\nis attained, a justification: it is for the service of a higher sovereign\ntype which stands upon it and only so can lift itself to its own task.\nNot merely a master-race whose function is exhausted in ruling; but\na race with its own sphere of life, with a surplus of energy enabling it\nto carry beauty, bravery, culture, manners into their most spiritual expressions; an affirmative race which can allow itself every great luxury\u2014strong enough not to need a tyrannical imperative to virtue, rich enough\nnot to need petty economy and pedantry, beyond good and evil; a hothouse for strange and choice plants.\" In ibid., 937, he quotes a French\nemigr\u00e9, M. de Montlosier, who in his De la monarchie fran\u00e7aise had expressed the ancient sentiment of his class in an astonishingly frank\nmanner: \"Race d'affranchis, race d'esclaves arrach\u00e9s de nos mains, peuple\ntributaire, peuple nouveau, license vous fut octroy\u00e9e d'\u00eatre libres, et non\npas \u00e0 nous d'\u00eatre nobles; pour nous tout est de droit, pour vous tout est\nde grace, nous ne somme point de votre communaut\u00e9; nous sommes un\ntout par nous-m\u00eames.\" Nietzsche remarks that Augustin Thierry read\nthis in 1814, and with a cry of anger proceeded to write his own book\non the Revolution.\n\nj He said in one of his earliest essays (\"On the Use and Harm of\nHistory for Life,\" sect. 9): \"The masses appear to me to deserve a\nglance only in three ways: first, as fading copies of great men, made on\nbad paper and with wornout plates, then as a force of opposition to the\ngreat, and finally as instruments for the great; aside from this, the devil\nand statistics take them\"! This is disparagement, but not altogether so.\n\nk Henri Lichtenberger, in one of the most illuminating expositions of\nNietzsche's social conceptions yet made, remarks that this is a part of\nhis ethics which Nietzsche has left in the shade (\"L'Individualisme de Nietzsche,\" Entre Camerades, Paris, 1901, pp. 341-57). See also his La Philosophie de Nietzsche, p. 151.\n\nl All this is left out of account by writers, like a critic in the London\nAcademy (June 28, 1913), who speaks of the \"overman\" as crushing out\nthe weaker masses, and even by Brandes in his first article on Nietzsche\n(Deutsche Rundschau, April, 1890), who represents him as having only\nhatred and contempt for the undermost strata of the social pyramid.\n\nm This is a subtlety that appears to escape the subtle Mr. Balfour\nhimself and all who argue for the necessity of an other than naturalistic\nethics, if the weak are to be respected; it was perhaps first strikingly\nset forth by C. C. Everett, in an article, \"The New Ethics,\" Unitarian Review, Vol. X, p. 408 ff. (reprinted in Poetry, Comedy, and Duty, see\npp. 287-8).\n\nn Meyer (op. dt., p. 310) thinks that Nietzsche started with the ordinary economic or political meaning of \"slave,\" and then generalized,\nbeginning to do so in Human, All-too-Human.\n\no When we in America speak of slavery, we are apt to think of what\nexisted in our country, before the Civil War, when a black man had \"no\nrights which a white man was bound to respect\"\u2014but this laisser faire or\nanarchy is not a necessary accompaniment of slavery.\n\np Cf. Richter (op. cit., pp. 244-5), \"Why recommend measures to the\nweak, by which they preserve themselves? Should not all the weak\ndisappear? This Nietzsche believes that he must positively deny. The\nmass \u2026 will always be necessary in the interest of the strong; \u2026\nonly those who are altogether sickly and crippled in mind and body, who corrupt and disintegrate the species and consequently do not facilitate, but rather render more difficult the producing of the superman,\nshould pass away\u2014for them there is only one virtue: to disappear.\"\n\nq Cf. William James's references to the world of concrete personal\nexperience as \"tangled, muddy, painful, and perplexed,\" to the \"vast\ndriftings of the cosmic weather\" (Pragmatism, pp. 21, 105)\u2014apparently\nJames could only find relief in experiences of a more or less mystical\ncharacter (ibid., p. 109, Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 380, 388, 422, but see p. 425).\n\nr Cf. Richter's statement of the \"moral task\" of the weaker; \"disregarding their own development (Aushildung), to make possible the\nproduction, preservation, furtherance of strong personalities\" (op. cit.,\np. 245).\n\ns That business men, when they go out of business, are often at a\nloss how to occupy themselves and are most unhappy, is well known.\n\nt A consideration of this sort may explain the extremely contrasted\npoints of view of Genealogy etc., II, \u00a7 17, and Werke, XIII, 195, \u00a7 430, in\ncommenting on the origin of the state (in the one case force, in the\nother, reverence being emphasized).\n\nu The passage which H\u00f6ffding (op. cit., p. 174) quotes as evidence\nthat Nietzsche changed his mind\u2014it is to the effect that the rulers are\nto win the deep unconditional confidence of the ruled (Werke, pocket ed.,\nVII, 486, \u00a7 36)\u2014is not inconsistent with \"Herrenmoral,\" and there are\nas many strong expressions of the latter doctrine in his later writings\nas earlier.\n\nv A \"Kampf der Kasten,\" at least at the beginning and latent always,\nis not, as H\u00f6ffding thinks (op. cit., p. 175), inconsistent with a\n\"gemeinschaftliches Ziel\"\u2014this has been explained in the text. The\nsame may be said of the \"hostility\" to which Dorner refers. As for\nthe \"abyss\" or \"ditch,\" of which Faguet speaks, Nietzsche would have\nit, but at the same time \"no antitheses\" (see Will to Power, \u00a7 891). He\nexpressly mentions as one of his problems, \"How is the new nobility to\norganize itself as the power-possessing class? how is it to mark itself\noff from others without making them enemies and opponents\"! (Werke,\nXII, 122, \u00a7240\u2014the italics here are mine).\n\nw Faguet regards what he conceives to be Nietzsche's idea, that the\nhigher class has held the mass down by force, as historically false, urging\nthat the mass have wished to be governed aristocratically, being essentially aristocratic in their sentiments and in a sense more aristocratic\nthan the higher class itself\u2014since among the latter self-interest may\nwork, while among the mass the feeling is a passion against interest\n(op. cit., p. 344 f.). Faguet does not do justice to the complexities of\nNietzsche's meaning, but he perhaps states an essential truth.\n\nx Cf. the description of the highest man as determining the values\nand guiding the will of millenniums, rulers being his instruments (Will to Power, \u00a7\u00a7 998-9); also the picture of the wise man,\n\n\"Strange to the people and yet useful to the people,\"\n\n(Werke, pocket ed., VI, 52) .\n\ny We have already found Nietzsche warning against confusing the\nhigher egoism with impulses which, apparently egoistic, have really for\ntheir aim a social result (for example, the impulse for the accumulation\nof property, or the sexual impulse, or that of the conqueror or statesman\u2014see Werke, XII, 117, \u00a7230).\n\nz It must be admitted that there is still another difficulty, which\nis hinted at by Dolson, op. cit., p. 80. The higher individuals, loosed from\nsocial bands, may be hostile to one another (cf. Werke, XI, 240, \u00a7 198;\nXIV, 76-7\u2014the mutual hostilities of strong races, as described in Will to Power, \u00a7 864, are, I take it, another matter) . For if it comes to physical conflicts, other parts of the society may take sides, and the life of the\nwhole be endangered\u2014one thinks of the Wars of the Roses, and of feuds\nsuch as have often existed between noble families. But though such\npossibilities cannot be denied, Nietzsche's ordinary thought of an aristocracy is of something cohering\u2014indeed, something which makes a principle of coherence and organization for the society to which it belongs:\nthe same men, who, in one aspect of their being, are individuals proper,\nare, in another, functionaries of (if only to the extent of giving legislative thought to) the society. If then they push their individualistic\ninstincts so far, that they go to fighting one another and jeopardizing\nthe life of the society, they must be restrained. As if envisaging a\nsituation of this general character, Nietzsche once defined it as the\nproblem of the legislator to join together forces out of order, so that\nthey shall not destroy themselves in conflict with one another, and so\nsecure a real increase of force (I follow here Hal\u00e9vy's Vie, p. 341, not\nbeing able to locate the passage he cites). He calls it the task of culture\nto take into service all that is fearful, singly, experimentally, step by\nstep, adding, however, that till it is strong enough to do this, it must\nfight, moderate, or even curse what is fearful (Will to Power, \u00a7 1025;\ncf. Werke, XII, 92, \u00a7182). For, as already explained, temporary hostility to great men may be justified on grounds of economy\u2014they may\nuse up force too quickly, which, if stored, would grow to greater (Will to Power, \u00a7 896).\n\naa In one passage (Werke, XII, 119, \u00a7233) Nietzsche even questions\nwhether the ends of the individual are necessarily those of the species,\nbut here I think he means of a given species. The variant individual\nmay be the principle of the possibility of a higher species, or he may be\na species (so to speak) all by himself: humanity may present a succession of species, one rising above another.\n\nbb Morality (in the usual sense) regards man as function purely, i.e.,\nso far degrades him\u2014this being said, of course, only from the highest\npoint of view. Cf. Joyful Science, \u00a7 116.\n\ncc The question is sometimes raised (e.g., by H\u00f6ffding, op. cit., pp.\n68-9) whether Nietzsche was an Utilitarian. It is a question which has,\nto one who has felt the new issues which Nietzsche raises, a somewhat\nantiquated air; all the same we may say that if Utilitarianism is the\ndoctrine of the greatest good of the greatest number (or of all\u2014each\ncounting for one and no more than one) as the standard, Nietzsche was\nnot an Utilitarian, since he held that there may be individuals who are\nmore important than others, even than all the rest combined. Quite\nas little was he an Utilitarian so far as this is an eudaemonistic doctrine,\nfor questions of pleasure and pain (no matter how universalistically\nconceived) have a secondary place with him. But so far as Utilitarianism\nmeans that actions are good and bad not in themselves, but with reference\nto ends beyond them, the highest end being the highest possible development of humanity, Nietzsche was an Utilitarian, for he broke entirely\nwith Intuitionalism (which is little more than uncritical common sense\nturned into a formal doctrine): nothing to him is good or bad, right or\nwrong, of itself, or as a divine command, or as an unanalyzable dictate\nof conscience. At the same time the highest development of humanity is\nnot conceived in social but rather in personal terms\u2014hence the happy\ncharacterization of his doctrine by Simmel as Personalism. The actions\nof the mass, indeed, the mass themselves and all who stop short of being\npersons, are viewed in an utilitarian light\u2014he speaks of himself in this\nway (\"fearful,\" yet \"beneficent,\" Ecce Homo, IV, \u00a72); but the supreme\nindividuals are not utilities, being rather the standard by which utility\nin all else is measured.\n\ndd Nietzsche's view that the flock-feeling (social sentiment) should rule in the flock (society), needs to be emphasized, in view of the common\nmisapprehension of his meaning. I have already noted his strong statement that flock-morality is to be held \"unconditionally sacred\" [in the\nflock]. Will to Power, \u00a7 132. He protests that higher natures are not to\ntreat their valuations as universally valid (Joyful Science, \u00a73). The\nquestion may, of course, be raised whether contrasted valuations are consistent with a common goal, and we may say in reply, (1) that it is not\nimpossible that different classes should move toward the same goal, even\nif they are not aware of doing so, and (2) that as matter of fact\nNietzsche seems to conceive that the mass may have some idea of the\nfinal goal and willingly lend themselves to movement in that direction.\n\nee See Will to Power, \u00a7 898, where it is accordingly said that the\nleveling is not to be hindered, but rather hastened. For a long time the\nmechanizing process must seem the only aim (Werke, 1st ed., XV, 415\u2014I\ncannot locate this passage in the 2d ed., from which I quote in general).\nThis, I need not say, is very different from making the process a final\naim, as Walter Rathenau seems to do (Zur Kritik der Zeit). There is\nanother version of Nietzsche's general view in Will to Power, \u00a7 866, which\nmay be summarized as follows: The outcome of modern tendencies will\nbe a whole of enormous power, the single factors of which, however,\nrepresent minimum forces, minimum values; in opposition to this dwarfing and specializing of men, there is needed a reverse movement\u2014a\nproducing of a synthetic, justifying type of man, for whom the general\nmechanization is a condition of existence, as a sort of ground framework\n(Untergestell) on which he can devise a higher form of being for himself.\nHe needs the antagonism of the mass, the feeling of distance from them\u2014he stands on them, lives off them. Morally speaking, the mechanization\nrepresents a maximum of human exploitation; but it presupposes those\non whose account the exploitation has meaning. Otherwise the mechanization would be actually a collective lowering of the human type\u2014a retrogressive phenomenon in grand style. All this in opposition to the\neconomic optimism which would find the sacrifices of all compensated by\nthe good (Nutzen) of all; instead, these sacrifices would add themselves\nup into a collective loss, and we could no longer see for what the immense\nprocess had served. Cf. Faguet's enlargement on the possibilities of\nthe actual coming of a superior race (op. cit., p. 275).\n\nff An organic connection might even be said to exist between the\nhigher and lower, considered as exceptions and the rule. \"What I contend\nagainst: that an exceptional type should make war on the rule, instead\nof realizing that the continuance of the rule is the presupposition for\nthe value of the exception\" (Will to Power, \u00a7894); he gives as illustration women with extraordinary desire for knowledge, who, instead of\nfeeling the distinction that this brings, wish to change the position of\nwomen in general.\n\n\u00a0\n\nCHAPTER XXX\n\na Nietzsche is similarly classed with \"anarchists, ego-worshipers,\nrebels to law and order\" in the Quarterly Review (October, 1896, p. 318).\nAlso Ludwig Stein speaks of his \"anarchistic-aristocratic theory\"\n(Friedrich Nietzsche's Weltschaming und ihre Gefahren, p. 167)\u2014cf. Kurt\nBreysig's view, Jahrbuch f\u00fcr Gesetzgebung, XX (1896), pp. 4-14, but also\nthe admissions on p. 16.\n\nb Griechische Kulturgeschichte, Til, 378-9, \" The decisive and notable\nthing in it [philosophy among the Greeks] is the rise of a class of free,\nindependent men in the despotic polis. The philosophers do not become\nemployees and officials of the polis; they willingly withdraw from it \u2026 and over against it and public business and talk, the free personality wins\nforce and opportunity for contemplation.\"\n\nc Cf. Mazzini's description of Austria as \"not a nation, but a system\nof government,\" and a casual remark of Nietzsche to his sister after\nhearing some patriotic songs, \"Fatherland is to be sure something other\nthan state\" (Hamburgischer Correspondent, September 15, 1914, p. 2).\nSimilarly R. M. MacIver speaks of the Roman Empire as \"not a society,\nnot a living thing, but an imposed system, an institution\" (International Journal of Ethics, January, 1913, p. 134). Meyer explains Nietzsche's\nantagonism to the state, to the extent it existed, as due partly to the\ncircumstances and tendencies of the time, and maintains that he always\nthought of the organization of society as realizing itself through essentially political forms (op. cit., pp. 24-6, and 441).\n\nd Only from a similar point of view, i.e., because he placed the Poles\nhigh in the scale of rank, can I account for the opinion once expressed\nthat their political unruliness and weakness, even their extravagances,\nindicate their superiority rather than anything else (Werke, XII, 198,\n\u00a7421).\n\ne I may refer in this connection to my little book. Anarchy or government? An Inquiry in Fundamental Politics (1895).\n\nf As bearing on the future of marriage he proposes in one place\nheavier inheritance taxes, also a longer period of military duty, on\nbachelors; special privileges for fathers who bring a goodly number of\nboys into the world, in certain circumstances the right to cast several\nvotes; a medical record to precede every marriage and be signed by the\ncommunal authorities (in which a variety of questions by the parties and\nthe physicians are to be answered, \"family history\"); as an antidote to prostitution (or an ennobling transformation of it) the legalizing of\nmarriages for given terms (a year, a month), with guarantees for the\nchildren; every marriage answered for and recommended by a certain\nnumber of trustworthy men in the community, as a community affair\n(Will to Power, \u00a7 733).\n\ng Nietzsche found the literary class as well as the political parties\nand the socialists repulsive (Werke, XIV, 358, \u00a7 223; cf. the reference to\nthe literary class who \"live\" off their opinions, ibid., 357, \u00a7 222; also\nJoyful Science, \u00a7 366); and Berthelot comments on his opposition to the\nconservatives and reactionaries who were only bent on retaining their\nmaterial goods and maintaining Christian morality (Grande Eycyclop\u00e9die, art. \"Nietzsche\"). Ironically enough, in Germany the literary\nclass and artists seem to have been most affected by Nietzsche\u2014probably\nthrough admiration for his qualities of style rather than from any considerable understanding of his thought.\n\nh It may be said, however, that a united Europe was once a possibility\nat the hands of another Frenchman, earlier than Napoleon\u2014Henry IV,\nwho had an end put to his career by the dagger of Ravaillac.","title":"Nietzsche the thinker/Notes","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":31842}