{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Part_I/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Part_I","id":"wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Part_I","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Basis_of_Morality/Part_I","summary":null,"tags":["Pages_with_translator","Subpages"],"text":"Part I. INTRODUCTION.\n\nCHAPTER I. THE PROBLEM.\n\n\" WHY do philosophers differ so widely as to the\nfirst principles of Morals, but agree respecting the\nconclusions and duties which they deduce from those\nprinciples\u00a0? \"\n\nThis is the question which was set as subject for\na prize essay by the Royal Society of Holland at\nHarlem, 1810, and solved by J. C. F. Meister\u00a0; and\nin comparison with the task before us, the inquiry\npresented no extraordinary difficulty. For\u00a0:\n\n(1) The present question of the Royal Society has\nto do with nothing less important than the objectively\ntrue basis of morals, and consequently of morality.\nIt is an Academy, be it observed, which invites this\ninquiry\u00a0; and hence, from its position, it has no\npractical purpose in view\u00a0; it asks for no discourse\ninculcating the exercise of uprightness and virtue,\nwith arguments based on evidence, of which the\nplausibility is dwelt on, and the sophistry evaded, as\nis done in popular manuals. Rather, as its aim is\nnot practical, but only theoretical, it desires nothing\nbut the purely philosophical, that is, the objective,\nundisguised, and naked exposition of the ultimate\nbasis of all good moral conduct, independent of every positive law, of every unproved assumption,\nand hence free from all groundwork, whether meta-\nphysical or mythical. This, however, is a problem whose bristling difficalties are attested by the circumstance that all philosophers in every age and land have blunted their wits on it, and still more by the fact that all gods, oriental and occidental, actually derive their existence therefrom. Should therefore this opportunity serve to solve it, assuredly the Royal Society will not have expended its money amiss.\n\n(2) Apart from this, a peculiar disadvantage will\nbe found to attach to any theoretical examination of\nthe basis of morals, because such an investigation\nis suspiciously like an attempt to undermine, and\noccasion the collapse of, the structure itself. The fact\nis, that in this matter we are apt to so closely\nassociate practical aims with theory, that the well-\nmeant zeal of the former is with difficulty restrained\nfrom ill-timed intervention. Nor is it within the\npower of every one to clearly dissociate the purely\ntheoretical search for objective truth, purged of all\ninterest, even of that of morality as practised, from\na shameless attack on the heart's sacred convictions.\nTherefore he, who here puts his hand to the plough,\nmust, for his encouragement, ever bear in mind that\nfrom the doings and affairs of the populace, from the\nturmoil and bustle of the market-place, nothing is\nfurther removed than the quiet retreat and sanctuary\nof the Academy, where no noise of the world may\nenter, and where the only god raised on a pedestal\nis Truth, in solitary, naked sublimity.\n\nThe conclusion from these two premises is that I must be allowed complete freedom of speech, as\nwell as the right of questioning everything\u00a0; and\nfurthermore, that if I succeed in really contributing\nsomething, however small, to this subject, then that\ncontribution will be of no little importance.\n\nBut there are still other difficulties obstructing\nmy path. The Royal Society asks for a short mono-\ngraph setting forth the basis of Ethics entirely by\nitself; which means to say, independent of its con-\nnection with the general system, i.e., the actual\nmetaphysics of any philosophy. Such a demand\nmust not only render the accomplishment of the\ntask more difficult, but necessarily make it imper-\nfect. Long ago Christian Wolff, in his Philosophia\nPractica (P. II., 28) observed\u00a0: \" Tenebrae in\nphilosophia practica non dispelluntur, nisi luce meta-\nphysicd effulgente\" (Darkness in practical philo-\nsophy is only dispersed, when the light of meta-\nphysics shines on it\u00a0;) and Kant in the Preface to\nhis Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten remarks\u00a0:\n\" Metaphysics must precede, and is in every case\nindispensable to, moral philosophy.\" For, just as\nevery religion on earth, so far as it prescribes\nmorality, does not leave the latter to rest on itself,\nbut backs it by a body of dogmas (the chief end\nof which is precisely to be the prop of the moral\nsense)\u00a0; so with philosophy, the ethical basis, what-\never it be, must itself attach to, and find its support\nin, one system of metaphysics or another, that is\nto say, iu a presupposed explanation of the world,\nand of existence in general. This is so, because the\nultimate and true conclusion concerning the essential nature of the Universe must necessarily be closely connected with that touching the ethical significance\nof human action\u00a0; and because, in any case, that\nwhich is presented as the foundation of morality, if\nit is not to be merely an abstract formula, floating\nin the clouds, and out of contact with the real world,\nmust be some fact or other discoverable either in the\nobjective kosmos, or else in man's consciousness\u00a0;\nbut, as such, it can itself be only a phaenomenon\u00a0;\nand consequently, like all other phaenomena, it\nrequires a further explanation\u00a0; and this explanation\nis supplied by Metaphysics. Philosophy indeed is\nsuch a connected whole that it is impossible to\nexhaustively discuss any one part without all the\nothers being involved. Thus Plato says quite\ncorrectly\u00a0: Wvxfjs ovv (f>vcri,v a/o>? Xoyou Karavoijcrai\notet SVVCITOV elvai, avev T% rov o\\ov <t/crea)<?\u00a0; (Phaedr.,\np. 371, Ed. Bip.) (Do you think then it is possible\nto understand at all adequately the nature of the\nsoul, without at the same time understanding the\nnature of the Whole, i.e., the totality of things?)\nThe metaphysics of nature, the metaphysics of morals,\nand the metaphysics of the beautiful mutually pre-\nsuppose each other, and only when taken as connected\ntogether do they complete the explanation of things\nas they really are, and of existence in general. So\nthat whoever should exactly trace one of these three\nto its ultimate origin, would be found to have neces-\nsarily brought the others into his solution of the\nproblem\u00a0; just as an absolutely clear and exhaustive\nunderstanding of any single thing in the world would\nimply a perfect comprehension of everything else.\n\nNow if we were to start from a given system of\nmetaphysics, which, is assumed to be true, we should\nreach synthetically a basis of morals, and this basis,\nbeing, so to say, built up from below, would provide\nthe resulting ethical structure with a sure foundation.\nBut in the present case, since the terms of the question\nenforce the separation of ethics from all metaphysics,\nthere remains nothing but the analytic method, which\nproceeds from facts either of external experience, or\nof consciousness. It is true that thus the ultimate\norigin of the latter may be traced back to the human\nspirit, a source which then, however, must be taken\nas a fundamental fact, a primary phaenomenon, un-\nderivable from anything else, with the result that the\nwhole explanation remains simply a psychological one.\nAt best its connection with any general metaphysical\nstandpoint can only be described as accessory. Oil\nthe other hand, the fundamental datum, the primary\nphaenomenon of Ethics, so found in man's nature, could\nitself in its turn be accounted for and explained, if\nwe might first treat of metaphysics, and then by the\nsynthetic method deduce Ethics from it. This would\nmean, however, nothing less than the construction of\na complete system of philosophy, whereby the limits\nof the given question would be far exceeded. I am,\ntherefore, compelled to answer it within the lines\nwhich its own isolated narrowness has laid down.\n\nAnd lastly, there is the following consideration. The\nbasis on which it is here intended to place Ethics will\nprove to be a very small one\u00a0; and the consequence is\nthat of the many lawful, approvable, and praiseworthy\nactions of mankind, only the minority will be found to\nspring from purely moral motives, while the majority\nwill have to be attributed to other sources. This\ngives less satisfaction, has not such a specious glitter\nas, let us say, a Categorical Imperative, which always\nstands ready for commands, only that itself in its turn\nmay command what ought to be done, and what ought\nto be left undone\u00a0; not to mention other foundations\nthat are entirely material.\n\nI can only, therefore, remind the reader of the\nsaying in Ecclesiastes (iv. 6)\u00a0: \" Better is an handful\nwith quietness, than both the hands full with travail\nand vexation of spirit.\" In all knowledge the\ngenuine, proof-resisting, indestructible coefficient is\nnever large\u00a0; just as in the earth's metallic strata a\nhundredweight of stone hides but a few ounces of\ngold. But whether others will prefer as I do the\nassured to the bulky possession, the small quantity\nof gold which remains in the crucible to the big\nlump of matter that was brought along with it; or\nwhether I shall rather be charged with having re-\nmoved from Ethics its basis, instead of providing one,\nin so far as I prove that the lawful and commendable\nactions of mankind often do not contain a particle\nof pure moral worth, and in most cases only a very\nlittle, resting, as they do, otherwise on motives, the\nsufficiency of which must ultimately be referred to\nthe egoism of the doer\u00a0; all this I must leave un-\ndecided; and I do so, not without anxiety, nay, rather\nwith resignation, because I have long since been of\nthe same mind as Johann Georg von Zimmermann,\nwhen he said\u00a0: \" Rest assnred until your dying day,\nthat nothing in the world is so rare as a good judge.\"\n( Ueber die Einsamkeit\u00a0; Pt. I., Ch. iii., p. 93.)\n\nFor all true and voluntary righteousness, for all\nlovingkindness, for all nobleness, wherever these\nqualities may be found, my theory can only point\nto a very small foundation\u00a0; whereas my opponents\nconfidently construct broad bases for Morals, which\nare made strong enough for every possible burden,\nand are at the same time thrust upon every doubter's\nconscience, accompanied with a threatening side-glance\nat his own morality. As contrasted with these,\nmy own position is indeed in sore and sorry plight.\nIt is like that of Cordelia before King Lear, with\nher weakly worded assurance of dutiful affection,\ncompared with the effusive protestations of her more\neloquent sisters. So that there seems to be need of\na cordial that may be furnished by some maxim\ntaken from intellectual hunting grounds, such as,\nILagna est vis veritatis, et praevalebit. (Great is the\nstrength of truth, and it will prevail.) But to a man\nwho has lived and laboured even this fails to give\nmuch encouragement. Meanwhile, I will for once\nmake the venture with truth on my side\u00a0; and what\nopposes me will at the same time oppose truth.\n\nCHAPTER II. GENERAL RETROSPECT.\n\nFOR the people morality comes through, and is\nfounded on, theology, as the express will of God.\nOn the other hand, we see philosophers, with few\nexceptions, taking special pains to entirely exclude\nthis kind of foundation\u00a0; indeed, so they may but\navoid it, they prefer even to find a refuge in sophistry.\nWhence comes this antithesis\u00a0? Assuredly no more\nefficient basis for Ethics can be imagined than the\ntheological\u00a0; for who would be so bold as to oppose\nthe will of the Almighty and the Omniscient\u00a0?\nUnquestionably, no one\u00a0; if only this will were pro-\nclaimed in an authentic, official manner (if one may\nsay so), whereby no possible room for doubt could\nbe left. This, however, is precisely the condition\nwhich does not admit of being realised. It is rather\nthe inverse process which is attempted. The law\ndeclared to be the will of God men try to accredit\nas such, by demonstrating its agreement with our\nown independent, and hence, natural moral views,\nand an appeal is consequently made to these as being\nmore direct and certain. But this is not all. We\nperceive that an action performed solely through\nthreat of punishment and promise of reward would\nbe moral much more in appearance than in reality\u00a0;\nsince, after all, it would have its root in Egoism,\nand in the last resort the scale would be turned\nby the greater or less amount of credulity evinced\nin each case. Now it was none other than Kant who\ndestroyed the foundations of Speculative Theology,\nwhich up to his time were accounted unshakable.\nSpeculative Theology had hitherto sustained Ethics,\nand in order to procure for the former an existence\nof some sort, if only an imaginary one, his wish\nwas to proceed inversely, and make Ethics sustain\nSpeculative Theology. So that it is now more than\never impossible to think of basing Ethics on Theology\u00a0;\nfor no one knows any longer which of the two is to\nbe the supporter, and which the supported, and the\nconsequence is a circulus vitiosus.\n\nIt is precisely through the influence of Kant's\nphilosophy\u00a0; through the contemporaneous effect of\nthe unparalleled progress made in all the natural\nsciences, with regard to which every past age in\ncomparison with our own appears childish\u00a0; and lastly,\nthrough the knowledge of Sanskrit literature, and\nof those most ancient and widest spread faiths,\nBrahmanism and Buddhism, which, as far as time\nand space go, are the most important religious\nsystems of mankind, and, as a matter of fact, are\nthe original native religious of our own race, now\nwell known to be of Asiatic descent our race, to\nwhich in its new strange home they once more send\na message across the centuries\u00a0; it is because of\nall this, I say, that the fundamental philosophical\nconvictions of learned Europe have in the course\nof the last fifty years undergone a revolution, which\nperhaps many only reluctantly admit, but which\ncannot be denied. The result of this change is that\nthe old supports of Ethics have been shown to be\nrotten, while the assurance remains that Ethics\nitself can never collapse\u00a0; whence the conviction\narises that for it there must exist a groundwork\ndifferent from any hitherto provided, and adaptable\nto the advanced views of the age. The need of such\nis making itself felt more and more, and in it we\nundoubtedly find the reason that has induced the\nRoyal Society to make the present important question\nthe subject of a prize essay.\n\nIn every age much good morality has been preached\u00a0;\nbut the explanation of its raison d'etre has always\nbeen encompassed with difficulties. On the whole\nwe discern an endeavour to get at some objective\ntruth, from which the ethical injunctions could be\nlogically deduced\u00a0; and it has been sought for both\nin the nature of things, and in the nature of man\u00a0;\nbut in vain. The result was always the same. The\nwill of each human unit was found to gravitate\nsolely towards its own individual welfare, the idea\nof which in its entirety is designated by the term\n\" blissfulness \" (Gluckseligkeif)\u00a0; and this striving\nafter self-satisfaction leads mankind by a path very\ndifferent to the one morality would fain point out.\nThe endeavour was next made now to identify \" bliss-\nfulness \" with virtue, now to represent it as virtue's\nconsequence and effect. Both attempts have always\nfailed\u00a0; and this for no want of sophistry. Then\nrecourse was had to artificial formulas, purely objective and abstract, as well a posteriori as a\npriori, from which correct ethical conduct undoubtedly\nadmitted of being deduced. But there was nothing\nfound in man's nature to afford these a footing, where-\nby they might have availed to guide the strivings\nof his volition, in face of its egoistic tendency. It\nappears to me superfluous to verify all this by\ndescribing and criticising every hitherto existing\nfoundation of morality\u00a0; not only because I share\nAugustine's opinion, non est pro magno habendum\nquid homines senserint, sed quae sit rei veritas (It\nis the truth about a thing, not men's opinions\nthereon, that is of importance)\u00a0; but also because\nit would be like y\\avicas ei9 'AOijvas Kopi^ew (i.e.,\ncarrying coals to Newcastle)\u00a0; for previous attempts\nto give a foundation to Ethics are sufficiently well-\nknown to the Royal Society, and the very question\nproposed shows that it is also convinced of their\ninadequateness. Any reader less well-informed will\nfind a careful, if not complete, presentment of the\nattempts hitherto made, in Garve's Uebersicht der\nwrnehmsten Principien der Sittenlehre, and again,\nin Staudlin's Geschichte der Moralpkilosophie. It is\nof course very disheartening to reflect that Ethics,\nwhich so directly concerns life, has met with the\nsame unhappy fate as the abstruse science of Meta-\nphysics, and that its first principle, though perpetually\nsought for ever since the time of Socrates, has still\nto be found. Moreover, we must remember that in\nEthics, much more than in any other science, what\nis essential is contained in its fundamental propo-\nsitions\u00a0; the deductions are so simple that they come\nof themselves. For all are capable of drawing a\nconclusion, but few of judging. And this is exactly\nthe reason why lengthy text-books and dissertations\non Morals are as superfluous as they are tedious.\nMeantime, if I may postulate an acquaintance with\nall the former foundations of Ethics, my task will\nbe lightened. Whoever observes how ancient as\nwell as modern philosophers (the Church creed\nsufficed for the middle ages) have had recourse to\nthe most diverse and extraordinary arguments, in\norder to provide for the generally recognised require-\nments of morality a basis capable of proof, and how\nnotwithstanding they admittedly failed\u00a0; he will be\nable to measure the difficulty of the problem, and\nestimate my contribution accordingly. And he whc\nhas learned to know that none of the roads hitherto\nstruck on lead to the goal, will be the more willing\nto tread with me a very different path from these\na path which up to now either has not been noticed,\nor else has been passed over with contempt\u00a0; perhaps\nbecause it was the most natural one. As a matter\nof fact my solution of the question will remind many\nof Columbus' egg.\n\nIt is solely to the latest attempt at giving a basis to\nEthics I mean the Kantian that a critical examina-\ntion will be devoted. I shall make it all the more\nexhaustive, partly because the great ethical reform\nof Kant gave to this science a foundation having\na real superiority to previous ones\u00a0; and partly be-\ncause it still remains the last important pronounce-\nment in this domain\u00a0; for which reason it has obtained\ngeneral acceptance up to the present day, and is\nuniversally taught, although differently garnished by\ncertain changes in the demonstration and in the ter-\nminology. It is the ethical system of the last sixty\nyears, which must be removed ere we enter on another\npath. Furthermore, my criticism of the Kantian basis\nwill give me occasion to examine and discuss most\nof the fundamental conceptions of Ethics, and the\noutcome of this investigation I shall later on be\nable to postulate. Besides, inasmuch as opposites\nillustrate each other, it is exactly this course which\nwill be the best preparation and guide, indeed the\ndirect way, to my own position, which in its essential\npoints is diametrically opposed to Kant's. It would\ntherefore be a very perverse beginning to skip the\nfollowing criticism, and turn at once to the positive\npart of my exposition, which then would remain only\nhalf intelligible.\n\nIn any case the time has assuredly arrived for\nonce to cite Ethics before the bar of a searching\nscrutiny. During more than half a century it has\nbeen lying comfortably on the restful cushion which\nKant arranged for it the cushion of the Categorical\nImperative of Practical Reason. In our day this\nImperative is mostly introduced to us under a name\nwhich, being smoother and less ostentations, has\nobtained more currency. It is called \" the Moral\nLaw \"\u00a0; and thus entitled, with a passing bow to\nreason and experience, it slips through unobserved\ninto the house. Once inside, there is no end to\nits orders and commands\u00a0; nor can it ever afterwards\nbe brought to account. It was proper, indeed in-\nevitable, that Kant, as the inventor of the thing,\nshould remain satisfied with his creation, particularly\nas he shelved by its means errors still more glaring.\nBut to be obliged to look on and see asses disporting\nthemselves on the comfortable cushion which he\nprepared, and which since his time has been more\nand more trampled on and flattened out this truly\nis hard. I allude to the daily hackney compilers,\nwho, with the ready confidence born of stupidity,\nimagine that they have given a foundation to Ethics,\nif they do but appeal to that \" Moral Law \" which\nis alleged to be inherent in our reason\u00a0; and then\nthey complacently weave upon this such a confused\nand wide-reaching tissue of phrases that they succeed\nin rendering unintelligible the clearest and simplest\nrelations of life\u00a0: and all this, without ever once\nseriously asking themselves whether in point of\nfact there really does exist such a \" Moral Law,\" as\na convenient code of morality, graven in our heads\nor hearts.\n\nHence I admit the especial pleasure I feel in\nproceeding to remove from Ethics its broad cushion\nof repose, and I unreservedly declare my intention\nof proving that Kant's Practical Reason and Categorical Imperative are completely unwarrantable,\nbaseless, and fabricated assumptions\u00a0; and I shall\nfurther show that Kant's whole system, like those\nof his predecessors, is in want of a solid foundation.\nConsequently Ethics will again be consigned to its\nformer entirely helpless condition, there to remain,\nuntil I come to demonstrate the true moral principle\nof human nature a principle which is incontestably\nefficient, and has its root in our very being. The\nlatter, however, has no such broad basis to offer as\nthe above-mentioned cushion\u00a0; so that, doubtless, those\nwho are accustomed to take things easily, will not\nabandon their comfortable old seat, before they are\nthoroughly aware how deeply the ground on which\nit stands is undermined\n\nFootnotes","title":"On the Basis of Morality/Part I","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":3735}