{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Part_III/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Part_III","id":"wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Part_III","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Basis_of_Morality/Part_III","summary":null,"tags":["Pages_with_translator","Subpages","Texts_requiring_OCR_fixes"],"text":"part ill.\nTHE FOUNDING OE ETHICS.\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nCONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM.\n\nTHUS the foundation which Kant gave to Ethics,\nwhich for the last sixty years has been regarded as\na sure basis, proves to be an inadmissible assumption,\nand merely theological Morals in disguise\u00a0; it sinks\ntherefore before our eyes into the deep gulf of\nphilosophic error, which perhaps will never be filled\nup. That the previous attempts to lay a foundation\nare still less satisfactory, I take for granted, as I\nhave already said. They consist, for the most part,\nof unproved assertions, drawn from the impalpable\nworld of dreams, and at the same time like Kant's\nsystem itself full of an artificial subtlety dealing\nwith the finest distinctions, and resting on the\nmost abstract conceptions. We find difficult combi-\nnations\u00a0; rules invented for the purpose\u00a0; formulae\nbalanced on a needle's point\u00a0; and stilted maxims,\nfrom which it is no longer possible to look down\nand see life as it really is with all its turmoil.\nSuch niceties are doubtless admirably adapted for\nthe lecture-room, if only with a view to sharpen-\ning the wits\u00a0; but they can never be the cause of\nthe impulse to act justly and to do good, which\nis found in every man\u00a0; as also they are powerless\n\n133\n\n134 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nto counterbalance the deep-seated tendency to in-\njustice and hardness of heart. Neither is it possible\nto fasten the reproaches of conscience upon them\u00a0; to\nattribute the former to the breaking of such hair-\nsplitting precepts only serves to make the same\nridiculous. In a word, artificial associations of ideas\nlike these cannot possibly if we take the matter\nseriously contain the true incentive to justice and\nloving-kindness. Rather must this be something\nthat requires but little reflection, and still less\nabstraction and complicated synthesis\u00a0; something\nthat, independent of the training of the understanding,\nspeaks to every one, even to the rudest, a something\nresting simply on intuitive perception, and forcing its\nway home as a direct emanation from the reality of\nthings. So long as Ethics cannot point to a foundation\nof this sort, she may go on with her discussions, and\nmake a great display in the lecture-rooms\u00a0; but real\nlife will only pour contempt upon her. I must there-\nfore give our moralists the paradoxical advice, first\nto look about them a little among their fellow-men.\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nSCEPTICAL VIEW.\n\nBUT when we cast a retrospect over the attempts\nmade, and made in vain, for more than two thousand\nyears, to find a sure basis for Ethics, ought we not\nperhaps to think that after all there is no natural\nmorality, independent of human institution\u00a0? Shall\nwe not conclude that all moral systems are nothing\nbut artificial products, means invented for the better\nrestraint of the selfish and wicked race of men\u00a0; and\nfurther, that, as they have no internal credentials\nand no natural basis, they would fail in their purpose,\nif without the support of positive religion\u00a0? The\nlegal code and the police are not sufficient in all\ncases\u00a0; there are offences, the discovery of which is\ntoo difficult\u00a0; some, indeed, where punishment is a\nprecarious matter\u00a0; where, in short, we are left\nwithout public protection. Moreover, the civil law\ncan at most enforce justice, not loving-kindness and\nbeneficence\u00a0; because, of course, these are qualities\nas regards which every one would like to play the\npassive, and no one the active, part. All this has\ngiven rise to the hypothesis that morality rests\nsolely on religion, and that both have the same\naim that of being complementary to the necessary\n\n135\n\n136 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\ninadequacy of state machinery and legislation.\nConsequently, there cannot be (it is said) a natural\nmorality, i.e., one based simply on the nature of\nthings, or of man, and the fruitless search of\nphilosophers for its foundation is explained. This\nview is not without plausibility\u00a0; and we find it as\nfar back as the Pyrrhonians\u00a0:\n\novTf ayadov TL e'crn (pvcrti, cure KUK.OV,\n\naXXa TTpos a.v6pa>TTU>v ravra v6a> Kcxptrat,\nKara TOV Tip.a>va. 1\n\nSext. Emp. adv. Math., XL, 140.\n\nAlso in modern times distinguished thinkers have\ngiven their adherence to it. A careful examination\ntherefore it deserves\u00a0; although the easier course would\nbe to shelve it by giving an inquisitorial glance at the\nconsciences of those in whom such a theory could arise.\nWe should fall into a great, a very childish\nblunder, if we believed all the just and legal actions\nof mankind to have a moral origin. This is far from\nbeing the case. As a rule, between the justice, which\nmen practise, and genuine singleness of heart, there\nexists a relation analogous to that between polite\nexpressions, and the true love of one's neighbour,\nwhich, unlike the former, does not ostensibly over-\ncome Egoism, but really does so. That honesty of\nsentiment, everywhere so carefully exhibited, which\n\n1 I.e., there is nothing either good or bad by nature, but\nthese things are decided by human judgment, as Timon says.\nV. Sexti Empiric! Opera Quae Exstant\u00a0: Adversus Mathe-\nmaticos\u00a0; p. 462 A ad fin. Aurelianae\u00a0: Petrus et Jacobus\nChouet, 1621. V. also\u00a0: Sexti Empiric! Opera, edit. Jo. Albertus\nFabricius\u00a0: Lipsiae, 1718, Lib. XL, 140, p. 716.\n\nSCEPTICAL VIEW. 137\n\nrequires to be regarded as above all suspicion\u00a0; that\ndeep indignation, which is stirred by the smallest\nsign of a doubt in this direction, and is ready to break\nout into furious anger\u00a0; to what are we to attri-\nbute these symptoms\u00a0? None but the inexperienced\nand simple will take them for pure coin, for the work-\ning of a fine moral feeling, or conscience. In point\nof fact, the general correctness of conduct which is\nadopted in human intercourse, and insisted on as\na rule no less immovable than the hills, depends\nprincipally on two external necessities\u00a0; first, on legal\nordinance, by virtue of which the rights of every\nman are protected by public authority\u00a0; and secondly,\non the recognised need of possessing civil honour,\n.in other words, a good name, in order to advance\nin the world. This is why the steps taken by the\nindividual are closely watched by public opinion,\nwhich is so inexorably severe that it never forgives\neven a single false move or slip, but remembers\nit against the guilty person as an indelible blot, all\nhis life long. As far as this goes, public opinion\nis wise enough\u00a0; for, starting from the fundamental\nprinciple\u00a0: Operari sequitur esse (what one does is\ndetermined by what one is), it shows its conviction\nthat the character is unchangeable, and that there-\nfore what a man has once done, he will assuredly do\nagain, if only the circumstances be precisely similar.\nSuch are the two custodians that keep guard on\nthe correct conduct of people, without which, to\nspeak frankly, we should be in a sad case, especially\nwith reference to property, this central point in human\nlife, around which the chief part of its energy and\n\n138 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nactivity revolves. For the purely ethical motives to\nintegrity, assuming that they exist, cannot as a rule\nbe applied, except very indirectly, to the question of\nownership as guaranteed by the state. These motives,\nin fact, have a direct and essential bearing only on\nnatural right\u00a0; with positive right their connection is\nmerely indirect, in so far as the latter is based on the\nformer. Natural right, however, attaches to no other\nproperty than that which has been gained by one's own\nexertion\u00a0; because, when this is seized, the owner is\nat the same time robbed of all the efforts he expended\nin acquiring it. The theory of preoccupancy I reject\nabsolutely, but cannot here set forth its refutation. Now of course all estate based on positive right ought\nultimately and in the last instance (it matters not\nhow many intermediate links are involved) to rest\non the natural right of possession. But what a\ndistance there is, in most cases, between the title-\ndeeds, that belong to our civil life, and this natural\nright their original source\u00a0! Indeed their connection\nwith the latter is generally either very difficult, or\nelse impossible, to prove. What we hold is ours by\ninheritance, by marriage, by success in the lottery\u00a0;\nor if in no way of this kind, still it is not gained by\nour own work, with the sweat of the brow, but rather\nby shrewdness and bright ideas (e.g., in the field\nof speculation), yes, and sometimes even by our very\nstupidity, which, through a conjunction of circum-\nstances, is crowned and glorified by the Deus eventus.\nIt is only in a very small minority of cases that property is the fruit of real labour and toil\u00a0; and even then the work is usually mental, like that of lawyers, doctors, civilians, teachers, etc.\u00a0; and this in the eyes of the rude appears to cost but little effort.\n\nNow, when wealth is acquired in any such fashion,\nthere is need of considerable education before the ethical\nright can be recognised and respected out of a purely\nmoral impulse. Hence it comes about that not a\nfew secretly regard the possessions of others as held\nmerely by virtue of positive right. So, if they find\nmeans to wrest from another man his goods, by using,\nor perhaps by evading, the laws, they feel no scruples\u00a0;\nfor in their opinion he would lose what he holds, in\nthe same way in which he had previously obtained it,\nand they consequently regard their own claims as\nequal to his. From their point of view, the right of\nthe stronger in civil society is superseded by the right\nof the cleverer.\n\nIncidentally we may notice that the rich man\noften shows an inflexible correctness of conduct.\nWhy\u00a0? Because with his whole heart he is attached\nto, and rigidly maintains, a rule, on the observance\nof which his entire wealth, and all its attendant\nadvantages, depend. For this reason his profession\nof the principle\u00a0: Suum cuique (to each his own), is\nthoroughly in earnest, and shows an unswerving\nconsistency. No doubt there is an objective loyalty\nto sincerity and good faith, which avails to keep them\nsacred\u00a0; but such loyalty is based simply on the\nfact that sincerity and good faith are the foundation\nof all free intercourse among men\u00a0; of good order\u00a0;\nand of secure ownership. Consequently they very\n\n140 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\noften benefit ourselves, and with this end in view they\nmust be preserved even at some cost\u00a0: just as a good\npiece of land is worth a certain outlay. But integrity\nthus derived is, as a rule, only to be met with among\nwealthy people, or at least those who are engaged\nin a lucrative business. It is an especial characteristic\nof tradesmen\u00a0; because they have the strongest con-\nviction that for all the operations of commerce the\none thing indispensable is mutual trust and credit\u00a0;\nand this is why mercantile honour stands quite by\nitself. On the other hand, the poor man, who cannot\nmake both ends meet, and who, by reason of the\nunequal division of property, sees himself condemned\nto want and hard work, while others before his eyes\nare lapped in luxury and idleness, will not easily\nperceive that the raison d'etre of this inequality is a\ncorresponding inequality of service and honest industry.\nAnd if he does not recognise this, how is he to be\ngoverned by the purely ethical motive to uprightness,\nwhich should keep him from stretching out his hand\nto grasp the superfluity of another\u00a0? Generally, it\nis the order of government as established by law\nthat restrains him. But should ever the rare occasion\npresent itself when he discovers that he is beyond\nthe reach of the police, an'd that he could by a single\nact throw off the galling burden of penury, which is\naggravated by the sight of others' opulence\u00a0; if he\nfeels this, and realises that he could thus enter\ninto the possession and enjoyment of all that he has\nso often coveted\u00a0: what is there then to stay his\nhand\u00a0? Religious dogmas\u00a0? It is seldom that faith\nis so firm. A purely moral incentive to be just and\n\nSCEPTICAL VIEW. 141\n\nupright\u00a0? Perhaps in a few isolated cases. But in by\nfar the greater number there is in reality nothing\nbut the anxiety a man feels to keep his good\nname, his civil honour a thing that touches closely\neven those in humble circumstances. He knows\nthe imminent danger incurred of having to pay\nfor dishonest conduct by being expelled from the\ngreat Masonic Lodge of honourable people who live\ncorrect lives. He knows that property all over the\nworld is in their hands, and duly apportioned among\nthemselves, and that they wield the power of making\nhim an outcast for life from good society, in case he\ncommit a single disgraceful action. He knows that\nwhoever takes one false step in this direction is\nmarked as a person that no one trusts, whose company\nevery one shuns, and from whom all advancement is\ncut off; to whom, as being \" a fellow that has stolen,\"\nthe proverb is applied\u00a0: \" He who steals once is a\nthief all his life.\"\n\nThese, then, are the guards that watch over correct\nbehaviour between man and man, and he who has\nlived, and kept his eyes open, will admit that the\nvast majority of honourable actions in human inter-\ncourse must be attributed to them\u00a0; nay, he will go\nfurther, and say that there are not wanting people\nwho hope to elude even their vigilance, and who\nregard justice and honesty merely as an external\nbadge, as a flag, under the protection of which they\ncan carry out their own freebooting propensities with\nbetter success. We need not therefore break out into\nholy wrath, and buckle on our armour, if a moralist\nis found to suggest that perhaps all integrity and\n\n142 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nuprightness may be at bottom only conventional.\nThis is what Holbach, Helvetins, d'Alembert, and\nothers of their time did\u00a0; and, following out the\ntheory, they endeavoured with great acumen to trace\nback all moral conduct to egoistic motives, however\nremote and indirect. That their position is literally\ntrue of most just actions, as having an ultimate\nfoundation centred in the Self, I have shown above.\nThat it is also true to a large extent of what is done\nin kindness and humanity, there can be no doubt\u00a0;\nacts of this sort often arise from love of ostentation,\nstill oftener from belief in a retribution to come,\nwhich may be dealt out in the second or even the\nthird power\u00a0; l or they can be explained by other\negoistic motives. Nevertheless, it is equally certain\nthat there occur actions of disinterested good-will\nand entirely voluntary justice. To prove the latter\nstatement, I appeal only to the facts of experience,\nnot to those of consciousness. There are isolated,\nyet indisputable cases on record, where not only\nthe danger of legal prosecution, but also all chance\nof discovery, and even of suspicion has been ex-\ncluded, and where, notwithstanding, the poor man has\nrendered to the rich his own. For example, things\nlost, and found, have been given back without any\nthought or hope of reward\u00a0; a deposit made by a\nthird person has been restored after his death to the\nrightful owner\u00a0; a poor man, secretly intrusted with\n\n1 In other words\u00a0: If a be a given offence, or virtuous act,\nand x the punishment, or reward, proportional to it\u00a0; then\nthe punishment, or reward, actually inflicted, instead of being\nx, may be a? or x 3 . (Translator.)\n\nSCEPTICAL VIEW. 143\n\na treasure by a fugitive, has faithfully kept, and then\nreturned, it. Instances of this sort can be found, beyond\nall doubt\u00a0; only the surprise, the emotion, and the\nhigh respect awakened, when we hear of them, testify\nto the fact that they are unexpected and very ex-\nceptional. There are in truth really honest people\u00a0:\nlike four-leaved clover, their existence is not a fiction.\nBut Hamlet uses no hyperbole when he says\u00a0: \" To\nbe honest, as this world goes, is to be one man pick'd\nout of ten thousand.\" If it be objected that, after\nall, religious dogmas, involving rewards and penalties\nin another world, are at the root of conduct as\nabove described\u00a0; cases could probably be adduced\nwhere the actors possessed no religious faith what-\never. And this is a thing by no means so infrequent\nas is generally maintained.\n\nThose who combat the sceptical view appeal specially\nto the testimony of conscience. But conscience itself\nis impugned, and doubts are raised about its natural\norigin. Now, as a matter of fact, there is a conscientia\nspuria (false conscience), which is often confounded\nwith the true. The regret and anxiety which many\na man feels for what he has done is frequently,\nat bottom, nothing but fear of the possible conse-\nquences. Not a few people, if they break external,\nvoluntary, and even absurd rules, suffer from painful\nsearchings of heart, exactly similar to those inflicted\nby the real conscience. Thus, for instance, a bigoted\nJew, if on Saturday he should smoke a pipe at\nhome, becomes really oppressed with the sense of\nhaving disobeyed the command in Exodus xxxv. 3\u00a0:\n\" Ye shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations\n\n144 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nupon the Sabbath day.\" How often it happens that\na nobleman or officer is the victim of self-reproach,\nbecause on some occasion or other he has not properly\ncomplied with that fools' codex, which is called\nknightly honour\u00a0! Nay more\u00a0: there are many of this\nclass, who, if they see the impossibility of merely\ndoing enough in some quarrel to satisfy the above-\nnamed code to say nothing of keeping their pledged\nword of honour are ready to shoot themselves. (In-\nstances of both have come under my knowledge.)\nAnd this, while the selfsame man would with\nan easy mind break his promise every day, if only\nthe shibboleth \" Honour \" be not involved. In short,\nevery inconsequent, and thoughtless action, all\nconduct contrary to our prejudices, principles, or\nconvictions, whatever these may be\u00a0; indeed, every\nindiscretion, every mistake, every piece of stupidity\nrankles in us secretly, and leaves its sting behind.\nThe average individual, who thinks his conscience\nsuch an imposing structure, would be surprised, could\nhe see of what it actually consists\u00a0: probably of about\none-fifth, fear of men\u00a0; one-fifth, superstition\u00a0; one-\nfifth, prejudice\u00a0; one-fifth, vanity\u00a0; and one-fifth, habit.\nSo that in reality he is no better than the English-\nman, who said quite frankly\u00a0: \" I cannot aiford to\nkeep a conscience.\" Religious people of every creed,\nas a rule, understand by conscience nothing else\nthan the dogmas and injunctions of their religion,\nand the self-examination based thereon\u00a0; and it is\nin this sense that the expressions coercion of conscience\nand liberty of conscience are used. The same inter-\npretation was always given by the theologians,\n\nSCEPTICAL VIEW. 145\n\nschoolmen, and casuists of the middle ages and of\nlater times. Whatever a man knew of the formulae\nand prescriptions of the Church, coupled with a re-\nsolution to believe and obey it, constituted his\nconscience. Thus we find the terms \" a doubting\nconscience,\" \" an opinionated conscience,\" \" an erring\nconscience,\" and the like\u00a0; and councils were held,\nand confessors employed, for the special purpose of\nsetting such irregularities straight. How little the\nconception of conscience, just as other conceptions, is\ndetermined by its own object\u00a0; how differently it is\nviewed by different people\u00a0; how wavering and un-\ncertain it appears in books\u00a0; all this is briefly but\nclearly set forth in Staudlin's Geschichte der Lehrevom\nGewissen. These facts taken in conjunction are not\ncalculated to establish the reality of the thing\u00a0; they\nhave rather given rise to the question whether there is\nin truth a genuine, inborn conscience. I have already\nhad occasion in Part II., Chapter YIIL, where the\ntheory of Freedom is discussed, to touch on my view\nof conscience, and I shall return to it below.\n\nAll these sceptical objections added together do\nnot in the least avail to prove that no true morality\nexists, however much they may moderate our ex-\npectations as to the moral tendency in man, and the\nnatural basis of Ethics. Undoubtedly a great deal\nthat is ascribed to the ethical sense can be proved\nto spring from other incentives\u00a0; and when we\ncontemplate the moral depravity of the world, it is\nsufficiently clear that the stimulus for good cannot\nbe very powerful, especially as it often does not\nwork even in cases where the opposing motives are\n\n10\n\n146 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nweak, although then the individual difference of\ncharacter makes itself fully felt.\n\nIt should be observed that this moral depravity\nis all the more difficult to discern, because its\nmanifestations are checked and cloaked by public\norder, as enforced by law\u00a0; by the necessity of having\na good name\u00a0; and even by ordinary polite manners.\nAnd this is not all. People commonly suppose that\nin the education of the young their moral interests\nare furthered by representing uprightness and virtue\nas principles generally followed by the world. Later\non, it is often to their great harm that experience\nteaches them something else\u00a0; for the discovery, that\nthe instructors of their early years were the first to\ndeceive them, is likely to have a more mischievous\neffect on their morality than if these persons had given\nthem the first example of ingenuous truthfulness, by\nsaying frankly\u00a0: \" The world is sunk in evil, and\nmen are not what they ought to be\u00a0; but be not\nmisled thereby, and see that you do better.\" All\nthis, as I have said, increases the difficulty of re-\ncognising the real immorality of mankind. The state\nthis masterpiece, which sums up the self-conscious,\nintelligent egoism of all consigns the rights of each\nperson to a power, which, being enormously superior\nto that of the individual, compels him to respect the\nrights of all others. This is the leash that restrains\nthe limitless egoism of nearly every one, the malice\nof many, the cruelty of not a few. The illusion\nthus arising is so great that, when in special cases,\nwhere the executive power is ineffective, or is eluded,\nthe insatiable covetousness, the base greed, the deep\n\nSCEPTICAL VIEW. 147\n\nhypocrisy, or the spiteful tricks of men are apparent\nin all their ugliness, we recoil with horror, supposing\nthat we have stumbled on some unheard-of monster\u00a0:\nwhereas, without the compulsion of law, and the\nnecessity of keeping an honourable name, these sights\nwould be of every day occurrence. In order to dis-\ncover what, from a moral point of view, human\nbeings are made of, we must study anarchist records,\nand the proceedings connected with criminals. The\nthousands that throng before our eyes, in peaceful\nintercourse each with the other, can only be regarded\nas so many tigers and wolves, whose teeth are secured\nby a strong muzzle. Let us now suppose this muzzle\ncast off, or, in other words, the power of the state\nabolished\u00a0; the contemplation of the spectacle then\nto be awaited would make all thinking people\nshudder\u00a0; and they would thus betray the small\namount of trust they really have in the efficiency\neither of religion, or of conscience, or of the natural\nbasis of Morals, whatever it be. But if these im-\nmoral, antinomian forces should be unshackled and\nlet loose, it is precisely then that the true moral\nincentive, hidden before, would reveal its activity,\nand consequently be most easily recognised. And\nnothing would bring out so clearly as this the\nprodigious moral difference of character between man\nand man\u00a0; it would be found to be as great as the\nintellectual, which is saying much.\n\nThe objection will perhaps be raised that Ethics\nis not concerned with what men actually do, but\nthat it is the science which treats of what their\nconduct ought to be. Now this is exactly the position\n\n148 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nwhich I deny. In the critical part of the present\ntreatise I have sufficiently demonstrated that the con-\nception of ought, in other words, the imperative form of\nEthics, is valid only in theological morals, outside of\nwhich it loses all sense and meaning. The end which\nI place before Ethical Science is to point out all the\nvaried moral lines of human conduct\u00a0; to explain\nthem\u00a0; and to trace them to their ultimate source.\nConsequently there remains no way of discovering\nthe basis of Ethics except the empirical. We must\nsearch and see whether we can find any actions to\nwhich we are obliged to ascribe genuine moral worth\u00a0:\nactions, that is, of voluntary justice, of pure loving-\nkindness, and of true nobleness. Such conduct,\nwhen found, is to be regarded as a given phaenome-\nnon, which has to be properly accounted for\u00a0; in other\nwords, its real origin must be explored, and this will\ninvolve the investigation and explanation of the\npeculiar motives which lead men to actions so radically\ndistinct from all others, that they form a class by\nthemselves. These motives, together with a respon-\nsive susceptibility for them, will constitute the\nultimate basis of morality, and the knowledge of\nthem will be the foundation of Ethics. This is the\nhumble path to which I direct the Science of Morals.\nIt contains no construction a priori, no absolute\nlegislation for all rational beings in abstractor it\nlacks all official, academic sanction. Therefore, who-\never thinks it not sufficiently fashionable, may return\nto the Categorical Imperative; to the Shibboleth\nof \" Human Dignity \"\u00a0; to the empty phrases, the\ncobwebs, and the soap-bubbles of the Schools\u00a0; to\n\nSCEPTICAL VIEW. 149\n\nprinciples on which experience ponrs contempt at\nevery step, and of which no one, outside the lecture-\nrooms knows anything, or has ever had the least\nnotion. On the other hand, the foundation which\nis reached by following my path is upheld by ex-\nperience\u00a0; and it is experience which daily and hourly\ndelivers its silent testimony in favour of my theory.\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nANTIMORAL 1 INCENTIVES.\n\nTHE chief and fundamental incentive in man, as in\nanimals, is Egoism, that is, the urgent impulse to\nexist, and exist under the best circumstances. The\nGerman word Selbstsucht (self-seeking) involves a\nfalse secondary idea of disease (Sucht). 2 The term\nEigennutz (self-interest) denotes Egoism, so far as\nthe latter is guided by reason, which enables it, by\nmeans of reflection, to prosecute its purposes system-\n\n1 I venture to use this word although irregularly formed,\nbecause \" antiethical \" would not here give an adequate\nmeaning. Sittlich (in accordance with good manners) and\nunsittlich (contrary to good manners), which have lately\ncome into vogue, are bad substitutes for moralisch (moral)\nand unmoralisch (immoral)\u00a0: first, because moralisch is a\nscientific conception, which, as such, requires to be denoted\nby a Greek or Latin term, for reasons which may be found\nin Die Welt ah Wille und Vorstellung, vol. ii., chap. 12, p. 134\nsqq.\u00a0; and secondly, because sittlich is a weaker and tamer\nexpression, difficult to distinguish from sittsam (modest)\nwhich in popular acceptation means zimperlich (simpering).\nNo concessions must be made to this extravagant love of\ngermanising\u00a0!\n\n2 In Sucht (s^ecA = sick) and Selbst-sucht (sunken seek) there\nis an apparent confusion between the two bases SUK (seuka)\nto be ill, and sOKYAN, to seek. V. Skeat's Etymological\nDictionary. (Translator.)\n\n150\n\nANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 151\n\natically\u00a0; so that animals may be called egoistic,\nbut not self-interested (eigennutzig). I shall there-\nfore retain the word Egoism for the general idea. Now\nthis Egoism is, both in animals and men, connected\nin the closest way with their very essence and being\u00a0;\nindeed, it is one and the same thing. For this reason\nall human actions, as a rule, have their origin in\nEgoism, and to it, accordingly, we must always first\nturn, when we try to find the explanation of any\ngiven line of conduct\u00a0; just as, when the endeavour\nis made to guide a man in any direction, the means\nto this end are universally calculated with reference\nto the same all-powerful motive. Egoism is, from\nits nature, limitless. The individual is filled with\nthe unqualified desire of preserving his life, and of\nkeeping it free from all pain, under which is included\nall want and privation. He wishes to have the\ngreatest possible amount of pleasurable existence,\nand every gratification that he is capable of appreciat-\ning\u00a0; indeed, he attempts, if possible, to evolve fresh\ncapacities for enjoyment. Everything that opposes\nthe strivings of his Egoism awakens his dislike, his\nanger, his hate\u00a0: this is the mortal enemy, which\nhe tries to annihilate. If it were possible, he would\nlike to possess everything for his own pleasure\u00a0; as\nthis is impossible, he wishes at least to control every-\nthing. \" All things for me, and nothing for others \"\nis his maxim. Egoism is a huge giant overtopping\nthe world. If each person were allowed to choose\nbetween his own destruction and that of the rest\nof mankind, I need not say what the decision would\nbe in most cases. Thus it is that every human unit\n\n152 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nmakes himself the centre of the world, which he views\nexclusively from that standpoint. Whatever occurs,\neven, for instance, the most sweeping changes in the\ndestinies of nations, he brings into relation first and\nforemost with his own interests, which, however\nslightly and indirectly they may be affected, ho is\nsure to think of before anything else. No sharper\ncontrast can be imagined than that between the\nprofound and exclusive attention which each person\ndevotes to his own self, and the indifference with\nwhich, as a rule, all other people regard that self, -\nan indifference precisely like that with which lie in\nturn looks upon them. To a certain extent it is\nactually comic to see how each individual out of\ninnumerable multitudes considers himself, at least\nfrom the practical point of view, as the only real\nthing, and all others in some sort as mere phantoms.\nThe ultimate reason of this lies in the fact that\nevery one is directly conscious of himself, but of\nothers only indirectly, through his mind's eye\u00a0; and\nthe direct impression asserts its right. In other\nwords, it is in consequence of the subjectivity which\nis essential to our consciousness that each person\nis himself the whole world\u00a0; for all that is objec-\ntive exists only indirectly, as simply the mental\npicture of the subject\u00a0; whence it comes about that\neverything is invariably expressed in terms of self-\nconsciousness. The only world which the individual\nreally grasps, and of which he has certain knowledge,\nhe carries in himself, as a mirrored image fashioned\nby his brain\u00a0; and he is, therefore, its centre. Conse-\nquently he is all in all to himself\u00a0; and since he\n\nANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 153\n\nfeels that he contains within his ego all that is real,\nnothing can be of greater importance to him than his\nown self. 1 Moreover this supremely important self, this\nmicrocosm, to which the macrocosm stands in relation\nas its mere modification or accident, this, which is\nthe individual's whole world, he knows perfectly well\nmust be destroyed by death\u00a0; which is therefore for\nhim equivalent to the destruction of all things.\n\nSuch, then, are the elements out of which, on the\nbasis of the Will to live, Egoism grows up, and like a\nbroad trench it forms a perennial separation between\nman and man. If on any occasion some one actually\njumps across, to help another, such an act is regarded\nas a sort of miracle, which calls forth amazement and\nwins approval. In Part II., Chapter VI., where Kant's\nprinciple of Morals is discussed, I had the opportunity\nof describing how Egoism behaves in everyday life,\nwhere it is always peering out of some corner or other,\ndespite ordinary politeness, which, like the traditional\nfig-leaf, is used as a covering. In point of fact,\npoliteness is the conventional and systematic dis-\navowal of Egoism in the trifles of daily intercourse,\nand is, of course, a piece of recognised hypocrisy.\nGentle manners are expected and commended, because\nthat which they conceal Egoism is so odious, that\nno one wishes to see it, however much it is known\nto be there\u00a0; just as people like to have repulsive\nobjects hidden at least by a curtain. Now, unless\n\n1 It should be noticed that while from the subjective side\na man's self assumes these gigantic proportions, objectively\nit shrinks to almost nothing namely, to about the one-\nthousand-millionth part of the human race.\n\n154 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nexternal force (under which must be included every\nsource of fear whether of human or superhuman\npowers), or else the real moral incentive is in\neffective operation, it is certain that Egoism always\npursues its purposes with unqualified directness\u00a0;\nhence without these checks, considering the countless\nnumber of egoistic individuals, the bellum omnium\ncontra omnes l would be the order of the day, and\nprove the ruin of all. Thus is explained the early\nconstruction by reflecting reason of state government,\nwhich, arising, as it does, from a mutual fear of\nreciprocal violence, obviates the disastrous con-\nsequences of the general Egoism, as far as it is\npossible to do by negative procedure. Where, how-\never, the two forces that oppose Egoism fail to be\noperative, the latter is not slow to reveal all its\nhorrible dimensions, nor is the spectacle exactly\nattractive. In order to express the strength of this\nantimoral power in a few words, to portray it, so to\nsay, at one stroke, some very emphatic hyperbole is\nwanted. It may be put thus\u00a0: many a man would be\nquite capable of killing another, simply to rub his\nboots over with the victim's fat. I am only doubtful\nwhether this, after all, is any exaggeration. Egoism,\nthen, is the first and principal, though not the only,\npower that the moral Motive has to contend against\u00a0;\nand it is surely sufficiently clear that the latter, in\norder to enter the lists against such an opponent,\nmust be something more real than a hair-splitting\nsophism or an a priori soap-bubble. In war the first\n\n1 The war of all against all. Hobbes uses this expression.\n(Translator.)\n\nANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 155\n\nthing to be done is to know the enemy well\u00a0; and\nin the shock of battle, now impending, Egoism, as the\nchief combatant on its own side, is best set against\nthe virtue of Justice, which, in my opinion, is the\nfirst and original cardinal virtue.\n\nThe virtue of loving-kindness, on the other hand,\nis rather to be matched with ill-will, or spitefulness,\nthe origin and successive stages of which we will\nnow consider. Ill-will, in its lower degrees, is very\nfrequent, indeed, almost a common thing\u00a0; and it\neasily rises in the scale. Goethe is assuredly right\nwhen he says that in this world indifference and\naversion are quite at home. ( Wahlverwandtschaften,\nPart I., chap. 3.) It is very fortunate for us that\nthe cloak, which prudence and politeness throw over\nthis vice, prevents us from seeing how general it\nis, and how the bellum omnium contra omnes is\nconstantly waged, at least in thought. Yet ever\nand anon there is some appearance of it\u00a0: for instance,\nin the relentless backbiting so frequently observed\u00a0;\nwhile its clearest manifestation is found in all out-\nbreaks of anger, which, for the most part, are quite\ndisproportioual to their cause, and which could\nhardly be so violent, had they not been compressed\nlike gunpowder into the explosive compound formed\nof long cherished brooding hatred. Ill-will usually\narises from the unavoidable collisions of Egoism\nwhich occur at every step. It is, moreover, objectively\nexcited by the view of the weakness, the folly, the\nvices, failings, shortcomings, and imperfections of\nall kinds, which every one more or less, at least\noccasionally, affords to others. Indeed, the spectacle\n\n156 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nis such, that many a man, especially in moments of\nmelancholy and depression, may be tempted to regard\nthe world, from the aesthetic standpoint, as a cabinet\nof caricatures\u00a0; from the intellectual, as a madhouse\u00a0;\nand from the moral, as a nest of sharpers. If such\na mental attitude be indulged, misanthropy is the\nresult. Lastly, one of the chief sources of ill-will\nis envy\u00a0; or rather, the latter is itself ill-will, kindled\nby the happiness, possessions, or advantages of others.\nNo one is absolutely free from envy\u00a0; and Herodotus\n(III. 80) said long ago\u00a0: t\\ia jravrav -n-pbs\n&rravras, which comes very near to loving-kindness. It\ncontains also certain *aXa rfjs (pi\\ias TfK^pia. (Translator.)\n\n200 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nThe second degree is sharply distinguished from the\nfirst, through the positive character of the actions\nresulting therefrom\u00a0; for at this point Compassion\ndoes more than keep me back from injuring my\nneighbour\u00a0; it impels me to help him. And according\nas, on the one hand, my sense of direct participation\nis keen and deep, and, on the other hand, the distress\nis great and urgent, so shall I be constrained by\nthis motive, which (be it noted) is purely and wholly\nmoral, to make a greater or less sacrifice in order to\nmeet the need or the calamity which I observe\u00a0; and\nthis sacrifice may involve the expenditure of my\nbodily or mental powers, the loss of my property,\nfreedom, or even life. So that in this direct\nsuffering with another, which rests on no arguments\nand requires none, is found the one simple origin of\nloving-kindness, caritas, ayaTrr}- in other words, that\nvirtue whose rule is\u00a0: Omnes, quantum potes, juva\n(help all people, as far as lies in your power)\u00a0;\nand from which all those actions proceed which are\nprescribed by Ethics under the name of duties of\nvirtue, otherwise called duties of love, or imperfect\nduties. It is solely by direct and, as it were,\ninstinctive participation in the sufferings which we\nsee, in other words, by Compassion, that conduct\nso defined is occasioned\u00a0; at least when it can be\nsaid to have moral worth, that is, be declared free\nfrom all egoistic motives, and when on that account\nit awakens in us that inward contentment which is\ncalled a good, satisfied, approving conscience, and\nelicits from the spectator (not without making him\ncast a humiliating glance at himself), that remark-\n\nTHE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS. 201\n\nable commendation, respect, and admiration which are\ntoo well-known to be denied.\n\nBut if a beneficent action have any other motive\nwhatever, then it must be egoistic, if not actually\nmalicious. For as the fundamental springs of all\nhuman conduct (v. Chapter Y. of this Part), are three,\nnamely, Egoism, Malice, Compassion\u00a0; so the various\nmotives which are capable of affecting men may be\ngrouped under three general heads\u00a0: (1) one's own weal\u00a0;\n(2) others' woe\u00a0; (3) others' weal. Now if the motive\nof a kind act does not belong to the third class, it must\nof course be found in the first or second. To the\nsecond it is occasionally to be ascribed\u00a0; for instance,\nif I do good to some one, in order to vex another,\nto whom I am hostile\u00a0; or to make the latter's\nsufferings more acute\u00a0; or, it may be, to put to\nshame a third person, who refrained from helping\u00a0;\nor lastly, to inflict a mortification on the man whom\nI benefit. But it much more usually springs from\nthe first class. And this is the case whenever, in\ndoing some good, I have in view my own weal, no\nmatter how remote or indirect it may be\u00a0; that is,\nwhenever I am influenced by the thought of reward\nwhether in this, or in another, world, or by the hope\nof winning high esteem, and of gaining a reputation\nfor nobleness of character\u00a0; or again, when I reflect\nthat the person, whom I now aid, may one day be\nable to assist me in return, or otherwise be of some\nservice and benefit\u00a0; or when, lastly, I am guided\nby the consideration that I must keep the rules of\nmagnanimity and beneficence, because I too may on\nsome occasion profit thereby. In a word, my motive\n\n202 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nis egoistic as sooii as it is anything other than the\npurely objective desire of simply knowing, without\nany ulterior purpose, that my neighbour is helped,\ndelivered from his distress and need, or freed from\nhis suffering. If such an aim shorn, as it is, of\nall subjectivity be really mine, then, and then only,\nhave I given proof of that loving-kindness, caritas,\ndyaTrr}, which it is the great and distinguishing merit\nof Christianity to have preached. It should be ob-\nserved, in this connection, that the injunctions which\nthe Gospel adds to its commandment of love, e.g.,\nfjbr) ryvcbrw r) dpLcrrepd crov, rl irotel 77 Seid trov (let\nnot thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth),\nand the like, are, in point of fact, based on a\nconsciousness of the conclusion I have here reached,\nnamely, that another's distress, of itself alone, without\nany further consideration, must be my motive, if\nwhat I do is to be of moral value. And in the same\nplace (Matth. vi. 2) we find it stated with perfect\ntruth that ostentations almsgivers (nrk-^ovaiv rby\npicrdov avr&v. (Get in full exhaust their reward.)\nAlthough, in this respect too, the Vedas shed on\nus the light of a higher teaching. They repeatedly\ndeclare that he, who desires any sort of recompense\nfor his work, is still wandering in the path of dark-\nness, and not yet ripe for deliverance. If any one\nshould ask me what he gets from a charitable act,\nmy answer in all sincerity would be\u00a0: \" This, that\nthe lot of the poor man you relieve is just so much\nthe lighter\u00a0; otherwise absolutely nothing. If you\nare not satisfied, and feel that such is not a suffi-\ncient end, then your wish was not to give alms,\n\nTHE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS. 203\n\nbut to make a purchase\u00a0; and you have effected a\nbad bargain. But if the one thing you are concerned\nwith is that he should feel the pressure of poverty\nless\u00a0; then you have gained your object\u00a0; you have\ndiminished his suffering, and you see exactly how\nfar your gift is requited.\"\n\nNow, how is it possible that trouble which is not\nmine, and by which I am untouched, should become\nas direct a motive to me as if it were my own, and\nincite me to action\u00a0? As already explained, only\nthrough the fact that, although it comes before\nme merely as something outside myself, by means\nof the external medium of sight or hearing\u00a0; I am,\nnevertheless, sensible of it with the sufferer\u00a0; I feel\nit as my own, not indeed in myself, but in him\nAnd so what Calderon said comes to pass\u00a0:\n\nque entre el ver\nPadecer y el padecer\nNinguna distancia habia.\n(No Siempre lo Peor es Cierto. Jorn. II., Esc. 9.) 1\n\nThis, however, presupposes that to a certain extent\nI have become identified with the other, and con-\nsequently that the barrier between the ego and the\nnon-ego is, for the moment, broken down. It is then,\nand then only, that I make his interests, his need,\nhis distress, his suffering directly my own\u00a0; it is then\nthat the empirical picture I have of him vanishes,\n\n1 For between the view\nOf pain, and pain itself, I never knew\nA distance He.\n\nIt is not Always the Worst that is Certain\u00a0: Act II.,\nSc. 9. (Translator. )\n\n204 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nand I no longer see the stranger, who is entirely\nunlike myself, and to whom I am indifferent\u00a0; but\nI share his pain in him, despite the certainty that\nhis skin does not enclose my nerves. Only in this\nway is it possible for his woe, his distress to become a\nmotive for me\u00a0; otherwise I should be influenced solely\nby my own. This process . is, I repeat, mysterious.\nFor it is one which Reason can give no direct account\nof, and its causes lie outside the field of experience.\nAnd yet it is of daily occurrence. Every one has\noften felt its working within himself; even to the\nmost hard-hearted and selfish it is not unknown.\nEach day that passes brings it before our eyes, in\nsingle acts, on a small scale\u00a0; whenever a man, by\ndirect impulse, without much reflection, helps a\nfellow-creature and comes to his aid, sometimes even\nexposing himself to the most imminent peril for the\nsake of one he has never seen before, and this, with-\nout once thinking of anything but the fact that\nhe witnesses another's great distress and danger. It\nwas manifested on a large scale, when after long\nconsideration, and many a stormy debate, the noble-\nhearted British nation gave twenty millions of pounds\nto ransom the negroes in its colonies, with the\napprobation and joy of a whole world. If any one\nrefuses to recognise in Compassion the cause of this\ndeed, magnificent as it is in its grand proportions,\nand prefers to ascribe it to Christianity\u00a0; let him\nremember that in the whole of the New Testament\nnot one word is said against slavery, though at that\ntime it was practically universal\u00a0; and further, that\nas late as A.D. I860, in North America, when the\n\nTHE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS. 205\n\nquestion was being discussed, a man was found who\nthought to strengthen his case by appealing to the\nfact that Abraham and Jacob kept slaves\u00a0!\n\nWhat will be in each separate case the practical\neffect of this mysterious inner process may be left\nto Ethics to analyse, in chapters and paragraphs\nentitled \"Duties of Virtue,\" \"Duties of Love,\"\n\" Imperfect Duties,\" or whatever other name be used.\nThe root, the -basis of all these is the one here\nindicated\u00a0; for out of it arises the primary precept\u00a0:\nOmnes, quantum potes, jmia\u00a0; from which in turn\neverything else required can very easily be deduced\u00a0;\njust as out of the Neminem laede the first half of\nmy principle all duties of justice are derivable.\nEthics is in truth the easiest of all sciences. And\nthis is only to be expected, since it is incumbent on\neach person to construct it for himself, and himself\nform the rule for every case, as it occurs, out of\nthe fundamental law which lies deep in his heart\u00a0;\nfor few have leisure and patience enough to learn\na ready-made system of Morals. From justice and\nloving-kindness spring all the other virtues\u00a0; for which\nreason these two may properly be called cardinal, and\nthe disclosure of their origin lays the corner-stone\nof Moral Science. The entire ethical content of\nthe Old Testament is justice\u00a0; loving-kindness being\nthat of the New. The latter is the tccuvr) eVroX^ (the\nnew commandment [John xiii. 34] ), which accord-\ning to Paul (Romans xiii. 8-10) includes all Christian\nvirtues.\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED\nBY EXPERIENCE.\n\nTHE truth I have here laid down, that Compassion\nis the sole non-egoistic stimulus, and therefore the\nonly really moral one, is a strange, indeed almost\nincomprehensible paradox. I shall hope, therefore,\nto render it less extraordinary to the reader, if I\nshow that it is confirmed by experience, and by the\nuniversal testimony of human sentiment.\n\n(1) For this purpose I shall, in the first place,\nstate an imaginary case, which in the present investi-\ngation may serve as an experimentum crucis 1 (a crucial\ntest). But not to make the matter too easy, I shall\ntake no instance of loving-kindness, but rather a\nbreach of lawful right, and that of the worse kind.\n\n1 This term appears to have been first used by Newton\nand Boyle. The sense is undoubtedly derived from Bacon's\nphrase \"instantia crucis\" which is one of his \"Prerogative\nInstances.\" Vide, Novum Organum\u00a0: Lib. II., xxxvi., where it\nis explained as follows\u00a0: Inter Praerogativas Instantiarum\nponemus loco decimo quarto INSTANTIAS CRUCIS\u00a0; translate\nvocabulo a Crucibus, quae erectae in Hiviis, indicant et signant\nviarum separationes. Has etiam Instantias Decisorias et\nJudiciales, et in Casibus nonnullis Instantias Oracvli et\nMandati, appellare consuevimus, etc. (Translator.)\n\n206\n\nTHE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 207\n\nLet us suppose two young people, Cains and Titus,\nto be passionately in love, each with a different girl,\nand that both are completely thwarted by two other\nmen who are preferred because of certain external\ncircumstances. They have both resolved to put their\nrivals out of the way, and are perfectly secure from\nevery chance of detection, even from all suspicion.\nBut when they come to actually prepare for the\nmurder, each of them, after an inward struggle,\ndraws back. They are now to give us a truthful and\nclear account of the reasons why they abandoned\ntheir project. As for Caius, I leave it entirely to\nthe reader to choose what motive he likes. It may\nbe that religious grounds checked him\u00a0; for in-\nstance, the thought of the Divine Will, of future\nretribution, of the judgment to come, etc. Or perhaps\nhe may say\u00a0: \" I reflected that the principle I was\ngoing to apply in this case would not be adapted to\nprovide a rule universally valid for all possible\nrational beings\u00a0; because I should have treated my\nrival only as a means, and not at the same time as\nan end.\" Or, following Fichte, he may deliver\nhimself as follows\u00a0: \" Every human life is a means\ntowards realising the moral law\u00a0; consequently, I\ncannot, without being indifferent to this realisation,\ndestroy a being ordained to do his part in effecting\nit.\" (Sittenlehre, p. 373.) (This scruple, be it ob-\nserved in passing, he might well overcome by the\nhope of soon producing a new instrument of the moral\nlaw, when once in possession of his beloved.) Or,\nagain, he may speak after the fashion of Wollaston\u00a0:\n\" I considered that such an action would be the\n\n208 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nexpression of a false tenet.\" Or like Hutcheson\u00a0: \" The\nMoral Sense, whose perceptions, equally with those\nof every other sense, admit of no final explanation,\nforbade me to commit such a deed.\" Or like Adam\nSmith\u00a0: \" I foresaw that my act would awaken no\nsympathy with me in the minds of the spectators.\"\nOr his language may be borrowed from Christian\nWolff\u00a0: \" I recognised that I should thereby advance\nneither the work of making myself perfect, nor the\nsame process in any one else.\" Or from Spinoza\u00a0:\n\" Homini nihil utilius homine\u00a0: ergo hominem interimere\nnolui.\" (To man nothing is more useful than man\u00a0:\ntherefore I was unwilling to destroy a man.) In\nshort, he may say what one pleases. But Titus,\nwhose explanation is supplied by myself, will speak\nas follows\u00a0: \" When I came to make arrangements\nfor the work, and so, for the moment, had to occupy\nmyself not with my own passion, but with my rival\u00a0;\nthen for the first time I saw clearly what was going\nto happen to him. But simultaneously I was seized\nwith compassion and pity; sorrow for him laid hold\nupon me, and overmastered me\u00a0: I could not strike the\nblow.\" Now I ask every honest and unprejudiced\nreader\u00a0: Which of these two is the better man\u00a0? To\nwhich would he prefer to entrust his own destiny?\nWhich is restrained by the purer motive? Conse-\nquently, where does the basis of morality lie\u00a0?\n\n(2) There is nothing that revolts our moral sense\nso much as cruelty. Every other offence we can\npardon, but not cruelty. The reason is found in the\nfact that cruelty is the exact opposite of Compassion.\nWhen we hear of intensely cruel conduct, as, for\n\nTHE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 209\n\ninstance, the act, which has just been recorded in\nthe papers, of a mother, who murdered her little\nson of five years, by pouring boiling oil into his\nthroat, and her younger child, by burying it alive\u00a0;\nor what was recently reported from Algiers\u00a0: how a\ncasual dispute between a Spaniard and an Algerine\nended in a fight\u00a0; and how the latter, having van-\nquished the other, tore out the whole of his lower\njaw bone, and carried it off as a trophy, leaving his\nadversary still alive\u00a0; when we hear of cruelty like\nthis, we are seized with horror, and exclaim\u00a0: \" How\nis it possible to do such a thing\u00a0? \" Now, let me\nask what this question signifies. Does it mean\u00a0:\n\" How is it possible to fear so little the punishments\nof the future life\u00a0? \" It is difficult to admit this\ninterpretation. Then perhaps it intends to say\u00a0:\n\" How is it possible to act according to a principle\nwhich is so absolutely unfitted to become a general\nlaw for all rational beings\u00a0? \" Certainly not. Or,\nonce more\u00a0: \" How is it possible to neglect so utterly\none's own perfection as well as that of another\u00a0? \"\nThis is equally unimaginable. The sense of the\nquestion is assuredly nothing but this\u00a0: \" How is\nit possible to be so utterly bereft of compassion\u00a0? \"\nThe conclusion is that when an action is characterised\nby an extraordinary absence of compassion, it bears\nthe certain stamp of the deepest depravity and loath-\nsomeness. Hence Compassion is the true moral\nincentive.\n\n(3) The ethical basis, or the original moral stimulus,\nwhich I have disclosed, is the only one that can be\njustly said to have a real and extended sphere of\n\n14\n\n210 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\neffective influence. No one will surely venture to\nmaintain as much of all the other moral principles\nthat philosophers have set up\u00a0; for these are composed\nof abstract, sometimes even of hair-splitting propo-\nsitions, with no foundation other than an artificial\ncombination of ideas\u00a0; such that their application\nto actual conduct would often incline to the comic.\nA good action, inspired solely by Kant's Moral Prin-\nciple, would be at bottom the work of philosophic\npedantry\u00a0; or else would lead the doer into self-\ndeception, through his reason interpreting conduct,\nwhich had other, perhaps nobler, incentives, as the\nproduct of the Categorical Imperative, and of the\nconception of Duty, which, as we have seen, rests\non nothing. But not only is it true that the philo-\nsophic moral principles, purely theoretical as they\nare, have seldom any operative power\u00a0; of those\nestablished by religion, and expressly framed for\npractical purposes, it is equally difficult to predicate\nany marked efficiency. The chief evidence of this lies\nin the fact that in spite of the great religious differ-\nences in the world, the amount of morality, or rather\nof immorality, shows no corresponding variation, but\nin essentials is pretty much the same everywhere.\nOnly it is important not to confound rudeness and\nrefinement with morality and immorality. The re-\nligion of Hellas had an exceedingly small moral\ntendency, it hardly went further than respect for\noaths. No dogma was taught, and no system of\nEthics publicly preached\u00a0; nevertheless, all things\nconsidered, it does not appear that the Greeks were\nmorally inferior to the men of the Christian era. The\n\nTHE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 211\n\nmorality of Christianity is of a ranch higher kind than\nthat of any other religion which previously appeared\nin Europe. But if any one should believe for this\nreason that European morals have improved pro-\nportionally, and that now at any rate they surpass\nwhat obtains elsewhere, it would not be difficult to\ndemonstrate that among the Mohammedans, Guebres,\nHindus, and Buddhists, there is at least as much\nhonesty, fidelity, toleration, gentleness, beneficence,\nnobleness, and self-denial as among Christian peoples.\nIndeed, the scale will be found rather to turn unfavour-\nably for Christendom, when we put into the balance\nthe long list of inhuman cruelties which have con-\nstantly been perpetrated within its limits and often\nin its name. We need only recall for a moment the\nnumerous religious wars\u00a0; the crusades that nothing\ncan justify\u00a0; the extirpation of a large part of the\nAmerican aborigines, and the peopling of that con-\ntinent by negroes, brought over from Africa, without\nthe shadow of a right, torn from their families, their\ncountry, their hemisphere, and, as slaves, condemned\nfor life to forced labour\u00a0; the tireless persecution of\nheretics\u00a0; the unspeakable atrocities of the Inquisition,\nthat cried aloud to heaven\u00a0; the Massacre of St.\nBartholomew\u00a0; the execution of 18,000 persons in\nthe Netherlands by the Duke of Alva\u00a0; and these are\nbut a few facts among many. Speaking generally,\n\n1 According to Buxton (The African Slave-trade, 1839),\ntheir number is even now yearly increased by about 150,000\nfreshly imported\u00a0; and to these more than 200,000 must be\nadded, who perish miserably at the time of their capture, or\non the voyage.\n\n212 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nhowever, if we compare with the performances of its\nfollowers the excellent morality which Christianity,\nand, more or less, every creed preaches, and then\ntry to imagine how far theory would become practice,\nif crime were not impeded by the secular arm of the\nstate\u00a0; nay more, what would probably happen, if, for\nonly one day all laws should be suspended\u00a0; we shall\nbe obliged to confess that the effect of the various\nreligions on Morals is in fact very small. This is\nof course due to weakness of faith. Theoretically,\nand so long as it is only a question of piety in the\nabstract, every one supposes his belief to be firm\nenough. Only the searching touch-stone of all our\nconvictions is what we do. When the moment for\nacting arrives, and our faith has to be tested by\ngreat self-denial and heavy sacrifices, then its feeble-\nness becomes evident. If a man is seriously planning\nsome evil, he has already broken the bounds of true\nand pure morality. Thenceforward the chief restraint\nthat checks him is invariably the dread of justice\nand the police. Should he be so hopeful of escap-\ning detection as to cast such fears aside, the next\nbarrier that meets him is regard for his honour. If\nthis second rampart be crossed, there is very little\nlikelihood, after both these powerful hindrances are\nwithdrawn, that any religious dogma will appeal\nto him strongly enough to keep him back from the\ndeed. For if he be not frightened by near and\nimmediate dangers, he will hardly be curbed by\nterrors which are distant, and rest merely on belief.\nMoreover, there is a positive objection that may be\nbrought against all good conduct proceeding solely from\n\nTHE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 213\n\nreligious conviction\u00a0; it is not purged of self-interest,\nbut done out of regard for reward and punishment, and\nhence can have no purely moral value. This view we\nfind very clearly expressed in a letter of the celebrated\nGrand-Duke of Weimar, Karl August. He writes\u00a0:\n\" Baron Weyhers was himself of opinion that he, who\nis good through religion, and not by natural inclina-\ntion, must be a bad fellow at heart. In vino veritas\" 1\n(Letters to J. H. Merck\u00a0; No. 229.) But now let us\nturn to the moral incentive which I have disclosed.\nWho ventures for a moment to deny that it displays\na marked and truly wonderful influence at all times,\namong all peoples, in all circumstances of life\u00a0; even\nwhen constitutional law is suspended, and the horrors\nof revolutions and wars fill the air\u00a0; in small things\nand in great, every day and every hour\u00a0? Who will\nrefuse to admit that it is constantly preventing much\nwrong, and calling into existence many a good action,\noften quite unexpectedly, and where there is no hope\nof reward\u00a0? Is there any one who will gainsay the\nfact that, where it and it alone has been operative,\nwe all with deep respect and emotion unreservedly\nrecognise the presence of genuine moral worth\u00a0?\n\n(4) Boundless compassion for all living beings\nis the surest and most certain guarantee of pure moral\nconduct, and needs no casuistry. Whoever is filled\nwith it will assuredly injure no one, do harm to no\none, encroach on no man's rights\u00a0; he will rather have\n\n1 I.e., under the influence of wine one speaks the truth. Cf.\nPliny, Nat. Hist., xiv., chap. 22, 28, 141, edit. Teubner\u00a0;\nvulgoque VEEITA.S jam attributa VINO est. Gk. olvos KOI\n. V. Paroemiographi, edit. Gaisford. (Translator.)\n\n214 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nregard for every one, forgive every one, help every\none as far as he can, and all his actions will bear the\nstamp of justice and loving-kindness. On the other\nhand, if we try to say\u00a0: \" This man is virtuous, but\nhe is a stranger to Compassion \"\u00a0; or\u00a0: \" he is an\nunjust and malicious man, yet. very compassionate;\"\nthe contradiction at once leaps to light. In former\ntimes the English plays used to finish with a petition\nfor the King. The old Indian dramas close with\nthese words\u00a0: \" May all living beings be delivered\nfrom pain.\" Tastes differ\u00a0; but in my opinion there\nis no more beautiful prayer than this.\n\n(5) Also from separate matters of detail it may\nbe inferred that the original stimulus of true morality\nis Compassion. For instance, to make a man lose\na hundred thalers, by legal tricks involving no\ndanger, is equally unjust, whether he be rich or poor\u00a0;\nbut in the latter case the rapping of conscience is\nmuch louder, the censure of disinterested witnesses\nmore emphatic. Aristotle was well aware of this,\nand said\u00a0: Beivorepov Se eart rby drvxpvvTa, rj rov\nevTvxpvvra, aSiiceiv. (It is worse to injure a man\nin adversity than one who is prosperous.) (Probl.\nxxix. 2.) If the man have wealth, self-reproach is\nproportionally faint, and grows still fainter, if it be\nthe treasury that has been overreached\u00a0; for state\ncoffers can form no object of Compassion. It thus\nappears that the grounds for self-accusation as well\nas for the spectators' blame are not furnished directly\nby the infringement of the law, but chiefly by the\nsuffering thereby brought upon others. The violation\nof right, by itself and as such, which is involved in\n\nTHE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 215\n\ncheating the exchequer, (to take the above instance,)\nwill be disapproved by the conscience alike of actor\nand witness\u00a0; but only because, and in so far as, the\nrule of respecting every right, which forms the sine\nqua non of all honourable conduct, is in consequence\nbroken. The stricture passed will, in fact, be in-\ndirect and limited. If, however, it be a confidential\nemploye in the service that commits the fraud, the\ncase assumes quite another aspect\u00a0; it then has all\nthe specific attributes of, and belongs to, that class\nof actions described above, whose characteristic is\na double injustice. The analysis here given explains\nwhy the worst charge which can ever be brought\nagainst rapacious extortioners and legal sharpers is,\nthat they appropriate for themselves the goods of\nwidows and orphans. The reason appears in the\nfact that the latter, more than others, owing to their\nhelplessness, might be expected to excite Compassion\nin the most callous heart. Hence we conclude that\nthe entire absence of this sense is sufficient to lower\na man to the last degree of villainy.\n\n(6) Compassion is the root no less of justice than\nof loving-kindness\u00a0; but it is more clearly evidenced\nin the latter than in the former. We never receive\nproofs of genuine loving-kindness on the part of others,\nso long as we are in all respects prosperous. The\nhappy man may, no doubt, often hear the words of\ngood- will on his relations' and friends' lips\u00a0; but\nthe expression of that pure, disinterested, objective\nparticipation in the condition and lot of others, which\nloving-kindness begets, is reserved for him who is\nstricken with some sorrow or suffering, whatever\n\n216 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nit be. For the fortunate as such we do not feel\nsympathy\u00a0; unless they have some other claim on\nus, they remain alien to our hearts\u00a0: habeant sibi sua.\n(They may keep their own affairs, pleasures, etc., to\nthemselves.) Nay, if a man has many advantages\nover others, he will easily become an object of envy,\nwhich is ready, should he once fall from his height\nof prosperity, to turn into malignant joy. Neverthe-\nless this menace is, for the most part, not fulfilled\u00a0;\nthe Sophoclean 7eX, /j,d\\icrTa dewv\n(3lov /cat //,era/3oXa-\n\nas we suppose he suffers\u00a0; it is not in us, it is in him, that we\nsuffer . . . offer a young man objects, on which the expansive\nforce of his heart can act\u00a0; objects such as may enlarge his\nnature, and incline it to go out to other beings, in whom he\nmay everywhere find himself again. Keep carefully away\nthose things which narrow his view, and make him self-centred,\nand which tighten the strings of the human ego. [Tendent le\nressort (stretch the spring) du moi humain\u00a0: i.e., stimulate the\negoistic tendency. (Translator.)]\n\n1 Journal Asiatique, Vol. ix., p. 62. Cf. Meng-Tseu (other-\nwise called Mencius), edited by Stanislas Julien, 1824, Bk. 1,\n45\u00a0; also Meng-Tseu in the Livres Sacres de VOrient, by\nPanthier p. 281.\n\nV. Dictionnaire Francais Latin Chinois, par Paul Perny\n(Didot Freres, Paris, 1869)\u00a0; where the five cardinal virtues\n(-ft, 1^\") are transliterated\u00a0: ou clistng. V. also\u00a0: A Syllabic\nDictionary of the Chinese Language\u00a0; by S. Wells Williams,\nLL.B. (Shanghai: 1874); where Sin (Sin), i.e., humanity.\nlove of one's neighbour, is written Sin'. (Translator.}\n\n2 The Athenians have an altar in their Agora to Compassion\u00a0;\n\nTHE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 235\n\nLucianalso mentions (his altar in the Timon, 99. 1 A\nphrase of Phocion, preserved by Stobaeus, describes\nCompassion as the most sacred thing in human life\u00a0:\novre eg iepov {3a)/ji6v, ovre etc rf)<; avOpwirivrjs (^ucreo)?\na^aipereov rov eA,eov. 2 In the Sapientia Indorum,\nthe Greek translation of the Panca-tantra, we read\n(Section 3, p. 220)\u00a0: Aeyerat, yap, o>9 Trpcorrj rwv\naperwv 77 eXe^/uocruj/T;. 3 It is clear, then, that the\nreal source of morality has been distinctly recog-\nnised at all times and in all countries\u00a0; Europe\nalone excepted, owing to ihefoetor Judaicus (Jewish\nstench), which here pervades everything, and is\nthe reason why the Western races require for the\nobject of their obedience a command of duty, a moral\nlaw, an imperative, in short, an order and decree.\nThey remain wedded to this habit of thought, and\n\nfor this deity, they believe, is of all the gods the most helpful\nin human life, and its vicissitudes. They are the only Greeks\nwho have instituted this cultus. (Translator.)\n\n1 V. Lucian, Timon, chap. 42 (Ausgewahlte Schriften des\nLiician, edit. Julius Sommerbrodt\u00a0; Weidmann, Berlin, 1872,\n\np. 75)\u00a0: (f)i\\os 8e ^ f-evos f) tralpos rj 'EXe'ou /3o>/u6s vGXos nd\\vs.\n\nV. also Apollodorus (edit. J. Bekker)\u00a0; 2, 8, 1. 3, 7, 1. Dem.\n(edit. Keisk.), 57. Scholiast on Soph. Oed. Col., 258.\n(Translator.)\n\n3 A temple must not be despoiled of its altar, nor human\nnature of compassion. V. Joannis Stobaei Anthologium,\nedit. Curtius Wachsmuth et Otto Hense\u00a0; Weidmann, Berlin,\n1894\u00a0; Vol. III., p. 20, Nr. 52. (Translator.)\n\n3 The chief of virtues is said to be Compassion. The Panca-\ntantra is a well-known collection of moral stories and fables\nin five (pan6ari) books or chapters (tantra), from which the\nauthor of the Hitopade'sa drew a large portion of his materials.\nV. Monier Williams' Sanskrit Dictionary. (Translator.)\n\n236 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nrefuse to open their eyes to the fact that such a view\nis, after all, based upon nothing but Egosim. Of\ncourse, now and then, isolated individuals of fine\nperception have felt the truth, and given it utterance\u00a0:\nsuch a one was Rousseau\u00a0; and such, Lessing. In a\nletter written by the latter in 1756 we read\u00a0: \" The\nbest man, and the one most likely to excel in all\nsocial virtues, in all forms of magnanimity, is he\nwho is most compassionate.\"\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER.\n\nTHERE still remains a question to be resolved, before\nthe basis which I have given to Ethics can be\npresented in all its completeness. It is this. On\nwhat does the great difference in the moral behaviour\nof men rest\u00a0? If Compassion be the original incentive\nof all true, that is, disinterested justice and loving-\nkindness\u00a0; how comes it that some are, while others\nare not, influenced thereby\u00a0? Are we to suppose\nthat Ethics, which discloses the moral stimulus, is\nalso capable of setting it in motion\u00a0? Can Ethics\nfashion the hard-hearted man anew, so that he be-\ncomes compassionate, and, as a consequence, just\nand humane\u00a0? Certainly not. The difference of\ncharacter is innate, and ineradicable. The wicked\nman is born with his wickedness as much as the\nserpent is with its poison-fangs and glands, nor can\nthe former change his nature a whit more than the\nlatter. 1 Velle non discitur (to use one's will is\nnot a thing that can be taught) is a saying of Nero's\ntutor. In the Meno, Plato minutely investigates\n\n1 Of- Jeremiah xiii. 23. (Translator.)\n237\n\n238 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nthe nature of virtue, and inquires whether it can,\nor cannot, be taught. He quotes a passage from\nTheonis\u00a0:\n\ndXXa 8i\nQviroTf TToi^trfis TOV KaKov v(Ti, ovre SiBaKTOv. d\\\\a Oeia pot pa Trapayvyvoaewri,\navev vov, ol? av TrapayiyvrjTat. 1 Here the terms\n(frvaei, and Oeia uotpa form a distinction, in my opinion,\nmuch the same as that between \" physical \" and\n\" metaphysical.\" Socrates, the father of Ethics, if\nwe may trust Aristotle, declared that OVK e r} ulv\nyevecrdai TO crTrovSaiov? elvai, rj varei TTW?' KOI jap 81/caioi, Kal (raxfrpoviKol,\n/cal rd\\\\a e^o/juev evdvf etc ^ej/err}?. 3 (Eth. Nicom.\nvi. 13.) We find also a similar conviction very decidedly\nexpressed in the fragments attributed to the Pytha-\n\n1 Virtue would appear not to come naturally (i.e., through\nthe physical order of things), nor can it be taught; but in\nwhomsoever it dwells, there it is present, apart from the\nintellect, under divine ordinance. [V. Platonis Opera, edit.\nDidot, Paris, 1856\u00a0; Vol. I. Meno, 96 and 99, ad fin\n(Translator.}]\n\n2 It is not in our power to be either good or bad.\n\n3 For it appears that the different characters of all men\nare in some way implanted in them by nature\u00a0; if we are just,\nand temperate, and otherwise virtuous, we are so straightway\nfrom our birth.\n\nON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 239\n\ngorean Archytas, and preserved by Stobaeus in the\nFlorilegium (Chap. i. 77). 1 If not authentic, they are\ncertainly very old. Orelli gives them in his Opuscula\nGraecorum Sententiosa et Moralia. There (Vol. II.,\np. 240) we read in the Dorian dialect as follows\u00a0:\nTa? yap \\6yois teal aTroSei^eaiv TroTt^pto^eva? dpera?\nSeov eTTtcrrttyLta? TTorayopevev, aperav Se, rav r/Oticav /cat\n\nav Kal iroioL rti/65 rj^iev \\y6/j,eOa Kara TO rjdos, olov\ne\\v6epioi, SUatoi Kal o-w^poye?. 2 On examining the\nvirtues and vices, as summarised by Aristotle in the De\nVirtutibus et Vitiis, it will be found that all of them,\nwithout exception, are not properly thinkable unless\nassumed to be inborn qualities, and that only as such\ncan they be genuine. If, in consequence of reasoned\nreflection, we take them as voluntary, they are then\nseen to lose their reality, and pass into the region\nof empty forms\u00a0; whence it immediately follows that\ntheir permanence and resistance under the storm\nand stress of circumstance could not be counted\non. And the same is true of the virtue of loving-\nkindness, of which Aristotle, in common with all\nthe ancients, knows nothing. Montaigne keeps, of\ncourse, his sceptical tone, but he practically agrees\n\n1 V. Joannis Stobaei Florilegium, edit. Meineke, publ.\nLipsiae, Teubner, 1855\u00a0; Vol. I., p. 33, 1. 14, sqq. (Translator.')\n\n2 For the so-called virtues, that require reasoning and demon-\nstration, ought to be called sciences. By the term \" virtue \"\nwe mean rather a certain moral and excellent disposition of\nthe soil's unreasoning part. This disposition determines the\ncharacter which we show, and in accordance with which we\nare called generous, just, or temperate.\n\n240 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nwith the venerable authorities above quoted, when\nhe says\u00a0: Serait-il vrai, que pour etre bon tout a\nfait, il nous le faille fare par occulte, naturelle et\nuniverselle propriete, sans lot, sans raison, sans\nexemple? 1 (Liv. IL, chap. 11.) Lichtenberg hits\nthe mark exactly in his Vermischte Schriften, (v.\nMoralische Bermerkungeri). He writes\u00a0: \" All virtue\narising from premeditation is not worth much.\nWhat is wanted is feeling or habit.\" Lastly,\nit should be noted that Christianity itself, in its\noriginal teaching, recognises, and bears witness to\nthis inherent, immutable difference between character\nand character. In the Sermon on the Mount we\nfind the allegory of the fruit which is determined\nby the nature of the tree that bears it (Luke\nvi. 43, 44\u00a0; cf. Matthew vii. 16-18)\u00a0; and then in\nthe following verse (Luke vi. 45), we read\u00a0: 6 dyadbs\navdpa)7ro<> K TOV ajaSov drjcravpov TT}? KapStoG avrov\nirpofyepei TO a