{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Part_IV/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Part_IV","id":"wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Part_IV","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Basis_of_Morality/Part_IV","summary":null,"tags":["Pages_with_translator","Subpages"],"text":"part IV.\n\nON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANA-\nTION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL\nPHAENOMENON.\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nHOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD.\n\nIN the foregoing pages the moral incentive (Com-\npassion) has been established as a fact, and I have\nshown that from it alone can proceed unselfish justice\nand genuine loving-kindness, and that on these two\ncardinal virtues all the rest depend. Now, for the\npurpose of supplying Ethics with a foundation, this\nis sufficient, in a certain sense\u00a0; that is, in so far\nas Moral Science necessarily requires to be supported\nby some actual and demonstrable basis, whether\nexisting in the external world, or in the consciousness.\nThe only alternative is to tread in the footsteps that\nso many of my predecessors have left, in other words,\nto choose arbitrarily some proposition or other, some\nbare and abstract formula and make it the source\nof all that morality prescribes\u00a0; or, like Kant, to\nsublimate a mere idea, that of law, into the key-stone\nof the ethical arch. But, dismissing this method\nfor the reasons discussed above, in the Second Part,\nthe investigation proposed by the Royal Society\nappears to me now completed. For their question,\nas it stands, deals only with the foundation of Ethics\u00a0;\nas to a possible metaphysical explanation of this\nfoundation nothing whatever is asked. Nevertheless,\n\n257 17\n\n258 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nat the point we have reached, I am very sensible\nthat the human spirit can find no abiding satisfaction,\nno real repose. As in all branches of practical\nresearch, so also in Ethical Science, when all is\nsaid, man is inevitably confronted with an ultimate\nphaenomenon, which while it renders an account of\neverything that it includes, and everything deduc-\nible from it, remains itself an unexplained riddle.\nSo that here, as elsewhere, the want is felt of a\nfinal interpretation (which, obviously, cannot but be\nmetaphysical) of the ultimate data, as such, and\nthrough these, if they be taken in their entirety\nof the world. And here, too, this want finds utterance\nin the question\u00a0: How is it that, what is present to\nour senses, and grasped by our intellect, is as it is,\nand not otherwise\u00a0? And how does the character\nof the phaenomenon, as manifest to us, shape itself\nout of the essential nature of things\u00a0? Indeed, in\nMoral Science the need of a metaphysical basis is\nmore urgent than in any other, because all systems,\nphilosophical no less than religious, are at one in\npersistently attaching to conduct not only an ethical,\nbut also a metaphysical significance, which, passing\nbeyond the mere appearance of things, transcends\nevery possibility of experience, and therefore stands\nin the closest connection with human destiny and\nwith the whole cosmic process. For if life (it is\naverred) have a meaning, then the supreme goal\nto which it points is undoubtedly ethical. Nor is\nthis view a bare unsupported theory\u00a0; it is sufficiently\nestablished by the undeniable fact that, as death\ndraws nigh, the thoughts of each individual assume\n\nHOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 259\n\na moral trend, equally whether he be credulous of\nreligious dogmas, or not\u00a0; he is manifestly anxious\nto wind up the affairs of his life, now verging to\nits end, entirely from the moral standpoint. In\nthis particular the testimony of the ancients is of\nspecial value, standing, as they do, outside the pale\nof Christian influence. I shall therefore here quote\na remarkable passage preserved by Stobaeus, in his\nFlorilegium (chap. 44, . 20). It has been attri-\nbuted to the earliest Hellenic lawgiver, Zaleucus,\nthough, according to Bentley and Heyne, its source\nis Pythagorean. The language is graphic and un-\nmistakable. Ael ri6eo-6ai Trpb o/uLfj,dra)v rov icaipbv\nrourov, ev d> <ylyvrai rb reXo9 e/cacrrw T\nrov r)z>. TlaaL yap e/j,7ri7rrei, fjt,era[jie\\eia rots\nre\\evrdv, fiefj-vrjuevo^ &v r)$i,Kr)Kacri, teal opftr) rov\nf3ov\\eo-0ai rcavra TrtTrpayQai StKaltoS aurofc. 1\n\nFurthermore, to come to an historical personage,\nwe find Pericles, on his death-bed, unwilling to\nhear anything about his great achievements, and\nonly anxious to know that he had never brought\ntrouble on a citizen. (Plutarch, Life of Pericles.)\nTurning to modern times, if a very different case\nmay be placed beside the preceding, I remember\nhaving noticed in a report of depositions made\n\n1 We ought to realise as if before our eyes that moment\nof time when the end comes to each one for deliverance from\nliving. Because all who are about to die are seized with\nrepentance, remembering, as they do, their unjust deeds, and\nbeing filled with the wish that they had always acted justly.\n'ATraXAayrj = Erlosung. V. Joannes Stobeaus, Florilegium,\nedit. Meineke\u00a0; publ. Lipsiae\u00a0: Teubner, 1855. Vol. ii., p.\n164, 1. 7 sqq. (Translator.)\n\n260 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nbefore an English jury the following occurrence. A\nrough negro lad, fifteen years old, had been mortally\ninjured in some brawl on board a ship. As he was\ndying, he eagerly begged that all his companions\nmight be fetched in haste\u00a0: he wanted to ask if he\nhad ever vexed or insulted any one of them, and\nafter hearing that he had not, his mind appeared\ngreatly relieved. It is indeed the uniform teaching\nof experience that those near death wish to be\nreconciled with every one before they pass away.\n\nBut there is evidence of another kind that Ethics\ncan only be finally explained by Metaphysics. It is\nwell known that, while the author of an intellectual\nperformance, even should it be a supreme master-\npiece is quite willing to take whatever remuneration\nhe can get, those, on the other hand, who have done\nsomething morally excellent, almost without exception,\nrefuse compensation for it. The latter fact is specially\nobservable where conduct rises to the heroic. For\ninstance, when a man at the risk of his life has\nsaved another, or perhaps many, from destruction, as\na rule, he simply declines all reward, poor though\nhe may be\u00a0; because he instinctively feels that the\nmetaphysical value of his act would be thereby\nimpaired. At the end of Burger's song, \" The Brave\nMan,\" we find a poetical presentment of this psycho-\nlogical process. Nor does the reality, for the most\npart, differ at all from the ideal, as I have frequently\nnoticed in English papers. Conduct of this kind\noccurs in evefy part of the world, and independently\nof all religious differences. In human beings there is\nan undeniable ethical tendency, rooted (however uncon-\n\nHOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 261\n\nsciously) in Metaphysics, and without an explanation\nof life on these lines, no religion could gain standing-\nground\u00a0; for it is by virtue of their ethical side that\nthey all alike keep their hold on the mind. Every\nreligion makes its body of dogmas the basis of the\nmoral incentive which each man feels, but which he\ndoes not, on that account, understand\u00a0; and it unites\nthe two so closely, that they appear to be inseparable.\nIndeed the priests take special pains to proclaim\nunbelief and immorality as one and the same thing.\nThe reason is thus apparent, why believers regard\nunbelievers as identical with the vicious, and why ex-\npressions such as \"godless,\" \"atheistic,\" \"unchristian,\"\n\" heretic,\" etc., are used as synonymes for moral\ndepravity. The religions have, in fact, a sufficiently\neasy task. Faith is the principle they start from.\nHence they are in a position to simply insist on\nits application to their dogmas, and this, even to\nthe point of employing threats. But philosophy\nhas no such convenient instrument ready to hand. If\nthe different systems be examined, it will be found\nthat the situation is beset with difficulties, both as\nregards the foundation to be provided for Ethics, and\nin relation to the point of connection discoverable in.\nany such foundation with the given metaphysical theory.\nAnd yet, as I have emphasised in the introduction,\nwith an appeal to the authority of Wolff and Kant\nwe are under the stringent necessity of obtaining\nfrom Metaphysics a support for Moral Science.\n\nNow, of all the problems that the human intellect\nhas to grapple with, that of Metaphysics is by far\nthe hardest\u00a0; so much so that it is regarded by many\n\n262 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nthinkers as absolutely insoluble. Apart from this,\nin the present case, I labour under the special dis-\nadvantage which the form of a detached monograph\ninvolves. In other words, I am not at liberty to start\nfrom some definite metaphysical system, of which I\nmay be an adherent\u00a0; because, if I did, either it would\nhave to be expounded in detail, which would take\ntoo much space\u00a0; or else there would be the necessity\nof supposing it granted and unquestioned, an exceed-\ningly precarious proceeding. The consequence is that\nI am as little able to use the synthetic method here\nas in the foregoing Part. Analysis alone is possible\u00a0:\nthat is, I must work backwards from the effects\nto their cause, and not vice versd. This stern obliga-\ntion, however, of having at the outset no previous\nhypothesis, no standpoint other than the commonly\naccepted one, made the discovery of the ethical basis\nso laborious that, as I look back upon the task, I\nseem to have accomplished some wondrous feat of\ndexterity, not unlike that of a man who executes with\nsubtlest skill in mid air what otherwise is only done\non a solid support. But now that we have come to\nthe question whether there can be given a metaphysical\nexplanation of the foundation obtained, the difficulty\nof proceeding without any assumption becomes so\nenormous, that but one course appears to me open,\nnamely, to attempt nothing beyond a general sketch\nof the subject. I shall, therefore, indicate rather\nthan elaborate the line of thought\u00a0: I shall point\nout the way leading to the goal, but not follow it\nthither\u00a0; in short, I shall present but a very small\npart of what, under other circumstances, could be\n\nHOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 263\n\nadduced. In adopting this attitude for the reasons\nstated, I wish, before beginning, to emphatically\nremark, that in any case the actual problem put for-\nward has now been solved\u00a0; consequently, that what\nI here add is an opus supererogationis, an appendix\nto be given and taken entirely at will.\n\nCHAPTER II;\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWOEK.\n\nSo far all our steps have been supported by the firm\nrock of experience. But at this point it fails us, and\nthe solid earth sinks from under our feet, as we\npress forward in our search after a final theoretical\nsatisfaction, there, where no experience can ever by\nany possibility penetrate\u00a0; and happy shall we be,\nif perchance we gain one hint, one transient gleam,\nthat may bring us a certain measure of content.\nWhat, however, shall not desert us is the honesty\nthat has hitherto attended our procedure. We shall\nnot make shift with dreams, and serve up fairy tales,\nafter the fashion of the so-called post-Kantian\nphilosophers\u00a0; nor shall we, like them, seek, by a\nwordy exuberance, to impose upon the reader, arid\ncast dust in his eyes. A little is all we promise\u00a0;\nbut that little will be presented in perfect sincerity.\n\nThe principle, which we discovered to be the final\nexplanation of Ethics, now in turn itself requires\nexplaining\u00a0; so that our present problem has to deal\nwith that natural Compassion, which in every man\nis innate and indestructible, and which has been\nshown to be the sole source of non-egoistic conduct,\nthis kind alone being of real moral worth. Now\n\n264\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 265\n\nmany modern thinkers treat the conceptions of Good\nand Bad as simple, that is, as neither needing, nor\nadmitting any elucidation, and then they go on, for\nthe most part, to talk very mysteriously and devoutly\nof an \" Idea of the Good,\" out of which they make\na pedestal for their moral system, or at least a cloak\nfor their poverty. 1 Hence I am obliged in this\nconnection to point out parenthetically, that these\nconceptions are anything but simple, much less a\npriori\u00a0; that they in fact express a relation, and are\nderived from the commonest daily experience. What-\never is in conformity with the desires of any individual\nwill, is, relatively to it, termed good\u00a0; for instance,\ngood food, good roads, a good omen\u00a0; the contrary is\ncalled bad, and, in the case of living beings, malicious.\nAnd so one, who by virtue of his character, has no\nwish to oppose what others strive after, but rather,\nas far as he reasonably may, shows himself favourable\nand helpful to them\u00a0; one, who, instead of injuring,\nassists his neighbours, and promotes their interests,\nwhen he can\u00a0; is named by the latter, in respect to\nthemselves, a good man\u00a0; the term good being applied\nto him in the sense of the above definition, and from\n-their own point of view, which is thus relative,\n\n1 The conception of the Good, in its purity, is an ultimate\none, \" an absolute Idea, whose substance loses itself in\ninfinity.\" (Bouterweck\u00a0: Praktische Apkorismen, p. 54.)\n\nIt is obvious that this writer would like to transform the\nfamiliar, nay, trivial conception \" Good \" into a sort of AtiVtr*;?,\nto be set up as an idol in his temple. [AuVrerjfs- lit., \" fallen\nfrom Zeus \"\u00a0; and so \" heaven-sent,\" \" a thing of divine origin.\"\nOf. Horn., II. XVI., 174\u00a0; Od. IV. 477. Eur., Bacch., 1268.\n(Translator.)]\n\n266 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nempirical, and centred in the passive subject. Now,\nif we examine the nature of such a man, not only\nas it affects others, but as it is in itself, we are\nenabled by the foregoing exposition to perceive that\nthe virtues of justice and loving-kindness, which he\npractises, are due to a direct participation in weal\nand woe external to himself\u00a0; and we have learnt\nthat the source of such participation is Compassion.\nIf, further, we pause to consider what is the essential\npart in this type of character, we shall certainly find\nit to lie in the fact that such a person draws less dis-\ntinction between himself and others than is usually done.\nIn the eyes of the malicious individual this\ndifference is so great that he takes direct delight\nin the spectacle of suffering, a delight, which he\naccordingly seeks without thought of any other benefit\nto himself, nay, sometimes, even to his own hurt.\nFrom the egoist's point of view the same difference is\nstill large enough to make him bring much trouble on\nhis neighbours, in order to obtain a small personal\nadvantage. Hence for both of these, between the\nego, which is limited to their own persons, and the\nnon-ego, which includes all the rest of the world,\nthere is fixed a great gulf, a mighty abyss\u00a0: Pereat\nmunduSj dum ego salvus sim (the world may perish,\nprovided I be safe), is their maxim. For the good\nman, on the contrary, this distinction is by no means\nso pronounced\u00a0; indeed, in the case of magnanimous\ndeeds, it appears to become a vanishing quantity, be-\ncause then the weal of another is advanced at the cost\nof the benefactor, the self of another placed on an\nequality with his own. And when it is a question of\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 267\n\nsaving a number of fellow-beings, total self-obliteration\nmay be developed, the one giving his life for many.\n\nThe inquiry now presents itself, whether the latter\nway of looking at the relation subsisting between\nthe ego and the non-ego, which forms the mainspring\nof a good man's conduct, is mistaken and due to an\nillusion\u00a0; or whether the error does not rather attach\nto the opposite view, on which Egoism and Malice\nare based.\n\nNo doubt the theory lying at the root of Egoism\nis, from the empirical standpoint, perfectly justified.\nFrom the testimony of experience, the distinction\nbetween one's own person and that of another appears\nto be absolute. I do not occupy the same space as\nmy neighbour, and this difference, which separates\nme from him physically, separates me also from his\nweal and woe. But in the first place, it should be\nobserved that the knowledge we have of our own\nselves is by no means exhaustive and transparent to\nits depths. By means of the intuition, which the\nbrain constructs out of the data supplied by the\nsenses, that is to say, in an indirect manner, we\nrecognise our body as an object in space\u00a0; through\nan inward perception, we are aware of the continuous\nseries of our desires, of our volitions, which arise\nthrough the agency of external motives\u00a0; and finally,\nwe come to discern the manifold movements, now\nstronger, now weaker, of our will itself, to which\nall feelings from within are ultimately traceable.\nAnd that is all\u00a0: for the perceiving faculty is not in\nits turn perceived. On the contrary, the real sub-\nstratum of our whole phaenomenal nature, our inmost\n\n268 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nessence in itself, that which wills and perceives, is\nnot accessible to us. We see only the outward side\nof the ego\u00a0; its inward part is veiled in darkness.\nConsequently, the knowledge we possess of ourselves\nis in no sort radical and complete, but rather very\nsuperficial. The larger and more important part of\nour being remains unknown, and forms a riddle to\nspeculate about\u00a0; or, as Kant puts it\u00a0: \" The ego\nknows itself only as a phaenomenon\u00a0; of its real\nessence, whatever that may be, it has no knowledge.\"\nNow, as regards that side of the self which falls\nwithin our ken, we are, undoubtedly, sharply dis-\ntinguished, each from the other\u00a0; but it does not\nfollow therefrom that the same is true of the re-\nmainder, which, shrouded in impenetrable obscurity,\nis yet, in fact, the very substance of which we consist.\nThere remains at least the possibility that the latter\nis in all men uniform and identical.\n\nWhat is the explanation of all plurality, of all\nnumerical diversity of existence\u00a0? Time and Space.\nIndeed it is only through the latter that the former\nis possible\u00a0: because the concept \" many \" inevitably\nconnotes the idea either of succession (time), or of\nrelative position (space). Now, since a homogeneous\nplurality is composed of Individuals, I call Space and\nTime, as being the conditions of multiplicity, the\nprincipium individuationis (the principle of individua-\ntion)\u00a0; and I do not here pause to consider whether this\nexpression was exactly so employed by the Schoolmen.\n\nIf in the disclosures which Kant's wonderful\nacumen gave to the world there is anything true\nbeyond the shadow of a doubt, this is to be found\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 269\n\nin the Transcendental Aesthetics, that is to say,\nin his doctrine of the ideality of Space and Time.\nOn such solid foundations is the structure built that\nno one has been able to raise even an apparent\nobjection. It is Kant's triumph, and belongs to\nthe very small number of metaphysical theories which\nmay be regarded as really proved, and as actual\nconquests in that field of research. It teaches us\nthat Space and Time are the forms of our own\nfaculty of intuition, to which they consequently\nbelong, and not to the objects thereby perceived\u00a0;\nand further, that they can in no way be a condition\nof things in themselves, but rather attach only to\ntheir mode of appearing, such as is alone possible\nfor us who have a consciousness of the external\nworld determined by strictly physiological limits.\nNow, if to the Thing in itself, that is, to the Reality\nunderlying the kosmos, as we perceive it, Time and\nSpace are foreign\u00a0; so also must multiplicity be.\nConsequently that which is objectivated in the count-\nless phaenomena of this world of the senses cannot\nbut be a unity, a single indivisible entity, manifested\nin each and all of them. And conversely, the web\nof plurality, woven in the loom of Time and Space,\nis not the Thing in itself, but only its appearance-\nform. Externally to the thinking subject, this appear-\nance-form, as such, has no existence\u00a0; it is merely\nan attribute of our consciousness, bounded, as the\nlatter is, by manifold conditions, indeed, depending\non an organic function.\n\nThe view of things as above stated, that all\nplurality is only apparent, that in the endless series\n\n270 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nof individuals, passing simultaneously and successively\ninto and out of life, generation after generation,\nage after age, there is but one and the same entity\nreally existing, which is present and identical in all\nalike\u00a0; this theory, I say, was of course known\nlong before Kant\u00a0; indeed, it may be carried back\nto the remotest antiquity. It is the alpha and\nomega of the oldest book in the world, the sacred\nVedas, whose dogmatic part, or rather esoteric\nteaching, is found in the Upanishads. 1 There, in\nalmost every page this profound doctrine lies\n\n1 The genineness of the Oupnek'hat has been disputed on\nthe ground of certain marginal glosses which were added by\nMohammedan copyists, and then interpolated in the text.\nIt has, however, been fully established by the Sanskrit scholar,\nF. H. H. Windischmann (junior) in his Sancara, sive de\nTheologumenis Vedanticorum, 1833, p. xix\u00a0; and also by\nItochinger in his book De la Vie Contemplative chez les\nIndous, 1831, p. 12. The reader though ignorant of Sanskrit,\nmay yet convince himself that Anquetil Duperron's word\nfor word Latin translation of the Persian version of the\nUpanishads made by the martyr of this creed, the Sultan\nDara-Shukoh, is based on a thorough and exact knowledge\nof the language. He has only to compare it with recent\ntranslations of some of the Upanishads by Rammohun Koy,\nby Poley, and especially with that of Colebrooke, as also\nwith Roer's, (the latest). These writers are obviously\ngroping in obscurity, and driven to make shift with hazy\nconjectures, so that without doubt their work is much less\naccurate. More will be found on this subject in Vol. II. of\nthe Parerga, chap. 16, 184. [V. The Upanishads, translated\nby Max Muller, in The Sacred Books of the East, Vols. I. and\nXV. Of. also Max Muller, The Science of Language, Vol. I.,\np. 171. Now that an adequate translation of the original\nexists, the Oupnek'hat has only an historical interest.\nThe value which Schopenhauer attached to the Upanishads\nis very clearly expressed also in the Welt als Wille and\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 271\n\nenshrined\u00a0; with tireless repetition, in countless\nadaptations, by many varied parables and similes\nit is expounded and inculcated. That such was, more-\nover, the fount whence Pythagoras drew his wisdom,\ncannot be doubted, despite the scanty knowledge we\npossess of what he taught. That it formed practically\nthe central point in the whole philosophy of the\nEleatic School, is likewise a familiar fact. Later\non, the New Platonists were steeped in the same,\none of their chief tenets being\u00a0: Sia ryv evortjTa\nairdvrwv Tracra? -^vya? piav elvai. (All souls are\none, because all things form a unity.) In the ninth\ncentury we find it unexpectedly appearing in Europe.\nIt kindles the spirit of no less a divine than Johannes\nScotus Erigena, who endeavours to clothe it with the\nforms and terminology of the Christian religion.\nAmong the Mohammedans we detect it again in the\nrapt mysticism of the Sufi. 1 In the West Giordano\nBruno cannot resist the impulse to utter it aloud\u00a0;\nbut his reward is a death of shame and torture.\nAnd at the same time we find the Christian Mystics\nlosing themselves in it, against their own will and\n\nVorstellung, Preface to the first Edition\u00a0; and in the Parerga,\nII., chap, xvi., 184. (Translator.)]\n\n1 For the Sufi, more correctly S u f I y a sect which ap-\npeared already in the first century of the Hijrah, the reader is\nreferred to\u00a0: Tholuck's Bliithensammlung am der Morgen-\nlandischen Mystik (Berlin, 1825)\u00a0; Tholuck's S-dfismits, sive\nTheosvphia Persarum Pantheistica (Berlin, 1821); Kremer's\nOeschichte der Herrschenden Ideen des Isldms (Leipzig, 1868)\u00a0;\nPalmer's Oriental Mysticism (London, 1867)\u00a0; Gobineau's Les\nReligions et les Philosophies dans VAsie Centrale (2nd edit.\nParis, 1866)\u00a0; A Dictionary of Islam, by T. P. Hughes (London,\n1885), p. 608 sqq. (Translator.)\n\n272 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nintention, whenever and wherever we read of them 1 l\nSpinoza's name is identified with it. Lastly, in onr own\ndays, after Kant had annihilated the old dogmatism,\nand the world stood aghast at its smoking ruins,\nthe same teaching was revived in Schelling's eclectic\nphilosophy. The latter took all the systems of\nPlotinus, Spinoza, Kant, and Jacob Boehm, and\nmixing them together with the results of modern\nNatural Science, speedily served up a dish sufficient\nto satisfy for the moment the pressing needs of his\ncontemporaries\u00a0; and then proceeded to perform a\nseries of variations on the original theme. The con-\nsequence is that in the learned circles of Germany\nthis line of thought has come to be generally ac-\ncepted\u00a0; indeed even among people of ordinary educa-\ntion, it is almost universally diffused. 2 A solitary\nexception is formed by the University philosophers\nof the present day. They have the hard task of\nfighting what is called Pantheism. Being brought\n\n1 This is too well-known to need verification by references.\nThe Gantico del Sole by St. Francis of Assisi sounds almost like\na passage from the Upanishadsor the Bhagavadgit3.\n(Translator.)\n\n2 Onpeut assez long temps, chez notre espece,\nFermer la porte a la Raison.\n\nMais, des qu'elle entre avec adresse,\nElle reste dans la maison,\n\nEt bientot die en est maltresse.\n\n(Voltaire.)\n\n(We men may, doubtless, all our lives\n\nTo Reason bar the door.\nBut if to enter she contrives,\n\nThe house she leaves no more,\nAnd soon as mistress there presides.)\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 273\n\nthrough the stress of battle into great embarrassment\nand difficulty, they anxiously catch now at the most\npitiful sophisms, now at phrases of choicest bombast,\nso only they may patch together some sort of re-\nspectable disguise, wherein to dress up the favourite\npetticoat Philosophy, that has duly received official\nsanction. In a word, the *Ev teal -rrav l has been in\nall ages the laughing-stock of fools, for the wise a\nsubject of perpetual meditation. Nevertheless, the\nstrict demonstration of this theory is only to be\nobtained from the Kantian teaching, as I have just\nshown. Kant himself did not carry it out\u00a0; after\nthe fashion of clever orators, he only gave the\npremises, leaving to his hearers the pleasure of\ndrawing the conclusion.\n\nNow if plurality and difference belong only to the\nappearance-form; if there is but one and the same\nEntity manifested in all living things\u00a0: it follows that,\nwhen we obliterate the distinction between the ego\nand the non-ego, we are not the sport of an illusion.\nRather are we so, when we maintain the reality of\ninclividuation, a thing the Hindus call Maya, 2 that\nis, a deceptive vision, a phantasma. The former\ntheory we have found to be the actual source of the\nphaenomenon of Compassion\u00a0; indeed Compassion is\nnothing but its translation into definite expression.\nThis, therefore, is what I should regard as the\nmetaphysical foundation of Ethics, and should describe\n\n1 To tV = the eternal Reality outside Time and Space\nTo ivav = the phaenomenal universe. (Translator.)\n\n3 May is \" the delusive reflection of the true eternal\nEntity.\" (Translator.)\n\n18\n\n274 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nit as the sense which identifies the ego with the\nnon-ego, so that the individual directly recognises\nin another his own self, his true and very being.\nFrom this standpoint the profoundest teaching of\ntheory pushed to its furthest limits may be shown\nin the end to harmonise perfectly with the rules\nof justice and loving-kindness, as exercised\u00a0; and\nconversely, it will be clear that practical philosophers,\nthat is, the upright, the beneficent, the magnanimous,\ndo but declare through their acts the same truth\nas the man of speculation wins by laborious research,\nby the loftiest flights of intellect. Meanwhile moral\nexcellence stands higher than all theoretical sapience.\nThe latter is at best nothing but a very unfinished\nand partial structure, and only by the circuitous path\nof reasoning attains the goal which the former reaches\nin one step. He who is morally noble, however\ndeficient in mental penetration, reveals by his conduct\nthe deepest insight, the truest wisdom\u00a0; and puts to\nshame the most accomplished and learned genius, if the\nlatter's acts betray that his heart is yet a stranger to\nthis great principle, the metaphysical unity of life.\n\n\" Individuation is real. The principium individua-\ntioniSj with the consequent distinction of individuals,\nis the order of things in themselves. Each living\nunit is an entity radically different from all others.\nIn my own self alone I have my true being\u00a0; every-\nthing outside it belongs to the non-ego, and is foreign\nto me.\" This is the creed to the truth of which flesh\nand bone bear witness\u00a0: which is at the root of all\negoism, and which finds its objective expression in\nevery loveless, unjust, or malicious act.\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. \"275\n\n\" Individuation is merely an appearance, born of\nSpace and Time\u00a0; the latter being nothing else than\nthe forms under which the external world necessarily\nmanifests itself to me, conditioned as they are by\nmy brain's faculty of perception. Hence also the\nplurality and diiference of individuals is but a\nphaenomenon, that is, exists only as my mental\npicture. My true inmost being subsists in every\nliving thing, just as really, as directly as in my own\nconsciousness it is evidenced only to myself.\"\nThis is the higher knowledge\u00a0: for which there is\nin Sanskrit the standing formula, tat tvam asi, \" that\nart thou.\" 1 Out of the depths of human nature it\nwells up in the shape of Compassion, and is therefore\nthe source of all genuine, that is, disinterested\nvirtue, being, so to say, incarnate in every good\ndeed. It is this which in the last resort is invoked,\nwhenever we appeal to gentleness, to loving-kindness\u00a0;\nwhenever we pray for mercy instead of justice. For\nsuch appeal, such prayer is in reality the effort to re-\nmind a fellow-being of the ultimate truth that we are\nall one and the same entity. On the other hand,\nEgoism and its derivatives, envy, hatred, the spirit of\npersecution, hardness of heart, revenge, pleasure at the\nsight of suffering, and cruelty, all claim support from\nthe other view of things, and seek their justification in\nit. The emotion and joy we experience when we hear\nof, still more, when we see, and most of all, when\n\n1 This expression is used in the Brahmanical philosophy\nto denote the relation between the world-fiction as a whole\nand its individualised parts. V. A. E. Gough, Philosophy of\nthe Upanishads, 1882. (Translator.)\n\n276 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nwe ourselves do, a noble act, are at bottom traceable\nto the feeling of certainty such a deed gives, that,\nbeyond all plurality and distinction of individuals,\nwhich the principium individuationis, like a kaleido-\nscope, shows us in ever-shifting evanescent forms,\nthere is an underlying unity, not only truly existing,\nbut actually accessible to us\u00a0; for lo\u00a0! in tangible,\nobjective form, it stands before our sight.\n\nOf these two mental attitudes, according as the\none or the other is adopted, so the </u?ua (Love) or the\nveiKos (Hatred) of Empedocles appears between man\nand man. If any one, who is animated by z/et/co?, could\nforcibly break in upon his most detested foe, and\ncompel him to lay bare the inmost recesses of his\nheart\u00a0; to his surprise, he would find again in the\nlatter his very self. For just as in dreams, all the\npersons that appear to us are but the masked images\nof ourselves\u00a0; so in the dream of our waking life, it\nis our own being which looks on us from out our\nneighbours' eyes, though this is not equally easy\nto discern. Nevertheless, tat tvam asi.\n\nThe preponderance of either mode of viewing life\nnot only determines single acts\u00a0; it shapes a man's\nwhole nature and temperament. Hence the radical\ndifference of mental habit between the good character\nand the bad. The latter feels everywhere that a\nthick wall of partition hedges him off from all others.\nFor him the world is an absolute non-ego, and his\nrelation to it an essentially hostile one\u00a0; consequently,\nthe key-note of his disposition is hatred, suspicion,\nenvy, and pleasure in seeing distress. The good\ncharacter, on the other hand, lives in an external\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 277\n\nworld homogeneous with his own being\u00a0; the rest of\nmankind is not in his eyes a non-ego\u00a0; he thinks of it\nrather as \" myself once more.\" He therefore stands\non an essentially amicable footing with every one\u00a0:\nhe is conscious of being, in his inmost nature, akin\nto the whole human race, 1 takes direct interest in\ntheir weal and woe, and confidently assumes in their\ncase the same interest in him. This is the source\nof his deep inward peace, and of that happy, calm,\ncontented manner, which goes out on those around\nhim, and is as the \"presence of a good diffused.\"\nWhereas the bad character in time of trouble has\nno trust in the help of his fellow-creatures. If he\ninvokes aid, he does so without confidence\u00a0: obtained,\nhe feels no real gratitude for it\u00a0; because he can\nhardly discern therein anything but the effect of\nothers' folly. For he is simply incapable of recognis-\ning his own self in some one else\u00a0; and this, even\nafter it has furnished the most incontestible signs\nof existence in that other person\u00a0: on which fact the\nrepulsive nature of all unthankfulness in reality de-\npends. The moral isolation, which thus naturally\nand inevitably encompasses the bad man, is often the\ncause of his becoming the victim of despair. The\ngood man, on the contrary, will appeal to his neigh-\nbours for assistance, with an assurance equal to the\nconsciousness he has of being ready himself to help\nthem. As I have said\u00a0: to the one type, humanity is\na non-ego\u00a0; to the other, \" myself once more.\" The\nmagnanimous character, who forgives his enemy,\n\n1 Homo sum\u00a0: humani nil a me alienum puto. Terence,\nHeaut., I. 1, 25. (Translator.')\n\n278 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nand returns good for evil, rises to the sublime, and\nreceives the highest meed of praise\u00a0; because he\nrecognises his real self even there where it is most\nconspicuously disowned.\n\nEvery purely beneficent act all help entirely and\ngenuinely unselfish, being, as such, exclusively inspired\nby another's distress, is, in fact, if we probe the\nmatter to the bottom, a dark enigma, a piece of\nmysticism put into practice\u00a0; inasmuch as it springs\nout of, and finds its only true explanation in, the\nsame higher knowledge that constitutes the essence\nof whatever is mystical.\n\nFor how, otherwise than metaphysically, are we\nto account for even the smallest offering of alms made\nwith absolutely no other object than that of lessening\nthe want which afflicts a fellow-creatare\u00a0? Such an\nact is only conceivable, only possible, in so far as\nthe giver knows that it is his very self which stands\nbefore him, clad in the garments of suffering\u00a0; in\nother words, so far as he recognises the essential part\nof his own being, under a form not his own. 1 It now\nbecomes apparent, why in the foregoing part I have\ncalled Compassion the great mystery of Ethics.\n\nHe, who goes to meet death for his fatherland, has\nfreed himself from the illusion which limits a man's\nexistence to his own person. Such a one has broken\nthe fetters of the principium individuationis. In his\n\n1 It is probable that many, perhaps, most cases of truly\ndisinterested Compassion when they really occur are due\nnot to any conscious knowledge of this sort, but to an\nunconscious impulse springing from the ultimate unity of all\nliving things, and acting, so to say, automatically. (Translator.)\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 279\n\nwidened, enlightened nature he embraces all his\ncountrymen, and in them lives on and on. Nay, he\nreaches forward to, and merges himself in the genera-\ntions yet unborn, for whom he works\u00a0; and he regards\ndeath as a wink of the eyelids, so momentary that\nit does not interrupt the sight.\n\nWe may here sum up the characteristics of the\ntwo human types above indicated. To the Egoist all\nother people are uniformly and intrinsically strangers.\nIn point of fact, he considers nothing to be truly real,\nexcept his own person, and regards the rest of man-\nkind practically as troops of phantoms, to whom he\nassigns merely a relative existence, so far as they\nmay be instruments to serve, or barriers to obstruct,\nhis purposes\u00a0; the result being an immeasurable differ-\nence, a vast gulf between Ms ego on the one side, and\nthe non-ego on the other. In a word, he lives ex-\nclusively centred in his own individuality, and on his\ndeath-day he sees all reality, indeed the whole world,\ncoming to an end along with himself. 1 Whereas the\nAltruist discerns in all other persons, nay, in every\nliving thing, his own entity, and feels therefore that\nhis being is commingled, is identical with the being\nof whatever is alive. By death he loses only a small\npart of himself. Putting off the narrow limitations\nof the individual, he passes into the larger life of all\nmankind, in whom he always recognised, and, recog-\nnising, loved, his very self; and the illusion of Time\nand Space, which separated his consciousness from\nthat of others, vanishes. These two opposite modes\n\n1 Cf. Richard Wagner\u00a0: Jesus von Nazareth\u00a0; pp. 79-90.\n(Translator.)\n\n280 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nof viewing the world are probably the chief, though\nnot indeed the sole cause of the difference we find\nbetween very good and exceptionally bad men, as to\nthe manner in which they meet their last hour.\n\nIn all ages Truth, poor thing, has been put to\nshame for being paradoxical\u00a0; and yet it is not her\nfault. She cannot assume the form of Error seated\non his throne of world-wide sovereignty. So then,\nwith a sigh, she looks up to her tutelary god,\nTime, who nods assurance to her of future victory and\nglory, but whose wings beat the air so slowly with\ntheir mighty strokes, that the individual perishes\nor ever the day of triumph be come. Hence I,\ntoo, am perfectly aware of the paradox which this\nmetaphysical explanation of the ultimate ethical\nphaenomenon must present to Western minds, accus-\ntomed, as they are, to very different methods of\nproviding Morals with a basis. Nevertheless, I cannot\noffer violence to the truth. All that is possible\nfor me to do, out of consideration for European\nblindness, is to assert once more, and demonstrate\nby actual quotation, that the Metaphysics of Ethics,\nwhich I have here suggested, was thousands of years\nago the fundamental principle of Indian wisdom.\nAnd to this wisdom I point back, as Copernicus did\nto the Pythagorean cosmic system, which was sup-\npressed by Aristotle and Ptolemaeus. In the\nBhagavadgita (Lectio XIII.\u00a0; 27, 28), according to\nA. W. von Schlegel's translation, we find the following\npassage\u00a0: Eundem in omnibus animantibus consis-\ntentem summum dominum, istis pereuntibus hand\npereuntem qui cernit, is vere cernit. Eundem vero\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 281\n\ncernens ubique praesentem dominum, non violat semet\nipsum sua ipsius culpa\u00a0: exinde pergit ad summum\niter. 1\n\nWith these hints towards the elaboration of a\nmetaphysical basis for Ethics I must close, although\nan important step still remains to be taken. The\nlatter would presuppose a further advance in Moral\nScience itself\u00a0; and this can hardly be made, because\nin the West the highest aim of Ethics is reached\nin the theory of justice and virtue. What lies\nbeyond is unknown, or at any rate ignored. The\nomission, therefore, is unavoidable\u00a0; and the reader\n\n1 That man is endowed with true insight who sees that the\nsame ruling power is inherent in all things, and that when\nthese perish, it perishes not. For if he discerns the same\nruling power everywhere present, he does not degrade himself\nby his own fault\u00a0: thence he passes to the highest path. For\nthe Ehagavadflitd the reader is referred to Vol. VIII. of The\nSacred Books of the East (Oxford\u00a0: Clarendon Press), where\n(p. 105) this passage is translated as follows\u00a0: \" He sees\n(truly) who sees the supreme lord abiding alike in all entities,\nand not destroyed though they are destroyed. For he who\nsees the lord abiding everywhere alike, does not destroy him-\nself * by himself, and then reaches the highest goal.\"\n\n\"Not to have true knowledge, is equivalent to self-\n\ndestruction.\"\n\nOf. Fauche\u00a0: Le Maha-Bharata\u00a0: Paris, 1867\u00a0; Vol. VII., p.\n128:\n\n\" Celui-la possede une vue nette des choses, qui voit ce\nprincipe souverain en tous les gtres d'une maniere 6gale, et\nleur survivre, quand ils pe>issent. II ne se fait aucum tort\na soi-meme par cette vue d'un principe qui subsiste egalement\npartout\u00a0: puis, apres cette vie, il entre dans la voie superieure.\"\n\nThe obscurity of Schlegel's Latin in the second sentence\nis sufficiently removed by these more recent translations.\n(Translator.)\n\n282 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\nneed feel no surprise, if the above slight outline of\nthe Metaphysics of Ethics does not bring into view\neven remotely the corner-stone of the whole meta-\nphysical edifice, nor reveal the connection of all\nthe parts composing the Divina Commedia. Such\na presentment, moreover, is involved neither in the\nquestion set, nor in my own plan. A man cannot\nsay everything in one day, and should not answer\nmore than he is asked.\n\nHe who tries to promote human knowledge and\ninsight is destined to always encounter the opposition\nof his age, which is like the dead weight of some\nmass that has to be dragged along\u00a0: there on the\nground it lies, a huge inert deformity, defying all\nefforts to quicken its shape with new life. But such\na one must take comfort from the certainty that,\nalthough prejudices beset his path, yet the truth is\nwith him. And Truth does but wait for her ally,\nTime, to join her\u00a0; once he is at her side, she is\nperfectly sure of victory, which, if to-day delayed,\nwill be won to-morrow.\n\nJUDICIUM\n\nEEGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS.\n\nQUAESTIONEM anno 1837 propositam, \" utrum philo-\nsophiae moralis fons et fundamentum in idea morali-\ntatis, quae immediate conscientia contineatur, et ceteris\nnotionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex ilia prodeant,\neocplicandis quaerenda sint, an in alio cognoscendi\nprincipio\" unus tantum scriptor explicare conatus\nest, cujus commentationem, germanico sermone com-\npositam, et his verbis notatam\u00a0: \" MORAL PREDIGEN\nIST LEICHT, MORAL BEGRUNDEN IST SCHWER,\" praemio\ndignam judicare nequivimus. Omisso enim eo, quod\npotissimumpostulabatur, hoc expeti putavit, ut princi-\npium aliquod ethicae conderetur, itaque earn partem\ncommentationis suae, in qua principii ethicae a se\npropositi et metaphysicae suae nexum exponit, appen-\ndicis loco habuit, in qua plus quam postulatum esset\npraestaret, quum tamen ipsum tkema ejusmodi disputa-\ntionemjlagitaret t in qua velpraecipuo loco metaphysicae\net ethicae nexus consider aretur. Quod autem scriptor\nin sympathia fundamentum ethicae constituere conatus\nest, neque ipsa disserendi forma nobis satisfecit, neque\nreapse, hoc fundamentum sufficere, evicit\u00a0; quin ipse\ncontra esse confiteri coactus est. Neque reticendum\nvidetur, plures recentioris aetatis summos philosophos\n\n283\n\n284 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.\n\ntarn indecenter commemorari, ut justam et gravem\noffensionem habeat.\n\nJUDGMENT OF THE DANISH EOYAL SOCIETY OF\nSCIENCES.\n\nIn 1837 the following question was set as subject for\na Prize Essay\u00a0: \" Is the fountain and basis of Morals\nto be sought for in an idea of morality which lies\ndirectly in the consciousness (or conscience), and in\nthe analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions\nwhich arise from it\u00a0? Or is it to be found in some\nother source of knowledge\u00a0? \" There was only one\ncompetitor\u00a0; but his dissertation, written in German,\nand bearing the motto\u00a0: \" To preach Morality is easy,\nto found it is difficult\" l we cannot adjudge worthy\nof the Prize. He has omitted to deal with the\nessential part of the question, apparently thinking\nthat he was asked to establish some fundamental\nprinciple of Ethics. Consequently, that part of the\ntreatise, which explains how the moral basis he\nproposes is related to his system of metaphysics,\nwe find relegated to an appendix, as an \" opus\nsupererogationis\" although it was precisely the con-\nnection between Metaphysics and Ethics that our\nquestion required to be put in the first and foremost\n\n1 The Academy has been good enough to insert the second\n\" is \" on its own account, by way of proving the truth of\nLonginus' theory ( V. De Sublimitate\u00a0: chap. 39, ad fin.\\ that\nthe addition or subtraction of a single syllable is sufficient\nto destroy the whole force of a sentence. [ V. Longinus\u00a0: De\nSublimitate Libellus\u00a0; edit. Joannes Vahlen, Bonnae, 1887.\n(Translator.*)]\n\nREGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS. 285\n\nplace. The writer attempts to show that compassion\nis the ultimate source of morality\u00a0; but neither does\nhis mode of discussion appear satisfactory to us, nor\nhas he, in point of fact, succeeded in proving that\nsuch a foundation is adequate. Indeed he himself\nis obliged to admit that it is not. 1 Lastly, the Society\ncannot pass over in silence the fact that he mentions\nseveral recent philosophers of the highest standing\nin an unseemly manner, such as to justly occasion\nserious offence.\n\n1 I suppose this is the meaning of contra esse confiteri.\n(Translator.)","title":"On the Basis of Morality/Part IV","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":7769}