{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Translator_s_Introduction/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Translator_s_Introduction","id":"wikisource_On_the_Basis_of_Morality_Translator_s_Introduction","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Basis_of_Morality/Translator's_Introduction","summary":null,"tags":["Pages_with_translator","Subpages"],"text":"TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION\n\nIN 1837 the Danish Royal Society of Sciences propounded, as subject for a prize competition, the\nquestion with which this treatise opens\u00a0; and Schopenhauer, who was glad to seize the opportunity of\nbecoming better known, prepared, and sent to Copenhagen, the earliest form of \" The Basis of Morality.\" In January, 1840, the work was pronounced unsuccessful, though there was no other candidate. In\nSeptember of the same year it was published by\nthe author, with only a few unimportant additions,\nbut preceded by a long introduction, which, cast\nin the form of an exceedingly caustic philippic, is,\nin its way, a masterpiece. In 1860, (only a month\nbefore Schopenhauer's death,) the second edition was\nprinted with many enlargements and insertions, the\nshort preface, dated August being one of the last\nthings he wrote.\n\nThe reason why the prize was withheld is not far to seek, and need not detain us. At that time the philosophical atmosphere was saturated with Hegel, and, to a certain extent, with Fichte\u00a0; hence it is easy to imagine with what ruffled, not to say, scandalised feelings the Academy must have risen from its perusal of the work. Moreover, putting Hegel and Fichte out of the question, the position advanced was in 1840 so new, indeed so paradoxical (as Schopenhauer himself admits)\u00a0; there is at times such an aggressiveness in the style\u00a0; the whole essay is so much more calculated to startle than to conciliate; that we cannot feel much surprise at the official decision.\n\nIn the Judgment published by the Society three\nreasons are given for its unfavourable attitude. The\nsecond is declared to be not only dissatisfaction with\nthe mode of discussion (ipsa disserendi forma), but\nalso inability to see that Schopenhauer proves his\ncase. As the third is alleged the \"unseemly\"\nlanguage employed in connection with certain \"summi philosophi\" (Hegel and Fichte). These two objections are of course in themselves perfectly legitimate,\nand how far the Academy was right or wrong may\nbe left for the reader to determine.\n\nBut the first reason stated is of a different kind,\nand affords as neat an instance of self-stultification\nproceeding ex cathedra as can well be found. It is\ntrue that the question is worded vaguely enough, but\nif it means anything, it asks where the \"philosophiae\nmoralis Jons et fundamentum\" the foundation of\nmoral science is to be sought for, i.e., where it is\nto be found. Turning to the Judgment we read\u00a0:\n\" He \" (Schopenhauer) \" has omitted to deal with\nthe essential part of the question, apparently thinking\nthat he was required to establish some fundamental principle of Ethics \"\u00a0: which he was required to do,\nunless the Society's Latin is borrowed from Ne<a\\o-\nKOKtcisyia. And then it goes on to declare that he\ntreated as secondary, indeed as an opus supererogationis,\nthe very thing which the Academy intended should\noccupy the first place, namely, the connection between\nMetaphysics and Ethics. But the \"metaphysicae et\nethicae nexus,\" so far from being formulated in the\nquestion as the chief point to be considered, is not\neven mentioned! The Society thus denies having\nasked what it actually did ask, while the discussion,\nwhich it asserts was specially indicated, is not\nsuggested by a single word. Its embarrassment is\nsufficiently shown by this unworthy shifting, to\nenlarge upon which would here be out of place.\n\nIt is not intended to offer any criticism either\non Schopenhauer's main position in this essay, or\non the various side-issues involved. The reader is\nsupposed to be accurately acquainted with the fundamentals of his philosophy, as contained in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellurig, and is invited to be\nthe critic himself. But perhaps a few remarks on\nthe structure and general trend of the work may\nnot be amiss.\n\nAfter preliminary considerations, partly to show the difficulty of the subject, partly to clear the ground (Part I.), the treatise opens with a searching critique of Kant's Ethical Basis, of the Leading Principle of his system, and of its derived forms. (Part II., Chapters I. -VI.) Schopenhauer's conclusion is that the Categorical Imperative is a very cleverly woven web, yet in reality nothing but the old theological basis in disguise, the latter being the indispensable, if invisible, clothes' peg for the former\u00a0; and that Kant's tour de main of deducing his Moral Theology from Ethics is like inverting a pyramid. The theory of Conscience is next discussed (Chapter VII.). The half-supernatural element which Kant introduced under the highly dramatic form of a court of justice holding ing secret session in the breast, is examined, and eliminated\u00a0; and Conscience is defined as the knowledge that we have of ourselves through our acts.\n\nBut if, so far, the result obtained is distinctly\nunfavourable to Kant, Schopenhauer is glad to agree\nwith him on one point, namely, the theory of Freedom,\nto a brief notice of which he now passes (Chapter\nVIII.). He points out that the solution of this question\nis found in the doctrine of the coexistence of Liberty\nand Necessity\u00a0: according to which the basis of our\nnature, the so-called Intelligible Character, that lies\noutside the forms attaching to phaenomena, namely,\nTime, Space, and Causality, is transcendentally free\u00a0;\nwhile the Empirical Character, together with the whole person, being, as a phaenomenon, the transient objectivation of the Intelligible Character, under the laws of\nthe principium individuationis, is strictly determined.\nPart II. closes with a sufficiently amusing examination of Fichte (Chapter IX.). His proper function is shown to be that of a magnifying glass for Kant.\nBy means of this powerful human lens we can see\nthe monstrous shapes into which the Kantian pet\ncreations are capable of developing. Thus we find the\nCategorical Imperative become a Despotic Imperative,\nthe \" Absolute Ought \" grown into a fathomless inscrutable Eifj,ap/jLwr), etc.\n\nWith Part III. we reach the positive part of the\nwork. Schopenhauer begins (Chapter I.) by emphasising the necessity of finding a basis for Ethics\nthat appeals, not to the intellect, but to the intuitive\nperception. Such (he says) can never be any\nartificial formula, which surely crumbles to powder\nbeneath the rough touch of real life\u00a0; rather must\nit be something springing out of the heart of things,\nand therefore lying at the root of man's nature. But\nis there, he asks (Chapter II.), after all, such a thing\nas natural morality\u00a0? Is anything good ever done\nabsolutely without an egoistic motive? The conclusion arrived at is that, although much may be,\nand has been, at all times, said in favour of the\nSceptical View, and although this view is in fact true as regards the greater number of apparently\nunselfish acts, yet there can be no doubt that truly\nmoral conduct does occur, that deeds of justice and\nloving-kindness are occasionally performed without\nthe smallest hope of reward, or fear of punishment\ninvolved in their omission. The last paragraph of\nthis chapter is important because it puts in the\nclearest light what, according to Schopenhauer, is\nthe end of Ethics. Its aim, he says, is not to treat\nof that which people ought to do (for \" ought \" has no\nplace except in theological Morals, whether explicit,\nor implicit)\u00a0; but l: to point out all the varied moral\nlines of human conduct\u00a0; to explain them\u00a0; and to\ntrace them to their ultimate source.\" This definition,\nwhich assigns no educative function to Ethics, strictly\nagrees with the doctrine of the unchangeableness\nof character. (F. Chapter IX. of this Part.)\n\nOur philosopher then proceeds to show (Chapter III.)\nthat there are two fundamental \" antimoral \" incentives in man's nature\u00a0: Egoism and Malice. Be\nit, however, here remarked that a still simpler\nclassification would reduce these two to one. Malice\nmay well be regarded as nothing but Egoism carried\nto its extreme, developed to gigantic proportions. It\nis a distinct source of gratification to certain natures\nto witness the suffering of another\u00a0; because a diminution of the latter' s capacity for action, whether effected\nby itself, or not, is regarded by an ego of this kind\nas an increase of its own power to do as it likes, as\nan enhancement of its own glorification.\n\nIn Chapter IV. the ultimate test of truly moral conduct is explained to be the absence of all egoistic motivation\u00a0; and in Chapters V.-VIL, by a process\nof careful reasoning, every human act is traced to\none of three original springs, namely, (1) Egoism,\n(2) Malice, and (3) Compassion\u00a0; or to a combination\nof (1) and (3), or (1) and (2). Of these the third\nis shown to be the only counter-motive to the first\nand second, and in fact the sole source of the two\ncardinal virtues, justice and loving-kindness, which\nare explained as the manifestation of Compassion\nin a lower, and a higher, degree, respectively. In\nthe course of the demonstration the question as to\nhow far a lie is legitimate comes incidentally under\ndiscussion\u00a0; as also the theory of Duty\u00a0; duties being\ndefined as \"actions, the simple omission of which\nconstitutes a wrong.\" (Cf. Part II., Chapter III.)\n\nThe position now reached, namely, that Compassion\nis the one and only fount of true morality, because\nit is the sole non-egoistic source of action, is (says\nSchopenhauer) a strange paradox\u00a0; hence the testimony\nof experience and of universal human sentiment is\nappealed to, in confirmation of it, under nine different\nconsiderations (Chapter VIII.). They are as follows\u00a0:\n\n(1) An imaginary case.\n\n(2) Cruelty, which means the maximum deficiency\nin Compassion, is the mark of the deepest moral\ndepravity. Therefore the real moral incentive must\n\"be Compassion.\n\n(3) Compassion is the only thoroughly effective\nspring of moral conduct.\n\n(4) Limitless Compassion for all living things is\nthe surest and most certain token of a really good\nman.\n\n(5) The evidence of separate matters of detail.\n\n(6) Compassion is more easily discerned in its higher\npower\u00a0; it is more obviously the root of loving-kindness-\nthan of justice.\n\n(7) Compassion does not stop short with men\u00a0;\nit 'includes all living beings.\n\n(8) Considered simply from the empirical point of\nview, Compassion is the best possible antidote to\nEgoism, no less than the most soothing balsam for\nthe world's inevitable suffering.\n\n(9) Rousseau's testimony is quoted, as well as.\npassages from the Paiiea-tantra, Pausanias, Lucian,\nStobaeus, and Lessing\u00a0; and reference is made to\nChinese Ethics and Hindu customs.\n\nPart III. closes (Chapter IX.) with an inquiry into\nthe Ethical Difference of Character. The theory that\nthis difference is innate and immutable is supported\nby numerous extracts from various writers of all\nperiods, and illustrated in many ways. But all the\nevidence accumulated hardly amounts to more than\nso many hints and indications, and the matter (says\nSchopenhauer) was only satisfactorily explained by\nKant's doctrine of the Intelligible and Empirical Character. (Cf. Part II., Chapter VIII.) According\nto this, the ethical difference between man and man\nis an original and ultimate datum, caused by the\ntranscendentally free act of the Intelligible Character,\nthat is, the Will, as Thing in itself, outside phaeno-\nmena\u00a0; the Empirical Character being, so to say,\nthe reflection of the Intelligible, mirrored through\nthe functions of our perceptive faculty, namely, Time,.\nSpace, and Causality. Hence the former, while\nmanifested in plurality and difference of acts, yet\nnecessarily always wears the same unchangeable\nfeatures, inasmuch as it is but the appearance-form\nof the unity behind. If the reader asks why \" the\nessential constitution of the Thing in itself under-\nlying the phaenomenon \" is so enorrnousty different\nin different individuals, it can only be said that our\nintellect, conditioned, as it is, by the laws of Causality,\nSpace, and Time, has no power to deal with noumena,\nits range being limited to phaeaomena\u00a0; and that\ntherefore this question is one of those which have\nno conceivable answer. (Cf. Die Welt als Wille und\nVorstellung, vol. ii., chap. 50., Epiphilosophie.)\n\nThe discussion now terminated points to the\nconclusion that nine-tenths, or perhaps nineteen-\ntwentieths, of what we do is, more or less, due\nto Egoism, conscious or unconscious\u00a0; while acts of\nreal morality, that is, of unselfish justice and pure\nloving-kindness (admitting that they occur) are to\nbe attributed to Compassion, that is, the sense of\nsuffering with another. Nor is the principle of\nAltruism new. It is as old as man himself. All\nthe rare and sensitive natures in the world have\ngiven utterance to it, each in his own way. Like a\ngolden thread it runs from the earliest Indian literature\nto George Eliot, to Tolstoi\u00a0; and every day, for un-\nnumbered ages, \" from youth to eld, from sire to\nson,\" in lowly dwellings and in princes' palaces, it\nhas been unawares translated into action.\n\nAnd if we may forecast the future from the past,\nit would appear that in all the stormy seas yet to\nbe traversed by the human race, before its little day\nis spent, Compassion will ever be the surest guide\nto better things\u00a0; and that the light of knowledge\nilluminating the path, whereby the world may become\nrelatively happier, will always vary directly as man's\nsusceptibility to its promptings\u00a0: for \"Durch Mitleid\nwissend\" is not truer of Parsifal than of all other\nsaviours.\n\nIn the fourth Part of the treatise Schopenhauer\nattempts the metaphysical explanation of Compassion,\nwhich for those, who still think that Metaphysics is\nsomething more than a pseudo-science of the past--like Alchemy or Astrology--will have special\ninterest.\n\nIt should be observed (as is pointed out in our author's\nPreface to the first edition) that the line of thought\nfollowed does not belong to any particular meta-\nphysical school, but to many\u00a0; being in fact a principle\nat the root of the oldest systems in the world, and\ntraceable in one form or another down to Kant. As\nin the dawn of history it was our own Aryan fore-\nfathers, who divined with subtle intuition the ideality\nof Time and Space\u00a0; so in the fulness of the ages\nit was reserved for another Aryan of Scotch descent\nto formulate the same in exact language. Now, by\nthe vast majority of men the ideality of the principium\nindividuationis is undoubtedly either not consciously\nrealised at all, or else but dimly perceived under\nthe form of allegories and mythologies. Yet, if this\ntheory be true, if individuation be only a phaenomenon\ndepending on the subjectivity of Time and Space,\nthen Compassion, and its external expression, the\najaTTij that is greater than Faith and Hope, receive\ntheir final explanation. And every evdavaata\u00a0; every\nword that vibrates in harmony with the inspired\nrhapsody of 1 Corinthians xiii.\u00a0; every act of genuine\njustice, or of true loving-kindness, done by man to\nman, as well as the uplifting emotion which stirs\nour hearts at the sight of such conduct\u00a0:--all these\nthings become fraught with a new and luminous\nsignificance\u00a0: the secret writing is interpreted, its\ndeepest meaning disclosed.\n\nMoreover, the \" thou shalt,\" and the \" thou shalt\nnot,\" no less of the various theologies than of the\nCategorical Imperative, may from this point of view\nbe accounted for, on the ground of the identity of man, so far as he is noumenal, with the transcendental Reality behind phaenomena. The crude threats of\npunishment and promises of reward, the stern Moral\nLaw, poised in mid air, these hypotheses, and all\ntheir varieties (whose function is in reality nothing\nelse but to check Egoism), are seen to be due to the\nintellect's imperfect comprehension of, or rather,\nits vague groping after, the transcendental unity of\nlife, however individualised and differentiated as a\nphaenomenon in Time and Space. It thus becomes\napparent that the position developed by Schopenhauer\nin the third and fourth parts of the Essay is not so\nmuch destructive, as explanatory, of the usual theories,\nwhich, if once the former be fully grasped, lose\nthemselves in it as stars and moon in the light of\nday. They are at once interpreted, and shown to\nbe no longer of importance. Similarly, all the\nreligions of the world, \" which are the Metaphysics\nof the people,\" find their raison d'etre in the same\ndoctrine. The theory of an external bjfuovprfa takes\nits place as the natural mode of denoting, in children's\nlanguage, the internal metaphysical Entity, whose\nappearance-form, in terms of our consciousness, is\ncalled the Universe. The circle is completed\u00a0; the\ndiscords vanish, and an ultimate harmony is reached.\nAnd so over the thrice-tangled skein of phaenominal\nexistence a simplifying and integrating light is shed,\nshowing that the irav is but the reflection of the\nev, under the forms of our faculty of perception,\nnamely, Time, Space, and Causality forms, which\nnecessarily imply plurality and change, on which,\nagain, in the last resort the Welt-Schmerz depends.\n\n\"The One remains, the many change and pass;\n\nLife, like a dome of many-coloured glass,\n\nStains the white radiance of Eternity,\n\nUntil Death tramples it to fragments.\"\n\n\"What an unspeakable gain,\" says Richard\nWagner, \"we should bring to those who are terrified\nby the threats of the Church, and, on the other hand, to those who are reduced to despair by our physicists, if we could quicken the noble edifice of 'Love, Faith, and Hope,' with a clear consciousness of the ideality of the world, conditioned by the laws of Space and Time, which form the sole basis of our perceptive capacity! In that case all anxious inquiries as to a 'Where' and 'When' of the 'other world' would be understood to be only answerable by a blissful smile. For, if there is a solution to these questions, which seem of such boundless importance, our philosopher has given it with incomparable precision and beauty in the following sentence, which, to a certain extent, is only a corollary to the definition of the ideality of Time and Space: 'Peace, Rest, and Bliss dwell only there where there is no where, and no when.\" (V. Schopenhauer\u00a0: Parerga, and Paralipomena, vol. ii., chap. 3, 30 bis.)\n\nFootnotes","title":"On the Basis of Morality/Translator's Introduction","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":3044}