{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_IV/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_IV","id":"wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_IV","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Analysis_of_Mind/Lecture_IV","summary":null,"tags":["Headers_applying_DefaultSort_key","Subpages"],"text":"In this lecture we shall be concerned with a very general\ncharacteristic which broadly, though not absolutely,\ndistinguishes the behaviour of living organisms from that of dead\nmatter. The characteristic in question is this:\n\nThe response of an organism to a given stimulus is very often\ndependent upon the past history of the organism, and not merely\nupon the stimulus and the HITHERTO DISCOVERABLE present state of\nthe organism.\n\nThis characteristic is embodied in the saying \"a burnt child\nfears the fire.\" The burn may have left no visible traces, yet it\nmodifies the reaction of the child in the presence of fire. It is\ncustomary to assume that, in such cases, the past operates by\nmodifying the structure of the brain, not directly. I have no\nwish to suggest that this hypothesis is false; I wish only to\npoint out that it is a hypothesis. At the end of the present\nlecture I shall examine the grounds in its favour. If we confine\nourselves to facts which have been actually observed, we must say\nthat past occurrences, in addition to the present stimulus and\nthe present ascertainable condition of the organism, enter into\nthe causation of the response.\n\nThe characteristic is not wholly confined to living organisms.\nFor example, magnetized steel looks just like steel which has not\nbeen magnetized, but its behaviour is in some ways different. In\nthe case of dead matter, however, such phenomena are less\nfrequent and important than in the case of living organisms, and\nit is far less difficult to invent satisfactory hypotheses as to\nthe microscopic changes of structure which mediate between the\npast occurrence and the present changed response. In the case of\nliving organisms, practically everything that is distinctive both\nof their physical and of their mental behaviour is bound up with\nthis persistent influence of the past. Further, speaking broadly,\nthe change in response is usually of a kind that is biologically\nadvantageous to the organism.\n\nFollowing a suggestion derived from Semon (\"Die Mneme,\" Leipzig,\n1904; 2nd edition, 1908, English translation, Allen & Unwin,\n1921; \"Die mnemischen Empfindungen,\" Leipzig, 1909), we will give\nthe name of \"mnemic phenomena\" to those responses of an organism\nwhich, so far as hitherto observed facts are concerned, can only\nbe brought under causal laws by including past occurrences in the\nhistory of the organism as part of the causes of the present\nresponse. I do not mean merely--what would always be the\ncase--that past occurrences are part of a CHAIN of causes leading\nto the present event. I mean that, in attempting to state the\nPROXIMATE cause of the present event, some past event or events\nmust be included, unless we take refuge in hypothetical\nmodifications of brain structure.) For example: you smell\npeat-smoke, and you recall some occasion when you smelt it\nbefore. The cause of your recollection, so far as hitherto observ\nable phenomena are concerned, consists both of the peat smoke\n(present stimulus) and of the former occasion (past experience).\nThe same stimulus will not produce the same recollection in\nanother man who did not share your former experience, although\nthe former experience left no OBSERVABLE traces in the structure\nof the brain. According to the maxim \"same cause, same effect,\"\nwe cannot therefore regard the peat-smoke alone as the cause of\nyour recollection, since it does not have the same effect in\nother cases. The cause of your recollection must be both the\npeat-smoke and the past occurrence. Accordingly your recollection\nis an instance of what we are calling \"mnemic phenomena.\"\n\nBefore going further, it will be well to give illustrations of\ndifferent classes of mnemic phenomena.\n\n(a) ACQUIRED HABITS.--In Lecture II we saw how animals can learn\nby experience how to get out of cages or mazes, or perform other\nactions which are useful to them but not provided for by their\ninstincts alone. A cat which is put into a cage of which it has\nhad experience behaves differently from the way in which it\nbehaved at first. We can easily invent hypotheses, which are\nquite likely to be true, as to connections in the brain caused by\npast experience, and themselves causing the different response.\nBut the observable fact is that the stimulus of being in the cage\nproduces differing results with repetition, and that the\nascertainable cause of the cat's behaviour is not merely the cage\nand its own ascertainable organization, but also its past history\nin regard to the cage. From our present point of view, the matter\nis independent of the question whether the cat's behaviour is due\nto some mental fact called \"knowledge,\" or displays a merely\nbodily habit. Our habitual knowledge is not always in our minds,\nbut is called up by the appropriate stimuli. If we are asked\n\"What is the capital of France?\" we answer \"Paris,\" because of\npast experience; the past experience is as essential as the\npresent question in the causation of our response. Thus all our\nhabitual knowledge consists of acquired habits, and comes under\nthe head of mnemic phenomena.\n\n(b) IMAGES.--I shall have much to say about images in a later\nlecture; for the present I am merely concerned with them in so\nfar as they are \"copies\" of past sensations. When you hear New\nYork spoken of, some image probably comes into your mind, either\nof the place itself (if you have been there), or of some picture\nof it (if you have not). The image is due to your past\nexperience, as well as to the present stimulus of the words \"New\nYork.\" Similarly, the images you have in dreams are all dependent\nupon your past experience, as well as upon the present stimulus\nto dreaming. It is generally believed that all images, in their\nsimpler parts, are copies of sensations; if so, their mnemic\ncharacter is evident. This is important, not only on its own\naccount, but also because, as we shall see later, images play an\nessential part in what is called \"thinking.\"\n\n(c) ASSOCIATION.--The broad fact of association, on the mental\nside, is that when we experience something which we have\nexperienced before, it tends to call up the context of the former\nexperience. The smell of peat-smoke recalling a former scene is\nan instance which we discussed a moment ago. This is obviously a\nmnemic phenomenon. There is also a more purely physical\nassociation, which is indistinguishable from physical habit. This\nis the kind studied by Mr. Thorndike in animals, where a certain\nstimulus is associated with a certain act. This is the sort which\nis taught to soldiers in drilling, for example. In such a case\nthere need not be anything mental, but merely a habit of the\nbody. There is no essential distinction between association and\nhabit, and the observations which we made concerning habit as a\nmnemic phenomenon are equally applicable to association.\n\n(d) NON-SENSATIONAL ELEMENTS IN PERCEPTION.--When we perceive any\nobject of a familiar kind, much of what appears subjectively to\nbe immediately given is really derived from past experience. When\nwe see an object, say a penny, we seem to be aware of its \"real\"\nshape we have the impression of something circular, not of\nsomething elliptical. In learning to draw, it is necessary to\nacquire the art of representing things according to the\nsensation, not according to the perception. And the visual\nappearance is filled out with feeling of what the object would be\nlike to touch, and so on. This filling out and supplying of the\n\"real\" shape and so on consists of the most usual correlates of\nthe sensational core in our perception. It may happen that, in\nthe particular case, the real correlates are unusual; for\nexample, if what we are seeing is a carpet made to look like\ntiles. If so, the non-sensational part of our perception will be\nillusory, i.e. it will supply qualities which the object in\nquestion does not in fact have. But as a rule objects do have the\nqualities added by perception, which is to be expected, since\nexperience of what is usual is the cause of the addition. If our\nexperience had been different, we should not fill out sensation\nin the same way, except in so far as the filling out is\ninstinctive, not acquired. It would seem that, in man, all that\nmakes up space perception, including the correlation of sight and\ntouch and so on, is almost entirely acquired. In that case there\nis a large mnemic element in all the common perceptions by means\nof which we handle common objects. And, to take another kind of\ninstance, imagine what our astonishment would be if we were to\nhear a cat bark or a dog mew. This emotion would be dependent\nupon past experience, and would therefore be a mnemic phenomenon\naccording to the definition.\n\n(e) MEMORY AS KNOWLEDGE.--The kind of memory of which I am now\nspeaking is definite knowledge of some past event in one's own\nexperience. From time to time we remember things that have\nhappened to us, because something in the present reminds us of\nthem. Exactly the same present fact would not call up the same\nmemory if our past experience had been different. Thus our\nremembering is caused by--\n\n(1) The present stimulus,\n\n(2) The past occurrence.\n\nIt is therefore a mnemic phenomenon according to our definition.\nA definition of \"mnemic phenomena\" which did not include memory\nwould, of course, be a bad one. The point of the definition is\nnot that it includes memory, but that it includes it as one of a\nclass of phenomena which embrace all that is characteristic in\nthe subject matter of psychology.\n\n(f) EXPERIENCE.--The word \"experience\" is often used very\nvaguely. James, as we saw, uses it to cover the whole primal\nstuff of the world, but this usage seems objection able, since,\nin a purely physical world, things would happen without there\nbeing any experience. It is only mnemic phenomena that embody\nexperience. We may say that an animal \"experiences\" an occurrence\nwhen this occurrence modifies the animal's subsequent behaviour,\ni.e. when it is the mnemic portion of the cause of future\noccurrences in the animal's life. The burnt child that fears the\nfire has \"experienced\" the fire, whereas a stick that has been\nthrown on and taken off again has not \"experienced\" anything,\nsince it offers no more resistance than before to being thrown\non. The essence of \"experience\" is the modification of behaviour\nproduced by what is experienced. We might, in fact, define one\nchain of experience, or one biography, as a series of occurrences\nlinked by mnemic causation. I think it is this characteristic,\nmore than any other, that distinguishes sciences dealing with\nliving organisms from physics.\n\nThe best writer on mnemic phenomena known to me is Richard Semon,\nthe fundamental part of whose theory I shall endeavour to\nsummarize before going further:\n\nWhen an organism, either animal or plant, is subjected to a\nstimulus, producing in it some state of excitement, the removal\nof the stimulus allows it to return to a condition of\nequilibrium. But the new state of equilibrium is different from\nthe old, as may be seen by the changed capacity for reaction. The\nstate of equilibrium before the stimulus may be called the\n\"primary indifference-state\"; that after the cessation of the\nstimulus, the \"secondary indifference-state.\" We define the\n\"engraphic effect\" of a stimulus as the effect in making a\ndifference between the primary and secondary indifference-states,\nand this difference itself we define as the \"engram\" due to the\nstimulus. \"Mnemic phenomena\" are defined as those due to engrams;\nin animals, they are specially associated with the nervous\nsystem, but not exclusively, even in man.\n\nWhen two stimuli occur together, one of them, occurring\nafterwards, may call out the reaction for the other also. We call\nthis an \"ekphoric influence,\" and stimuli having this character\nare called \"ekphoric stimuli.\" In such a case we call the engrams\nof the two stimuli \"associated.\" All simultaneously generated\nengrams are associated; there is also association of successively\naroused engrams, though this is reducible to simultaneous\nassociation. In fact, it is not an isolated stimulus that leaves\nan engram, but the totality of the stimuli at any moment;\nconsequently any portion of this totality tends, if it recurs, to\narouse the whole reaction which was aroused before. Semon holds\nthat engrams can be inherited, and that an animal's innate habits\nmay be due to the experience of its ancestors; on this subject he\nrefers to Samuel Butler.\n\nSemon formulates two \"mnemic principles.\" The first, or \"Law of\nEngraphy,\" is as follows: \"All simultaneous excitements in an\norganism form a connected simultaneous excitement-complex, which\nas such works engraphically, i.e. leaves behind a connected\nengram-complex, which in so far forms a whole\" (\"Die mnemischen\nEmpfindungen,\" p. 146). The second mnemic principle, or \"Law of\nEkphory,\" is as follows: \"The partial return of the energetic\nsituation which formerly worked engraphically operates\nekphorically on a simultaneous engram-complex\" (ib., p. 173).\nThese two laws together represent in part a hypothesis (the\nengram), and in part an observable fact. The observable fact is\nthat, when a certain complex of stimuli has originally caused a\ncertain complex of reactions, the recurrence of part of the\nstimuli tends to cause the recurrence of the whole of the\nreactions.\n\nSemon's applications of his fundamental ideas in various\ndirections are interesting and ingenious. Some of them will\nconcern us later, but for the present it is the fundamental\ncharacter of mnemic phenomena that is in question.\n\nConcerning the nature of an engram, Semon confesses that at\npresent it is impossible to say more than that it must consist in\nsome material alteration in the body of the organism (\"Die\nmnemischen Empfindungen,\" p. 376). It is, in fact, hypothetical,\ninvoked for theoretical uses, and not an outcome of direct\nobservation. No doubt physiology, especially the disturbances of\nmemory through lesions in the brain, affords grounds for this\nhypothesis; nevertheless it does remain a hypothesis, the\nvalidity of which will be discussed at the end of this lecture.\n\nI am inclined to think that, in the present state of physiology,\nthe introduction of the engram does not serve to simplify the\naccount of mnemic phenomena. We can, I think, formulate the known\nlaws of such phenomena in terms, wholly, of observable facts, by\nrecognizing provisionally what we may call \"mnemic causation.\" By\nthis I mean that kind of causation of which I spoke at the\nbeginning of this lecture, that kind, namely, in which the\nproximate cause consists not merely of a present event, but of\nthis together with a past event. I do not wish to urge that this\nform of causation is ultimate, but that, in the present state of\nour knowledge, it affords a simplification, and enables us to\nstate laws of behaviour in less hypothetical terms than we should\notherwise have to employ.\n\nThe clearest instance of what I mean is recollection of a past\nevent. What we observe is that certain present stimuli lead us to\nrecollect certain occurrences, but that at times when we are not\nrecollecting them, there is nothing discoverable in our minds\nthat could be called memory of them. Memories, as mental facts,\narise from time to time, but do not, so far as we can see, exist\nin any shape while they are \"latent.\" In fact, when we say that\nthey are \"latent,\" we mean merely that they will exist under\ncertain circumstances. If, then, there is to be some standing\ndifference between the person who can remember a certain fact and\nthe person who cannot, that standing difference must be, not in\nanything mental, but in the brain. It is quite probable that\nthere is such a difference in the brain, but its nature is\nunknown and it remains hypothetical. Everything that has, so far,\nbeen made matter of observation as regards this question can be\nput together in the statement: When a certain complex of\nsensations has occurred to a man, the recurrence of part of the\ncomplex tends to arouse the recollection of the whole. In like\nmanner, we can collect all mnemic phenomena in living organisms\nunder a single law, which contains what is hitherto verifiable in\nSemon's two laws. This single law is:\n\nIF A COMPLEX STIMULUS A HAS CAUSED A COMPLEX REACTION B IN AN\nORGANISM, THE OCCURRENCE OF A PART OF A ON A FUTURE OCCASION\nTENDS TO CAUSE THE WHOLE REACTION B.\n\nThis law would need to be supplemented by some account of the\ninfluence of frequency, and so on; but it seems to contain the\nessential characteristic of mnemic phenomena, without admixture\nof anything hypothetical.\n\nWhenever the effect resulting from a stimulus to an organism\ndiffers according to the past history of the organism, without\nour being able actually to detect any relevant difference in its\npresent structure, we will speak of \"mnemic causation,\" provided\nwe can discover laws embodying the influence of the past. In\nordinary physical causation, as it appears to common sense, we\nhave approximate uniformities of sequence, such as \"lightning is\nfollowed by thunder,\" \"drunkenness is followed by headache,\" and\nso on. None of these sequences are theoretically invariable,\nsince something may intervene to disturb them. In order to obtain\ninvariable physical laws, we have to proceed to differential\nequations, showing the direction of change at each moment, not\nthe integral change after a finite interval, however short. But\nfor the purposes of daily life many sequences are to all in tents\nand purposes invariable. With the behaviour of human beings,\nhowever, this is by no means the case. If you say to an\nEnglishman, \"You have a smut on your nose,\" he will proceed to\nremove it, but there will be no such effect if you say the same\nthing to a Frenchman who knows no English. The effect of words\nupon the hearer is a mnemic phenomena, since it depends upon the\npast experience which gave him understanding of the words. If\nthere are to be purely psychological causal laws, taking no\naccount of the brain and the rest of the body, they will have to\nbe of the form, not \"X now causes Y now,\" but--\n\n\"A, B, C, . . . in the past, together with X now, cause Y now.\"\nFor it cannot be successfully maintained that our understanding\nof a word, for example, is an actual existent content of the mind\nat times when we are not thinking of the word. It is merely what\nmay be called a \"disposition,\" i.e. it is capable of being\naroused whenever we hear the word or happen to think of it. A\n\"disposition\" is not something actual, but merely the mnemic\nportion of a mnemic causal law.\n\nIn such a law as \"A, B, C, . . . in the past, together with X\nnow, cause Y now,\" we will call A, B, C, . . . the mnemic cause,\nX the occasion or stimulus, and Y the reaction. All cases in\nwhich experience influences behaviour are instances of mnemic\ncausation.\n\nBelievers in psycho-physical parallelism hold that psychology can\ntheoretically be freed entirely from all dependence on physiology\nor physics. That is to say, they believe that every psychical\nevent has a psychical cause and a physical concomitant. If there\nis to be parallelism, it is easy to prove by mathematical logic\nthat the causation in physical and psychical matters must be of\nthe same sort, and it is impossible that mnemic causation should\nexist in psychology but not in physics. But if psychology is to\nbe independent of physiology, and if physiology can be reduced to\nphysics, it would seem that mnemic causation is essential in\npsychology. Otherwise we shall be compelled to believe that all\nour knowledge, all our store of images and memories, all our\nmental habits, are at all times existing in some latent mental\nform, and are not merely aroused by the stimuli which lead to\ntheir display. This is a very difficult hypothesis. It seems to\nme that if, as a matter of method rather than metaphysics, we\ndesire to obtain as much independence for psychology as is\npractically feasible, we shall do better to accept mnemic\ncausation in psychology protem, and therefore reject parallelism,\nsince there is no good ground for admitting mnemic causation in\nphysics.\n\nIt is perhaps worth while to observe that mnemic causation is\nwhat led Bergson to deny that there is causation. at all in the\npsychical sphere. He points out, very truly, that the same\nstimulus, repeated, does not have the same consequences, and he\nargues that this is contrary to the maxim, \"same cause, same\neffect.\" It is only necessary, however, to take account of past\noccurrences and include them with the cause, in order to\nre-establish the maxim, and the possibility of psychological\ncausal laws. The metaphysical conception of a cause lingers in\nour manner of viewing causal laws: we want to be able to FEEL a\nconnection between cause and effect, and to be able to imagine\nthe cause as \"operating.\" This makes us unwilling to regard\ncausal laws as MERELY observed uniformities of sequence; yet that\nis all that science has to offer. To ask why such-and-such a kind\nof sequence occurs is either to ask a meaningless question, or to\ndemand some more general kind of sequence which includes the one\nin question. The widest empirical laws of sequence known at any\ntime can only be \"explained\" in the sense of being subsumed by\nlater discoveries under wider laws; but these wider laws, until\nthey in turn are subsumed, will remain brute facts, resting\nsolely upon observation, not upon some supposed inherent\nrationality.\n\nThere is therefore no a priori objection to a causal law in which\npart of the cause has ceased to exist. To argue against such a\nlaw on the ground that what is past cannot operate now, is to\nintroduce the old metaphysical notion of cause, for which science\ncan find no place. The only reason that could be validly alleged\nagainst mnemic causation would be that, in fact, all the\nphenomena can be explained without it. They are explained without\nit by Semon's \"engram,\" or by any theory which regards the\nresults of experience as embodied in modifications of the brain\nand nerves. But they are not explained, unless with extreme\nartificiality, by any theory which regards the latent effects of\nexperience as psychical rather than physical. Those who desire to\nmake psychology as far as possible independent of physiology\nwould do well, it seems to me, if they adopted mnemic causation.\nFor my part, however, I have no such desire, and I shall\ntherefore endeavour to state the grounds which occur to me in\nfavour of some such view as that of the \"engram.\"\n\nOne of the first points to be urged is that mnemic phenomena are\njust as much to be found in physiology as in psychology. They are\neven to be found in plants, as Sir Francis Darwin pointed out\n(cf. Semon, \"Die Mneme,\" 2nd edition, p. 28 n.). Habit is a\ncharacteristic of the body at least as much as of the mind. We\nshould, therefore, be compelled to allow the intrusion of mnemic\ncausation, if admitted at all, into non-psychological regions,\nwhich ought, one feels, to be subject only to causation of the\nordinary physical sort. The fact is that a great deal of what, at\nfirst sight, distinguishes psychology from physics is found, on\nexamination, to be common to psychology and physiology; this\nwhole question of the influence of experience is a case in point.\nNow it is possible, of course, to take the view advocated by\nProfessor J. S. Haldane, who contends that physiology is not\ntheoretically reducible to physics and chemistry. But the weight\nof opinion among physiologists appears to be against him on this\npoint; and we ought certainly to require very strong evidence\nbefore admitting any such breach of continuity as between living\nand dead matter. The argument from the existence of mnemic\nphenomena in physiology must therefore be allowed a certain\nweight against the hypothesis that mnemic causation is ultimate.","title":"The Analysis of Mind/Lecture IV","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":4043}