{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_V/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_V","id":"wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_V","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Analysis_of_Mind/Lecture_V","summary":null,"tags":["Headers_applying_DefaultSort_key","Subpages"],"text":"The traditional conception of cause and effect is one which\nmodern science shows to be fundamentally erroneous, and requiring\nto be replaced by a quite different notion, that of LAWS OF\nCHANGE. In the traditional conception, a particular event A\ncaused a particular event B, and by this it was implied that,\ngiven any event B, some earlier event A could be discovered which\nhad a relation to it, such that--\n\n(1) Whenever A occurred, it was followed by B;\n\n(2) In this sequence, there was something \"necessary,\" not a mere\nde facto occurrence of A first and then B.\n\nThe second point is illustrated by the old discussion as to\nwhether it can be said that day causes night, on the ground that\nday is always followed by night. The orthodox answer was that day\ncould not be called the cause of night, because it would not be\nfollowed by night if the earth's rotation were to cease, or\nrather to grow so slow that one complete rotation would take a\nyear. A cause, it was held, must be such that under no\nconceivable circumstances could it fail to be followed by its\neffect.\n\nAs a matter of fact, such sequences as were sought by believers\nin the traditional form of causation have not so far been found\nin nature. Everything in nature is apparently in a state of\ncontinuous change, so that what we call one \"event\" turns out to\nbe really a process. If this event is to cause another event, the\ntwo will have to be contiguous in time; for if there is any\ninterval between them, something may happen during that interval\nto prevent the expected effect. Cause and effect, therefore, will\nhave to be temporally contiguous processes. It is difficult to\nbelieve, at any rate where physical laws are concerned, that the\nearlier part of the process which is the cause can make any\ndifference to the effect, so long as the later part of the\nprocess which is the cause remains unchanged. Suppose, for\nexample, that a man dies of arsenic poisoning, we say that his\ntaking arsenic was the cause of death. But clearly the process by\nwhich he acquired the arsenic is irrelevant: everything that\nhappened before he swallowed it may be ignored, since it cannot\nalter the effect except in so far as it alters his condition at\nthe moment of taking the dose. But we may go further: swallowing\narsenic is not really the proximate cause of death, since a man\nmight be shot through the head immediately after taking the dose,\nand then it would not be of arsenic that he would die. The\narsenic produces certain physiological changes, which take a\nfinite time before they end in death. The earlier parts of these\nchanges can be ruled out in the same way as we can rule out the\nprocess by which the arsenic was acquired. Proceeding in this\nway, we can shorten the process which we are calling the cause\nmore and more. Similarly we shall have to shorten the effect. It\nmay happen that immediately after the man's death his body is\nblown to pieces by a bomb. We cannot say what will happen after\nthe man's death, through merely knowing that he has died as the\nresult of arsenic poisoning. Thus, if we are to take the cause as\none event and the effect as another, both must be shortened\nindefinitely. The result is that we merely have, as the\nembodiment of our causal law, a certain direction of change at\neach moment. Hence we are brought to differential equations as\nembodying causal laws. A physical law does not say \"A will be\nfollowed by B,\" but tells us what acceleration a particle will\nhave under given circumstances, i.e. it tells us how the\nparticle's motion is changing at each moment, not where the\nparticle will be at some future moment.\n\nLaws embodied in differential equations may possibly be exact,\nbut cannot be known to be so. All that we can know empirically is\napproximate and liable to exceptions; the exact laws that are\nassumed in physics are known to be somewhere near the truth, but\nare not known to be true just as they stand. The laws that we\nactually know empirically have the form of the traditional causal\nlaws, except that they are not to be regarded as universal or\nnecessary. \"Taking arsenic is followed by death\" is a good\nempirical generalization; it may have exceptions, but they will\nbe rare. As against the professedly exact laws of physics, such\nempirical generalizations have the advantage that they deal with\nobservable phenomena. We cannot observe infinitesimals, whether\nin time or space; we do not even know whether time and space are\ninfinitely divisible. Therefore rough empirical generalizations\nhave a definite place in science, in spite of not being exact of\nuniversal. They are the data for more exact laws, and the grounds\nfor believing that they are USUALLY true are stronger than the\ngrounds for believing that the more exact laws are ALWAYS true.\n\nScience starts, therefore, from generalizations of the form, \"A\nis usually followed by B.\" This is the nearest approach that can\nbe made to a causal law of the traditional sort. It may happen in\nany particular instance that A is ALWAYS followed by B, but we\ncannot know this, since we cannot foresee all the perfectly\npossible circumstances that might make the sequence fail, or know\nthat none of them will actually occur. If, however, we know of a\nvery large number of cases in which A is followed by B, and few\nor none in which the sequence fails, we shall in PRACTICE be\njustified in saying \"A causes B,\" provided we do not attach to\nthe notion of cause any of the metaphysical superstitions that\nhave gathered about the word.\n\nThere is another point, besides lack of universality and\nnecessity, which it is important to realize as regards causes in\nthe above sense, and that is the lack of uniqueness. It is\ngenerally assumed that, given any event, there is some one\nphenomenon which is THE cause of the event in question. This\nseems to be a mere mistake. Cause, in the only sense in which it\ncan be practically applied, means \"nearly invariable antecedent.\"\nWe cannot in practice obtain an antecedent which is QUITE\ninvariable, for this would require us to take account of the\nwhole universe, since something not taken account of may prevent\nthe expected effect. We cannot distinguish, among nearly\ninvariable antecedents, one as THE cause, and the others as\nmerely its concomitants: the attempt to do this depends upon a\nnotion of cause which is derived from will, and will (as we shall\nsee later) is not at all the sort of thing that it is generally\nsupposed to be, nor is there any reason to think that in the\nphysical world there is anything even remotely analogous to what\nwill is supposed to be. If we could find one antecedent, and only\none, that was QUITE invariable, we could call that one THE cause\nwithout introducing any notion derived from mistaken ideas about\nwill. But in fact we cannot find any antecedent that we know to\nbe quite invariable, and we can find many that are nearly so. For\nexample, men leave a factory for dinner when the hooter sounds at\ntwelve o'clock. You may say the hooter is THE cause of their\nleaving. But innumerable other hooters in other factories, which\nalso always sound at twelve o'clock, have just as good a right to\nbe called the cause. Thus every event has many nearly invariable\nantecedents, and therefore many antecedents which may be called\nits cause.\n\nThe laws of traditional physics, in the form in which they deal\nwith movements of matter or electricity, have an apparent\nsimplicity which somewhat conceals the empirical character of\nwhat they assert. A piece of matter, as it is known empirically,\nis not a single existing thing, but a system of existing things.\nWhen several people simultaneously see the same table, they all\nsee something different; therefore \"the\" table, which they are\nsupposed all to see, must be either a hypothesis or a\nconstruction. \"The\" table is to be neutral as between different\nobservers: it does not favour the aspect seen by one man at the\nexpense of that seen by another. It was natural, though to my\nmind mistaken, to regard the \"real\" table as the common cause of\nall the appearances which the table presents (as we say) to\ndifferent observers. But why should we suppose that there is some\none common cause of all these appearances? As we have just seen,\nthe notion of \"cause\" is not so reliable as to allow us to infer\nthe existence of something that, by its very nature, can never be\nobserved.\n\nInstead of looking for an impartial source, we can secure\nneutrality by the equal representation of all parties. Instead of\nsupposing that there is some unknown cause, the \"real\" table,\nbehind the different sensations of those who are said to be\nlooking at the table, we may take the whole set of these\nsensations (together possibly with certain other particulars) as\nactually BEING the table. That is to say, the table which is\nneutral as between different observers (actual and possible) is\nthe set of all those particulars which would naturally be called\n\"aspects\" of the table from different points of view. (This is a\nfirst approximation, modified later.)\n\nIt may be said: If there is no single existent which is the\nsource of all these \"aspects,\" how are they collected together?\nThe answer is simple: Just as they would be if there were such a\nsingle existent. The supposed \"real\" table underlying its\nappearances is, in any case, not itself perceived, but inferred,\nand the question whether such-and-such a particular is an\n\"aspect\" of this table is only to be settled by the connection of\nthe particular in question with the one or more particulars by\nwhich the table is defined. That is to say, even if we assume a\n\"real\" table, the particulars which are its aspects have to be\ncollected together by their relations to each other, not to it,\nsince it is merely inferred from them. We have only, therefore,\nto notice how they are collected together, and we can then keep\nthe collection without assuming any \"real\" table as distinct from\nthe collection. When different people see what they call the same\ntable, they see things which are not exactly the same, owing to\ndifference of point of view, but which are sufficiently alike to\nbe described in the same words, so long as no great accuracy or\nminuteness is sought. These closely similar particulars are\ncollected together by their similarity primarily and, more\ncorrectly, by the fact that they are related to each other\napproximately according to the laws of perspective and of\nreflection and diffraction of light. I suggest, as a first\napproximation, that these particulars, together with such\ncorrelated others as are unperceived, jointly ARE the table; and\nthat a similar definition applies to all physical objects.\n\nIn order to eliminate the reference to our perceptions, which\nintroduces an irrelevant psychological suggestion, I will take a\ndifferent illustration, namely, stellar photography. A\nphotographic plate exposed on a clear night reproduces the\nappearance of the portion of the sky concerned, with more or\nfewer stars according to the power of the telescope that is being\nused. Each separate star which is photographed produces its\nseparate effect on the plate, just as it would upon ourselves if\nwe were looking at the sky. If we assume, as science normally\ndoes, the continuity of physical processes, we are forced to\nconclude that, at the place where the plate is, and at all places\nbetween it and a star which it photographs, SOMETHING is\nhappening which is specially connected with that star. In the\ndays when the aether was less in doubt, we should have said that\nwhat was happening was a certain kind of transverse vibration in\nthe aether. But it is not necessary or desirable to be so\nexplicit: all that we need say is that SOMETHING happens which is\nspecially connected with the star in question. It must be\nsomething specially connected with that star, since that star\nproduces its own special effect upon the plate. Whatever it is\nmust be the end of a process which starts from the star and\nradiates outwards, partly on general grounds of continuity,\npartly to account for the fact that light is transmitted with a\ncertain definite velocity. We thus arrive at the conclusion that,\nif a certain star is visible at a certain place, or could be\nphotographed by a sufficiently sensitive plate at that place,\nsomething is happening there which is specially connected with\nthat star. Therefore in every place at all times a vast multitude\nof things must be happening, namely, at least one for every\nphysical object which can be seen or photographed from that\nplace. We can classify such happenings on either of two\nprinciples:\n\n(1) We can collect together all the happenings in one place, as\nis done by photography so far as light is concerned;\n\n(2) We can collect together all the happenings, in different\nplaces, which are connected in the way that common sense regards\nas being due to their emanating from one object.\n\nThus, to return to the stars, we can collect together either--\n\n(1) All the appearances of different stars in a given place, or,\n\n(2) All the appearances of a given star in different places.\n\nBut when I speak of \"appearances,\" I do so only for brevity: I do\nnot mean anything that must \"appear\" to somebody, but only that\nhappening, whatever it may be, which is connected, at the place\nin question, with a given physical object--according to the old\northodox theory, it would be a transverse vibration in the\naether. Like the different appearances of the table to a number\nof simultaneous observers, the different particulars that belong\nto one physical object are to be collected together by continuity\nand inherent laws of correlation, not by their supposed causal\nconnection with an unknown assumed existent called a piece of\nmatter, which would be a mere unnecessary metaphysical thing in\nitself. A piece of matter, according to the definition that I\npropose, is, as a first approximation, the collection of all\nthose correlated particulars which would normally be regarded as\nits appearances or effects in different places. Some further\nelaborations are desirable, but we can ignore them for the\npresent. I shall return to them at the end of this lecture.\n\nAccording to the view that I am suggesting, a physical object or\npiece of matter is the collection of all those correlated\nparticulars which would be regarded by common sense as its\neffects or appearances in different places. On the other hand,\nall the happenings in a given place represent what common sense\nwould regard as the appearances of a number of different objects\nas viewed from that place. All the happenings in one place may be\nregarded as the view of the world from that place. I shall call\nthe view of the world from a given place a \"perspective.\" A\nphotograph represents a perspective. On the other hand, if\nphotographs of the stars were taken in all points throughout\nspace, and in all such photographs a certain star, say Sirius,\nwere picked out whenever it appeared, all the different\nappearances of Sirius, taken together, would represent Sirius.\nFor the understanding of the difference between psychology and\nphysics it is vital to understand these two ways of classifying\nparticulars, namely:\n\n(1) According to the place where they occur;\n\n(2) According to the system of correlated particulars in\ndifferent places to which they belong, such system being defined\nas a physical object.\n\nGiven a system of particulars which is a physical object, I shall\ndefine that one of the system which is in a given place (if any)\nas the \"appearance of that object in that place.\"\n\nWhen the appearance of an object in a given place changes, it is\nfound that one or other of two things occurs. The two\npossibilities may be illustrated by an example. You are in a room\nwith a man, whom you see: you may cease to see him either by\nshutting your eyes or by his going out of the room. In the first\ncase, his appearance to other people remains unchanged; in the\nsecond, his appearance changes from all places. In the first\ncase, you say that it is not he who has changed, but your eyes;\nin the second, you say that he has changed. Generalizing, we\ndistinguish--\n\n(1) Cases in which only certain appearances of the object change,\nwhile others, and especially appearances from places very near to\nthe object, do not change;\n\n(2) Cases where all, or almost all, the appearances of the object\nundergo a connected change.\n\nIn the first case, the change is attributed to the medium between\nthe object and the place; in the second, it is attributed to the\nobject itself.\n\nIt is the frequency of the latter kind of change, and the\ncomparatively simple nature of the laws governing the\nsimultaneous alterations of appearances in such cases, that have\nmade it possible to treat a physical object as one thing, and to\noverlook the fact that it is a system of particulars. When a\nnumber of people at a theatre watch an actor, the changes in\ntheir several perspectives are so similar and so closely\ncorrelated that all are popularly regarded as identical with each\nother and with the changes of the actor himself. So long as all\nthe changes in the appearances of a body are thus correlated\nthere is no pressing prima facie need to break up the system of\nappearances, or to realize that the body in question is not\nreally one thing but a set of correlated particulars. It is\nespecially and primarily such changes that physics deals with,\ni.e. it deals primarily with processes in which the unity of a\nphysical object need not be broken up because all its appearances\nchange simultaneously according to the same law--or, if not all,\nat any rate all from places sufficiently near to the object, with\nin creasing accuracy as we approach the object.\n\nThe changes in appearances of an object which are due to changes\nin the intervening medium will not affect, or will affect only\nvery slightly, the appearances from places close to the object.\nIf the appearances from sufficiently neighbouring places are\neither wholly un changed, or changed to a diminishing extent\nwhich has zero for its limit, it is usually found that the\nchanges can be accounted for by changes in objects which are\nbetween the object in question and the places from which its\nappearance has changed appreciably. Thus physics is able to\nreduce the laws of most changes with which it deals to changes in\nphysical objects, and to state most of its fundamental laws in\nterms of matter. It is only in those cases in which the unity of\nthe system of appearances constituting a piece of matter has to\nbe broken up, that the statement of what is happening cannot be\nmade exclusively in terms of matter. The whole of psychology, we\nshall find, is included among such cases; hence their importance\nfor our purposes.\n\nWe can now begin to understand one of the fundamental differences\nbetween physics and psychology. Physics treats as a unit the\nwhole system of appearances of a piece of matter, whereas\npsychology is interested in certain of these appearances\nthemselves. Confining ourselves for the moment to the psychology\nof perceptions, we observe that perceptions are certain of the\nappearances of physical objects. From the point of view that we\nhave been hitherto adopting, we might define them as the\nappearances of objects at places from which sense-organs and the\nsuitable parts of the nervous system form part of the intervening\nmedium. Just as a photographic plate receives a different\nimpression of a cluster of stars when a telescope is part of the\nintervening medium, so a brain receives a different impression\nwhen an eye and an optic nerve are part of the intervening\nmedium. An impression due to this sort of intervening medium is\ncalled a perception, and is interesting to psychology on its own\naccount, not merely as one of the set of correlated particulars\nwhich is the physical object of which (as we say) we are having a\nperception.\n\nWe spoke earlier of two ways of classifying particulars. One way\ncollects together the appearances commonly regarded as a given\nobject from different places; this is, broadly speaking, the way\nof physics, leading to the construction of physical objects as\nsets of such appearances. The other way collects together the\nappearances of different objects from a given place, the result\nbeing what we call a perspective. In the particular case where\nthe place concerned is a human brain, the perspective belonging\nto the place consists of all the perceptions of a certain man at\na given time. Thus classification by perspectives is relevant to\npsychology, and is essential in defining what we mean by one\nmind.\n\nI do not wish to suggest that the way in which I have been\ndefining perceptions is the only possible way, or even the best\nway. It is the way that arose naturally out of our present topic.\nBut when we approach psychology from a more introspective\nstandpoint, we have to distinguish sensations and perceptions, if\npossible, from other mental occurrences, if any. We have also to\nconsider the psychological effects of sensations, as opposed to\ntheir physical causes and correlates. These problems are quite\ndistinct from those with which we have been concerned in the\npresent lecture, and I shall not deal with them until a later\nstage.\n\nIt is clear that psychology is concerned essentially with actual\nparticulars, not merely with systems of particulars. In this it\ndiffers from physics, which, broadly speaking, is concerned with\nthe cases in which all the particulars which make up one physical\nobject can be treated as a single causal unit, or rather the\nparticulars which are sufficiently near to the object of which\nthey are appearances can be so treated. The laws which physics\nseeks can, broadly speaking, be stated by treating such systems\nof particulars as causal units. The laws which psychology seeks\ncannot be so stated, since the particulars themselves are what\ninterests the psychologist. This is one of the fundamental\ndifferences between physics and psychology; and to make it clear\nhas been the main purpose of this lecture.\n\nI will conclude with an attempt to give a more precise definition\nof a piece of matter. The appearances of a piece of matter from\ndifferent places change partly according to intrinsic laws (the\nlaws of perspective, in the case of visual shape), partly\naccording to the nature of the intervening medium--fog, blue\nspectacles, telescopes, microscopes, sense-organs, etc. As we\napproach nearer to the object, the effect of the intervening\nmedium grows less. In a generalized sense, all the intrinsic laws\nof change of appearance may be called \"laws of perspective.\"\nGiven any appearance of an object, we can construct\nhypothetically a certain system of appearances to which the\nappearance in question would belong if the laws of perspective\nalone were concerned. If we construct this hypothetical system\nfor each appearance of the object in turn, the system\ncorresponding to a given appearance x will be independent of any\ndistortion due to the medium beyond x, and will only embody such\ndistortion as is due to the medium between x and the object.\nThus, as the appearance by which our hypothetical system is\ndefined is moved nearer and nearer to the object, the\nhypothetical system of appearances defined by its means embodies\nless and less of the effect of the medium. The different sets of\nappearances resulting from moving x nearer and nearer to the\nobject will approach to a limiting set, and this limiting set\nwill be that system of appearances which the object would present\nif the laws of perspective alone were operative and the medium\nexercised no distorting effect. This limiting set of appearances\nmay be defined, for purposes of physics, as the piece of matter\nconcerned.\n\n{{reflist|1|refs=","title":"The Analysis of Mind/Lecture V","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":4093}