{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_VI/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_VI","id":"wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_VI","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Analysis_of_Mind/Lecture_VI","summary":null,"tags":["Headers_applying_DefaultSort_key","Subpages"],"text":"One of the main purposes of these lectures is to give grounds for\nthe belief that the distinction between mind and matter is not so\nfundamental as is commonly supposed. In the preceding lecture I\ndealt in outline with the physical side of this problem. I\nattempted to show that what we call a material object is not\nitself a substance, but is a system of particulars analogous in\ntheir nature to sensations, and in fact often including actual\nsensations among their number. In this way the stuff of which\nphysical objects are composed is brought into relation with the\nstuff of which part, at least, of our mental life is composed.\n\nThere is, however, a converse task which is equally necessary for\nour thesis, and that is, to show that the stuff of our mental\nlife is devoid of many qualities which it is commonly supposed to\nhave, and is not possessed of any attributes which make it\nincapable of forming part of the world of matter. In the present\nlecture I shall begin the arguments for this view.\n\nCorresponding to the supposed duality of matter and mind, there\nare, in orthodox psychology, two ways of knowing what exists. One\nof these, the way of sensation and external perception, is\nsupposed to furnish data for our knowledge of matter, the other,\ncalled \"introspection,\" is supposed to furnish data for knowledge\nof our mental processes. To common sense, this distinction seems\nclear and easy. When you see a friend coming along the street,\nyou acquire knowledge of an external, physical fact; when you\nrealize that you are glad to meet him, you acquire knowledge of a\nmental fact. Your dreams and memories and thoughts, of which you\nare often conscious, are mental facts, and the process by which\nyou become aware of them SEEMS to be different from sensation.\nKant calls it the \"inner sense\"; sometimes it is spoken of as\n\"consciousness of self\"; but its commonest name in modern English\npsychology is \"introspection.\" It is this supposed method of\nacquiring knowledge of our mental processes that I wish to\nanalyse and examine in this lecture.\n\nI will state at the outset the view which I shall aim at\nestablishing. I believe that the stuff of our mental life, as\nopposed to its relations and structure, consists wholly of\nsensations and images. Sensations are connected with matter in\nthe way that I tried to explain in Lecture V, i.e. each is a\nmember of a system which is a certain physical object. Images,\nthough they USUALLY have certain characteristics, especially lack\nof vividness, that distinguish them from sensations, are not\nINVARIABLY so distinguished, and cannot therefore be defined by\nthese characteristics. Images, as opposed to sensations, can only\nbe defined by their different causation: they are caused by\nassociation with a sensation, not by a stimulus external to the\nnervous system--or perhaps one should say external to the brain,\nwhere the higher animals are concerned. The occurrence of a\nsensation or image does not in itself constitute knowledge but\nany sensation or image may come to be known if the conditions are\nsuitable. When a sensation--like the hearing of a clap of\nthunder--is normally correlated with closely similar sensations\nin our neighbours, we regard it as giving knowledge of the\nexternal world, since we regard the whole set of similar\nsensations as due to a common external cause. But images and\nbodily sensations are not so correlated. Bodily sensations can be\nbrought into a correlation by physiology, and thus take their\nplace ultimately among sources of knowledge of the physical\nworld. But images cannot be made to fit in with the simultaneous\nsensations and images of others. Apart from their hypothetical\ncauses in the brain, they have a causal connection with physical\nobjects, through the fact that they are copies of past\nsensations; but the physical objects with which they are thus\nconnected are in the past, not in the present. These images\nremain private in a sense in which sensations are not. A\nsensation SEEMS to give us knowledge of a present physical\nobject, while an image does not, except when it amounts to a\nhallucination, and in this case the seeming is deceptive. Thus\nthe whole context of the two occurrences is different. But in\nthemselves they do not differ profoundly, and there is no reason\nto invoke two different ways of knowing for the one and for the\nother. Consequently introspection as a separate kind of knowledge\ndisappears.\n\nThe criticism of introspection has been in the main the work of\nAmerican psychologists. I will begin by summarizing an article\nwhich seems to me to afford a good specimen of their arguments,\nnamely, \"The Case against Introspection,\" by Knight Dunlap\n(\"Psychological Review,\" vol xix, No. 5, pp. 404-413, September,\n1912). After a few historical quotations, he comes to two modern\ndefenders of introspection, Stout and James. He quotes from Stout\nsuch statements as the following: \"Psychical states as such\nbecome objects only when we attend to them in an introspective\nway. Otherwise they are not themselves objects, but only\nconstituents of the process by which objects are recognized\"\n(\"Manual,\" 2nd edition, p. 134. The word \"recognized\" in Dunlap's\nquotation should be \"cognized.\") \"The object itself can never be\nidentified with the present modification of the individual's\nconsciousness by which it is cognized\" (ib. p. 60). This is to be\ntrue even when we are thinking about modifications of our own\nconsciousness; such modifications are to be always at least\npartially distinct from the conscious experience in which we\nthink of them.\n\nAt this point I wish to interrupt the account of Knight Dunlap's\narticle in order to make some observations on my own account with\nreference to the above quotations from Stout. In the first place,\nthe conception of \"psychical states\" seems to me one which\ndemands analysis of a somewhat destructive character. This\nanalysis I shall give in later lectures as regards cognition; I\nhave already given it as regards desire. In the second place, the\nconception of \"objects\" depends upon a certain view as to\ncognition which I believe to be wholly mistaken, namely, the view\nwhich I discussed in my first lecture in connection with\nBrentano. In this view a single cognitive occurrence contains\nboth content and object, the content being essentially mental,\nwhile the object is physical except in introspection and abstract\nthought. I have already criticized this view, and will not dwell\nupon it now, beyond saying that \"the process by which objects are\ncognized\" appears to be a very slippery phrase. When we \"see a\ntable,\" as common sense would say, the table as a physical object\nis not the \"object\" (in the psychological sense) of our\nperception. Our perception is made up of sensations, images and\nbeliefs, but the supposed \"object\" is something inferential,\nexternally related, not logically bound up with what is occurring\nin us. This question of the nature of the object also affects the\nview we take of self-consciousness. Obviously, a \"conscious\nexperience\" is different from a physical object; therefore it is\nnatural to assume that a thought or perception whose object is a\nconscious experience must be different from a thought or\nperception whose object is a physical object. But if the relation\nto the object is inferential and external, as I maintain, the\ndifference between two thoughts may bear very little relation to\nthe difference between their objects. And to speak of \"the\npresent modification of the individual's consciousness by which\nan object is cognized\" is to suggest that the cognition of\nobjects is a far more direct process, far more intimately bound\nup with the objects, than I believe it to be. All these points\nwill be amplified when we come to the analysis of knowledge, but\nit is necessary briefly to state them now in order to suggest the\natmosphere in which our analysis of \"introspection\" is to be\ncarried on.\n\nAnother point in which Stout's remarks seem to me to suggest what\nI regard as mistakes is his use of \"consciousness.\" There is a\nview which is prevalent among psychologists, to the effect that\none can speak of \"a conscious experience\" in a curious dual\nsense, meaning, on the one hand, an experience which is conscious\nof something, and, on the other hand, an experience which has\nsome intrinsic nature characteristic of what is called\n\"consciousness.\" That is to say, a \"conscious experience\" is\ncharacterized on the one hand by relation to its object and on\nthe other hand by being composed of a certain peculiar stuff, the\nstuff of \"consciousness.\" And in many authors there is yet a\nthird confusion: a \"conscious experience,\" in this third sense,\nis an experience of which we are conscious. All these, it seems\nto me, need to be clearly separated. To say that one occurrence\nis \"conscious\" of another is, to my mind, to assert an external\nand rather remote relation between them. I might illustrate it by\nthe relation of uncle and nephew a man becomes an uncle through\nno effort of his own, merely through an occurrence elsewhere.\nSimilarly, when you are said to be \"conscious\" of a table, the\nquestion whether this is really the case cannot be decided by\nexamining only your state of mind: it is necessary also to\nascertain whether your sensation is having those correlates which\npast experience causes you to assume, or whether the table\nhappens, in this case, to be a mirage. And, as I explained in my\nfirst lecture, I do not believe that there is any \"stuff\" of\nconsciousness, so that there is no intrinsic character by which a\n\"conscious\" experience could be distinguished from any other.\n\nAfter these preliminaries, we can return to Knight Dunlap's\narticle. His criticism of Stout turns on the difficulty of giving\nany empirical meaning to such notions as the \"mind\" or the\n\"subject\"; he quotes from Stout the sentence: \"The most important\ndrawback is that the mind, in watching its own workings, must\nnecessarily have its attention divided between two objects,\" and\nhe concludes: \"Without question, Stout is bringing in here\nillicitly the concept of a single observer, and his introspection\ndoes not provide for the observation of this observer; for the\nprocess observed and the observer are distinct\" (p. 407). The\nobjections to any theory which brings in the single observer were\nconsidered in Lecture I, and were acknowledged to be cogent. In\nso far, therefore, as Stout's theory of introspection rests upon\nthis assumption, we are compelled to reject it. But it is\nperfectly possible to believe in introspection without supposing\nthat there is a single observer.\n\nWilliam James's theory of introspection, which Dunlap next\nexamines, does not assume a single observer. It changed after the\npublication of his \"Psychology,\" in consequence of his abandoning\nthe dualism of thought and things. Dunlap summarizes his theory\nas follows:\n\n\"The essential points in James's scheme of consciousness are\nSUBJECT, OBJECT,and a KNOWING of the object by the subject. The\ndifference between James's scheme and other schemes involving the\nsame terms is that James considers subject and object to be the\nsame thing, but at different times In order to satisfy this\nrequirement James supposes a realm of existence which he at first\ncalled 'states of consciousness' or 'thoughts,' and later, 'pure\nexperience,' the latter term including both the 'thoughts' and\nthe 'knowing.' This scheme, with all its magnificent\nartificiality, James held on to until the end, simply dropping\nthe term consciousness and the dualism between the thought and an\nexternal reality\"(p. 409).\n\nHe adds: \"All that James's system really amounts to is the\nacknowledgment that a succession of things are known, and that\nthey are known by something. This is all any one can claim,\nexcept for the fact that the things are known together, and that\nthe knower for the different items is one and the same\" (ib.).\n\nIn this statement, to my mind, Dunlap concedes far more than\nJames did in his later theory. I see no reason to suppose that\n\"the knower for different items is one and the same,\" and I am\nconvinced that this proposition could not possibly be ascertained\nexcept by introspection of the sort that Dunlap rejects. The\nfirst of these points must wait until we come to the analysis of\nbelief: the second must be considered now. Dunlap's view is that\nthere is a dualism of subject and object, but that the subject\ncan never become object, and therefore there is no awareness of\nan awareness. He says in discussing the view that introspection\nreveals the occurrence of knowledge: \"There can be no denial of\nthe existence of the thing (knowing) which is alleged to be known\nor observed in this sort of 'introspection.' The allegation that\nthe knowing is observed is that which may be denied. Knowing\nthere certainly is; known, the knowing certainly is not\"(p. 410).\nAnd again: \"I am never aware of an awareness\" (ib.). And on the\nnext page: \"It may sound paradoxical to say that one cannot\nobserve the process (or relation) of observation, and yet may be\ncertain that there is such a process: but there is really no\ninconsistency in the saying. How do I know that there is\nawareness? By being aware of something. There is no meaning in\nthe term 'awareness' which is not expressed in the statement 'I\nam aware of a colour (or what-not).' \"\n\nBut the paradox cannot be so lightly disposed of. The statement\n\"I am aware of a colour\" is assumed by Knight Dunlap to be known\nto be true, but he does not explain how it comes to be known. The\nargument against him is not conclusive, since he may be able to\nshow some valid way of inferring our awareness. But he does not\nsuggest any such way. There is nothing odd in the hypothesis of\nbeings which are aware of objects, but not of their own\nawareness; it is, indeed, highly probable that young children and\nthe higher animals are such beings. But such beings cannot make\nthe statement \"I am aware of a colour,\" which WE can make. We\nhave, therefore, some knowledge which they lack. It is necessary\nto Knight Dunlap's position to maintain that this additional\nknowledge is purely inferential, but he makes no attempt to show\nhow the inference is possible. It may, of course, be possible,\nbut I cannot see how. To my mind the fact (which he admits) that\nwe know there is awareness, is ALL BUT decisive against his\ntheory, and in favour of the view that we can be aware of an\nawareness.\n\nDunlap asserts (to return to James) that the real ground for\nJames's original belief in introspection was his belief in two\nsorts of objects, namely, thoughts and things. He suggests that\nit was a mere inconsistency on James's part to adhere to\nintrospection after abandoning the dualism of thoughts and\nthings. I do not wholly agree with this view, but it is difficult\nto disentangle the difference as to introspection from the\ndifference as to the nature of knowing. Dunlap suggests (p. 411)\nthat what is called introspection really consists of awareness of\n\"images,\" visceral sensations, and so on. This view, in essence,\nseems to me sound. But then I hold that knowing itself consists\nof such constituents suitably related, and that in being aware of\nthem we are sometimes being aware of instances of knowing. For\nthis reason, much as I agree with his view as to what are the\nobjects of which there is awareness, I cannot wholly agree with\nhis conclusion as to the impossibility of introspection.\n\nThe behaviourists have challenged introspection even more\nvigorously than Knight Dunlap, and have gone so far as to deny\nthe existence of images. But I think that they have confused\nvarious things which are very commonly confused, and that it is\nnecessary to make several distinctions before we can arrive at\nwhat is true and what false in the criticism of introspection.\n\nI wish to distinguish three distinct questions, any one of which\nmay be meant when we ask whether introspection is a source of\nknowledge. The three questions are as follows:\n\n(1) Can we observe anything about ourselves which we cannot\nobserve about other people, or is everything we can observe\nPUBLIC, in the sense that another could also observe it if\nsuitably placed?\n\n(2) Does everything that we can observe obey the laws of physics\nand form part of the physical world, or can we observe certain\nthings that lie outside physics?\n\n(3) Can we observe anything which differs in its intrinsic nature\nfrom the constituents of the physical world, or is everything\nthat we can observe composed of elements intrinsically similar to\nthe constituents of what is called matter?\n\nAny one of these three questions may be used to define\nintrospection. I should favour introspection in the sense of the\nfirst question, i.e. I think that some of the things we observe\ncannot, even theoretically, be observed by any one else. The\nsecond question, tentatively and for the present, I should answer\nin favour of introspection; I think that images, in the actual\ncondition of science, cannot be brought under the causal laws of\nphysics, though perhaps ultimately they may be. The third\nquestion I should answer adversely to introspection I think that\nobservation shows us nothing that is not composed of sensations\nand images, and that images differ from sensations in their\ncausal laws, not intrinsically. I shall deal with the three\nquestions successively.\n\n(1) PUBLICITY OR PRIVACY OF WHAT IS OBSERVED. Confining\nourselves, for the moment, to sensations, we find that there are\ndifferent degrees of publicity attaching to different sorts of\nsensations. If you feel a toothache when the other people in the\nroom do not, you are in no way surprised; but if you hear a clap\nof thunder when they do not, you begin to be alarmed as to your\nmental condition. Sight and hearing are the most public of the\nsenses; smell only a trifle less so; touch, again, a trifle less,\nsince two people can only touch the same spot successively, not\nsimultaneously. Taste has a sort of semi-publicity, since people\nseem to experience similar taste-sensations when they eat similar\nfoods; but the publicity is incomplete, since two people cannot\neat actually the same piece of food.\n\nBut when we pass on to bodily sensations--headache, toothache,\nhunger, thirst, the feeling of fatigue, and so on--we get quite\naway from publicity, into a region where other people can tell us\nwhat they feel, but we cannot directly observe their feeling. As\na natural result of this state of affairs, it has come to be\nthought that the public senses give us knowledge of the outer\nworld, while the private senses only give us knowledge as to our\nown bodies. As regards privacy, all images, of whatever sort,\nbelong with the sensations which only give knowledge of our own\nbodies, i.e. each is only observable by one observer. This is the\nreason why images of sight and hearing are more obviously\ndifferent from sensations of sight and hearing than images of\nbodily sensations are from bodily sensations; and that is why the\nargument in favour of images is more conclusive in such cases as\nsight and hearing than in such cases as inner speech.\n\nThe whole distinction of privacy and publicity, however, so long\nas we confine ourselves to sensations, is one of degree, not of\nkind. No two people, there is good empirical reason to think,\never have exactly similar sensations related to the same physical\nobject at the same moment; on the other hand, even the most\nprivate sensation has correlations which would theoretically\nenable another observer to infer it.\n\nThat no sensation is ever completely public, results from\ndifferences of point of view. Two people looking at the same\ntable do not get the same sensation, because of perspective and\nthe way the light falls. They get only correlated sensations. Two\npeople listening to the same sound do not hear exactly the same\nthing, because one is nearer to the source of the sound than the\nother, one has better hearing than the other, and so on. Thus\npublicity in sensations consists, not in having PRECISELY similar\nsensations, but in having more or less similar sensations\ncorrelated according to ascertainable laws. The sensations which\nstrike us as public are those where the correlated sensations are\nvery similar and the correlations are very easy to discover. But\neven the most private sensations have correlations with things\nthat others can observe. The dentist does not observe your ache,\nbut he can see the cavity which causes it, and could guess that\nyou are suffering even if you did not tell him. This fact,\nhowever, cannot be used, as Watson would apparently wish, to\nextrude from science observations which are private to one\nobserver, since it is by means of many such observations that\ncorrelations are established, e.g. between toothaches and\ncavities. Privacy, therefore does not by itself make a datum\nunamenable to scientific treatment. On this point, the argument\nagainst introspection must be rejected.\n\n(2) DOES EVERYTHING OBSERVABLE OBEY THE LAWS OF PHYSICS? We come\nnow to the second ground of objection to introspection, namely,\nthat its data do not obey the laws of physics. This, though less\nemphasized, is, I think, an objection which is really more\nstrongly felt than the objection of privacy. And we obtain a\ndefinition of introspection more in harmony with usage if we\ndefine it as observation of data not subject to physical laws\nthan if we define it by means of privacy. No one would regard a\nman as introspective because he was conscious of having a stomach\nache. Opponents of introspection do not mean to deny the obvious\nfact that we can observe bodily sensations which others cannot\nobserve. For example, Knight Dunlap contends that images are\nreally muscular contractions, and evidently regards our\nawareness of muscular contractions as not coming under the head\nof introspection. I think it will be found that the essential\ncharacteristic of introspective data, in the sense which now\nconcerns us, has to do with LOCALIZATION: either they are not\nlocalized at all, or they are localized, like visual images, in a\nplace already physically occupied by something which would be\ninconsistent with them if they were regarded as part of the\nphysical world. If you have a visual image of your friend sitting\nin a chair which in fact is empty, you cannot locate the image in\nyour body, because it is visual, nor (as a physical phenomenon)\nin the chair, because the chair, as a physical object, is empty.\nThus it seems to follow that the physical world does not include\nall that we are aware of, and that images, which are\nintrospective data, have to be regarded, for the present, as not\nobeying the laws of physics; this is, I think, one of the chief\nreasons why an attempt is made to reject them. I shall try to\nshow in Lecture VIII that the purely empirical reasons for\naccepting images are overwhelming. But we cannot be nearly so\ncertain that they will not ultimately be brought under the laws\nof physics. Even if this should happen, however, they would still\nbe distinguishable from sensations by their proximate causal\nlaws, as gases remain distinguishable from solids.\n\n(3) CAN WE OBSERVE ANYTHING INTRINSICALLY DIFFERENT FROM\nSENSATIONS? We come now to our third question concerning\nintrospection. It is commonly thought that by looking within we\ncan observe all sorts of things that are radically different from\nthe constituents of the physical world, e.g. thoughts, beliefs,\ndesires, pleasures, pains and emotions. The difference between\nmind and matter is increased partly by emphasizing these supposed\nintrospective data, partly by the supposition that matter is\ncomposed of atoms or electrons or whatever units physics may at\nthe moment prefer. As against this latter supposition, I contend\nthat the ultimate constituents of matter are not atoms or\nelectrons, but sensations, and other things similar to sensations\nas regards extent and duration. As against the view that\nintrospection reveals a mental world radically different from\nsensations, I propose to argue that thoughts, beliefs, desires,\npleasures, pains and emotions are all built up out of sensations\nand images alone, and that there is reason to think that images\ndo not differ from sensations in their intrinsic character. We\nthus effect a mutual rapprochement of mind and matter, and reduce\nthe ultimate data of introspection (in our second sense) to\nimages alone. On this third view of the meaning of introspection,\ntherefore, our decision is wholly against it.\n\nThere remain two points to be considered concerning\nintrospection. The first is as to how far it is trustworthy; the\nsecond is as to whether, even granting that it reveals no\nradically different STUFF from that revealed by what might be\ncalled external perception, it may not reveal different\nRELATIONS, and thus acquire almost as much importance as is\ntraditionally assigned to it.\n\nTo begin with the trustworthiness of introspection. It is common\namong certain schools to regard the knowledge of our own mental\nprocesses as incomparably more certain than our knowledge of the\n\"external\" world; this view is to be found in the British\nphilosophy which descends from Hume, and is present, somewhat\nveiled, in Kant and his followers. There seems no reason whatever\nto accept this view. Our spontaneous, unsophisticated beliefs,\nwhether as to ourselves or as to the outer world, are always\nextremely rash and very liable to error. The acquisition of\ncaution is equally necessary and equally difficult in both\ndirections. Not only are we often un aware of entertaining a\nbelief or desire which exists in us; we are often actually\nmistaken. The fallibility of introspection as regards what we\ndesire is made evident by psycho-analysis; its fallibility as to\nwhat we know is easily demonstrated. An autobiography, when\nconfronted by a careful editor with documentary evidence, is\nusually found to be full of obviously inadvertent errors. Any of\nus confronted by a forgotten letter written some years ago will\nbe astonished to find how much more foolish our opinions were\nthan we had remembered them as being. And as to the analysis of\nour mental operations--believing, desiring, willing, or what\nnot--introspection unaided gives very little help: it is\nnecessary to construct hypotheses and test them by their\nconsequences, just as we do in physical science. Introspection,\ntherefore, though it is one among our sources of knowledge, is\nnot, in isolation, in any degree more trustworthy than \"external\"\nperception.\n\nI come now to our second question: Does introspection give us\nmaterials for the knowledge of relations other than those arrived\nat by reflecting upon external perception? It might be contended\nthat the essence of what is \"mental\" consists of relations, such\nas knowing for example, and that our knowledge concerning these\nessentially mental relations is entirely derived from\nintrospection. If \"knowing\" were an unanalysable relation, this\nview would be incontrovertible, since clearly no such relation\nforms part of the subject matter of physics. But it would seem\nthat \"knowing\" is really various relations, all of them complex.\nTherefore, until they have been analysed, our present question\nmust remain unanswered I shall return to it at the end of the\npresent course of lectures.\n\n{{reflist|2|refs=","title":"The Analysis of Mind/Lecture VI","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":4579}