{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XI/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XI","id":"wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XI","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Analysis_of_Mind/Lecture_XI","summary":null,"tags":["Headers_applying_DefaultSort_key","Subpages"],"text":"It is said to be one of the merits of the human mind that it is\ncapable of framing abstract ideas, and of conducting\nnonsensational thought. In this it is supposed to differ from the\nmind of animals. From Plato onward the \"idea\" has played a great\npart in the systems of idealizing philosophers. The \"idea\" has\nbeen, in their hands, always something noble and abstract, the\napprehension and use of which by man confers upon him a quite\nspecial dignity.\n\nThe thing we have to consider to-day is this: seeing that there\ncertainly are words of which the meaning is abstract, and seeing\nthat we can use these words intelligently, what must be assumed\nor inferred, or what can be discovered by observation, in the way\nof mental content to account for the intelligent use of abstract\nwords?\n\nTaken as a problem in logic, the answer is, of course, that\nabsolutely nothing in the way of abstract mental content is\ninferable from the mere fact that we can use intelligently words\nof which the meaning is abstract. It is clear that a sufficiently\ningenious person could manufacture a machine moved by olfactory\nstimuli which, whenever a dog appeared in its neighbourhood,\nwould say, \"There is a dog,\" and when a cat appeared would throw\nstones at it. The act of saying \"There is a dog,\" and the act of\nthrowing stones, would in such a case be equally mechanical.\nCorrect speech does not of itself afford any better evidence of\nmental content than the performance of any other set of\nbiologically useful movements, such as those of flight or combat.\nAll that is inferable from language is that two instances of a\nuniversal, even when they differ very greatly, may cause the\nutterance of two instances of the same word which only differ\nvery slightly. As we saw in the preceding lecture, the word \"dog\"\nis useful, partly, because two instances of this word are much\nmore similar than (say) a pug and a great dane. The use of words\nis thus a method of substituting for two particulars which differ\nwidely, in spite of being instances of the same universal, two\nother particulars which differ very little, and which are also\ninstances of a universal, namely the name of the previous\nuniversal. Thus, so far as logic is concerned, we are entirely\nfree to adopt any theory as to general ideas which empirical\nobservation may recommend.\n\nBerkeley and Hume made a vigorous onslaught on \"abstract ideas.\"\nThey meant by an idea approximately what we should call an image.\nLocke having maintained that he could form an idea of triangle in\ngeneral, without deciding what sort of triangle it was to be,\nBerkeley contended that this was impossible. He says:\n\n\"Whether others,have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their\nideas, they best can tell: for myself, I dare be confident I have\nit not. I find, indeed, I have indeed a faculty of imagining, or\nrepresenting to myself, the ideas of those particular things I\nhave perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I\ncan imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man\njoined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye,\nthe nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of\nthe body. But, then, whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have\nsome particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of a man that\nI frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a\ntawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a\nmiddle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the\nabstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for\nme to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body\nmoving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor\nrectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract\ngeneral ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to\nabstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts\nof qualities separated from others, with which, though they are\nunited in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist\nwithout them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or\nconceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible\nshould exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion,\nby abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid--which\nlast are the two proper acceptations of ABSTRACTION. And there is\nground to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my\ncase. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never\npretend to ABSTRACT NOTIONS. It is said they are difficult and\nnot to be attained without pains and study; we may therefore\nreasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined\nonly to the learned.\n\n\"I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the\ndoctrine of abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is\nthat inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so\nremote from common sense as that seems to be. There has been a\nlate excellent and deservedly esteemed philosopher who, no doubt,\nhas given it very much countenance, by seeming to think the\nhaving abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference\nin point of understanding betwixt man and beast. 'The having of\ngeneral ideas,' saith he, 'is that which puts a perfect\ndistinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which\nthe faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For, it is\nevident we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general\nsigns for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine\nthat they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general\nideas, since they have no use of words or any other general\nsigns.' And a little after: 'Therefore, I think, we may suppose\nthat it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated\nfrom men, and it is that proper difference wherein they are\nwholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance.\nFor, if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as\nsome would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason.\nIt seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain\ninstances reason as that they have sense; but it is only in\nparticular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses.\nThey are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and\nhave not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of\nabstraction.* (\"Essay on Human Understanding,\" Bk. II, chap. xi,\nparagraphs 10 and 11.) I readily agree with this learned author,\nthat the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to\nabstraction. But, then, if this be made the distinguishing\nproperty of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those\nthat pass for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason\nthat is here assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have\nabstract general ideas is, that we observe in them no use of\nwords or any other general signs; which is built on this\nsupposition-that the making use of words implies the having\ngeneral ideas. From which it follows that men who use language\nare able to abstract or generalize their ideas. That this is the\nsense and arguing of the author will further appear by his\nanswering the question he in another place puts: 'Since all\nthings that exist are only particulars, how come we by general\nterms?' His answer is: 'Words become general by being made the\nsigns of general ideas.' (\"Essay on Human Understanding,\" Bk.\nIII, chap. III, paragraph 6.) But it seems that a word becomes\ngeneral by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea,\nbut of several particular ideas, any one of which it\nindifferently suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said\n'the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force,' or\nthat 'whatever has extension is divisible,' these propositions\nare to be understood of motion and extension in general; and\nnevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my thoughts\nan idea of motion without a body moved, or any determinate\ndirection and velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract\ngeneral idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor\nsolid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any\nother determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever\nparticular motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow,\nperpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the\naxiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of\nevery particular extension, it matters not whether line, surface,\nor solid, whether of this or that magnitude or figure.\n\n\"By observing how ideas become general, we may the better judge\nhow words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not\ndeny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are\nany ABSTRACT general ideas; for, in the passages we have quoted\nwherein there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed\nthat they are formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth\nin sections 8 and 9. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our\nwords, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall\nacknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is\nparticular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand\nfor all other particular ideas of the same sort. To make this\nplain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the\nmethod of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for\ninstance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in\nitself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its\nsignification general, since, as it is there used, it represents\nall particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of\nit is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in\ngeneral. And, as THAT PARTICULAR LINE becomes general by being\nmade a sign, so the NAME 'line,' which taken absolutely is\nparticular, by being a sign is made general. And as the former\nowes its generality not to its being the sign of an abstract or\ngeneral line, but of all particular right lines that may possibly\nexist, so the latter must be thought to derive its generality\nfrom the same cause, namely, the various particular lines which\nit indifferently denotes.\"\n\nBerkeley's view in the above passage, which is essentially the\nsame as Hume's, does not wholly agree with modern psychology,\nalthough it comes nearer to agreement than does the view of those\nwho believe that there are in the mind single contents which can\nbe called abstract ideas. The way in which Berkeley's view is\ninadequate is chiefly in the fact that images are as a rule not\nof one definite prototype, but of a number of related similar\nprototypes. On this subject Semon has written well. In \"Die\nMneme,\" pp. 217 ff., discussing the effect of repeated similar\nstimuli in producing and modifying our images, he says: \"We\nchoose a case of mnemic excitement whose existence we can\nperceive for ourselves by introspection, and seek to ekphore the\nbodily picture of our nearest relation in his absence, and have\nthus a pure mnemic excitement before us. At first it may seem to\nus that a determinate quite concrete picture becomes manifest in\nus, but just when we are concerned with a person with whom we are\nin constant contact, we shall find that the ekphored picture has\nsomething so to speak generalized. It is something like those\nAmerican photographs which seek to display what is general about\na type by combining a great number of photographs of different\nheads over each other on one plate. In our opinion, the\ngeneralizations happen by the homophonic working of different\npictures of the same face which we have come across in the most\ndifferent conditions and situations, once pale, once reddened,\nonce cheerful, once earnest, once in this light, and once in\nthat. As soon as we do not let the whole series of repetitions\nresound in us uniformly, but give our attention to one particular\nmoment out of the many... this particular mnemic stimulus at once\noverbalances its simultaneously roused predecessors and\nsuccessors, and we perceive the face in question with concrete\ndefiniteness in that particular situation.\" A little later he\nsays: \"The result is--at least in man, but probably also in the\nhigher animals--the development of a sort of PHYSIOLOGICAL\nabstraction. Mnemic homophony gives us, without the addition of\nother processes of thought, a picture of our friend X which is in\na certain sense abstract, not the concrete in any one situation,\nbut X cut loose from any particular point of time. If the circle\nof ekphored engrams is drawn even more widely, abstract pictures\nof a higher order appear: for instance, a white man or a negro.\nIn my opinion, the first form of abstract concepts in general is\nbased upon such abstract pictures. The physiological abstraction\nwhich takes place in the above described manner is a predecessor\nof purely logical abstraction. It is by no means a monopoly of\nthe human race, but shows itself in various ways also among the\nmore highly organized animals.\" The same subject is treated in\nmore detail in Chapter xvi of \"Die mnemischen Empfindungen,\" but\nwhat is said there adds nothing vital to what is contained in the\nabove quotations.\n\nIt is necessary, however, to distinguish between the vague and\nthe general. So long as we are content with Semon's composite\nimage, we MAY get no farther than the vague. The question whether\nthis image takes us to the general or not depends, I think, upon\nthe question whether, in addition to the generalized image, we\nhave also particular images of some of the instances out of which\nit is compounded. Suppose, for example, that on a number of\noccasions you had seen one negro, and that you did not know\nwhether this one was the same or different on the different\noccasions. Suppose that in the end you had an abstract\nmemory-image of the different appearances presented by the negro\non different occasions, but no memory-image of any one of the\nsingle appearances. In that case your image would be vague. If,\non the other hand, you have, in addition to the generalized\nimage, particular images of the several appearances, sufficiently\nclear to be recognized as different, and as instances of the\ngeneralized picture, you will then not feel the generalized\npicture to be adequate to any one particular appearance, and you\nwill be able to make it function as a general idea rather than a\nvague idea. If this view is correct, no new general content needs\nto be added to the generalized image. What needs to be added is\nparticular images compared and contrasted with the generalized\nimage. So far as I can judge by introspection, this does occur in\npractice. Take for example Semon's instance of a friend's face.\nUnless we make some special effort of recollection, the face is\nlikely to come before us with an average expression, very blurred\nand vague, but we can at will recall how our friend looked on\nsome special occasion when he was pleased or angry or unhappy,\nand this enables us to realize the generalized character of the\nvague image.\n\nThere is, however, another way of distinguishing between the\nvague, the particular and the general, and this is not by their\ncontent, but by the reaction which they produce. A word, for\nexample, may be said to be vague when it is applicable to a\nnumber of different individuals, but to each as individuals; the\nname Smith, for example, is vague: it is always meant to apply to\none man, but there are many men to each of whom it applies. The\nword \"man,\" on the other hand, is general. We say, \"This is\nSmith,\" but we do not say \"This is man,\" but \"This is a man.\"\nThus we may say that a word embodies a vague idea when its\neffects are appropriate to an individual, but are the same for\nvarious similar individuals, while a word embodies a general idea\nwhen its effects are different from those appropriate to\nindividuals. In what this difference consists it is, however, not\neasy to say. I am inclined to think that it consists merely in\nthe knowledge that no one individual is represented, so that what\ndistinguishes a general idea from a vague idea is merely the\npresence of a certain accompanying belief. If this view is\ncorrect, a general idea differs from a vague one in a way\nanalogous to that in which a memory-image differs from an\nimagination-image. There also we found that the difference\nconsists merely of the fact that a memory-image is accompanied by\na belief, in this case as to the past.\n\nIt should also be said that our images even of quite particular\noccurrences have always a greater or a less degree of vagueness.\nThat is to say, the occurrence might have varied within certain\nlimits without causing our image to vary recognizably. To arrive\nat the general it is necessary that we should be able to contrast\nit with a number of relatively precise images or words for\nparticular occurrences; so long as all our images and words are\nvague, we cannot arrive at the contrast by which the general is\ndefined. This is the justification for the view which I quoted on\np. 184 from Ribot (op. cit., p. 32), viz. that intelligence\nprogresses from the indefinite to the definite, and that the\nvague appears earlier than either the particular or the general.\n\nI think the view which I have been advocating, to the effect that\na general idea is distinguished from a vague one by the presence\nof a judgment, is also that intended by Ribot when he says (op.\ncit., p. 92): \"The generic image is never, the concept is always,\na judgment. We know that for logicians (formerly at any rate) the\nconcept is the simple and primitive element; next comes the\njudgment, uniting two or several concepts; then ratiocination,\ncombining two or several judgments. For the psychologists, on the\ncontrary, affirmation is the fundamental act; the concept is the\nresult of judgment (explicit or implicit), of similarities with\nexclusion of differences.\"\n\nA great deal of work professing to be experimental has been done\nin recent years on the psychology of thought. A good summary of\nsuch work up to the year agog is contained in Titchener's\n\"Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought\nProcesses\" (1909). Three articles in the \"Archiv fur die gesammte\nPsychologie\" by Watt, Messer and Buhler contain a great\ndeal of the material amassed by the methods which Titchener calls\nexperimental.\n\nFor my part I am unable to attach as much importance to this work\nas many psychologists do. The method employed appears to me\nhardly to fulfil the conditions of scientific experiment. Broadly\nspeaking, what is done is, that a set of questions are asked of\nvarious people, their answers are recorded, and likewise their\nown accounts, based upon introspection, of the processes of\nthought which led them to give those answers. Much too much\nreliance seems to me to be placed upon the correctness of their\nintrospection. On introspection as a method I have spoken earlier\n(Lecture VI). I am not prepared, like Professor Watson, to reject\nit wholly, but I do consider that it is exceedingly fallible and\nquite peculiarly liable to falsification in accordance with\npreconceived theory. It is like depending upon the report of a\nshortsighted person as to whom he sees coming along the road at a\nmoment when he is firmly convinced that Jones is sure to come. If\neverybody were shortsighted and obsessed with beliefs as to what\nwas going to be visible, we might have to make the best of such\ntestimony, but we should need to correct its errors by taking\ncare to collect the simultaneous evidence of people with the most\ndivergent expectations. There is no evidence that this was done\nin the experiments in question, nor indeed that the influence of\ntheory in falsifying the introspection was at all adequately\nrecognized. I feel convinced that if Professor Watson had been\none of the subjects of the questionnaires, he would have given\nanswers totally different from those recorded in the articles in\nquestion. Titchener quotes an opinion of Wundt on these\ninvestigations, which appears to me thoroughly justified. \"These\nexperiments,\" he says, \"are not experiments at all in the sense\nof a scientific methodology; they are counterfeit experiments,\nthat seem methodical simply because they are ordinarily performed\nin a psychological laboratory, and involve the co-operation of\ntwo persons, who purport to be experimenter and observer. In\nreality, they are as unmethodical as possible; they possess none\nof the special features by which we distinguish the\nintrospections of experimental psychology from the casual\nintrospections of everyday life.\" Titchener, of course, dissents\nfrom this opinion, but I cannot see that his reasons for dissent\nare adequate. My doubts are only increased by the fact that\nBuhler at any rate used trained psychologists as his subjects. A\ntrained psychologist is, of course, supposed to have acquired the\nhabit of observation, but he is at least equally likely to have\nacquired a habit of seeing what his theories require. We may take\nBuhler's \"Uber Gedanken\" to illustrate the kind of results\narrived at by such methods. Buhler says (p. 303): \"We ask\nourselves the general question: 'WHAT DO WE EXPERIENCE WHEN WE\nTHINK?' Then we do not at all attempt a preliminary determination\nof the concept 'thought,' but choose for analysis only such\nprocesses as everyone would describe as processes of thought.\"\nThe most important thing in thinking, he says, is \"awareness\nthat...\" (Bewusstheit dass), which he calls a thought. It is, he\nsays, thoughts in this sense that are essential to thinking.\nThinking, he maintains, does not need language or sensuous\npresentations. \"I assert rather that in principle every object\ncan be thought (meant) distinctly, without any help from sensuous\npresentation (Anschauungshilfen). Every individual shade of blue\ncolour on the picture that hangs in my room I can think with\ncomplete distinctness unsensuously (unanschaulich), provided it\nis possible that the object should be given to me in another\nmanner than by the help of sensations. How that is possible we\nshall see later.\" What he calls a thought (Gedanke) cannot be\nreduced, according to him, to other psychic occurrences. He\nmaintains that thoughts consist for the most part of known rules\n(p. 342). It is clearly essential to the interest of this theory\nthat the thought or rule alluded to by Buhler should not need to\nbe expressed in words, for if it is expressed in words it is\nimmediately capable of being dealt with on the lines with which\nthe behaviourists have familiarized us. It is clear also that the\nsupposed absence of words rests solely upon the introspective\ntestimony of the persons experimented upon. I cannot think that\nthere is sufficient certainty of their reliability in this\nnegative observation to make us accept a difficult and\nrevolutionary view of thought, merely because they have failed to\nobserve the presence of words or their equivalent in their\nthinking. I think it far more likely, especially in view of the\nfact that the persons concerned were highly educated, that we are\nconcerned with telescoped processes, in which habit has caused a\ngreat many intermediate terms to be elided or to be passed over\nso quickly as to escape observation.\n\nI am inclined to think that similar remarks apply to the general\nidea of \"imageless thinking,\" concerning which there has been\nmuch controversy. The advocates of imageless thinking are not\ncontending merely that there can be thinking which is purely\nverbal; they are contending that there can be thinking which\nproceeds neither in words nor in images. My own feeling is that\nthey have rashly assumed the presence of thinking in cases where\nhabit has rendered thinking unnecessary. When Thorndike\nexperimented with animals in cages, he found that the\nassociations established were between a sensory stimulus and a\nbodily movement (not the idea of it), without the need of\nsupposing any non-physiological intermediary (op. cit., p. 100\nff.). The same thing, it seems to me, applies to ourselves. A\ncertain sensory situation produces in us a certain bodily\nmovement. Sometimes this movement consists in uttering words.\nPrejudice leads us to suppose that between the sensory stimulus\nand the utterance of the words a process of thought must have\nintervened, but there seems no good reason for such a\nsupposition. Any habitual action, such as eating or dressing, may\nbe performed on the appropriate occasion, without any need of\nthought, and the same seems to be true of a painfully large\nproportion of our talk. What applies to uttered speech applies of\ncourse equally to the internal speech which is not uttered. I\nremain, therefore, entirely unconvinced that there is any such\nphenomenon as thinking which consists neither of images nor of\nwords, or that \"ideas\" have to be added to sensations and images\nas part of the material out of which mental phenomena are built.\n\nThe question of the nature of our consciousness of the universal\nis much affected by our view as to the general nature of the\nrelation of consciousness to its object. If we adopt the view of\nBrentano, according to which all mental content has essential\nreference to an object, it is then natural to suppose that there\nis some peculiar kind of mental content of which the object is a\nuniversal, as oppose to a particular. According to this view, a\nparticular cat can be PERceived or imagined, while the universal\n\"cat\" is CONceived. But this whole manner of viewing our dealings\nwith universals has to be abandoned when the relation of a mental\noccurrence to its \"object\" is regarded as merely indirect and\ncausal, which is the view that we have adopted. The mental\ncontent is, of course, always particular, and the question as to\nwhat it \"means\" (in case it means anything) is one which cannot\nbe settled by merely examining the intrinsic character of the\nmental content, but only by knowing its causal connections in the\ncase of the person concerned. To say that a certain thought\n\"means\" a universal as opposed to either a vague or a particular,\nis to say something exceedingly complex. A horse will behave in a\ncertain manner whenever he smells a bear, even if the smell is\nderived from a bearskin. That is to say, any environment\ncontaining an instance of the universal \"smell of a bear\"\nproduces closely similar behaviour in the horse, but we do not\nsay that the horse is conscious of this universal. There is\nequally little reason to regard a man as conscious of the same\nuniversal, because under the same circumstances he can react by\nsaying, \"I smell a bear.\" This reaction, like that of the horse,\nis merely closely similar on different occasions where the\nenvironment affords instances of the same universal. Words of\nwhich the logical meaning is universal can therefore be employed\ncorrectly, without anything that could be called consciousness of\nuniversals. Such consciousness in the only sense in which it can\nbe said to exist is a matter of reflective judgment consisting in\nthe observation of similarities and differences. A universal\nnever appears before the mind as a single object in the sort of\nway in which something perceived appears. I THINK a logical\nargument could be produced to show that universals are part of\nthe structure of the world, but they are an inferred part, not a\npart of our data. What exists in us consists of various factors,\nsome open to external observation, others only visible to\nintrospection. The factors open to external observation are\nprimarily habits, having the peculiarity that very similar\nreactions are produced by stimuli which are in many respects very\ndifferent from each other. Of this the reaction of the horse to\nthe smell of the bear is an instance, and so is the reaction of\nthe man who says \"bear\" under the same circumstances. The verbal\nreaction is, of course, the most important from the point of view\nof what may be called knowledge of universals. A man who can\nalways use the word \"dog\" when he sees a dog may be said, in a\ncertain sense, to know the meaning of the word \"dog,\" and IN THAT\nSENSE to have knowledge of the universal \"dog.\" But there is, of\ncourse, a further stage reached by the logician in which he not\nmerely reacts with the word \"dog,\" but sets to work to discover\nwhat it is in the environment that causes in him this almost\nidentical reaction on different occasions. This further stage\nconsists in knowledge of similarities and differences:\nsimilarities which are necessary to the applicability of the word\n\"dog,\" and differences which are compatible with it. Our\nknowledge of these similarities and differences is never\nexhaustive, and therefore our knowledge of the meaning of a\nuniversal is never complete.\n\nIn addition to external observable habits (including the habit of\nwords), there is also the generic image produced by the\nsuperposition, or, in Semon's phrase, homophony, of a number of\nsimilar perceptions. This image is vague so long as the\nmultiplicity of its prototypes is not recognized, but becomes\nuniversal when it exists alongside of the more specific images of\nits instances, and is knowingly contrasted with them. In this\ncase we find again, as we found when we were discussing words in\ngeneral in the preceding lecture, that images are not logically\nnecessary in order to account for observable behaviour, i.e. in\nthis case intelligent speech. Intelligent speech could exist as a\nmotor habit, without any accompaniment of images, and this\nconclusion applies to words of which the meaning is universal,\njust as much as to words of which the meaning is relatively\nparticular. If this conclusion is valid, it follows that\nbehaviourist psychology, which eschews introspective data, is\ncapable of being an independent science, and of accounting for\nall that part of the behaviour of other people which is commonly\nregarded as evidence that they think. It must be admitted that\nthis conclusion considerably weakens the reliance which can be\nplaced upon introspective data. They must be accepted simply on\naccount of the fact that we seem to perceive them, not on account\nof their supposed necessity for explaining the data of external\nobservation.\n\nThis, at any rate, is the conclusion to which. we are forced, so\nlong as, with the behaviourists, we accept common-sense views of\nthe physical world. But if, as I have urged, the physical world\nitself, as known, is infected through and through with\nsubjectivity, if, as the theory of relativity suggests, the\nphysical universe contains the diversity of points of view which\nwe have been accustomed to regard as distinctively psychological,\nthen we are brought back by this different road to the necessity\nfor trusting observations which are in an important sense\nprivate. And it is the privacy of introspective data which causes\nmuch of the behaviourists' objection to them.\n\nThis is an example of the difficulty of constructing an adequate\nphilosophy of any one science without taking account of other\nsciences. The behaviourist philosophy of psychology, though in\nmany respects admirable from the point of view of method, appears\nto me to fail in the last analysis because it is based upon an\ninadequate philosophy of physics. In spite, therefore, of the\nfact that the evidence for images, whether generic or particular,\nis merely introspective, I cannot admit that images should be\nrejected, or that we should minimize their function in our\nknowledge of what is remote in time or space.","title":"The Analysis of Mind/Lecture XI","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":5376}