{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XII/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XII","id":"wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XII","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Analysis_of_Mind/Lecture_XII","summary":null,"tags":["Headers_applying_DefaultSort_key","Subpages"],"text":"Belief, which is our subject to-day, is the central problem in\nthe analysis of mind. Believing seems the most \"mental\" thing we\ndo, the thing most remote from what is done by mere matter. The\nwhole intellectual life consists of beliefs, and of the passage\nfrom one belief to another by what is called \"reasoning.\" Beliefs\ngive knowledge and error; they are the vehicles of truth and\nfalsehood. Psychology, theory of knowledge and metaphysics\nrevolve about belief, and on the view we take of belief our\nphilosophical outlook largely depends.\n\nBefore embarking upon the detailed analysis of belief, we shall\ndo well to note certain requisites which any theory must fulfil.\n\n(1) Just as words are characterized by meaning, so beliefs are\ncharacterized by truth or falsehood. And just as meaning consists\nin relation to the object meant, so truth and falsehood consist\nin relation to something that lies outside the belief. You may\nbelieve that such-and-such a horse will win the Derby. The time\ncomes, and your horse wins or does not win; according to the\noutcome, your belief was true or false. You may believe that six\ntimes nine is fifty-six; in this case also there is a fact which\nmakes your belief false. You may believe that America was\ndiscovered in 1492, or that it was discovered in 1066. In the one\ncase your belief is true, in the other false; in either case its\ntruth or falsehood depends upon the actions of Columbus, not upon\nanything present or under your control. What makes a belief true\nor false I call a \"fact.\" The particular fact that makes a given\nbelief true or false I call its \"objective,\" and the relation of\nthe belief to its objective I call the \"reference\" or the\n\"objective reference\" of the belief. Thus, if I believe that\nColumbus crossed the Atlantic in 1492, the \"objective\" of my\nbelief is Columbus's actual voyage, and the \"reference\" of my\nbelief is the relation between my belief and the voyage--that\nrelation, namely, in virtue of which the voyage makes my belief\ntrue (or, in another case, false). \"Reference\" of beliefs differs\nfrom \"meaning\" of words in various ways, but especially in the\nfact that it is of two kinds, \"true\" reference and \"false\"\nreference. The truth or falsehood of a belief does not depend\nupon anything intrinsic to the belief, but upon the nature of its\nrelation to its objective. The intrinsic nature of belief can be\ntreated without reference to what makes it true or false. In the\nremainder of the present lecture I shall ignore truth and\nfalsehood, which will be the subject of Lecture XIII. It is the\nintrinsic nature of belief that will concern us to-day.\n\n(2) We must distinguish between believing and what is believed. I\nmay believe that Columbus crossed the Atlantic, that all Cretans\nare liars, that two and two are four, or that nine times six is\nfifty-six; in all these cases the believing is just the same, and\nonly the contents believed are different. I may remember my\nbreakfast this morning, my lecture last week, or my first sight\nof New York. In all these cases the feeling of memory-belief is\njust the same, and only what is remembered differs. Exactly\nsimilar remarks apply to expectations. Bare assent, memory and\nexpectation are forms of belief; all three are different from\nwhat is believed, and each has a constant character which is\nindependent of what is believed.\n\nIn Lecture I we criticized the analysis of a presentation into\nact, content and object. But our analysis of belief contains\nthree very similar elements, namely the believing, what is\nbelieved and the objective. The objections to the act (in the\ncase of presentations) are not valid against the believing in the\ncase of beliefs, because the believing is an actual experienced\nfeeling, not something postulated, like the act. But it is\nnecessary first to complete our preliminary requisites, and then\nto examine the content of a belief. After that, we shall be in a\nposition to return to the question as to what constitutes\nbelieving.\n\n(3) What is believed, and the believing, must both consist of\npresent occurrences in the believer, no matter what may be the\nobjective of the belief. Suppose I believe, for example, \"that\nCaesar crossed the Rubicon.\" The objective of my belief is an\nevent which happened long ago, which I never saw and do not\nremember. This event itself is not in my mind when I believe that\nit happened. It is not correct to say that I am believing the\nactual event; what I am believing is something now in my mind,\nsomething related to the event (in a way which we shall\ninvestigate in Lecture XIII), but obviously not to be confounded\nwith the event, since the event is not occurring now but the\nbelieving is. What a man is believing at a given moment is wholly\ndeterminate if we know the contents of his mind at that moment;\nbut Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon was an historical physical\nevent, which is distinct from the present contents of every\npresent mind. What is believed, however true it may be, is not\nthe actual fact that makes the belief true, but a present event\nrelated to the fact. This present event, which is what is\nbelieved, I shall call the \"content\" of the belief. We have\nalready had occasion to notice the distinction between content\nand objective in the case of memory-beliefs, where the content is\n\"this occurred\" and the objective is the past event.\n\n(4) Between content and objective there is sometimes a very wide\ngulf, for example in the case of \"Caesar crossed the Rubicon.\"\nThis gulf may, when it is first perceived, give us a feeling that\nwe cannot really \" know \" anything about the outer world. All we\ncan \"know,\" it may be said, is what is now in our thoughts. If\nCaesar and the Rubicon cannot be bodily in our thoughts, it might\nseem as though we must remain cut off from knowledge of them. I\nshall not now deal at length with this feeling, since it is\nnecessary first to define \"knowing,\" which cannot be done yet.\nBut I will say, as a preliminary answer, that the feeling assumes\nan ideal of knowing which I believe to be quite mistaken. ~ it\nassumes, if it is thought out, something like the mystic unity of\nknower and known. These two are often said to be combined into a\nunity by the fact of cognition; hence when this unity is plainly\nabsent, it may seem as if there were no genuine cognition. For my\npart, I think such theories and feelings wholly mistaken: I\nbelieve knowing to be a very external and complicated relation,\nincapable of exact definition, dependent upon causal laws, and\ninvolving no more unity than there is between a signpost and the\ntown to which it points. I shall return to this question on a\nlater occasion; for the moment these provisional remarks must\nsuffice.\n\n(5) The objective reference of a belief is connected with the\nfact that all or some of the constituents of its content have\nmeaning. If I say \"Caesar conquered Gaul,\" a person who knows the\nmeaning of the three words composing my statement knows as much\nas can be known about the nature of the objective which would\nmake my statement true. It is clear that the objective reference\nof a belief is, in general, in some way derivative from the\nmeanings of the words or images that occur in its content. There\nare, however, certain complications which must be borne in mind.\nIn the first place, it might be contended that a memory-image\nacquires meaning only through the memory-belief, which would\nseem, at least in the case of memory, to make belief more\nprimitive than the meaning of images. In the second place, it is\na very singular thing that meaning, which is single, should\ngenerate objective reference, which is dual, namely true and\nfalse. This is one of the facts which any theory of belief must\nexplain if it is to be satisfactory.\n\nIt is now time to leave these preliminary requisites, and attempt\nthe analysis of the contents of beliefs.\n\nThe first thing to notice about what is believed, i.e. about the\ncontent of a belief, is that it is always complex: We believe\nthat a certain thing has a certain property, or a certain\nrelation to something else, or that it occurred or will occur (in\nthe sense discussed at the end of Lecture IX); or we may believe\nthat all the members of a certain class have a certain property,\nor that a certain property sometimes occurs among the members of\na class; or we may believe that if one thing happens, another\nwill happen (for example, \"if it rains I shall bring my\numbrella\"), or we may believe that something does not happen, or\ndid not or will not happen (for example, \"it won't rain\"); or\nthat one of two things must happen (for example, \"either you\nwithdraw your accusation, or I shall bring a libel action\"). The\ncatalogue of the sorts of things we may believe is infinite, but\nall of them are complex.\n\nLanguage sometimes conceals the complexity of a belief. We say\nthat a person believes in God, and it might seem as if God formed\nthe whole content of the belief. But what is really believed is\nthat God exists, which is very far from being simple. Similarly,\nwhen a person has a memory-image with a memory-belief, the belief\nis \"this occurred,\" in the sense explained in Lecture IX; and\n\"this occurred\" is not simple. In like manner all cases where the\ncontent of a belief seems simple at first sight will be found, on\nexamination, to confirm the view that the content is always\ncomplex.\n\nThe content of a belief involves not merely a plurality of\nconstituents, but definite relations between them; it is not\ndeterminate when its constituents alone are given. For example,\n\"Plato preceded Aristotle\" and \"Aristotle preceded Plato\" are\nboth contents which may be believed, but, although they consist\nof exactly the same constituents, they are different, and even\nincompatible.\n\nThe content of a belief may consist of words only, or of images\nonly, or of a mixture of the two, or of either or both together\nwith one or more sensations. It must contain at least one\nconstituent which is a word or an image, and it may or may not\ncontain one or more sensations as constituents. Some examples\nwill make these various possibilities clear.\n\nWe may take first recognition, in either of the forms \"this is of\nsuch-and-such a kind\" or \"this has occurred before.\" In either\ncase, present sensation is a constituent. For example, you hear a\nnoise, and you say to yourself \"tram.\" Here the noise and the\nword \"tram\" are both constituents of your belief; there is also a\nrelation between them, expressed by \"is\" in the proposition \"that\nis a tram.\" As soon as your act of recognition is completed by\nthe occurrence of the word \"tram,\" your actions are affected: you\nhurry if you want the tram, or cease to hurry if you want a bus.\nIn this case the content of your belief is a sensation (the\nnoise) and a word (\"tram\") related in a way which may be called\npredication.\n\nThe same noise may bring into your mind the visual image of a\ntram, instead of the word \"tram.\" In this case your belief\nconsists of a sensation and an image suitable related. Beliefs of\nthis class are what are called \"judgments of perception.\" As we\nsaw in Lecture VIII, the images associated with a sensation often\ncome with such spontaneity and force that the unsophisticated do\nnot distinguish them from the sensation; it is only the\npsychologist or the skilled observer who is aware of the large\nmnemic element that is added to sensation to make perception. It\nmay be objected that what is added consists merely of images\nwithout belief. This is no doubt sometimes the case, but is\ncertainly sometimes not the case. That belief always occurs in\nperception as opposed to sensation it is not necessary for us to\nmaintain; it is enough for our purposes to note that it sometimes\noccurs, and that when it does, the content of our belief consists\nof a sensation and an image suitably related.\n\nIn a PURE memory-belief only images occur. But a mixture of words\nand images is very common in memory. You have an image of the\npast occurrence, and you say to yourself: \"Yes, that's how it\nwas.\" Here the image and the words together make up the content\nof the belief. And when the remembering of an incident has become\na habit, it may be purely verbal, and the memory-belief may\nconsist of words alone.\n\nThe more complicated forms of belief tend to consist only of\nwords. Often images of various kinds accompany them, but they are\napt to be irrelevant, and to form no part of what is actually\nbelieved. For example, in thinking of the Solar System, you are\nlikely to have vague images of pictures you have seen of the\nearth surrounded by clouds, Saturn and his rings, the sun during\nan eclipse, and so on; but none of these form part of your belief\nthat the planets revolve round the sun in elliptical orbits. The\nonly images that form an actual part of such beliefs are, as a\nrule, images of words. And images of words, for the reasons\nconsidered in Lecture VIII, cannot be distinguished with any\ncertainty from sensations, when, as is often, if not usually, the\ncase, they are kinaesthetic images of pronouncing the words.\n\nIt is impossible for a belief to consist of sensations alone,\nexcept when, as in the case of words, the sensations have\nassociations which make them signs possessed of meaning. The\nreason is that objective reference is of the essence of belief,\nand objective reference is derived from meaning. When I speak of\na belief consisting partly of sensations and partly of words, I\ndo not mean to deny that the words, when they are not mere\nimages, are sensational, but that they occur as signs, not (so to\nspeak) in their own right. To revert to the noise of the tram,\nwhen you hear it and say \"tram,\" the noise and the word are both\nsensations (if you actually pronounce the word), but the noise is\npart of the fact which makes your belief true, whereas the word\nis not part of this fact. It is the MEANING of the word \"tram,\"\nnot the actual word, that forms part of the fact which is the\nobjective of your belief. Thus the word occurs in the belief as a\nsymbol, in virtue of its meaning, whereas the noise enters into\nboth the belief and its objective. It is this that distinguishes\nthe occurrence of words as symbols from the occurrence of\nsensations in their own right: the objective contains the\nsensations that occur in their own right, but contains only the\nmeanings of the words that occur as symbols.\n\nFor the sake of simplicity, we may ignore the cases in which\nsensations in their own right form part of the content of a\nbelief, and confine ourselves to images and words. We may also\nomit the cases in which both images and words occur in the\ncontent of a belief. Thus we become confined to two cases: (a)\nwhen the content consists wholly of images, (b) when it consists\nwholly of words. The case of mixed images and words has no\nspecial importance, and its omission will do no harm.\n\nLet us take in illustration a case of memory. Suppose you are\nthinking of some familiar room. You may call up an image of it,\nand in your image the window may be to the left of the door.\nWithout any intrusion of words, you may believe in the\ncorrectness of your image. You then have a belief, consisting\nwholly of images, which becomes, when put into words, \"the window\nis to the left of the door.\" You may yourself use these words and\nproceed to believe them. You thus pass from an image-content to\nthe corresponding word-content. The content is different in the\ntwo cases, but its objective reference is the same. This shows\nthe relation of image-beliefs to word-beliefs in a very simple\ncase. In more elaborate cases the relation becomes much less\nsimple.\n\nIt may be said that even in this very simple case the objective\nreference of the word-content is not quite the same as that of\nthe image-content, that images have a wealth of concrete features\nwhich are lost when words are substituted, that the window in the\nimage is not a mere window in the abstract, but a window of a\ncertain shape and size, not merely to the left of the door, but a\ncertain distance to the left, and so on. In reply, it may be\nadmitted at once that there is, as a rule, a certain amount of\ntruth in the objection. But two points may be urged to minimize\nits force. First, images do not, as a rule, have that wealth of\nconcrete detail that would make it IMPOSSIBLE to express them\nfully in words. They are vague and fragmentary: a finite number\nof words, though perhaps a large number, would exhaust at least\ntheir SIGNIFICANT features. For--and this is our second\npoint--images enter into the content of a belief through the fact\nthat they are capable of meaning, and their meaning does not, as\na rule, have as much complexity as they have: some of their\ncharacteristics are usually devoid of meaning. Thus it may well\nbe possible to extract in words all that has meaning in an\nimage-content; in that case the word-content and the\nimage-content will have exactly the same objective reference.\n\nThe content of a belief, when expressed in words, is the same\nthing (or very nearly the same thing) as what in logic is called\na \"proposition.\" A proposition is a series of words (or sometimes\na single word) expressing the kind of thing that can be asserted\nor denied. \"That all men are mortal,\" \"that Columbus discovered\nAmerica,\" \"that Charles I died in his bed,\" \"that all\nphilosophers are wise,\" are propositions. Not any series of words\nis a proposition, but only such series of words as have\n\"meaning,\" or, in our phraseology, \"objective reference.\" Given\nthe meanings of separate words, and the rules of syntax, the\nmeaning of a proposition is determinate. This is the reason why\nwe can understand a sentence we never heard before. You probably\nnever heard before the proposition \"that the inhabitants of the\nAndaman Islands habitually eat stewed hippopotamus for dinner,\"\nbut there is no difficulty in understanding the proposition. The\nquestion of the relation between the meaning of a sentence and\nthe meanings of the separate words is difficult, and I shall not\npursue it now; I brought it up solely as being illustrative of\nthe nature of propositions.\n\nWe may extend the term \"proposition\" so as to cover the\nimage-contents of beliefs consisting of images. Thus, in the case\nof remembering a room in which the window is to the left of the\ndoor, when we believe the image-content the proposition will\nconsist of the image of the window on the left together with the\nimage of the door on the right. We will distinguish propositions\nof this kind as \"image-propositions\" and propositions in words as\n\"word-propositions.\" We may identify propositions in general with\nthe contents of actual and possible beliefs, and we may say that\nit is propositions that are true or false. In logic we are\nconcerned with propositions rather than beliefs, since logic is\nnot interested in what people do in fact believe, but only in the\nconditions which determine the truth or falsehood of possible\nbeliefs. Whenever possible, except when actual beliefs are in\nquestion, it is generally a simplification to deal with\npropositions.\n\nIt would seem that image-propositions are more primitive than\nword-propositions, and may well ante-date language. There is no\nreason why memory-images, accompanied by that very simple\nbelief-feeling which we decided to be the essence of memory,\nshould not have occurred before language arose; indeed, it would\nbe rash to assert positively that memory of this sort does not\noccur among the higher animals. Our more elementary beliefs,\nnotably those that are added to sensation to make perception,\noften remain at the level of images. For example, most of the\nvisual objects in our neighbourhood rouse tactile images: we have\na different feeling in looking at a sofa from what we have in\nlooking at a block of marble, and the difference consists chiefly\nin different stimulation of our tactile imagination. It may be\nsaid that the tactile images are merely present, without any\naccompanying belief; but I think this view, though sometimes\ncorrect, derives its plausibility as a general proposition from\nour thinking of explicit conscious belief only. Most of our\nbeliefs, like most of our wishes, are \"unconscious,\" in the sense\nthat we have never told ourselves that we have them. Such beliefs\ndisplay themselves when the expectations that they arouse fail in\nany way. For example, if someone puts tea (without milk) into a\nglass, and you drink it under the impression that it is going to\nbe beer; or if you walk on what appears to be a tiled floor, and\nit turns out to be a soft carpet made to look like tiles. The\nshock of surprise on an occasion of this kind makes us aware of\nthe expectations that habitually enter into our perceptions; and\nsuch expectations must be classed as beliefs, in spite of the\nfact that we do not normally take note of them or put them into\nwords. I remember once watching a cock pigeon running over and\nover again to the edge of a looking-glass to try to wreak\nvengeance on the particularly obnoxious bird whom he expected to\nfind there, judging by what he saw in the glass. He must have\nexperienced each time the sort of surprise on finding nothing,\nwhich is calculated to lead in time to the adoption of Berkeley's\ntheory that objects of sense are only in the mind. His\nexpectation, though not expressed in words, deserved, I think, to\nbe called a belief.\n\nI come now to the question what constitutes believing, as opposed\nto the content believed.\n\nTo begin with, there are various different attitudes that may be\ntaken towards the same content. Let us suppose, for the sake of\nargument, that you have a visual image of your breakfast-table.\nYou may expect it while you are dressing in the morning; remember\nit as you go to your work; feel doubt as to its correctness when\nquestioned as to your powers of visualizing; merely entertain the\nimage, without connecting it with anything external, when you are\ngoing to sleep; desire it if you are hungry, or feel aversion for\nit if you are ill. Suppose, for the sake of definiteness, that\nthe content is \"an egg for breakfast.\" Then you have the\nfollowing attitudes \"I expect there will be an egg for\nbreakfast\"; \"I remember there was an egg for breakfast\"; \"Was\nthere an egg for breakfast?\" \"An egg for breakfast: well, what of\nit?\" \"I hope there will be an egg for breakfast\"; \"I am afraid\nthere will be an egg for breakfast and it is sure to be bad.\" I\ndo not suggest that this is a list of all possible attitudes on\nthe subject; I say only that they are different attitudes, all\nconcerned with the one content \"an egg for breakfast.\"\n\nThese attitudes are not all equally ultimate. Those that involve\ndesire and aversion have occupied us in Lecture III. For the\npresent, we are only concerned with such as are cognitive. In\nspeaking of memory, we distinguished three kinds of belief\ndirected towards the same content, namely memory, expectation and\nbare assent without any time-determination in the belief-feeling.\nBut before developing this view, we must examine two other\ntheories which might be held concerning belief, and which, in\nsome ways, would be more in harmony with a behaviourist outlook\nthan the theory I wish to advocate.\n\n(1) The first theory to be examined is the view that the\ndifferentia of belief consists in its causal efficacy I do not\nwish to make any author responsible for this theory: I wish\nmerely to develop it hypothetically so that we may judge of its\ntenability.\n\nWe defined the meaning of an image or word by causal efficacy,\nnamely by associations: an image or word acquires meaning, we\nsaid, through having the same associations as what it means.\n\nWe propose hypothetically to define \"belief\" by a different kind\nof causal efficacy, namely efficacy in causing voluntary\nmovements. (Voluntary movements are defined as those vital\nmovements which are distinguished from reflex movements as\ninvolving the higher nervous centres. I do not like to\ndistinguish them by means of such notions as \"consciousness\" or\n\"will,\" because I do not think these notions, in any definable\nsense, are always applicable. Moreover, the purpose of the theory\nwe are examining is to be, as far as possible, physiological and\nbehaviourist, and this purpose is not achieved if we introduce\nsuch a conception as \"consciousness\" or \"will.\" Nevertheless, it\nis necessary for our purpose to find some way of distinguishing\nbetween voluntary and reflex movements, since the results would\nbe too paradoxical, if we were to say that reflex movements also\ninvolve beliefs.) According to this definition, a content is said\nto be \"believed\" when it causes us to move. The images aroused\nare the same if you say to me, \"Suppose there were an escaped\ntiger coming along the street,\" and if you say to me, \"There is\nan escaped tiger coming along the street.\" But my actions will be\nvery different in the two cases: in the first, I shall remain\ncalm; in the second, it is possible that I may not. It is\nsuggested, by the theory we are considering, that this difference\nof effects constitutes what is meant by saying that in the second\ncase I believe the proposition suggested, while in the first case\nI do not. According to this view, images or words are \"believed\"\nwhen they cause bodily movements.\n\nI do not think this theory is adequate, but I think it is\nsuggestive of truth, and not so easily refutable as it might\nappear to be at first sight.\n\nIt might be objected to the theory that many things which we\ncertainly believe do not call for any bodily movements. I believe\nthat Great Britain is an island, that whales are mammals, that\nCharles I was executed, and so on; and at first sight it seems\nobvious that such beliefs, as a rule, do not call for any action\non my part. But when we investigate the matter more closely, it\nbecomes more doubtful. To begin with, we must distinguish belief\nas a mere DISPOSITION from actual active belief. We speak as if\nwe always believed that Charles I was executed, but that only\nmeans that we are always ready to believe it when the subject\ncomes up. The phenomenon we are concerned to analyse is the\nactive belief, not the permanent disposition. Now, what are the\noccasions when, we actively believe that Charles I was executed?\nPrimarily: examinations, when we perform the bodily movement of\nwriting it down; conversation, when we assert it to display our\nhistorical erudition; and political discourses, when we are\nengaged in showing what Soviet government leads to. In all these\ncases bodily movements (writing or speaking) result from our\nbelief.\n\nBut there remains the belief which merely occurs in \"thinking.\"\nOne may set to work to recall some piece of history one has been\nreading, and what one recalls is believed, although it probably\ndoes not cause any bodily movement whatever. It is true that what\nwe believe always MAY influence action. Suppose I am invited to\nbecome King of Georgia: I find the prospect attractive, and go to\nCook's to buy a third-class ticket to my new realm. At the last\nmoment I remember Charles I and all the other monarchs who have\ncome to a bad end; I change my mind, and walk out without\ncompleting the transaction. But such incidents are rare, and\ncannot constitute the whole of my belief that Charles I was\nexecuted. The conclusion seems to be that, although a belief\nalways MAY influence action if it becomes relevant to a practical\nissue, it often exists actively (not as a mere disposition)\nwithout producing any voluntary movement whatever. If this is\ntrue, we cannot define belief by the effect on voluntary\nmovements.\n\nThere is another, more theoretical, ground for rejecting the view\nwe are examining. It is clear that a proposition can be either\nbelieved or merely considered, and that the content is the same\nin both cases. We can expect an egg for breakfast, or merely\nentertain the supposition that there may be an egg for breakfast.\nA moment ago I considered the possibility of being invited to\nbecome King of Georgia, but I do not believe that this will\nhappen. Now, it seems clear that, since believing and considering\nhave different effects if one produces bodily movements while the\nother does not, there must be some intrinsic difference between\nbelieving and considering; for if they were precisely similar,\ntheir effects also would be precisely similar. We have seen that\nthe difference between believing a given proposition and merely\nconsidering it does not lie in the content; therefore there must\nbe, in one case or in both, something additional to the content\nwhich distinguishes the occurrence of a belief from the\noccurrence of a mere consideration of the same content. So far as\nthe theoretical argument goes, this additional element may exist\nonly in belief, or only in consideration, or there may be one\nsort of additional element in the case of belief, and another in\nthe case of consideration. This brings us to the second view\nwhich we have to examine.\n\n(2) The theory which we have now to consider regards belief as\nbelonging to every idea which is entertained, except in so far as\nsome positive counteracting force interferes. In this view belief\nis not a positive phenomenon, though doubt and disbelief are so.\nWhat we call belief, according to this hypothesis, involves only\nthe appropriate content, which will have the effects\ncharacteristic of belief unless something else operating\nsimultaneously inhibits them. James (Psychology, vol. ii, p. 288)\nquotes with approval, though inaccurately, a passage from Spinoza\nembodying this view:\n\n\"Let us conceive a boy imagining to himself a horse, and taking\nnote of nothing else. As this imagination involves the existence\nof the horse, AND THE BOY HAS NO PERCEPTION WHICH ANNULS ITS\nEXISTENCE [James's italics], he will necessarily contemplate the\nhorse as present, nor will he be able to doubt of its existence,\nhowever little certain of it he may be. I deny that a man in so\nfar as he imagines [percipit] affirms nothing. For what is it to\nimagine a winged horse but to affirm that the horse [that horse,\nnamely] has wings? For if the mind had nothing before it but the\nwinged horse, it would contemplate the same as present, would\nhave no cause to doubt of its existence, nor any power of\ndissenting from its existence, unless the imagination of the\nwinged horse were joined to an idea which contradicted [tollit]\nits existence\" (\"Ethics,\" vol. ii, p. 49, Scholium).\n\nTo this doctrine James entirely assents, adding in italics:\n\n\"ANY OBJECT WHICH REMAINS UNCONTRADICTED IS IPSO FACTO BELIEVED AND POSITED AS ABSOLUTE REALITY.\"\n\nIf this view is correct, it follows (though James does not draw\nthe inference) that there is no need of any specific feeling\ncalled \"belief,\" and that the mere existence of images yields all\nthat is required. The state of mind in which we merely consider a\nproposition, without believing or disbelieving it, will then\nappear as a sophisticated product, the result of some rival force\nadding to the image-proposition a positive feeling which may be\ncalled suspense or non-belief--a feeling which may be compared to\nthat of a man about to run a race waiting for the signal. Such a\nman, though not moving, is in a very different condition from\nthat of a man quietly at rest And so the man who is considering a\nproposition without believing it will be in a state of tension,\nrestraining the natural tendency to act upon the proposition\nwhich he would display if nothing interfered. In this view belief\nprimarily consists merely in the existence of the appropriate\nimages without any counteracting forces.\n\nThere is a great deal to be said in favour of this view, and I\nhave some hesitation in regarding it as inadequate. It fits\nadmirably with the phenomena of dreams and hallucinatory images,\nand it is recommended by the way in which it accords with mental\ndevelopment. Doubt, suspense of judgment and disbelief all seem\nlater and more complex than a wholly unreflecting assent. Belief\nas a positive phenomenon, if it exists, may be regarded, in this\nview, as a product of doubt, a decision after debate, an\nacceptance, not merely of THIS, but of THIS-RATHER-THAN-THAT. It\nis not difficult to suppose that a dog has images (possible\nolfactory) of his absent master, or of the rabbit that he dreams\nof hunting. But it is very difficult to suppose that he can\nentertain mere imagination-images to which no assent is given.\n\nI think it must be conceded that a mere image, without the\naddition of any positive feeling that could be called \"belief,\"\nis apt to have a certain dynamic power, and in this sense an\nuncombated image has the force of a belief. But although this may\nbe true, it accounts only for some of the simplest phenomena in\nthe region of belief. It will not, for example, explain memory.\nNor can it explain beliefs which do not issue in any proximate\naction, such as those of mathematics. I conclude, therefore, that\nthere must be belief-feelings of the same order as those of doubt\nor disbelief, although phenomena closely analogous to those of\nbelief can be produced by mere uncontradicted images.\n\n(3) I come now to the view of belief which I wish to advocate. It\nseems to me that there are at least three kinds of belief, namely\nmemory, expectation and bare assent. Each of these I regard as\nconstituted by a certain feeling or complex of sensations,\nattached to the content believed. We may illustrate by an\nexample. Suppose I am believing, by means of images, not words,\nthat it will rain. We have here two interrelated elements, namely\nthe content and the expectation. The content consists of images\nof (say) the visual appearance of rain, the feeling of wetness,\nthe patter of drops, interrelated, roughly, as the sensations\nwould be if it were raining. Thus the content is a complex fact\ncomposed of images. Exactly the same content may enter into the\nmemory \"it was raining\" or the assent \"rain occurs.\" The\ndifference of these cases from each other and from expectation\ndoes not lie in the content. The difference lies in the nature of\nthe belief-feeling. I, personally, do not profess to be able to\nanalyse the sensations constituting respectively memory,\nexpectation and assent; but I am not prepared to say that they\ncannot be analysed. There may be other belief-feelings, for\nexample in disjunction and implication; also a disbelief-feeling.\n\nIt is not enough that the content and the belief-feeling should\ncoexist: it is necessary that there should be a specific relation\nbetween them, of the sort expressed by saying that the content is\nwhat is believed. If this were not obvious, it could be made\nplain by an argument. If the mere co-existence of the content and\nthe belief-feeling sufficed, whenever we were having (say) a\nmemory-feeling we should be remembering any proposition which\ncame into our minds at the same time. But this is not the case,\nsince we may simultaneously remember one proposition and merely\nconsider another.\n\nWe may sum up our analysis, in the case of bare assent to a\nproposition not expressed in words, as follows: (a) We have a\nproposition, consisting of interrelated images, and possibly\npartly of sensations; (b) we have the feeling of assent, which is\npresumably a complex sensation demanding analysis; (c) we have a\nrelation, actually subsisting, between the assent and the\nproposition, such as is expressed by saying that the proposition\nin question is what is assented to. For other forms of\nbelief-feeling or of content, we have only to make the necessary\nsubstitutions in this analysis.\n\nIf we are right in our analysis of belief, the use of words in\nexpressing beliefs is apt to be misleading. There is no way of\ndistinguishing, in words, between a memory and an assent to a\nproposition about the past: \"I ate my breakfast\" and \"Caesar\nconquered Gaul\" have the same verbal form, though (assuming that\nI remember my breakfast) they express occurrences which are\npsychologically very different. In the one case, what happens is\nthat I remember the content \"eating my breakfast\"; in the other\ncase, I assent to the content \"Caesar's conquest of Gaul\noccurred.\" In the latter case, but not in the former, the\npastness is part of the content believed. Exactly similar remarks\napply to the difference between expectation, such as we have when\nwaiting for the thunder after a flash of lightning, and assent to\na proposition about the future, such as we have in all the usual\ncases of inferential knowledge as to what will occur. I think\nthis difficulty in the verbal expression of the temporal aspects\nof beliefs is one among the causes which have hampered philosophy\nin the consideration of time.\n\nThe view of belief which I have been advocating contains little\nthat is novel except the distinction of kinds of belief-feeling~\nsuch as memory and expectation. Thus James says: \"Everyone knows\nthe difference between imagining a thing and believing in its\nexistence, between supposing a proposition and acquiescing in its\ntruth...IN ITS INNER NATURE, BELIEF, OR THE SENSE OF REALITY, IS\nA SORT OF FEELING MORE ALLIED TO THE EMOTIONS THAN. TO ANYTHING\nELSE\" (\"Psychology,\" vol. ii, p. 283. James's italics). He\nproceeds to point out that drunkenness, and, still more, nitrous-\noxide intoxication, will heighten the sense of belief: in the\nlatter case, he says, a man's very soul may sweat with\nconviction, and he be all the time utterly unable to say what he\nis convinced of. It would seem that, in such cases, the feeling\nof belief exists unattached, without its usual relation to a\ncontent believed, just as the feeling of familiarity may\nsometimes occur without being related to any definite familiar\nobject. The feeling of belief, when it occurs in this separated\nheightened form, generally leads us to look for a content to\nwhich to attach it. Much of what passes for revelation or mystic\ninsight probably comes in this way: the belief-feeling, in\nabnormal strength, attaches itself, more or less accidentally, to\nsome content which we happen to think of at the appropriate\nmoment. But this is only a speculation, upon which I do not wish\nto lay too much stress.","title":"The Analysis of Mind/Lecture XII","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":6632}