{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XIV/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XIV","id":"wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XIV","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Analysis_of_Mind/Lecture_XIV","summary":null,"tags":["Headers_applying_DefaultSort_key","Subpages"],"text":"On the two subjects of the present lecture I have nothing\noriginal to say, and I am treating them only in order to complete\nthe discussion of my main thesis, namely that all psychic\nphenomena are built up out of sensations and images alone.\n\nEmotions are traditionally regarded by psychologists as a\nseparate class of mental occurrences: I am, of course, not\nconcerned to deny the obvious fact that they have characteristics\nwhich make a special investigation of them necessary. What I am\nconcerned with is the analysis of emotions. It is clear that an\nemotion is essentially complex, and we have to inquire whether it\never contains any non-physiological material not reducible to\nsensations and images and their relations.\n\nAlthough what specially concerns us is the analysis of emotions,\nwe shall find that the more important topic is the physiological\ncausation of emotions. This is a subject upon which much valuable\nand exceedingly interesting work has been done, whereas the bare\nanalysis of emotions has proved somewhat barren. In view of the\nfact that we have defined perceptions, sensations, and images by\ntheir physiological causation, it is evident that our problem of\nthe analysis of the emotions is bound up with the problem of\ntheir physiological causation.\n\nModern views on the causation of emotions begin with what is\ncalled the James-Lange theory. James states this view in the\nfollowing terms (\"Psychology,\" vol. ii, p. 449):\n\n\"Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions, grief,\nfear, rage, love, is that the mental perception of some fact\nexcites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this\nlatter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My\ntheory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion\n(James's italics). Common sense says: we lose our fortune, are\nsorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are\ninsulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to\nbe defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that\nthe one mental state is not immediately induced by the other,\nthat the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between,\nand that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry\nbecause we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we\ntremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are\nsorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily\nstates following on the perception, the latter would be purely\ncognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional\nwarmth.\"\n\nRound this hypothesis a very voluminous literature has grown up.\nThe history of its victory over earlier criticism, and its\ndifficulties with the modern experimental work of Sherrington and\nCannon, is well told by James R. Angell in an article called \"A\nReconsideration of James's Theory of Emotion in the Light of\nRecent Criticisms.\" In this article Angell defends James's\ntheory and to me--though I speak with diffidence on a question as\nto which I have little competence--it appears that his defence is\non the whole successful.\n\nSherrington, by experiments on dogs, showed that many of the\nusual marks of emotion were present in their behaviour even when,\nby severing the spinal cord in the lower cervical region, the\nviscera were cut off from all communication with the brain,\nexcept that existing through certain cranial nerves. He mentions\nthe various signs which \"contributed to indicate the existence of\nan emotion as lively as the animal had ever shown us before the\nspinal operation had been made.\" He infers that the\nphysiological condition of the viscera cannot be the cause of the\nemotion displayed under such circumstances, and concludes: \"We\nare forced back toward the likelihood that the visceral\nexpression of emotion is SECONDARY to the cerebral action\noccurring with the psychical state.... We may with James accept\nvisceral and organic sensations and the memories and associations\nof them as contributory to primitive emotion, but we must regard\nthem as re-enforcing rather than as initiating the psychosis.\"*\n\nAngell suggests that the display of emotion in such cases may be\ndue to past experience, generating habits which would require\nonly the stimulation of cerebral reflex arcs. Rage and some forms\nof fear, however, may, he thinks, gain expression without the\nbrain. Rage and fear have been especially studied by Cannon,\nwhose work is of the greatest importance. His results are given\nin his book, \"Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage\" (D.\nAppleton and Co., 1916).\n\nThe most interesting part of Cannon's book consists in the\ninvestigation of the effects produced by secretion of adrenin.\nAdrenin is a substance secreted into the blood by the adrenal\nglands. These are among the ductless glands, the functions of\nwhich, both in physiology and in connection with the emotions,\nhave only come to be known during recent years. Cannon found that\npain, fear and rage occurred in circumstances which affected the\nsupply of adrenin, and that an artificial injection of adrenin\ncould, for example, produce all the symptoms of fear. He studied\nthe effects of adrenin on various parts of the body; he found\nthat it causes the pupils to dilate, hairs to stand erect, blood\nvessels to be constricted, and so on. These effects were still\nproduced if the parts in question were removed from the body and\nkept alive artificially.\n\nCannon's chief argument against James is, if I understand him\nrightly, that similar affections of the viscera may accompany\ndissimilar emotions, especially fear and rage. Various different\nemotions make us cry, and therefore it cannot be true to say, as\nJames does, that we \"feel sorry because we cry,\" since sometimes\nwe cry when we feel glad. This argument, however, is by no means\nconclusive against James, because it cannot be shown that there\nare no visceral differences for different emotions, and indeed it\nis unlikely that this is the case.\n\nAs Angell says (loc. cit.): \"Fear and joy may both cause cardiac\npalpitation, but in one case we find high tonus of the skeletal\nmuscles, in the other case relaxation and the general sense of\nweakness.\"\n\nAngell's conclusion, after discussing the experiments of\nSherrington and Cannon, is: \"I would therefore submit that, so\nfar as concerns the critical suggestions by these two\npsychologists, James's essential contentions are not materially\naffected.\" If it were necessary for me to take sides on this\nquestion, I should agree with this conclusion; but I think my\nthesis as to the analysis of emotion can be maintained without\ncoming to. a probably premature conclusion upon the doubtful\nparts of the physiological problem.\n\nAccording to our definitions, if James is right, an emotion may\nbe regarded as involving a confused perception of the viscera\nconcerned in its causation, while if Cannon and Sherrington are\nright, an emotion involves a confused perception of its external\nstimulus. This follows from what was said in Lecture VII. We\nthere defined a perception as an appearance, however irregular,\nof one or more objects external to the brain. And in order to be\nan appearance of one or more objects, it is only necessary that\nthe occurrence in question should be connected with them by a\ncontinuous chain, and should vary when they are varied\nsufficiently. Thus the question whether a mental occurrence can\nbe called a perception turns upon the question whether anything\ncan be inferred from it as to its causes outside the brain: if\nsuch inference is possible, the occurrence in question will come\nwithin our definition of a perception. And in that case,\naccording to the definition in Lecture VIII, its non-mnemic\nelements will be sensations. Accordingly, whether emotions are\ncaused by changes in the viscera or by sensible objects, they\ncontain elements which are sensations according to our\ndefinition.\n\nAn emotion in its entirety is, of course, something much more\ncomplex than a perception. An emotion is essentially a process,\nand it will be only what one may call a cross-section of the\nemotion that will be a perception, of a bodily condition\naccording to James, or (in certain cases) of an external object\naccording to his opponents. An emotion in its entirety contains\ndynamic elements, such as motor impulses, desires, pleasures and\npains. Desires and pleasures and pains, according to the theory\nadopted in Lecture III, are characteristics of processes, not\nseparate ingredients. An emotion--rage, for example--will be a\ncertain kind of process, consisting of perceptions and (in\ngeneral) bodily movements. The desires and pleasures and pains\ninvolved are properties of this process, not separate items in\nthe stuff of which the emotion is composed. The dynamic elements\nin an emotion, if we are right in our analysis, contain, from our\npoint of view, no ingredients beyond those contained in the\nprocesses considered in Lecture III. The ingredients of an\nemotion are only sensations and images and bodily movements\nsucceeding each other according to a certain pattern. With this\nconclusion we may leave the emotions and pass to the\nconsideration of the will.\n\nThe first thing to be defined when we are dealing with Will is a\nVOLUNTARY MOVEMENT. We have already defined vital movements, and\nwe have maintained that, from a behaviourist standpoint, it is\nimpossible to distinguish which among such movements are reflex\nand which voluntary. Nevertheless, there certainly is a\ndistinction. When we decide in the morning that it is time to get\nup, our consequent movement is voluntary. The beating of the\nheart, on the other hand, is involuntary: we can neither cause it\nnor prevent it by any decision of our own, except indirectly, as\ne.g. by drugs. Breathing is intermediate between the two: we\nnormally breathe without the help of the will, but we can alter\nor stop our breathing if we choose.\n\nJames (\"Psychology,\" chap. xxvi) maintains that the only\ndistinctive characteristic of a voluntary act is that it involves\nan idea of the movement to be performed, made up of memory-images\nof the kinaesthetic sensations which we had when the same\nmovement occurred on some former occasion. He points out that, on\nthis view, no movement can be made voluntarily unless it has\npreviously occurred involuntarily.\n\nI see no reason to doubt the correctness of this view. We shall\nsay, then, that movements which are accompanied by kinaesthetic\nsensations tend to be caused by the images of those sensations,\nand when so caused are called VOLUNTARY.\n\nVolition, in the emphatic sense, involves something more than\nvoluntary movement. The sort of case I am thinking of is decision\nafter deliberation. Voluntary movements are a part of this, but\nnot the whole. There is, in addition to them, a judgment: \"This\nis what I shall do\"; there is also a sensation of tension during\ndoubt, followed by a different sensation at the moment of\ndeciding. I see no reason whatever to suppose that there is any\nspecifically new ingredient; sensations and images, with their\nrelations and causal laws, yield all that seems to be wanted for\nthe analysis of the will, together with the fact that\nkinaesthetic images tend to cause the movements with which they\nare connected. Conflict of desires is of course essential in the\ncausation of the emphatic kind of will: there will be for a time\nkinaesthetic images of incompatible movements, followed by the\nexclusive image of the movement which is said to be willed. Thus\nwill seems to add no new irreducible ingredient to the analysis\nof the mind.","title":"The Analysis of Mind/Lecture XIV","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":1923}