{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XV/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XV","id":"wikisource_The_Analysis_of_Mind_Lecture_XV","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Analysis_of_Mind/Lecture_XV","summary":null,"tags":["Headers_applying_DefaultSort_key","Subpages"],"text":"At the end of our journey it is time to return to the question\nfrom which we set out, namely: What is it that characterizes mind\nas opposed to matter? Or, to state the same question in other\nterms: How is psychology to be distinguished from physics? The\nanswer provisionally suggested at the outset of our inquiry was\nthat psychology and physics are distinguished by the nature of\ntheir causal laws, not by their subject matter. At the same time\nwe held that there is a certain subject matter, namely images, to\nwhich only psychological causal laws are applicable; this subject\nmatter, therefore, we assigned exclusively to psychology. But we\nfound no way of defining images except through their causation;\nin their intrinsic character they appeared to have no universal\nmark by which they could be distinguished from sensations.\n\nIn this last lecture I propose to pass in review various\nsuggested methods of distinguishing mind from matter. I shall\nthen briefly sketch the nature of that fundamental science which\nI believe to be the true metaphysic, in which mind and matter\nalike are seen to be constructed out of a neutral stuff, whose\ncausal laws have no such duality as that of psychology, but form\nthe basis upon which both physics and psychology are built.\n\nIn search for the definition of \"mental phenomena,\" let us begin\nwith \"consciousness,\" which is often thought to be the essence of\nmind. In the first lecture I gave various arguments against the\nview that consciousness is fundamental, but I did not attempt to\nsay what consciousness is. We must find a definition of it, if we\nare to feel secure in deciding that it is not fundamental. It is\nfor the sake of the proof that it is not fundamental that we must\nnow endeavour to decide what it is.\n\n\"Consciousness,\" by those who regard it as fundamental, is taken\nto be a character diffused throughout our mental life, distinct\nfrom sensations and images, memories, beliefs and desires, but\npresent in all of them. Dr. Henry Head, in an article which I\nquoted in Lecture III, distinguishing sensations from purely\nphysiological occurrences, says: \"Sensation, in the strict sense\nof the term, demands the existence of consciousness.\" This\nstatement, at first sight, is one to which we feel inclined to\nassent, but I believe we are mistaken if we do so. Sensation is\nthe sort of thing of which we MAY be conscious, but not a thing\nof which we MUST be conscious. We have been led, in the course of\nour inquiry, to admit unconscious beliefs and unconscious\ndesires. There is, so far as I can see, no class of mental or\nother occurrences of which we are always conscious whenever they\nhappen.\n\nThe first thing to notice is that consciousness must be of\nsomething. In view of this, I should define \"consciousness\" in\nterms of that relation of an image of a word to an object which\nwe defined, in Lecture XI, as \"meaning.\" When a sensation is\nfollowed by an image which is a \"copy\" of it, I think it may be\nsaid that the existence of the image constitutes consciousness of\nthe sensation, provided it is accompanied by that sort of belief\nwhich, when we reflect upon it, makes us feel that the image is a\n\"sign\" of something other than itself. This is the sort of belief\nwhich, in the case of memory, we expressed in the words \"this\noccurred\"; or which, in the case of a judgment of perception,\nmakes us believe in qualities correlated with present sensations,\nas e.g., tactile and visual qualities are correlated. The\naddition of some element of belief seems required, since mere\nimagination does not involve consciousness of anything, and there\ncan be no consciousness which is not of something. If images\nalone constituted consciousness of their prototypes, such\nimagination-images as in fact have prototypes would involve\nconsciousness of them; since this is not the case, an element of\nbelief must be added to the images in defining consciousness. The\nbelief must be of that sort that constitutes objective reference,\npast or present. An image, together with a belief of this sort\nconcerning it, constitutes, according to our definition,\nconsciousness of the prototype of the image.\n\nBut when we pass from consciousness of sensations to\nconsciousness of objects of perception, certain further points\narise which demand an addition to our definition. A judgment of\nperception, we may say, consists of a core of sensation, together\nwith associated images, with belief in the present existence of\nan object to which sensation and images are referred in a way\nwhich is difficult to analyse. Perhaps we might say that the\nbelief is not fundamentally in any PRESENT existence, but is of\nthe nature of an expectation: for example. when we see an object,\nwe expect certain sensations to result if we proceed to touch it.\nPerception, then, will consist of a present sensation together\nwith expectations of future sensations. (This, of course, is a\nreflective analysis, not an account of the way perception appears\nto unchecked introspection.) But all such expectations are liable\nto be erroneous, since they are based upon correlations which are\nusual but not invariable. Any such correlation may mislead us in\na particular case, for example, if we try to touch a reflection\nin a looking-glass under the impression that it is \"real.\" Since\nmemory is fallible, a similar difficulty arises as regards\nconsciousness of past objects. It would seem odd to say that we\ncan be \"conscious\" of a thing which does not or did not exist.\nThe only way to avoid this awkwardness is to add to our\ndefinition the proviso that the beliefs involved in consciousness\nmust be TRUE.\n\nIn the second place, the question arises as to whether we can be\nconscious of images. If we apply our definition to this case, it\nseems to demand images of images. In order, for example, to be\nconscious of an image of a cat, we shall require, according to\nthe letter of the definition, an image which is a copy of our\nimage of the cat, and has this image for its prototype. Now, it\nhardly seems probable, as a matter of observation, that there are\nimages of images, as opposed to images of sensations. We may meet\nthis difficulty in two ways, either by boldly denying\nconsciousness of images, or by finding a sense in which, by means\nof a different accompanying belief, an image, instead of meaning\nits prototype, can mean another image of the same prototype.\n\nThe first alternative, which denies consciousness of images, has\nalready been discussed when we were dealing with Introspection in\nLecture VI. We then decided that there must be, in some sense,\nconsciousness of images. We are therefore left with the second\nsuggested way of dealing with knowledge of images. According to\nthis second hypothesis, there may be two images of the same\nprototype, such that one of them means the other, instead of\nmeaning the prototype. It will be remembered that we defined\nmeaning by association a word or image means an object, we said,\nwhen it has the same associations as the object. But this\ndefinition must not be interpreted too absolutely: a word or\nimage will not have ALL the same associations as the object which\nit means. The word \"cat\" may be associated with the word \"mat,\"\nbut it would not happen except by accident that a cat would be\nassociated with a mat. And in like manner an image may have\ncertain associations which its prototype will not have, e.g. an\nassociation with the word \"image.\" When these associations are\nactive, an image means an image, instead of meaning its\nprototype. If I have had images of a given prototype many times,\nI can mean one of these, as opposed to the rest, by recollecting\nthe time and place or any other distinctive association of that\none occasion. This happens, for example, when a place recalls to\nus some thought we previously had in that place, so that we\nremember a thought as opposed to the occurrence to which it\nreferred. Thus we may say that we think of an image A when we\nhave a similar image B associated with recollections of\ncircumstances connected with A, but not with its prototype or\nwith other images of the same prototype. In this way we become\naware of images without the need of any new store of mental\ncontents, merely by the help of new associations. This theory, so\nfar as I can see, solves the problems of introspective knowledge,\nwithout requiring heroic measures such as those proposed by\nKnight Dunlap, whose views we discussed in Lecture VI.\n\nAccording to what we have been saying, sensation itself is not an\ninstance of consciousness, though the immediate memory by which\nit is apt to be succeeded is so. A sensation which is remembered\nbecomes an object of consciousness as soon as it begins to be\nremembered, which will normally be almost immediately after its\noccurrence (if at all); but while it exists it is not an object\nof consciousness. If, however, it is part of a perception, say of\nsome familiar person, we may say that the person perceived is an\nobject of consciousness. For in this case the sensation is a SIGN\nof the perceived object in much the same way in which a\nmemory-image is a sign of a remembered object. The essential\npractical function of \"consciousness\" and \"thought\" is that they\nenable us to act with reference to what is distant in time or\nspace, even though it is not at present stimulating our senses.\nThis reference to absent objects is possible through association\nand habit. Actual sensations, in themselves, are not cases of\nconsciousness, because they do not bring in this reference to\nwhat is absent. But their connection with consciousness is very\nclose, both through immediate memory, and through the\ncorrelations which turn sensations into perceptions.\n\nEnough has, I hope, been said to show that consciousness is far\ntoo complex and accidental to be taken as the fundamental\ncharacteristic of mind. We have seen that belief and images both\nenter into it. Belief itself, as we saw in an earlier lecture, is\ncomplex. Therefore, if any definition of mind is suggested by our\nanalysis of consciousness, images are what would naturally\nsuggest themselves. But since we found that images can only be\ndefined causally, we cannot deal with this suggestion, except in\nconnection with the difference between physical and psychological\ncausal laws.\n\nI come next to those characteristics of mental phenomena which\narise out of mnemic causation. The possibility of action with\nreference to what is not sensibly present is one of the things\nthat might be held to characterize mind. Let us take first a very\nelementary example. Suppose you are in a familiar room at night,\nand suddenly the light goes out. You will be able to find your\nway to the door without much difficulty by means of the picture\nof the room which you have in your mind. In this case visual\nimages serve, somewhat imperfectly it is true, the purpose which\nvisual sensations would otherwise serve. The stimulus to the\nproduction of visual images is the desire to get out of the room,\nwhich, according to what we found in Lecture III, consists\nessentially of present sensations and motor impulses caused by\nthem. Again, words heard or read enable you to act with reference\nto the matters about which they give information; here, again, a\npresent sensible stimulus, in virtue of habits formed in the\npast, enables you to act in a manner appropriate to an object\nwhich is not sensibly present. The whole essence of the practical\nefficiency of \"thought\" consists in sensitiveness to signs: the\nsensible presence of A, which is a sign of the present or future\nexistence of B, enables us to act in a manner appropriate to B.\nOf this, words are the supreme example, since their effects as\nsigns are prodigious, while their intrinsic interest as sensible\noccurrences on their own account is usually very slight. The\noperation of signs may or may not be accompanied by\nconsciousness. If a sensible stimulus A calls up an image of B,\nand we then act with reference to B, we have what may be called\nconsciousness of B. But habit may enable us to act in a manner\nappropriate to B as soon as A appears, without ever having an\nimage of B. In that case, although A operates as a sign, it\noperates without the help of consciousness. Broadly speaking, a\nvery familiar sign tends to operate directly in this manner, and\nthe intervention of consciousness marks an imperfectly\nestablished habit.\n\nThe power of acquiring experience, which characterizes men and\nanimals, is an example of the general law that, in mnemic\ncausation, the causal unit is not one event at one time, but two\nor more events at two or more times.& A burnt child fears the\nfire, that is to say, the neighbourhood of fire has a different\neffect upon a child which has had the sensations of burning than\nupon one which has not. More correctly, the observed effect, when\na child which has been burnt is put near a fire, has for its\ncause, not merely the neighbourhood of the fire, but this\ntogether with the previous burning. The general formula, when an\nanimal has acquired experience through some event A, is that,\nwhen B occurs at some future time, the animal to which A has\nhappened acts differently from an animal which A has not\nhappened. Thus A and B together, not either separately, must be\nregarded as the cause of the animal's behaviour, unless we take\naccount of the effect which A has had in altering the animal's\nnervous tissue, which is a matter not patent to external\nobservation except under very special circumstances. With this\npossibility, we are brought back to causal laws,and to the\nsuggestion that many things which seem essentially mental are\nreally neural. Perhaps it is the nerves that acquire experience\nrather than the mind. If so, the possibility of acquiring\nexperience cannot be used to define mind.\n\nVery similar considerations apply to memory, if taken as the\nessence of mind. A recollection is aroused by something which is\nhappening now, but is different from the effect which the present\noccurrence would have produced if the recollected event had not\noccurred. This may be accounted for by the physical effect of the\npast event on the brain, making it a different instrument from\nthat which would have resulted from a different experience. The\ncausal peculiarities of memory may, therefore, have a\nphysiological explanation. With every special class of mental\nphenomena this possibility meets us afresh. If psychology is to\nbe a separate science at all, we must seek a wider ground for its\nseparateness than any that we have been considering hitherto.\n\nWe have found that \"consciousness\" is too narrow to characterize\nmental phenomena, and that mnemic causation is too wide. I come\nnow to a characteristic which, though difficult to define, comes\nmuch nearer to what we require, namely subjectivity.\n\nSubjectivity, as a characteristic of mental phenomena, was\nconsidered in Lecture VII, in connection with the definition of\nperception. We there decided that those particulars which\nconstitute the physical world can be collected into sets in two\nways, one of which makes a bundle of all those particulars that\nare appearances of a given thing from different places, while the\nother makes a bundle of all those particulars which are\nappearances of different things from a given place. A bundle of\nthis latter sort, at a given time, is called a \"perspective\";\ntaken throughout a period of time, it is called a \"biography.\"\nSubjectivity is the characteristic of perspectives and\nbiographies, the characteristic of giving the view of the world\nfrom a certain place. We saw in Lecture VII that this\ncharacteristic involves none of the other characteristics that\nare commonly associated with mental phenomena, such as\nconsciousness, experience and memory. We found in fact that it is\nexhibited by a photographic plate, and, strictly speaking, by any\nparticular taken in conjunction with those which have the same\n\"passive\" place in the sense defined in Lecture VII. The\nparticulars forming one perspective are connected together\nprimarily by simultaneity; those forming one biography, primarily\nby the existence of direct time-relations between them. To these\nare to be added relations derivable from the laws of perspective.\nIn all this we are clearly not in the region of psychology, as\ncommonly understood; yet we are also hardly in the region of\nphysics. And the definition of perspectives and biographies,\nthough it does not yet yield anything that would be commonly\ncalled \"mental,\" is presupposed in mental phenomena, for example\nin mnemic causation: the causal unit in mnemic causation, which\ngives rise to Semon's engram, is the whole of one perspective--\nnot of any perspective, but of a perspective in a place where\nthere is nervous tissue, or at any rate living tissue of some\nsort. Perception also, as we saw, can only be defined in terms of\nperspectives. Thus the conception of subjectivity, i.e. of the\n\"passive\" place of a particular, though not alone sufficient to\ndefine mind, is clearly an essential element in the definition.\n\nI have maintained throughout these lectures that the data of\npsychology do not differ in, their intrinsic character from the\ndata of physics. I have maintained that sensations are data for\npsychology and physics equally, while images, which may be in\nsome sense exclusively psychological data, can only be\ndistinguished from sensations by their correlations, not by what\nthey are in themselves. It is now necessary, however, to examine\nthe notion of a \"datum,\" and to obtain, if possible, a definition\nof this notion.\n\nThe notion of \"data\" is familiar throughout science, and is\nusually treated by men of science as though it were perfectly\nclear. Psychologists, on the other hand, find great difficulty in\nthe conception. \"Data\" are naturally defined in terms of theory\nof knowledge: they are those propositions of which the truth is\nknown without demonstration, so that they may be used as\npremisses in proving other propositions. Further, when a\nproposition which is a datum asserts the existence of something,\nwe say that the something is a datum, as well as the proposition\nasserting its existence. Thus those objects of whose existence we\nbecome certain through perception are said to be data.\n\nThere is some difficulty in connecting this epistemological\ndefinition of \"data\" with our psychological analysis of\nknowledge; but until such a connection has been effected, we have\nno right to use the conception \"data.\"\n\nIt is clear, in the first place, that there can be no datum apart\nfrom a belief. A sensation which merely comes and goes is not a\ndatum; it only becomes a datum when it is remembered. Similarly,\nin perception, we do not have a datum unless we have a JUDGMENT\nof perception. In the sense in which objects (as opposed to\npropositions) are data, it would seem natural to say that those\nobjects of which we are conscious are data. But consciousness, as\nwe have seen, is a complex notion, involving beliefs, as well as\nmnemic phenomena such as are required for perception and memory.\nIt follows that no datum is theoretically indubitable, since no\nbelief is infallible; it follows also that every datum has a\ngreater or less degree of vagueness, since there is always some\nvagueness in memory and the meaning of images.\n\nData are not those things of which our consciousness is earliest\nin time. At every period of life, after we have become capable of\nthought, some of our beliefs are obtained by inference, while\nothers are not. A belief may pass from either of these classes\ninto the other, and may therefore become, or cease to be, a\nbelief giving a datum. When, in what follows, I speak of data, I\ndo not mean the things of which we feel sure before scientific\nstudy begins, but the things which, when a science is well\nadvanced, appear as affording grounds for other parts of the\nscience, without themselves being believed on any ground except\nobservation. I assume, that is to say, a trained observer, with\nan analytic attention, knowing the sort of thing to look for, and\nthe sort of thing that will be important. What he observes is, at\nthe stage of science which he has reached, a datum for his\nscience. It is just as sophisticated and elaborate as the\ntheories which he bases upon it, since only trained habits and\nmuch practice enable a man to make the kind of observation that\nwill be scientifically illuminating. Nevertheless, when once it\nhas been observed, belief in it is not based on inference and\nreasoning, but merely upon its having been seen. In this way its\nlogical status differs from that of the theories which are proved\nby its means.\n\nIn any science other than psychology the datum is primarily a\nperception, in which only the sensational core is ultimately and\ntheoretically a datum, though some such accretions as turn the\nsensation into a perception are practically unavoidable. But if\nwe postulate an ideal observer, he will be able to isolate the\nsensation, and treat this alone as datum. There is, therefore, an\nimportant sense in which we may say that, if we analyse as much\nas we ought, our data, outside psychology, consist of sensations,\nwhich include within themselves certain spatial and temporal\nrelations.\n\nApplying this remark to physiology, we see that the nerves and\nbrain as physical objects are not truly data; they are to be\nreplaced, in the ideal structure of science, by the sensations\nthrough which the physiologist is said to perceive them. The\npassage from these sensations to nerves and brain as physical\nobjects belongs really to the initial stage in the theory of\nphysics, and ought to be placed in the reasoned part, not in the\npart supposed to be observed. To say we see the nerves is like\nsaying we hear the nightingale; both are convenient but\ninaccurate expressions. We hear a sound which we believe to be\ncausally connected with the nightingale, and we see a sight which\nwe believe to be causally connected with a nerve. But in each\ncase it is only the sensation that ought, in strictness, to be\ncalled a datum. Now, sensations are certainly among the data of\npsychology. Therefore all the data of the physical sciences are\nalso psychological data. It remains to inquire whether all the\ndata of psychology are also data of physical science, and\nespecially of physiology.\n\nIf we have been right in our analysis of mind, the ultimate data\nof psychology are only sensations and images and their relations.\nBeliefs, desires, volitions, and so on, appeared to us to be\ncomplex phenomena consisting of sensations and images variously\ninterrelated. Thus (apart from certain relations) the occurrences\nwhich seem most distinctively mental, and furthest removed from\nphysics, are, like physical objects, constructed or inferred, not\npart of the original stock of data in the perfected science. From\nboth ends, therefore, the difference between physical and\npsychological data is diminished. Is there ultimately no\ndifference, or do images remain as irreducibly and exclusively\npsychological? In view of the causal definition of the difference\nbetween images and sensations, this brings us to a new question,\nnamely: Are the causal laws of psychology different from those of\nany other science, or are they really physiological?\n\nCertain ambiguities must be removed before this question can be\nadequately discussed.\n\nFirst, there is the distinction between rough approximate laws\nand such as appear to be precise and general. I shall return to\nthe former presently; it is the latter that I wish to discuss\nnow.\n\nMatter, as defined at the end of Lecture V, is a logical fiction,\ninvented because it gives a convenient way of stating causal\nlaws. Except in cases of perfect regularity in appearances (of\nwhich we can have no experience), the actual appearances of a\npiece of matter are not members of that ideal system of regular\nappearances which is defined as being the matter in question. But\nthe matter is. after all, inferred from its appearances, which\nare used to VERIFY physical laws. Thus, in so far as physics is\nan empirical and verifiable science, it must assume or prove that\nthe inference from appearances to matter is, in general,\nlegitimate, and it must be able to tell us, more or less, what\nappearances to expect. It is through this question of\nverifiability and empirical applicability to experience that we\nare led to a theory of matter such as I advocate. From the\nconsideration of this question it results that physics, in so far\nas it is an empirical science, not a logical phantasy, is\nconcerned with particulars of just the same sort as those which\npsychology considers under the name of sensations. The causal\nlaws of physics, so interpreted, differ from those of psychology\nonly by the fact that they connect a particular with other\nappearances in the same piece of matter, rather than with other\nappearances in the same perspective. That is to say, they group\ntogether particulars having the same \"active\" place, while\npsychology groups together those having the same \"passive\" place.\nSome particulars, such as images, have no \"active\" place, and\ntherefore belong exclusively to psychology.\n\nWe can now understand the distinction between physics and\npsychology. The nerves and brain are matter: our visual\nsensations when we look at them may be, and I think are, members\nof the system constituting irregular appearances of this matter,\nbut are not the whole of the system. Psychology is concerned,\ninter alia, with our sensations when we see a piece of matter, as\nopposed to the matter which we see. Assuming, as we must, that\nour sensations have physical causes, their causal laws are\nnevertheless radically different from the laws of physics, since\nthe consideration of a single sensation requires the breaking up\nof the group of which it is a member. When a sensation is used to\nverify physics, it is used merely as a sign of a certain material\nphenomenon, i.e. of a group of particulars of which it is a\nmember. But when it is studied by psychology, it is taken away\nfrom that group and put into quite a different context, where it\ncauses images or voluntary movements. It is primarily this\ndifferent grouping that is characteristic of psychology as\nopposed to all the physical sciences, including physiology; a\nsecondary difference is that images, which belong to psychology,\nare not easily to be included among the aspects which constitute\na physical thing or piece of matter.\n\nThere remains, however, an important question, namely: Are mental\nevents causally dependent upon physical events in a sense in\nwhich the converse dependence does not hold? Before we can\ndiscuss the answer to this question, we must first be clear as to\nwhat our question means.\n\nWhen, given A, it is possible to infer B, but given B, it is not\npossible to infer A, we say that B is dependent upon A in a sense\nin which A is not dependent upon B. Stated in logical terms, this\namounts to saying that, when we know a many-one relation of A to\nB, B is dependent upon A in respect of this relation. If the\nrelation is a causal law, we say that B is causally dependent\nupon A. The illustration that chiefly concerns us is the system\nof appearances of a physical object. We can, broadly speaking,\ninfer distant appearances from near ones, but not vice versa. All\nmen look alike when they are a mile away, hence when we see a man\na mile off we cannot tell what he will look like when he is only\na yard away. But when we see him a yard away, we can tell what he\nwill look like a mile away. Thus the nearer view gives us more\nvaluable information, and the distant view is causally dependent\nupon it in a sense in which it is not causally dependent upon the\ndistant view.\n\nIt is this greater causal potency of the near appearance that\nleads physics to state its causal laws in terms of that system of\nregular appearances to which the nearest appearances increasingly\napproximate, and that makes it value information derived from the\nmicroscope or telescope. It is clear that our sensations,\nconsidered as irregular appearances of physical objects, share\nthe causal dependence belonging to comparatively distant\nappearances; therefore in our sensational life we are in causal\ndependence upon physical laws.\n\nThis, however, is not the most important or interesting part of\nour question. It is the causation of images that is the vital\nproblem. We have seen that they are subject to mnenic causation,\nand that mnenic causation may be reducible to ordinary physical\ncausation in nervous tissue. This is the question upon which our\nattitude must turn towards what may be called materialism. One\nsense of materialism is the view that all mental phenomena are\ncausally dependent upon physical phenomena in the above-defined\nsense of causal dependence. Whether this is the case or not, I do\nnot profess to know. The question seems to me the same as the\nquestion whether mnemic causation is ultimate, which we\nconsidered without deciding in Lecture IV. But I think the bulk\nof the evidence points to the materialistic answer as the more\nprobable.\n\nIn considering the causal laws of psychology, the distinction\nbetween rough generalizations and exact laws is important. There\nare many rough generalizations in psychology, not only of the\nsort by which we govern our ordinary behaviour to each other, but\nalso of a more nearly scientific kind. Habit and association\nbelong among such laws. I will give an illustration of the kind\nof law that can be obtained. Suppose a person has frequently\nexperienced A and B in close temporal contiguity, an association\nwill be established, so that A, or an image of A, tends to cause\nan image of B. The question arises: will the association work in\neither direction, or only from the one which has occurred earlier\nto the one which has occurred later? In an article by Mr.\nWohlgemuth, called \"The Direction of Associations\" (\"British\nJournal of Psychology,\" vol. v, part iv, March, 1913), it is\nclaimed to be proved by experiment that, in so far as motor\nmemory (i.e. memory of movements) is concerned, association works\nonly from earlier to later, while in visual and auditory memory\nthis is not the case, but the later of two neighbouring\nexperiences may recall the earlier as well as the earlier the\nlater. It is suggested that motor memory is physiological, while\nvisual and auditory memory are more truly psychological. But that\nis not the point which concerns us in the illustration. The point\nwhich concerns us is that a law of association, established by\npurely psychological observation, is a purely psychological law,\nand may serve as a sample of what is possible in the way of\ndiscovering such laws. It is, however, still no more than a rough\ngeneralization, a statistical average. It cannot tell us what\nwill result from a given cause on a given occasion. It is a law\nof tendency, not a precise and invariable law such as those of\nphysics aim at being.\n\nIf we wish to pass from the law of habit, stated as a tendency or\naverage, to something more precise and invariable, we seem driven\nto the nervous system. We can more or less guess how an\noccurrence produces a change in the brain, and how its repetition\ngradually produces something analogous to the channel of a river,\nalong which currents flow more easily than in neighbouring paths.\nWe can perceive that in this way, if we had more knowledge, the\ntendency to habit through repetition might be replaced by a\nprecise account of the effect of each occurrence in bringing\nabout a modification of the sort from which habit would\nultimately result. It is such considerations that make students\nof psychophysiology materialistic in their methods, whatever they\nmay be in their metaphysics. There are, of course, exceptions,\nsuch as Professor J. S. Haldane, who maintains that it is\ntheoretically impossible to obtain physiological explanations of\npsychical phenomena, or physical explanations of physiological\nphenomena. But I think the bulk of expert opinion, in practice,\nis on the other side.\n\nThe question whether it is possible to obtain precise causal laws\nin which the causes are psychological, not material, is one of\ndetailed investigation. I have done what I could to make clear\nthe nature of the question, but I do not believe that it is\npossible as yet to answer it with any confidence. It seems to be\nby no means an insoluble question, and we may hope that science\nwill be able to produce sufficient grounds for regarding one\nanswer as much more probable than the other. But for the moment I\ndo not see how we can come to a decision.\n\nI think, however, on grounds of the theory of matter explained in\nLectures V and VII, that an ultimate scientific account of what\ngoes on in the world, if it were ascertainable, would resemble\npsychology rather than physics in what we found to be the\ndecisive difference between them. I think, that is to say, that\nsuch an account would not be content to speak, even formally, as\nthough matter, which is a logical fiction, were the ultimate\nreality. I think that, if our scientific knowledge were adequate\nto the task, which it neither is nor is likely to become, it\nwould exhibit the laws of correlation of the particulars\nconstituting a momentary condition of a material unit, and would\nstate the causal laws of the world in terms of these\nparticulars, not in terms of matter. Causal laws so stated would,\nI believe, be applicable to psychology and physics equally; the\nscience in which they were stated would succeed in achieving what\nmetaphysics has vainly attempted, namely a unified account of\nwhat really happens, wholly true even if not the whole of truth,\nand free from all convenient fictions or unwarrantable\nassumptions of metaphysical entities. A causal law applicable to\nparticulars would count as a law of physics if it could be stated\nin terms of those fictitious systems of regular appearances which\nare matter; if this were not the case, it would count as a law of\npsychology if one of the particulars were a sensation or an\nimage, i.e. were subject to mnemic causation. I believe that the\nrealization of the complexity of a material unit, and its\nanalysis into constituents analogous to sensations, is of the\nutmost importance to philosophy, and vital for any understanding\nof the relations between mind and matter, between our perceptions\nand the world which they perceive. It is in this direction, I am\nconvinced, that we must look for the solution of many ancient\nperplexities.\n\nIt is probable that the whole science of mental occurrences,\nespecially where its initial definitions are concerned, could be\nsimplified by the development of the fundamental unifying science\nin which the causal laws of particulars are sought, rather than\nthe causal laws of those systems of particulars that constitute\nthe material units of physics. This fundamental science would\ncause physics to become derivative, in the sort of way in which\ntheories of the constitution of the atom make chemistry\nderivative from physics; it would also cause psychology to appear\nless singular and isolated among sciences. If we are right in\nthis, it is a wrong philosophy of matter which has caused many of\nthe difficulties in the philosophy of mind--difficulties which a\nright philosophy of matter would cause to disappear.\n\nThe conclusions at which we have arrived may be summed up as\nfollows:\n\nI. Physics and psychology are not distinguished by their\nmaterial. Mind and matter alike are logical constructions; the\nparticulars out of which they are constructed, or from which they\nare inferred, have various relations, some of which are studied\nby physics, others by psychology. Broadly speaking, physics group\nparticulars by their active places, psychology by their passive\nplaces.\n\nII. The two most essential characteristics of the causal laws\nwhich would naturally be called psychological are SUBJECTIVITY\nand MNEMIC CAUSATION; these are not unconnected, since the causal\nunit in mnemic causation is the group of particulars having a\ngiven passive place at a given time, and it is by this manner of\ngrouping that subjectivity is defined.\n\nIII. Habit, memory and thought are all developments of mnemic\ncausation. It is probable, though not certain, that mnemic\ncausation is derivative from ordinary physical causation in\nnervous (and other) tissue.\n\nIV. Consciousness is a complex and far from universal\ncharacteristic of mental phenomena.\n\nV. Mind is a matter of degree, chiefly exemplified in number and\ncomplexity of habits.\n\nVI. All our data, both in physics and psychology, are subject to\npsychological causal laws; but physical causal laws, at least in\ntraditional physics, can only be stated in terms of matter, which\nis both inferred and constructed, never a datum. In this respect\npsychology is nearer to what actually exists.","title":"The Analysis of Mind/Lecture XV","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":6252}