{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_1/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_1","id":"wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_1","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy/Chapter_1","summary":null,"tags":["Headers_applying_DefaultSort_key","Subpages"],"text":"CHAPTER I.\n\nINTRODUCTION; RELIGION AS A MORAL CODE AND AS A THEORY.\n\nAuch bezweifl\u2019 ich, dass du glaubest,\nWas so rechter Glaube heisst,\nGlaubst wohl nicht an Gott den Vater,\nAn den Sohn und heil\u2019gen Geist.\n\nHeine.\n\nIntending in the following pages to sketch certain\nphilosophic opinions that seem to him to have a\nreligious bearing, the author must begin by stating\nwhat he understands to be the nature of religion,\nand how he conceives philosophy to be related to\nreligion.\n\nWe speak commonly of religious feelings and of\nreligious beliefs; but we find difficulty in agreeing\nabout what makes either beliefs or feelings religious.\nA feeling is not religious merely because it is strong,\nnor yet because it is also morally valuable, nor yet\nbecause it is elevated. If the strength and the\nmoral value of a feeling made it religious, patriotism\nwould be religion. If elevation of feeling were\nenough, all higher artistic emotion would be\nreligious. But such views would seem to most persons\nvery inadequate. As for belief, it is not religious\nmerely because it is a belief in the supernatural.\nNot merely is superstition as such very different from religion, but even a belief in God as the highest of\nbeings need not be a religious belief. If La Place\nhad needed what he called \u201cthat hypothesis,\u201d the\nDeity, when introduced into his celestial mechanics,\nwould have been but a mathematical symbol, or a\nformula like Taylor\u2019s theorem, \u2014 no true object of\nreligious veneration. On the other hand, Spinoza\u2019s\nimpersonal Substance, or the Nirv\u00e2na of the\nBuddhists, or any one of many like notions, may have,\neither as doctrines about the world or as ideals of\nhuman conduct, immense religious value. Very\nmuch that we associate with religion is therefore\nnon-essential to religion. Yet religion is something\nunique in human belief and emotion, and must not\nbe dissolved into any lower or more commonplace\nelements. What then is religion?\n\nI.\n\nSo much at all events seems sure about religion.\nIt has to do with action. It is impossible without\nsome appearance of moral purpose. A totally\nimmoral religion may exist; but it is like a totally\nunseaworthy ship at sea, or like a rotten bank, or like\na wildcat mine. It deceives its followers. It\npretends to guide them into morality of some sort. If\nit is blind or wicked, not its error makes it religious,\nbut the faith of its followers in its worth. A religion\nmay teach the men of one tribe to torture and\nkill men of another tribe. But even such a religion\nwould pretend to teach right conduct. Religion,\nhowever, gives us more than a moral code. A moral code alone, with its \u201cThou shalt,\u201d would be no more\nreligious than is the civil code. A religion adds\nsomething to the moral code. And what it adds is, first,\nenthusiasm. Somehow it makes the faithful regard\nthe moral law with devotion, reverence, love. By\nhistory, by parable, by myth, by ceremony, by song,\nby whatever means you will, the religion gives to the\nmere code life and warmth. A religion not only\ncommands the faithful, but gives them something\nthat they are glad to live for, and if need be to die\nfor.\n\nBut not yet have we mentioned the element of\nreligion that makes it especially interesting to a\nstudent of theoretical philosophy. So far as we have\ngone, ethical philosophy would criticise the codes of\nvarious religions, while theoretical philosophy would\nhave no part in the work. But, in fact, religion\nalways adds another element. Not only does religion\nteach devotion to a moral code, but the means that\nit uses to this end include a more or less complete\ntheory of things. Religion says not merely do and\nfeel but also believe. A religion tells us about the\nthings that it declares to exist, and most especially it\ntells us about their relations to the moral code and\nto the religious feeling. There may be a religion\nwithout a supernatural, but there cannot be a\nreligion without a theoretical element, without a\nstatement of some supposed matter of fact, as part of\nthe religious doctrine.\n\nThese three elements, then, go to constitute any\nreligion. A religion must teach some moral code,\nmust in some way inspire a strong feeling of devotion to that code, and in so doing must show\nsomething in the nature of things that answers to the code\nor that serves to reinforce the feeling. A religion\nis therefore practical, emotional, and theoretical; it\nteaches us to do, to feel, and to believe, and it teaches\nthe belief as a means to its teaching of the action\nand of the feeling.\n\nII.\n\nWe may now see how philosophy is related to\nreligion. Philosophy is not directly concerned with\nfeeling, but both action and belief are direct objects\nof philosophical criticism. And on the other hand,\nin so far as philosophy suggests general rules for\nconduct, or discusses the theories about the world,\nphilosophy must have a religious aspect. Religion\ninvites the scrutiny of philosophy, and philosophy\nmay not neglect the problems of religion. Kant\u2019s\nfundamental problems: What do I know? and\nWhat ought I to do? are of religious interest no\nless than of philosophic interest. They ask how\nthe highest thought of man stands related to his\nhighest needs, and what in things answers to our\nbest ideals. Surely no one ought to fear such\nquestions, nor ought any philosophic student to hesitate\nto suggest in answer to them whatever after due\nreflection he honestly can suggest, poor and\ntentative though it may be. In fact there is no defense\nfor one as sincere thinker if, undertaking to pay\nattention to philosophy as such, he willfully or thoughtlessly\nneglects such problems on the ground that he\nhas no time for them. Surely he has time to be not merely a student of philosophy, but also a man, and\nthese things are among the essentials of humanity,\nwhich the non-philosophic treat in their way, and\nwhich philosophic students must treat in theirs.\n\nWhen, however, we say that the thinker must\nstudy and revere these questions, we must not fancy\nthat because of their importance he may prejudge\nthem. Assumptions, postulates, a priori demands,\nthese indeed are in all thinking, and no thinker is\nwithout such. But prejudice, i.e. foregone\nconclusions in questionable matters, deliberate\nunwillingness to let the light shine upon our beliefs, all this\nis foreign to true thought. Thinking is for us just\nthe clarifying of our minds, and because clearness is\nnecessary to the unity of thought, necessary to lessen\nthe strife of sects and the bitterness of doubt,\nnecessary to save our minds from hopeless, everlasting\nwandering, therefore to resist the clarifying process,\neven while we undertake it, is to sin against what is\nbest in us, and is also to sin against humanity.\nDeliberately insincere, dishonest thinking is downright\nblasphemy. And so, if we take any interest in these\nthings, our duty is plain. Here are questions of\ntremendous importance to us and to the world. We\nare sluggards or cowards if, pretending to be\nphilosophic students and genuine seekers of truth, we do\nnot attempt to do something with these questions.\nWe are worse than cowards if, attempting to\nconsider them, we do so otherwise than reverently,\n\nfearlessly, and honestly.\nIII.\n\nThe religious thought of our time has reached a\nposition that arouses the anxiety of all serious\nthinkers, and the interest of many who are not serious.\nWe are not content with what we learned from our\nfathers; we want to correct their dogmas, to prove\nwhat they held fast without proof, to work out our\nown salvation by our own efforts. But we know\nnot yet what form our coming faith will take. We\nare not yet agreed even about the kind of question\nthat we shall put to ourselves when we begin any\nspecific religious inquiry. People suggest very\nvarious facts or aspects of facts in the world as having\na religious value. The variety of the suggestions\nshows the vagueness of the questions that people have\nin mind when they talk of religion. One man wants\nto worship Natural Law, or even Nature in\ngeneral. Another finds Humanity to be his ideal object\nof religious veneration. Yet another gravely insists\nthat the Unknowable satisfies his religious longings.\nNow it is something to be plain in expressing a\nquestion, even if you cannot give an answer. We\nshall do something if we only find out what it is that\nwe ought to seek. And the foregoing considerations\nmay help us in this way, even if what follows should\nbe wholly ineffective. For we have tried to give a\ndefinition that shall express, not merely what a\nBuddhist or a Catholic or a Comtist or an Hegelian\nmeans by his religion, but what all men everywhere\nmean by religion. They all want religion to define for them their duty, to give them the heart to do it,\nand to point out to them such things in the real\nworld as shall help them to be steadfast in their\ndevotion to duty. When people pray that they may\nbe made happy, they still desire to learn what they\nare to do in order to become happy. When saints\nof any creed look up to their God as their only good,\nthey are seeking for guidance in the right way.\nThe savages of whom we hear so much nowadays\nhave indeed low forms of religion, but these religions\nof theirs still require them to do something, and\ntell them why it is worth while to do this, and make\nthem more or less enthusiastic in doing it. Among\nourselves, the poor and the lonely, the desolate and\nthe afflicted, when they demand religious comfort,\nwant something that shall tell them what to do with\nlife, and how to take up once more the burdens of\ntheir broken existence. And the religious philosophers\nmust submit to the same test that humanity\neverywhere proposes to its religions. If one tries\nto regulate our diet by his theories, he must have\nthe one object, whatever his theory, since he wants\nto tell us what is healthful for us. If he tells us to\neat nothing but snow, that is his fault. The true\nobject of the theory of diet remains the same. And\nso if men have expressed all sorts of one-sided,\ndisheartening, inadequate views of religion, that does\nnot make the object of religious theory less catholic,\nless comprehensive, less definitely human. A man\nwho propounds a religious system must have a moral\ncode, an emotional life, and some theory of things to\noffer us. With less we cannot be content. He need not, indeed, know or pretend to know very much\nabout our wonderful world, but he must know\nsomething, and that something must be of definite value.\n\nTo state the whole otherwise. Purely theoretic\nphilosophy tries to find out what it can about the\nreal world. When it makes this effort, it has to be\nperfectly indifferent to consequences. It may not\nshudder or murmur if it comes upon unspeakably\ndreadful truths. If it finds nothing in the world but\nevil, it must still accept the truth, and must calmly\nstate it without praise and without condemnation.\nTheoretic philosophy knows no passion save the\npassion for truth, has no fear save the fear of error,\ncherishes no hope save the hope of theoretic success.\nBut religious philosophy has other objects in addition\nto these. Religious philosophy is indeed neither\nthe foe nor the mistress of theoretic philosophy.\nReligious philosophy dare not be in opposition to the\ntruths that theory may have established. But over\nand above these truths it seeks something else. It\nseeks to know their value. It comes to the world\nwith other interests, in addition to the purely\ntheoretic ones. It wants to know what in the world is\nworthy of worship as the good. It seeks not merely\nthe truth, but the inspiring truth. It defines for\nitself goodness, moral worth, and then it asks. What\nin this world is worth anything? Its demands in\nthis regard are boundless. It will be content only\nwith the best it can find. Having formulated for\nitself its ideal of worth, it asks at the outset: Is\nthere then, anywhere in the universe, any real thing\nof Infinite Worth? If this cannot be found, then and then only will religious philosophy be content\nwith less. Then it will still ask: What in this world\nis worth most? It cannot make realities, but it is\ndetermined to judge them. It cannot be content\nwith blind faith, and demands the actual truth as\nmuch as theoretic philosophy demands it; but\nreligious philosophy treats this truth only as the material\nfor its ideal judgments. It seeks the ideal among\nthe realities.\n\nUpon such a quest as this, we ask the reader to\naccompany us in the following pages. We have not\nspace to be exhaustive, nor in fact to offer much\nmore than suggestions; but we want the suggestions\nto be explicit, and we hope that they may stimulate\nsome reader, and may perhaps help him in\ncompleting his own trains of thought.\n\nIV.\n\nPeople come to such questions as these with\ncertain prejudices about the method and spirit of\ninquiry; and all their work may be hampered by these\nprejudices. Let us say yet a little more of what we\nthink as to this matter. There are two extremes to\nfear in religious philosophy: indifference that arises\nfrom a dogmatic disposition to deny, and timidity\nthat arises from an excessive show of reverence for\nthe objects of religious faith. Both of these extreme\nmoods have their defective methods in dealing with\nreligious philosophy. The over-skeptical man looks\nwith impatience on all lengthy discussions of these\ntopics. There can be nothing in it all, he says; nothing but what Hume, in an eloquent passage,\ncalled sophistry and delusion. Why spend time to\npuzzle over these insoluble mysteries? Hence his\nmethod is: swift work, clear statement of known\ndifficulties, keen ridicule of hasty assumptions, and\nthen a burning of the old deserted Moscow of\ntheology, and a bewildering flight into the inaccessible\nwintry wastes, where no army of religious philosophers\nshall follow him. Now for our part we want\nto be as skeptical as anybody; and we personally\nalways admire the freedom of motion that pure\nskepticism gives. Our trouble with it all, however, is that,\nafter we have enjoyed the freedom and the frosty air\nof pure philosophic skepticism for a while, we find\nourselves unexpectedly in the midst of philosophic\ntruth that needs closer examination. The short and\neasy agnostic method is not enough. You must\nsupplement skepticism by philosophy; and when you\ndo so, you find yourself forced to accept, not indeed\nthe old theology of your childhood, but something\nthat satisfies, oddly enough, certain religious\nlongings, that, as skeptic, you had carefully tried to\nforget. Then you find yourself with what you may\nhave to call a religious doctrine; and then you may\nhave to state it as we are here going to do, not in an\neasy or fascinating way, such as the pure skeptic can\nso well follow, but at all events with some approach to\na serious and sustained effort to consider hard\nquestions from many sides. The skeptical method is not\nonly a good, but also a necessary beginning of\nreligious philosophy. But we are bound to go deeper\nthan mere superficial agnosticism. If, however, any reader is already sure that we cannot go deeper, and\nthat modern popular agnosticism has exhausted all\nthat can be said on religious questions, then we bid\nhim an immediate and joyous farewell. If we had\nnot something to say in this book that seems to us\nboth foreign to the popular modern agnostic range\nof discussion, and deeper than the insight of popular\nmodern skepticism, we should say nothing. The\nundertaking of this book is not to wrangle in the old\nway over the well-known ordinary debates of to-day,\nbut to turn the flank of the common popular thought\non these topics altogether, by going back to a type\nof philosophic investigation, that is nowadays\nfamiliar indeed to a certain school of specialists, but\nforgotten by the general public. In this type of\ninvestigation, we have furthermore something to offer\nthat seems to us no mere repetition of the views of\nother thinkers, but an effort to make at least one\nlittle step in advance of the thoughts that the great\nmasters of philosophy have given to us. Yet we\nknow indeed that the range of any useful independent\nthought in philosophy must be, in case of any\none individual, very narrow.\n\nThe other mood and its method remain. It is the\nmood of excessive reverence. It wastes capital\nletters on all the pronouns and adjectives that have to\ndo with the objects of religious faith; but it fears to\ndo these objects the honor to get clear ideas about\nthem. Now we respect this mood when it appears in\nmen who do well their life-work, who need their\nreligious faith for their work, and who do not feel any\ncalling as truth-seekers. No man has any business to set up his vocation as the highest one; and the\nman for whom truth is useful in his actual life-work\nas an inspiration, revealed to him only in feeling, is\nwelcome to his feelings, is worthy of all regard from\nthose whose vocation is philosophy, and shall not be\ntormented by our speculations. He is careful and\ntroubled about many things; the world needs him,\nand philosophy does not. We only lay claim to our\nown rights, and do not want to interfere with his.\nOur right to clear thought, we must insist upon.\nFor looked at philosophically, and apart from the\nnecessary limitations of the hard worker, all this dumb\nreverence, this vague use of vague names, has its\nserious dangers. You are reverent, we may say to the\nman who regards philosophic criticism as a dangerous\ntrifling with stupendous truths; you are reverent,\nbut what do you reverence? Have a care lest what\nyou reverence shall turn out to be your own vague\nand confused notions, and not the real divine Truth\nat all. Take heed lest your object of worship be only\nyour own little pet infinite, that is sublime to you\nmainly because it is yours, and that is in truth about\nas divine and infinite as your hat. For this is the\ndanger that besets these vague and lofty sentiments.\nUnreflected upon, uncriticised, dumbly experienced,\ndumbly dreaded, these, your religious objects, may\nbecome mere feelings, mere visceral sensations of\nyours, that you have on Sunday mornings, or when\nyou pray. Of course, if you are a worker, you\nmay actually realize these vague ideas, in so far as\nthey inspire you to work. If they do, they shall be\njudged by their fruits. Otherwise, do not trust too confidently their religious value. You, individually\nregarded, are but a mass of thought and feeling.\nWhat is only yours and in you, is not divine at all.\nUnless you lift it up into the light of thought and\nexamine it often, how do you know into what your\ncherished religious ideal may not have rotted in the\ndarkness of your emotions? Once in a while, there\ndoes come to a man some terrible revelation of\nhimself in a great sorrow. Then in the tumult of\nanguish he looks for his religious faith to clothe his\nnakedness against the tempest; and he finds perhaps\nsome moth-eaten old garment that profits him\nnothing, so that his soul miserably perishes in the\nfrost of doubt. Such a man has expected God to\ncome to his help in every time of need; but the\nonly god he has actually and consciously had, has\nbeen his own little contemptible, private notion and\ndim feeling of a god, which he has never dared fairly\nto look at. Any respectable wooden idol would have\ndone him better service; for then a man could know\nwhere and what his idol is. Such is only too apt\nto be the real state of the man who regards it as\nprofanity to think clearly and sensibly on religious\ntopics.\n\nWe claim, then, the right to criticise as fearlessly,\nas thoroughly, and as skeptically as may be, the\nfoundations of conduct and faith. For what we\ncriticise are, at the outset, our own notions, which we\nwant to have conform to the truth, if so be that there\nis any truth. As for doubt on religious questions,\nthat is for a truth-seeker not only a privilege but a\nduty; and, as we shall experience all through this study, doubt has a curious and very valuable place\nin philosophy. Philosophic truth, as such, comes to\nus first under the form of doubt; and we never can\nbe very near it in our search unless, for a longer or\nshorter time, we have come to despair of it\naltogether. First, then, the despair of a thorough-going\ndoubt, and then the discovery that this doubt\ncontains in its bosom the truth that we are sworn to\ndiscover, however we can, \u2014 this is the typical\nphilosophic experience. May the memory of this\nsuggestion support the failing patience of the kindly\ndisposed reader through some of the longer and more\nwearisome stretches of dry skeptical analysis over\nwhich we must try to journey together. Whatever\nmay be the truth, it must lie beyond those deserts.","title":"The Religious Aspect of Philosophy/Chapter 1","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":3627}