{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_12/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_12","id":"wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_12","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy/Chapter_12","summary":null,"tags":["Headers_applying_DefaultSort_key","Subpages"],"text":"CHAPTER XII.\n\nTHE RELIGIOUS INSIGHT.\n\nIf thou betake thyself to the ever-living and abiding Truth, the desertion or death of a friend shall not make thee sad. \u2014 Imitation of Christ.\nCum contra sapiens, quatenus ut talis consideratur, vix animo movetur, sed sui et Dei et rerum aeterna quadam necessitate conscius, nunquam esse desinit, sed semper vera animi acquiescentia potitur. \u2014 Spinoza, Ethica.\n\nWe are in a new world of Divine Life. The dark\nworld of the powers has passed away from our\nthought. Here is the Eternal, for which all these\npowers exist, in which they dwell. Here we are in\nthe presence of the Ideal Judge who knows all Good\nand Evil. From the other side the world as we\napproached it had seemed so restless, so disheartening,\nso deaf. The world of our postulates was a brighter\none only because we determined to make it so. But\nthere was something lonesome in the thought that\nthe postulates got, as answer from the real world,\nonly their own echo, and not always that. Their\nworld was rather their own creation than an\nexternal something that gave them independent support.\nSometimes there seemed to be nothing solid that\ncould echo back anything at all. Now we seem to\nlook upon a truth that satisfies indeed no selfish\nlongings of ours, no whims of theological tradition, no demands of our personal narrow lives. We shall\nnot learn in this way who is first in the kingdom of\nheaven, nor how the dead are raised, nor any answer\nto any other special demand of any set of men. We\nlearn, however, this at least: All truth is known to\nOne Thought, and that Infinite. What does that\nimply? Let us see.\n\nI.\n\nOur argument is somewhat near to the thought\nthat partially satisfied St. Augustine when he found\nit in his Plato. That there should be a truth at all\nimplies, we have seen, that there should be an\nInfinite Truth, known to an Infinite Thought; or, in\nother words, that all is for thought, and without\nthought is nothing that is. We also are a part of\nthis infinite thought. We know not yet more of the\nnature of this thought, save that it must be eternal,\nall-embracing, and One. What then shall we be\nable further to say about it?\n\nTo answer would be to expound a system of\nphilosophy. But we must limit ourselves here to the\nnecessary. And so, for the first, we shall try to\npoint out what this ideal and infinite life of thought\nthat we have found as the eternal truth of things\ncannot be expected to accomplish for the purposes\nof our religion, and then to consider what we may\nnevertheless dare to hope from it.\n\nIt cannot be expected to furnish us an a priori\nknowledge of any fact of experience, of any\nparticular law of nature, of the destiny of any one finite\nbeing. All that remains just as dark as it was before. We neither rejoice in this result, nor lament it.\nNobody who wanders into the ideal world may expect\nto find it ordered for his individual advantage; nor\nneed he try to find there good investments for his\nmoney. The Infinite does not wait for his\nindividual approval; although morally speaking he may do\nwell to get the approval of the Infinite. The\nInfinite was not elected to office by his vote, and he\nmay not impeach it for disregard of his humble\npetitions for good things, nor threaten it with want of\nconfidence because it does not secure passage for his\nprivate bills. In so far as to say this is to condemn\nthe Real, we unhesitatingly do so. But then, as we\nsaw in our ethical discussion, the moral insight is not\nso much concerned with private bills, as with certain\ngreater matters. If the moral insight wants\nreligious support, possibly the failure of all these\npersonal concerns of ours to find any hint of response\nfrom the Absolute, may not render impossible the\nethical undertakings of the human spirit. If as\nindividuals we must hear the dreadful words from the\nspirit of nature: Du gleichst dem Geist den du\nbegreifst nicht mir; still it is possible that with a\nhigher insight, looking upon this same spirit in its\neternal and inmost nature, we may yet come with\nfull reason at last to say: Erhabner Geist, du gabst\nmir, gabst mir alles, warum ich bat. For there are\ndemands and demands. Man, as lover, demands\nsuccess in love, and the course of the world may thwart\nhim; as toiler, he demands for himself personal\nimmortality, and the course of the world may care\nnaught for his individual life; as bereaved, as mourner over his dead, he may demand for his loved\nones also this immortality, and the course of the\nworld may leave the fate of all his loved ones\nmysterious forever; as lover of mankind, he may\ndemand an infinite future of blessed progress for his\nrace, and the law of the dissipation of energy may\ngive him the only discoverable physical answer to\nhis demand; as just man, he may cry aloud that evil\nshall cease from among men, and the wicked may\nstill laugh in triumph unpunished. And yet for all\nthis he may find some higher compensation.\nAgnostic as he will remain about all the powers of this\nworld, about the outcome of all finite processes, he\nwill take comfort in the assurance that an Infinite\nReason is above all and through all, embracing\neverything, judging everything, infallible, perfect.\nTo this Thought he may look up, saying: \u201cThou\nAll-Knowing One seest us, what we are, and how we\nstrive. Thou knowest our frame, and rememberest\nthat we are as dust. In thy perfection is our Ideal.\nThat thou art, is enough for our moral comfort.\nThat thou knowest our evil and our good, that gives\nus our support in our little striving for the good.\nNot worthless would we be in thy sight; not of the\nvile, the base, the devilish party in the warfare of\nthis world. Thou that judgest shalt say that we,\neven in our poor individual lives, are better than\nnaught. Thou shalt know that in our weakness and\nblindness, in our pain and sorrow, in our little days,\nin our dark world, ignorant as to the future,\nconfused with many doubts, beset with endless\ntemptations, full of dread, of hesitation, of sloth, we yet sought, such as we were, to be in our own fashion\nlike thee; to know the truth as thou knowest it, to\nbe full of higher life as thou art full, to be above\nstrife as thou art above it, to be of one Spirit as\nthou art One, to be perfect as thou art perfect. This\nthou shalt see in us, and this record shall be eternal,\nlike our knowledge. In thee what we vaguely aim\nto conceive is clear light. In thee the peace that we\nstrive to find is experienced. And when we try to do\nright, we know that thou seest both our striving and\nour successes and our failures. And herein we have\ncomfort. We perish, but thou endurest. Ours is\nnot thy eternity. But in thy eternity we would be\nremembered, not as rebels against the good, but as\ndoers of the good; not as blots on the face of this\npart of thy infinite reality, but as healthy leaves that\nflourished for a time on the branches of the eternal\ntree of life, and that have fallen, though not into\nforgetfulness. For to thee nothing is forgotten.\u201d\n\nThis thought, of the Judge that never ceases to\nthink of us and of all things, never changes, never\nmistakes, and that knows the Good simply because\nthat Good is an clement of the Truth \u2014 perhaps this\ncan sustain us when all else fails. Nothing but this\nmay be certain; but this, if it be not all that some\npeople have sought, may be a help to us. This\nReligion may have no such hot little fires on its altars\nas we at first longed for; but then it is a very old\nobjection to the stars to say that they bake us no\nbread, and only glitter up there in the dark to be\nlooked at. Yet even the stars are worth something\nto us.\n\nII.\n\nBut if we leave these limitations of our view, and\npass to its positive religious value, our first sense is\none of joy and freedom to find that our long sought\nideal of a perfect unity of life is here attained. Let\nus look away for a moment from our finite existence,\nwith its doubts and its problems, to the conception\nof that infinite life. In that life is all truth, fully\npresent in the unity of one eternal moment. The\nworld is no mass of separate facts, stuck one to\nanother in an external way, but, for the infinite, each\nfact is what it is only by reason of its place in the\ninfinite unity. The world of life is then what we\ndesired it to be, an organic total; and the\nindividual selves are drops in this ocean of the absolute\ntruth.\n\nThus then, seen in the light of this our result,\nthe human tasks that we sketched in our ethical\ndiscussion find their place in the objective world.\nNow, and in fact for the first time, we can see what\nwe were really trying to accomplish through our\nideal. We were trying in a practical way to\nrealize what we now perceive to be the fullness of the\nlife of God. So that the one highest activity, in\nwhich all human activities were to join, is known to\nus now as the progressive realization by men of the\neternal life of an Infinite Spirit. So whereas we\nformerly had to say to men: Devote yourselves to\nart, to science, to the state, or to any like work that\ndoes tend to organize your lives into one life, we\nmay now substitute one absolute expression for all those accidental expressions, and may say: Devote\nyourselves to losing your lives in the divine life.\nFor all these special aims that we have mentioned\nare but means of accomplishing the knowledge of\nthe fullness of the truth. And Truth is God.\n\nNow this precept is no barren abstraction. It\nmeans to take hold of every act of life, however\nhumble and simple. \u201cWhere art thou, O man?\u201d\nour ideal says to us. \u201cArt thou not in God? To\nwhom dost thou speak? With whom dost thou walk?\nWhat life is this in whose midst thou livest? What\nare all these things that thou seemest to touch?\nWhose is all this beauty that thou enjoyest in art,\nthis unity that thou seekest to produce in thy state,\nthis truth that thou pursuest in thy thought? All\nthis is in God and of God. Thou hast never seen,\nor heard, or touched, or handled, or loved anything\nbut God. Know this truth, and thy life must be\ntransformed to thee in all its significance. Serve\nthe whole God, not the irrationally separate part\nthat thy delusions have made thee suppose to be an\nindependent thing. Live out thy life in its full\nmeaning; for behold, it is God\u2019s life.\u201d\n\nSo, as it seems, the best that we could have wished\nfrom the purely moral side is attained. The\nDivine Thought it is that actually accomplishes what\nwe imperfectly sought to attain, when we defined\nfor ourselves Duty. In the Divine Thought is\nperfectly and finally realized the Moral Insight and the\nUniversal Will of our ethical discussion. And this\ninsight and will are not realized as by some Power,\nthat then should set about to accomplish their fulfillment externally. But in the infinite, where all is\neternally complete, the insight is both present and\nfulfilled; the universal will gets what it seeks.\nThere is no lack there, nor hesitation, nor striving,\nnor doubt, nor weariness; but all is eternally\nperfect triumph.\n\nNow this, though it sounds mystical enough to\nour untrained common sense, is no mere poetry of\nthought. It is the direct philosophical outcome of\nwhat we have found by a purely logical process.\nThe driest thought, the simplest fragment of\nrationality, involves this absolute, infinite, and perfect\nthought. And this it involves because it involves\nthe possibility of error, and because, as separate from\nthe infinite, this possibility of error in a single thought\nbecomes unintelligible and contradictory. We did\nall that we could to escape this conclusion. We\nwandered in the thickets of confusion and\ncontradiction, until there was no chance of finding there a\nfurther pathway. And then we turned to see, and\nbehold, God was in this place, though we had known\nit not. The genuine God that we thus found was no\nincomplete, struggling God, whom we might pity in\nhis conflict with evil, but the all-embracing thought,\nin which the truth is eternally finished. And this\nGod it is that we now see as the complete realization\nof our own ideal, as of all worthy ideals.\n\nFor consider if you will this element in our\nconception of this Thought. Can this infinite know\nitself as imperfect, or as not possessing some object\nthat it knows to be good? This is impossible, and\ndoubly so. Not only does the conception of an Infinite, in which and for which are all things, wholly\nexclude the possibility of any good thing beyond\nthe Infinite itself, but also in still another way does\nthe same truth appear. For if you suppose that this\ninfinite thought desires some perfection G, that it\nhas not, then either it is right in supposing this\nperfection to be truly desirable, or it is wrong. In\neither case the previous argument of Chapter XI.\nshows us that the truth or the falsity of this\njudgment of desire about G must exist as known truth\nor falsity for a higher thought, which, including the\nthought that desires, and itself actually having this\ndesired good thing, compares the desired object with\nthe conception of the thought that desires it, and\njudges of them both. Above the desire, then, must\nin every case exist the satisfaction of the desire in a\nhigher thought. So that for the Infinite there can\nbe no unsatisfied desire. Unsatisfied desire exists\nonly in the finite beings, not in the inclusive Infinite.\n\nThe world then, as a whole, is and must be\nabsolutely good, since the infinite thought must know\nwhat is desirable, and knowing it, must have present\nin itself the true objects of desire. The existence\nof any amount of pain or of other evil, of crime or\nof baseness in the world as we see it, is, thus viewed,\nno evidence against the absolute goodness of things,\nrather a guaranty thereof. For all evil viewed\nexternally is just an evidence to us finite beings that\nthere exists something desirable, which we have not,\nand which we just now cannot get. However\nstubborn this evil is for us, that has naught to do with\nthe perfection of the Infinite. For the infinite did not make this evil, but the evil, together with the\nmaking of it, which indeed was also in its separateness\nevil, \u2014 all this is a phenomenon for the infinite\nthought, which, in knowing this evil, merely knows\nthe absolute desirableness of that which it also\npossesses, namely, the absolutely good.\n\nWe have used here an argument that could not be\nused in our study of the \u201cWorld of Doubt.\u201d When\nwe there thought evil to be possible for the world as\na whole, we conceived that a being who knew all the\nworld would yet desire something better. But what\nwould this imply? It implies that this being would\ndesire a state of things different from the existing\none, and would do so believing that state to be better\nthan the existing one. But would he truly know\nthis desired state to be better, or would he only hope\nso? Who truly knows the value of a state save the\none that possesses it? Knowledge is of the present.\nTherefore this being would not really know the\nbetter state, unless it were already actual for him. But\nin that case he would include not only the present\nworld, but the perfect world, and his total state\ncould not be one of discontent. So the other\nalternative remains. Our supposed being would only\nhope the desired state to be better than what was\nreal already for him. But would his hope be a true\none? If so, then it could only be true in case this\nperfection is already realized in a higher thought.\nFor the Infinite then the question, \u201cIs there\nanything better than what exists?\u201d must be nonsense.\nFor him the actual and the possible fall together in\none truth; and this one truth cannot be evil.\n\nOn another side, our conception gives us religious\nsupport. The imperfection of the purely moral view\nlay in part in the fact that there was an inner\nincompleteness about the very definition of our ideal, as\nwell as a doubt about its attainability. This inner\nincompleteness must however be removed in and for\nthe Infinite Mind. In dealing with the work of life,\nwe came to a point where we said, thus far we can\nsee our way, but beyond that our ideal remains\nincomplete. We must have faith, so we implied, that\nif we attained so much of the ideal social condition,\nthe way from that point onward would become\nclear. But now we see why the way would of\nnecessity become clear to one whose knowledge of life\nwere broad enough and deep enough. For in the\nInfinite that includes all life, that rests above all\nfinite strife in the absolute attainment of the ideal,\nthere can be no incompleteness, no torso of an ideal,\nbut a perfect knowledge of what is most excellent.\nThose faint foreshadowings of a perfect life that art\nand science and social work show to us, must be for\nthe Infinite no faint foreshadowings, but absolute\ncertainty and perfect clearness. Hence by our\nreligious doctrine we get not merely the assurance that\nsuch ideals as we have are realized for the Infinite;\nbut, better than this, we get our first full assurance\nthat our incomplete ideals have an actual completion\nas ideals. For we thus get our first full assurance\nthat there is in the highest sense any definite ideal\nat all. Pessimism, as we have seen, implies either\ndoubt about what the ideal state is, or unavoidable\nlack of that state. And the Infinite can be no\nPessimist in either sense.\n\nThe religious comfort that a man can get from\ncontemplating all this truth is indeed very different\nfrom the consolation of the separate individual as\nsuch that many people want their religion to give\nthem. And this very fact furnishes us a good test\nof moral sincerity. The religious comfort that we\nfind is no comfort save to the truly religious spirit in\nus. It says to us: \u201cYou that have declared your\nwillingness to serve moral ideals because they are\nsuch, does this help you to know, not of a goodly\nplace where you personally and individually shall\nlive without tears forever as a reward for your\nservices, but of an eternal Judge that respects in no\nwhit your person, before whom and in whom you are\nquite open and perfectly known, who now and for\nall eternity sees your good and your evil, and\nestimates you with absolute justice? This blaze of\ninfinite light in which you stand, does it cheer you?\nIf it does, then you are glad to learn that above all\nyour struggles there is the eternal Victory, amid all\nyour doubts there is the eternal Insight, and that\nyour highest triumph, your highest conception, is\njust an atom of the infinite truth that all the time is\nthere. But if all this is true of you, then you do love\nthe ideal for its own sake. Then it is not your\ntriumph that you seek, but the triumph of the Highest.\nAnd so it is that you rejoice to learn how this that is\nbest in the world not only will triumph, but always\nhas triumphed, since, as you now learn, for God the\nhighest good is thus a matter of direct experience.\u201d\n\nThe writer remembers well, how some years since,\nwhile all this doctrine seemed to him shrouded in doubt, he heard a very thoughtful and pious friend\nmaintain that the greatest comfort to be got from a\nbelief in God is the sense that however much the\nworld may misjudge us, however much even our best\nand closest friends may misunderstand us, there is\none perfect all-knowing Thought that comprehends\nus far better than we comprehend ourselves.\nGoodness is, in that thought, estimated at its full worth.\nNothing is hidden from the Judge. And what we\nare, He knoweth it altogether. The present view\nseems to the author to meet the conditions that his\nfriend here had in mind. Theism as a doctrine that\nthere is a big power that fights and beats down\nother powers in the service of the good, is open to all\nthe objections before suggested. This warrior, why\ndoes he not win? This slayer of evil things, this\nbinder of Satan, who boasts that all things will yet\nbe put under his feet, \u2014 has he not had all eternity\nin which to put all things under his feet, and has\nhe done it yet? He may be indeed good, but\nsomehow disaster seems to pursue him. Religious\ncomfort in contemplating him you can have if you\nbelieve in him, but always you feel that this comfort is\nshadowed by the old doubt; is he after all what we\nwant him to be, the victorious ruler of the world?\nBut if we leave the eternally doubtful contemplation\nof the world as a heap of powers, and come to the\ndeeper truth of the world as Thought, then these\ndoubts must disappear.\n\nYet to show that this is true, we must dwell upon\ndoubts a little longer, and must compare our present\nview of the solution of the problem of evil with the\nviews condemned in Chap. VIII.\n\nIII.\n\nSo far we have come in joyful contemplation of the Divine Truth. But now is there not a serpent in this Eden also? We have been talking of the infinite goodness; but after all, what shall we still say of that finite \"partial evil\" of life? We seem to have somehow proved a priori that it must be \"universal good.\" For, as we have said, in the Infinite Life of our ideal there can be no imperfection. This, we have said, is the demonstration that we missed all through our study of the world of the Powers. Since we approached that world from without, and never felt the pulse of its heart's blood, we had nothing but doubt after doubt when we contemplated the evil that seemed to be in it. Our efforts to explain evil seemed hollow and worthless. There might be some deeper truth involved in these efforts; but we knew it not. Well, are we right in declaring that we have altogether overcome our difficulty now? Apparently we are as far as ever from seeing how the partial evil can be the universal good; we only show, from the conception of the infinite itself, that the partial evil must be the universal good. God must see how; and we know this because we know of God. More than this we seem to be unable to suggest.\n\nBut will this do? Have we not forgotten one terrible consequence of our doctrine? The partial evil is universal good, is it? There is no evil? All apparent imperfection is an illusion of our partial view? So then where is the chance to be in a free way and of our own choice better than we otherwise\nin truth should be? Is not the arm that is raised\nto strike down wickedness paralyzed by the very\nthought that was to give it divine strength? This\nevil that I fight here in this finite world is a\ndelusion. So then, why fight it? If I do good works,\nthe world is infinitely good and perfect. If I seem\nto do evil works, the world is in truth no worse.\nSeeming good is not better than seeming evil, for if\nit were, then the seeming evil would be a real defect\nin God, in whose life is everything. If I have never\nloved aught but God, even so I have never hated\naught but God. It is all alike. God does not need\njust me. Or rather I may say, in so far as he needs\nme to complete his infinite truth, he already has me\nfrom all eternity. I have nothing to do with the\nbusiness, save to contemplate in dizzy indolence the\nwhirling misty masses of seeming evil, and to say\nwith a sort of amused reverence that they look very\nill and opaque to me, but that of course God sees\nthrough them clearly enough somehow. The mist is\nin truth crystalline water, and he has so quick a\nsense as to look beyond the drops as easily as if they\nwere in the calm unity of a mountain lake. And\nso, my religion is simply a contemplation of God\u2019s\nwisdom, but otherwise an idle amusement.\n\nSo says the man who sees only this superficial\nview of our doctrine. In so far as, standing once\nmore outside of some evil thing, we say: \u201cThat\nthing yonder looks bad, but God must see it to be\ngood,\u201d we do indeed remain indolent, and our\nreligion simply means a sort of stoical indifference to the apparent distinction of good and evil. This is in\nfact the proper practical attitude of even the most\nearnest man in the presence of evil that he cannot\nunderstand and cannot affect. In such matters we\nmust indeed be content with the passive knowledge.\nDeath and the unavoidable pains of life, the\ndownfall of cherished plans, all the cruelty of fate, we\nmust learn to look at as things to us opaque, but to\nGod, who knows them fully, somehow clear and\nrational. So regarding them, we must aim to get to\nthe stage of stoical indifference about them. They\nare to us the accidents of existence. We have no\nbusiness to murmur about them, since we see that\nGod, experiencing them, somehow must experience\nthem as elements in an absolutely perfect life. For\nGod we regard not as the mysterious power who\nmade them, and who then may have been limited to\nthe use of imperfect means, but as the absolute\nthought that knows them; so that, however\ninexplicable they must now be to us, they are in themselves\nnothing that God vainly wishes to have otherwise,\nbut they are organically joined with the rest of the\nglorious Whole.\n\nSuch is indeed the only present word for us finite\nminds about many of the shadows of seeming evil\nthat we have to behold in the world of the\napparently external facts. Such however is not the last\nword for us about the only evil that has any\nimmediate moral significance, namely, the evil that we see,\nnot as an external, shadowy mist, but as a present\nfact, experienced in us. Here it is that the objector\njust mentioned seems really formidable to us. But just here it is that we find the answer to him. For\nin the world of our own acts we have a wondrous\nexperience. We realize evil, we fight it, and, at the\nsame time, we realize our fragment of the perfect\ndivine life in the moment itself of struggling with\nthe evil. And in this wondrous experience lies the\nwhole solution of the ancient problem of the existence\nof moral evil. For instance, I find in myself a\nselfish impulse, trying to destroy the moral insight.\nNow of this evil impulse I do not say, looking at it\nobjectively: \u201cIt is somehow a part of the universal\ngood;\u201d but, in the moment of moral action I make\nit, even in the very moment of its sinfulness, a part\nof my good consciousness, in overcoming it. The\nmoral insight condemns the evil that it experiences;\nand in condemning and conquering this evil it forms\nand is, together with the evil, the organic total that\nconstitutes the good will. Only through this inner\nvictory over the evil that is experienced as a\nconquered tendency does the good will have its being.\nNow since the perfect life of God must have the\nabsolutely good will, therefore it also must be conscious\nof such a victory. Thus the solution of our\ndifficulty begins to appear. And thus we reap a new\nreligious fruit from our ethical doctrine, to whose\nmain principles we must once more here refer the\nreader.\n\nWhen I experience the victory of the moral\ninsight over the bad will, I experience in one\nindivisible moment both the partial evil of the selfish\nimpulse (which in itself as a separate fact would be\nwholly bad) and the universal good of the moral victory, which has its existence only in the\noverwhelming of the evil. So, in the good act, I\nexperience the good as my evil lost in goodness, as a\nrebellion against the good conquered in the moment of its\nbirth, as a peace that arises in the midst of this\ntriumphant conflict, as a satisfaction that lives in this\nrestless activity of inner warfare. This child of inner\nstrife is the good, and the only moral good, we know.\n\nWhat I here have present in me when I do a good\nact is an element of God\u2019s life. I here directly\nexperience how the partial moral evil is universal\ngood; for so it is a relatively universal good in me\nwhen, overcoming myself, I choose the universal\nwill. The bad impulse is still in me, but is defeated.\nIn the choice against evil is the very life of goodness,\nwhich would be a pale, stupid abstraction otherwise.\nEven so, to take another view, in the overcoming of\nour separateness as individuals lies, as we saw in the\nprevious book, our sense of the worth of the\nuniversal life. And what we here experience in the single\nmoment of time, and in the narrowness of our finite\nlives, God must experience, and eternally. In our\nsingle good acts we have thus the specimen of the\neternal realization of goodness.\n\nBut now how simple becomes the answer to that\nterrible suggestion of a moment since! How simple\nalso the solution of the problem of evil! \u201cIf I want\nto do evil, I cannot,\u201d said the objector; \u201cfor God\nthe perfect one includes me with the rest, and so\ncannot in his perfection be hurt by me. Let me do\nwhat I will, my act can only seem bad, and cannot\nbe bad. All evil is illusion, hence there is no moral\ndifference in action possible.\u201d\n\n\u201cRight indeed,\u201d we answer, \u201cbut also wrong,\nbecause half the truth. The half kills, the whole gives\nlife. Why canst thou not do any absolute evil?\nBecause thy evil intent, which, in its separateness,\nwould be unmixed evil, thy selfish will, thy struggle\nagainst the moral insight, this evil will of thine is no\nlonesome fact in the world, but is an element in the\norganic life of God. In him thy evil impulse forms\npart of a total good will, as the evil impulse of the\ngood man forms an element in his realization of\ngoodness. In God thy separateness is destroyed,\nand with it thy sin as evil. For good will in the\ninfinite is what the good man finds the good will to be\nin himself, namely, the organic total whose truth is\nthe discovery of the evil. Therefore is God\u2019s life\nperfect, because it includes not only the knowledge\nof thy finite wicked will, but the insight into its truth\nas a moment in the real universal will.\n\nIf then thou wert good, thou wouldst be good by\nincluding the evil impulse in a realization of its\nevil, and in an acceptance of the higher insight. If\nthou art evil, then in thyself, as separate being, thou\nart condemned, and just because thy separate evil\nis condemned, therefore is the total life of God, that\nincludes thee with thy condemnation and with the\ntriumph over thee, good.\n\nThis is the ground for the solution of the problem.\nTo go more into detail: Evil is for us of two classes:\nthe external seeming evil, such as death, pain, or\nweakness of character; and internal evil, namely the\nbad will itself. Because we know so little, therefore\nwe can never tell whether those externally seen seeming evils are blessings in disguise, or expressions\nof some wicked diabolical will-power at work about\nus. Somehow then, we never know exactly how,\nthese seeming great evils must be in God universal\ngood. But with regard to the only evil that we know\nas an inward experience, and so as a certain reality,\nnamely, the Evil Will, we know both the existence of\nthat, and its true relation to universal goodness,\nbecause and only because we experience both of them\nfirst through the moral insight, and then in the good\nact. Goodness having its very life in the insight\nand in its exercise, has as its elements the evil\nimpulse and its correction. The evil will as such may\neither be conquered in our personal experience, and\nthen we are ourselves good; or it may be conquered\nnot in our thought considered as a separate thought,\nbut in the total thought to which ours is so related,\nas our single evil and good thoughts are related to\nthe whole of us. The wicked man is no example of\nGod\u2019s delight in wickedness, just as the evil impulse\nthat is an element in the good man\u2019s goodness, and\na very real element too, is no proof that the good\nman delights in evil. As the evil impulse is to the\ngood man, so is the evil will of the wicked man to\nthe life of God, in which he is an element. And\njust because the evil will is the only evil that we are\nsure of, this explanation is enough.\n\nThus the distinction between good and evil\nremains as clear as ever. Our difficulty about the\nmatter is removed, not by any barren external\ntheodicy, such as were the forms of guess-work that we\ncriticised in a previous chapter, but by a plain reflection on the moral experience itself. Goodness as a\nmoral experience is for us the overcoming of\nexperienced evil; and in the eternal life of God the\nrealization of goodness must have the same sort of\norganic relation to evil as it has in us. Goodness is\nnot mere innocence, but realized insight. To the\nwicked man we say: God is good because in\nthinking thee he damns thy evil impulse and overwhelms\nit in a higher thought of which thou art a part. And\nin so far as thy will is truly evil, thou art in God\njust as the evil is in the good man; thou art known\nonly to be condemned and overcome. That is thy\nblessed mission; and this mission of evil such as\nthine is indeed an eternal one. So that both things\nare true. The world is wholly good, and thou, such\nas thou individually art, mayest be damnably evil if\nso thou desirest.\n\nWe do not say then that evil must exist to set the\ngood off by way of external contrast. That view we\nlong since justly rejected. We say only that the\nevil will is a conquered element in the good will, and\nis as such necessary to goodness. Our conception of\nthe absolute unity of God\u2019s life, and that conception\nalone, enables us to apply this thought here. No\nform of dualistic Theism has any chance to apply\nthis, the only satisfactory theodicy. If God were\nconceived as external to his creatures, as a power\nthat made them beyond himself, the hopeless\nproblems and the unworthy subterfuges of the older\ntheodicies would come back to torment us. As it is,\nthe solution of the problem of evil is given us in the\ndirectest and yet in the most unexpected way.\n\nLet us compare this solution with others. Evil,\nsaid one thought, before expounded, is an illusion of\nthe partial view, as the shapelessness of the\nfragment of a statue is no disproof of the real beauty of\nthe whole. We replied in a previous chapter to this\nnotion, by saying that evil seems so positive an\nelement in the world as to make very hard this\nconception of the partial evil as good universally in the\naesthetic sense in which shapelessness of parts may\ncoexist with a total beauty of the statue. For the\nfragment of the statue is merely an indifferent bit of\nstone without character. But the evil in the world\nseems in positive crying opposition to all goodness.\nYet now, in the moral experience, we have found a\nwholly different relation of evil part to good whole.\nMy good act is good just because of the evil that\nexists in it as conquered element. Without the evil\nmoment actual in it, the total act could be at best\ninnocent, not good. It is good by reason of its\nstructure. That structure includes the evil all, but\nso includes it that the whole act is good. Even so,\nas we declare, God\u2019s life includes, in the organic\ntotal of one conscious eternal instant, all life, and\nso all goodness and evil. To say that God is\nnevertheless perfectly good is to say, not that God is\ninnocent, knowing of no evil whatever, and\nincluding none; but that he so includes the evil will in\nthe structure of his good will, as the good man, in\none indivisible moment, includes his evil will in his\ngood will; and that God is good only because he\ndoes so.\n\nAgain, to pass to another explanation, it has been said that evil exists in the world as a means to goodness. We objected to this that it puts the evil and the good first in separate beings, in separate acts or moments, and then makes the attainment of the good result dependent on the prior attainment of the separate and independently present evil. Now all that explanation could only explain and justify the acts of a finite Power, which, not yet possessing a given good thing, seeks it through the mediation of some evil. In no wise can this explanation apply to God as infinite. He is no finite Power, nor does he make or get things external to himself. Hence he cannot be said to use means for the attainment of ends. But our explanation does not make evil a means to get the separate end, goodness. We say that the connection is one of organic part with organic whole; that goodness has its life only in the instant of the discovery and inner overcoming of the evil will; and that therefore any life is good in which the evil will is present only as overcome, and so as lost in the good will. We appeal to the moral experience to illustrate how, when we do good, the evil will is present as a real fact in us, which yet does not make us as a whole bad, but just because it is present as an overcome element, is, even for that very reason, necessary to make us good. And we go on to say that even so in God the evil will of all who sin is present, a real fact in the Divine Life, no illusion in so far as one sees that it exists in God and nowhere else, but for that very reason an element, and a necessary element, in the total goodness of the Universal Will, which, realized in God, is related to the wills of the sinners as the wills of the good men are\nrelated to their evil impulses.\n\nThe explanation that evil is needed to contrast\nwith goodness has already been mentioned.\n\nEvil therefore, as a supposed real fact, separate\nfrom goodness, and a totally independent entity, is\nand must be an illusion. The objections to this\nview that we previously urged in Chapter VIII. were\nall applicable to the world of powers, which we\nviewed and had to view externally. God\u2019s life,\nviewed internally, as philosophy must view it, is not\nsubject to these criticisms. And the moral\nexperience has taught us how we are to explain the\nexistence of the only partial evil that we clearly know to\nbe even a partial evil, namely, the evil will. The\nexplanation is that the good act has its existence and\nlife in the transcending of experienced present evil.\nThis evil must not be an external evil, beyond the\ngood will, but must be experienced in the same\nindivisible moment in which it is transcended. That\nthis wondrous union is possible, we simply find as\nfact in the moral experience. No genuine moral\ngoodness is possible save in the midst of such inner\nwarfare. The absence of the evil impulse leaves naught\nbut innocence or instinct, morally insipid and\ncolorless. Goodness is this organism of struggling\nelements. Now, as we declare, in the infinite and united\nthought of God this unity of goodness is eternally\npresent. God\u2019s life is this infinite rest, not apart\nfrom but in the endless strife, as in substance\nHeraclitus so well and originally taught.\n\nIV.\n\nThe problem of the existence of evil thus treated\nas our limits allow, we must return to a study of the\nvisible world. That we formerly refused to find\nreligious comfort in that world, depended upon our\nprevious manner of approaching it. It was, so\napproached, the world of doubt; but now it may\nprove no longer disheartening, so that we may be\nable to get in it a concrete hold of useful truth. We\nmust briefly sketch the process of return. Our\nInfinite, once known, is known not as an abstraction,\nbut as an immediately actual object of knowledge.\nHis then is this visible world; and, knowing the\nfact, we return cheerfully and courageously among\nthe facts that before seemed dead externalities, to\nfind his truth in them. For our general belief in the\ninfinite rationality of things is useless to supersede\nany jot or tittle of careful scientific study of the\ncommon world of experience. Be this aspect of the\nmatter well understood. Some older forms of idealism\nhave looked coldly on experience. Ours does not.\nTo us, if you want to realize your ideal you must\nknow the means, you must study applied ethics as\nwell as the ideal itself; and only from science, from\nhard, dry, careful collection and collaboration of\nfacts, from cautious generalizations, from endless\nexperiments, observations, calculations, can mankind\nhope to learn the means of realizing their ideals.\nYet more, only from exact science can you get the\nbest concrete examples of that unity of conception,\nthat mastery of complex details, that exhaustive perfection of insight, that we must attribute in an\ninfinitely complete form to our all-embracing Ideal\nThought, now that we have got it before us as our\nIdeal. That all facts and relations of facts should\nappear in one moment of insight to the all-knowing\nthought is our postulate, and, as we have shown, it is\nno mere postulate, but a necessary and absolute\nprinciple of philosophy. We must go to exact science to\nfind illustrations of how all this can be in particular\ncases realized. As the equation of a curve expresses\nin one thought all the properties of the curve, as the\nlaw of a physical process includes all the cases of\nthat process under any of the supposed conditions,\nas a function of a variable may be the sum of a long\nseries of quantities, each one of which is a derived\nfunction of the first multiplied by a particular\ncoefficient, so that the one function is the united\nexpression of the numerous separate functions: even in\nsuch wise must the Infinite thought comprehend in\nsome supreme highest unity all the facts and\nrelations of facts that are in the world of truth. For\nus then the highest achievements of science are the\ndim shadow of the perfection of the infinite thought.\nAnd to science, accordingly, we must go, not for the\ninvention, but for the intellectual illustration of our\nideal. And science we must treat as absolute\nmistress of her own domain. Of the world as a whole,\nof the eternal as such, of infinite past time, of the\ninner truth of things, science pretends to tell and\ncan tell nothing. Nor does science invent, nor yet\ncan she prove, her own postulates, as we previously\ndefined them. But in the application of her postulates to the facts, in the discovery of particular laws,\nscience is almighty. To doubt her capacity as\nhighest judge in this field is flagrant contempt of court.\nScience is just the Infinite Thought as far as it is\nyet by us realized in the facts of nature. A priori\nwe can realize nothing about finite facts, save that\nthey must be capable of rational comprehension.\nWe know that the Infinite thinks them, and this is\nall that we know about them. What they are,\nexperience must tell us.\n\nSuch then are some of the restrictions imposed\nupon our thought. We must now consider more\ncarefully how we must treat the scientific postulates\nthat were our only comfort in studying reality before\nwe reached our present insight.\n\nWhen we postulated that the world must in the\nbest sense satisfy our fundamental intellectual needs,\nwe assumed what is necessary for science, but what\nscience itself does not satisfactorily explain. Have\nwe now reached any foundation for this theoretical\npostulate? We have in fact reached one. The\npostulate of science amounts to this, that the real\nconnections among facts must be such as would be\nrationally comprehensible if they were known. But\nwe have found in fact that all facts not only must\nbe rationally comprehensible, but are rationally\ncomprehended, in and by the one Divine Mind. The\npostulate of science expresses therefore in part and\nas a mere assumption, what we now know as a whole,\nand as a result of demonstration. The unity of the\nDivine Thought implies that all facts, if we knew\nthem well enough, would appear rationally interdependent, reducible to unity, a total of realities\nexpressible as one truth. Just as in the one concept of\nthe nature of number is implied all the infinite series\nof properties that a complete Theory of Numbers\nwould develop, so in the one concept of the universe,\nwhich constitutes the Divine Mind, all the facts of\nall possible experience are comprehended and are\nreduced to perfect unity. There must be then in fact a\nuniversal formula. What this formula is we do not\nsee, and just because we do not see it, we have to\nlook here and there in experience for any traces of\nthe unity and rational connection of facts. Nor can\nwe ever be sure that a connection surmised by us is\nthe really rational connection of things. A law\ndiscovered by us is only our attempt to imitate the\nDivine Thought. Our attempt may in a given case\nfail; our induction may be mistaken. But the\nfoundation of our inductive processes is the thought\nthat, since the real world is a perfectly rational and\nunited body of truth, that hypothesis which reduces\nto relatively rational unity the greatest number of\nfacts is more apt to represent the truth of things\nthan any hypothesis of less scope, and of less rational\nsignificance. Just because this natural dualism with\nwhich we set out is a blunder, just because in fact\nthe world is not rent in twain by our arbitrary\ndistinction of object and subject, but is in deepest truth\none united world, a single thought; therefore it is\nthat when we consider those facts which we have\nfrom moment to moment to regard as external, we\ncan be assured that there is a certain and not an\narbitrary basis for our views about them. The visible world becomes again hard reality, which we\nexperience and try to comprehend, just because we\nknow that in itself this world is once for all\ncomprehended.\n\nPractically then, in dealing with the world of\nconcrete facts, we must be realistic. It is our duty, for\nhumanity\u2019s sake, to study and to believe in this\nexternal world, to have faith in the great postulates of\ncommon sense, to use all the things of the world.\nBut the basis of this faith common sense can never\nfind. And we have found it in the Absolute.\n\nV.\n\nHave we then discovered that something of\ninfinite religious worth of which we went in quest? Or\ncan we say that our life is in vain in such a world?\nTruly our religious longing has met with a genuine\nresponse, but it was not such a response as we at\nfirst expected, nor such as most systems appear to\ndesire. Personal needs and hopes apart, most men\nwho make systems to satisfy the impersonal religious\nlonging, seek to prove that the world as a whole\nprogresses towards goodness, so that, in the great\nconsummation of this progress, evil shall certainly\nand finally disappear, leaving the world as innocent\nand insipid as in the days of Eden. Now we have\nfound a thought that makes this concept of progress\nnot only wholly inapplicable to the world of the\ninfinite life, but wholly superfluous. If, as we insisted\nabove, moral goodness is not the absence, but the\norganic subordination, of the evil will, its overthrow in the good will, in which it is still actually present\nas subdued, then, whenever the world contains any\nmoral goodness, it also, and for that very reason,\ncontains, in its organic unity, moral evil. The\nworld is morally good in spite of the evil will, and\nyet because of the evil will, since, as every moral\nexperience shows us, the good will is just this\ntriumphant rest in strife above the evil will. Therefore\nwe have no sympathy with those who expect the\nfuture \u201csalvation\u201d of the world as a whole in time\nthrough any all-pervading process. The only\ndestruction of moral evil that ever takes place or can\ntake place is the transcendence of the evil will by\nthe good will in the very moment of the life of the\nevil will. If moral evil were to be, as the older\nsystems often expect, absolutely destroyed, and the\nworld so freed therefrom that the evil will was totally\nforgotten, then what remained would be no moral\ngood any more, only the laziness of an infinitely\nvacant life. Not indeed to set off the good by any\nexternal contrast, but to constitute a moment in the\norganic unity of the good act, is this evil in the world.\nAnd the whole vast trouble about understanding its\npresence arises because we usually separate it from\nthe very unity with goodness in which we find it\nwhenever we consciously do right ourselves. Then\nwhen so separated, as we separated it in a former\nchapter, moral evil, viewed as an external opaque\nfact, is inexplicable, disheartening, horrible. Only\nwhen we do right ourselves do we practically get the\nsolution of the problem. Only the moral man knows\nhow and why evil exists. For in him the evil will is an essential element of his goodness. The conflicts\nof morality are and must be eternal.\n\nOur present explanation of evil in the world is,\nwe have seen, the only one that can both give us\nthe absolute religious comfort, and save us from the\nterrible moral paralysis involved in destroying, for\nthe Infinite, the distinction between good and evil.\nThe moral experience itself contains the miracle of\nthis solution in the simplest and clearest shape.\nAnd it relieves us of any need to long for an\nabsolute peace. For in it the distinction of good and\nevil is the sharpest, the significance of the strife is\nthe most vivid, at the very instant when, in the strife,\nthe evil will, present and real still, is yet conquered\nby the good will, and so lost in the universal\ngoodness of the total good act. The distinction of good\nwill and evil will becomes thus the greatest possible;\nand yet only through the reality of this distinction in\nthe unity of the moral life is goodness present and\ntriumphant. Progress in this world as a whole is\ntherefore simply not needed. The good is eternally\ngained even in and through the evil. How far the\nactual process of evolution may in our part of the\nuniverse extend is a matter for empirical science.\n\nBut our own ideal of human life as a\n\u201cprogressive realization of the good,\u201d \u2014 what of that? The\nanswer is obvious. The good will that is in us as a\ntemporal fact, not being yet fully realized or\ntriumphant in us as we are in ourselves as mere finite\nbeings, must aim at complete expression of itself in\ntime and in us, and through us in those whom we\nseem to influence. For only in so seeking to perfect us in whom it exists, is this good will in us good\nat all. In so far as we, viewed abstractly, in our\nseparateness from God, are good, we then do indeed\ntry to realize that life of God in which we are all\nthe time an element. For us this is progress. This\nprogress is the form taken temporarily in us by the\ngood will. But for God this is no real progress.\nTherefore is it indeed true that the moral insight in\nus must lead us to aim at progress in goodness, just\nas, on the other side, the rational element in us leads\nus to aim at progress in knowledge. But, meanwhile,\nour moral progress and our rational progress, mere\nminor facts happening at a moment of time, are but\ninsignificant elements in the infinite life in which, as\na whole, there is and can be no progress, but only\nan infinite variety of the forms of the good will and\nof the higher knowledge.\n\nAnd so consciousness has given us in concrete\nform solutions of our two deepest philosophic\nproblems. The possibility of error, necessitating an\ninclusive thought, is illustrated for us by our own\nconscious thought, which can include true and false\nelements in the unity of one clear and true thought at\nany moment. And the possibility and necessity of\nmoral evil, demanding a real distinction between\ngood and evil, a hateful opposition that seems at first\nsight fatal to our religious need for the supremacy\nof goodness in the united world, is illustrated for us\nin a way that solves this whole trouble, namely, in\nthe unity of the conscious moral act. There at the\none moment are good and evil, warring, implacable,\nyet united in the present momentary triumph of the good will. A world in which this strife, this victory,\nthis absolute rest above the real strife and in\nthe midst of the real strife, is the supreme fact, is\nthe perfect world that religion needs. It is a world\nof the true Life of God.\n\nVI.\n\nAnd our insight appeals not only to our general\nreligious needs. It comes with its truth home to the\nindividual man. It demands that we consider what\nour individual life is really worth when it is lived in\nthe presence of this Infinite Judge. O man, what\nis this thy daily life! Thou livest for the applause\nor in fear of the blame of thy neighbors. An unkind\nword cuts thee to the quick. A little public favor,\nor the approving word of a friend, is worth half thy\nsoul to thee. And all the while thou knowest not\nthat One infinitely greater than multitudes of\nneighbors is here, not above thee only, nor afar in the\nheavens, but pervading thy every thought. And that\nall-pervading Thought judges thee as these\nneighbors never can. Myriads of their blunders about\nthee are as nothing to an atom of this infinite Truth.\nThat rain-drop yonder in the sunshine is not more\nfilled with the light, than are all the most hidden\nrecesses of thy heart filled with that Infinite Presence.\nNo one of us is more famous than his neighbor; for\nno one is known save by God, and to him all alike\nare known. To be sure, to know this is the same\nas understanding rightly, that thou art in truth what\nthou art. All truth is truth because it is known by a conscious Thought: therefore whatsoever thou art,\nwhether it is consciously or unconsciously existent in\nthee, is known to the all-seeing Universal\nConsciousness. But commonplace as this seems to the\nphilosopher, is it not more than a mere commonplace to\nthee, if thou lovest genuine righteousness? For is it\nnot something to feel that thy life is, all of it, in\nGod and for God? No one else knows thee. Alone\nthou wanderest in a dead world, save for this\nPresence. These other men, how can they know thee?\nThey love thee or scorn thee or hate thee, but none\nof them love or scorn or hate thee for what thou art.\nWhatever they hold of thee, it is an accident. If\nthey knew more of thee, doubtless they would think\notherwise of thee. Do they love thee? Then they\nknow thee not well enough, nor do they see thy\nmeanness and thy vileness, thy selfishness and thy\njealousy and thy malice. If they saw these, surely\nthey would hate thee. But do they hate thee?\nThen thou callest them unjust. Doubtless they are\nso. Some chance word of thine, a careless look or\ngesture, an accident of fortune, a trifling fault, these\nthey have remembered; and therefore do they hate\nthee. If they knew better things of thee, perhaps\nthey would love thee.\n\nThus contradictory is thy life with them. And yet\nthou must labor that the good may triumph near\nthee by thy effort. Now in all this work who shall\nbe thy true friend? Whose approval shall\nencourage thee? Thy neighbor\u2019s? Nay, but it is thy duty\nalways to suspect thy neighbor\u2019s opinion of thee.\nHe is a corrupt judge, or at best an ignorant judge. He sees not thy heart. He is a respecter of persons.\nHe is too often a bundle of whims. If he also professes\nto be trying to serve righteousness, it is thy\nduty to have ready faith in his good intent, if that\nbe possible for thee; but by all means doubt his\nwisdom about thee, and thine about him. If he\npraises thee for thy righteousness, listen not willingly\nto his praise. It will deceive thee. He will most\npraise thee when thou inwardly art not righteous.\nIf he blames thee for evil, let it warn thee; for if\nhe is not right now, he doubtless soon will be. But\ntake it not too much to heart. He is ignorant of\nthee. He talks of thee as he might talk of the other\nside of the moon, unless indeed he talks of thee just\nas man in general, and not as to thy particular acts.\nTrust him not in all these things. Realize his needs\nas thou canst, strive to aid him in being righteous,\nuse him as an instrument for the extension of\ngoodness; but trust not his judgment of thee. Who\nthen is, as the true judge of thy worthy thy only\nperfect friend?\n\nThe Divine Thought. There is the opinion of\nthee to which thou canst look up. To be sure it is\nrevealed to thee only in thy consciousness of what\nrighteousness is and of what truth is. Nowhere else\nhast thou a guide that can do more for thee than to\nhelp to quicken thy insight. But, then, thy\nreligious comfort is to be, not that the moral law is\nthundered down from mountain-tops as if some vast\ntown-crier were talking, but that when thou seekest\nto do right, the Infinite all-seeing One knows and\napproves thee. If thou lovest righteousness for its own sake, then this will comfort thee. If not, if\nthou seekest sugar-plums, seek them not in the home\nof the Infinite. Go among thy fellow-men and be a\nsuccessful hypocrite and charlatan, and thou shalt\nhave gaping and wonderment and sugar-plums\nenough.\n\nHerein then lies the invitation of the Infinite to\nus, that it is, and that it knows us. No deeper\nsanction is there for true righteousness than this\nknowledge that one is serving the Eternal. Yet when we\nsay all this, are we simply doing that which we spoke\nof in the opening chapter of this work? Are we\nbut offering snow to appease the religious hunger?\nIs this doctrine too cold, too abstract, too far-off?\nCold and abstract and far-off is indeed the proof of\nit. But that was philosophy. That was not the\nreligious aspect of our doctrine, but only the\npreparation for showing the religious aspect of philosophy.\nIs the doctrine itself, however, once gained, so\nremote from the natural religious emotion? What\ndoes a man want when he looks to the world for\nreligious support? Does he want such applause as\nblind crowds give men, such flattery as designing\npeople shower upon them, such sympathy as even the\ncherished but prejudiced love of one\u2019s nearest friends\npours out for him? Nay, if he seeks merely this,\nis he quite unselfishly righteous? Can he not get\nall that if he wants it, wholly apart from religion?\nAnd if he looks for reward, can he not get that also\notherwise? But what his true devotion to the moral\nlaw ardently desires is not to be alone. Approval\nfor what really deserves approval he needs, approval from one who truly knows him. Well, our doctrine\nsays that he gets it. Just as deep, as full, as rich,\nas true approval as expresses the full worth of his\nact, \u2014 this he has for all eternity from the Infinite.\nTo feed upon that truth is to eat something better\nthan snow, but as pure as the driven snow. To love\nthat truth is to love God.\n\nWe spoke in the former book of the boundless\nmagnitude of human life as it impresses itself upon\none who first gains the moral insight. To many\nthis first devotion to human life seems itself enough\nfor a religion. But then one goes beyond this point,\nand says that human life has, after all, very much\nthat is base and petty in it. Here is not the ideal.\n\u201cWould that there were a higher life! To that we\nwould devote ourselves. We will serve humanity,\nbut how can we worship it?\u201d Such is the thought\nof many an ardent soul that seeks no personal\nrewards in serving the good, but that does seek some\ngreat Reality that shall surely be worthy of service.\nTo such, our religious insight points out this higher\nreality. You that have been willing to devote\nyourselves to humanity, here is a Life greater in infinite\ndegree than humanity. And now is it not a help to\nknow that truly to serve humanity is just the same\nas to serve this Infinite? For whatever had seemed\ndisheartening in the baseness and weakness of man\nloses its discouraging darkness now that all is\ntransfigured in this Infinite light.\n\nLet us then be encouraged in our work by this\ngreat Truth. But let us not spend too much time\nin merely contemplating this Truth. We, whose lives are to be lived in toil, \u2014 it is not good that we\nshould brood over even an infinite Thought. For in\nour finite minds it will soon become petty, unless we\nrealize it chiefly through our acts. Let us then go\nabout our business. For every man has business\nand desire, such as they are.\n\nAs we turn away then for the time from our\ncontemplation, we have one last word yet as to these\npractical consequences of our view. If the reader\nfollows us at ail in our argument, we want him also\nto follow us into the practical application of it to\nlife. To work for the extension of the moral insight\nis, we have said, the chief present duty of man in\nsociety. All else is preparation for this work, or else\nis an anticipation of the higher stage when, if we\never grow up to that level, we shall have our further\nwork to do in the light of the insight itself. But\nthis chief present work of ours, this extension of the\nmoral insight, is best furthered by devotion to our\nindividual vocations, coupled with strict loyalty to\nthe relations upon which society is founded. The\nwork thus set before us demands the sacrifice of\nmany ideal emotional experiences to the service of\nthe Highest. Our comfort however in it all must be\nthat the Highest is there above us, forget it as we\nmay. If the reader accepts all this, then with us\nhe has the assurance that, whatever becomes of the\nold creeds in the present religious crisis, the\nfoundations of genuinely religious faith are sure.\n\nWhenever we must pause again in our work for\nreligious support, and whenever we are worn out\nwith the jargon of the schools, we can rest once more for a time in this contemplation of the Eternal\nTruth. Hic breve plangitur. But not so is it in\nGod\u2019s life. Our problems may be hard, but there\nall is solved. Our lives may be poor and\ncontemptible, but there all is wealth and fullness of worth.\nOur efforts may often prove vain, but there naught\nexists that is vanity. For the imperfection of the\nfinite is but the fragment of the Infinite Whole\nwhere there is no true imperfection. Is it not a\nReligion to feel this? And we shall then turn from\nsuch a contemplation once again as we do now, to\nlook with fresher courage at this boundless, tossing\nsea of human life about us. This is not itself the\nDivine, but over it all God\u2019s winds are blowing.\nAnd to our eyes it is boundless. Let us go down\ninto this great sea and toil, fearing no storm, but\nseeking to find there treasures that shall be copies,\nhowever faint, of that which is Eternal.","title":"The Religious Aspect of Philosophy/Chapter 12","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":11237}