{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_7/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_7","id":"wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_7","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy/Chapter_7","summary":null,"tags":["Headers_applying_DefaultSort_key","Subpages"],"text":"CHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE ORGANIZATION OF LIFE.\n\nDie wahre Freiheit ist als Sittlichkeit dies, dass der Wille nicht subjektive, d. i. eigens\u00fcchtige, sondern allgemeinen Inhalt zu seinen Zwecken hat. \u2014 Hegel, Encyclop\u00e4die.\n\nUnexpectedly we have been saved from our\nethical skepticism even in and through the very act of\nthinking it out. Here, as elsewhere in philosophy,\nthe truth is to be reached, neither by dreading nor by\ndiscountenancing the doubt, but by accepting,\nexperiencing, and absorbing the doubt, until, as an\nelement in our thought, it becomes also an element in\nan higher truth. We do not say, therefore, to\ncommend our moral principle, as it has just been\npropounded, that it is immediately acceptable to all\nhealthy consciences, or that it is a pious, or a\nrespectable, or a popularly recognized principle. We say\nonly this: Doubt rationally about moral doctrines,\nand your doubt itself, if real, thorough-going, all-embracing,\nmerciless, will involve this very principle of\nours. We find the principle by means of the universal\ndoubt, and it is this method of procedure that\ndistinguishes the foregoing discussion of the basis of\nmorals from many of those that have previously been\nconcerned with this problem. To point out that the\naverage man, or the reputed saint, or the inspired prophet, or the great poet, or the reader himself,\nwhenever he is enthusiastic has or has had a given\nideal, is not to justify this ideal. Yet of such a\nnature are the justifications that most moralists have\ngiven for their ideals. If we have gained our\nresult by any better method, that was because we were\nfree to doubt all those pretended defenses of the\ngood. We have found the nature of the absolute\nand universal will, by rigidly questioning the\nsignificance of all the individual wills.\n\nBut our ideal must be made to do work in the\nworld. It must accomplish something, by solving\nfor us a few concrete moral problems, such as\nactually trouble men. Even the present discussion must\nconsider some of these consequences of our general\nprinciple; for religious philosophy, in seeking an\nideal for life, does not want a barren abstraction,\nbut such an ideal as can also be our guide. What\ndoes our principle tell a man to do?\n\nThe principle, as is plain, may be viewed in two\nways. If by moral insight we mean what the last\nchapter defijied, namely, insight into the fact of the\nexistence of other conscious wills besides our own,\ncoupled with full rational appreciation of this truth,\nthen our principle may be viewed as saying to each\nof us: Get and keep the moral insight as an\nexperience, and do all that thou canst to extend among\nmen this experience. On the other hand, the\nprinciple may be equally well viewed as saying: Act\nout in each case what the moral insight bids thee\ndo; that is, as before explained, Having made\nthyself, in so far as thou art able, one with all the conflicting wills before thee, act out the resulting\nuniversal will as it then arises in thee. Two classes of\nhuman duties are thus defined, one formal and\nprovisional, the other permanent. We must explain in\nsome measure each of them, in order that we may\nshow the practical applications of our moral\nprinciple.\n\nI.\n\nThe first class of duties comprises those that have\nmost especially to do with the moral education of our\nrace. We are, and must long remain, exceedingly\nimperfect and blind creatures. If there is possible\nany state of humanity in which all shall be ready to\nact in accordance with the moral insight, that state\nmust be, morally speaking, better than any other.\nTherefore the first demand that the moral insight\nmakes of us so soon as we get it is: So act as to\nincrease the number of those who possess the insight.\nHere, of course, is a precept of a very formal\ncharacter, and plainly provisional in its nature. It is as\nif one were to be among blind men, himself blind,\nand were by some magical act, say by accidentally\nwashing in a miraculous fountain, to get at one stroke\nand for the first time the power of sight, in all its\nmaturity and perfection. Such an one would\nperhaps say: \u201cHow noble is this new sense! But to\nwhat end shall I use it? For the first I must use\nit to bring these other men to the fountain, to wash\ntheir eyes, that they may miraculously learn in one\ninstant to see this glorious world.\u201d But some one\nmight object: \u201cIn this way, if the only use to be made of a man\u2019s sight is to extend the power of sight\nto others, of what use is the power itself? The sole\naim of seeing cannot be to cause others to see. Else\nwhat good would result to any one, if all followed\nyour precept?\u201d The answer would be plain:\n\u201cWhen all or the most of us get the power, then\nindeed we can use it for other ends. But because it\nis the best of powers for all these other ends, therefore\nthe best provisional use to make of it is, not to\nspend much time upon these ends, but to spend time\nupon extending the possession of the power. When\nthis is done, then first will begin the real use of the\npower for its own sake.\u201d As in this case of the\nsupposed miraculous acquirement of a new sense in all\nits maturity of power at one stroke, so it is in case\nof the much more gradual acquirement of the moral\ninsight. To be sure, the ultimate aim of life cannot\nbe merely the extension of the power to realize the\nwills that are active about us, but must at last be\nfound by defining the course of action that best\nharmonizes these wills. But, provisionally, we have a\ntask before us that is easily defined, because\nelementary. Harmony cannot be even partially attained,\nthe best human acti^dty cannot be even imperfectly\ndeveloped, until a very great number of men have\nthis, the very first, most elementary requisite of\nconscious morality, namely, the power to see the facts of\nhuman life as they are. So long as a man is bound\nup in his individual will, he may be instinctively\nupright, he cannot be consciously and with clear intent\nrighteous. So long therefore as this is true of him,\nhe will be dependent on traditions that are often pernicious, on conscience that is often brutal prejudice,\non faith that is often bigotry, on emotion that is the\nblindest of all guides; and if he does good or if he\ndoes evil, the power responsible for his deeds will\nnot be a truly moral impulse. To gain the moral\nends of humanity, the indispensable prerequisite is\ntherefore the moral insight in its merely formal\naspect, as an human power and as an experience of life.\nWhen a good many more men have reached the\npossession of this power, then more of life will be taken\nup with concrete duties. Until that time comes, the\ngreat aim must be this formal and provisional one:\nto produce in men the moral mood, and so to\nprepare the way for the further Iniowledge of the\nhighest good. If we put the matter otherwise we may\nsay: The moral insight, insisting upon the need of\nthe harmony of all human wills, shows us that,\nwhatever the highest human good may be, we can only\nattain it together, for it involves harmony. The\nhighest good then is not to be got by any one of us\nor by any clique of us separately. Either the\nhighest good is for humanity unattainable, or the\nhumanity of the future must get it in common. Therefore\nthe sense of conununity, the power to work together,\nwith clear insight into our reasons for so working,\nis the first need of humanity. Not what good thing\nmen may hereafter come to see, but how they shall\nattain the only sense whereby they can ever get to\nsee the good, is the great present human concern.\n\nStarting with this duty, we can now examine\nwhat rule of life this duty will give us. Extend the\nmoral insight among men, and in thy own life: this is the first commandment. The direct\nconsequence is that, so regarded, the first duty of man in\nthe present day cannot be either to get happiness\nhimself, or, in view of this present state of human\nlife, to make other people happy. All that he may\nindeed be in some measure required to do, but not,\nin the present state of the world, as an end, but solely\nas a means to an end. This at all events is not the\nday for contentment, but for work; and joy is now\na proper part of human life chiefly in so far as it\ntends to preserve, to increase, or to foster the moral\ninsight. Here we have the present practical\nsolution suggested for all the questions about the right\nand wrong of so-called hedonism. Hedonism is the\nproduct of an imperfect understanding of the moral\ninsight. Benevolent hedonism springs from the\ninsight that men like to be happy. Realizing this, the\nbeliever in universal hedonism says:\nMake men happy so far as thou canst. But this principle of\nhedonism is surely not the immediate truth for this\npresent time, whatever may or may not turn out to\nbe the case in future. For to labor to increase\nhappiness may for the present mean to increase the moral\nblindness of men Some sorts of happiness tend to\nmake us blind, as has in fact been shown in a\nformer chapter. Unless a man experiences very\nbitterly the reality of the conflict of wills in this world,\nthe moral insight is apt to forsake him. But until\nthe moral insight becomes practically universal, the\nhighest good for humanity cannot be got.\nTherefore all forms of happiness that hinder rather than\nhelp the moral insight are evil, and we ought to do what we can to get rid of them out of the world.\nAnd all experiences, however painful, that certainly\ntend to the increase of the power of moral insight,\nare good for men; and if we see no other\nexperiences more suitable for this purpose, we ought to do\nwhat we can to increase among men the number\nand the definiteness of these pains.\n\nYet of course it will at once appear, when we\nexamine human emotional experiences in the light of\nwhat we know of men, that there is a decided limit\nto the morally educative power of painful\nexperiences, and that, on the other hand, very many\npleasant experiences are useful to the moral insight, either\nby directly aiding it, or by preparing a man to\nattain it. In considering this branch of the subject,\nwe at last reach the point where a scientific\npsychology can give us a great deal of help. We\nrejected the so-called \u201cscientific basis\u201d for morals\nbecause it founds the ought to be upon brutal physical\nfacts. Now, however, we can turn to science to help\nus in our present task, because, having defined our\nought to be, we are dealing with applied ethics, and\nare asking how this moral insight is to be attained.\nPsychology must tell us what it can as to this\nmatter. And here such suggestions as those in Mr.\nSpencer\u2019s \u201cData of Ethics\u201d are indeed a useful aid\nto applied moral doctrine. We reject wholly the\nnotion that Mr. Spencer or any like teacher has even\ncaught a glimpse of the fundamental ethical problem.\nMr. Spencer seems to be in the most childlike\nignorance that there is any such problem at all. But we\nare glad to find that Mr. Spencer once having very illogically accepted a partially correct fundamental\nnotion about the ideal of life, does suggest a good\ndeal about this problem of applied ethics with which\nwe are now dealing. He does tell us some very\nsensible things about the attainment of this ideal.\n\nAmong these sensible suggestions is the insistence\nupon the value of pleasure as an indication of the\nincrease of healthy life in the man who has the\npleasure; and the further insistence upon the thought\nthat, since pleasure thus indicates in some wise\nhealth and efficiency, and since efficiency is an\nindispensable prerequisite to sound practical morality,\nthere must always be a certain moral presumption\nin favor of happiness, and in favor of whatever tends\nto increase happiness. Properly understood and\nlimited, this doctrine of Mr. Spencer\u2019s is an obvious\nand useful consequence from what we know of\npsychology. Mr. Spencer dwells on it at tedious and\nwholly unnecessary length, but he is surely justified\nwhen he protests, against the ascetics, that their\nideal man must be in general a puny, inefficient, and\nperhaps wholly burdensome man, whose ill-health\nmay make him, at last, hopelessly selfish. This we\nknow on good scientific grounds, and it is well to\nhave said the thing plainly in an ethical treatise.\n\nBut what is the result? Is happiness the only\naim of life because the permanently unhappy man is\napt to be a poor diseased creature, useless, or even\ndangerous? No; the consequence of all this is that\nthe first moral aim must be to make a man efficient\nin possessing and extending the moral insight.\nEfficiency for moral ends is still oiir proximate goal. Happiness is, at least for the present, only a\nsubordinate means. Therefore we say: By all means make\nmen happy, so far as their happiness tends to give\nthem and to preserve in them moral insight. True\nit is, as scientific psychology shows us, that a man,\nin order to be as good as possible, must generally be\npossessed of respectable health, of what he thinks a\ngood place in the world, of friends, and of numerous\npleasures. He must digest well, he must enjoy the\nesteem of his fellows, he must be strong, and he must\nbe frequently amused. All this is true, and is in\nfact a commonplace. When an ascetic denies this,\nhe maintains a pernicious heresy, that tends to\ndestroy moral insight by depriving men of the\nphysical power to get it. But these facts must not be\nmisinterpreted. Whatever might be true of a society\nin which moral insight had been attained, nothing is\nplainer than that happiness at the present time\ncannot be regarded from our point of view as more\nthan a means to the present great end. If we try\nto amuse our neighbors, to relieve their woes, to\nimprove their worldly estate, we must do so not as if\nthis were the end of the present life, but as workers\nin a very vast drama of human life, whose far-off\npurpose must govern every detail. The good\nSamaritan must say to himself, as he helps the poor\nwretch by the wayside: \u201cIn so far as I realize only\nthis man\u2019s need, my purpose is indeed simply to\nrelieve him. But my purpose must be higher than that.\nThis man is not alone, but one of a multitude. My\nhighest aim in helping him is not to make him\nindividually happy, but to increase by this, as by all my acts, the harmony of mankind. Not alone that he\nmay by and by go away and enjoy himself do I help\nhim now, but because by so doing I hope through\nhim to increase among men moral insight.\u201d Therefore,\nnotwithstanding Schopenhauer\u2019s ridicule, Fichte\nwas right in saying that we ought to treat the\nindividual man not chiefly as an individual, but as an\ninstrument for extending and serving the moral law.\nBecause a certain kind of happiness means efficiency,\nand efficiency morality, therefore and therefore alone\nhave we the right and duty, in this present\ngeneration, to labor for this kind of happiness.\n\nEqually, therefore, it becomes our duty to labor\nto increase pain, whenever pain is the best means of\nfostering the moral insight. Therefore, in this\npresent day, it cannot be our duty to labor to diminish\npain in the world, simply as pain. Again we must\nappeal to psychology to guide us aright. The pains\nthat foster moral insight, although limited in\nnumber and intensity, are numerous, and still\nimperfectly defined. It would be a useful task to study\nmore in detail than psychologists have yet done, the\nmoralizing power of pain. This is a task for the\npsychology of the future. In general, of course, we\ncan say that the range of such pains has been much\nexaggerated by ascetics. Bodily pain, if severe, is\ngenerally brutalizing, at least for most people, and\nthe moral insight is in it only in so far as the past\nexperience of bodily pain helps us to know the\nsignificance of the suffering of others, not by giving\nus that blind emotion of sympathy before criticised,\nbut by giving us the means to form a cool abstract estimate of the value of this evil of physical pain.\nFor thus we can realize the strength of the will that\nseeks to escape it, and can act with due respect to\nthis will. But nature generally gives us enough\nexperience of pain to furnish excellent material for the\ncalculations needed. Therefore, bodily pains, save\nas punishments, are seldom useful instruments for\nour great purpose. Not thus can self be duly\nmortified.\n\nIt is different with certain mental pains. All\nthose that tend to make the individual feel his own\nnecessary limitations, and thereby to approach the\nrealization of the great world of life about him, are\nnecessary evils. His will must be overwhelmed, that\nthe Universal Will may have place to establish itself\nin him. Therefore, without considering whether\nwe are thereby increasing or diminishing the sum\nof human misery, we all of us unhesitatingly set\nabout the work of contending with blind self-confidence\nand self-absorption wherever it may appear.\nTherefore it is right that we ridicule all pretentious\nmediocrity that is unconscious of its stupidities.\nTherefore, in fact, it is right that we should criticise\nunsparingly all pretenders, however much they may\nbe pained by our criticism. Therefore it is well that\nwe should feel not a selfish but a righteous joy\nwhenever pride has a fall, whenever the man who thinks\nthat he is something discovers of a truth that he is\nnothing. Therefore, also, do we put down excessive\nforwardness and vanity in growing children, although\nso to do hurts their sensitive young selfishness very\nkeenly. In all such ways we must ask and we must show no mercy, save when these keen pains of\nwounded vanity are so given as to inflame and\nincrease this vanity itself. All healthy, truthful\ncriticism of individual limitations is a duty, even if it is a\npresent torture to the individual criticised. For this\nindividual is blind to other life because he is wrapped\nup in himself. If by showing him his insignificance\nyou can open his eyes, you are bound to do so, even\nthough you make him writhe to see his worthlessness.\nFor what we here defends is not that ill-natured\ncriticism whose only aim is to gratify the miserable\nself of the critic, but the criticism whose edge is\nturned in earnest against every form of self-satisfaction\nthat hinders insight. Let a man be self-satisfied\nwhen he is at rest, after dinner, or in merry\ncompany. It is a harmless and even a useful amusement.\nBut when he is at work doing good he ought\nto hate self-satisfaction, which hinders the moral\ninsight, which exalts his will above the universal will,\nwhich takes the half-done task for the whole task,\nand altogether glorifies the vanity of vanities. If\nnow my critic rids me of such self-satisfaction, he\nmay hurt me keenly, but he is my best friend. My\nlife may often be miserable in consequence, but then\nI am an instrument, whose purpose it is to attain, to\nfoster, to extend, and to employ the moral insight.\nMy misery is a drop, evil no doubt in itself (since\nmy poor little will must writhe and struggle when it\nsees its own vanity and the hopelessness of its separate\nsatisfactions), but a relative good, since through\nit I may attain to the moral insight. All such pains\nmust be dealt with in the same way. Hence the utilitarian principle of benevolent hedonism, even if\nright in its application to the far-off future, has but\nlittle direct practical application to a life that must\nto-day be judged by such standards as these.\n\nII.\n\nBut has the principle of hedonism any truth even\nin its application to a world where all had attained\nthe moral insight as an experience? If we\nconsider the higher human activities, whose worth is not\nmerely provisional, but permanent, the activities that\nmen will carry on when they have freed themselves\nfrom selfish strife, is the aggregate happiness as such\nthe goal of the action of this unselfish society?\n\nThere are existent already among men activities\nthat belong to spheres where selfish strife is,\nrelatively speaking, suppressed. These activities are\nforeshadowings of the life of the possible future\nhumanity that may come to possess the moral insight.\nArt, science, philosophy, are the types of such life.\nThese activities form still but a small part of the\naggregate work of men, aud so it must long be; jet,\nthough subordinated in extent to the pressing moral\nneeds of an imperfect state, these activities are\nalready among the highest in our lives. But now, are\nthey valuable because of the aggregate happiness\nthat they cause, or for some other reason? To judge\nof this we must study the definition of the second,\nmore permanent class of human duties.\n\nSuppose then that the first and provisional aim of\nhuman conduct had beeji attained, and that all men possessed the moral insight, what would this insight\nthen lead them to do? Here the hedonist will expect\nto have his revenge for our previous neglect of his\nadvice. \u201cMy precepts have been set aside so far,\u201d\nhe may say, \u201cas having no immediate application to\nthe moral needs of the moment. To get this merely\nformal condition of harmony among men, the moral\nman has been advised to subordinate all direct efforts\ntowards making people happy, to the end of making\nthem first possess what you have called the moral\nmood. But now at last, in the supposed case, the\ngreat end has been attained, and men are formally\nmoral. Now surely they have nothing to do but to\nbe as happy as possible. So at last my plan will be\nvindicated, and the ideal man will come to be a\nseeker of ideal pleasures.\u201d\n\nThe hedonist is too sanguine. His ideas of the\nhighest state may have their value, but they are\nindefinite in at least one respect. When he says that\nhe wants all his ideal men, in the ideal state, to be\nhappy together, he never tells us what he means by\nthe individual man at all, nor what inner relation\nthat individual\u2019s happiness is to have to the\nhappiness of other men. All men, in the ideal state, are\nto be harmonious and happy together: this the\nhedonist tells us; but he does not see how many\ndifficulties are involved in the definition of this ideal\nstate. He plainly means and says that in this ideal\nstate the good of the wiiole society is to be an\naggregate of a great number of individual happy states,\nwhich the various men of the blessed society are to\nfeel. He assumes then that in the ideal state each man would be able to say: \u201cI, separately regarded,\nam happy, and so are all my fellows.\u201d Now\npossibly the very notion of an ideal state, in which the\nseparate selves are as such happy, and in which\nthe blessedness of the whole is an aggregate of the\nblessedness of the separate individuals, is a\ncontradictory notion. At all events it is a notion whose\nmeaning and validity every hedonist coolly and\nunquestioningly assumes. Yet it is an assumption that\nwe must examine with care.\n\nIf a man sets before himself and his fellows the\ngoal of individual happiness, as the hedonist wants\nhim to do in the supposed ideal state, can he\nconceivably attain that goal? The hedonist supposes\nthat the only moral limitation to the pursuit of\npersonal happiness is the moral requirement of\naltruism, according to which no one ought to seek his\nown pleasure at the cost of a greater misery to\nanother. In the ideal state, as all would be in the\nmoral mood, and all disposed to help one another,\nand to get happiness only together, this one\nlimitation would be removed. Then, thinks the hedonist,\nthe highest law would be: Get the most happiness, all of you.\nThis happiness the hedonist conceives as\nan aggregate of states that would exist in the various\nseparate individuals. So each individual will strive\nafter his own joy, but in such wise as to hinder the\njoy of nobody else. But we oppose to this the\nquestion: Is there not some other limitation than this to\nindividual search for happiness? Is not the ideal\nof individual happiness as such an impossible ideal,\nnot because the individuals in the imperfect state lack harmony, but because, even in the supposed\nharmonious state, there would be an inner hindrance to\nthe pursuit of this ideal by any individual? Would\nnot the moral insight detect the hindrance, and so\nreject this ideal? There are at least some very\nfamiliar reasons for thinking this to be the case. These\nreasons do not of themselves prove, but they certainly\nsuggest, that the notion of a progressive individual\nhappiness has in it some strange contradiction.\n\nFirst, then, we have the old empirical truth that\nindividual happiness is never very nearly approached\nby any one, so long as he is thinking about it. The\nhappy man ought to be able to say, \u201cI am happy.\u201d\nHe can much more easily say, \u201cI was happy;\u201d for\npresent reflection upon happiness interferes in most\ncases with happiness. So here is an inner difficulty,\nvery well known, in the way of njaking individual\nhappiness the goal of life. We have no desire to\ndwell here upon this difficulty, which has so often\nbeen discussed. We do not exaggerate its\nimportance. We consider it only the first suggestion that\nthe hedonistic ideal of life has some inner\ncontradiction in its very nature, so that there is some deeper\nconflict here going on than that between selfishness\nand altruism.\n\nIn the second place, we notice that, if anybody\ntries to sketch for us the ideal state of human life\nas the hedonist conceives it, we are struck with a\nsense of the tameness and insignificance of the whole\npicture. The result is strange. Here we have been\nmaking peace and harmony among men the\nproximate goal of life, yet when this harmony has to be conceived in hedonistic fashion, when the hedonist\ngives us his picture of a peaceful society, where, in\nthe midst of universal good humor, his ideal, the\nhappiness of everybody concerned, is steadfastly pursued,\nwe find ourselves disappointed and contemptuous.\nThat harmless company of jolly good fellows is\nunspeakably dull. One listens to the account of their\nhappiness as one might listen to the laughter and\nmerry voices of some evening club of jovial strangers,\nwho had been dining at the hotel in which one\nhappened himself to be eating a late and frugal supper,\nin sobriety and weariness. Those unknown\ncreatures whose chatter in the next room the traveler\ndimly hears at such a time, \u2014 a confused babble of\nstupid noises; how insignificant their joys seem to\nhim! Who cares whether that really wretched set\nof animals yonder, with their full stomachs and their\nmisty brains, think themselves happy or not? To be\nsure, among them the harmony seems in some sort\nto have been momentarily realized. One would no\ndoubt seem to enjoy it all jnst as well as they, if he\nwere one of them. But one is viewing it at a\ndistance, from outside; and so looking at it he possibly\nsees that a mass of individual happiness is not just\nthe ideal of ideals after all.\n\nJust such, however, is the feeling that comes to one\nin considering Mr. Spencer\u2019s description of his ideal\nsociety. And similar feelings have been awakened\nin many reflective people when they have considered\ntraditional notions of heaven, and have tried to\nestimate the value of the life of individual bliss therein\npictured. Professor William James has recently so well stated these objections in a few brilliant\nsentences, that we cannot do better than to quote from\nhis recent article on \u201cThe Dilemma of\nDeterminism\u201d: \u2014\n\n\u201cEvery one must at some time have wondered at that\nstrange paradox of our moral nature, that, though the\npursuit of outward good is the breath of its nostrils, the\nattainment of outward good would seem to be its suffocation\nand death. Why does the painting of any paradise\nor Utopia, in heaven or on earth, awaken such yawnings\nfor Nnvana and escape? The white-robed, harp-playing\nheaven of our Sabbath-schools, and the ladylike tea-table\nelysium represented in Mr. Spencer\u2019s \u2018Data of Ethics,\u2019 as\nthe final consummation of progress, are exactly on a par\nin this respect, \u2014 lubberlands, pure and simple, one and\nall. We look upon them from this delicious mess of\ninsanities and realities, strivings and deadnesses, hopes and\nfears, and agonies and exultations, which form our\npresent state; and tedium vit\u00e6 is the only sentiment they\nawaken in our breasts. To our crepuscular natures, born\nfor the conflict, the Rembrandtesque moral chiaroscuro,\nthe shifting struggle of the sunbeam in the gloom, such\npictures of light upon light are vacuous and expressionless,\nand neither to be enjoyed nor understood. If this\nbe the whole fruit of the victory, we say; if the generations\nof mankind suffered and laid down their lives; if\nprophets confessed and martyrs sang in the fire, and all\nthe sacred tears were shed for no other end than that a\nrace of creatures of such unexampled insipidity should\nsucceed, and protract in s\u00e6cula s\u00e6culorum their contented\nand inoffensive lives, \u2014 why, at such a rate, better lose\nthan win the battle, or at all events better ring down the\ncurtain before the last act of the play, so that a business that began so importantly may be saved from so\nsingularly flat a winding-up.\u201d\n\nNow not only does all this seem true in such cases,\nbut we have similar feelings about even so ideal a\npicture of happy future life as is Shelley\u2019s, in the last\nact of the \u201cPrometheus.\u201d There are indeed many\ndeeper elements in that noble ideal of Shelley\u2019s, for\nhe distinctly says that his true ideal is \u201cMan \u2014 Oh!\nnot men\u201d; or, as he again expresses it: \u2014\n\n\u201cOne undivided soul of many a soul\nWhose nature is its own diviue control,\nWhere all things flow to all, as rivers to the sea.\u201d\nAnd when he says this, he gets far beyond mere\nhedonism. But yet there are other elements in his\naccount that are not so satisfactory, and that are\ndecidedly hedonistic. Their expression is indeed\nperfect. Surely if the noblest hedonism could ever\nsucceed with us through the noblest of statements,\nsuch an advocate as Shelley would convince us. But\nwhen the poet glorifies mere individual pleasure, as\nhe does in part of his picture, our clearest reflection\nis that, after all, the end of the tragedy is petty when\ncompared with the beginning.\n\nFor consider what a world it is in which we begin\nthe poem. At first glance it is a gloomy and terrible\nworld of brutal wrong. But soon the picture\ngrows brighter, even while the wrong is depicted.\nThere is the glorious figure of the suffering Titan,\nthere is the sweetness of the tender love that watches\nhim; and above the tyrant himself one feels that\nthere is somehow a heavenly might, that does not\nsuffer him to do his worst. The world in which these tilings live is not intolerable. But then come\nthe spirits that sing to Prometheus, in his anguish,\nof immortal deeds done on the earth, of great\nthoughts and lofty passions. All these are born of\nthe conflict, and have their being in the midst of the\nterrors of the tyrant\u2019s dominion. It is indeed no\nperfect world, this; and one needs some higher\nlight, such as Prometheus has, to prophesy that the\ngood will ever triumph; but one sees forthwith that\nfrom the perfect world, if it ever comes, these great\nstrivings for good, this sublime devotion and love\nand heroism, must not wholly vanish. These things\nmust not be laid aside like old garments whenever\nPrometheus wins and is free; their spirit must be\npreserved as an element in the higher life of the\nfuture. If they are worth anything, their true\nnature must be eternal.\n\nAnd as for the real worth of this world in which\nthe evil is so far triumphant \u2014 we learn something\nof that from Demogorgon. This mysterious being\nhas indeed no very definite religious philosophy to\noffer. He meets plain questions with vague answers,\nwhen Asia and Panthea catechise him; and\none feels it to be well for his reputation as a\nprofound teacher that his questioners are neither men\nnor Socratic inquirers. But still what he tells of the\ndeep truth that is \u201cimageless,\u201d is enough to make\nus feel that even this world of horrors is not without\na divine significance. Jove reigns, but, whatever the\nvisible world may be, the truth of things is a world of\nhope and love, where the real God is somehow above\nall and through all, a Spirit of Eternal Goodness. To have found this out in the midst of all the evil\nis surely not to have found life wholly vain.\n\nBut then what happens? By the accident that,\naccording to Shelley, rules the world, the revolution\nis accomplished, and Zeus is hurled headlong into the\nabyss. What glorious life shall now begin? When\nthe deep and magnificent truth that was felt to be\nbeneath all the horror of the tyrant\u2019s reign, comes out\ninto full light, what tongue shall be able to sing the\nglories of that beatific vision? We listen eagerly \u2014\nand we are disappointed. Prometheus arises grandly\nfrom his bed of torture, and then \u2014 he forthwith\nbethinks himself of a very pretty cave, where one\nmight be content to rest a long time in the refined\ncompany of agreeable women. There one will lie,\nand wreathe flowers, and tell tales, and sing songs,\nand laugh and weep; and the hours will fly swiftly\nby. And then what will become of the rest of the\nworld? Oh, this world simply becomes a theatre of\nlike individual enjoyments. Everybody to his cave\nand his flowers and his agreeable companions. And\nthat will then be all. No organization; just good\nfellowship and fragmentary amusements.\n\nNo, that cannot be all. Shelley felt as much,\nand added the last act of the play. There we are\nto have depicted grandly and vaguely the life of\norganized love. The world shall be all alive, and the\nuniversal life shall join in the hymn of praise. All\nthe powers of reality shall feel the new impulse of\nperfect harmony, and what shall spring from their\nunion shall be some higher kind of existence, in\nwhich there is no longer to be any talk of thine and mine; but the \u201cone undivided soul of many a soul,\u201d\n\u201cwhere all things flow to all, as rivers to the sea,\u201d\nshall enter upon a life of transcendent significance,\nupon a task of eternal duration, and of a meaning\ntoo high for us poor mortals of this present world\nwell to comprehend. But this is no longer pure\nhedonism, although the verses hereabouts are so full\nof the joyous outbursts and of the anticipations of\nrapture. In fine, the outcome is no perfect and\nharmonious conception at all. We find the joy of the\nfreed and loving, yet still separate selves, and the\nhigher life of the all-pervading universal spirit, both\nalike glorified; and we never get from the poet any\nclearness about their actual relation. Is the world\nblessed just because the tyrant no longer interferes\nwith each man\u2019s flower-wreathing and other\namusements? Or is the sole source of bliss the\ndisposition of everybody to give everybody else everything?\nOr is the real source of the perfection this: that\nthese souls, no longer oppressed by hatred, have at\nlast come to feel not only their freedom, but also\nsome higher aim of universal life? Shelley hints,\nbut does not consistently make us feel, what his real\nresult is. There was in fact always about Shelley\nthat childish innocence of benevolent hope, to which\nthe only evil seemed to be the hatred of men for one\nanother, and the highest good the outburst of\nuniversal kindliness. Now that is the beginning of\nmoral insight, but cannot be all of it. As if the\nbenevolence would not turn out to be utter emptiness,\nunless there is something beyond it! As if there\ncould be any value in this unity of life, unless there is something to be done by the one life after it is\nunited! As if the moral insight must not reveal\nsome deeper truth than can be seen in its first\nmoments!\n\nOne expects what we are coming to. In discussing\nthis problem of Shelley\u2019s we are reaching the\nsense that the moral insight must be yet further\ncompleted, or else it will be all in vain. The moral\ninsight says to us all: Act as one being. We must\ncome to that point; but we must also go beyond.\nWe must ask: What is this one being to do, after\nthe insight has made all the individuals of one will?\nAnd we already begin to see, in opposition to hedonism,\nthat it cannot be the end of this universal will\nsimply to make of us so and so many new separate\nindividuals once more. The mass of tediously happy\nselves seems insipid to our common sense, just\nbecause we all dimly feel the truth that we must now\ncome to understand better, namely, that\nthe universal will of the moral insight must aim at the destruction\nof all which separates us into a heap of\ndifferent selves, and at the attainment of some higher\npositive organic aim. The \u201cone undivided soul\u201d\nwe are bound to make our ideal. And the ideal of\nthat soul cannot be the separate happiness of you\nand of me, nor the negative fact of our freedom\nfrom hatred, but must be something above us all,\nand yet very positive.\n\nHad we deduced our principle in any other way\nthan the one we chose, we should be unable to take\nthis, our present necessary step forwards. The feeling\nof sympathy, for instance, is concerned with the individual object of our sympathy. To sympatliize\nwith all men is to wish everybody happy, each after\nhis own fashion. But we rejected that emotional\nsympathy as such. We said: The facts of life show\nus a conflict of wills. To realize this conflict is to\nsee that no will is more justified in its separateness\nthan is any other. This realization is ethical\nskepticism, a necessary stage on the way to the true\nmoral insight. The ethical doubt means and is the\nrealization of the conflict. But this realization\nmeans, as we see on reflection, a real will in us that\nunites these realized wills in one, and demands the\nend of their conflict. This is our realization of an\nUniversal Will. The rest of our doctrine must be\nthe development of the nature of the universal will.\nThis will first says to each of the individual wills:\n\u201cSubmit thyself to me.\u201d Or otherwise put, let\neach will be so acted out as if by One Being who\ncombined in himself all the other wills. Hence the\nuniversal will must demand, not the indefinitely\nconceived or dimly and sentimentally desired separate\nsatisfaction of everybody, but an organic union of\nlife; such an union as this our world would try to\nmake of itself if it were already in empirical fact\nwhat the universal will demands it to be, namely,\none Self. This one Self, however, could no longer\nwill to cut itself up again into the separate empirical\nselves, any more than it could in any narrow,\npriggish fashion set itself up for a new specimen of\na lofty individual, to be obeyed as an arbitrary law-giver.\nIt would demand all the wealth of life that\nthe separate selves now have; and all the unity that any one individual now seeks for himself. It would\naim at the fullest and most organized life conceivable.\nAnd this its aim would become no longer\nmerely a negative seeking for harmony, but a\npositive aim, demanding the perfect Organization of\nLife.\n\nIII.\n\nBut the postulate of all hedonism, utilitarian or\nother, this postulate of the absolute worth of\nindividual satisfaction, finds its practical refutation for\nevery growing character in yet another form.\nEverybody has tried to realize the ideal of individualism,\nthis ideal of a happy or satisfied self, either for\nhimself or for some loved one; and everybody finds, if\nhe tries the thing long enough, what a hollow and\nworthless business it all is. If there is, or is possible\nanywhere, a really satisfied self, it certainly has no\nplace in any fleshly body; and the reason is not\nalone what disappointed people call the\n\u201cdisagreeable order of things in this wicked world,\u201d but the\ninner contradictions of this notion of a perfected\nhuman self. Let us remind ourselves of some of these\ncontradictions.\n\nHedonism has no meaning, unless the satisfied\nhuman self is logically possible. The ideal of hedonism,\nwith all its vagueness, has at least one essential\nelement, in that it demands the satisfaction of\nhuman selves by the free supply of all that they desire\nfor themselves. Hedonism therefore must and does\nassert that what a man desires is his own contentment;\nso that, if you could, physically speaking, give him all that he asks for himself, you would have\nreached the goal for him. But now, if all this is a\ndelusion, if in fact a man does not really want his\nown satisfaction alone, but does actually want\nsomething more, that is not his individual satisfaction, and\nthat is not to be attained through his satisfaction,\nthen the hedonistic ideal does not express the truth\nof life. And this paradoxical experience we all get,\nsooner or later. We find that our little self does\ndesire something that, if gained, would be not its\nown satisfaction at all, but its own destruction in its\nseparate life as this self. So the aim of life cannot\nbe ultimately hedonistic. For, if possessed of the\nmoral insight, we cannot will that each self should\nget the greatest possible aggregate of separate\nsatisfactions, when in truth no one of the selves seeks\nmerely an aggregate of self-satisfactions as such, but\nwhen each does seek something else that is unattainable\nin the form of separate self-satisfaction.\n\nBut possibly a reader may incredulously demand\nwhere the proof is of this self-contradictory desire\nthat all the selves are declared to have. The proof\nlies in the general fact that to be fully conscious of\none\u2019s own individual life as such is to be conscious\nof a distressing limitation. This limitation every one\nvery shrewdly notices for the first in other people.\nThe knowledge of it expresses itself in personal\ncriticism. One first puts the matter very na\u00efvely thus,\nthat, whereas the rule of life for one\u2019s own person is\nsimply to get all the satisfaction that one can, the\nappearance of anybody else who pretends to be content\nwith himself must be the signal not for admiration at the sight of his success, but for a good deal\nof coutempt. One sees at once that he is a person\nof serious limitations. One sees and feels perfections\nthat the other has not. One despises then the other\nman\u2019s complacency, because it is so plainly founded\nin illusion. \u201cIf he could only see himself as others\nsee him,\u201d one says, \u201che could not be self-satisfied.\u201d\nCriticism thus seems to indicate why he ought to be\ndiscontented, and why he would, if he knew more,\nfeel a contempt for himself. All such criticism is\nreally an abandonment of the hedonistic principle.\nIf an individual ought to be dissatisfied, although he\nis actually satisfied, and if he ought to be dissatisfied\nmerely because he has not some perfection that\nexists in somebody else, then the doctrine that a self\nreaches its goal in so far as ifc reaches inner\ncontentment is given up. No benevolent hedonist has any\nbusiness to criticise a happy man who is harming\nnobody by his happiness. He is at the goal, or\napproximately so. Let him alone. To do otherwise,\nby criticising him, is a crime.\n\nBut no; every one feels that the true goal is not\nattained for this man. And this feeling, though in\nitself as feeling it proves nothing, is the first\nsuggestion to many of some deeper truth. This truth,\nhowever, enters like iron into his soid, when\nsomebody else ably and justly and severely criticises him\nin his turn. Here, for example, I have been for a\ntime content with myself, and have been saying to\nmy soul: \u201cSoul, take thy ease,\u201d and here comes one\nwho says to me, very justly, \u201cThou fool,\u201d and points\nout some great lack in my conduct, or in my characcharacter, or in my knowledge. And now I have a strange\nexperience of conflicting passions. This critic has\ncaused me a sharp pang. Perhaps I hate him for it;\nbut then, when I go away and think the matter over,\nI see that as to the fact, he is right. This great\nlimitation does actually exist for me, and perhaps I\ncannot remove it; so I can but suffer from the sense of\nit. I was innocent and ignorant before, and\ntherefore happy. If the critic had not showed me to\nmyself, I should have kept this bliss. But it is in\nvain now to think of returning to that innocence. I\nam indeed a wretch and a fool; and how shall I\nescape myself? Alas for my lost pleasure in\ncontemplating my fancied perfection!\n\nBut no: cannot I in fact return to that ignorance,\nand to the blissful illusion of my own worth once\nmore? Surely I can if I but try awhile. To flatter\nmyself, to curse the critic, to talk of his jealousy and\nof his blindness: surely this will bring me back to\nmy ignorance again in time. He will be forgotten,\nand I contented. But once more, my enlightened\nself revolts from this lie. The defect is real, and I\nknow it. Would my ignorance make it less real?\nTo have this defect and to suffer from it is bad\nenough; but with horror do I now contemplate the\nstate of going on forever with this defect, but still\nignorant of it and so not suffering from it. My old\ninnocence seems really pitiful. It actually adds much\nto my present pang of chagrin, that I previously\nought to have felt the chagrin, and yet had it not.\nI tremble when I reflect how, amid all that selfish\ncomplacency, I really was a fool the whole time, and appeared so to discerning people, and yet knew it\nnot. And therefore now, through all the pang of\nthe discovery, runs the feeling that I would not if I\ncould, no, not for any delight of complacency, return\nto that state of hollow, delicious, detestable\nignorance. It was a fool\u2019s paradise; but I have escaped\nfrom it. I know my nakedness, and I prefer the fruit\nof the tree of knowledge, with bitter exile, to the\nwhole of the delights of that wretched place. It is\na contradictory state, this. My knowledge is torture\nto my foolish, sensitive self; yet while I writhe with\nthe vainest of pangs, I despise utterly the thought\nof escaping it by illusion, or by forgetfulness, or by\nany means save the actual removal or conquest of\nthe defect. And this I feel even when the defect is\nseen to be utterly irremovable without the destruction\nof myself. Better go on despising myself, and\nfeeling the contempt of others, than return to the\ndelights of foolishness; or, if the pain of knowing\nwhat I am is insupportable, then it were better\nto die, than to live in despicable ignorance. Oh,\nwretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me?\n\nIs all this mere emotion? or is it insight? In\nfact it is a growing, though still imperfect insight,\na form of the moral insight. The pangs of this\nwounded self-love are themselves in truth also\nvanity, like the complacent self-love that they mourn;\nbut only through the gateway of this pain can most\npeople get beyond these vanities of individualism.\nFor this wounded self-love, that refuses to be\ncomforted by any deliberate return to its old illusions,\nis, as Adam Smith long since pointed out, an emotional expression of the result of putting ourselves\nat the point of view of our critics. We see our\nlimitations as they see them. Our will conforms\nitself, therefore, to their contemptuous will concerning\nus, because we realize the existence of that will.\nIn recognizing and sharing their contempt, we\ntherefore realize in part the universal will that must\ncondemn all individual limitations as such. We\npractically experience the truth that a perfectly fair judge\nof us all would not be satisfied merely with our\nindividual contentments as such, but would also demand\nthe destruction of all our individual limitations. We\nthus get practically far beyond hedonism. We see\nthat as we are weak and wretched in the eyes of one\nanother, we should all be far more so in the eyes of\na ofod Our ideal of life must then be the notion of\na life where no one being could fairly criticise any\nother at all. But such a life would be no longer a\nlife of separate individuals, each limited to his petty\nsphere of work. It would be a life in which self was\nlost in a higher unity of all the conscious selves.\n\nSingular may appear this conception even now,\nafter all that we have said; but it is a practical\nconception in our every-day human life. That we\ncriticise the limitations of others, and desire them to\nsacrifice their pleasures for the sake of removing these\nlimitations, may be regarded at first as our cruel\ncaprice, if you will so regard it. But when the edge\nof the sword is turned against us, when we, feeling\nthe bitterness of criticism and seeing our limitations,\nlong to be beyond them, hate ourselves for them, and\nyet refuse to escape from the pain of all this by forgetfulness of the defect, we pass from capricious\ncriticism to something higher. We accept with\nagony the point of view of the one who stands outside\nof us. And, so doing, we pass in effect to the\nacceptance of the demands of the universal will. If there\nwere a will that included in one consciousness all our\nseparate wills, it could not will our individual\ndefects as such. It woid.d be absolute critic, as well\nas absolute harmonizer, of all of us. It would tear\ndown these individual barriers of our petty lives,\nas the corporation of a great city may tear down\nwretched old rookeries. It would demand that we\nbe one in spirit, and that our oneness be perfect.\nBut if we experience this universal will, we\nexperience that hedonism, whose life-blood is the insistence\nupon individual states as such, cannot be upheld by\nthe moral insight, either now, or at any future stage\nof our human life on this earth. We perceive too\nthat we all have a deep desire for self-destruction, in\nso far as we recognize that our self-love means absence of perfection.\n\nIV.\n\nWe have seen in general the moral outcome of\nindividualism. Let us study some of its forms and\nfortunes more in detail. Individualism, viewed as the\ntendency to hold that the ideal of life is the separate\nhappy man, is itself yery naturally the normal\ntendency of unreflecting strong natures, to whom happiness\nhas been in a fair human measure already given.\nChildren and child-like men, full of vigor, are innocently\nselfish; or, when they act unselfishly, their whole ideal is the making of others like themselves.\nThey fall into a notion about life that the author\nnot long since heard well-expressed by a cheerful\nyoung friend, a former fellow-student, who, having\nearly plunged into a busy life, has already won both\ninfluence and property. This man, full of the enthusiasm\nof first success, v/as talking over his life with\nthe writer, and fell to defining his opinions on\nvarious subjects, such as young men like to discuss. At\nlast he was asked about the view of life that he had\nalready formed in his little experience. He was\nquick, honest, and definite in his answer, as he always\nhas been. \u201cMy notion of a good life is,\u201d he\nsaid, \u201cthat you ought to help your friends and whack\nyour enemies.\u201d The notion was older than the\nspeaker remembered; for Socratic dialogues on the\nJust, with their ingenious Sophists making bold\nassertions, form no part of his present stock of\nsubjects for contemplation. But what was interesting\nin the fresh and frank manner of the speech was\nthe clearness of the conviction that a world of\nsuccessful and friendly selves, whose enemies chanced\nto be all recently \u201cwhacked,\u201d would be at the goal\nof bliss. Such indeed is and must be the individualism\nof the successful and unreflecting man, by\nwhom all the world is classified as being either his\nor not his, as to a cow all is either cow feed or not\ncow feed. A man in this position has never yet\nknown the burden of Faust\u2019s soul when he says.\nCursed he what as possession charms us. If such\na man gets any moral insight, it will be on this stage\nimperfect. He will seek only to multiply himself in the forms of other men. These he will call his\nfriends. That in which he does not recognize\nhimself, he will \u201cwhack.\u201d\n\nBut most men cannot keep this form of the\nillusion of individualism. They pass most of their lives\nin the midst of disappointment. The self cannot get\nits objects. The ideal independence is hampered.\nThe stubborn world asserts itself against us. We\nfeel the littleness of our powers and of our plans.\nThe broken and despairing self has to seek refuge\nelsewhere. And so individualism most commonly\nassumes another shape. In inner self-development\nwe seek what the world refuses us in outer self-realization.\nThoughts at least are free. Our emotions\nare our own. The world does not understand them;\nbut the world is cold and unappreciative. Let us\nbe within ourselves what we cannot get in the outer\nworld. Let us be inwardly complete, even if we are\noutwardly failures. Then we shall outmt the cruel\nworld, and produce the successful self, in spite of\nmisfortunes.\n\nThe reader need not be reminded of what vast\ndevelopment individualism has undergone in this\ndirection. Literature is full of accounts of struggles\nfor inward self-realization, made by men whose outer\ngrowth is impeded. The Hamlets and the Fausts\nof poetry, the saints and the self-conscious martyrs\nof great religious movements, are familiar examples.\nWe have already in a former chapter studied the\noutcome of this romantic individualism in a few cases.\nThere is no time to dwell here afresh at any length\non so familiar a theme, but for the present we may point out that all illustrations of the tendency fall\ninto two classes, representing respectively the\nsentimental and the heroic individualism. These are the\nforms of that Nobler Selfishness which benevolent\nhedonism defends. They are efforts to find the\ncontented and perfected self. Their failure is the\nfailure of individualism, and therewith of hedonism.\n\nAs for the sentimental individualism, we have seen\nalready how unstable are its criteria of perfection,\nhow full of fickleness is its life. The sentimental self\nadmits that the world cannot understand it, and will\nnot receive it; but it insists that this neglect comes\nbecause the world does not appreciate the strength\nand beauty of the inner emotional life. The ideal,\nthen, is devotion to a culture of the beautiful soul,\nand to a separation of this soul from all other life.\nLet other souls be saved m like fashion. One does\nnot object to their salvation; but one insists that\neach saved soul dwells apart in its own sensitive feelings,\nin the world of higher artistic pleasures. Now\nin fact such lives may be not uninteresting to the\nmoralist; but no moralist can be really content with\ntheir ideal. Its best direct refutation is after all a\nsense of humor strong enough to let the sensitive and\nbeautiful soul see once in a while how comical is its\ndemure pursuit of these subjective phantoms. This\nmiserable life of deep inward excitements and longings,\nhow absurd it seems to any critic who, standing\noutside, sees that there is nothing more than froth\nand illusion and hypocrisy in it. Heine\u2019s anecdote\nof the monkey boiling his own tail so as to get an\ninward sense of the nature and worth of the art of cookery, is what first comes to mind when we see\nsuch a man as this subjective idealist of the\nemotions. You have only to get him to laugh heartily\nonce or twice, and his Philistine narrowness can no\nlonger content him. \u201cWhy is just my feeling worth\nso much?\u201d he will say. And then he will wake up\nto observe that his ideal was all a bad dream; and\nthat an experience has no more or less worth because\nit happens in connection with the decomposition of\nhis particular brain-stuff. Faust discovered that, as\nwe have seen; and so in time will any other sensible\nman. The real reason after all why Mephistopheles\ncould not get Faust\u2019s soul was that Faust could\nunderstand the Mephistophelean wit, which was\nthroughout destructive of individualism. The\nsentimentalist who has no humor is once for all given\nover to the devil, and need sign no contract. He\nstares into every mirror that he passes, and, cursing\nthe luck that makes him move so fast in this world,\nhe murmurs incessantly, Verweile doch, du hist so sch\u00f6n.\nAnd so in the presence of the moral insight\nhe is forthwith and eternally damned, unless some\nmiracle of grace shall save him. It is noteworthy\nthat one or two of our recent and yoimgest novelists\nin this country have gained a certain reputation by\nsentimental stories of collegiate and post-graduate\nlife that precisely illustrate this simple-minded but\nabominable spirit. May these young authors repent\nwhile there is time, if indeed they can repent.\n\nLess dangerous to genuine morality, and far\nhigher in the scale of worth, is the Titanic form of\nindividualism, the form that has given birth to such expressions as the Everlasting No of \u201cSartor\nResartus.\u201d The name of Prometheus at once springs to\nour lips when we think of this view of life.\nPrometheus is so fully the representative of Titanism,\nthat there is no better way of characterizing its\nwhole spirit than to call it the Heresy of\nPrometheus, the finest of all moral heresies, and the last.\n\nThe world will not grant you outward freedom, and\nyou see the hollowness of that inward life of blessed\nemotions. You despise it in others; you see that\nthe moral insight cannot approve such a form of\nselfish separation in you or in them. But there is\nanother form of self-development. You must be\nsomething. Why not be heroic? Possibly the ideal\nis a world of courageous selves, that find their\nperfection in their independence of action. Prometheus\ngave this ideal a peculiar emphasis by reason of the\nfact that he had a Zeus to defy. But the same ideal,\nin a more moderate expression, is the ideal of many\na quiet, matter of fact man, who has little happiness,\nbut much spirit and energy, who is too busy and too\nhealthy to be sentimental, who knows little of poetry,\nwho has never heard the name of Prometheus, but\nwho knows what it is to hold his own in the fight\nwith the world. This man you cannot put down;\nhe cares little for the opinions of others. There is\nno judge above him save God or his conscience. He\nis no saint; but he is at least an admirable fellow.\nHe belongs to the race of Achilles; he believes in\nthe gospel of eternal warfare against whatever seems\nto him evil. He respects others; he wants to do\ngood in his way. But he thinks that the best good that he could do would be to make other men brave\nlike himself. This lonely, active, indomitable self\nhe thinks the ideal type of perfection. For him the\nmoral insight does not go beyond the approval of\nsuch life as this, indefinitely multiplied.\n\nIt is always a delight to follow this Titanism in\nits various shapes. Buddhism, as we know, is a\nreligion wholly founded on self-denial, and it counsels\naustere self-extinction. And yet, by a strange freak\nof moral dialectics, it is Buddhism that has given\nus some of the best expressions of the Titanic\nindividualism. In a Buddhist homily in the Sutta Nip\u00e2ta\none may find such an outburst as the following,\n\u2014 one of the finest of the confessions of the\nTitans: \u2014\n\n\u201cHaving laid aside the rod against all beings, and not\nhurting any of them, let no one wish for a son, much less\nfor a companion; let him wander alone like a rhinoceros.\n\n\u201cIn him who has intercourse with others, affections\narise, and then the pain which follows affection; considering\nthe misery that originates in affection, let one wander\nalone like a rhinoceros.\n\n\u201cHe who has compassion on his friends and confidential\ncompanions loses his own advantage, having a fettered\nmind; seeing this danger in friendship, let one wander\nalone like a rhinoceros.\n\n\u201cJust as a large bamboo-tree, with its branches entangled\nin each other, such is the care one has with children\nand wife; but like the shoot of the bamboo not chnging\nto anything, let one wander alone like a rhinoceros.\n\n\u201cAs a beast unbound in the forest goes feeding at pleasure, so let the wise man, considering only his own will,\nwander alone like a rhinoceros. . . .\n\n. . . \u201cDiscontented are some ascetics, also some\nhouseholders, dwelling in houses; let one, caring little\nabout other people\u2019s children, wander alone like a\nrhinoceros.\n\n\u201cIf one acquires a clever companion, an associate\nrighteous and wise, let him, overcoming all dangers, wander\nabout with him glad and thoughtful.\n\n\u201cIf one does not acquire a clever companion, an\nassociate righteous and wise, then as a king abandoning his\nconquered kingdom, let him wander alone like a\nrhinoceros. . . .\n\n. . . \u201cSeeing bright golden bracelets, well-wrought by\nthe goldsmith, striking against each other when there are\ntwo on one arm, let one wander alone like a rhinoceros.\n\n\u201cThus, if I join myself with another, I shall swear or\nscold; considering this danger in future, let one wander\nalone like a rhinoceros. . . .\n\n. . . \u201cBoth cold and heat, hunger and thirst, wind and\na burning sun, and gadflies and snakes, \u2014 having\novercome all these things, let one wander alone like a\nrhinoceros.\n\n\u201cAs the elephant, the strong, the spotted, the large,\nafter leaving the herd walks at pleasure in the forest, even\nso let one wander alone like a rhinoceros. . . .\n\n\u201cNot adorning himself, not looking out for sport,\namusement, and the dehght of the pleasure in the world; on\nthe contrary, being loath of a life of dressing, speaking\nthe truth, let one wander alone like a rhinoceros. . . .\n\n. . . \u201cThis is a tie, in this there is little happiness,\nlittle enjoyment, but more of pain, this is a fishhook, so\nhaving understood, let a thoughtful man wander alone\nlike a rhinoceros.\n\n\u201cHaving torn the ties, having broken the net as a fish\nin the water, being like a fire not returning to the burnt\nplace, let one wander alone like a rhinoceros. . . .\n\n. . . \u201cNot abandoning seclusion and meditation, always\nwandering in accordance with the Dhammas, seeing misery\nin the existences, let one wander alone like the\nrhinoceros.\n\n\u201cWishing for the destruction of desire, being careful,\nno fool, learned, strenuous, considerate, restrained,\nenergetic, let one wander alone like a rhinoceros.\n\n\u201cLike a lion not trembling at noises, like the wind not\ncaught in a net, like a lotus not stained by water, let one\nwander alone like a rhinoceros.\n\n\u201cAs a lion strong by his teeth, after overcommg all\nanimals, wanders victorious as the king of the animals, and\nhaunts distant dwelling-places, even so let one wander\nalone like a rhinoceros.\u201d\n\n. . . \u201cThey cultivate the society of others, and serve\nthem for the sake of advantage; friends without a motive\nare now difficult to get, men know their own profit and\nare impure; therefore let one wander alone like a\nrhinoceros.\u201d\n\nWhen one contemplates the ideal of the heroic\nindividualism in this its purest form, rugged, empty of\nsensuous comforts, yet noble and inspiring in all but\nthe highest degree, one feels how hard the decision\nas to its worth will be, unless the moral insight gives\nvery definitely and authoritatively its ruling in the\nmatter. But fortunately, in trying to judge of even\nso splendid a caprice as this, we are not left to our\nindividual opinion. The will of the Titan as to the\nworld of life is simply, by hypothesis, not the\nuniversal will. The one being that included in his life all our petty lives, how must he regard this self-seeking\nloneliness of disposition? What is this heroic life\nbut an overflow from the great stream of universal\nlife, a pool, that, left to itself by some subsiding\nflood, slowly dries away in its shallow stagnancy,\nuntil it becomes a mud-puddle? And as for the\nproof of this, what becomes of your hero if you take\nhim at his word, and leave him to himself like a\nrhinoceros? Then indeed he soon sinks to the level of\na peevish animal. His admirable character is what\nit is by reason of his conflicts with his fellows, and\nby reason of the respect that he excites in others.\nStop talking about him, cease admiring him, do not\neven fight with him, ignore him utterly; and with\nthese external supports see his inner heroism vanish.\nHe exists as hero, in fact, only because he is in\norganic relation to the world about him. His boasted\nloneliness is an illusion. Could not Mephistopheles\nhave his laugh here too?\n\nBut the Titan is often properly the hero not only\nof a comedy, but also of a tragedy; and a tragedy,\nas we know, always discovers to us the gloomy\nworthlessness of this individual life as such. Mortal man,\nonce brought to possess the moral insight, finds his\ndestiny not in himself, but in the life about him, or\nin the ideal life of God. And the tragedy expresses\none way of getting this insight.\n\nIn short, just what the Heresy of Prometheus\nasserts to be the perfect, namely, the complete and\nall-sided development of life, just that can belong only\nto the general, not to the individual life. Hence\nTitanism always contradicts itself. It says that I, the narrow, limited self, who am dependent for every\nquality of my life on constant living intercourse with\nother people, must become perfect, independent,\npractically infinite. But to ask this is to ask that I\ndestroy myself, and my Titanism with me. Unquiet\nis and must be the life that seeks perfection in any\ngroup of selves. And so the ideal cannot here be\nfound.\n\nV.\n\nSomewhat hastily, as our limits have required, we\nhave pursued the definition of our ideal through the\nimperfect forms of individualism. And now what\nmust it be that the moral insight, with its Universal\nWill, demands of the possible future moral humanity,\nnot as the negative task of preparing the way for\ngoodness, but as the positive ideal task of the\ncommunity in which the moral insight is attained? This\ndemand is: Organize all Life. And this means:\nFind work for the life of the coming moral humanity\nwhich shall be so comprehensive and definite that\neach moment of every man\u2019s life in that perfect\nstate, however rich and manifold men\u2019s lives may\nthen be, can be and will be spent in the\naccomplishment of that one highest impersonal work. If such\nwork is found and accepted, the goal of human\nprogress will be in so far reached. There will then be\nharmony, the negative expression of the moral\ninsight; and there will be work, and organization of\nwork. And this work will be no more the work of\nso and so many separate men, but it will be the work\nof man as man. And the separate men will not know or care whether they separately are happy;\nfor they shall have no longer individual wills, but\nthe Universal Will shall work in and through them,\nas the one will of two lovers finds itself in the united\nlife of these twain, so that neither of them asks, as\nlover, whether this is his perfection or the other\u2019s\nthat he experiences. For their love makes them\none. In such wise we must figure to ourselves the\nideal state of humanity. And anything short of\nthat we are required by the moral insight to alter in\nthe direction of that end.\n\nThe reader may ask, What work can be found\nthat can thus realize the universal will? It is not\nfor us to know the whole nature of that work. We\nset before us the ideal task to discover such forms\nof activity as shall tend to organize life. The\ncomplete organization we cannot now foresee. But we\ncan foresee in what general direction that human\nactivity will tend, if it is ever discovered. For we\nhave certain human activities that do now already\ntend to the impersonal organization of the life of\nthose engaged in them. Such activities are found\nin the work of art, in the pursuit of truth, and in a\ngenuine public spirit. Beauty, Knowledge, and the\nState, are three ideal objects that do actually claim\nfrom those who serve them harmony, freedom from\nselfishness, and a wholly impersonal devotion. Both\nin art and in the service of the state, the weakness\nof human nature makes men too often put personal\nambition before the true service of their chosen\nideal. The faultiness of all such individualism is,\nhowever, generally recognized. The dignity and severely impersonal relationships and language of official\nlife are intended to express the sense that no\nindividual has as such the right to recognition at the\nmoment when he exercises an official function. He\nlives at the time wholly in his office. The state is\njust then everything. Even so all higher criticism\nprofesses to disregard the personal pleasure of the\nartist, and the personal whim of the critic. The\nproduction and the criticism of Art are no\namusements of two individuals. They are work done\nin the service of the one mistress, the divine art\nitself. But still, notwithstanding the recognition of\nthis ideal devotion to one\u2019s country or to one\u2019s art,\nour typical politician and our typical ambitious\nartist show us that these activities still but imperfectly\novercome individualism, or lead men to the higher\nplane of moral life. Better success in organizing life\none finds, when one passes to the activity of truth-seeking,\nespecially in fields where human thought\nis best master of itself, and best conscious of its\npowers. When one considers the work of a company\nof scientific specialists, \u2014 how each one lives for his\nscience, and how, when the specialty is advanced\nand well organized, no one in official expressions\nof his purely scientific purposes dares either to give\nhimself airs of importance as an individual, or to\nshow any benevolence or favoritism or fear in\nconsidering and testing the work of anybody else; when\none sees how impersonal is this idea of the scientific\nlife, how no self of them all is supposed to have a\nthought about his science because it pleases him,\nbut solely because it is true, \u2014 when one considers all this, one sees faintly what the ideal relation\nof mankind would be, if the ideal work for all men\nwere found. This devoted scientific spirit is itself\nonly an ideal even to-day; and all sorts of personal\nmotives still interfere to disturb its purity. But\nhere, at all events, one sees dimly in a concrete\ninstance what the organization of life may yet\nbecome.\n\nNow suppose a world in which men had some one\nend of activity that united somehow all the different\nstrivings of our nature, \u2014 \u00e6sthetic, social,\ntheoretical. Suppose that in the pursuit of this end all\nthe petty, selfish aims of individuals had been\nforgotten. Suppose that men said no longer: \u201cI have\nwon this good thing for myself and my friends,\u201d\nbut only, \u201cThis good is attained,\u201d no matter by\nwhom. Suppose that thus all life was organized in\nand through this activity, so that a man rose up\nand lay down to rest, ate and drank, exercised and\namused his senses, met his fellows, talked with them,\nlived and planned with them, built his cities,\nwandered over the oceans, searched the heavens with\nhis telescopes, toiled in his laboratories, sang his\nsongs, wrote his poems, loved and died, all for the\nservice of this one great work, and knew his life\nonly as the means to serve that one end, then would\nthe ideal of the moral insight be attained. The\nworld of life would be as one will, working through\nall and in all, seeking the ends of no one individual,\ncaring not for any stupid and meaningless \u201caggregate\u201d\nof individual states, but getting what as insight\nit demands, the absolute Unity of Life. Then indeed we should have reached the ideal; and this\nbeing the ideal, all is good that helps us in the\ndirection thereof, and all is evil that drives us in the\nopposing direction.\n\nThe imperfection and the relative justification in\nits place of benevolent hedonism are thus indicated.\nThe moral insight being attained by all men as an\nexperience, this insight could not will for individuals\nsuch painful experiences as would degrade the\nsufferers below the level of the insight itself, back to\nthe struggles and the illusions of individualism. It\nwould be the business of men then as now, to remove\nuseless pain out of the world, not however for any\nother reason than that pain implies separation of\nthe sufferer from the consciousness of universal life,\nand consequent disharmony of his will in its relation\nto other wills. Pain that springs from selfish\ndisappointments we must often temporarily increase, that\nwe may lead a man out of himself. But for the\nrest, the moral insight rejects pain, though only\nbecause it means disharmony of the wills that are in\nthe world.\n\nThus we have completed the expression of our gen-\neral ideal. We must add a few concrete precepts\nthat this ideal has to give us concerning the conduct\nof our daily life. Plainly, if such a goal as this is\nwhat we aim at from afar, the acts of our lives must\nbe influenced by it. What relation between me and\nmy neighbor to-day does this moral law establish?\n\nThou and I, neighbor, have in this world no rights\nas individuals. We are instruments. The insight\nthat begins in me when I find thee, must go further. I find not only thee, but also Life Universal.\nInasmuch as I do anything for thee, I do it also to\nthe life universal; but, even so, it is only because\nI serve the life universal that I dare serve thee.\nThy happiness, however near and dear thou art to\nme, is but a drop in this vast ocean of life. And\nwe must be ready to sacrifice ourselves to the Whole.\nBut while we live together, and while we may\nwithout sin enjoy each other's presence, how shall we treat\neach other? As mere masses of happy or miserable\nstates? As selves to be made separately perfect!\nNo, that cannot be. We must live united with each\nother and the world. Therefore must we do our\npart to find work vast enough to bring us all in so\nfar as may be into unity, without cramping the\ntalent of any of us. Each then is to do his work, but\nso as to unite with the work of others. How may\nwe accomplish this? By seeking to develop every\nform of life that does bring men into such oneness.\nOur vocation, whatever it be, must not end simply\nin increasing what people call the aggregate\nhappiness of mankind, but in giving human life more\ninterconnection, closer relationship. Therefore we\nmust serve as we can art, science, truth, the state,\nnot as if these were machines for giving people\npleasant feelings, but because they make men more united.\nWhen we urge or seek independence of character,\nwe must do so only because such independence is a\ntemporary means, whose ultimate aim is harmony and\nunity of all men on a higher plane. In all this we\nmust keep before us very often the high ideal that\nwe are trying to approach. And when we judge of a good action we must say, not that this was good\nbecause it made some one happy, but that it was good\nbecause it tended directly or remotely to realize the\nUniversal Will.\n\nAnd so, however much mere harmony may be our\naim, we must be ready very often temporarily to fight\nwith disorganizing and separating tendencies, forces,\nor men. When we fight we must do so for the sake\nof conquering a peace in the name of the Highest.\nAnd so we must fight resolutely, fearlessly,\nmercilessly. For we care not how many stubbornly\ndisorganizing spirits are crushed on the way. The One\nWill must conquer. But on the other side we must\nbe very careful of every soul, and of every tendency\nthat may, without destruction, be moulded into the\nservice of the Universal Will. The moral insight\ndesires that no hair fall from the head of any living\ncreature unnecessarily. The one aim is stern to its\nsteadfast enemies, but it is infinitely regardful of all\nthe single aims, however they may seem wayward,\nthat can at last find themselves subdued and yet\nrealized in its presence, and so conformed to its will.\nAll these rivulets of purpose, however tiny, all these\nstrong floods of passion, however angry, it desires to\ngather into the surging tides of its infinite ocean,\nthat nothing may be lost that consents to enter. Its\nunity is no abstraction. The One Will is not a one-sided\nwill. It desires the realization of all possible\nlife, however rich, strong, ardent, courageous,\nmanifold such life may be, if only this life can enter into\nthat highest unity. All that has will is sacred to it,\nsave in so far as any will refuses to join with the others in the song and shout of the Sons of God.\nIts warfare is never intolerance, its demand for\nsubmission is never tyranny, its sense of the excellence\nof its own unity is never arrogance; for its warfare\nis aimed at the intolerance of the separate selves,\nits yoke is the yoke of complete organic freedom,\nits pride is in the perfect development of all life.\nWhen we serve it, we must sternly cut off all that\nlife in ourselves or in others that cannot ultimately\nconform to the universal will; but we have nothing\nbut love for every form of sentient existence that can\nin any measure express this Will.\n\nVI.\n\nWe have done for the present with the ideal, and\nmust turn to reality. Our religious consciousness\nwants support for us in our poor efforts to do right.\nIs this real world that we have so naively assumed\nthus far, in any wise concerned to help us in realizing\nideals, or to support us by any form of approval in\nour search for the right? We must face this\nproblem coolly and skeptically, if we want any result.\nWe must not fear the thunders of any angry\ndogmatic thinker, nor the pain that such researches must\ncause us if they are unsuccessful. It is something\nvery precious that we seek, and we must run great\nrisks, if need be, to get it.\n\nLet us begin to define a little better what this is\nthat we seek. By a support for moral acts in outer\nreality, we do not mean merely or mainly a power\nthat will reward goodness. The moral insight cares not for individual rewards. Only the good intention\nis truly moral. Good acts done for pay are selfish\nacts. So the outer support that we want in our\nmorality is not reward as such. We want to know that,\nwhen we try to do right, we are not alone; that there\nis something outside of us that harmonizes with our\nown moral efforts by being itself in some way moral.\nThis something may be a person or a tendency. Let\nus exemplify what we mean by some familiar cases.\nJob seeks, in his consciousness of moral integrity,\nfor outer support in the midst of his sufferings.\nNow whatever he may think about rewards, they are\nnot only rewards that he seeks. He wants a\nvindicator, a righteous, all-knowing judge, to arise, that\ncan bear witness how upright he has been; such a\nvindicator he wants to see face to face, that he may\ncall upon him as a beholder of what has actually\nhappened. \u201cOh that I knew where I might find\nhim, that I might come even to his seat. I would\norder my cause before him, and fill my mouth with\narguments. I would know the words which he\nwould answer me, and understand what he would\nsay unto me. . . . There the righteous might dis-\npute with him; so should I be delivered forever from\nmy judge. Behold I go forward, but he is not there;\nand backward, but I cannot perceive him: On the\nleft hand, where he doth work, but I cannot behold\nhim: he hideth himself on the right hand, that I\ncannot see him\u00a0: But he knoweth the way that I\ntake: when he hath tried me I shall come forth as\ngold.\u201d\n\nSo again in the great parable of the judgment day, in the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew, the moral\nforce of the story is not expressed by the rewards\nand punishments described, any more than in Elijah\u2019s\nvision on Horeb, \u2014 the Lord was in the thunder and\nin the fire. But the moral force of the scene lies in\nthe concluding words that the judge is made to speak\nto the multitudes of just and unjust. \u201cInasmuch as\nye did it unto the least of these, ye did it unto me.\u201d\nThat is, if we may paraphrase the words of the judge:\n\u201cI,\u201d he says, \u201crepresent all beings. Their good is\nmine. If they are hungry or naked or sick or\nimprisoned, so am I. We are brethren; ours is all\none universal life. That I sit in this seat, arbiter\nof heaven and hell, makes me no other than the\nrepresentative of universal life. Such reverence as ye\nnow bear to me is due, and always was due, to the\nleast of these my brethren.\u201d The infinite sacredness\nof all conscious life, that is the sense of the story;\nthe rest is the scenic accompaniment, which, whether\nliterally or symbolically true, has no direct moral\nsignificance. Now the knowledge such as Job sought,\nthe knowledge that there is in the universe some\nconsciousness that sees and knows all reality, including\nourselves, for which therefore all the good and evil\nof our lives is plain fact, \u2014 this knowledge would be\na religious support to the moral consciousness. The\nknowledge that there is a being that is no respecter\nof persons, that considers all lives as equal, and that\nestimates our acts according to their true value, \u2014\nthis would be a genuine support to the religious need\nin us, quite apart from all notions about reward\nand punishment. A thinking being, a seer of all good and evil, is thus desired. This thinking being\nwould still have religious significance, even if it had\nno other attributes than these. Should we find it\nnecessary to regard this being as without affection,\nsympathy, or even power to act, as without willingness\nto avenge wrong-doing, if we had to deprive it\nof everything else that is human save knowledge;\nlet this be a passionless and perfect knowledge,\nan absolutely fair judgment of our moral actions,\nand there would still be in the world something of\nreligious value. It is not affirmed that we ought\nto rest content with such a conception as this, but\nat all events this conception would not be valueless.\nEven so again, the conception of some natural\ntendency in the world that, being \u201ca power not ourselves,\u201d\n\u201cmakes for righteousness,\u201d this conception,\nas Mr. Matthew Arnold has so well shown us, would\nhave a religious value. Something of this kind then,\nmore or less definite and full of life, is what we seek.\nWhat indication is there that such search is not\nhopeless? For the author\u2019s part, he professes to be\nquite willing to accept any result of research,\nhowever gloomy or skeptical, to which he is led by\ngenuine devotion to the interests of human thought as\nthought. But he insists that as moral beings we\nshould make clear to ourselves what are the\ninterests of thought, and that we should see whether they\ndo lead us to results that are not wholly skeptical,\nnor altogether gloomy. There is no reason for\nclipping our own wings for fear lest we should escape\nfrom our own coops and fly over the palings into\nour own garden. Let us get all the satisfaction from philosophy that we can. In truth we shall never get\ntoo much.\n\nBut, for the rest, the reader must be reminded of\none thing that was said in the opening chapter about\nthe magnitude and boldness of the demands that\nreligious philosophy makes in coming to the study of\nthe world. We said that we will be satisfied only\nwith the very best that we can get. We want to\nfind some reality that our ideal aims can lead us to\nregard as of Infinite Worth. If we cannot find that,\nthen the best possible aspect of reality must be\nchosen instead. We will not be satisfied with little,\nif we can get much. Our religious demands are\nboundless. We will not falsify the truth; nor yet\nwill we dread any disaster to our ideal aims,\nhowever great the disappointment that would result from\nfailure. But, while pursuing the truth with\nreverence, we will not withdraw our demands until we see\nthat we can get no certain success in them.\n\nWe insist, therefore, that the religiously valuable\nreality in the world shall be, if so we can find it, a\nSupreme Reality, no mere chance outcome of special\ncircumstances, but an ultimate aspect of things.\n\nFurthermore, the special form that our ideal has\ntaken demands another character in our object of\nreligious satisfaction. It must be such as to support\nthe realization of our particular ideal. If a power,\nit must aim at the unity of our lives; if in some\nother way approved as the deepest truth of thiugs, it\nmust show us how our ideal either can be realized\nby us, or else is already realized at the heart of this\ntruth.\n\nSuch is the work of our second book. We\napproach it not as if we expected any mystical\nrevelation, but solely as having for our one desire to find\nout what a sensible man ought reasonably to think of\nthe world wherein he finds himself.\n\nNotes","title":"The Religious Aspect of Philosophy/Chapter 7","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":14952}