{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_8/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_8","id":"wikisource_The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy_Chapter_8","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Religious_Aspect_of_Philosophy/Chapter_8","summary":null,"tags":["Headers_applying_DefaultSort_key","Subpages"],"text":"CHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE WORLD OF DOUBT.\n\nWhen we turn from our world of ideals to the\nworld actually about us, our position is not at once\na happy position. These ideals that we have agreed\nupon, in so far as they are our own, do not make the\nworld, and people differ endlessly about what the\nworld is and means. Very naturally, then, we also\nmust ourselves begin with difficulties and doubts.\nFor if we want a religious doctrine that in these days\ncan stand us in good stead, we must fear nothing,\nand must run the risk of all the disasters of thought.\nThe warfare of faiths is so angry and ancient, that\nwe must be content if, with our best efforts, we get\nanything out of it at all. As millions of brains must\ntoil, doubtless, for centuries before any amount of\nideal agreement among men is attained or even\napproximated, we must be content if we do very little\nand work very hard. We can be tolerably certain\nthat in a world where nearly all is dark very much\nof our labor will be wasted. But this is natural.\nThere is the delight of activity in truth-seeking; but\nwhen, at the outset, you compare your hopes and\nclaims with the shadowy and doubtful results that\nyou may reach, the comparison cannot seem\notherwise than melancholy. Through the failures of millions of devoted servants, the humanity of the future\nmay possibly (we do not, at least at this point in our\nstudy, know that it will certainly) be led to a grand\nsuccess. This far-off divine event to which, for all\nwe know, our fragment of creation may be moving,\nbut which at any rate we regard with longing and\ndelight, constitutes the moral aim of our philosophic\nstudies. It is good to strive.\n\nIn the present chapter, therefore, we shall devote\nourselves for the most part to negative criticism of\ncertain views that are or may be held about the real\nworld.\n\nI.\n\nThat skepticism in studying reality is to some\nextent useful, most people will admit. But not every\none will follow us at once into the thorough-going\nand uncompromising skepticism that we shall have\nto present in the following as the very basis of our\npositive doctrine. It is surprising how easily the\nphilosophic need is satisfied in the minds of most\npersons, even in the minds of many professed\nphilosophic students. A few very complacent questions,\nreadily if unintelligibly answered, put to rest the\nwhole desire that such people feel to cross-examine\nreason. In fact they seem to hold that a certain\ndisrespect would be shown by questioning reason\nany more sharply; and so their philosophy is like a\nCongressional investigation of the doings of a\npolitician, conducted by his fellow-partisans. But we feel,\nin writing this book, that such a philosophy, whose\nonly business it is to \u201cwhitewash\u201d reason, is an insuit to reason. Reason\u2019s investigations of its own\nnature are not partisan affairs conducted for the sake\nof effect; nor does reason seek, like a demagogue, to\nget a popular \u201cvindication,\u201d but solely to reach the\ndeepest possible insight into its own absolute truth.\nHence we refuse utterly to have the following\nregarded as in any narrower sense an \u201capology\u201d for\nany religious truth, since the defensive or apologetic\nattitude in presence of religious problems is once for\nall an insult to genuine religion. If there is truth\nabsolute, we desire to know the same, and if we ever\nget a glimpse of it, doubtless it will need very little\napology from us. But meanwhile we propose to\ndoubt fearlessly and thoroughly. If our limits\nprevent here the proper exhaustive search for all the\nactual difficulties of the views that we present, still\nwe want to have, and as far as may be to show, the\nspirit of honest, determined, conscientious\nskepticism. A clerical friend of the author\u2019s impressed\nhim very much in early youth by the words: \u201cGod\nlikes to have us doubt his existence, if we do so\nsincerely and earnestly.\u201d These words are almost a\ntruism; they surely ought to be a truism. Yet they\nhave been forgotten in many a controversy. Surely\nif God exists, he knows at least as much about\nphilosophy as any of us do; he has at least as much\nappreciation for a philosophic problem as we can have.\nAnd if his own existence presents a fine philosophic\nproblem, he delights therein at least as much as we\ndo. And he then does not like to see that problem\nhalf-heartedly handled by timid, whining, trembling\nmen, who constantly apologize to God because the existence of certain fools called atheists forces them\nto present in very pious language certain traditional\nproofs of his existence. No, surely not in this spirit\nwould a rational God, if he exists, have us approach\nthe question. But with at least as much coolness and\nclearness of head as we try to have when we toil over\na problem in mathematics; with at least as merciless\nan analysis of all that is obscure and doubtful and\ncontradictory in our own confused ideas as we should\nuse in studying science; with at least as much\neagerness in finding out the weakness and the uncertainty\nof men\u2019s wavering and ill-trained judgments as we\nshould bring to the examination of an important\ncommercial investment, \u2014 with at least so much of\ncaution, of diligence, and of doubt we should\napproach the rational study of the Highest. For what\ncan insult God more than careless blundering? It\nis shameful that men should ever have treated this\nmatter as if it were the aim of religious philosophy\nto have a store-house of formulated traditional\nanswers ready wherewith to silence certain troublesome\npeople called doubters. In these matters the truly\nphilosophic doubt is no external opinion of this or\nthat wayward person; this truly philosophic doubt\nis of the very essence of our thought. It is not to\nbe \u201canswered\u201d or \u201csilenced\u201d by so and so much\napologetic pleading. The doubt is inherent in the\nsubject-matter as we must in the beginning regard\nthe same. This doubt is to be accepted as it comes,\nand then to be developed in all its fullness and in all\nits intensity. For the truth of the matter is\nconcealed in that doubt, as the fire is concealed in the stony coal. You can no more reject the doubt and\nkeep the innermost truth, than you can toss away the\ncoal and hope to retain its fire. This doubt is the\ninsight partially attained.\n\nSuch must be our spirit. And now, to apply it\nat once to the problems before us, where shall we\nbegin our search for a religious truth? We are to find,\nif possible, some element in Reality that shall have\nreligious significance. But how shall we do this\nunless we have made clear to ourselves in what sense\nwe know Reality at all? It would seem that our\nreligious philosophy must begin with the problem of all\ntheoretical philosophy: What can be our knowledge\nof this world, and whereon can this knowledge be\nfounded?\n\nA dark and dismal topic, one may say. But\nremember, here and here only can our beloved treasure\nbe found buried. Either there is no religious\nphilosophy possible, or it is here; and here we must\ndelve for it. Nor let one be too much terrified at\nonce by the forbidding aspect of the question. It is\nindeed no easy one; yet to answer it is but to know\nthe real meaning of our own thoughts. This truth\nthat we seek is not in the heavens, nor in the depths;\nit is nigh us, even in our hearts. Only inattention\ncan be hiding it from us. Let us look closer.\n\nThis real world that popular thought declares to\nexist outside of us \u2014 we have so far taken it on\ntrust. But now, what right have we so to take it?\nWhat do we mean by it? When we say that we\ncan know it, do we not mean that it is in some way\nbound to conform to some of our thoughts? Or, if you will put the matter in the reverse order, and\nwill say, with seeming modesty, that our thought is\nso constituted as to have a certain likeness to\nreality, do you really make the matter clearer? The\nmysterious conformity between our thought and\nwhat is no thought of ours remains, and we have to\nmake clear our assurance of that. This assurance\nitself, if we got it, would seem to be in just the same\nposition as is the conformity of which it is to assure\nus. Itself again would be outside of the external real\nworld, and in our thought. Yet this assurance is to\ntell us something about that external world, namely,\nits conformity to certain of our thoughts. What\ncan we thus know about any external object at all?\n\nThe difficulty is an old one. Our solution of it,\nif we get any, must determine the whole of our\nreligious thought. Let us see at all events where the\ndifficulty arises, and why. Whether or no there is\npossible any solution, the difficulty plainly lies in a\ncertain conceived relation between us and the world.\nAll the common metaphysical and religious doctrines\nbegin by setting a thinker over against an external\nworld, which is declared independent of his thought,\nand which his thought is then required to grasp and\nknow. This supposed relation of subject and object\ngives metaphysics its seemingly insoluble problems.\nThis thinker, whose thought is one fact, while that\nworld out there is another fact, how can he learn by\nwhat takes place in his thought, that is, in the one\nof these two supposed entities, what goes on in the\nother of these entities, namely, in the world? Once\nfor all, this marvelous relation of pre\u00ebstablished harmony between these supposed separate entities\ndemands philosophic deduction. The relation, to be\nsure, may be itself a metaphysical figment. We\nhold that it is. We shall try to show hereafter the\nbaselessness of this notion of a world of external\nfact on one side, in the barren isolation of its\ntranscendental reality, with an equally lonesome thinker\non the other side, somehow magically bound to\nfollow after the facts of that world. We hold, to put\nit in plain language, that neither the external world\nnor the individual thinker has any such reality as\ntraditional popular beliefs, together with most\nmetaphysical schools, have desired us to assume. But,\nfor the first, we cannot yet undertake to trouble the\nreader with this our philosophic speculation. That\nwill come in its good time, we hope not too\nunintelligibly, and it will have its place in our religious\ndoctrine.\n\nWe begin, however, with the popular metaphysical\nconcept, of a separate external world, and of a\nthinker bound somehow to repeat the facts of it in\nhis thought. We ask, with popular metaphysics:\nHow can we be sure that he does this? And from\nmetaphysical systems, both popular and unpopular,\nwe get an amazing jargon of answers.\n\nThe most popular answer, after all, is a threat, a\nthreat repeated endlessly in all sorts of apologetic\nbooks, but still a mere base, abject, wholly\nunphilosophical threat. It is said to us that we must\nbelieve our human thinker to be capable of thinking\ncorrectly the facts of this supposed external world,\nbecause, if he does not, the result will be disastrous to the whole common sense conception of the world.\nIf this thinker does not somehow magically\nreproduce external facts in his private mind, then is our\nfaith vain, and we are all very miserable. It is\nastonishing how this, the most helpless abandonment\nof all philosophic thought, is constantly reiterated\nby certain of those who pretend to be philosophers.\nCan a threat scare us from philosophy? To get a\nsure foundation for our religion, we begin by asking\nhow a man can really know the external world at\nall. We get as reply the threat that, unless we\nadmit the knowledge of the external world, we must\nbe in eternal doubt, and therefore wretched. To\ndoubt this knowledge, we are told, would be to\ndoubt all that makes life worth living. But it is\njust because we want to find a sure basis for what\nmakes life worth living that we begin with this\ndoubt. We are determined to get at the root of\nthis matter, however bitter may be the evil that will\nbefall us if our skepticism does not succeed in\ngetting past this guarded gateway of philosophy. We\npersist in asking, all threats to the contrary\nnotwithstanding, just how and why and in what sense the\nexternal world can be known to us, if indeed this\nconception itself of an external world is justly\nformed at all.\n\nYet we grant that the full force and need and\nbitterness of our problem may not be plain to the\nreader, unless he has first undertaken to examine\nwith us at some length the philosophic character\nand consequences of this popular metaphysical\nconception of the external world. To get him to share well our doubt, we must first provisionally accept\nthis notion of popular metaphysics itself. We must\nwaive for the moment our difficulty, that it may\nrecur to us with greater importance by and by. Let\nthe reader once come to see that this popular notion\nof an external world is an utterly vague conception,\ncapable of numberless forms, and religiously\nunsatisfactory in all of them, and then we shall expect\nhim to feel the force of the deeper philosophic problems\ninvolved. This present chapter will therefore\nproceed directly to an examination of the popular\nnotions about the external world. We shall\nexamine them, namely, to find whether they offer any\nreligious aspect. We shall find that they do not\noffer any such aspect in any satisfactory sense.\nThat the good is supreme in the external world as\npopularly conceived, nobody can establish. This\nsupposed external world is once for all a World of\nDoubt, and in it there is no abiding place. When\nthe reader has come to feel with us this truth, then\nhe will be ready to look deeper into the matter.\nThen some other more genuinely philosophic\nconception of Reality will have its place. Hence in\nthe rest of this chapter we shall be accepting\nprovisionally notions that we are hereafter to reject,\nand assuming much on trust that is at best very\ndoubtful. We shall show that, even so aided, the\npopular notions about the religious aspect of this\nworld cannot bear criticism. This visible world of\npopular faith will lose its worth for us. We shall\nhave to look elsewhere.\n\nThe religious significance once removed from the popular realistic philosophy, with its crudely\nmetaphysical notion of things, we shall be ready to listen\nto skepticism about the foundations of this notion;\nand we shall be ready for some new conception.\nThis new conception will indeed not falsify the true\nmoral meaning of that innocent faith in a real world\nupon which we have so far depended in our research.\nThe popular notion of an external world, practically\nuseful for many purposes, and sufficient for many\nscientific ends, will be refuted and rejected in its\ncontradictions and in its absurdities, but the soul of\ntruth that is in it will be absorbed into a higher\nconception both of the eternal Reality and of our\nrelation thereto. Our seeming loss will become our\ngain. That bad dream, the dead and worthless\nWorld of Doubt in which most of our modern\nteachers remain stuck fast, will be transformed for us.\nWe shall see that the truth of it is a higher World,\nof glorious religious significance.\n\nSo for the first we turn to that supposed world of\npopular metaphysics, to test its religious value. It is\nconceived as a world existent in space and time, and\nas a world of real things which act and interact. For\nconvenience sake, we shall in the following use the\nword Power to mean any one of these things, or any\ngroup of them, that in this external world may be\nsupposed to produce effects upon any other thing or\ngroup of things. However these Powers get their\nefficiency, the religious significance of the supposed\nexternal world, if it has any, must lie in the supremacy\nof the Good in this world of the Powers. One must\nthen view this external world historically as a mass of Powers, which work together in harmony or in\ndiscord, and which give you Products. The religious\nideals must find satisfaction here, if at all, in\ncontemplating the goodness of these powers and of their\nworks. If the religious ideals here fail, there will\nbe the other aspect open. Regarded in a truly\nphilosophical way, and in its eternal nature, the world,\nas we shall hereafter come to see, cannot be supposed\nto be either a power or a heap of powers. For powers\nhave their being only in time, and only in relation\nto one another. If then all fails when we consider\nthis external world of powers, this figment of\npopular metaphysics, the eternal nature of reality in\nsome deeper view of that nature may still be found\nof infinite value to us. In fact we shall find the\nsearch for a religious truth, among the powers of this\npopularly conceived external world, very disheartening.\nThe jargon of their contending voices will not\nunite into any religious harmony. We shall find\nthese powers like the thunder and the fire. The still\nsmall voice is not in them. We shall be driven to\nsome other aspect of the world. We shall approach\nthat aspect in ways that imply no disrespect to those\nwho have been so long scientifically studying the\nhistory and forces of the assumed external world.\nTheir results, with the practical consequences in daily\nlife, and with all that Agnosticism about the nature\nand purposes of the powers of this visible world\nwhich such men nowadays feel bound to proclaim,\nwe shall on the whole accept. We too shall be\nAgtics, namely, as to the powers that rule the visible\nworld. But we shall find a very different way, untrodden by scientific research, and yet, we hope, not\na way of mere dreams, not a way into a world of\nfancy, but a way that leads us to a point whence we\nget a glimpse into that other aspect of things. This\nway Modern Idealism since Kant has been busy in\nfinding and clearing. How wearisome some of the\nexploring expeditions have been, we well know. Our\nsearch also may end in a wilderness; but we fancy\nourselves to have found an open path that to some\nreaders will seem at least in part new. And some\nof the prospects on that road may not be wholly\ndisheartening, even to the most exacting religious\nseeker. But all this is anticipation. First then:\nThe World as a theatre for the display of power,\nphysical or metaphysical. This is the World of\nDoubt.\n\nII.\n\nLet us begin our study of the powers that work\ntogether in the supposed external reality, by accepting\nfor a moment, without criticism, the notion of this\nsupposed external world from which scientific experience\nsets out. Let us say: there it is, an objective\nworld of moving matter, subject to certain laws. All\nthe powers are but manifestations or forms of\nmatter in motion. Planets revolve, comets come and go,\ntides swell and fall, clouds rise and rivers flow to the\nsea, lightning flashes, volcanoes are active, living\nbeings are born, live, and die, all exemplifying certain\nuniversal principles, that are discoverable by\nexperience, that are capable of being used to predict the\nfuture, and that are related to one another in such a way as to show us a vast connected whole, the natural\nuniverse. This matter however is dead; these\nlaws are ultimate given truths. We did not make\nthem, cannot see why just they and none other were\nfrom the beginning; we must accept them as they\nare. The whole world is a vast machine. A mind\npowerful enough might be possessed of the knowledge\nthat La Place, and, in our own generation. Prof.\nDu Bois Reymond, have so finely described as the\nscientific ideal. Such a mind might have an universal\nformula, in its possession, a key to the mysteries\nof the succession of phenomena. Such a being could\nthen, using this formula, calculate all events, as\nastronomers now predict eclipses. At every instant\nmultitudes of air pulsations quiver about us. These,\nin all their forms, our mind possessed of this universal\nformula, would have been able to predict ages\nago, just as certainly as you now can predict that the\nsun will rise to-morrow morning. All is predetermined:\nthe glitter of every ice crystal on your frozen\nwindow-panes on a winter morning, the quiver of\nevery muscle in the death agony of the fish that you\npull out of a mountain-stream, the falling of every\nyellow leaf in the autumn woods, \u2014 each of these\nevents could have been foreseen, mathematically\ncalculated, and fully described, by one able to use the\nuniversal formula, and possessed, myriads of aeons\nago, of an exact knowledge of the positions of the\natoms of the original nebula from which our great\nstellar system condensed. Such is the natural world.\n\nWhat religious aspect can this vast machine possess?\nWhat room is there for a higher element to be introduced into this mass of dead mathematical\nfacts? The answer of some representatives of\nscience in our day is well known to us. Whatever else\nis doubtful, say such men, there stands fast the great\nlaw of progress. Evolution in the physical world\nbecomes actual progress in the world of human life.\nThe world, under the influence of all these far-reaching\nlaws, is actually growing forever better. Thus\nnatural law agrees with morality. Thus there is a\nreligious aspect to the mechanical laws of the universe.\n\nLet us consider once more the law of progress.\nWe spoke of it in a previous chapter. There it did\nnot help us. For we wanted to agree upon the\nnature of morality. We were not helped towards such\nagreement by the knowledge that there is in the\nworld a physical evolution. For we could not tell\nwhat ought to be, merely by considering what is.\nWe had first to agree upon a moral law, before we\ncould decide whether evolution is actually progress.\nBut now, perhaps, we can make use of the law of\nevolution to aid our inquiry into the religious aspect\nof reality. For now, having defined what the good\nis, we may estimate whether the world is growing\ntoward the good. And if the world is morally\nprogressing, then one great demand of the religious\nconsciousness is fulfilled. Then there is a power not\nourselves that works for righteousness. Or is this\nreally the consequence of the law of evolution?\n\nThe first answer is that if there is any tendency\nat work in the world that as time goes on more and\nmore helps men in their struggle towards morality,\nthis tendency is indeed, as far as it goes, what we want to find. And if such a tendency is found, as\nwe are told, in evolution, the result is in just so\nfar encouraging. Although the external world still\noften hinders moral growth, yet, we are told, as\nevolution reaches higher and higher stages, the world\ncomes to harmonize more and more with man\u2019s moral\ngrowth. This also seems to be what we seek. In\ntime morality will become a natural product of early\nchildhood. Men will be born with characters that\nwe now seek in vain to develop by a life-time of\nlabor. Natural evolution, then, does help moral progress,\nand the world is more moral to-day than ever\nbefore. This then is to be the religious aspect of\nthe outer world. Does it contain enough of the truth\nof things to content us?\n\nWe are far from doubting the scientific worth of\nthe natural laws that have been discovered of late\nyears, and that have made so clear to us the great\ntruth of far-reaching physical evolution. But let us\nreflect before we accept these facts as furnishing any\ndeeply important contribution to our present\nproblem. We thoroughly believe in evolution; but we\nmust take, in these matters, a very high position.\nIf the world of powers apart from man is to have a\nreligious aspect, then this aspect must belong to this\nworld as a whole. A minor power for good is not\nenough. It will not suffice to find that one bit of\nreality fights for our moral needs while another bit\nof reality fights against them, unless we can in some\nway harmonize these conflicting aspects, or unless\nwe can show that they that be with us are not only\nmore important or significant than they that be against us, but are really the deepest truth of things.\nElse we shall be left face to face with a gloomy world\nof conflict, where the good and bad are mingled in\nhopeless confusion. If such a world is the fact, we\nmust accept that fact; but we cannot then say that\nwe have made sure of an answer to our religious\nneeds. Now suppose that in examining the world\nwe found two tendencies at work, equally\nfundamental, equally active, fairly balanced in power,\nproducing in the long run equally permanent, equally\ntransient results, but always in deadly antagonism to each\nother, the one making for moral goodness, the other\nfor moral evil. Suppose that the world appeared as\nthe theatre and the result of this struggle of the good\nand of the evil principles, could we say that we had\nfound in these facts a religious aspect of reality?\nWe should hardly answer in the affirmative. So\nlong as we must fix our minds on this struggle of\nequally balanced powers, we could not find the world\na religiously encouraging vision. We should either\nhave to regard the world in some other and higher\naspect, or we should have to give up regarding it as\nreligiously interesting. An answer to our moral\nneeds that is drowned by a hubbub of opposing\nnoises can be no harmonious song. Now we affirm\nthat so long as you look upon the world as a growth\nin time, as a product of natural forces, as an historical\ndevelopment, you can never make it certain, or\neven probable, that this world is not such a scene of\nendless warfare. Hence the progress that you may\nobserve can never overbalance the probability that\nthis progress is a transient and insignificant fact, in the midst of a chaos of confused tendencies.\nTherefore progress on this planet for a few thousands or\nmillions of years indicates nothing about any true\nharmony between nature and morality.\n\nLet us call attention to one aspect, well-known,\nyet often neglected in recent discussions of a few\nfamiliar facts. Modern science is justly sure of\nphysical evolution, but is no less sure that\nevolution on this planet is a process that began at a\nperiod distant by a finite and in fact by a not very\ngreat time from the present moment. That our\nplanet was a nebulous mass at a date at most\nsomewhere between twenty millions and one hundred\nmillions of years ago, we have all heard, and we have\nalso had explained to us some of the proofs of this\nfact. Our planet is still imperfectly cooled. At a\ncomparatively recent period in the history of this\nstellar universe, this little point of it was a spheroid\nof glowing vapor, from which the moon had not yet\nbeen separated. The present heat of the earth is an\nindication of its youth. Furthermore, what our\nplanet is to become in time, the moon itself tells us,\nhaving cooled, by reason of its small size, more\nrapidly than we have done. Cold and dead, waterless,\nvaporless, that little furrowed mass of rock\ndesolately rolls through its slow days, looking with\npassionless stare at our stormy, ardent earth, full of\nmotion and of suffering. What that mass is, our earth\nshall become. And progress here will cease with\nthe tides. All these are the commonplaces of\npopular science. Progress then, as we know it here, is\na fact of transient significance. Physical nature permits progress rather than renders it necessary.\nProgress is an incident of a certain thermal process,\na kind of episode in the history of the dissipation\nof the energy of our particular mass of matter, and\nthus, in so far as we yet know, a present occurrence\njust in our neighborhood, a local item in the news of\nthe universe. Now these are the familiar facts whose\nmeaning we want to enforce in an often neglected\naspect.\n\nBut, one says, all this has been anticipated\nhundreds of times. It is really unfair to insist upon\nsuch things. For at least here, at least now, the\nworld does realize our moral needs by showing us\nprogress. Is not this all that we need? May we\nnot be content with the few millions of years of\ngrowth that remain to our race before the earth\ngrows cold? Is it not foolish to look into futurity\nso curiously? What matters it whether chaos comes\nagain in far-off ages?\n\nBut we still insist. We desire, vainly or justly,\nyet ardently, that the world shall answer to our\nmoral needs not by accident, not by the way, not for\na time, but from its own nature and forever. If we\ncan see that present progress is an indication of the\nnature of the universe, that the present is a symbol\nor a specimen of eternity, we shall be content. But\nif this is not so, if present progress is seen to be a\nmere accident, an eddy in the stream of atoms, then\npresent progress is a pleasant fact to contemplate,\nbut not a fact of any deep significance. Still we\nshall be crying in the darkness for support and\nfinding none. For nature will say to each of us; \u201cI give support to thy moral needs so long as the\ntemperature of thy earth crust is high enough to prevent\nthy oceans from being absorbed, so long as the\nradiant heat of the sun is given out in sufficient\nquantities to keep thee warm. When the next stage is\nreached, I propose to freeze and to dry thy fair\nhome and all thy moral needs, until there shall be\nnothing found on thy planet lovelier than the ruined\ncrags of thy hills as they glimmer in the last red\nrays of a torpid sun. What is thy progress to me?\u201d\nNotice then where our real difficulty lies. The\naspect of the facts that we now mean is this. It is\nnot because progress is to endure on this planet for\na short or for a long time, but because the world in\nwhich this progress is so to end seems, thus\nregarded, wholly indifferent to progress, \u2014 this is the\ngloomy aspect. To-day, even while progress is so\nswift and sure, at this moment, we are living in a\nworld for which, as science displays it to us, this\nprogress is as indifferent and unessential as the\nfleeting hues of an evaporating soap-bubble. Is the\nphysical fact of progress, thus regarded, a moral\nhelp to us?\n\nYet men turn away from these plain and often-mentioned\nfacts to all sorts of fantastic dreams of a\ncoming golden age. They make of future humanity\na saintly people, living in devotion, or a merry\npeople, always dancing to waltzes yet undreamt of, or a\nscientific people, calculating by some higher algebra\nthe relative positions and motions of the molecules\nin the rocks on the other side of the moon. Every\ndream of progress is to be realized in that blessed time, and we are invited to praise a nature that\ncould produce all this blessedness by pure physical\nlaw. Now we must indeed wish well for the men of\nthe year a. d. 1,000,000, but we can receive no\nreligious support from the knowledge that if all goes\nright and if the sun keeps well at work, the men of\nthat time will be better than we are. For still the\nworld as a whole gives no support to our real moral\nneeds, for only by a happy accident will this\nblessedness be possible. Or, in short, two tendencies are\nseen before us in the world, one working for\nevolution, for concentration of energy in living beings,\nfor increase of their powers, for progress; the other\nfor dissipation of energy, for death, for the\ndestruction of all that is valuable on our earth. We learn\nthat the latter tendency has triumphed quite near\nus, on the moon. We hear that it is certain in\ntime to triumph on the earth, and that the other\ntendency is to be only of transient superiority. We\nknow that its present predominance here is,\nphysically speaking, a happy accident, which a cosmical\ncatastrophe might at any moment bring to an end.\nAnd now we are asked to see in this combination of\nfacts a religious aspect. For the writer\u2019s part, he\nrefuses to regard it as anything but an interesting\nstudy in physics. He delights in it as science, but\nit has nothing to do with religion. Yet some people\ntalk of a Religion of Evolution.\n\nBut no doubt believers in universal progress are\nready with hypotheses that shall show how\nsignificant a fact progress really is. A world that has\nprogressed so many millions of years doubtless has resources of which we know nothing. There are all\nthe stars with their vast stores of energy. Possibly\nthey are infinite in number. Progress ceasing just\nhere may flash out in renewed brilliancy elsewhere.\nWho knows what is in store for the future, when\nthe present seemingly chaotic arrangement of the\nstars gives way to vastly higher organized systems\nof interacting bodies, in whose light life shall flourish\neternally?\n\nWell, all this we can all fancy as well as our\nscientific neighbors. Nobody would call such dreams\nscientific, but they are logically possible dreams,\nand they are very beautiful. But they have one\nterrible negative consideration against them. This\nprogress is either conceived as having gone on\nthrough infinite past time, or else it has no genuine\nsignificance for the true nature of the universe. A\nworld that has now grown, now decayed, that has\nsometimes progressed, sometimes become worse, is a\nworld in which progress is an accident, not an essential\nfeature. But now, if progress has gone on\nthrough infinite time, it has so gone on as to make\npossible, after all this infinite time, just the misery\nand imperfection that we see about us. Let us\nremember that fact. This poor life of ours is in the\nsupposed case the outcome of infinite ages of growth.\nThat must be our hypothesis, if we are to cling to\nprogress as an essential truth about the world. Very\nwell then, all our temptations, all our weakness, our\nmisery, our ignorance \u2014 the infinite past ages have\nended in fashioning them. Our diseases, our fears,\nand our sins \u2014 are they perfect\u00a0? If not, then what is the meaning of endless progress toward perfection? For we are an outcome of this infinite progress. Another infinity of progress is not certain then to remove such imperfections. Here is progress put to the simple test. Is it the removal of evil? Then can infinite progress, as facts show us, pass by with evil yet unremoved. And if progress is not the removal of evil, then what means progress? Is not the temporary removal of evil more probably a mere occasional event in the history of the world?\n\nIt is surprising that we ever think of talking about universal progress as an essential fact of the popularly conceived external world. If nothing certain can be made out about it, still the world as a whole seems, as far as we can judge by the above considerations, so indifferent to progress, that it is marvelous to behold the religious comfort that, in their shallow optimistic faith, so many amiable people take, while they wax fervent over the thought of progress. Let us have clear ideas about the matter. What is in the true nature of reality is as eternal as reality itself. Then progress is either an unessential, insignificant aspect of reality, or it is eternal. If progress has been eternal, then either the world was in the beginning infinitely bad, or else infinite progress has been unable to remove from the world the finite quantity of evil that was always in it. For here in the empirical world is evil now\u2014if indeed there is any empirical world at all\u2014plenty of evil unremoved.\n\nIf you found a man shoveling sand on the seashore, and wheeling it away to make an embankment, and if you began to admire his industry, seeing how considerable a mass of sand he had wheeled away, and how little remained in the sand-hill on which he was working, you might still check yourself to ask him: \"How long, O friend, hast thou been at work?\" And if he answered that he had been wheeling away there from all eternity, and was in fact an essential feature of the universe, you would not only inwardly marvel at his mendacity, but you would be moved to say: \"So be it, O friend, but thou must then have been from all eternity an infinitely lazy fellow.\" Might we not venture to suspect the same of our law of universal physical progress?\n\nBut let us already hint by anticipation one further thought. Why is not any purely historical view of the world open to the same objection? If the history began by some arbitrary act of will at some time not very long since, then this history, viewed by itself apart from the creative act, may be intelligible enough in its inner unity and significance, although an arbitrary act of will can be no true explanation. But the whole physical world cannot be regarded at once as a complete, self-existent whole, with an eternity of past life, and as, in its deepest truth, an historical process of any sort. For it is of the essence of an intelligible historical process to have, like a tragedy in Aristotle's famous account of tragedy, a beginning, a middle, and an end. An infinite series of successive acts cannot be one organic historical process. Either this everlasting series of facts has no significance at all, or else it must have had essentially the same significance all the way\nalong. So, if the world is infinite in time, it\ncannot as a whole have, strictly speaking, any history.\nThe longest continued story in the most thrilling of\nthe cheap weeklies reaches, as we are given to\nunderstand, a conclusion at some time. Imagine an\ninfinite continued story, with the poor lovers\neternally weeping and quarreling, and you will see what\nan infinite historical process in the world would\nmean. It would of course be an eternal repetition\nof the same thing, no story at all. If the world,\nregarded in time, cannot as a whole have any genuine\nhistory at all, it is then hopeless to look in the\nworld\u2019s history, as distinct from the world\u2019s nature,\nfor anything of fundamental religious significance.\n\nAnd so we are thrown back to our starting-point.\nThis splendid conception of science, this world of\nunalterable mechanical law, in which all things that\nhappen are predetermined from all eternity, this\nmathematical machine, has a real history no more\nthan the ebbing and flowing sea-tides would have\nfrom day to day any history, apart from the fact\nthat they once did not so ebb and flow at all.\nEternally repeated rhythms, or ceaseless new\ncombinations of elements, clash of atoms, quiver of ether\nwaves, mechanical changes forever; but no eternal\nprogress, no historical sense to the whole, \u2014 that\nseems the conception of the physical world as a\nwhole to which we are driven. It is a strictly\nmathematical, a physically intelligible, conception, but\nwhat religious significance has it? Yet such is the\nconception that we must have of any eternal\nphysical process.\n\nWe have gone through this thorny path of\nproblems, because we want already to indicate one thing\nas the result of it all, namely, that not what the\npresent world has come from, not what it is\nbecoming, not what it will be by and by, but what it\neternally is, must furnish us with the deepest religious\naspect of reality. All else is subordinate. We do\nnot care so much to know what story anybody has\nto tell us about what has happened in the world, as\nto know what of moral worth always is in the world,\nso that whatever has happened or will happen may\npossess a religious significance dependent on its\nrelation to this reality. That which changes not, wherein\nis no variableness, neither shadow of turning, that\nmust give us the real religious truth upon which all\nelse will depend. A particular event in the world\nmay have a religious significance, but that\nsignificance will depend on the relation of this event to\neternal truth. And the eternal truth is what we\nwant to know.\n\nTherefore our search will become somewhat\nnarrowed, whenever at least we grow fully convinced of\nthis truth. The \u201cpower that makes for righteousness\u201d\nwill become a conception of doubtful religious\nvalue. An eternal power, that with all its past\neternity of work cannot yet quite vindicate\nrighteousness? Perhaps we shall have to find the\nreligious aspect of things elsewhere. But let us leave, at\nall events, the world of pure science.\n\nAs we do so some objector may interpose the\nassertion that we have generalized too hastily in speak-\ning of the insignificance of the historical aspect of things; for, after all, we have been talking of\nnatural science. Let us turn then to the more\nphilosophical theories of the powers that are at work in\nthis supposed external world of metaphysics. There\nare philosophical theories that try to show us of what\nhidden reality this mechanical world of ours is the\nmere appearance, or phenomenal symbol. Let us\nsee if any of them can give a religious interpretation\nto the powers that rule the world.\n\nIII.\n\nWe pass, then, from the scientific to the more\nmetaphysical view of the world. What can we hope\nfrom realistic metaphysics? Let us first consider\nthe value of that philosophic view nowadays most\nfrequently held, namely, what in general is called\nMonism. We hear nowadays, with almost wearisome\nrepetition, of Matter and Spirit, of Force and\nIntelligence, of Motion and Sensation, as being\nopposite aspects, or faces, or manifestations, of one\nultimate Reality, until we wonder whether clear\nthinking is not in danger of losing itself altogether in\nthe contemplation of a mere empty form of words.\nFrom whispers and low mutterings with bated breath\nabout the inscrutable mystery of the ultimate unity\nof Being, one turns with satisfaction to efforts\ntowards some intelligible account of the sense in which\nall things can be regarded as manifestations of one\nPower or actual Existent. Yet in truth even these\nefforts, in so far as they consider the world of the\nPowers, have thus far failed to satisfy the demands of criticism. Where they are clearly stated they are\ninadequate. Where they resort to figures of speech\nand tell us about the two sides of the shield, or the\nconvexity and concavity of the same curve, as\nillustrations of the ultimate oneness of nature amid the\nvarious manifestations of experience, there these\nefforts merely sink back into the primitive incoherency\nso dear to all pre-Kantian metaphysics. The same\ncurve is, indeed, convex and concave; but matter\nand spirit are simply not the two faces of a curve,\nand the relevant circumstance on which this\nmetaphor turns will never be clear to us until we learn,\nquite literally, wholly apart from fables about shields,\njust how, in what sense, and by what evidence,\nmatter and mind are known to be of like substance.\nAnd that we must do, ere this hypothesis can have\nfor us a religious value. The failure of dogmatic\nMonism, if it should take place, ought, indeed, not\nto throw us over into the arms of an equally\ndogmatic Dualism; but we must refuse to accept the\nmonistic hypothesis until it has been freed from all\ntrace of mysticism. We shall here follow the plan\nannounced at the outset of the chapter, and confine\nour attention to the realistic Monism, that regards\nthe events in the external world as the results of the\naction of the one Power. A very different form of\nmonism we shall ourselves hereafter maintain. But\njust now we deal in negations.\n\nLet us begin with the attempts that have been\nmade to interpret the results of modern physical\nscience in a monistic sense, by regarding the ultimate\nphysical or chemical units as endowed with some form of actual or potential consciousness.\nOrganisms of the highest sort are combinations of atoms.\nThe whole is the sum of its parts. Why may not\nthe mental possessions of these highest organisms\nbe the sum of the indefinitely small mental powers\nof the atoms? An atom in motion may be a thought,\nor, if that bo saying far too much of so simple a\nthing, an atom in motion may be, or may be endowed\nwith, an infinitesimal consciousness. Billions of\natoms in interaction may have as their resultant quite\na respectable little consciousness. Sufficiently\ncomplex groups of these atoms of Mind-Stuff (to use\nProfessor Clifford\u2019s ingenious terminology) might\nproduce a great man. One shudders to think of the\nbase uses to which the noble mind-stuff of\nShakespeare might return; but the theory tries to be an\nexpression of natural phenomena, not merely an\n\u00e6sthetic creation, and must not pause before such\nconsequences. And, if it be the truth, might it not\nsomehow, no matter in what way, be made of\nreligious value? Or otherwise, if true, might it not end\nour vain search for a religion?\n\nSuch is an outline that will suggest to the initiated\nthoughts common to several modern theories of\nbeing. Are these theories in a fair way to satisfy\ncritical needs? The writer is not satisfied that they\nare. Time does not permit any lengthy discussion\nof the matter here, but let us remind ourselves of the\nconsiderations that will most readily occur to any\none that is disposed for a moment to accept one of\nthese modern forms of monism. Even if they\npromised us the religious aspect that we seek, we could\nnot accept them. As it is, we need not fear them.\n\nCan our consciousness be regarded as an\naggregate of elementary facts, such as sensations or as\natoms of pleasure and pain? If so, what aggregate\nof sensations forms a judgment, such as, \u201cThis man\nis my father?\u201d Evidently here is indeed an aggregate\nof sensations represented, but also something\nmore. What is this more? A product, it may be\nsaid, formed through association from innumerable\npast experiences. Granted for the moment; but the\nquestion is not as to the origin of this consciousness,\nbut as to its analysis. This judgment, whereby a\npresent sensation is regarded as in definite relation\nto real past experiences, as a symbol, not merely of\nactual sensations now remembered, not merely of\nfuture sensations not yet experienced, but of a reality\nwholly outside of the individual consciousness, this\nfact of acknowledging something not directly\npresented as nevertheless real \u2014 is this act possibly to\nbe regarded as a mere aggregate of elementary mental\nstates? Surely, at best, the act can be so regarded\nonly in the sense in which a word is an\naggregate of letters. For and in the one simple\nmomentary consciousness, all these elements exist as\nan aggregate, but as an aggregate formed into one\nwhole, as the matter of a single act. But in\nthemselves, without the very act of unity in which they\nare one, these elements would be merely an aggregate,\nor, in Mr. Gurney\u2019s apt words, \u201ca rope of\nsand.\u201d Our mental life then, as a union of innumerable\nelements into the one Self of any moment, is\nmore than an aggregate, and can never be explained\nas an aggregate of elementary atoms of sensation. Nor may we say that the ultimate atomic states of\nconsciousness may be, as it were, chemically united\ninto a whole that is more than an aggregate.\nPhysical atoms in space, if endowed with sufficiently\nnumerous affinities, may unite into what wholes you\nwill; but a mental fact is a mental fact, and no\nmore. An ultimate independent unit of consciousness,\nconceived after the analogy of a sensation, can\nhave to another like unit only one of three relations;\nit may coexist with this other unit, or it may\nprecede or follow it in time. There is no other relation\npossible. Affinity, or attraction, or approach of one\npain or pleasure, of one sensation of pressure or of\nmotion to another, is a meaningless jingle of words,\nunless, indeed, such an expression is used to name\nfiguratively the relations that in and for a comparing,\ncontrasting, uniting, and separating active\nconsciousness, two ideas are made to bear. Thus, then,\nthis atomic monism brings us no nearer than before\nto the relation between the data of consciousness and\nthe facts of physical nature. For the rest, how\nmechanical science can be satisfied to regard its\nmaterial points as nothing but independently existing\nfragments of mind, whose whole being is intensive;\nhow, out of these intensive units, space-relations are\nto be constructed at all \u2014 these questions we may\nfor the present neglect. Atomic monism, a synthesis,\nor, rather, a jumble of physiological psychology\nwith doctrines that are incompatible with any\nscience whatever, has never answered these questions,\nand doubtless never will.\n\nBut let us not be over-hasty. There are other forms of monism now extant. The purely materialistic\nmonism, for which the hard and extended atoms\nof naive realism are already and in themselves\npotentially mind, the old-fashioned materialism of days\nwhen Mind-Stuff and physiological psychology were\nalike undreamed of, may indeed be neglected.\nThat doctrine needed not critical philosophy, of more\nthan a very undeveloped sort, to do away with it\nonce for all. Modern monism knows of supposed\natoms that are in their ultimate nature psychical;\nand of supposed psychical forces or agents that, when\nseen from without, behave much like extended atoms.\nBut the old fragment of matter that, being no more\nthan what every blacksmith knows as matter, was\nyet to be with all its impenetrability and its inertia\na piece of the soul, has been banished from the talk\nof serious philosophers. There remain, then, the\nnumerous efforts that see in the world the expression\nof psychical powers as such, not mere mind-stuff\natoms, but organized wholes, related in nature to\nwhat we know by internal experience as mind, yet\nhigher or lower, subtler or mightier, wiser or more\nfoolish, than the human intelligence. These views\nmay be divided into two classes: those that see in\nnature the manifestations of a logical or intelligent\npower, and those that see in it the manifestations of\nan alogical or blind, though still psychical power.\nEach of these classes again may be subdivided\naccording as the power is conceived as conscious or as\nunconscious in its working. How do these ontological\nefforts stand related to critical thought?\n\nFirst let us consider logical monism. Since human intelligence is itself an activity, a working\ntowards an end, and since the logical monist thinks\nthe external universe after the analogy of the human\nreason, the constant tendency is for him to conceive\nthe world as a process whereby his World Spirit\nmakes actual what was potential. Modern science,\nin fact, when viewed speculatively, though it does not\nconfirm, yet lends itself easily to such efforts, and\nwe can always, if we choose, imagine the evolution\nof the organic kingdom as possibly the process of\nself-manifestation of one eternal rational Power.\nOnly in this way we are very far from a satisfactory\nontology. A world, the work or the child of the\nuniversal reason, developing in time, how can any\nreflective mind be content with this account of things?\nThe universal reason surely means something by its\nprocess, surely lacks something when it seeks for\nhigher forms. Now, on a lower stage the universal\nreason has not yet what it seeks, on the higher stage\nit attains what it had not. Whence or how does it\nobtain this something? What hindered the possible\nfrom being forthwith actual at the outset? If there\nwas any hindrance, was this of the same nature with\nthe universal reason, or was it other? If other,\nthen we are plunged into a Dualism, and the good\nand evil principles appear once more. But if there\nwas no external hindrance, no illogical evil principle\nin existence, then the universal reason has irrationally\ngone without the possible perfection that it\nmight possess, until, after great labor, it has made\nactual what it never ought to have lacked. The\ninfinite Logos thus becomes no more than the \u201cchild playing with bubbles\u201d of the old philosopher.\nEverything about the process of evolution becomes\nintelligible and full of purpose \u2014 except the fact\nthat there should be any process at all where all was\nin, and of, and for the universal reason at the outset.\nThe infinite power has been playing with perfection\nas a cat with a mouse, letting it run away a few\naeons in time, that it might be caught once more in a\nlittle chase, involving the history of some millions of\nworlds of life. Is this a worthy conception? Nay,\nis it not a self-contradictory one? Evolution and\ncreative Reason \u2014 are they compatible? Yes,\nindeed, when the evolution is ended, the hurly-burly\ndone, the battle lost and won; but meanwhile \u2014\u00a0?\nIn short, either evolution is a necessity, one of the\ntwelve labors of this Hercules-Absolute, or else it is\nirrational. In the one case the Absolute must be\nconceived as in bonds, in the other case the Logos\nmust be conceived as blundering. Both conceptions\nare rank nonsense. This kind of Monism will not\nsatisfy critical demands.\n\nAnd then there is the objection, stated by\nSchopenhauer, and by we know not how many before\nhim, and that we have already insisted upon, namely,\nthat every historical conception of the world as a\nwhole, every attempt to look upon Being as a\nrational process in time, as a perpetual evolution from\na lower to a higher, is beset by the difficulty that\nafter an infinite time the infinite process is still in\na very early stage. Infinitely progressing, always\ngrowing better, and yet reaching after all this\neternity of work only the incoherent, troublous, blind imperfection that we feel in ourselves, and that we\nsee in every dung-heap and sick-room and government\non the earth, in every scattered mass of nebulous\nmatter, in every train of meteor-fragments in\nthe heavens \u2014 what is this but progress without a\ngoal, blind toil? The world would be, one might\nthink, after an infinity of growth, intensively\ninfinite at every point of its extent. We mortals see\nno one point in the physical universe where one\nviewing things as we in this chapter have chosen to\ndo, namely, from outside, might lay his hand and\nsay: Here the ideal is attained.\n\nYet we should be very far from dreaming of\naccepting the opposing dogmatic theorem, the antithesis\nof this sublime Antinomy, namely, \u201cThe world\nis the product of an irrational force. The One is\nblind.\u201d Schopenhauer undertook the defense of\nthis antithesis, and, in bad logic, as we all know, he\nsomewhat surpassed even that arch blunderer, the\nuniversal Will of his own system. This Will, after\nall, desired a good deal of trouble, and got his wish.\nBut Schopenhauer desired a consistent statement,\nand, with all his admirable ingenuity and learning,\nhe produced a statement whose inconsistencies have\nbeen exposed too often to need much more discussion.\nNo; to the defenders of the alogical hypothesis,\nas a dogmatic doctrine, it has not yet been\ngiven to make out more than the purely negative\ncase that we have stated above. Dogmatic\npanlogism can be assaulted, with much show of success.\nThe opposite doctrine has not yet been dogmatically\nmaintained without even worse confusion. Panlogism and Alogism are difficult enough in\nthemselves, but how much worse becomes their\ncondition when, as in the \u201cPhilosophy of the Unconscious,\u201d\nof Von Hartmann, either one of them, or a\nhybrid of the two, is burdened with yet another\nhypothesis, namely, that the One Being is unconscious,\nand yet in nature psychical. Founding himself on\ncertain physiological facts, very doubtfully\ninterpreted, on a monstrous perversion of the\nmathematical theory of probabilities, on an ingenious view of\nthe history of philosophy, on a like ingenious\ncriticism of Kant, Von Hartmann has expounded an\nontological doctrine of which, after all, serious thought\ncan make nothing. This unconscious being, existent\nnot for itself, for it is conscious of nothing, nor\nfor others, because all else is a part of it (and, for\nthe rest, nobody ever thought of it before Von\nHartmann), shall be the maker and upholder of the\nuniverse. Surely all this is a philosophy of round\nsquares, and is not to be taken very seriously.\n\nOf course the previous criticism is absurdly\ninadequate to the magnitude of the problems involved,\nand is intended only as the merest sketch,\ndogmatically stated, of critical objections to certain\nontologies. Seeming irreverence, in this hasty style of\ndoing battle, must be pardoned. Only against\nimperfect metaphysic as such do we war. Critical\nphilosophy holds no theoretical opinion sacred, just\nas it regards no earnest practical faith as other than\nsacred. The question is here not yet what we are\nto believe, but what we can in argument maintain,\nand what our method of search ought to be. Absolute and Infinite, Logos and not Logos, Mind-Stuff\nand Spirit \u2014 what are they all for critical philosophy,\nbut, in the first place, mere ideas, conceptions\nof reason, to be mercilessly analyzed without regard\nfor consequences?\n\nOne way remains whereby this realistic monism\ncan still hope to reach a satisfactory statement of the\nworld-problem. Suppose that, once for all, the\nhistorical form of statement is abandoned, while the\nnotion of the Reason as a power is retained. This may\nbe done in either of two ways. The universal reason\nmay be conceived as manifesting itself in time, but\nnot in a series of events that are united as the parts\nof a single process. The world-life may be conceived\nnot as a single history, but as an eternally repeated\nproduct of the One reason, a process ever renewed\nas soon as finished, an infinite series of growing and\ndecaying worlds \u2014 worlds that are like the leaves\nof the forest, that spring and wither through an\neternity of changing seasons. The rationality of the\nworld-process is thus saved for our thought by the\nhypothesis that reason is not like a belated traveler,\nwandering through the night of time, seeking for\na self-realization that is never reached, but, rather,\nlike the sun that each day begins afresh his old\ntask, rejoicing as a giant in the fullness of his\nattained power. Whoever regards the world as it now\nis as plainly a sufficient expression of infinite\nrational power, is at liberty to accept this hypothesis;\nbut he must prepare to answer those of his objectors\nto whom reason means perfection, and to whom\nthe world of sense will not appear as just at present\nmore perfect than the world of Candide\u2019s experiences. For every one but the blind optimist there\nis difficulty in regarding this wind-swept battle-field\nof human action as obviously and altogether a drama\nof unhindered infinite reason, to be repeated with\nunwearying tautology through an unending future.\nThus, then, we are tossed back and forth between\nthe possibilities suggested by our hypothesis.\n\u201cThe world is the manifestation of infinite reason;\u201d\ngood, then, but how? \u201cThe world is a rational\ngrowth from lower to higher.\u201d How, then, is this\npossible if the infinite reason rules all and desires\nthe higher? Was it not always at the goal? So,\nthen: \u201cThe world is not one process merely, but\nan eternal repetition of the drama of infinite reason,\nwhich, as infinite, is thus always active and always\nat the goal.\u201d But this hypothesis is seemingly\noverthrown by the appearance of the least imperfection\nor irrationality in nature. The first starving\nfamily, or singed moth, or broken troth, or wasted\neffort, or wounded bird, is an indictment of the\nuniversal reason, that, always at the goal, has wrought\nthis irrational wrong. The other possible\nhypothesis leaves us, after all, in the same quandary. Time\nmay be a mere \u201cmirage.\u201d For the eternal One\nthere is, then, no process; only fact. This notion\nof a timeless Being is, no doubt, very well worth\nstudy. But, then, the eternal One is thus always at\nthe goal, just as in the other case. The One, we\nshould think, cannot be infinite and rational and yet\nproductive of the least trace of wrong, absurdity,\nerror, falsehood. Again our Monism fails. For,\nafter all, the world has been viewed by us only from\nwithout; and so remains dark.\n\nIV.\n\nOur monism fails, namely, to establish itself on\nany ground of experience. Absolute refutation is\nindeed not yet thus attained, for the defender of\nthe hypothesis of an infinite reason always has at\nhis disposal the suggestions of the ancient theodicy,\nmodified to suit his needs. He can say: \u201cThe partial\nevil is, somehow, we cannot see how, universal\ngood.\u201d Or, again, \u201cEvil results from the free-will\nof moral agents, who have to suffer for their own\nchosen sins.\u201d The latter answer, a very plausible one\nin its own sphere, is for the general problem\ninsignificant. That there is free-will we do not dispute,\nand that free-will, if it exists, is a cause of much\nmischief is undoubted. Yet if the universe is so\nmade that the free-will of the slave-driver, or of the\nmurderer, or of the seducer, or of the conqueror,\nworks untold ill to innocent victims, then the fault\nof the suffering of the victims rests not wholly with\nthe evil-doer, but partly with the order of the world,\nwhich has given him so much power, such a wide\nfreedom to do the mischief that he desires. The\nworld in which such things happen must justify its\nreligiously inspiring nature in some other way.\n\nThe other answer, that partial evil is universal good,\nwe have to regard as a much deeper answer,\nshallow as have been the uses often made of it in the\npast. But if it is to be a valid answer, it must take\na particular form. The words are usually spoken\ntoo glibly. Their meaning, if they are to have any,\nwe must very carefully consider, ere we can dare to accept them. Only from a higher point of view\nshall we in fact be able to apply them. In the\nworld of the Powers they find no resting-place.\n\nHow can a partial evil be an universal good?\nOnly in certain cases. The notion plainly is that\nthe evil in the external world of popular thought\nis, as known to us, only a part of the whole, and\nthe whole, it is said, may be in character opposed to\nthe part. This must indeed be the case, if the world\nas a whole is to be the work of an Infinite Reason.\nFor if so, the evil must be, not merely a bad lesser\npart that is overbalanced by the goodness of the\nlarger half of the world, but non-existent, save as a\nseparate aspect of reality, so that it would vanish\nif we knew more about the truth. This is what the\nsaying asserts: not that evil is overbalanced by good\n(for that would leave the irrational still real), but\nthat evil is only a deceitful appearance, whose true\nnature, if seen in its entirety, would turn out to be\ngood. One could not say of a rotting apple, however\nsmall the rotten spot as yet is, that the partial\nrottenness is the universal soundness of the apple. If\nI have but one slight disorder in but one of my\norgans, still you cannot say that my partial disorder\nmust be universal health. The old optimists did not\nmean anything so contradictory as that. They meant\nthat there is no real evil at all; that what seems to\nme to be evil, say toothaches, and broken households,\nand pestilences, and treasons, and wars, all that\ntogether is but a grand illusion of my partial view.\nAs one looking over the surface of a statue with a\nmicroscope, and finding nothing but a stony surface, might say, how ugly! but on seeing the whole at a\nglance would know its beauty; even so one seeing\nthe world by bits fancies it evil, but would know it\nto be good if he saw it as a whole. And the seeming\nbut unreal evil of the parts may be necessary in\norder that the real whole should be good. Such is\nthe position of our optimists. This is the Platonic-Augustinian\ndoctrine of the unreality of evil.\n\nThe logical possibility of ail this we do not for the\nfirst either dispute or affirm. But we are dealing\nwith a world of difficulties, and we can only point\nout the antecedent difficulty of this theory. If the\nworld of experience simply lacked here and there\ninterest, or positive signs of rational perfection, then\none might well compare it to the statue, that seen\nonly piecemeal, and through a microscope applied\nto its surface, would wholly lack the beauty that\nappears when all is viewed at once. Then one might\nsay, with great plausibility, that if perceptible\nharmony is simply lacking to our partial view, the great\nwhole may still be a grand harmony. But the\ntrouble lies in the seemingly positive character of\nevil. Not simple lack of harmony, but horrible\ndiscord, is here. How the tortures of the wounded on\na field of battle can anyhow enter into a whole in\nwhich, as seen by an absolute judge, there is actually\nno trace of evil at all, this is what we cannot\nunderstand. It seems very improbable. Only absolute\nproof will satisfy us. And of course, as has been\nindicated, by some of our examples above, it is not\nthe quantity of any evil (if an evil be a quantity at\nall), but the quality of it, that makes us urge it in opposition to the claims of reason to be the ruler of\nall things. Any evil will do, if it seems to be a real\nand positive evil. For then it seems positively at\nwar with reason.\n\nActually, however, theodicies and kindred efforts,\nwhether monistic or not, in trying to vindicate the\nrational in the world have seldom consistently\nmaintained this high and slippery ground of the theory\nof Plato and of St. Augustine. Far from declaring\nthat all physical evil is and must be apparent, the\npopular theodicies have often consented to accept\nthe reality of this positive evil, and to minimize its\nsignificance by certain well-worn, and, for the\npurposes of this argument, contemptible devices. They\nhave pointed out that the evil in the world, though\na reality separate from the good, exists as a means to\ngood. Or, again, they have said that evil is\nnecessary as something outside of the good, setting it off\nby way of contrast. Both devices, if applied to a\nworld in which good and evil are conceived as\nseparate entities, are unworthy of philosophic thinkers.\n\nFor consider the first device. \u201cEvil is a reality,\nnot an illusion, but it is a means to good.\nTherefore in the world as a whole, good triumphs.\nTherefore reason, which desires the good, is the One\nRuler.\u201d But first, to mention a lesser objection,\nthe basis in experience for this view is surely very\nnarrow. Much evil exists whose use as a means we\ncannot even faintly conceive. But grant this point.\nThen the real evil is a means to a separate and\nexternal good end. But if the end was good, why was\nit not got without the evil means? Only two answers are possible to this, in case the evil is separate from\nthe good. Either the One Reason was driven to\ntake just this way, and could take no less expensive\none; or the One Reason, not being bound to this\nroad, still arbitrarily chose to take it instead of a\nbetter. But either answer is fatal. Was the One\nReason unable to do better? Then it is not the only\npower at work. The Monism fails. The Reason\nwas bound. But he who binds the strong man is\nstronger than he. If, however, the One chose this\nway rather than a better, then the One chose evil for\nits own sake. The dilemma is inevitable.\n\nTo exemplify: If pain is an evil, and if the evil\nof the pain caused you by a burn, or cut, or bruise\nis justified by saying that all-wise nature makes your\nskin sensitive to the end that you may be helped in\nkeeping it whole; then the obvious answer is, that\nif nature is all-wise and all-powerful and benevolent\ntowards you, it was her business to find a way of\nkeeping your skin in general whole, without\nentailing upon you the tortures of this present injury. If\na machine that we make runs poorly, we are not\ndisposed to blame ourselves, in case we are sure that\nwe have done our very best with it. But the\nmachines of all-wise nature must not run with\ndestructive friction, unless all-wise nature intends\ndestructive friction. The same remark applies to all the\neloquent speeches about the educative value of our\nsufferings. If nature could make us perfect without\nsuffering, and if suffering is not itself an organic\npart of our perfection, but only an external means\nthereto, then it was nature\u2019s rational business to develop us differently. But if nature could not perfect\nour characters save through this imperfect means,\nthen nature\u2019s means were limited. Nature was not\nall-powerful. Reason had some irrational power\nbeyond it that it could not conquer. Even so we\ncannot yet run certain engines without smoke. When\nwe are more civilized, we shall abolish smoke,\nbecause we shall get more power over the processes of\ncombustion. At present, by this hypothesis, nature\ncan only make characters perfect through suffering,\nthis smoke of the engine of life. So much the worse\nfor nature, unless indeed, in some unknown way,\nsuffering is really no true evil at all, but itself a\nperfection that, if seen from above, would become\nplainly universal good. And does that as yet look\nprobable?\n\nEven worse is the other device often suggested\nfor explaining evil. \u201cEvil is a reality, but it is\nuseful as a foil to good. The two separate facts, good\nand evil, set each other off. By its contrast, evil\nincreases the importance of good.\u201d When this\nremark is made about us personally with our\nlimitations of body and circumstance, with our relativity\nof feeling and of attention, the remark has some\npsychological interest. Made to justify the supposed\nuniversal reason, the remark is childish. Always,\nindeed, it is possible that evil as a separate entity\nmay be made out to be an illusion; and that good\nand evil have some higher unity that involves the\nperfection of the world. But if evil is real, and\nseparate from goodness, then the talk about explaining\nit as a useful contrast is of no worth in the present argument. For we ask: Could not the One create\na perfect good save by making good more attractive\nas set off against the foil evil? Shall we say that\nReason could do better than to depend upon this\ncontrast? Then why the evil? If, however, the\nOne Reason could not do better, but had to use the\ncontrast, then the One was less powerful in its\ndevices than is the maker of a concert-programme,\nwho has no need to introduce into his concert any\nsaw-filing or tin-trumpeting or pot-scraping to set off\nthe beauty of his songs and symphonies. But as a\nfact of experience, is most evil seemingly even thus\nuseful? Are the sick needed to make the healthy\njoyous? Was Judas necessary in order that Jesus\nshould show himself wholly good? Tradition, in\nthis latter case, says yes, and adds the mystical\nspeech about the need that the offense should come.\nBut what enlightened man nowadays will have it\nthat, supposing good and evil to be separate facts,\nthere can be logically possible nothing thoroughly\ngood, in case some of this evil were removed? Could\nnot Jesus have been what he was without Judas?\nOne doubts here the fact of the necessity of the evil,\neven in our own little lives; and one is indignant\nat the trifling that supposes so weak a device as\nmere external contrast to be the sole device at the\ndisposal of the One Reason. Yet this weak\nhypothesis of good and evil as externally contrasting\nseparate entities is, after all, provokingly near in form\nto what we shall hold to be the true solution of the\ngreat problem. But that solution is still far away\nfrom us and from this world of sense. Thus far, then, monism seems, if not an impossible,\nstill a decidedly doubtful, view of the world.\nIts value as furnishing religious support seems small.\nWe cannot yet by experience prove that the rational\npower is supreme in the world; and we fail to make\nclear to ourselves a priori how it should be supreme.\nSo far we remain agnostics. Our only escape would\nseem to be through the still doubtful doctrine of the\nunreality of Evil. And that way seems very dark.\n\nV.\n\nDualistic Theism here confronts us, the doctrine\nin which the wise of so many ages have found so\nmuch support, the doctrine of a Father, separate\nfrom the world of created finite beings, who directs\nall things, pities and loves his children, and judges\nwith supreme truthfulness all human acts. The\nreligious value of this doctrine, on one side at least,\nnobody can possibly question. The Father, as Jesus\nconceives him, has in a very high sense the character\nthat we desire to find in reality. To be sure,\nthere is the other side. This God of the dualistic\nview is seemingly limited. As a Father pitieth his\nchildren, so this God pitieth. But this pity seems to\nbe the love of one who yet cannot or will not save\nus from all our evil. And if the evil is a reality,\nand is meant to work for our good, still there is the\nunanswerable objection that if the Father is not\nbound by an irrational power beyond him, he need\nnot have put us into so evil a state, but might have\nwrought us our good in some less painful and dangerous way. In fact, the only plausible explanation\nof real evil, in case there is separate evil in the\nworld, an explanation which shall yet be consistent\nwith the Father\u2019s power and goodness, is the\npreviously mentioned explanation, that, if beings were\ncreated, as we are, free, they must needs be also\nfree to choose the evil. But this explanation only\nserves to explain the evil that has directly resulted\nfrom free choice, that directly affects those who\nmade the choice, and that was distinctly foreseen\nby them when they chose it. No other evil is\njustifiable as a result of free-will; all other evil seems\nabsolutely mysterious, when viewed with reference\nto God\u2019s goodness; and very little of the evil that\nwe experience in this world is the direct result of\nthe deliberate choice of those who suffer it. It is\nhardly necessary to illustrate these facts, which, like\nthe most of the present chapter, belong to the best-known\nand most frequently misrepresented of the\nmatters of human controversy. The poor of great\ncities, the men who inherit loathsome diseases, the\nnaturally weak of will, the insane, the sufferers in\naccidents, the soldiers led to slaughter, the slaves,\nthe down-trodden peasants and laborers of the world:\nall these, whose ills are simply inconceivable in\nmight, have no more brought all this on themselves\nof their own free-will, than have the healthy and\nhappy, the heirs of wealth, the ever-joyous, earned\nfor themselves the good fortune to which they are\nborn. A man can do much with and for himself;\nbut the best part of him, and commonly of his\nenvironment, is determined by birth. And for most of that \u201cwith which the face of man is blackened,\u201d the\npower is thus responsible which no free-will of man\nhas made. This evil must either be an organic\nelement in a real higher perfect unity of the world, or\nelse free-will is no explanation or justification for its\nexistence.\n\nBut really, the intelligent reader needs, when we\nget to this most familiar part of our discussion, no\nvery lengthy repetition of the old story. His mind\nis doubtless made up already, and he will desire only\na brief reminder of the chief points that have to do\nwith this question and with those questions most\nnearly related thereto.\n\nIf, then, the doctrine of God\u2019s Fatherhood is to\nbe religiously useful to us, we must make up our\nminds whether the Father that we seek is to be the\nomnipotent Ruler of things, or only a limited Power,\nor again, something else that is not power. In the\nlast mentioned case, he belongs to that aspect of the\nworld which we just now purposely exclude from\nconsideration. If the Father is a Power, then we\nall know the old but eternally fresh dilemma about\nhis nature. He is either infinite or limited. If he\nis infinite, we find arising all the difficulties just\nsuggested in our consideration of the hypothesis of an\nInfinite Reason, and one other difficulty, worse, if\nanything, than they all. That difficulty we shall\nmention soon again. But if, on the other hand, the\nFather is to be conceived as a limited power, if we\nare to accept some sort of modern Manicheanism,\nthen no a priori disproof of the possibility of the\nhypothesis can be offered; since, a priori. any finite power you please is a possibility; but our great\ntrouble will then lie in the fact that only experience\ncan establish such an hypothesis, which by its very\nnature needs a posteriori proof. And experience,\nas summed up in science, has in fact simply no need\nof that hypothesis. Hence we shall be left\naltogether in doubt, at least while we study the World\nas Power.\n\nSuch is the argument in its most general\nstatement. Now as to the points in greater detail. The\ngreat difficulty mentioned above as lying in the way\nof the hypothesis of an infinite creative power is a\ndifficulty in the conception of creation itself.\nCreation, for the popular conception, certainly involves\nproducing a thing of some kind by a creative act,\nthe thing produced existing forthwith outside of the\ncreator. To give up this separation of creator and\nproduct is to become pantheistic. And with monism\nwe are not here concerned. But now the idea of\nan infinite creative Power outside of his products\ninvolves more than one difficulty. We shall not\ndwell on the old difficulty that this infinite Power\nwould become finite as soon as there was in existence\nsomething outside of it. We shall proceed at once\nto a more fruitful and serious difficulty, which we\nfind in the fact that the concept of producing an\nexternal thing involves, of necessity, a relation to a\nLaw, above both producer and product, which\ndetermines the conditions under which there can be\na product at all. The creative power must then\nwork under conditions, however magical and\nmysterious its acts may be. And working under conditions, it must be finite. No device for minimizing\nthe meaning of this separation of creative power and\ncreated thing will really escape the difficulty\nresulting. And this difficulty will appear in all cases\nof supposed creation. It may be summed up once\nmore in the statement that any creative power in act,\njust as much needs explanation in some higher law\nand power as does the thing created itself, so that\nwhatever creates a product external to itself becomes\nthereby as truly dependent a power as we ourselves\nare. Let us exemplify.\n\n\u201cLet there he light,\u201d shall represent a creative\nact. If the light that results is simply a fact in God,\nthen our difficulty is avoided, but the very\nconception of a power creating anything external to itself\nis abandoned. Then one becomes frankly\npantheistic, and identifies all things with the creative power.\nBut if the light is not the creative act, but\nseparate from it, then you have an insurmountable\ndifficulty in the conception. For the power that makes\nthe fiat is not itself the created thing, but, as it were,\nthis power finds the product as a result of the fiat,\nGod saying. Fiat lux, finds that this act, this word,\nor whatever process it symbolizes as actually\nhappening in the divine mind, is followed by the external\nappearance of something, namely, light. Now as\ncreator of light, God is not yet conceived as the\ncreator of those conditions under which just this\nfiat could be followed by just these consequences.\nBut the external success of the fiat presupposes\nexternal conditions under which the fiat can succeed.\nJust as when I say, \u201clet there be light,\u201d and produce it by my own fiat plus the necessary physical\nacts, even so the conceived Deity in the conceived\ncase, though needing no other means save his fiat,\nhas yet needed that, and has found his fiat a\nsufficient cause of this external change from darkness to\nlight. But just as my success in making light needs\nexplanation by the laws of an external world, so\nGod\u2019s success in making it also needs explanation, in\nthe case thus conceived, although his means are\nsupposed to have been less complex than mine have to\nbe. He too is put by this conception in a world of\nlaw external to himself, the laws of this world being\nsuch as require that, in order to produce light as an\nexternal fact he shall perform a certain act, the fiat.\nThese laws secure him success, in the supposed case,\nunder just these conditions. The fiat may itself be\nwhatever process you will.\n\nBut how then did these conditions arise? How\nis it that God is able to make light as an existence\nexternal to himself? The external conditions on\nwhich his present success depends may indeed have\nbeen again created by himself. Even so a man could\nnow possibly make some ingenious mechanism, com-\npounded of telephones and what else you will, so as\nto be able to light a whole building by the impulse\nproduced by some very simple act, e.g., by speaking\nthe words, \u201cLet there be light,\u201d against some\nprepared membrane. But then we are involved in just\nthe same difficulties. As the man\u2019s mechanical skill\nwould imply a conformity to laws of nature\npreceding his present power to make light by the word of\nhis mouth, even so, if God\u2019s creative power has previously created the conditions of the success of this\nhis present fiat, the same questions would arise about\nthose conditions, and so on ad infinitum. Always\neven the infinite series of acts would imply, at every\nstep of the regress, God working upon a nature\nexternal to himself, and so God as a finite power,\nsubject to the laws that let him work.\n\nBut then may we not hereupon accept the doctrine\nof God's infinity, and say that this infinite power is\nidentical with its products? Shall we not be\npantheists of the old-fashioned sort, and yet keep the\ndoctrine of God\u2019s Fatherhood? The attempt is\nhopeless. And the difficulties in the way of the religious\nuse of the pantheistic hypotheses have already been\nconsidered. Furthermore, many theistic thinkers\nhave felt the force of an old set of arguments that,\nin this country and recently. Professor Bowne, in his\n\u201cMetaphysics,\u201d has more than once set forth at\nlength, namely, the thought that, if God can be as\nCreator identical with his other creations, he cannot\nas a Power well be identical with us, who feel\nourselves to be also creative powers, and not mere forms\nor acts in any other power. But if we are separate\nfrom God, then in this class of cases his creation of\nus involves all the difficulties before pointed out.\nWhen he made us, his fiat was successful beyond\nhimself. The success needs a preexistent law, or, if\nyou will, a pre\u00ebxistent power outside of him, to\nexplain it; just exactly as my power to move my hand\nor to wink my eye implies a whole universe of being\noutside of me in order to give my will just this\nposition of authority. Merely assume in your thought these conceptions, namely, a power that acts and an\nexternal product resulting from its acts; and at once\nyou need a higher power and a higher law, external\nto the first power, to explain how the first power,\nacting in just this way, could achieve just this\nexternal result. Hence either God creates nothing\nexternal to himself, or else, in creating, he works under\nthe laws that presuppose a power higher than\nhimself, and external to himself. In the briefest form:\nActs that produce external changes imply\nadjustment of means to ends. The creation of external\nthings is such an act. Unless an actor is identical\nwith the product itself, he must therefore be subject\nto the external conditions of adjustment, i.e., he\nmust be finite.\n\nCertain thinkers are accustomed to suppose that\nthey honor God by having obscure and self-contradictory\nideas about him. Hence they avoid all of\nthe foregoing difficulties by calling the creative act\na mystery. Now there are mysteries and mysteries.\nWe do not know how trees grow, nor why the planets\nobey the law of gravitation. But we are sure that\nthey do. On the other hand, we do not know how\nsquares can be round; but we happen in this case\nto perceive that squares cannot be round. Now if\nsomebody tells me that God is a round square, and\nappeals to me to consider reverently whether piety\nallows me to assert, in view of the mystery of God\u2019s\nbeing, that God is not a round square, my answer is\nvery plain. I say at once that it must be as\nirreverent to call God absurd and self-contradictory in his\nnature as to call him anything else discreditable; and that I, for my part, hesitate not to declare very\nfrankly that though I know very little about God, I\nam sure that he is no round square. Now even so,\nan absurd and self-contradictory account of the act\nof creation must not be allowed to escape us by\npleading that creation is a mystery, and that nobody\ncan see how God makes things. For, mysterious as\ncreation may be, we can be sure that if creation is of\nsuch a nature as to involve an external power and an\nexternal law, outside of God\u2019s creative power itself,\nthen God is himself not infinite. And we can be\nequally sure that unless God as creator is identical\nwith his products, the idea of a creative act does\ninvolve just such a power preceding the act and\noutside of God himself. The device then by which so\nmany thinkers seek to escape from this well-known\nand ancient net of dialectics, seems for us necessarily\nunsuccessful. There are mysteries that we have\nreverently to accept, and before long we ourselves shall\nfind such, and we shall be glad to bow before them.\nBut if creation is indeed such a mystery, at all events\na self-contradiction about creation is not such a\nmystery.\n\nVI.\n\nWe have dwelt at length on one of the\nalternatives of Theism. Disheartened, and without any\nenthusiasm, we turn to the other. Must we after all\nremain content in our religion without any\nassurance of the supremacy of the good? Must we be\ncontent with this halting half Theism of the empirical\nDesign- Argument? If we must be, we must be. But what if that too should fail us? Let us at least try\nit. This unsatisfactory view says: \u201cWhat powers\nthere may be in the world we can never wholly know.\nBut we think that there is evidence that they that\nbe for the moral law are more than they that be\nagainst it. And this evidence is given us by the\nempirically discerned marks of benevolent design about\nus in the world.\u201d This view, whatever its religious\nworth, is at all events capable only of empirical\nproof, and pretends only to such a rank. And it is\nin discussing this hypothesis, in the dim light of the\nweary centuries of dispute about it, that one comes\nat last fully to feel the bitterness of the doubt that,\nlike a tormenting disease, assails and eternally must\nassail one who tries to be content with this dreary visible\nworld in which we have been so far vainly seeking\nfor comfort. Wrangle upon wrangle, ceaseless\nbalancing of probabilities this way and that, opinions\nand ridicule and abuse forever, and no result: such\nis this empirical teleology that seeks a world-manufacturer,\nand cannot discover him. Let us take up\nthe miserable business just where we happen to\nfind it.\n\nThere is no doubt about this, that the doctrine of\nevolution has rendered the popular empirical proof\nof a special designing power much harder than we\nused to suppose. And when we pass to this aspect\nof our question, we must confess at once that we have\nnothing to say which can be new to any reader of\nmodern discussion. This empirical teleology will\nalways remain a doubtful subject for human inquiry.\nAny dogmatic disproof of intelligent finite powers or daemons above us must be regarded as impossible.\nThe only question to be here solved is the\npossibility of purely inductive proof of the existence\nof such higher intelligent agencies. And here, as\nwe hold, just the ancient difficulties as to the proof\nof any empirical teleological theory survive, and are,\nin spite of all that recent writers have done, rather\nincreased by our knowledge of the facts of evolution.\nEspecially does evolution make the empirical hypothesis\nof the existence of any finite and good daemonic\npower, intelligently and morally working in the\nworld, continually more and more obscure. For\nfirst, as to the intelligence of the higher powers, what\nthe theory of evolution has done for us in this\nrespect is simply to make us feel that we know not,\nand cannot yet even guess, how much what we\nempirically call bare mechanism can do to simulate the\neffects of what, in an equally empirical and blind\nway, men call intelligence. Therefore no empirical\ndesign-argument has longer anywhere nearly the\nsame amount of persuasive power that it once seemed\nto have. The matter stands thus: An empirical\ndesign-argument might very plausibly reason that, if I\nfind a child\u2019s blocks arranged to make a house or to\nspell words, I can assume that some designing human\nhand has so placed them. But the inductive force\nof the argument rests on my previous knowledge\nthat nothing is so apt to put blocks in that order,\nin this present visible world, as just a designing\nhuman hand. But if I discovered certain physical\nconditions that did very frequently work, and that\ndid often so arrange blocks, then I should no longer consider the given arrangement good proof of human\ndesign. Even so, until I see that natural selection\ncan simulate the designing power of human beings,\nI may be disposed to regard a given case of\napparent design in nature as a fair inductive proof of\nsome great carpenter or watch-maker working there.\nBut the induction, never overwhelming, becomes very\nweak when I learn that there are so-called physical\nconditions such as we or chance can produce, which,\nhowever, do nevertheless result in things that my eye\nwoidd have called full of design. For then I am led\nto feel as if I could pass no judgment at all upon\nconcrete cases. Yet only by concrete cases can an\nempirical hypothesis be proved. Therefore unless a\npebble proves design an eye does not prove design.\n\nBut design, we hear, is not incompatible with\nevolution. Of course not. And if there is a designer,\nwho works through evolution, then indeed he shows\nwonderful foresight and mastery. But the question\nis, not what is compatible with evolution, but what\ncan be proven from bare experience. And what the\nmodern man has very justly come to see is that mere\nexperience must leave him in utter doubt about\nwhat powers, intelligent or not intelligent, are the\nsources of all our experience. We can find laws;\nbut they take us only a short way. And the more\nwe know about nature, the less inclined we feel to\ndogmatize on the basis of mere experience about\nwhat powers are behind the scenes. They may be\nintelligent, and they may be what we call in this\nworld of sense mechanical. But as finite powers,\ngiven in experience, we men know them solely by their effects. And their effects are very remote\nhints of their real nature. It is really painful to\nread the elaborate wastes of effort made in our day\nto prove that some theological dogma about some\npower beyond experience is not refuted by\nexperience. As if such proof made anybody\u2019s creed\neither more or less doubtful. A really well-founded\nTheism would not be, in this tedious way, eternally\non the defensive.\n\nBut there is the other aspect of the matter. An\nintelligent power, were it admitted, would not need to\nbe moral. If there is design, is the designer\ndemonstrably good? Let us pass over to that question.\n\nVII.\n\nIf evolution has done anything for us, it has\ntended to increase our sense of the mystery of the\nworld of experience, and therefore the\nphilosophically minded religious student is in truth, for yet\nthis other reason, weary of all this empirical Theism,\nnamely, because he despairs of finding out, by such\nan empirical process, anything about the actual\npurposes of any designer, even if there be a designer.\nTo study English literature in the rubbish heaps of\na book-binder\u2019s work-shop, would seem to a wise man\na much more hopeful undertaking than to seek any\none notion of the real plan on which this world is\nmade from a merely empirical study of our little\nfragment of nature. Science is right in abandoning\nsuch undertakings wholly and for all its now\nprobable future work. Religion must find the religious aspect of reality in a totally different direction. The\nhigher the realities that we study, the harder the\ntask. The heavens declare very many things not\nwholly clear to us; but the earth and man declare,\nas natural facts, very many more and more confusing\nthings. Only a poetical abstraction can show us any\none plan of religious value in the world of sense,\nany one declaration of anybody\u2019s glory therein. An\nequally strong opposing interest would find just as\ngood evidence for what it sought if it should hold\nanother view of what is designed. Nature is, so\nregarded, a confused hum of voices. \u201cNature,\u201d says\none voice, \u201cis meant to provide bountifully for the\nwants of sentient life.\u201d \u201cTherefore,\u201d says another\nvoice, \u201call the weak, the sick, the old, must starve,\nand all the carnivorous destroy their neighbors.\u201d\n\u201cNature aims at the evolution of the highest type of\nlife,\u201d says the first voice. \u201cTherefore,\u201d it is replied,\n\u201cshe bountifully provides swarms of parasites of all\nsorts to feed on higher life.\u201d \u201cNature desires\norder and unity,\u201d says the voice from the heavens.\n\u201cTherefore she makes meteors and comets,\u201d replies\nthe echoing voice. \u2014 And if now the Fiend appears,\nand suggests, as the only satisfactory design-hypothesis,\nsomething of this sort, how could experience\nanswer him? \u2014 \u201cNature,\u201d he says, \u201cis designed by\na being who delights in manifold activity of all sorts,\nin variety of organization throughout the world, in\nthe fine contrasts of the numberless forms of sentient\nlife, and in whatever means vigor. He likes to see\nmany living creatures, and he likes to see them fight.\nHe likes the sight of suffering, as well as of joy; because both mean variety of action. He delights in\nthe triumphs of the victors, in the groans of the\nconquered, in the sportiveness of young animals, in the\nwrithing of a poor beast that dies in torture, in the\ninsidious struo-o-le for existence that the Entozoa\ncarry on, in the hopeless sighs that men send up to\nhim in their woe, and in the ideal raptures and\nagonies of saints, artists, and lovers. All these things\nhe likes, because they are just so many forms of\nexistence. He wants plenty of life and vigor to\ncontemplate, as a boy wants stiff soap-suds to make\npretty bubbles for his pleasure as he lies idle. This\nbeing is doubtless finite (like his brother, the\nSetebos of the inimitable monologue that Browning has\nput into Caliban\u2019s mouth). But just now he reigns\nhereabouts, even as Caliban\u2019s Setebos reigned in the\nisland. And his designs are so obviously shown in\nnature, that anybody ought to believe in him who\nsimply looks at the facts of experience.\u201d\n\nOf this horrible doctrine we apprehend that\nexperience as such offers no disproof. For all that\nscience can say, we might be in the hands of just\nsuch a demon. Hence it behooves religious students\nto cease looking for the living God among the dead\nfacts of physical science, and to betake themselves\nto their own proper field. Science simply leaves all\nsuch hypotheses utterly doubtful. Our little corner\nof the world may have become what it is in any one\nof numberless physically definable ways. And, if\ndesigned, its immediate purpose may be any one of\nnumberless purposes. It is not probable that\nexperience can tell us much about that matter. Science is very right in appealing to experience with wholly\ndifferent aims, namely, for the sake of understanding\nthe laws of the sequence of phenomena, to the end\nthat we may be able to know what the world-plan,\nhowever it may be formed, does actually render us\ncapable of accomplishing just now and here in our\nconcrete dealings with things. And if science, in\ndoing all this, has to make certain postulates, and to\naccept them on faith, then such faith, though it needs\nindeed a deeper foundation, is at least not identical\nwith the presumption that, undertaking not simply\nto postulate, but to prove beyond doubt, pretends to\ndiscover with certainty, from bare experience, that\nthe world-maker\u2019s plans do agree with our plans.\nAfter all, such empirical Theism is assuming its\nsafest and most characteristic form when it appears\nno longer as a genuine investigator, but poses as the\ndefendant\u2019s attorney, takes prudent refuge behind the\nrules of debate, and demands that other people shall\nassume the burden of proof, and either show it to be\ncertainly false, or else accept it for the sake of\npropriety.\n\nVIII.\n\nWe turned to the supposed external World of\nPowers, and we have found it either dumb, or else\ngiven to dark and doubtful speeches. The Powers\nmay indeed be somehow of the highest worth. But\nto us, even if we accept unquestioningiy the supposed\nexternal world, the worth of it all seems doubtful,\nand more so the longer we study the matter. The\npartial evil may be universal good; but we could not in this external world see how, nor could we find\nproof of the fact. What a Power causes, that the\npower seems responsible for. And so the Powers\nthat cause the inestimable might of evil in the world\nseem of very doubtful religious worth.\n\nWe have already suggested in outline why this\ndoubtful residt was to be expected. These Powers\nwere assumed to exist apart from our thought, in\ntiuie and space, and to work in time. They have,\nas workers in time, no certain and eternal\nsignificance. A single Infinite Power is, properly\nspeaking, a misnomer. If a power produces something\nthat is external to itself, then the very idea of such\nan occurrence implies another power, separate from\nthe first, and therefore limiting it. If however the\npower is identical with its own products, then the\nname power no longer properly belongs to it. For,\nas we shall see when we come to speak of the world\nin its other aspect, namely, as eternal, the conceptions\nof power and product, of cause and effect, and of\nall like existences, are found to be only subordinate\nto the highest conception of the world as Thought.\nFor the Eternal Thought are all these powers; but\nin themselves they belong to the flux of things.\nEach one of them says. Not in me, when you ask it\nfor the significance of the world as a whole. Each\npower says: \u201cI work here along with the others.\nI fight, I strive, I conquer, I obey, I seek my ends\nas I can. But beyond me are the conditions that\nlimit me.\u201d And these conditions are the other\npowers. The world of powers is the world of the\nchildren of the dragon\u2019s teeth. Their struggles are endless. The only religion that they can teach is the\nreligion of endurance and of courage. Or one may\ncompare them to the warriors in king Atli\u2019s house.\nOnly the all-seeing Eternal Thought can possibly\ndiscover their significance. Of themselves they are\njust the fighters in the blood and dust of the\nbanqueting hall.\n\nAll this we just now affirm without full proof.\nBut our previous discussion has been one long\nillustration of it. You find or think you find in the\nworld a religiously valuable power or tendency at\nwork. But at once there stands beside it its sworn\nfoe. Is it Evolution that you have found? There\nstands beside it Dissolution. Is it the tender care of\na fatherly nature for the very sparrows? Then\nappears beside it the cruelty and deceit of nature. Is\nit the beauty of the world that suggests a power-loving\nbeauty? Nay, but the rottenness and the\nhorror of natural disease and decay assert as boldly\nthe workings of a power that hates beauty. Are\nall these seeming powers just mere phantoms, whose\ntruth is in the laws of physics? Then the world is\na vast wreck of colliding molecules. Are these powers\nreal tendencies? Then their fight is seemingly\nendless. The world of the powers is indeed full of\nphysical law, because and only because its facts are\nfound, by means of thought that has a deeper\nfoundation, to be cases of certain general rules. But\nfor our religious purpose, this world of the powers\nseems a chaos.\n\n\u201cBut,\u201d says some one, \u201call this is no disproof of\nthe existence of a real but to us not perfectly clear harmony of all the powers. This is simply absence\nof proof.\u201d Yes; but if proof is what we want, and\nif every single power sends us beyond itself for the\ninterpretation of the meaning of the whole, we\ncannot hope to grasp that meaning so long as we avoid\nstudying the world in its eternal aspect. The\npowers themselves make and unmake. We understand\nthem not. They remind us of the night-scene of\nFaust: \u2014\n\nFaust. Was weben die dort um den Rabenstein?\nMephistopheles. Weiss nicht was sie kochen uud schaffen.\nFaust. Schweben auf, schweben ab, neigen sich, beugen sich.\nMephistopheles. Eine Hexenkunst.\nFaust. Sie streuen und weihen.\nMephistopheles. Vorbei! Vorbei!\nAnd if we will hear the wisdom of Mephistopheles\nabout all this, he has elsewhere given his view, which,\nas an opinion about the world of powers by one of\nthe more authoritative powers in it, is worthy of\nas much respect as any other suggestion from an\nequally limited being: \u2014\n\n\u201cWas soll uns dann das ewige Schaffen!\nGescbaffenes zu nichts hinwegzuraffen!\n\u2018Da ist\u2019s vorbei!\u2019 Was ist daran zu lesen?\nEs ist so gut als w\u00e4r\u2019es nicht gewesen.\nUnd treibt sich doch im Kreis, als wenn es w\u00e4re.\nIch liebte mir daf\u00fcr das Ewig-Leere.\u201d\nAnd possibly it would be hard for us to be sure of\nmuch more meaning in this world of powers as such,\nthan Mephistopheles has found.\n\nFor us, we turn, not with despair, but with hope,\nelsewhere. We go to seek the Eternal, not in\nexperience, but in the thought that thinks experience. Our hope is not less because we have found in the\ntemporal a world of doubt. Our song is simply\nthe \u201cGood-by proud world, I\u2019m going home,\u201d of\nthe religious minds of all ages. The truly religious\nelements of theism are not hurt by the destruction\nof traditions about theistic arguments. It is only an\nexample of shallow thought when either the\ndestructive or the constructive thinkers imagine that the\nbattle is decided if the world of the powers is judged\nin one way or in another. Religion is as independent\nof all that as Sirius is independent of the north\nwind.\n\nNotes","title":"The Religious Aspect of Philosophy/Chapter 8","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":17813}