{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_Tractatus_Logico_Philosophicus_6/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_Tractatus_Logico_Philosophicus_6","id":"wikisource_Tractatus_Logico_Philosophicus_6","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Tractatus_Logico-Philosophicus/6","summary":null,"tags":["Pages_using_automatic_headers","Subpages"],"text":"6 The general form of truth function is:\n\n[\n\np\n\u00af\n\n,\n\n\u03be\n\u00af\n\n,\nN\n(\n\n\u03be\n\u00af\n\n)\n]\n\n{\\displaystyle [{\\bar {p}},{\\bar {\\xi }},N({\\bar {\\xi }})]}\n\n.\n\nThis is the general form of proposition.\n\n6.001 This says nothing else than that every proposition is the result of successive applications of the operation\n\nN\n(\n\n\u03be\n\u00af\n\n)\n\n{\\displaystyle N({\\bar {\\xi }})}\n\nto the elementary propositions.\n\n6.002 If we are given the general form of the way in which a proposition is constructed, then thereby we are also given the general form of the way in which by an operation out of one proposition another can be created.\n\n6.01 The general form of the operation\n\n\u03a9\n\u2032\n\n(\n\n\u03b7\n\u00af\n\n)\n\n{\\displaystyle \\Omega '({\\bar {\\eta }})}\n\nis therefore:\n\n[\n\n\u03be\n\u00af\n\n,\nN\n(\n\n\u03be\n\u00af\n\n)\n\n]\n\u2032\n\n(\n\n\u03b7\n\u00af\n\n)\n(\n=\n[\n\n\u03b7\n\u00af\n\n,\n\n\u03be\n\u00af\n\n,\nN\n(\n\n\u03be\n\u00af\n\n)\n]\n)\n\n{\\displaystyle [{\\bar {\\xi }},N({\\bar {\\xi }})]'({\\bar {\\eta }})(=[{\\bar {\\eta }},{\\bar {\\xi }},N({\\bar {\\xi }})])}\n\n.\n\nThis is the most general form of transition from one proposition to another.\n\n6.02 And thus we come to numbers: I define\n\nx=\u03a90'x Def. and\n\u03a9'\u03a9\u03bd'x = \u03a9\u03bd+1'x Def\nAccording, then, to these symbolic rules we write the series x, \u03a9'x, \u03a9'\u03a9'x, \u03a9'\u03a9'\u03a9'x.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\n\nas: \u03a90'x, \u03a90+1'x, \u03a90+1+1'x, \u03a90+1+1+1'x,.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\n\nTherefore I write in place of \"[x,\u03be,\u03a9'\u03be]\",\n\n\"[\u03a90'x, \u03a9\u03bd'x, \u03a9\u03bd+1'x]\".\nAnd I define:\n\n0 + 1 = 1 Def.\n0 + 1 + 1 = 2 Def.\n0 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 Def.\nand so on.\n6.021 A number is the exponent of an operation.\n\n6.022 The concept number is nothing else than that which is common to all numbers, the general form of number.\n\nThe concept number is the variable number.\n\nAnd the concept of equality of numbers is the general form of all special equalities of numbers.\n\n6.03 The general form of the cardinal number is: [0, \u03be, \u03be+1].\n\n6.031 The theory of classes is altogether superfluous in mathematics.\n\nThis is connected with the fact that the generality which we need in mathematics is not the accidental one.\n\n6.1 The propositions of logic are tautologies.\n\n6.11 The propositions of logic therefore say nothing. (They are the analytical propositions.)\n\n6.111 Theories which make a proposition of logic appear substantial are always false. One could e.g. believe that the words \"true\" and \"false\" signify two properties among other properties, and then it would appear as a remarkable fact that every proposition possesses one of these\nproperties. This now by no means appears self-evident, no more so than the proposition \"All\nroses are either yellow or red\" would sound even\nif it were true. Indeed our proposition now gets\nquite the character of a proposition of natural\nscience and this is a certain symptom of its being\nfalsely understood.\n\n6.112 The correct explanation of logical propositions\nmust give them a peculiar position among all\npropositions.\n\n6.113 It is the characteristic mark of logical propositions that one can perceive in the symbol alone\nthat they are true; and this fact contains in itself\nthe whole philosophy of logic. And so also it is\none of the most important facts that the truth or\nfalsehood of non-logical propositions can not be\nrecognized from the propositions alone.\n\n6.12 The fact that the propositions of logic are\ntautologies shows the formal\u2014logical\u2014properties\nof language, of the world.\n\nThat its constituent parts connected together in this way give a tautology characterizes the logic of\nits constituent parts.\n\nIn order that propositions connected together\nin a definite way may give a tautology they\nmust have definite properties of structure. That\nthey give a tautology when so connected shows\ntherefore that they possess these properties of\nstructure.\n\n6.1201 That e.g. the propositions \"p\" and \"~p\" in\nthe connexion \"~(p.~p)\" give a tautology\nshows that they contradict one another. That the\npropositions \"p\u2283q\", \"p\" and \"q\" connected\ntogether in the form \"(p\u2283q).(p):\u2283:(q)\" give a\ntautology shows that \"q\" follows from \"p\" and \"p\u2283q\". That \"(x).fx:\u2283:fa\" is a tautology shows that\nfa follows from (x) ,fx, etc. etc.\n\n6.1202 It is clear that we could have used for this\npurpose contradictions instead of tautologies.\n\n6.1203 In order to recognize a tautology as such, we\ncan, in cases in which no sign of generality occurs\nin the tautology, make use of the following intuitive\nmethod: I write instead of \"p\", \"q\", \"r\", etc.,\n\"TpF\", \"TqF\", \"TrF\", etc. The truth-combinations I express by brackets, e.g.:\n\nand the co-ordination of the truth or falsity of the\nwhole proposition with the truth-combinations of\nthe truth-arguments by lines in the following way:\n\nThis sign, for example, would therefore present the proposition \"p\u2283q\". Now I will proceed\nto inquire whether such a proposition as ~(p. ~p)\n(The Law of Contradiction) is a tautology. The\nform \"~ \u03be\" is written in our notation\n\nthe form \"\u03be . \u03b7\" thus\u00a0: \u2014\n\nHence the proposition ~(p . ~ q) runs thus:\u2014\n\nIf here we put \"p\" instead of \"q\" and examine\nthe combination of the outermost T and F with the\ninnermost, it is seen that the truth of the whole\nproposition is co-ordinated with all the truth-combinations of its argument, its falsity with none of\nthe truth-combinations.\n\n6.121 The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical\nproperties of propositions, by combining them into\npropositions which say nothing.\n\nThis method could be called a zero-method. In\na logical proposition propositions are brought into\nequilibrium with one another, and the state of\nequilibrium then shows how these propositions\nmust be logically constructed.\n\n6.122 Whence it follows that we can get on without logical propositions, for we can recognize in an adequate notation the formal properties of the propositions by mere inspection.\n\n6.1221 If for example two propositions \"p\" and \"q\"\ngive a tautology in the connexion \"p\u2283a\", then\nit is clear that \"q\" follows from \"p\".\n\nE.g. that \"q\" follows from \"p\u2283q.p\" we see from\nthese two propositions themselves, but we can also\nshow it by combining them to \"p\u2283q.p:\u2283:q\" and\nthen showing that this is a tautology.\n\n6.1222 This throws light on the question why logical\npropositions can no more be empirically confirmed\nthan they can be empirically refuted. Not only\nmust a proposition of logic be incapable of being\ncontradicted by any possible experience, but it\nmust also be incapable of being confirmed by any\nsuch.\n\n6.1223 It now becomes clear why we often feel as though\n\"logical truths\" must be \"postulated\" by us. We\ncan in fact postulate them in so far as we can\npostulate an adequate notation.\n\n6.1224 It also becomes clear why logic has been called\nthe theory of forms and of inference.\n\n6.123 It is clear that the laws of logic cannot themselves obey further logical laws.\n\n(There is not, as Russell supposed, for every\n\"type\" a special law of contradiction; but one is\nsufficient, since it is not applied to itself.)\n\n6.1231 The mark of logical propositions is not their\ngeneral validity.\n\nTo be general is only to be accidentally valid\nfor all things. An ungeneralized proposition can\nbe tautologous just as well as a generalized\none.\n\n6.1232 Logical general validity, we could call essential as opposed to accidental general validity, e.g. of the proposition \"all men are mortal\". Propositions like Russell's \"axiom of reducibility\" are not logical propositions, and this explains our feeling\nthat, if true, they can only be true by a happy\nchance.\n\n6.1233 We can imagine a world in which the axiom of\nreducibility is not valid. But it is clear that logic\nhas nothing to do with the question whether our\nworld is really of this kind or not.\n\n6.124 The logical propositions describe the scaffolding\nof the world, or rather they present it. They\n\"treat\" of nothing. They presuppose that names\nhave meaning, and that elementary propositions\nhave sense. And this is their connexion with the\nworld. It is clear that it must show something\nabout the world that certain combinations of symbols\u2014which essentially have a definite character\u2014are\ntautologies. Herein lies the decisive point. We said\nthat in the symbols which we use something is arbitrary, something not. In logic only this expresses:\nbut this means that in logic it is not we who express,\nby means of signs, what we want, but in logic the\nnature of the essentially necessary signs itself\nasserts. That is to say, if we know the logical\nsyntax of any sign language, then all the propositions of logic are already given.\n\n6.125 It is possible, also with the old conception of\nlogic, to give at the outset a description of all \"true\"\nlogical propositions.\n\n6.1251 Hence there can never be surprises in logic.\n\n6.126 Whether a proposition belongs to logic can be\ncalculated by calculating the logical properties of\nthe symbol.\n\nAnd this we do when we prove a logical proposition. For without troubling ourselves about a sense and a meaning, we form the logical\npropositions out of others by mere symbolic rules.\n\nWe prove a logical proposition by creating it\nout of other logical propositions by applying in\nsuccession certain operations, which again generate\ntautologies out of the first. (And from a tautology\nonly tautologies follow.)\n\nNaturally this way of showing that its propositions are tautologies is quite unessential to\nlogic. Because the propositions, from which the\nproof starts, must show without proof that they\nare tautologies.\n\n6.1261 In logic process and result are equivalent.\n(Therefore no surprises.)\n\n6.1262 Proof in logic is only a mechanical expedient\nto facilitate the recognition of tautology, where\nit is complicated.\n\n6.1263 It would be too remarkable, if one could prove\na significant proposition logically from another, and\na logical proposition also. It is clear from the\nbeginning that the logical proof of a significant\nproposition and the proof in logic must be two\nquite different things.\n\n6.1264 The significant proposition asserts something,\nand its proof shows that it is so; in logic every\nproposition is the form of a proof.\n\nEvery proposition of logic is a modus ponens\npresented in signs. (And the modus ponens can\nnot be expressed by a proposition.)\n\n6.1265 Logic can always be conceived to be such that\nevery proposition is its own proof.\n\n6.127 All propositions of logic are of equal rank\u00a0;\nthere are not some which are essentially primitive\nand others deduced from these.\n\nEvery tautology itself shows that it is a tautology.\n\n6.1271 It is clear that the number of \"primitive propositions of logic\" is arbitrary, for we could deduce logic from one primitive proposition by simply\nforming, for example, the logical product of Frege's\nprimitive propositions. (Frege would perhaps say\nthat this would no longer be immediately self-evident. But it is remarkable that so exact a\nthinker as Frege should have appealed to the\ndegree of self-evidence as the criterion of a\nlogical proposition.)\n\n6.13 Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the\nworld.\n\nLogic is transcendental.\n\n6.2 Mathematics is a logical method.\n\nThe propositions of mathematics are equations,\nand therefore pseudo-propositions.\n\n6.21 Mathematical propositions express no thoughts.\n\n6.211 In life it is never a mathematical proposition\nwhich we need, but we use mathematical propositions only in order to infer from propositions\nwhich do not belong to mathematics to others\nwhich equally do not belong to mathematics.\n\n(In philosophy the question \"Why do we really\nuse that word, that proposition?\" constantly leads\nto valuable results.)\n\n6.22 The logic of the world which the propositions\nof logic show in tautologies, mathematics shows\nin equations.\n\n6.23 If two expressions are connected by the sign of\nequality, this means that they can be substituted\nfor one another. But whether this is the case\nmust show itself in the two expressions themselves.\n\nIt characterizes the logical form of two expressions, that they can be substituted for one another.\n\n6.231 It is a property of affirmation that it can be\nconceived as double denial.\n\nIt is a property of \"1 + 1 + 1 + 1\" that it can be conceived as \"(1 + 1) + (1 + 1)\".\n\n6.232 Frege says that these expressions have the same\nmeaning but different senses.\n\nBut what is essential about equation is that it\nis not necessary in order to show that both expressions, which are connected by the sign of\nequality, have the same meaning: for this can be\nperceived from the two expressions themselves.\n\n6.2321 And, that the propositions of mathematics can\nbe proved means nothing else than that their\ncorrectness can be seen without our having to\ncompare what they express with the facts as regards\ncorrectness.\n\n6.2322 The identity of the meaning of two expressions\ncannot be asserted. For in order to be able to\nassert anything about their meaning, I must know\ntheir meaning, and if I know their meaning, I\nknow whether they mean the same or something\ndifferent.\n\n6.2323 The equation characterizes only the standpoint\nfrom which I consider the two expressions, that\nis to say the standpoint of their equality of\nmeaning.\n\n6.233 To the question whether we need intuition for\nthe solution of mathematical problems it must be\nanswered that language itself here supplies the\nnecessary intuition.\n\n6.2331 The process of calculation brings about just this intuition.\n\nCalculation is not an experiment.\n\n6.234 Mathematics is a method of logic.\n\n6.2341 The essential of mathematical method is working with equations. On this method depends the\nfact that every proposition of mathematics must\nbe self-evident.\n\n6.24 The method by which mathematics arrives at\nits equations is the method of substitution.\n\nFor equations express the substitutability of two expressions, and we proceed from a number of equations to new equations, replacing expressions by others in accordance with the equations.\n\n6.241 Thus the proof of the proposition 2x2 = 4 runs:\n\n(\u03a9\u03bd)\u03bc'x=\u03a9\u03bd\u00d7\u03bc'x Def.\n\u03a92\u00d72'x=(\u03a92)2'x=(\u03a92)1+1'x=\u03a92''\u03a92'x=\u03a91+1'\u03a91+1'x\n\n=(\u03a9'\u03a9)'(\u03a9'\u03a9)'x=\u03a9'\u03a9'\u03a9'\u03a9'x=\u03a91+1+1+1\n\n6.3 Logical research means the investigation of all regularity. And outside logic all is accident.\n\n6.31 The so-called law of induction cannot in any case be a logical law, for it is obviously a significant proposition.\u2014And therefore it cannot be a law a priori either.\n\n6.32 The law of causality is not a law but the form of a law.\n\n6.321 \"Law of Causality\" is a class name. And as in mechanics there are, for instance, minimum-laws, such as that of least action, so in physics there are causal laws, laws of the causality form.\n\n6.3211 Men had indeed an idea that there must be a \"law of least action\", before they knew exactly how it ran. (Here, as always, the a priori certain proves to be something purely logical.)\n\n6.33 We do not believe a priori in a law of conservation, but we know a priori the possibility of a logical form.\n\n6.34 All propositions, such as the law of causation, the law of continuity in nature, the law of least expenditure in nature, etc. etc., all these are a priori intuitions of possible forms of the propositions of science.\n\n6.341 Newtonian mechanics, for example, brings the description of the universe to a unified form. Let us imagine a white surface with irregular\nblack spots. We now say: Whatever kind of\npicture these make I can always get as near as\nI like to its description, if I cover the surface\nwith a sufficiently fine square network and now\nsay of every square that it is white or black.\nIn this way I shall have brought the description\nof the surface to a unified form. This form is\narbitrary, because I could have applied with equal\nsuccess a net with a triangular or hexagonal\nmesh. It can happen that the description would\nhave been simpler with the aid of a triangular\nmesh; that is to say we might have described\nthe surface more accurately with a triangular,\nand coarser, than with the finer square mesh, or\nvice versa, and so on. To the different networks\ncorrespond different systems of describing the\nworld. Mechanics determine a form of description by saying: All propositions in the description of the world must be obtained in a given\nway from a number of given propositions\u2014the\nmechanical axioms. It thus provides the bricks\nfor building the edifice of science, and says:\nWhatever building thou wouldst erect, thou shalt\nconstruct it in some manner with these bricks\nand these alone.\n\n(As with the system of numbers one must be\nable to write down any arbitrary number, so\nwith the system of mechanics one must be able\nto write down any arbitrary physical proposition.)\n\n6.342 And now we see the relative position of logic and mechanics. (We could construct the network out of figures of different kinds, as out of triangles and hexagons together.) That a picture like that instanced above can be described by a network of a given form asserts nothing about the picture. (For this holds of every picture of\nthis kind.) But this does characterize the picture,\nthe fact, namely, that it can be completely described by a definite net of definite fineness.\n\nSo too the fact that it can be described by\nNewtonian mechanics asserts nothing about the\nworld; but this asserts something, namely, that\nit can be described in that particular way in which\nas a matter of fact it is described. The fact,\ntoo, that it can be described more simply by one\nsystem of mechanics than by another says something about the world.\n\n6.343 Mechanics is an attempt to construct according\nto a single plan all true propositions which we\nneed for the description of the world.\n\n6.3431 Through their whole logical apparatus the\nphysical laws still speak of the objects of the\nworld.\n\n6.3432 We must not forget that the description of the\nworld by mechanics is always quite general.\nThere is, for example, never any mention of\nparticular material points in it, but always only\nof some points or other.\n\n6.35 Although the spots in our picture are geometrical figures, geometry can obviously say nothing\nabout their actual form and position. But the\nnetwork is purely geometrical, and all its properties can be given a priori.\n\nLaws, like the law of causation, etc., treat\nof the network and not of what the network\ndescribes.\n\n6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might run:\n\"There are natural laws\".\n\nBut that can clearly not be said: it shows itself.\n\n6.361 In the terminology of Hertz we might say: Only uniform connexions are thinkable.\n\n6.3611 We cannot compare any process with the\n\"passage of time\"\u2014there is no such thing\u2014but\nonly with another process (say, with the movement of the chronometer).\n\nHence the description of the temporal sequence\nof events is only possible if we support ourselves\non another process.\n\nIt is exactly analogous for space. When, for\nexample, we say that neither of two events (which\nmutually exclude one another) can occur, because\nthere is no cause why the one should occur rather\nthan the other, it is really a matter of our being\nunable to describe one of the two events unless\nthere is some sort of asymmetry. And if there is\nsuch an asymmetry, we can regard this as the\ncause of the occurrence of the one and of the non-occurrence of the other.\n\n6.36111 The Kantian problem of the right and left hand\nwhich cannot be made to cover one another already\nexists in the plane, and even in one-dimensional\nspace; where the two congruent figures a and b\ncannot be made to cover one another without\n\nmoving them out of this space. The right and\nleft hand are in fact completely congruent. And\nthe fact that they cannot be made to cover one\nanother has nothing to do with it.\n\nA right-hand glove could be put on a left hand\nif it could be turned round in four-dimensional\nspace.\n\n6.362 What can be described can happen too, and\nwhat is excluded by the law of causality cannot be\ndescribed.\n\n6.363 The process of induction is the process of assuming the simplest law that can be made to\nharmonize with our experience.\n\n6.3631 This process, however, has no logical foundation but only a psychological one.\nIt is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest course of events will really\nhappen.\n\n6.36311 That the sun will rise to-morrow, is an hypothesis; and that means that we do not know whether\nit will rise.\n\n6.37 A necessity for one thing to happen because\nanother has happened does not exist. There is\nonly logical necessity.\n\n6.371 At the basis of the whole modern view of\nthe world lies the illusion that the so-called\nlaws of nature are the explanations of natural\nphenomena.\n\n6.372 So people stop short at natural laws as at something unassailable, as did the ancients at God\nand Fate.\n\nAnd they both are right and wrong. But the\nancients were clearer, in so far as they recognized\none clear terminus, whereas the modern system\nmakes it appear as though everything were explained.\n\n6.373 The world is independent of my will.\n\n6.374 Even if everything we wished were to happen,\nthis would only be, so to speak, a favour of\nfate, for there is no logical connexion between will\nand world, which would guarantee this, and the\nassumed physical connexion itself we could not\nagain will.\n\n6.375 As there is only a logical necessity, so there is only a logical impossibility.\n\n6.3751 For two colours, e.g. to be at one place in the visual field, is impossible, logically impossible, for it is excluded by the logical structure of colour.\n\nLet us consider how this contradiction presents\nitself in physics. Somewhat as follows\u00a0: That a\nparticle cannot at the same time have two velocities, i.e. that at the same time it cannot be in\ntwo places, i.e. that particles in different places\nat the same time cannot be identical.\n\n(It is clear that the logical product of two\nelementary propositions can neither be a tautology\nnor a contradiction. The assertion that a point\nin the visual field has two different colours at the\nsame time, is a contradiction.)\n\n6.4 All propositions are of equal value.\n\n6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the\nworld. In the world everything is as it is and\nhappens as it does happen. In it there is no value\u2014and if there were, it would be of no value.\n\nIf there is a value which is of value, it must\nlie outside all happening and being-so. For all\nhappening and being-so is accidental.\n\nWhat makes it non-accidental cannot lie in\nthe world, for otherwise this would again be accidental.\n\nIt must lie outside the world.\n\n6.42 Hence also there can be no ethical propositions.\nPropositions cannot express anything higher.\n\n6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.\n\nEthics is transcendental.\n\n(Ethics and aesthetics are one.)\n\n6.422 The first thought in setting up an ethical law\nof the form \"thou shalt\u2026\" is: And what if I do not do it? But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. This question as to the consequences of an action must therefore be irrelevant. At least these consequences will not be events. For there must be something right in that formulation of the question. There must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself.\n\n(And this is clear also that the reward must be\nsomething acceptable, and the punishment something unacceptable.)\n\n6.423 Of the will as the subject of the ethical we cannot speak.\n\nAnd the will as a phenomenon is only of interest to psychology.\n\n6.43 If good or bad willing changes the world, it\ncan only change the limits of the world, not the\nfacts; not the things that can be expressed in\nlanguage.\n\nIn brief, the world must thereby become quite\nanother. It must so to speak wax or wane as a\nwhole.\n\nThe world of the happy is quite another than\nthat of the unhappy.\n\n6.431 As in death, too, the world does not change, but ceases.\n\n6.4311 Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived through.\n\nIf by eternity is understood not endless temporal\nduration but timelessness, then he lives eternally\nwho lives in the present.\n\nOur life is endless in the way that our visual\nfield is without limit.\n\n6.4312 The temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say, its eternal survival after death, is not only in no way guaranteed, but this assumption in the first place will not do for us what we always tried to make it do. Is a riddle solved by the fact that I survive for ever? Is this eternal life not as enigmatic as our present one? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.\n\n(It is not problems of natural science which have\nto be solved.)\n\n6.432 How the world is, is completely indifferent for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the\nworld.\n\n6.4321 The facts all belong only to the task and not to its performance.\n\n6.44 Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is.\n\n6.45 The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni\nis its contemplation as a limited whole.\n\nThe feeling of the world as a limited whole is\nthe mystical feeling.\n\n6.5 For an answer which cannot be expressed the\nquestion too cannot be expressed.\n\nThe riddle does not exist.\n\nIf a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.\n\n6.51 Scepticism is not irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would doubt where a question cannot be\nasked.\n\nFor doubt can only exist where there is a\nquestion; a question only where there is an answer,\nand this only where something can be said.\n\n6.52 We feel that even if all possible scientific\nquestions be answered, the problems of life have\nstill not been touched at all. Of course there is\nthen no question left, and just this is the\nanswer.\n\n6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem.\n\n(Is not this the reason why men to whom\nafter long doubting the sense of life became\nclear, could not then say wherein this sense\nconsisted?)\n\n6.522 There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.\n\n6.53 The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other\u2014he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy\u2014but it would be the only strictly correct method.\n\n6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)\n\nHe must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.","title":"Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus/6","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":4545}