{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/wikisource_Treatise_of_Human_Nature_Appendix/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/wikisource_Treatise_of_Human_Nature_Appendix","id":"wikisource_Treatise_of_Human_Nature_Appendix","license":"Public Domain / CC-BY-SA (see source)","rights_basis":"wikisource_site_inclusion_policy","source":"wikisource","source_url":"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treatise_of_Human_Nature/Appendix","summary":null,"tags":["Subpages"],"text":"APPENDIX.\n\n\u00a0\n\nThere is nothing I wou'd more willingly lay hold of, than\nan opportunity of confessing my errors; and shou'd esteem\nsuch a return to truth and reason to be more honourable than\nthe most unerring judgment. A man, who is free from mistakes,\ncan pretend to no praises, except from the justness of\nhis understanding: But a man, who corrects his mistakes,\nshews at once the justness of his understanding, and the candour\nand ingenuity of his temper. I have not yet been so\nfortunate as to discover any very considerable mistakes in the\nreasonings deliver'd in the preceding volumes, except on one\narticle: But I have found by experience, that some of my\nexpressions have not been so well chosen, as to guard against\nall mistakes in the readers; and 'tis chiefly to remedy this\ndefect, I have subjoin'd the following appendix.\n\nWe can never be induc'd to believe any matter of fact,\nexcept where its cause, or its effect, is present to us; but\nwhat the nature is of that belief, which arises from the relation\nof cause and effect, few have had the curiosity to ask themselves.\nIn my opinion, this dilemma is inevitable. Either\nthe belief is some new idea, such as that of reality or existance,\nwhich we join to the simple conception of an object, or it is\nmerely a peculiar feeling or sentiment. That it is not a new\nidea, annex'd to the simple conception, may be evinc'd from\nthese two arguments. First, We have no abstract idea of\nexistence, distinguishable and separable from the idea of\nparticular objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this idea\nof existence can be annex'd to the idea. of any object, or\nform the difference betwixt a simple conception and belie\u00a3\nSecondly, The mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases; so\nthat if belief consisted merely in a new idea, annex'd to the\nconception, it wou'd be in a man's power to believe what he\npleas'd. We may, therefore, conclude, that belief consists\nmerely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something, that\ndepends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate\ncauses and principles, of which we are not masters.\nWhen we are convinc'd of any matter of fact, we do nothing\nbut conceive it, along with a certain feeling, different from\nwhat attends the mere reveries of the imagination. And when\nwe express our incredulity concerning any fact, we mean,\nthat the arguments for the fact produce not that feeling. Did\nnot the belief consist in a sentiment different from our mere\nconception, whatever objects were presented by the wildest\nimagination, wou'd be on an equal footing with the most\nestablish'd truths founded on history and experience. There\nis nothing but the feeling, or sentiment, to distinguish the\none from the other.\n\nThis, therefore, being regarded as an undoubted truth,\nthat belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling, different from the simple conception, the next question, that naturally occurs, is,\nwhat is the nature of this feeling, or sentiment, and whether it be analogous to any other sentiment of the human mind? This\nquestion is important. For if it be not analogous to any\nother sentiment, we must despair of explaining its causes,\nand must consider it as an original principle of the human\nmind. If it be analogous, we may hope to explain its causes\nfrom analogy, and trace it up to more general principles. Now\nthat there is a greater firmness and solidity in the conceptions,\nwhich are the objects of conviction and assurance,\nthan in the loose and indolent reveries of a castle-builder,\nevery one will readily own. They strike upon us with more\nforce; they are more present to us; the mind has a firmer\nhold of them, and is more actuated and mov'd by them. It\nacquiesces in them; and, in a manner, fixes and reposes\nitself on them. In short, they approach nearer to the impressions, which are immediately present to us; and are\ntherefore analogous to many other operations of the mind.\n\nThere is not, in my opinion, any possibility of evading this\nconclusion, but by asserting, that belief, beside the simple\nconception, consists in some impression or feeling, distinguishable\nfrom the conception. It does not modify the\nconception, and render it more present and intense: It is\nonly annex'd to it, after the same manner that will and desire\nare annex'd to particular conceptions of good and pleasure.\nBut the following considerations will, I hope, be sufficient to\nremove this hypothesis. First, It is directly contrary to\nexperience, and our immediate consciousness. All men have\never allow'd reasoning to be merely an operation of our\nthoughts or ideas; and however those ideas may be varied\nto the feeling, there is nothing ever enters into our conclusions\nbut ideas, or our fainter conceptions. For instance; I hear\nat present a person's voice, whom I am acquainted with; and\nthis sound comes from the next room. This impression of\nmy senses immediately conveys my thoughts to the person,\nalong with all the surrounding objects. I paint them out to\nmyself as existent at present, with the same qualities and\nrelations, that I formerly knew them possess'd of. These\nideas take faster hold of my mind, than the ideas of an\nin chanted castle. They are different to the feeling; but\nthere is no distinct or separate impression attending them.\n'Tis the same case when I recollect the several incidents of\na journey, or the events of any history. Every particular\nfact is there the object of belief. Its idea is modified differently\nfrom the loose reveries of a castle-builder: But no\ndistinct impression attends every distinct idea, or conception\nof matter of fact. This is the subject of plain experience.\nIf ever this experience can be disputed on any occasion, 'tis\nwhen the mind has been agitated with doubts and difficulties;\nand afterwards, upon taking the object in a new point of\nview, or being presented with a new argument, fixes and\nreposes itself in one settled conclusion and belief. In this case there is a feeling distinct and separate from the conception.\nThe passage from doubt and agitation to tranquility\nand repose, conveys a satisfaction and pleasure to the mind.\nBut take any other case. Suppose I see the legs and thighs\nof a person in motion, while some interpos'd object conceals\nthe rest of his body. Here 'tis certain, the imagination\nspreads out the whole figure. I give him a head and\nshoulders, and breast and neck. These members I conceive\nand believe him to be possess'd of. Nothing can be more\nevident, than that this whole operation is perform'd by the\nthought or imagination alone. The transition is immediate.\nThe ideas presently strike us. Their customary connexion\nwith the present impression, varies them and modifies them\nin a certain manner, but produces no act of the mind,\ndistinct from this peculiarity of conception. Let any one\nexamine his own mind, and he will evidently find this to be\nthe truth.\n\nSecondly, Whatever may be the case, with regard to this\ndistinct impression, it must be allow'd, that the mind has a\nfirmer hold, or more steady conception of what it takes to be\nmatter of fact, than of fictions. Why then look any farther,\nor multiply suppositions without necessity?\n\nThirdly, We can explain the causes of the firm conception,\nbut not those of any separate impression. And not only so,\nbut the causes of the firm conception exhaust the whole\nsubject, and nothing is left to produce any other effect. An\ninference concerning a matter of fact is nothing but the idea\nof an object, that is frequently conjoin'd, or is associated\nwith a present impression. This is the whole of it. Every\npart is requisite to explain, from analogy, the more steady\nconception; and nothing remains capable of producing any\ndistinct impression.\n\nFourthly, The effects of belief, in influencing the passions\nand imagination, can all be explain'd from the firm conception;\nand there is no occasion to have recourse to any other\nprinciple. These arguments, with many others, enumerated in the foregoing volumes, sufficiently prove, that belief only\nmodifies the idea or conception; and renders it different to\nthe feeling, without producing any distinct impression.\n\nThus upon a general view of the subject, there appear to\nbe two questions of importance, which we may venture to\nrecommend to the consideration of philosophers, Whether there be any thing to distinguish belief from the simple conception beside the feeling or sentiment? And, Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold\u2019 that we take of the object?\n\nIf, upon impartial enquiry, the same conclusion, that I\nhave form'd, be assented to by philosophers, the next\nbusiness is to examine the analogy, which there is betwixt\nbelie\u00a3 and other acts of the mind, and find the cause of the\nfirmness and strength of conception: And this I do not\nesteem a difficult task. The transition from a present impression,\nalways enlivens and strengthens any idea. When\nany object is presented, the idea of its usual attendant immediately\nstrikes us, as something real and solid. 'Tis felt,\nrather than conceiv'd, and approaches the impression, from\nwhich it is deriv'd, in its force and influence. This I have\nprov'd at large. I cannot add any new arguments; tho\nperhaps my reasoning on this whole question, concerning\ncause and effect, wou'd have been more convincing, had the\nfollowing passages been inserted in the places, which I have\nmark'd for them. I have added a few illustrations on other\npoints, where I thought it necessary.\n\n\u00a0\n\nTo be inserted in Book I. page 85. line 22. after these words (fainter and more obscure.) beginning a new paragraph.\n\n\u00a0\n\nIt frequently happens, that when two men have been\nengag'd in any scene of action, the one shall remember it\nmuch better than the other, and shall have all the difficulty in\nthe world to make his companion recollect it. He runs over\nseveral circumstances in vain; mentions the time, the place, the company, what was said, what was done on all sides;\ntill at last he hits on some lucky circumstance, that revives\nthe whole, and gives his friend a perfect memory of every\nthing. Here the person that forgets receives at first all the\nideas from the discourse of the other, with the same circumstances\nof time and place; tho' he considers them as mere\nfictions of the imagination. But as soon as the circumstance\nis mention'd, that touches the memory, the very same ideas\nnow appear in a new light, and have, in a manner, a different\nfeeling from what they had before. Without any other\nalteration, beside that of the feeling, they become immediately\nideas of the memory, and are assented to.\n\nSince, therefore, the imagination can represent all the\nsame objects that the memory can offer to us, and since\nthose faculties are only distinguish'd by the different feeling\nof the ideas they present, it may be proper to consider what\nis the nature of that feeling. And here I believe every one\nwill readily agree with me, that the ideas of the memory are\nmore strong and lively than those of the fancy. A painter,\nwho intended, &c.\n\n\u00a0\n\nTo be inserted in Book I. page 97. line 16. after these words (according to the foregoing definition.) beginning a new paragraph.\n\n\u00a0\n\nThis operation of the mind, which forms the belief of\nany matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the\ngreatest mysteries of philosophy: tho' no one has so much\nas suspected, that there was any difficulty in explaining it.\nFor my part I must own, that I find a considerable difficulty\nin the case; and that even when I think I understand the\nsubject perfectly, I am at a loss for terms to express my\nmeaning. I conclude, by an induction which seems to me\nvery evident, that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea,\nthat is different from a fiction, not in the nature, or the order\nof its parts, but in the manner of its being conceiv'd. But when I wou'd explain this manner, I scarce find any word\nthat fully answers the case, but am oblig'd to have recourse\nto every one's feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion\nof this operation of the mind. An idea assented to feels\ndifferent from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents\nto us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by\ncalling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness,\nor steadiness. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophieal,\nis intended only to express that act of the\nmind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions,\ncauses them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a\nsuperior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided\nwe agree about the thing, 'tis needless to dispute about\nthe terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas,\nand can join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible.\nIt may conceive objects with all the circumstances of place\nand time. It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes in\ntheir true colours, just as they might have existed. But as it\nis impossible, that that faculty can ever, of itself, reach belief,\ntis evident, that belief consists not in the nature and order of\nour ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their\nfeeling to the mind. I confess, that 'tis impossible to explain\nperfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may\nmake use of words, that express something near it. But its\ntrue and proper name is belief which is a term that every one\nsufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy\nwe can go no farther, than assert, that it is something felt by\nthe mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment\nfrom the iictions of the imagination. It gives them more\nforce and induenoeg makes them appear of greater importance;\niniixes them in the mind; and renders them the\ngoverning principles of all our actions.\n\nA note to Book I. page 100. line 35. after these words (immediate\nimpression).\n\n\u00a0\n\nNafurane nobis, inquil, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceptimus multum esse versato, magis moveamur, quam siquando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus, aut scriptum aliquod legamus? velut ego nunc moveor. Venil enim mihi Platonis in mentem: quem accipimus primum hic disputare solitum: Cujus etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere. Hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic ejus auditor Polemo; cujus ipsa illa sessio fuit, quam videamus. Equidem etiam curiam nostrum, hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, qu\u00e6 mihi minor esse videtur postquam est major, solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, L\u00e6lium, nostrum vero in primus avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex his memori\u00e6 ducta sit disciplina. Cicero de Finibus, lib. 5.\n\n\u00a0\n\nTo be inserted in Book I. page 123. line 26. after these words (impressions of the senses.) beginning a new paragraph.\n\n\u00a0\n\nWe may observe the same effect of poetry in a lesser\ndegree; and this is common both to poetry and madness,\nthat the vivacity they bestow on the ideas is not deriv'd from\nthe particular situations or connexions of the objects of these\nideas, but from the present temper and disposition of the\nperson. But how great soever the pitch may be, to which\nthis vivacity rises, 'tis evident, that in poetry it never has the\nsame feeling with that which arises in the mind, when we\nreason, tho' even upon the lowest species of probability.\nThe mind can easily distinguish betwixt the one and the\nother; and whatever emotion the poetical enthusiasm may\ngive to the spirits, 'tis still the mere phantom of belief or\npersuasion. The case is the same with the idea, as with the\npassion it occasions. There is no passion of the human mind but what may arise from poetry; tho' at the same time\nthe feelings of the passions are very different when excited by\npoetical fictions, from what they are when they arise from\nbelief and reality. A passion, which is disagreeable in real\nlife, may afford the highest entertainment in a tragedy, or epic\npoem. In the latter case it lies not with that weight upon\nus: It feels less firm and solid: And has no other than the\nagreeable effect of exciting the spirits, and rouzing the attention.\nThe difference in the passions is a clear proof of a like\ndifference in thou ideas, from which the passions are deriv'd.\nWhere the vivacity arises from a customary conjunction with\na present impression; tho' the imagination may not, in\nappearance, be so much mov'd; yet there is always something\nmore forcible and real in its actions, than in the fervors\nof poetry and eloquence. The force of our mental actions\nin this case, no more than in any other, is not to be measur'd\nby the apparent agitation of the mind. A poetical description\nmay have a more sensible effect on the fancy, than an\nhistorical narration. It may collect more of those circumstances,\nthat form a compleat image or picture. It may seem\nto set the object before us in more lively colours. But still\nthe ideas it presents are different to the feeling from those,\nwhich arise from the memory and the judgment. There is\nsomething weak and imperfect amidst all that seeming vehemence\nof thought and sentiment, which attends the fictions\nof poetry.\n\nWe shall afterwards have occasion to remark both the resemblances\nand differences betwixt a poetical enthusiasm,\nand a serious conviction. In the mean time I cannot forbear\nobserving, that the great difference in their feeling proceeds\nin some measure from reflection and general rules. We\nobserve, that the vigour of conception, which fictions receive\nfrom poetry and eloquence, is a circumstance merely accidental,\nof which every idea is equally susceptible; and that\nsuch fictions are connected with nothing that is real. This\nobservation makes us only lend ourselves, so to speak, to the fiction: But causes the idea to feel very different from the\neternal establish'd persuasions founded on memory and\ncustom. They are somewhat of the same kind: But the one\nis much inferior to the other, both in its causes and effects.\n\nA like reflection on general rules keeps us from augmenting\nour belief upon every encrease of the force and vivacity of\nour ideas. Where an opinion admits of no doubt, or opposite\nprobability, we attribute to it a full conviction; tho' the\nwant of resemblance, or contiguity, may render its force inferior\nto that of other opinions. 'Tis thus the understanding\ncorrects the appearances of the senses, and makes us imagine,\nthat an object at twenty foot distance seems even to the eye\nas large as one of the same dimensions at ten.\n\n\u00a0\n\nTo be inserted in Book I. page1615. line 12. after these words (any idea of power.) beginning a new paragraph.\n\n\u00a0\n\nSome have asserted, that we feel an energy, or power, in\nour own mind; and that having in this manner acquir'd the\nidea of power, we transfer that quality to matter, where we\nare not able immediately to discover it. The motions of our\nbody, and the thoughts and sentiments of our mind, (say\nthey) obey the will; nor do we seek any farther to acquire a\njust notion of force or power. But to convince us how\nfallacious this reasoning is, we need only consider, that the\nwill being here consider'd as a cause, has no more a discoverable\nconnexion with its effects, than any material cause\nhas with its proper effect. So far from perceiving the connexion\nbetwixt an act of volition, and a motion of the body;\n'tis allow'd that no effect is more inexplicable from the powers\nand essence of thought and matter. Nor is the empire of\nthe will over our mind more intelligible. The effect is there\ndistinguishable and separable from the cause, and cou'd not\nbe foreseen without the experience of their constant conjunction. We have command over our mind to a certain degree, but beyond that lose all empire over it: And 'tis evidently impossible to fix any precise bounds to our authority,\nwhere we consult not experience. In short, the actions\nof the mind are, in this respect, the same with those of\nmatter. We perceive only their constant conjunction; nor\ncan we ever reason beyond it. No internal impression has\nan apparent energy, more than external objects have. Since,\ntherefore, matter is confess'd by philosophers to operate by\nan unknown force, we shou'd in vain hope to attain an idea\nof force by consulting our own minds.\n\n\u00a0\n\n\u00a0\n\nI had entertain'd some hopes, that however deficient our\ntheory of the intellectual world might be, it wou'd be free\nfrom those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to\nattend every explication, that human reason can give of the\nmaterial world. But upon a more strict review of the section\nconcerning personal identity, I find myself involv'd in such a\nlabyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct\nmy former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. If\nthis be not a good general reason for scepticism, 'tis at least\na sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supplied)\nfor me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my\ndecisions. I shall propose the arguments on both sides,\nbeginning with those that induc'd me to deny the strict and\nproper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being.\n\nWhen we talk of self or substance, we must have an idea\nannex'd to these terms, otherwise they are altogether unintelligible.\nEvery idea is deriv'd from preceding impressions;\nand we have no impression of self or substance, as something\nsimple and individual. We have, therefore, no idea of them\nin that sense.\n\nWhatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is\ndistinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination.\nAll perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable,\nand separable, and may be conceiv'd as separately\nexistent, and may exist separately, without any contradiction\nor absurdity.\n\nWhen I view this table and that chimney, nothing is\npresent to me but particular perceptions, which are of a like\nnature with all the other perceptions. This is the doctrine\nof philosophers. But this table, which is present to me, and\nthat chimney, may and do exist separately. This is the\ndoctrine of the vulgar, and implies no contradiction. There\nis no contradiction, therefore, in extending the same doctrine\nto all the perceptions.\n\nIn general, the following reasoning seems satisfactory. All\nideas are borrow'd from preceding perceptions. Our ideas of\nobjects, therefore, are deriv'd from that source. Consequently\nno proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to\nobjects, which is not so with regard to perceptions. But 'tis\nintelligible and consistent to say, that objects exist distinct\nand independent, without any common simple substance or\nsubject of inhesion. This proposition, therefore, can never\nbe absurd with regard to perceptions.\n\nWhen I turn my reflection on myself I never can perceive\nthis self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I\never perceive any thing but the perceptions. 'Tis the composition\nof these, therefore, which forms the self.\n\nWe can conceive a thinking being to have either many or\nfew perceptions. Suppose the mind to be reduc'd even below\nthe life of an oyster. Suppose it to have only one perception,\nas of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation.\nDo you conceive any thing but merely that perception?\nHave you any notion of self or substance? If not, the\naddition of other perceptions can never give you that notion.\n\nThe annihilation, which some people suppose to follow\nupon death, and which entirely destroys this self, is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions; love and\nhatred, pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These\ntherefore must be the same with self; since the one cannot\nsurvive the other.\n\nIs self the same with substance? If it be, how can that\nquestion have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under\na change of substance? If they be distinct, what is the\ndifference betwixt them? For my part, I have a notion of\nneither, when conceiv'd distinct from particular perceptions.\n\nPhilosophers begin to be reconcil'd to the principle, that we have no idea of external substance, distinct from the ideas of particular qualities. This must pave the way for a like\nprinciple with regard to the mind, that we have no notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions.\n\nSo far I seem to be attended with sufficient evidence. But\nhaving thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions, when I\nproceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds\nthem together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity\nand identity; I am sensible, that my account is very\ndefective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the\nprecedent reasonings cou'd have induc'd me to receive it. If\nperceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by\nbeing connected together. But no connexions among distinct\nexistences are ever discoverable by human understanding.\nWe only feel a connexion or determination of the thought, to\npass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that\nthe thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on\nthe train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas\nof them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce\neach other. However extraordinary this conclusion\nmay seem, it need not surprize us. Most philosophers seem\ninclin'd to think, that personal identity arises from consciousness;\nand consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or\nperception. The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a\npromising aspect. But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions\nin our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover\nany theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.\n\nIn short there are two principles, which I cannot render\nconsistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them,\nviz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and\nthat the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something\nsimple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real\nconnexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the\ncase. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic,\nand confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding.\nI pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely\ninsuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature\nreflections, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile\nthose contradictions.\n\nI shall also take this opportunity of confessing two other\nerrors of less importance, which more mature reflection has\ndiscover'd to me in my reasoning. The first may be found\nin Book I. page 58. where I say, that the distance betwixt\ntwo bodies is known, among other things, by the angles,\nwhich the rays of light flowing from the bodies make with\neach other. 'Tis certain, that these angles are not known to\nthe mind, and consequently can never discover the distance.\nThe second error may be found in Book I. page 96. where\nI say, that two ideas of the same object can only be different\nby their different degrees of force and vivacity. I believe there\nare other differences among ideas, which cannot properly be\ncomprehended under these terms. Had I said, that two ideas\nof the same object can only be different by their different\nfeeling, I shou'd have been nearer the truth.\n\nThere are two errors of the press, which affect the sense,\nand therefore the reader is desir'd to correct them. In Book\nI. page 190. lines 16, 17. for as the perception read a perception.\nIn Book I. p. 263. line 14. for moral read natural.\n\n\u00a0\n\nA note to Book I. page 20. line 17. to the word (resemblance.)\n\n\u00a0\n\n'Tis evident, that even different simple ideas may have\na similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary,\nthat the point or circumstance of resemblance shou'd\nbe distinct or separable from that in which they differ.\nBlue and green are different simple ideas, but are more\nresembling than blue and scarlet; tho' their perfect simplicity\nexcludes all possibility of separation or distinction.\nTis the same case with particular sounds, and tastes and\nsmells. These admit of infinite resemblances upon the\ngeneral appearance and comparison, without having any\ncommon circumstance the same. And of this we may be\ncertain, even from the very abstract terms simple idea. They\ncomprehend all simple ideas imder them. These resemble\neach other in their simplicity. And yet from their very\nnature, which excludes all composition, this circumstance,\nin which they resemble, is not distinguishable nor separable\nfrom the rest. 'Tis the same case with all the degrees in\nany quality. They are all resembling, and yet the quality,\nin any individual, is not distinct from the degree.\n\n\u00a0\n\nTo be inserted in Book I. page 47. line 4. after these words (of the present difficulty.) beginning a new paragraph.\n\n\u00a0\n\nThere are many philosophers, who refuse to assign any\nstandard of equality, but assert, that 'tis sufficient to present\ntwo objects, that are equal, in order to give us a just notion\nof this proportion. All definitions, say they, are fruitless,\nwithout the perception of such objects; and where we perceive\nsuch objects, we no longer stand in need of any definition.\nTo this reasoning I entirely agree; and assert, that\nthe only useful notion of equality, or inequality, is deriv'd\nfrom the whole united appearance and the comparison of\nparticular objects. For 'tis evident that the eye, &c.\n\n. \u00a0\n\nTo be inserted in Book I. page 52. line 17. after these words (practicable or imaginable.) beginning a new paragraph.\n\n\u00a0\n\nTo whatever side mathematicians turn, this dilemma still\nmeets them. If they judge of equality, or any other proportion,\nby the accurate and exact standard, viz. the enumeration\nof the minute indivisible parts, they both employ a\nstandard, which is useless in practice, and actually establish\nthe indivisibility of extension, which they endeavour to explode.\nOr if they employ, as is usual, the inaccurate\nstandard, deriv'd from a comparison of objects, upon their\ngeneral appearance, corrected by measuring and juxta position;\ntheir first principles, tho' certain and infallible, are too\ncoarse to afford any such subtile inferences as they commonly\ndraw from them. The first principles are founded on\nthe imagination and senses: The conclusion, therefore, can\nnever go beyond, much less contradict these faculties.\n\n\u00a0\n\nA note to Book I. page 64. line 19. to these words (impressions\nand ideas.)\n\n\u00a0\n\nAs long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions\nconcerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from\nall difficulties, and can never be embarrass'd by any question.\nThus, if it be ask'd, if the invisible and intangible distance,\ninterpos'd betwixt two objects, be something or nothing:\n'Tis easy to answer, that it is something, viz. a property of\nthe objects, which affect the senses after such a particular\nmanner. If it be ask'd, whether two objects, having such a\ndistance betwixt them, touch or not: It may be answer'd,\nthat this depends upon the definition of the word, touch. If\nobjects be said to touch, when there is nothing sensible interpos'd\nbetwixt them, these objects touch: If objects be said to\ntouch, when their images strike contiguous parts of the eye, and when the hand feels both objects successively without\nany interpos'd motion, these objects do not touch. The\nappearances of objects to our senses are all consistent; and\nno difficulties can ever arise, but from the obscurity of the\nterms we make use of.\n\nIf we carry our enquiry beyond the appearances of objects\nto the senses, I am afraid, that most of our conclusions\nwill be full of scepticism and uncertainty. Thus if it be ask'd,\nwhether or not the invisible and intangible distance be always\nfull of body, or of something that by an improvement of our\norgans might become visible or tangible, I must acknowledge,\nthat I find no very decisive arguments on either side; tho' I\nam inclin'd to the contrary opinion, as being more suitable\nto vulgar and popular notions. If the Newtonian philosophy\nbe rightly understood, it will be found to mean no more.\nA vacuum is asserted: That is, bodies are said to be plac'd\nafter such a manner, as to receive bodies betwixt them,\nwithout impulsion or penetration. The real nature of this\nposition of bodies is unknown. We are only acquainted with\nits effects on the senses, and its power of receiving body.\nNothing is more suitable to that philosophy, than a modest\nscepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of\nignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity.\n\n\u00a0\n\nFINIS.","title":"Treatise of Human Nature/Appendix","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":5537}