APPENDIX, No II.
See before, Vol. i. p. 374.
HAVING mentioned Barbeyrac's note ee, on Grotius de Jure, lib. ii. c. v. sect. 9.—in which the latter is represented as having changed his opinion, with regard to a new law of Christ on the subject of polygamy—I was much inclined to examine farther into this matter, and therefore procured Barbeyrac's French translation of Grotius de Jure, with the French annotations, to which Barbeyrac refers in the above note—imagining that I might there meet with a more ample account of the matter.
On searching the notes of this learned Frenchman on his translation of Grotius de Jure, I find abundant proof of a very great change of sentiment in that great man.
I will lay this before the reader in the very words of Barbeyrac; whose proofs are incontestible, because taken from the writings of Grotius himself.
The first passage which I would mention, is, Barbeyrac's note on Grot. de Jure, liv. ii. c. v. sect. 9. No. 7. which, as far as it relates to this matter, stands thus:
"Pour éclaircir la matiére, & pour savoir en même tems ce que pensoit nôtre auteur depuis la premiere édition de cet ouvrage, ou il ne fit neanmoins aucun changement dans cet endroit; il est bon d'ajouter ici quelques unes des reflexions que l'on trouve dans son commentaire sur le Nouveau Testament, Matt. v. 32. Il remarque donc d'abord, que notre Seigneur Jesus Christ ne pretend point, dans ce passage, non plus que dans tout le reste de son discours fait sur la montagne, abolir aucune partie de la loi de Moïse: il veut seulement montrer de quelle maniere, & en quel cas un homme-de-bien peut profiter de la permission du divorce accordée par un des reglemens politiques de cette loi, qui subsistoit encore dans le tems qu'il parloit. Il ne s'agit point par consequent d'une cause de divorce portée devant les juges: car, outre qu'un mari, qui vouloit repudier sa femme, n'étoit point obligé, selon la loi, de le faire par voie de justice; lors qu'il accusoit sa femme d'adultére devant les juges, cela alloit à la faire punir de mort, selon la loi, & non pas obtenir une dissolution de marriage.
"Ainsi quand nôtre seigneur par le de l'adultére, comme d'une juste cause de divorce, il suppose ou un mari doux & clement, qui ne vouloit point faire punir sa femme, quelque coupable qu'elle fut d'infidelité, comme Joseph en usa à l'egard de Marie, dans le tems qu'il ne pouvoit encore savoir la cause miraculeuse de sa grossesse; ou bien un mari, qui n'avoit pas dequoi prouver en justice l'infidelité de sa femme, quoiqu'il en fut persuadé, ou que même il en eut des preuves indubitables pour lui."
"To elucidate the matter, and to know at the same time what our author (Grotius) thought since the first edition of this work (De Jure)—in which nevertheless he made no alteration of this passage—it is proper to add here some of the reflections which we find in his notes on the New Testament, Matt. v. 32. He remarks then, first, that our Lord Jesus Christ doth not intend at all in this passage, any more than in the whole of his sermon upon the mount, to abolish any part of the law of Moses—he means only to shew after what manner, and in what case, a good man might avail himself of the permission of divorce, which was granted by one of the political regulations of that law which still subsisted at the time he spake. The question, consequently, was not concerning a cause of divorce brought before the judges; for, besides that an husband who would repudiate his wife was not obliged, according to the law, to do it in a judicial way, it must be observed, that when he accused his wife of adultery before the judges, that would have tended to her being punished with death, according to the law, and not to the obtaining of a dissolution of the marriage.
Also, where our Lord speaks of adultery as a just cause of divorce, he supposes, either a mild and kind husband, who would not have his wife punished, however guilty she might be of infidelity—as Joseph acted with respect to Mary at the time when he could not know the miraculous cause of her pregnancy—or else an husband who had not full legal proof of his wife's infidelity, though he was persuaded of it, or even had indubitable proofs with respect to himself."
Then follows a long passage on the subject of divorce; after which, Barbeyrac gives us Grotius's thoughts on the latter part of the verse.
"Dans les paroles suivantes—& celui qui epouse la femme repudiée, commet adultére—la loi de Moïse subsistant encore, comme nous l'avons dit, il faut entendre les paroles de Jesus Christ de celui qui epousoit une femme repudiée, avant qu'on eût tenté toutes les voies possibles de la reconcilier avec son mari, comme l'Apôtre St. Paul le prescrit, q Cor. vii. 11, ou ce qui est encore pis, de ceux qui etant devenus amoureux des femmes d'autrui cherchoient à s'en emparer par un divorce.
"C'est aussi à cela que se rapporte ce qui dit notre Seigneur, Matt. xix. 9. ou il explique plus au long sa pensée. Celui qui répudiera sa femme, et en epousera une autre, &c. car & celui qui epousoit la femme repudiée, empechoit par là qu'elle ne retournât avec son mari, qui n'auroit pû après cela la reprendre, quand il l'auroit voulu; & le mari de la femme repudiée, des-là qu'il en epousoit une autre, donnoit lieu de croire qu'il n'étoit point disposé à reprendre la premiere, & ainsi il lui fournissoit occasion, entant qu'en lui étoit, ou de s'abandonner à l'impudicité, ou de s'engager avec un autre mari: car c'est ainsi qu'il faut entendre le terme μοιχαται que l'on traduit commet adultére, mais qui doit signifer la meme chose que ποιει μοιχᾶσθαι fait commettre adultére, dans l'autre passage parallel du même evangeliste; selon le stile des Hebreux qui attribuent à quelqu'un directement, ce à quoi il donne occasion par quelque action propre. Voiez. Rom. viii. 26. Gal. iv. 6.
"Voila en substance ce que dit notre auteur dans ses notes sur le Nouveau Testament. D'ou il paroit, que ses idees n'étoient pas tout-à-fait les mêmes, quand il composa l'ouvrage que nous expliquons, quoiqu' il n'aît depuis rien changé dans cet endroit.
"De tout ce que l'on vient de voir, il s'ensuit, que dans les passages de l'evangile qu'il cite ici en marge pour montrer que nôtre Seigneur Jesus Christ a defendu par une de ses loix la polygamie, il ne s'agit que du divorce; & cela par opposition aux fausses idées des Juifs, qui le croioient permis en conscience pour quelque cause que ce fût. Matt. xix. 2.
"Aussi voyons nous que notre auteur dans son traité de la verité de la religion Chrétienne, publié pour la premiere fois en 1639, c'est à dire, environ deux ans avant ses notes sur le Nouveau Testament; lorsqu'il parle du marriage du'n avec une, après avoir dit, qu'il y en a peu des nations dans le paganisme parmi lesquelles on se soit contenté d'une femme, comme faisoient les Germains & les Romains; ajoute seulement, que les Chrêtiens suivent cette maniere de marriage, lib. ii. § 13. & dans les notes il ne cite aucun passage de l'evangile, mais seulement ces paroles de 1 Cor. vii. 4. Une femme n'est pas maitresse de son corps, mais son mari; de meme un mari n'est pas maitre de son corps, mais sa femme. Or, dans ses notes posthumes sur les epîtres, il explique ces paroles conformément à la suite du discours, comme n'emportant autre chose que le droit qu'a une femme d'exiger que son mari ne lui refuse point le devoir conjugal; parce que en vertu du marriage, elle entre avec lui dans une societé qui demande l'usage reciproque de leurs corps: Οὐκ εξουσιαζει hic est, non habet jus plenum atque integrum; nam non vitæ tantum, sed & corporum est initia κοινωνια. In re autem sociali, nemo sociorum jus plenum habet.
"Mais il n'ensuit point de là, qu'un mari ne puisse avoir plus d'une femme: car les societéz ne se sont pas toujours sur un pié egal. Ainsi ce n'est que par accommodation que notre auteur applique ici les paroles de St. Paul, & pour donner à entendre que les Chrétiens ont renoncé à la polygamie, plûtot pour suivre l'esprit & le genie de l'evangile, qui porte à eviter ce dont on peut abuser facilement, que pour obeïr à une loi expresse de nôtre Seigneur, ou de ses apôtres. Voiez Mr. Le Clerc, Hist. Eccl. Prolegom. sect. 3. c. iv. sect. 5. num. 9. p. 162. Il n'y a nulle apparence que Jesus Christ aît voulu obliger ceux qui avoient plusieurs femmes, avant que de devenir ses disciples, à les renvoier toutes, hormis une."
"In the words which follow—And he that marrieth her that is put away, committeth adultery—the law of Moses yet subsisting, as we have before observed, we must understand the words of Jesus Christ to concern him who married a divorced woman, before all possible ways had been tried to reconcile her to her husband, as St. Paul prescribes 1 Cor. vii. 11.—or, what is worse still, of those who having become fond of the wives of others, endeavoured to get possession of them by means of a divorce in order to possess them.
"It is to this also, that what our Lord saith, Matt. xix. 9. relates, where he explains his meaning more fully—Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, &c.; for both he who married the divorced woman, hindered her by that means from returning to her husband, who could not, after this, have taken her if he would; and the husband of the divorced wife, from the instant he married another woman, gave occasion to think, that he was not at all disposed to retake the first woman; and thus he gave occasion to her, as far as in him lay, either to abandon herself to lewdness, or to engage with another husband . For it is thus we must understand the term μοιχᾶται, which they translate—committeth adultery, but which ought to signify the same as ποιει μοιχᾶσθαι—causeth to commit adultery; as in the parallel place of the same evangelist—(ch. v. 32.)—according to the style of the Hebrews, who attribute that to a person directly, which by any action of his own he is the occasion of." See Rom. viii. 26. Gal. iv. 6.
"This is the substance of what our author says in his notes on the New Testament: from whence it appears, that his ideas were not altogether the same when he composed the work which we are now explaining, though he has not since made any alteration in this passage.
"From all that we have been observing, it follows, that in the passages of the gospel, which Grotius here cites in the margin, to shew that our Saviour prohibited, by one of his laws, polygamy, the subject was only concerning divorce; and that in opposition to the false notions of the Jews, who believed that in conscience it was permitted for any cause whatsoever. Matt. xix. 2.
"Let us observe also, that our author, in his treatise of the truth of the Christian Religion, first published in 1639, that is to say, about two years after his notes on the New Testament, speaking of the marriage of one man with one woman, after having said that there were few heathen nations, among which people contented themselves with one wife, as the Germans and Romans did, only adds, that the Christians followed this manner of marriage, lib. ii. sect. 13; and in the notes he does not cite a single passage from the gospel, but only these words of 1 Cor. vii. 4. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband: and likewise also the husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife. But in his posthumous notes on the Epistles, he explains these words conformably to the sequel of the discourse, as importing nothing else but the right which a wife hath to require that her husband shall not refuse her the conjugal duty; because, in virtue of the marriage, she enters with him into a society which demands the reciprocal use of their bodies. Ὀυκ ἐξουσιαζει, here signifies—he has not a full and entire right—for a communion, not of life only, but of their bodies also, is entered into. However, in a matter of partnership, neither of the parties have a full right.
"But it doth not follow from thence, that a man can have but one wife; for partnerships are not always made upon an equal footing. So that it is only by way of accommodation that our author applies these words of St. Paul, and to give us to understand, that Christians renounced polygamy, rather to follow the spirit and genius of the gospel, which carries us to avoid what may be easily abused, than to obey any express law of our Lord or of His Apostles. See Le Clerc Hist. Eccles. Prolegom. sect. 3. c. iv. sect. 5. numb. ix. p. 162. There is no appearance that Jesus Christ had any intention to oblige those who had several wives, before they became his disciples, to send away all but one." Barbeyrac, in another part of the French notes on his translation of Grot. de Jure—viz. Liv. i. c. 1. sect. 15. n. 3.—expresses himself thus—
Quand Moïse dit que l'homme quittera son pere & sa mere, pour s'attacher à sa femme, & qu'ils deviendront une seule chair, cela ne fait rien ni pour, ni contre, la polygamie, ou le divorce; l'expression, devenir une seule chair, signifie seulement par elle-même, qu'il y auroit, entre un mari & sa femme, une union très étroite: mais elle n'emporte point qu'un mari ne puisse avoir en même tems une semblable liaison avec deux ou plusieurs femmes; & a l'egard de la dissolution du marriage, tout ce qu'on en peut inferer, c'est qu'il ne doit pas être rompu legerement, & sans quelque bonne raison. Selon le stile des Hebreux, le mot de chair marque toute liaison, tant d'affinité que de consanguinité, comme l'a remarqué Mr. Le Clerc. C'est ainsi que Laban dit à Jacob, Gen. xxix. 14. Tu es mon os & ma chair—c'est-à-dire, je vous reconnois pour un des mes parens. Comme donc tout autant de parens qu'a une personne sont sa chair, de même rien n'empêche qu'un homme ne puisse être dit, selon ce stile, une même chair avec plusieurs femmes."
"When Moses says, that a man shall leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife, and they shall become one flesh—this makes nothing for or against polygamy or divorce; the expression—become one flesh—signifies only by itself, that there should be between a man and his wife a most strict union: but it does not import that an husband may not have at the same time, a like bond with two or more wives. As to the dissolution of the marriage, all that one can infer from it is, that it ought not to be broken lightly, and without some good reason. According to the style of the Hebrews, the word flesh denotes all relation, as well of affinity as of consanguinity, as Mr. Le Clerc has observed. Thus Laban says to Jacob, Gen. xxix. 14. Surely thou art my bone and my flesh—that is to say, I acknowledge thee for one of my relations.—As therefore all the relations which any person hath are his flesh, so nothing hinders, but that a man, according to this style of speaking, may be called one same flesh with many wives."
On that part of Liv. ii. c. v. sect. 9. where Grotius says—that "God's giving but one woman to one man, sufficiently shews what is most agreeable to God, and consequently this has always been comely and commendable; but it does not follow, adds Grotius, that one cannot do otherwise without a crime: for where there is no law, there is no violation of law: now at that time there was no law about the matter."
Grotius has a long note on part of this passage, which Barbeyrac translates; and then adds———
"A juger de cette question, indépendamment des loix civiles, il est certain que souvent on ne pourroit user de la liberté de la polygamie, sans pecher contre quelque vertu, & s'engager dans des inconvéniens sacheux; à cause desquels la prudence des legislateurs a demandé qu'on defendît entierement d'avoir plus d'une femme à la fois. Mais on ne sauroit inferer de là que la chose soit mauvaise en elle-même, selon le droit naturel: tout ce qu'on peut dire, c'est que c'est une des ces choses indifferentes de leur nature, dont il est facile d'abuser, comme le jeu, par exemple, & plusieurs autres divertissemens, dont le plus sür est de se priver, pour peu qu'on se sente de la disposition à en faire mauvais usage."
"To judge of this question, independently of civil laws, it is certain, that often one cannot use the liberty of polygamy without offending against some virtue, and engaging in grievous inconveniences; on account of which, the prudence of legislators has required, that the having more than one wife at a time, should be prohibited entirely. But we cannot infer from thence, that the thing is evil in itself, according to natural right: all that can be said is, that it is one of those things indifferent in their nature, which it is easy to abuse; such as gaming, for instance, and many other amusements, of which it is the surest way to deprive ourselves, if we perceive in the least a disposition in ourselves to make a bad use of them."
Barbeyrac, on Grot. de Jur. liv. i. c. 1. § 17. note 3. lays it down as a rule, that—"God cannot absolutely permit the least thing which is evil in itself, though he be considered as acting in the quality of a temporal monarch"—(as under the theocracy)—"for this character does not strip him of his holiness, nor does it hinder us from supposing that he approves, as innocent at least, all that he permits, either in formal terms, or by necessary consequence from any express law or ordinance. Here then, in my opinion," adds he, "are the consequences which we may draw from the divine permission, where reasons drawn from the nature of the things themselves, to which attention is always to be paid, may appear doubtful."
He then proceeds to lay down two general rules, which are well worth our attention.
"I. Quand Dieu permet une chose en certain cas, ou à certaines personnes, ou par rapport à certaines gens; on doit inferer de là, que cette chose permise n'est point mauvaise de sa nature."
"I. When God permits a thing in a certain case, or to certain persons, or with respect to certain people, we ought to infer from thence, that the thing which is permitted is not evil in itself."
After giving other examples to illustrate this rule, he proceeds—
"Il est defendu aux Rois, par la loi de Moïse (Deut. xvii. 17.) D'avoir un trop grand nombre des femmes, de peur qu'elles ne les portent à violer la loi: par la le legislateur permet tacitement à eux, & à tous les autres, d'avoir plus d'une femme sans quoi la defense seroit fort superfluë. Donc la polygamie n'est pas mauvaise, & illicite de sa nature."
By the law of Moses (Deut. xvii. 17.) the kings (of Israel) are forbidden to have too great a number of wives, lest they should carry them into a violation of the law: by this the legislator tacitly permits them, and all others, to have more than one wife, otherwise the command were superfluous. From hence it follows, that polygamy is not evil and illicit in itself."
"II. Lorsque Dieu regle la maniere d'une chose, ou qu'il fait par rapport à cette chose, quelque autre reglement, qui suppose necessairement qu'elle est permise; il faut voir s'il s'agit d'un seul acte passager, ou d'une chose qui par elle-meme, ou par ses suites, se reduise à une habitude, & une pratique continuelle."
"II. When God regulates the manner of a thing, or makes, with respect to the thing, some other regulation, which necessarily supposes the thing itself permitted; we should consider whether this concerns a single transitory act, or something which in itself, or by its consequences, reduce itself into habit and continual practice."
"Dans le dernier cas la permission emporte toujours une veritable approbation de la chose dont il s'agit, comme licite par elle-même. Il est impossible que Dieu permette, par exemple, le metier de brigand, de pirate, d'assassin, de duelliste, &c. sous quelques conditions que ce soit. Lors donc qu'on voit qu'il règle certains cas qui supposent la polygamie permise, comme dans Deut. xxi. 15. on a tout lieu d'inferer de cela seul que la polygamie n'est pas necessairement contraire au droit naturel.
"In the latter case, the permission always implies a real approbation of the thing in question, as lawful in itself. It is impossible that God should allow the trade, for instance, of a robber—of a pirate—of an assassin—of a duellist, &c. under any conditions whatsoever. As then we see that He regulates certain cases, which suppose a permission of polygamy—as in Deut. xxi. 15.—we are at full liberty to infer from thence, that polygamy is not necessarily contrary to natural right."
More transcripts might be made from this very learned and ingenious man, to the same purpose; but these are sufficient to shew the force of truth, over a liberal and candid mind, where scripture is made the one standard of decision as to good and evil. Influenced by this, the great Grotius shall vary from his first opinions, and Barbeyrac, though no friend to polygamy, yet does not offer, in a single instance, to condemn it on the footing of divine revelation; he fairly and honestly owns, that its abolition has been owing to human legislation only—and of course, that it is not evil in itself—not forbidden either in the Old or New Testament;—so far from it, most certainly approved and allowed—and, as such, regulated by the divine law.
I would not be understood to have quoted Grotius, Barbeyrac, or any other great and learned author, in the course of this work, with the least view of determining any matter of faith, or of deciding, either one way or the other, as to what is agreeable, or otherwise, to the mind and will of God, touching any of the points which have been discoursed upon. The writings of men are evidence of their opinions; but whether those opinions are right or wrong, can only appear from their conformity or disagreement with the scriptures. To these alone, therefore, we must appeal, for all decision in religious matters—if we think with these, we need not concern ourselves who differs from us; if our notions of religious truths are only derived from the opinions or reasonings of fallible men like ourselves, we are on no better footing than our Popish neighbours, or our heathen ancestors, as to any reason which we can give for the hope that is in us.—Therefore let me finish the whole of this work, as I concluded the Introduction to it—to the law and to the testimony.—Is. viii. 20.
As for any thing else, whether it be the wisdom of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, &c. among the antients—of Sir Isaac Newton, Mr. Locke, Bishop Warburton, or the old woman that sells apples at the corner of a street, among the moderns—the author esteems it all equally venerable, equally to be depended upon, where God's mind and will is concerned, independently of revelation; and he does earnestly hope, that every reader—if the author might presume to name himself after such great authorities—will, throughout the perusal of these volumes, treat him in the same way, and not believe one word, but as it appears consonant to the scriptures—For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man which is in him? Even so, the things of God knoweth no one (οὐδεις) but the spirit of God. 1 Cor. ii. 11.
END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.
References:
Uncharted Knowledge
Wisdom From Previous Realities
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