Part I. INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER I. THE PROBLEM.
" WHY do philosophers differ so widely as to the
first principles of Morals, but agree respecting the
conclusions and duties which they deduce from those
principles ? "
This is the question which was set as subject for
a prize essay by the Royal Society of Holland at
Harlem, 1810, and solved by J. C. F. Meister ; and
in comparison with the task before us, the inquiry
presented no extraordinary difficulty. For :
(1) The present question of the Royal Society has
to do with nothing less important than the objectively
true basis of morals, and consequently of morality.
It is an Academy, be it observed, which invites this
inquiry ; and hence, from its position, it has no
practical purpose in view ; it asks for no discourse
inculcating the exercise of uprightness and virtue,
with arguments based on evidence, of which the
plausibility is dwelt on, and the sophistry evaded, as
is done in popular manuals. Rather, as its aim is
not practical, but only theoretical, it desires nothing
but the purely philosophical, that is, the objective,
undisguised, and naked exposition of the ultimate
basis of all good moral conduct, independent of every positive law, of every unproved assumption,
and hence free from all groundwork, whether meta-
physical or mythical. This, however, is a problem whose bristling difficalties are attested by the circumstance that all philosophers in every age and land have blunted their wits on it, and still more by the fact that all gods, oriental and occidental, actually derive their existence therefrom. Should therefore this opportunity serve to solve it, assuredly the Royal Society will not have expended its money amiss.
(2) Apart from this, a peculiar disadvantage will
be found to attach to any theoretical examination of
the basis of morals, because such an investigation
is suspiciously like an attempt to undermine, and
occasion the collapse of, the structure itself. The fact
is, that in this matter we are apt to so closely
associate practical aims with theory, that the well-
meant zeal of the former is with difficulty restrained
from ill-timed intervention. Nor is it within the
power of every one to clearly dissociate the purely
theoretical search for objective truth, purged of all
interest, even of that of morality as practised, from
a shameless attack on the heart's sacred convictions.
Therefore he, who here puts his hand to the plough,
must, for his encouragement, ever bear in mind that
from the doings and affairs of the populace, from the
turmoil and bustle of the market-place, nothing is
further removed than the quiet retreat and sanctuary
of the Academy, where no noise of the world may
enter, and where the only god raised on a pedestal
is Truth, in solitary, naked sublimity.
The conclusion from these two premises is that I must be allowed complete freedom of speech, as
well as the right of questioning everything ; and
furthermore, that if I succeed in really contributing
something, however small, to this subject, then that
contribution will be of no little importance.
But there are still other difficulties obstructing
my path. The Royal Society asks for a short mono-
graph setting forth the basis of Ethics entirely by
itself; which means to say, independent of its con-
nection with the general system, i.e., the actual
metaphysics of any philosophy. Such a demand
must not only render the accomplishment of the
task more difficult, but necessarily make it imper-
fect. Long ago Christian Wolff, in his Philosophia
Practica (P. II., 28) observed : " Tenebrae in
philosophia practica non dispelluntur, nisi luce meta-
physicd effulgente" (Darkness in practical philo-
sophy is only dispersed, when the light of meta-
physics shines on it ;) and Kant in the Preface to
his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten remarks :
" Metaphysics must precede, and is in every case
indispensable to, moral philosophy." For, just as
every religion on earth, so far as it prescribes
morality, does not leave the latter to rest on itself,
but backs it by a body of dogmas (the chief end
of which is precisely to be the prop of the moral
sense) ; so with philosophy, the ethical basis, what-
ever it be, must itself attach to, and find its support
in, one system of metaphysics or another, that is
to say, iu a presupposed explanation of the world,
and of existence in general. This is so, because the
ultimate and true conclusion concerning the essential nature of the Universe must necessarily be closely connected with that touching the ethical significance
of human action ; and because, in any case, that
which is presented as the foundation of morality, if
it is not to be merely an abstract formula, floating
in the clouds, and out of contact with the real world,
must be some fact or other discoverable either in the
objective kosmos, or else in man's consciousness ;
but, as such, it can itself be only a phaenomenon ;
and consequently, like all other phaenomena, it
requires a further explanation ; and this explanation
is supplied by Metaphysics. Philosophy indeed is
such a connected whole that it is impossible to
exhaustively discuss any one part without all the
others being involved. Thus Plato says quite
correctly : Wvxfjs ovv (f>vcri,v a/o>? Xoyou Karavoijcrai
otet SVVCITOV elvai, avev T% rov o\ov <t/crea)<? ; (Phaedr.,
p. 371, Ed. Bip.) (Do you think then it is possible
to understand at all adequately the nature of the
soul, without at the same time understanding the
nature of the Whole, i.e., the totality of things?)
The metaphysics of nature, the metaphysics of morals,
and the metaphysics of the beautiful mutually pre-
suppose each other, and only when taken as connected
together do they complete the explanation of things
as they really are, and of existence in general. So
that whoever should exactly trace one of these three
to its ultimate origin, would be found to have neces-
sarily brought the others into his solution of the
problem ; just as an absolutely clear and exhaustive
understanding of any single thing in the world would
imply a perfect comprehension of everything else.
Now if we were to start from a given system of
metaphysics, which, is assumed to be true, we should
reach synthetically a basis of morals, and this basis,
being, so to say, built up from below, would provide
the resulting ethical structure with a sure foundation.
But in the present case, since the terms of the question
enforce the separation of ethics from all metaphysics,
there remains nothing but the analytic method, which
proceeds from facts either of external experience, or
of consciousness. It is true that thus the ultimate
origin of the latter may be traced back to the human
spirit, a source which then, however, must be taken
as a fundamental fact, a primary phaenomenon, un-
derivable from anything else, with the result that the
whole explanation remains simply a psychological one.
At best its connection with any general metaphysical
standpoint can only be described as accessory. Oil
the other hand, the fundamental datum, the primary
phaenomenon of Ethics, so found in man's nature, could
itself in its turn be accounted for and explained, if
we might first treat of metaphysics, and then by the
synthetic method deduce Ethics from it. This would
mean, however, nothing less than the construction of
a complete system of philosophy, whereby the limits
of the given question would be far exceeded. I am,
therefore, compelled to answer it within the lines
which its own isolated narrowness has laid down.
And lastly, there is the following consideration. The
basis on which it is here intended to place Ethics will
prove to be a very small one ; and the consequence is
that of the many lawful, approvable, and praiseworthy
actions of mankind, only the minority will be found to
spring from purely moral motives, while the majority
will have to be attributed to other sources. This
gives less satisfaction, has not such a specious glitter
as, let us say, a Categorical Imperative, which always
stands ready for commands, only that itself in its turn
may command what ought to be done, and what ought
to be left undone ; not to mention other foundations
that are entirely material.
I can only, therefore, remind the reader of the
saying in Ecclesiastes (iv. 6) : " Better is an handful
with quietness, than both the hands full with travail
and vexation of spirit." In all knowledge the
genuine, proof-resisting, indestructible coefficient is
never large ; just as in the earth's metallic strata a
hundredweight of stone hides but a few ounces of
gold. But whether others will prefer as I do the
assured to the bulky possession, the small quantity
of gold which remains in the crucible to the big
lump of matter that was brought along with it; or
whether I shall rather be charged with having re-
moved from Ethics its basis, instead of providing one,
in so far as I prove that the lawful and commendable
actions of mankind often do not contain a particle
of pure moral worth, and in most cases only a very
little, resting, as they do, otherwise on motives, the
sufficiency of which must ultimately be referred to
the egoism of the doer ; all this I must leave un-
decided; and I do so, not without anxiety, nay, rather
with resignation, because I have long since been of
the same mind as Johann Georg von Zimmermann,
when he said : " Rest assnred until your dying day,
that nothing in the world is so rare as a good judge."
( Ueber die Einsamkeit ; Pt. I., Ch. iii., p. 93.)
For all true and voluntary righteousness, for all
lovingkindness, for all nobleness, wherever these
qualities may be found, my theory can only point
to a very small foundation ; whereas my opponents
confidently construct broad bases for Morals, which
are made strong enough for every possible burden,
and are at the same time thrust upon every doubter's
conscience, accompanied with a threatening side-glance
at his own morality. As contrasted with these,
my own position is indeed in sore and sorry plight.
It is like that of Cordelia before King Lear, with
her weakly worded assurance of dutiful affection,
compared with the effusive protestations of her more
eloquent sisters. So that there seems to be need of
a cordial that may be furnished by some maxim
taken from intellectual hunting grounds, such as,
ILagna est vis veritatis, et praevalebit. (Great is the
strength of truth, and it will prevail.) But to a man
who has lived and laboured even this fails to give
much encouragement. Meanwhile, I will for once
make the venture with truth on my side ; and what
opposes me will at the same time oppose truth.
CHAPTER II. GENERAL RETROSPECT.
FOR the people morality comes through, and is
founded on, theology, as the express will of God.
On the other hand, we see philosophers, with few
exceptions, taking special pains to entirely exclude
this kind of foundation ; indeed, so they may but
avoid it, they prefer even to find a refuge in sophistry.
Whence comes this antithesis ? Assuredly no more
efficient basis for Ethics can be imagined than the
theological ; for who would be so bold as to oppose
the will of the Almighty and the Omniscient ?
Unquestionably, no one ; if only this will were pro-
claimed in an authentic, official manner (if one may
say so), whereby no possible room for doubt could
be left. This, however, is precisely the condition
which does not admit of being realised. It is rather
the inverse process which is attempted. The law
declared to be the will of God men try to accredit
as such, by demonstrating its agreement with our
own independent, and hence, natural moral views,
and an appeal is consequently made to these as being
more direct and certain. But this is not all. We
perceive that an action performed solely through
threat of punishment and promise of reward would
be moral much more in appearance than in reality ;
since, after all, it would have its root in Egoism,
and in the last resort the scale would be turned
by the greater or less amount of credulity evinced
in each case. Now it was none other than Kant who
destroyed the foundations of Speculative Theology,
which up to his time were accounted unshakable.
Speculative Theology had hitherto sustained Ethics,
and in order to procure for the former an existence
of some sort, if only an imaginary one, his wish
was to proceed inversely, and make Ethics sustain
Speculative Theology. So that it is now more than
ever impossible to think of basing Ethics on Theology ;
for no one knows any longer which of the two is to
be the supporter, and which the supported, and the
consequence is a circulus vitiosus.
It is precisely through the influence of Kant's
philosophy ; through the contemporaneous effect of
the unparalleled progress made in all the natural
sciences, with regard to which every past age in
comparison with our own appears childish ; and lastly,
through the knowledge of Sanskrit literature, and
of those most ancient and widest spread faiths,
Brahmanism and Buddhism, which, as far as time
and space go, are the most important religious
systems of mankind, and, as a matter of fact, are
the original native religious of our own race, now
well known to be of Asiatic descent our race, to
which in its new strange home they once more send
a message across the centuries ; it is because of
all this, I say, that the fundamental philosophical
convictions of learned Europe have in the course
of the last fifty years undergone a revolution, which
perhaps many only reluctantly admit, but which
cannot be denied. The result of this change is that
the old supports of Ethics have been shown to be
rotten, while the assurance remains that Ethics
itself can never collapse ; whence the conviction
arises that for it there must exist a groundwork
different from any hitherto provided, and adaptable
to the advanced views of the age. The need of such
is making itself felt more and more, and in it we
undoubtedly find the reason that has induced the
Royal Society to make the present important question
the subject of a prize essay.
In every age much good morality has been preached ;
but the explanation of its raison d'etre has always
been encompassed with difficulties. On the whole
we discern an endeavour to get at some objective
truth, from which the ethical injunctions could be
logically deduced ; and it has been sought for both
in the nature of things, and in the nature of man ;
but in vain. The result was always the same. The
will of each human unit was found to gravitate
solely towards its own individual welfare, the idea
of which in its entirety is designated by the term
" blissfulness " (Gluckseligkeif) ; and this striving
after self-satisfaction leads mankind by a path very
different to the one morality would fain point out.
The endeavour was next made now to identify " bliss-
fulness " with virtue, now to represent it as virtue's
consequence and effect. Both attempts have always
failed ; and this for no want of sophistry. Then
recourse was had to artificial formulas, purely objective and abstract, as well a posteriori as a
priori, from which correct ethical conduct undoubtedly
admitted of being deduced. But there was nothing
found in man's nature to afford these a footing, where-
by they might have availed to guide the strivings
of his volition, in face of its egoistic tendency. It
appears to me superfluous to verify all this by
describing and criticising every hitherto existing
foundation of morality ; not only because I share
Augustine's opinion, non est pro magno habendum
quid homines senserint, sed quae sit rei veritas (It
is the truth about a thing, not men's opinions
thereon, that is of importance) ; but also because
it would be like y\avicas ei9 'AOijvas Kopi^ew (i.e.,
carrying coals to Newcastle) ; for previous attempts
to give a foundation to Ethics are sufficiently well-
known to the Royal Society, and the very question
proposed shows that it is also convinced of their
inadequateness. Any reader less well-informed will
find a careful, if not complete, presentment of the
attempts hitherto made, in Garve's Uebersicht der
wrnehmsten Principien der Sittenlehre, and again,
in Staudlin's Geschichte der Moralpkilosophie. It is
of course very disheartening to reflect that Ethics,
which so directly concerns life, has met with the
same unhappy fate as the abstruse science of Meta-
physics, and that its first principle, though perpetually
sought for ever since the time of Socrates, has still
to be found. Moreover, we must remember that in
Ethics, much more than in any other science, what
is essential is contained in its fundamental propo-
sitions ; the deductions are so simple that they come
of themselves. For all are capable of drawing a
conclusion, but few of judging. And this is exactly
the reason why lengthy text-books and dissertations
on Morals are as superfluous as they are tedious.
Meantime, if I may postulate an acquaintance with
all the former foundations of Ethics, my task will
be lightened. Whoever observes how ancient as
well as modern philosophers (the Church creed
sufficed for the middle ages) have had recourse to
the most diverse and extraordinary arguments, in
order to provide for the generally recognised require-
ments of morality a basis capable of proof, and how
notwithstanding they admittedly failed ; he will be
able to measure the difficulty of the problem, and
estimate my contribution accordingly. And he whc
has learned to know that none of the roads hitherto
struck on lead to the goal, will be the more willing
to tread with me a very different path from these
a path which up to now either has not been noticed,
or else has been passed over with contempt ; perhaps
because it was the most natural one. As a matter
of fact my solution of the question will remind many
of Columbus' egg.
It is solely to the latest attempt at giving a basis to
Ethics I mean the Kantian that a critical examina-
tion will be devoted. I shall make it all the more
exhaustive, partly because the great ethical reform
of Kant gave to this science a foundation having
a real superiority to previous ones ; and partly be-
cause it still remains the last important pronounce-
ment in this domain ; for which reason it has obtained
general acceptance up to the present day, and is
universally taught, although differently garnished by
certain changes in the demonstration and in the ter-
minology. It is the ethical system of the last sixty
years, which must be removed ere we enter on another
path. Furthermore, my criticism of the Kantian basis
will give me occasion to examine and discuss most
of the fundamental conceptions of Ethics, and the
outcome of this investigation I shall later on be
able to postulate. Besides, inasmuch as opposites
illustrate each other, it is exactly this course which
will be the best preparation and guide, indeed the
direct way, to my own position, which in its essential
points is diametrically opposed to Kant's. It would
therefore be a very perverse beginning to skip the
following criticism, and turn at once to the positive
part of my exposition, which then would remain only
half intelligible.
In any case the time has assuredly arrived for
once to cite Ethics before the bar of a searching
scrutiny. During more than half a century it has
been lying comfortably on the restful cushion which
Kant arranged for it the cushion of the Categorical
Imperative of Practical Reason. In our day this
Imperative is mostly introduced to us under a name
which, being smoother and less ostentations, has
obtained more currency. It is called " the Moral
Law " ; and thus entitled, with a passing bow to
reason and experience, it slips through unobserved
into the house. Once inside, there is no end to
its orders and commands ; nor can it ever afterwards
be brought to account. It was proper, indeed in-
evitable, that Kant, as the inventor of the thing,
should remain satisfied with his creation, particularly
as he shelved by its means errors still more glaring.
But to be obliged to look on and see asses disporting
themselves on the comfortable cushion which he
prepared, and which since his time has been more
and more trampled on and flattened out this truly
is hard. I allude to the daily hackney compilers,
who, with the ready confidence born of stupidity,
imagine that they have given a foundation to Ethics,
if they do but appeal to that " Moral Law " which
is alleged to be inherent in our reason ; and then
they complacently weave upon this such a confused
and wide-reaching tissue of phrases that they succeed
in rendering unintelligible the clearest and simplest
relations of life : and all this, without ever once
seriously asking themselves whether in point of
fact there really does exist such a " Moral Law," as
a convenient code of morality, graven in our heads
or hearts.
Hence I admit the especial pleasure I feel in
proceeding to remove from Ethics its broad cushion
of repose, and I unreservedly declare my intention
of proving that Kant's Practical Reason and Categorical Imperative are completely unwarrantable,
baseless, and fabricated assumptions ; and I shall
further show that Kant's whole system, like those
of his predecessors, is in want of a solid foundation.
Consequently Ethics will again be consigned to its
former entirely helpless condition, there to remain,
until I come to demonstrate the true moral principle
of human nature a principle which is incontestably
efficient, and has its root in our very being. The
latter, however, has no such broad basis to offer as
the above-mentioned cushion ; so that, doubtless, those
who are accustomed to take things easily, will not
abandon their comfortable old seat, before they are
thoroughly aware how deeply the ground on which
it stands is undermined
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