part ill.
THE FOUNDING OE ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM.
THUS the foundation which Kant gave to Ethics,
which for the last sixty years has been regarded as
a sure basis, proves to be an inadmissible assumption,
and merely theological Morals in disguise ; it sinks
therefore before our eyes into the deep gulf of
philosophic error, which perhaps will never be filled
up. That the previous attempts to lay a foundation
are still less satisfactory, I take for granted, as I
have already said. They consist, for the most part,
of unproved assertions, drawn from the impalpable
world of dreams, and at the same time like Kant's
system itself full of an artificial subtlety dealing
with the finest distinctions, and resting on the
most abstract conceptions. We find difficult combi-
nations ; rules invented for the purpose ; formulae
balanced on a needle's point ; and stilted maxims,
from which it is no longer possible to look down
and see life as it really is with all its turmoil.
Such niceties are doubtless admirably adapted for
the lecture-room, if only with a view to sharpen-
ing the wits ; but they can never be the cause of
the impulse to act justly and to do good, which
is found in every man ; as also they are powerless
133
134 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
to counterbalance the deep-seated tendency to in-
justice and hardness of heart. Neither is it possible
to fasten the reproaches of conscience upon them ; to
attribute the former to the breaking of such hair-
splitting precepts only serves to make the same
ridiculous. In a word, artificial associations of ideas
like these cannot possibly if we take the matter
seriously contain the true incentive to justice and
loving-kindness. Rather must this be something
that requires but little reflection, and still less
abstraction and complicated synthesis ; something
that, independent of the training of the understanding,
speaks to every one, even to the rudest, a something
resting simply on intuitive perception, and forcing its
way home as a direct emanation from the reality of
things. So long as Ethics cannot point to a foundation
of this sort, she may go on with her discussions, and
make a great display in the lecture-rooms ; but real
life will only pour contempt upon her. I must there-
fore give our moralists the paradoxical advice, first
to look about them a little among their fellow-men.
CHAPTER II.
SCEPTICAL VIEW.
BUT when we cast a retrospect over the attempts
made, and made in vain, for more than two thousand
years, to find a sure basis for Ethics, ought we not
perhaps to think that after all there is no natural
morality, independent of human institution ? Shall
we not conclude that all moral systems are nothing
but artificial products, means invented for the better
restraint of the selfish and wicked race of men ; and
further, that, as they have no internal credentials
and no natural basis, they would fail in their purpose,
if without the support of positive religion ? The
legal code and the police are not sufficient in all
cases ; there are offences, the discovery of which is
too difficult ; some, indeed, where punishment is a
precarious matter ; where, in short, we are left
without public protection. Moreover, the civil law
can at most enforce justice, not loving-kindness and
beneficence ; because, of course, these are qualities
as regards which every one would like to play the
passive, and no one the active, part. All this has
given rise to the hypothesis that morality rests
solely on religion, and that both have the same
aim that of being complementary to the necessary
135
136 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
inadequacy of state machinery and legislation.
Consequently, there cannot be (it is said) a natural
morality, i.e., one based simply on the nature of
things, or of man, and the fruitless search of
philosophers for its foundation is explained. This
view is not without plausibility ; and we find it as
far back as the Pyrrhonians :
ovTf ayadov TL e'crn (pvcrti, cure KUK.OV,
aXXa TTpos a.v6pa>TTU>v ravra v6a> Kcxptrat,
Kara TOV Tip.a>va. 1
Sext. Emp. adv. Math., XL, 140.
Also in modern times distinguished thinkers have
given their adherence to it. A careful examination
therefore it deserves ; although the easier course would
be to shelve it by giving an inquisitorial glance at the
consciences of those in whom such a theory could arise.
We should fall into a great, a very childish
blunder, if we believed all the just and legal actions
of mankind to have a moral origin. This is far from
being the case. As a rule, between the justice, which
men practise, and genuine singleness of heart, there
exists a relation analogous to that between polite
expressions, and the true love of one's neighbour,
which, unlike the former, does not ostensibly over-
come Egoism, but really does so. That honesty of
sentiment, everywhere so carefully exhibited, which
1 I.e., there is nothing either good or bad by nature, but
these things are decided by human judgment, as Timon says.
V. Sexti Empiric! Opera Quae Exstant : Adversus Mathe-
maticos ; p. 462 A ad fin. Aurelianae : Petrus et Jacobus
Chouet, 1621. V. also : Sexti Empiric! Opera, edit. Jo. Albertus
Fabricius : Lipsiae, 1718, Lib. XL, 140, p. 716.
SCEPTICAL VIEW. 137
requires to be regarded as above all suspicion ; that
deep indignation, which is stirred by the smallest
sign of a doubt in this direction, and is ready to break
out into furious anger ; to what are we to attri-
bute these symptoms ? None but the inexperienced
and simple will take them for pure coin, for the work-
ing of a fine moral feeling, or conscience. In point
of fact, the general correctness of conduct which is
adopted in human intercourse, and insisted on as
a rule no less immovable than the hills, depends
principally on two external necessities ; first, on legal
ordinance, by virtue of which the rights of every
man are protected by public authority ; and secondly,
on the recognised need of possessing civil honour,
.in other words, a good name, in order to advance
in the world. This is why the steps taken by the
individual are closely watched by public opinion,
which is so inexorably severe that it never forgives
even a single false move or slip, but remembers
it against the guilty person as an indelible blot, all
his life long. As far as this goes, public opinion
is wise enough ; for, starting from the fundamental
principle : Operari sequitur esse (what one does is
determined by what one is), it shows its conviction
that the character is unchangeable, and that there-
fore what a man has once done, he will assuredly do
again, if only the circumstances be precisely similar.
Such are the two custodians that keep guard on
the correct conduct of people, without which, to
speak frankly, we should be in a sad case, especially
with reference to property, this central point in human
life, around which the chief part of its energy and
138 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
activity revolves. For the purely ethical motives to
integrity, assuming that they exist, cannot as a rule
be applied, except very indirectly, to the question of
ownership as guaranteed by the state. These motives,
in fact, have a direct and essential bearing only on
natural right ; with positive right their connection is
merely indirect, in so far as the latter is based on the
former. Natural right, however, attaches to no other
property than that which has been gained by one's own
exertion ; because, when this is seized, the owner is
at the same time robbed of all the efforts he expended
in acquiring it. The theory of preoccupancy I reject
absolutely, but cannot here set forth its refutation. Now of course all estate based on positive right ought
ultimately and in the last instance (it matters not
how many intermediate links are involved) to rest
on the natural right of possession. But what a
distance there is, in most cases, between the title-
deeds, that belong to our civil life, and this natural
right their original source ! Indeed their connection
with the latter is generally either very difficult, or
else impossible, to prove. What we hold is ours by
inheritance, by marriage, by success in the lottery ;
or if in no way of this kind, still it is not gained by
our own work, with the sweat of the brow, but rather
by shrewdness and bright ideas (e.g., in the field
of speculation), yes, and sometimes even by our very
stupidity, which, through a conjunction of circum-
stances, is crowned and glorified by the Deus eventus.
It is only in a very small minority of cases that property is the fruit of real labour and toil ; and even then the work is usually mental, like that of lawyers, doctors, civilians, teachers, etc. ; and this in the eyes of the rude appears to cost but little effort.
Now, when wealth is acquired in any such fashion,
there is need of considerable education before the ethical
right can be recognised and respected out of a purely
moral impulse. Hence it comes about that not a
few secretly regard the possessions of others as held
merely by virtue of positive right. So, if they find
means to wrest from another man his goods, by using,
or perhaps by evading, the laws, they feel no scruples ;
for in their opinion he would lose what he holds, in
the same way in which he had previously obtained it,
and they consequently regard their own claims as
equal to his. From their point of view, the right of
the stronger in civil society is superseded by the right
of the cleverer.
Incidentally we may notice that the rich man
often shows an inflexible correctness of conduct.
Why ? Because with his whole heart he is attached
to, and rigidly maintains, a rule, on the observance
of which his entire wealth, and all its attendant
advantages, depend. For this reason his profession
of the principle : Suum cuique (to each his own), is
thoroughly in earnest, and shows an unswerving
consistency. No doubt there is an objective loyalty
to sincerity and good faith, which avails to keep them
sacred ; but such loyalty is based simply on the
fact that sincerity and good faith are the foundation
of all free intercourse among men ; of good order ;
and of secure ownership. Consequently they very
140 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
often benefit ourselves, and with this end in view they
must be preserved even at some cost : just as a good
piece of land is worth a certain outlay. But integrity
thus derived is, as a rule, only to be met with among
wealthy people, or at least those who are engaged
in a lucrative business. It is an especial characteristic
of tradesmen ; because they have the strongest con-
viction that for all the operations of commerce the
one thing indispensable is mutual trust and credit ;
and this is why mercantile honour stands quite by
itself. On the other hand, the poor man, who cannot
make both ends meet, and who, by reason of the
unequal division of property, sees himself condemned
to want and hard work, while others before his eyes
are lapped in luxury and idleness, will not easily
perceive that the raison d'etre of this inequality is a
corresponding inequality of service and honest industry.
And if he does not recognise this, how is he to be
governed by the purely ethical motive to uprightness,
which should keep him from stretching out his hand
to grasp the superfluity of another ? Generally, it
is the order of government as established by law
that restrains him. But should ever the rare occasion
present itself when he discovers that he is beyond
the reach of the police, an'd that he could by a single
act throw off the galling burden of penury, which is
aggravated by the sight of others' opulence ; if he
feels this, and realises that he could thus enter
into the possession and enjoyment of all that he has
so often coveted : what is there then to stay his
hand ? Religious dogmas ? It is seldom that faith
is so firm. A purely moral incentive to be just and
SCEPTICAL VIEW. 141
upright ? Perhaps in a few isolated cases. But in by
far the greater number there is in reality nothing
but the anxiety a man feels to keep his good
name, his civil honour a thing that touches closely
even those in humble circumstances. He knows
the imminent danger incurred of having to pay
for dishonest conduct by being expelled from the
great Masonic Lodge of honourable people who live
correct lives. He knows that property all over the
world is in their hands, and duly apportioned among
themselves, and that they wield the power of making
him an outcast for life from good society, in case he
commit a single disgraceful action. He knows that
whoever takes one false step in this direction is
marked as a person that no one trusts, whose company
every one shuns, and from whom all advancement is
cut off; to whom, as being " a fellow that has stolen,"
the proverb is applied : " He who steals once is a
thief all his life."
These, then, are the guards that watch over correct
behaviour between man and man, and he who has
lived, and kept his eyes open, will admit that the
vast majority of honourable actions in human inter-
course must be attributed to them ; nay, he will go
further, and say that there are not wanting people
who hope to elude even their vigilance, and who
regard justice and honesty merely as an external
badge, as a flag, under the protection of which they
can carry out their own freebooting propensities with
better success. We need not therefore break out into
holy wrath, and buckle on our armour, if a moralist
is found to suggest that perhaps all integrity and
142 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
uprightness may be at bottom only conventional.
This is what Holbach, Helvetins, d'Alembert, and
others of their time did ; and, following out the
theory, they endeavoured with great acumen to trace
back all moral conduct to egoistic motives, however
remote and indirect. That their position is literally
true of most just actions, as having an ultimate
foundation centred in the Self, I have shown above.
That it is also true to a large extent of what is done
in kindness and humanity, there can be no doubt ;
acts of this sort often arise from love of ostentation,
still oftener from belief in a retribution to come,
which may be dealt out in the second or even the
third power ; l or they can be explained by other
egoistic motives. Nevertheless, it is equally certain
that there occur actions of disinterested good-will
and entirely voluntary justice. To prove the latter
statement, I appeal only to the facts of experience,
not to those of consciousness. There are isolated,
yet indisputable cases on record, where not only
the danger of legal prosecution, but also all chance
of discovery, and even of suspicion has been ex-
cluded, and where, notwithstanding, the poor man has
rendered to the rich his own. For example, things
lost, and found, have been given back without any
thought or hope of reward ; a deposit made by a
third person has been restored after his death to the
rightful owner ; a poor man, secretly intrusted with
1 In other words : If a be a given offence, or virtuous act,
and x the punishment, or reward, proportional to it ; then
the punishment, or reward, actually inflicted, instead of being
x, may be a? or x 3 . (Translator.)
SCEPTICAL VIEW. 143
a treasure by a fugitive, has faithfully kept, and then
returned, it. Instances of this sort can be found, beyond
all doubt ; only the surprise, the emotion, and the
high respect awakened, when we hear of them, testify
to the fact that they are unexpected and very ex-
ceptional. There are in truth really honest people :
like four-leaved clover, their existence is not a fiction.
But Hamlet uses no hyperbole when he says : " To
be honest, as this world goes, is to be one man pick'd
out of ten thousand." If it be objected that, after
all, religious dogmas, involving rewards and penalties
in another world, are at the root of conduct as
above described ; cases could probably be adduced
where the actors possessed no religious faith what-
ever. And this is a thing by no means so infrequent
as is generally maintained.
Those who combat the sceptical view appeal specially
to the testimony of conscience. But conscience itself
is impugned, and doubts are raised about its natural
origin. Now, as a matter of fact, there is a conscientia
spuria (false conscience), which is often confounded
with the true. The regret and anxiety which many
a man feels for what he has done is frequently,
at bottom, nothing but fear of the possible conse-
quences. Not a few people, if they break external,
voluntary, and even absurd rules, suffer from painful
searchings of heart, exactly similar to those inflicted
by the real conscience. Thus, for instance, a bigoted
Jew, if on Saturday he should smoke a pipe at
home, becomes really oppressed with the sense of
having disobeyed the command in Exodus xxxv. 3 :
" Ye shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations
144 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
upon the Sabbath day." How often it happens that
a nobleman or officer is the victim of self-reproach,
because on some occasion or other he has not properly
complied with that fools' codex, which is called
knightly honour ! Nay more : there are many of this
class, who, if they see the impossibility of merely
doing enough in some quarrel to satisfy the above-
named code to say nothing of keeping their pledged
word of honour are ready to shoot themselves. (In-
stances of both have come under my knowledge.)
And this, while the selfsame man would with
an easy mind break his promise every day, if only
the shibboleth " Honour " be not involved. In short,
every inconsequent, and thoughtless action, all
conduct contrary to our prejudices, principles, or
convictions, whatever these may be ; indeed, every
indiscretion, every mistake, every piece of stupidity
rankles in us secretly, and leaves its sting behind.
The average individual, who thinks his conscience
such an imposing structure, would be surprised, could
he see of what it actually consists : probably of about
one-fifth, fear of men ; one-fifth, superstition ; one-
fifth, prejudice ; one-fifth, vanity ; and one-fifth, habit.
So that in reality he is no better than the English-
man, who said quite frankly : " I cannot aiford to
keep a conscience." Religious people of every creed,
as a rule, understand by conscience nothing else
than the dogmas and injunctions of their religion,
and the self-examination based thereon ; and it is
in this sense that the expressions coercion of conscience
and liberty of conscience are used. The same inter-
pretation was always given by the theologians,
SCEPTICAL VIEW. 145
schoolmen, and casuists of the middle ages and of
later times. Whatever a man knew of the formulae
and prescriptions of the Church, coupled with a re-
solution to believe and obey it, constituted his
conscience. Thus we find the terms " a doubting
conscience," " an opinionated conscience," " an erring
conscience," and the like ; and councils were held,
and confessors employed, for the special purpose of
setting such irregularities straight. How little the
conception of conscience, just as other conceptions, is
determined by its own object ; how differently it is
viewed by different people ; how wavering and un-
certain it appears in books ; all this is briefly but
clearly set forth in Staudlin's Geschichte der Lehrevom
Gewissen. These facts taken in conjunction are not
calculated to establish the reality of the thing ; they
have rather given rise to the question whether there is
in truth a genuine, inborn conscience. I have already
had occasion in Part II., Chapter YIIL, where the
theory of Freedom is discussed, to touch on my view
of conscience, and I shall return to it below.
All these sceptical objections added together do
not in the least avail to prove that no true morality
exists, however much they may moderate our ex-
pectations as to the moral tendency in man, and the
natural basis of Ethics. Undoubtedly a great deal
that is ascribed to the ethical sense can be proved
to spring from other incentives ; and when we
contemplate the moral depravity of the world, it is
sufficiently clear that the stimulus for good cannot
be very powerful, especially as it often does not
work even in cases where the opposing motives are
10
146 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
weak, although then the individual difference of
character makes itself fully felt.
It should be observed that this moral depravity
is all the more difficult to discern, because its
manifestations are checked and cloaked by public
order, as enforced by law ; by the necessity of having
a good name ; and even by ordinary polite manners.
And this is not all. People commonly suppose that
in the education of the young their moral interests
are furthered by representing uprightness and virtue
as principles generally followed by the world. Later
on, it is often to their great harm that experience
teaches them something else ; for the discovery, that
the instructors of their early years were the first to
deceive them, is likely to have a more mischievous
effect on their morality than if these persons had given
them the first example of ingenuous truthfulness, by
saying frankly : " The world is sunk in evil, and
men are not what they ought to be ; but be not
misled thereby, and see that you do better." All
this, as I have said, increases the difficulty of re-
cognising the real immorality of mankind. The state
this masterpiece, which sums up the self-conscious,
intelligent egoism of all consigns the rights of each
person to a power, which, being enormously superior
to that of the individual, compels him to respect the
rights of all others. This is the leash that restrains
the limitless egoism of nearly every one, the malice
of many, the cruelty of not a few. The illusion
thus arising is so great that, when in special cases,
where the executive power is ineffective, or is eluded,
the insatiable covetousness, the base greed, the deep
SCEPTICAL VIEW. 147
hypocrisy, or the spiteful tricks of men are apparent
in all their ugliness, we recoil with horror, supposing
that we have stumbled on some unheard-of monster :
whereas, without the compulsion of law, and the
necessity of keeping an honourable name, these sights
would be of every day occurrence. In order to dis-
cover what, from a moral point of view, human
beings are made of, we must study anarchist records,
and the proceedings connected with criminals. The
thousands that throng before our eyes, in peaceful
intercourse each with the other, can only be regarded
as so many tigers and wolves, whose teeth are secured
by a strong muzzle. Let us now suppose this muzzle
cast off, or, in other words, the power of the state
abolished ; the contemplation of the spectacle then
to be awaited would make all thinking people
shudder ; and they would thus betray the small
amount of trust they really have in the efficiency
either of religion, or of conscience, or of the natural
basis of Morals, whatever it be. But if these im-
moral, antinomian forces should be unshackled and
let loose, it is precisely then that the true moral
incentive, hidden before, would reveal its activity,
and consequently be most easily recognised. And
nothing would bring out so clearly as this the
prodigious moral difference of character between man
and man ; it would be found to be as great as the
intellectual, which is saying much.
The objection will perhaps be raised that Ethics
is not concerned with what men actually do, but
that it is the science which treats of what their
conduct ought to be. Now this is exactly the position
148 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
which I deny. In the critical part of the present
treatise I have sufficiently demonstrated that the con-
ception of ought, in other words, the imperative form of
Ethics, is valid only in theological morals, outside of
which it loses all sense and meaning. The end which
I place before Ethical Science is to point out all the
varied moral lines of human conduct ; to explain
them ; and to trace them to their ultimate source.
Consequently there remains no way of discovering
the basis of Ethics except the empirical. We must
search and see whether we can find any actions to
which we are obliged to ascribe genuine moral worth :
actions, that is, of voluntary justice, of pure loving-
kindness, and of true nobleness. Such conduct,
when found, is to be regarded as a given phaenome-
non, which has to be properly accounted for ; in other
words, its real origin must be explored, and this will
involve the investigation and explanation of the
peculiar motives which lead men to actions so radically
distinct from all others, that they form a class by
themselves. These motives, together with a respon-
sive susceptibility for them, will constitute the
ultimate basis of morality, and the knowledge of
them will be the foundation of Ethics. This is the
humble path to which I direct the Science of Morals.
It contains no construction a priori, no absolute
legislation for all rational beings in abstractor it
lacks all official, academic sanction. Therefore, who-
ever thinks it not sufficiently fashionable, may return
to the Categorical Imperative; to the Shibboleth
of " Human Dignity " ; to the empty phrases, the
cobwebs, and the soap-bubbles of the Schools ; to
SCEPTICAL VIEW. 149
principles on which experience ponrs contempt at
every step, and of which no one, outside the lecture-
rooms knows anything, or has ever had the least
notion. On the other hand, the foundation which
is reached by following my path is upheld by ex-
perience ; and it is experience which daily and hourly
delivers its silent testimony in favour of my theory.
CHAPTER III.
ANTIMORAL 1 INCENTIVES.
THE chief and fundamental incentive in man, as in
animals, is Egoism, that is, the urgent impulse to
exist, and exist under the best circumstances. The
German word Selbstsucht (self-seeking) involves a
false secondary idea of disease (Sucht). 2 The term
Eigennutz (self-interest) denotes Egoism, so far as
the latter is guided by reason, which enables it, by
means of reflection, to prosecute its purposes system-
1 I venture to use this word although irregularly formed,
because " antiethical " would not here give an adequate
meaning. Sittlich (in accordance with good manners) and
unsittlich (contrary to good manners), which have lately
come into vogue, are bad substitutes for moralisch (moral)
and unmoralisch (immoral) : first, because moralisch is a
scientific conception, which, as such, requires to be denoted
by a Greek or Latin term, for reasons which may be found
in Die Welt ah Wille und Vorstellung, vol. ii., chap. 12, p. 134
sqq. ; and secondly, because sittlich is a weaker and tamer
expression, difficult to distinguish from sittsam (modest)
which in popular acceptation means zimperlich (simpering).
No concessions must be made to this extravagant love of
germanising !
2 In Sucht (s^ecA = sick) and Selbst-sucht (sunken seek) there
is an apparent confusion between the two bases SUK (seuka)
to be ill, and sOKYAN, to seek. V. Skeat's Etymological
Dictionary. (Translator.)
150
ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 151
atically ; so that animals may be called egoistic,
but not self-interested (eigennutzig). I shall there-
fore retain the word Egoism for the general idea. Now
this Egoism is, both in animals and men, connected
in the closest way with their very essence and being ;
indeed, it is one and the same thing. For this reason
all human actions, as a rule, have their origin in
Egoism, and to it, accordingly, we must always first
turn, when we try to find the explanation of any
given line of conduct ; just as, when the endeavour
is made to guide a man in any direction, the means
to this end are universally calculated with reference
to the same all-powerful motive. Egoism is, from
its nature, limitless. The individual is filled with
the unqualified desire of preserving his life, and of
keeping it free from all pain, under which is included
all want and privation. He wishes to have the
greatest possible amount of pleasurable existence,
and every gratification that he is capable of appreciat-
ing ; indeed, he attempts, if possible, to evolve fresh
capacities for enjoyment. Everything that opposes
the strivings of his Egoism awakens his dislike, his
anger, his hate : this is the mortal enemy, which
he tries to annihilate. If it were possible, he would
like to possess everything for his own pleasure ; as
this is impossible, he wishes at least to control every-
thing. " All things for me, and nothing for others "
is his maxim. Egoism is a huge giant overtopping
the world. If each person were allowed to choose
between his own destruction and that of the rest
of mankind, I need not say what the decision would
be in most cases. Thus it is that every human unit
152 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
makes himself the centre of the world, which he views
exclusively from that standpoint. Whatever occurs,
even, for instance, the most sweeping changes in the
destinies of nations, he brings into relation first and
foremost with his own interests, which, however
slightly and indirectly they may be affected, ho is
sure to think of before anything else. No sharper
contrast can be imagined than that between the
profound and exclusive attention which each person
devotes to his own self, and the indifference with
which, as a rule, all other people regard that self, -
an indifference precisely like that with which lie in
turn looks upon them. To a certain extent it is
actually comic to see how each individual out of
innumerable multitudes considers himself, at least
from the practical point of view, as the only real
thing, and all others in some sort as mere phantoms.
The ultimate reason of this lies in the fact that
every one is directly conscious of himself, but of
others only indirectly, through his mind's eye ; and
the direct impression asserts its right. In other
words, it is in consequence of the subjectivity which
is essential to our consciousness that each person
is himself the whole world ; for all that is objec-
tive exists only indirectly, as simply the mental
picture of the subject ; whence it comes about that
everything is invariably expressed in terms of self-
consciousness. The only world which the individual
really grasps, and of which he has certain knowledge,
he carries in himself, as a mirrored image fashioned
by his brain ; and he is, therefore, its centre. Conse-
quently he is all in all to himself ; and since he
ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 153
feels that he contains within his ego all that is real,
nothing can be of greater importance to him than his
own self. 1 Moreover this supremely important self, this
microcosm, to which the macrocosm stands in relation
as its mere modification or accident, this, which is
the individual's whole world, he knows perfectly well
must be destroyed by death ; which is therefore for
him equivalent to the destruction of all things.
Such, then, are the elements out of which, on the
basis of the Will to live, Egoism grows up, and like a
broad trench it forms a perennial separation between
man and man. If on any occasion some one actually
jumps across, to help another, such an act is regarded
as a sort of miracle, which calls forth amazement and
wins approval. In Part II., Chapter VI., where Kant's
principle of Morals is discussed, I had the opportunity
of describing how Egoism behaves in everyday life,
where it is always peering out of some corner or other,
despite ordinary politeness, which, like the traditional
fig-leaf, is used as a covering. In point of fact,
politeness is the conventional and systematic dis-
avowal of Egoism in the trifles of daily intercourse,
and is, of course, a piece of recognised hypocrisy.
Gentle manners are expected and commended, because
that which they conceal Egoism is so odious, that
no one wishes to see it, however much it is known
to be there ; just as people like to have repulsive
objects hidden at least by a curtain. Now, unless
1 It should be noticed that while from the subjective side
a man's self assumes these gigantic proportions, objectively
it shrinks to almost nothing namely, to about the one-
thousand-millionth part of the human race.
154 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
external force (under which must be included every
source of fear whether of human or superhuman
powers), or else the real moral incentive is in
effective operation, it is certain that Egoism always
pursues its purposes with unqualified directness ;
hence without these checks, considering the countless
number of egoistic individuals, the bellum omnium
contra omnes l would be the order of the day, and
prove the ruin of all. Thus is explained the early
construction by reflecting reason of state government,
which, arising, as it does, from a mutual fear of
reciprocal violence, obviates the disastrous con-
sequences of the general Egoism, as far as it is
possible to do by negative procedure. Where, how-
ever, the two forces that oppose Egoism fail to be
operative, the latter is not slow to reveal all its
horrible dimensions, nor is the spectacle exactly
attractive. In order to express the strength of this
antimoral power in a few words, to portray it, so to
say, at one stroke, some very emphatic hyperbole is
wanted. It may be put thus : many a man would be
quite capable of killing another, simply to rub his
boots over with the victim's fat. I am only doubtful
whether this, after all, is any exaggeration. Egoism,
then, is the first and principal, though not the only,
power that the moral Motive has to contend against ;
and it is surely sufficiently clear that the latter, in
order to enter the lists against such an opponent,
must be something more real than a hair-splitting
sophism or an a priori soap-bubble. In war the first
1 The war of all against all. Hobbes uses this expression.
(Translator.)
ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 155
thing to be done is to know the enemy well ; and
in the shock of battle, now impending, Egoism, as the
chief combatant on its own side, is best set against
the virtue of Justice, which, in my opinion, is the
first and original cardinal virtue.
The virtue of loving-kindness, on the other hand,
is rather to be matched with ill-will, or spitefulness,
the origin and successive stages of which we will
now consider. Ill-will, in its lower degrees, is very
frequent, indeed, almost a common thing ; and it
easily rises in the scale. Goethe is assuredly right
when he says that in this world indifference and
aversion are quite at home. ( Wahlverwandtschaften,
Part I., chap. 3.) It is very fortunate for us that
the cloak, which prudence and politeness throw over
this vice, prevents us from seeing how general it
is, and how the bellum omnium contra omnes is
constantly waged, at least in thought. Yet ever
and anon there is some appearance of it : for instance,
in the relentless backbiting so frequently observed ;
while its clearest manifestation is found in all out-
breaks of anger, which, for the most part, are quite
disproportioual to their cause, and which could
hardly be so violent, had they not been compressed
like gunpowder into the explosive compound formed
of long cherished brooding hatred. Ill-will usually
arises from the unavoidable collisions of Egoism
which occur at every step. It is, moreover, objectively
excited by the view of the weakness, the folly, the
vices, failings, shortcomings, and imperfections of
all kinds, which every one more or less, at least
occasionally, affords to others. Indeed, the spectacle
156 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
is such, that many a man, especially in moments of
melancholy and depression, may be tempted to regard
the world, from the aesthetic standpoint, as a cabinet
of caricatures ; from the intellectual, as a madhouse ;
and from the moral, as a nest of sharpers. If such
a mental attitude be indulged, misanthropy is the
result. Lastly, one of the chief sources of ill-will
is envy ; or rather, the latter is itself ill-will, kindled
by the happiness, possessions, or advantages of others.
No one is absolutely free from envy ; and Herodotus
(III. 80) said long ago : <f)66vos ap^rjdev e^verat
avOptairw (envy is a natural growth in man from
the beginning). But its degrees vary considerably.
It is most poisonous and implacable when directed
against personal qualities, because then the envious
have nothing to hope for. And precisely in such
cases its vilest form also appears, because men
are made to hate what they ought to love and
honour. Yet so " the world wags," even as Petrarca
complained :
Di lor par piu, die d'altri, invidia s'abbia,
Che per se stessi son levati a volo,
Uscendo fuor della commune gabbia.
(For envy fastens most of all on those,
Who, rising on their own strong wings, escape
The bars wherein the vulgar crowd is cag'd.)
The reader is referred to the Parerga, vol. ii., 114,
for a more complete examination of envy.
In a certain sense the opposite of envy is the
habit of gloating over the misfortunes of others.
At any rate, while the former is human, the latter
is diabolical. There is no sign more infallible of an
ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 157
entirely bad heart, and of profound moral worthless-
ness than open and candid enjoyment in seeing other
people suffer. The man in whom this trait is observed
ought to be for ever avoided : Hie niger est, hunc
tu, Romane, caveto. 1 These two vices are in them-
selves merely theoretical ; in practice they become
malice and cruelty. It is true that Egoism may
lead to wickedness and crime of every sort ; but
the resulting injury and pain to others are simply
the means, not the end, and are therefore involved
only as an accident. Whereas malice and cruelty
make others' misery the end in itself, the realisation
of which affords distinct pleasure. They therefore
constitute a higher degree of moral turpitude. The
maxim of Egoism, at its worst is : Neminem juva,
immo omnes, si forte conducit (thus there is always
a condition), laede (help no body, but rather injure
all people, if it brings you any advantage). The
guiding rule of malice is : Omnes, quantum potes,
laede (injure all people as far as you can). As
malicious joy is in fact theoretical cruelty, so, con-
versely, cruelty is nothing but malicious joy put
into practice ; and the latter is sure to show itself
in the form of cruelty, directly an opportunity offers.
An examination of the special vices that spring
from these two primary antimoral forces forms no part
of the present treatise : its proper place would be
found in a detailed system of Ethics. From Egoism
we should probably derive greed, gluttony, lust,
selfishness, avarice, covetousness, injustice, hardness
1 This man is black ; of him shalt thou, O Roman, beware.
V. Horace, Sat., Lib. I. 4. 85. (Translator.)
158 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
of heart, pride, arrogance, etc. ; while to spitefulness
-might be ascribed disaffection, envy, ill-will, malice,
pleasure in seeing others suffer, prying curiosity,
slander, insolence, petulance, hatred, anger, treachery,
fraud, thirst for revenge, cruelty, etc. The first root
is more bestial, the second more devilish ; and accord-
ing as either is the stronger ; or according as the
moral incentive, to be described below, predominates,
so the salient points for the ethical classification
of character are determined. No man is entirely
free from some traces of all three.
Here I bring to an end my review of these terrible
powers of evil ; it is an array reminding one of the
Princes of Darkness in Milton's Pandemonium. But
my plan, which in this respect of course differs from
that of all other moralists, required me to consider
at the outset this gloomy side of human nature, and,
like Dante, to descend first to Tartarus.
It will now be fully apparent how difficult our
problem is. We have to find a motive capable of
making a man take up a line of conduct directly
opposed to all those propensities which lie deeply
ingrained in his nature ; or, given such conduct as
a fact of experience, we must search for a motive
capable of supplying an adequate and non-artificial
explanation of it. The difficulty, in fact, is so great
that, in order to solve it, for the vast majority of
mankind, it has been everywhere necessary to have
recourse to machinery from another world. Gods
have been pointed to, whose will and command
the required mode of behaviour was said to be, and
who were represented as emphasising this command
ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 159
by penalties and rewards either in this, or in another
world, to which death would be the gate. Now
let ns assume that belief in a doctrine of this sort
took general root (a thing which is certainly possible
through strenuous inculcation at a very early age) ;
and let us also assume that it brought about the
intended effect, though this is a much harder matter
to admit, and not nearly so well confirmed by ex-
perience ; we should then no doubt succeed in obtain-
ing strict legality of action, even beyond the limits
that justice and the police can reach ; but every one
feels that this would not in the least imply what
we mean by morality of the heart. For obviously,
every act arising from motives like those just
mentioned is after all derived simply from pure
Egoism. How can I talk of unselfishness when I
am enticed by a promised guerdon, or deterred by a
threatened punishment ? A recompense in another
world, thoroughly believed in, must be regarded as
a bill of exchange, which is perfectly safe, though
only payable at a very distant date. It is thus quite
possible that the profuse assurances, which beggars
so constantly make, that those, who relieve them,
will receive a thousandfold more for their gifts in the
next world, may lead many a miser to generous alms-
giving ; for such a one complacently views the matter
as a good investment of money, being perfectly con-
vinced that he will rise again as a Croesus. For the
mass of mankind, it will perhaps be always necessary
to continue the appeal to incentives of this nature,
and we know that such is the teaching promulgated
by the different religions, which are in fact the
160 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
metaphysics of the people. Be it, however, observed
in this connection that a man is sometimes just as
much in error as to the true motives that govern his
own acts, as he is with regard to those of others.
Hence it is certain that many persons, while they
can only account to themselves for their noblest
actions by attributing them to motives of the kind
above described, are, nevertheless, really guided in
their conduct by far higher and purer incentives,
though the latter may be much more difficult to
discover. They are doing, no doubt, out of direct
love of their neighbour, that which they can but
explain as the command of their God. On the other
hand, Philosophy, in dealing with this, as with all
other problems, endeavours to extract the true and
ultimate cause of the given phaenomena from the
disclosures which the nature itself of man yields,
and which, freed as they must be from all mythical
interpretation, from all religious dogmas, and trans-
cendent hypostases, she requires to see confirmed
by external or internal experience. Now, as our
present task is a philosophical one, we must entirely
disregard all solutions conditioned by any religion ;
and I have here touched on them merely in order
to throw a stronger light on the magnitude of the
difficulty.
CHAPTER IV.
CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH.
THERE is first the empirical question to be settled,
whether actions of voluntary justice and unselfish
loving-kindness, which are capable of rising to noble-
ness and magnanimity, actually occur in experience.
Unfortunately, this inquiry cannot be decided alto-
gether empirically, because it is invariably only the
act that experience gives, the incentives not being
apparent. Hence the possibility always remains that
an egoistic motive may have had weight in determining
a just or good deed. In a theoretical investigation
like the present, I shall not avail myself of the
inexcusable trick of shifting the matter on to the
reader's conscience. But I believe there are few
people who have any doubt about the matter, and
who are not convinced from their own experience
that just acts are often performed simply and solely
to prevent a man suffering from injustice. Most of
us, I do not hesitate to say, are persuaded that there
are persons in whom the principle of giving others
their due seems to be innate, who neither intentionally
injure any one, nor unconditionally seek their own
advantage, but in considering themselves show regard
also for the rights of their neighbours ; persons who,
161 11
162 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
when they undertake matters involving reciprocal
obligations, not only see that the other party does
his duty, but also that he gets his own, because it is
really against their will that any one, with whom they
have to do, should be shabbily treated. These are the
men of true probity, the few aequi (just) among the
countless number of the iniqui (unjust). Such people
exist. Similarly, it will be admitted, I think, that
many help and give, perform services, and deny them-
selves, without having any further intention in their
hearts than that of assisting another, whose distress
they see. When Arnold von Winkelried exclaimed :
" Triiwen, lieben Eidgenossen, wullCs minem Wip und
Kinde gedenken" 1 and then clasped in his arms as
many hostile spears as he could grasp ; can any one
believe that he had some selfish purpose ? I cannot.
To cases of voluntary justice, which cannot be denied
without deliberate and wilful trifling with facts, I have
already drawn attention in Chapter II. of this Part.
Should any one, however, persist in refusing to believe
that such actions ever happen, then, according to
his view, Ethics would be a science without any real
object, like Astrology and Alchemy, and it would
be waste of time to discuss its basis any further.
With him, therefore, I have nothing to do, and
address myself to those who allow that we are deal-
ing with something more than an imaginary creation.
It is, then, only to conduct of the above kind that
genuine moral worth can be ascribed. Its special
mark is that it rejects and excludes the whole class
1 Comrades, true and loyal to our oath, care for my wife
and child in remembrance of this.
CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH 163
of motives by which otherwise all human action is
prompted : I mean the self-interested motives, using
the word in its widest sense. Consequently the moral
value of an act is lowered by the disclosure of an
accessory selfish incentive ; while it is entirely de-
stroyed, if that incentive stood alone. The absence
of all egoistic motives is thus the Criterion of an
action of moral value. It may, no doubt, be objected
that also acts of pure malice and cruelty are not
selfish. 1 Bat it is manifest that the latter cannot be
meant, since they are, in kind, the exact opposite
of those now being considered. If, however, the de-
finition be insisted on in its strict sense, then we
may expressly except such actions, because of their
essential token the compassing of others' suffering.
There is also another characteristic of conduct having
real moral worth, which is entirely internal and there-
fore less obvious. I allude to the fact that it leaves
behind a certain self-satisfaction which is called the
approval of conscience : just as, on the other hand,
injustice and urikindness, and still more malice and
cruelty, involve a secret self-condemnation. Lastly,
there is an external, secondary, and accidental sign
that draws a clear line between the two classes. Acts
of the former kind win the approval and respect
of disinterested witnesses : those of the latter incur
their disapproval and contempt.
Those actions that bear the stamp of moral value,
so determined, and admitted to be realities, constitute
1 Acts of malice and cruelty are so many gratifications of
the ego, and are therefore, in a certain sense, selfish. V. Intro-
duction, pp. xvi. and xvii. (Translator.)
164 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
the phaenomenon that lies before us, and which we
have to explain. We must accordingly search out
what it is that moves men to such conduct. If we
succeed in oor investigation, we shall necessarily bring
to light the true moral incentive ; and, as it is upon
this that all ethical science must depend, our problem
will then be solved.
CHAPTER V.
STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL
INCENTIVE.
THE preceding considerations, which were unavoidably
necessary in order to clear the ground, now enable
me to indicate the true incentive which underlies
all acts of real moral worth. The seriousness, and
indisputable genuineness, with which we shall find
it is distinguished, removes it far indeed from the
hair-splittings, subtleties, sophisms, assertions formu-
lated out of airy nothings, and a priori soap-bubbles,
which all systems up to the present have tried to
make at once the source of moral conduct and the
basis of Ethics. This incentive I shall not put
forward as an hypothesis to be accepted or rejected,
as one pleases ; I shall actually prove that it is the
only possible one. But as this demonstration requires
several fundamental truths to be borne in mind, the
reader's attention is first called to certain propositions
which we must presuppose, and which may properly
be considered as axioms ; except the last two, which
result from the analysis contained in the preceding
chapter, and in Part II., Chapter III.
(1) No action can take place without a sufficient
166
166 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
motive ; as little as a stone can move without a
sufficient push or pull.
(2) Similarly, no action can be left undone, when,
given the character of the doer, a sufficient motive
is present ; unless a stronger counter-motive neces-
sarily prevents it.
(3) Whatever moves the Will, this, and this
alone, implies the sense of weal and woe, in the
widest sense of the term ; and conversely, weal and
woe signify " that which is in conformity with, or
which is contrary to, a Will." Hence every motive
must have a connection with weal and woe.
(4) Consequently every action stands in relation to,
and has as its ultimate object, a being susceptible of
weal and woe.
(5) This being is either the doer himself ; or
another, whose position as regards the action is there-
fore passive ; since it is done either to his harm, or
to his benefit and advantage.
(6) Every action, which has to do, as its ultimate
object, with the weal and woe of the agent himself,
is egoistic.
(7) The foregoing propositions with regard to what
is done apply equally to what is left undone, in all
cases where motive and counter-motive play their parts.
(8) From the analysis in the foregoing chapter,
it results that Egoism and the moral worth of an
action absolutely exclude each other. If an act have
an egoistic object as its motive, then no moral value
can be attached to it ; if an act is to have moral
value, then no egoistic object, direct or indirect, near
or remote, may be its motive.
THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. 167
(9) In consequence of my elimination in Part II.,
Chapter III., of alleged duties towards ourselves, the
moral significance of our conduct can only lie in
the effect produced upon others ; its relation to the
latter is alone that which lends it moral worth, or
worthlessness, and constitutes it an act of justice,
loving-kindness, etc., or the reverse.
From these propositions the following conclusion
is obvious : The weal and woe, which (according
to our third axiom) must, as its ultimate object, lie
at the root of everything done, or left undone, is
either that of the doer himself, or that of some other
person, whose role with reference to the action is
passive. Conduct in the first case is necessarily
egoistic, as it is impelled by an interested motive.
And this is not only true when men as they nearly
always do plainly shape their acts for their own
profit and advantage ; it is equally true when from
anything done we expect some benefit to ourselves,
no matter how remote, whether in this or in another
world. Nor is it less the fact when our honour, our
good name, or the wish to win the respect of some
one, the sympathy of the lookers on, etc., is the
object we have in view ; or when our intention is
to uphold a rule of conduct, which, if generally
followed, would occasionally be useful to ourselves, for
instance, the principle of justice, of mutual succour
and aid, and so forth. Similarly, the proceeding is
at bottom egoistic, when a man considers it a prudent
step to obey some absolute command issued by
an unknown, but evidently supreme power ; for in
such a case nothing can be the motive but fear of
168 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
the disastrous consequences of disobedience, however
generally and indistinctly these may be conceived.
Nor is it a whit the less Egoism that prompts us when
we endeavour to emphasise, by something done or left
undone, the high opinion (whether distinctly realised
or not) which we have of ourselves, and of our value
or dignity ; for the diminution of self-satisfaction,
which might otherwise occur, would involve the
wounding of our pride. Lastly, it is still Egoism
that is operative, when a man, following Wolff's
principles, seeks by his conduct to work out his own
perfection. In short, one may make the ultimate
incentive to an action what one pleases ; it will
always turn out, no matter by how circuitous a path,
that in the last resort what affects the actual weal
and woe of the agent himself is the real motive ;
consequently what he does is egoistic, and there-
fore without moral worth. There is only a single
case in which this fails to happen : namely, when the
ultimate incentive for doing something, or leaving
it undone, is precisely and exclusively centred in the
weal and woe of some one else, who plays a passive
part ; that is to say, when the person on the active
side, by what he does, or omits to do, simply and
solely regards the weal and woe of another, and has
absolutely no other object than to benefit him, by
keeping harm from his door, or, it may be, even by
affording help, assistance, and relief. It is this aim
alone that gives to what is done, or left undone, the
stamp of moral worth ; which is thus seen to depend
exclusively on the circumstance that the act is carried
out, or omitted, purely for the benefit and advantage
THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. 169
of another. If and when this is not so, then the
question of weal and woe which incites to, or deters
from, every action contemplated, can only relate to
the agent himself ; whence its performance, or non-
performance is entirely egoistic, and without moral
value.
Bat if what I do is to take place solely on account
of some one else ; then it follows that Ms weal
and woe must directly constitute my motive ; just
as, ordinarily, my own weal and woe form it. This
narrows the limits of our problem, which may now
be stated as follows : How is it possible that
another's weal and woe should influence my will
directly, that is, exactly in the same way as otherwise
my own move it ? How can that which affects
another for good or bad become my immediate motive,
and actually sometimes assume such importance that
it more or less supplants my own interests, which are,
as a rule, the single source of the incentives that
appeal to me ? Obviously, only because that other
person becomes the ultimate object of my will, pre-
cisely as usually I myself am that object ; in other
words, because I directly desire weal, and not woe,
for him, just as habitually I do for myself. This,
however, necessarily implies that I suffer with him,
and feel his woe, exactly as in most cases I feel only
mine, and therefore desire his weal as immediately
as at other times I desire only my own. But, for this
to be possible, I must in some way or other be
identified with him ; that is, the difference between
myself and him, which is the precise raison d'etre
of my Egoism, must be removed, at least to a certain
170 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
extent. Now, since I do not live in his skin, there
remains only the knowledge, that is, the mental
picture, I have of him, as the possible means where-
by I can so far identify myself with him, that
my action declares the difference to be practically
effaced. The process here analysed is not a dream,
a fancy floating in the air ; it is perfectly real, and
by no means infrequent. It is, what we see every
day, the phaenomenon of Compassion ; in other words,
the direct participation, independent of all ulterior
considerations, in the sufferings of another, leading to
sympathetic assistance in the effort to prevent or remove
them ; whereon in the last resort all satisfaction and all
well-being and happiness depend. It is this Compassion
alone which is the real basis of all voluntary justice
and all genuine loving-kindness. Only so far as an
action springs therefrom, has it moral value ; and all
conduct that proceeds from any other motive whatever
has none. When once compassion is stirred within
me, by another's pain, then his weal and woe go
straight to my heart, exactly in the same way, if
not always to the same degree, as otherwise I feel
only my own. Consequently the difference between
myself and him is no longer an absolute one.
No doubt this operation is astonishing, indeed hardly
comprehensible. It is, in fact, the great mystery of
Ethics, its original phaenomenon, and the boundary
stone, past which only transcendental speculation may
dare to take a step. Herein we see the wall of
partition, which, according to the light of nature (as
reason is called by old theologians), entirely separates
being from being, broken down, and the non-ego to
THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. 171
a certain extent identified with the ego. I wish for
the moment to leave the metaphysical explanation
of this enigma untouched, and first to inquire
whether all acts of voluntary justice and true loving-
kindness really arise from it. If so, our problem
will be solved, for we shall have found the ultimate
basis of morality, and shown that it lies in human
nature itself. This foundation, however, in its turn
cannot form a problem of Ethics, but rather, like
every other ultimate fact as such, of Metaphysics.
Only the solution, that the latter offers of the
primary ethical phaenomenon, lies outside the limits
of the question put by the Danish Royal Society,
which is concerned solely with the basis ; so that
the transcendental explanation can be given merely
as a voluntary and unessential appendix.
But before I turn to the derivation of the cardinal
virtues from the original incentive, as here disclosed,
I have still to bring to the notice of the reader two
observations which the subject renders necessary.
(1) For the purpose of easier comprehension I have
simplified the above presentation of compassion as
the sole source of truly moral actions, by intentionally
leaving out of consideration the incentive of Malice,
which while it is equally useless to the self as com-
passion, makes the pain of others its ultimate purpose.
We are now, however, in a position, by including
it, to state the above proof more completely, and
rigorously, as follows :
There are only three fundamental springs of human
conduct, and all possible motives arise from one or
other of these. They are :
172 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
(a) Egoism ; which desires the weal of the self,
and is limitless.
() Malice ; which desires the woe of others, and
may develop to the utmost cruelty.
(c) Compassion ; which desires the weal of others,
and may rise to nobleness and magnanimity.
Every human act is referable to one of these
springs ; although two of them may work together.
Now, as we have assumed that actions of moral worth
are in point of fact realities ; it follows that they
also must proceed from one of these primal sources.
But, by the eighth axiom, they cannot arise from the
first, and still less from the second ; since all conduct
springing from the latter is morally worthless, while
the offshoots of the former are in part neither good
nor bad in themselves. Hence they must have
their origin in the third incentive ; and this will be
established a posteriori in the sequel.
(2) Direct sympathy with another is limited to
his sufferings, and is not immediately awakened by
his well-being : the latter per se leaves us indifferent.
J. J. Rousseau in his Emile (Bk. IV.) expresses the
same view : " Premiere maxime : il n'est pas dans
le coeur humain, de se mettre a la place des gens,
qui sont plus heureux que nous, mais settlement de
ceux, qui sont plus a plaindre" 1 etc.
The reason of this is that pain or suffering, which
includes all want, privation, need, indeed every wish,
is positive, and works directly on the consciousness.
1 First maxim : it is not in our hearts to identify ourselves
with those who are happier than we are, but only with those
who are less happy.
THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. 173
Whereas the nature of satisfaction, of enjoyment, of
happiness, and the like, consists solely in the fact
that a hardship is done away with, a pain lulled :
whence their effect is negative. We thus see why
need or desire is the condition of every pleasure.
Plato understood this well enough, and only excepted
sweet odours, and intellectual enjoyment. (De Rep.,
IX., p. 264 sq., edit. Bipont.) l And Voltaire says :
" II n'est pas de vrais plaisirs, qu'avec de vrais
besoms." 2 Pain, then, is positive, and makes itself
known by itself : satisfaction or pleasure is negative
simply the removal of the former. This principle
explains the fact that only the suffering, the want,
the danger, the helplessness of another awakens our
sympathy directly and as such. The lucky or con-
tented man, as such, leaves us indifferent in reality
because his state is negative ; he is without pain,
indigence, or distress. We may of course take pleasure
in the success, the well-being, the enjoyment of
'others : but if we do, it is a secondary pleasure, and
caused by our having previously sorrowed over their
sufferings and privations. Or else we share the joy
and happiness of a man, not as such, but because,
and in so far as, he is our child, father, friend, relation,
servant, subject, etc. In a word, the good fortune,
or pleasure of another, purely as such, does not
arouse in us the same direct sympathy as is certainly
elicited by his misfortune, privation, or misery, purely
as such. If even on our own behalf it is only suffering
(under which must be reckoned all wants, needs,
1 Stallbaum : p. 584, sq. (Translator.)
3 There are no real pleasures, without real needs.
174 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
wishes, and even ennui) that stirs onr activity ; and
if contentment and prosperity fill us with indolence
and lazy repose ; why should it not be the same
when others are concerned ? For (as we have seen)
our sympathy rests on an identification of ourselves
with them. Indeed, the sight of success and enjoy-
ment, purely as such, is very apt to raise the envy,
to which every man is prone, and which has its
place among the antimoral forces enumerated above.
In connection with the exposition of Compassion
here given, as the coming into play of motives
directly occasioned by another's calamity, I take the
opportunity of condemning the mistake of Cassina, 1
which has been so often repeated. His view is that
compassion arises from a sudden hallucination, which
makes us put ourselves in the place of the sufferer,
and then imagine that we are undergoing Ms pain
in own own person. This is not in the least the
case. The conviction never leaves us for a moment
that he is the sufferer, not we ; and it is precisely
in his person, not in ours, that we feel the distress
which afflicts us. We suffer with him, and there-
fore in him ; we feel his trouble as his, and are
not under the delusion that it is ours ; indeed, the
happier we are, the greater the contrast between
our own state and his, the more we are open to the
promptings of Compassion. The explanation of the
possibility of this extraordinary phaenomenon is,
however, not so easy ; nor is it to be reached by the
path of pure psychology, as Cassina supposed. The
1 V. his Saggio Analitico sulla Compassione, 1788 ; German
translation by Pockels, 1790.
THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. 175
key can be furnished by Metaphysics alone ; and this I
shall attempt to give in the last Part of the present
treatise.
I now turn to consider the derivation of actions
of real moral worth from the source which has been
indicated. The general rule by which to test such
conduct, and which, consequently, is the leading
principle of Ethics, I have already enlarged upon
in the foregoing Part, and enunciated as follows :
Neminem laede ; immo omnes, quantum potes, juva.
(Do harm to no one ; but rather help all people,
as far as lies in your power.) As this formula
contains two clauses, so the actions corresponding
to it fall naturally into two classes.
CHAPTER VI.
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE.
IF we look more closely at this process called Com-
passion, which we have shown to be the primary
ethical phaenomenon, we remark at once that there
are two distinct degrees in which another's suffering
may become directly my motive, that is, may urge
me to do something, or to leave it nndone. The
first degree of Compassion is seen when, by counter-
acting egoistic and malicious motives, it keeps me
from bringing pain on another, and from becoming
myself the cause of trouble, which so far does not
exist. The other higher degree is manifested, when
it works positively, and incites me to active help.
The distinction between the so-called duties of law
and duties of virtue, better described as justice and
loving-kindness, which was effected by Kant in such
a forced and artificial manner, here results entirely
of itself ; whence the correctness of the principle
is attested. It is the natural, unmistakable, and
sharp separation between negative and positive, be-
tween doing no harm, and helping. The terms in
common use namely, " the duties of law," and " the
duties of virtue," (the latter being also called
" duties of love," or " imperfect duties,") are in the
176
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 177
first place faulty because they co-ordinate the genus
with the species ; for justice is one of the virtues.
And next, they owe their origin to the mistake of
giving a much too wide extension to the idea " Duty " ;
which I shall reduce to its proper limits below. In
place, therefore, of these duties I put two virtues ;
the one, justice, and the other, loving-kindness ; and
I name them cardinal virtues, since from them all
others not only in fact proceed, but also may be
theoretically derived. Both have their root in natural
Compassion. And this Compassion is an undeniable
fact of human consciousness, is an essential part of
it, and does not depend on assumptions, conceptions,
religions, dogmas, myths, training, and education.
On the contrary, it is original and immediate, and
lies in human nature itself. It consequently remains
unchanged under all circumstances, and reveals itself
in every land, and at all times. This is why appeal
is everywhere confidently made to it, as to something
necessarily present in every man ; and it is never
an attribute of the " strange gods." l As he, who
appears to be without compassion, is called inhuman ;
so " humanity " is often used as its synonyme.
The first degree, then, in which this natural and
genuine moral incentive shows itself is only negative,
Originally we are all disposed to injustice and violence,
because our need, our desire, our anger and hate
1 Thus, when the first gleam of Mitleid stole into her heart,
Briinnhilde could no longer remain a Walkiire ; and Wotan's
end comes, when by the same solvent he is at length set
free from the delusion of the pritidpium individuationis.
12
178 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
pass into the consciousness directly, and hence have
the Jus primi occupantis. (The right of the first
occupant.) Whereas the sufferings of others, caused
by our injustice and violence, enter the consciousness
indirectly, that is, by the secondary channel of a mental
picture, and not till they are understood by experience.
Thus Seneca (Ep. 50) says : Ad neminem ante bona
mens venit, quam mala. (Good feelings never come
before bad ones.) In its first degree, therefore,
Compassion opposes and baffles the design to which
I am urged by the antimoral forces dwelling within
me, and which will bring trouble on a fellow-being.
It calls out to me : " Stop ! " and encircles the
other as with a fence, so as to protect him from
the injury which otherwise my egoism or malice
would lead me to inflict on him. So arises out of
this first degree of compassion the rule : Neminem
laede. (Do harm to no one.) This is the fundamental
principle of the virtue of justice, and here alone is
to be found its origin, pure and simple, an origin
which is truly moral, and free from all extraneous
admixture. Otherwise derived, justice would have
to rest on Egoism, a reductio ad absurdum. If my
nature is susceptible of Compassion up to this
point, then it will avail to keep me back, whenever
I should like to use others' pain as a means
to obtain my ends ; equally, whether this pain be
immediate, or an after-consequence, whether it be
effected directly, or indirectly, through intermediate
links. I shall therefore lay hands on the property as
little as on the person of another, and avoid causing
him distress, no less mental than bodily. I shall thus
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 179
not only abstain from doing him physical injury, but
also, with equal care I shall guard against inflicting on
him the suffering of mind, which - mortification and
calumny, anxiety and vexation so surely work. The
same sense of Compassion will check me from gratify-
ing my desires at the cost of women's happiness for life,
or from seducing another man's wife, or from ruining
youths morally and physically by tempting them
to paederastia. Not that it is at all necessary in
each single case that Compassion should be definitely
excited ; indeed it would often come too late ; but
rather the rule : Neminem laede, is formed by noble
minds out of the knowledge, gained once for all,
of the injury which every unjust act necessarily
entails upon others, and which is aggravated by
the feeling of having to endure wrong through a
force majeure. Such natures are led by reflecting
reason to carry out this principle with unswerving
resolution. They respect the rights of every man,
and abstain from all encroachment on them ; they
keep themselves free from self-reproach, by refus-
ing to be the cause of others' trouble ; they do
not shift on to shoulders not their own, by force
or by trickery, the burdens and sorrows of life,
which circumstances bring to every one ; they prefer
to bear themselves the portions allotted to them,
so as not to double those of their neighbours.
For although generalising formulae, and abstract
knowledge of whatever kind, are not in the least
the cause, or the real basis of morality ; these are
nevertheless indispensable for a moral course of life.
They are the cistern or reservoir, in which the habit
180 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
of mind, that springs from the fount of all morality
(a fount not at all moments flowing), may be stored
up, thence to be drawn off, as occasion requires.
There is thus an analogy between things moral and
things physiological ; among many instances of which
we need only mention that of the gall-bladder, which
is used for keeping the secretion of the liver. Without
firmly held principles we should inevitably be at
the mercy of the antimoral incentives, directly they
are roused to activity by external influences ; and
self-control lies precisely in steadfast adherence and
obedience to such principles, despite the motives
which oppose them.
In general, the feminine half of humanity is
inferior to the masculine in the virtue of justice,
and its derivatives, uprightness, conscientiousness,
etc. ; the explanation is found in the fact that,
owing to the weakness of its reasoning powers the
former is much less capable than the latter of
understanding and holding to general laws, and of
taking them as a guiding thread. Hence injustice
and falseness are women's besetting sins, and lies
their proper element. On the other hand, they
surpass men in the virtue of loving-kindness ; because
usually the stimulus to this is intuitive, and con-
sequently appeals directly to the sense of Compassion,
of which females are much more susceptible than
males. For the former nothing but what is intuitive,
present, and immediately real has a true existence ;
that which is knowable only by means of concepts,
as for instance, the absent, the distant, the past,
the future, they do not readily grasp. We thus find
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 181
compensation here, as in so much else ; justice
is more the masculine, loving-kindness more the
feminine virtue. The mere idea of seeing women
sitting on the judges' bench raises a smile ; but the
sisters of mercy far excel the brothers of charity.
Now animals, as they have no power of gaining
knowledge by reason, that is, of forming abstract
ideas, are entirely incapable of fixed resolutions, to
say nothing of principles ; they consequently totally
lack self-control, and are helplessly given over to
external impressions and internal impulses. This
is why they have no conscious morality ; although
the different species show great contrasts of good
and evil in their characters, and as regards the
highest races these are traceable even in individuals.
From the foregoing 'considerations we see that in
the single acts of the just man Compassion works
only indirectly through his formulated principles, and
not so much actu as potentid ; much in the same way
as in statics the greater length of one of the scale-
beams, owing to its greater power of motion, balances
the smaller weight attached to it with the larger on
the other side, and works, while at rest, only potentid,
not actu ; yet with the same efficiency.
Nevertheless, Compassion is always ready to pass
into active operation. Therefore, whenever, in special
cases, the established rule shows signs of breaking
down, the one incentive (for we exclude of course those
based on Egoism), which is capable of infusing fresh
life into it, is that drawn from the fonntain-head
itself Compassion. This is true not only where it
is a question of personal violence, but also where
182 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
property is concerned, for instance, when any one
feels the desire to keep some valuable object which
he has found. In such cases, if we set aside all
motives prompted by worldly wisdom, and by religion
nothing brings a man back so easily to the path
of justice, as the realisation of the trouble, the grief,
the lamentation of the loser. It is because this is
felt to be trae, that, when publicity is given to the
loss of money, the assurance is so often added that
the loser is a poor man, a servant, etc.
It is hoped that these considerations have made
it clear that, however contrary appearances may be
at first sight, yet undoubtedly justice, as a genuine
and voluntary virtue has its origin in Compassion.
But if any one should suppose such a soil too barren
and meagre to bear this great cardinal virtue, let him
reflect on what is said above, and remember how
small is the amount of true, spontaneous, unselfish,
unfeigned justice among men ; how the real thing
only occurs as a surprising exception, and how, to
its counterfeit, the justice that rests on mere worldly
wisdom and is everywhere published abroad it is
related, both in quality and quantity, as gold is to
copper. I should like to call the one SiKaioa-vvrj
Travbrjiw? (common, ordinary justice), the other ovpavia
(heavenly justice). 1 For the latter is she, who, accord-
ing to Hesiod, 2 leaves the earth in the iron age, to
dwell with the celestial gods. To produce such a
1 There is here an allusion to the Travfynos "Epas and Ovpavia
in Plato's Symposium. V. Chap. 8, sq. Edit.- Schmelzer :
Weidmann, Berlin, 1882. (Translator.)
3 V. Hesiod, Opera et Dies, 174-201. (Translate.)
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 183
rare exotic as this the root we have indicated is
surely vigorous enough.
It will now be seen that injustice or wrong always
consists in working harm on another. Therefore
the conception of wrong is positive, and antecedent
to the conception of right, which is negative, and
simply denotes the actions performable without injury
to others ; in other words, without wrong being done.
That to this class belongs also whatever is effected
with no other object than that of warding off from
oneself meditated mischief is an easy inference. For
no participation in another's interests, and no sym-
pathy for him, can require me to let myself be
harmed by him, that is, to undergo wrong. The
theory that right is negative, in contradistinction
to wrong as positive, we find supported by Hugo
Grotius, the father of philosophical jurisprudence.
The definition of justice which he gives at the be-
ginning of his work, De Jure Belli et Pads (Bk. I.,
chap. 1., 3), runs as follows : Jus hie nihil aliud,
quam quod justum est, signijicat, idque negante magis
sensu, quam aiente, lit jus sit, quod injustum non est. 1
The negative character of justice is also established,
little as it may appear, even by the familiar formula :
" Give to each one his own." Now, there is no need
to give a man his own, if he has it. The real
meaning is therefore : " Take from none his own."
Since the requirements of justice are only negative,
they may be effected by coercion ; for the Neminem
1 Justice here denotes nothing else than that which is just,
and this, rather in a negative than in a positive sense ; so that
what is not unjust is to be regarded as justice.
184 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
laede can be practised by all alike. The coercive
apparatus is the state, whose sole raison d'etre is to
protect its subjects, individually from each other, and
collectively from external foes. It is true that a few
German would-be philosophers of this venal age
wish to distort the state into an institution for the
spread of morality, education, and edifying instruction.
But such a view contains, lurking in the background,
the Jesuitical aim of doing away with personal freedom
and individual development, and of making men
mere wheels in a huge Chinese governmental and
religious machine. And this is the road that once
led to Inquisitions, to Autos-da-fe", and religious wars.
Frederick the Great showed that he at least never
wished to tread it, when he said : " In my land every
one shall care for his own salvation, as he himself
thinks best." Nevertheless, we still see everywhere
(with the more apparent than real exception of North
America) that the state undertakes to provide for
the metaphysical needs of its members. The govern-
ments appear to have adopted as their guiding
principle the tenet of Qnintus Curtius : Nulla res
efficacius multitudinem regit, quam super stitio : alio-
quin impotens, saeva, mutabilis ; ubi vana religione
capta est, melius vatibus, quam ducibus suis paret.
We have seen that " wrong " and " right " are
convertible synonymes of " to do harm " and " to
1 There is no more efficient instrument in ruling the masses
than superstition. Without this they have no self-control ;
they are brutish ; they are changeable ; but once they are
caught by some vain form of religion, they lend a more willing
ear to its soothsayers than to their own leaders.
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 185
refrain from doing it," and that under " right " is
included the warding off of injury from oneself.
It will be obvious that these conceptions are inde-
pendent of, and antecedent to, all positive legislation.
There is, therefore, a pure ethical right, or natural
right, and a pure doctrine of right, detached from
all positive statutes. The first principles of this
doctrine have no doubt an empirical origin, so far
as they arise from the idea of harm done, but per se
they rest on the pure understanding, which a priori
furnishes ready to hand the axiom : causa causae
est causa effect-its. (The cause of a cause is the cause
of the effect.) Taken in this connection the words
mean : if any one desires to injure me, it is not I,
but he, that is the cause of whatever I am obliged
to do in self-defence ; and I can consequently oppose
all encroachments on his part, without wronging him.
Here we have, so to say, a law of moral repercussion.
Thus it comes about that the union of the empirical
idea of injury done with the axiom supplied by the
pure understanding, gives rise to the fundamental con-
ceptions of wrong and right, which every one grasps
a prioi'i, and learns by actual trial to immediately
adopt. The empiric, who denies this, and refuses
to accept anything but the verdict of experience, may
be referred to the testimony of the savage races,
who all distinguish between wrong and right quite
correctly, often indeed with nice precision ; as is
strikingly manifested when they are engaged in
bartering and other transactions with Europeans, or
visit their ships. They are bold and self-assured,
when they are in the right ; but uneasy, when they
186 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
know they are wrong. In disputes a just settlement
satisfies them, whereas unjust procedure drives them
to war. The Doctrine of Right is a branch of Ethics,
whose function is to determine those actions which
may not be performed, unless one wishes to injure
others, that is, to be guilty of wrong-doing ; and
here the active part played is kept in view. But
legislation applies this chapter of moral science
conversely, that is, with reference to the passive side
of the question, and declares that the same actions
need not be endured, since no one ought to have
wrong inflicted on him. To frustrate such con-
duct the state constructs the complete edifice of
the law, as positive Bight. Its intention is that
no one shall suffer wrong ; the intention of the
Doctrine of Moral Right is that no one shall do
wrong. 1
If by unjust action I molest some one, whether in
his person, his freedom, his property, or his honour,
the wrong as regards quality remains the same. But
with respect to quantity it may vary very much. This
difference in the amount of wrong effected appears not
to have been as yet investigated by moralists, although
it is everywhere recognised in real life, because the
censure passed is always proportional to the harm
inflicted. So also with just actions, the right done
is constant in quality, but not in quantity To explain
this better : he, who when dying of starvation steals a
loaf, commits a wrong ; but how small is this wrong
in comparison with the act of an opulent proprietor,
1 The Doctrine of Right in detail may be found in Die
Welt ah Wille und Vorstellung, vol. i., 62.
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 187
who, in whatever way, despoils a poor man of his last
penny ! Again : the rich person who pays his hired
labourer, acts justly ; but how insignificant is this piece
of justice when contrasted with that of a penniless
toiler, who voluntarily returns to its wealthy owner
a purse of gold which he has found ! The measure,
however, of this striking difference in the quantity
of justice, and injustice (the quality being always
constant), is not direct and absolute, as on a graduated
scale ; it is indirect and relative, like the ratio of
sines and tangents. I give therefore the following
definition : the amount of injustice in my conduct
varies as the amount of evil, which I thereby bring
on another, divided by the amount of advantage,
which I myself gain ; and the amount of justice in
my conduct varies as the amount of advantage, which
injury done to another brings me, divided by the
amount of harm which he thereby suffers .
We have further to notice a double form of injustice
which is specifically different from the simple kind, be
it never so great. This variety may be detected by
the fact that the amount of indignation shown by
disinterested witnesses, which is always proportional
to the amount of wrong inflicted, never reaches the
maximum except when it is present. We then see
how the deed is loathed, as something revolting and
heinous, as an $705 (i.e., abomination), before which,
as it were, the gods veil their faces. Double injustice
occurs when some one, after definitely undertaking
the obligation of protecting his friend, master, client,
etc., in a special way, not only is guilty of non-fulfilment
of that duty (which of itself would be injurious to the
188 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
other, and therefore a wrong) ; but when, in addition,
he turns round, and attacks the man, and strikes at
the very spot which he promised to guard. Instances
are : the appointed watch, or guide, who becomes an
assassin ; the trusted caretaker, who becomes a thief ;
the guardian, who robs his ward of her property ;
the lawyer, who prevaricates ; the judge, who is
corruptible ; the adviser, who deliberately gives some
fatal counsel. All such conduct is known by the
name of treachery, and is viewed with abhorrence by
the whole world. Hence Dante puts traitors in the
lowest circle of Hell, where Satan himself is found
(Inferno : xi, 61-66).
As we have here had occasion to mention the
word "obligation," this is the place to determine
the conception of Duty, which is so often spoken of
both in Ethics and in real life, but with too wide
an extension of meaning. We have seen that wrong
always signifies injury done to another, whether it
be in his person, his freedom, his property, or
his honour. The consequence appears to be that
every wrong must imply a positive aggression, and
so a definite act. Only there are actions, the
simple omission of which constitutes a wrong ; and
these are Duties. This is the true philosophic
definition of the conception " Duty," a term which
loses its characteristic note, and hence becomes
valueless, if it is used (as hitherto it has been in
Moral Science) to designate all praiseworthy conduct.
It is forgotten that " Duty " l necessarily means a
1 Duty = TO dtov = le devoir =Pflicht [cf. plight, O. H. G.
plegan], (Translator.)
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 189
debt which is owing, being thus an action, by the
simple omission of which another suffers harm, that
is, a wrong comes about. Clearly in this case the
injury only takes place through the person, who
neglects the duty, having distinctly pledged or bound
himself to it. Consequently all duties depend on
an obligation which has been entered into. This,
as a rule, takes the form of a definite, if some-
times tacit, agreement between two parties : as for
instance, between prince and people, government and
its servants, master and man, lawyer and client,
physician and patient ; in a word, between any and
every one who undertakes to perform some task,
and his employer in the widest sense of the word.
Hence every duty involves a right ; since no one
undertakes an obligation without a motive, which
means, in this case, without seeing some advantage
for himself. There is only one obligation that I
know of which is not subject to an agreement, but arises
directly and solely through an act ; this is because
one of the persons with whom it has to do was not
in existence when it was contracted. I refer to the
duty of parents towards their children. Whoever
brings a child into the world, has incumbent on him
the duty of supporting his offspring, until the latter is
able to maintain himself ; and should this time never
come, owing to incapacity from blindness, deformity,
cretinism, and the like, neither does the duty ever
come to an end. It is clear that merely by failing to
provide for the needs of his son, that is, by a simple
omission, the father would injure him, indeed jeopardise
his life. Children's duty towards their parents is
190 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
not so direct and imperative. It rests on the fact
that, as every duty involves a right, parents also
must have some just claim on their issue. This
is the foundation of the duty of filial obedience,
which, however, in course of time ceases simultaneously
with the right out of which it sprang. It is replaced
by gratitude for that which was done by father and
mother over and above their strict duty. Neverthe-
less, although ingratitude is a hateful, often indeed
a revolting vice, gratitude cannot be called a duty;
because its omission inflicts no injury on the other
side, and is therefore no wrong. Otherwise we should
have to suppose that in his heart of hearts the
benefactor aims at making a good bargain. It
should he noticed that reparation made for harm
done may also be regarded as a duty arising directly
through an action. This, however, is something purely
negative, as it is nothing but an attempt to remove
and blot out the consequences of an unjust deed, as
a thing that ought never to have taken place. Be
it also observed that equity l is the foe of justice,
and often comes into harsh collision with it ; so
that the former ought only to be admitted within
certain limits. The German is a friend of equity,
while the Englishman holds to justice.
The law of motivation is just as strict as that
of physical causality, and hence involves the same
1 The word here translated " equity " (Billigkeit : Lat.
aequitas) means the sense of fairness, or of natural justice
which determines what is fitting and due in all human
relations, as opposed to justice (Gerechtigkeit) taken as
positive written law. (Translator.)
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 191
irresistible necessity. Consequently wrong may be
compassed not only by violence, but also by cunning.
If by violence I ana able to kill or rob another, or compel
him to obey me, I can equally use cunning to
accomplish the same ends ; that is, I can place false
motives before his intellect, by reason of which he
must do what otherwise he would not. These false
motives are effected by lies. In reality lies are
unjustifiable solely in so far as they are instruments
of cunning, in other words, of compulsion, by means
of motivation. 1 And this is precisely their function,
as a rule. For, in the first place, I cannot tell a false-
hood without a motive, and this motive will certainly
be, with the rarest exceptions, an unjust one ; namely,
the intention of holding others, over whom I have
no power, under my will, that is, of coercing them
through the agency of motivation. Also in mere ex-
aggerations and untruthful bombast there is the same
purpose at work ; for, by employing such language,
a man tries to place himself higher in the sight
of others than is his due. The binding force of a
promise or a compact is contained in the fact that, if
it be not observed, it is a deliberate lie, pronounced
in the most solemn manner, a lie, whose intention
(that of putting others under moral compulsion) is,
in this case, all the clearer, because its motive, the
desired performance of something on the other side,
is expressly declared. The contemptible part of the
1 Motivation is defined in Part II., Chapter VIII., as " the
law of Causality acting through the medium of the intellect."
It is thus the law of the determination of conduct by
motives. (Translator.)
192 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
fraud is that hypocrisy is used to disarm the victim
before he is attacked. The highest point of villainy
is reached in treachery, which, as we have seen, is a
double injustice, and is always regarded with loathing.
It is, then, obvious that, just as I am not wrong,
that is, right in resisting violence by violence, so
where violence is not feasible, or it appears more
convenient, I am at liberty to resort to cunning ;
accordingly, whenever I am entitled to use force, I
may, if I please, employ falsehood ; for instance, against
robbers and miscreants of every sort, whom in this
way I entice into a trap. Hence a promise which is
extorted by violence is not binding. But, as a matter
of fact, the right to avail myself of lies extends
further. It occurs whenever an unjustifiable question
is asked, which has to do with my private, or business
affairs, and is hence prompted by curiosity ; for to
answer it, or even to put it off by the suspicion-
awakening words, " I can't tell you," would expose
me to danger. Here an untruth is the indispensable
weapon against unwarranted inquisitiveness, whose
motive is hardly ever a well-meaning one. For, just as
I have the right to oppose the apparent bad will of
another, and to anticipate with physical resistance,
to the danger of my would-be aggressor, the physical
violence presumably thence resulting ; so that, for
instance, as a precaution, I can protect my garden
wall with sharp spikes, let loose savage dogs in my
court at night, and even, if circumstances require it,
set man-traps and spring-guns, for the evil conse-
quences of which the burglar has only himself to
thank : if I have the right to do this, then I am
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 193
equally authorised in keeping secret, at any price, that
which, if known, would lay me bare to the attack
of others. And 1 have good reason for acting thus,
because, in moral, no less than in physical, relations,
I am driven to assume that the bad will of others
is very possible, and must therefore take all necessary
preventive measures beforehand. Whence Ariosto
says :
Quantunque il simitlar sia le piiib volte
Sipreso, e dia di mala mente indici,
Si trova pure in molte cose e molte
Avere fatti evidenti benefici,
E danni e biasnii e morti avere tolte :
Che non conversiam' sempre con gli amid,
In questa assai piu oscura che serena
Vita mortal, tutta d'invidia piena}
Orl. Fur., IV., 1.
I may, then, without any injustice match cunning
with cunning, and anticipate all crafty encroachments
on me, even if they be only probable ; and I need
neither render an account to him who unwarrantably
pries into my personal circumstances, nor by replying :
" I cannot answer this," show him the spot where I
1 However much we're won't to blame a lie,
As index of a mind estranged from right,
Yet times unnumber'd it hath shap'd results
Of good most evident ; disgrace and loss,
It chang'd ; e'en death it cheated. For with friends,
Alas ! not always in this mortal life,
Where envy fills all hearts, and gloom prevails
Much more than light, are we in converse join'd.
(Translator.)
13
194 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
have a secret, which perilous to me, and perhaps
advantageous to him, in any case puts me in his
power, if divulged : Scire wlunt secreta domus, atque
inde timeri. (They wish to know family secrets, and
thus become feared.) On the contrary, I am justified
in putting him off with a lie, involving danger to
himself, in case he is thereby led into a mistake that
works him harm. Indeed, a falsehood is the only
means of opposing inquisitive and suspicious curiosity ;
to meet which it is the one weapon of necessary self-
defence. " Ask me no questions, and I'll tell you no
lies " is here the right maxim. For among the
English, who regard the reproach of being a liar as
the deepest insult, and who on that account are really
more truthful than other nations, all unjustifiable
questions, having to do with another's affairs, are
looked upon as a piece of ill-breeding, which is denoted
by the expression, "to ask questions." Certainly
every sensible person, even when he is of the strictest
rectitude, follows the principle above set forth.
Suppose, for instance, such a one is returning from
a remote spot, where he has raised a sum of money ;
and suppose an unknown traveller joins him, and
after the customary " whither " and " whence "
gradually proceeds to inquire what may have taken
him to that place ; the former will undoubtedly give
a false answer in order to avoid the danger of robbery.
Again : if a man be found in the house of another,
whose daughter he is wooing ; and he is asked the
cause of his unexpected presence ; unless he has
entirely lost his head, he will not give the true reason,
but unhesitatingly invent a pretext. And the cases are
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 195
numberless in which every reasonable being tells an
untruth, without the least scruple of conscience. It is
this view of the matter alone that removes the crying
contradiction between the morality which is taught,
and that which is daily practised, even by the best
and most upright of men. At the same time, the
restriction of a falsehood to the single purpose of self-
defence must be rigidly observed ; for otherwise this
doctrine would admit of terrible abuse, a lie being in
itself a very dangerous instrument. But just as, even
in time of public peace, the law allows every one to
carry weapons and to use them, when required for
self-defence, so Ethics permits lies to be employed
for the same purpose, and be it observed for this
one purpose only. Every mendacious word is a wrong,
excepting only when the occasion arises of defending
oneself against violence or cunning. Hence justice
requires truthfulness towards all men. But the entirely
unconditional and unreserved condemnation of lies, as
properly involved in their nature, is sufficiently refuted
by well known facts. Thus, there are cases where a
falsehood is a duty, especially for doctors ; and there
are magnanimous lies, as, for instance, that of the
Marquis Posa in Don Carlos, 1 or that in the Gerusa-
lemme Liberata, II., 22 ; 2 they occur, indeed, whenever
a man wills to take on himself the guilt of another ;
and lastly, Jesus Christ himself is reported (John
1 Vide, Schiller's Don Carlos : Act V., Sc. 3. (Translator.)
" Magnanima menzogna, or quando e il vero
Si bello che si possa a te preporre ? "
Cf. also the Horatian splendid mendax. Carm. III., 11,
35. (Translator.)
196 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
vii. 8 ; cf. ver. 10) on one occasion to have inten-
tionally told an untruth. The reader will remember
that Campanella, in his Poesie Filosofahe (Delia
Bellezza: Madr. 9), does not hesitate to say : " Bello
il mentir, se a fare gran ben' si trova." l On the
other hand, the current teaching as regards necessary
falsehoods is a wretched patch on the dress of a
poverty-stricken morality. Kant is responsible for
the theory found in many text-books, which derives
the unjustifiableness of lies from man's faculty of
speech ; but the arguments are so tame, childish and
absurd that one might well be tempted, if only to
pour contempt on them, to join sides with the devil,
and say with Talleyrand : Vhomme a requ la parole
pour pouwir cacher sa pensee. 2 The unqualified and
boundless horror shown by Kant for falsehoods,
whenever he has the opportunity, is due either to
affectation, or to prejudice. In the chapter of his
" Tugendlehre" dealing with lies, he loads them
with every kind of defamatory epithet, bat does
not adduce a single adequate reason for their con-
demnation ; which would have been more to the
point. Declamation is easier than demonstration,
and to moralise less difficult than to be sincere.
Kant would have done better to open the vials of
his wrath on that vice which takes pleasure in seeing
others suffer ; it is the latter, and not a falsehood,
which is truly fiendish. For malignant joy is the exact
1 'Tis well to lie, an there result much good therefrom.
Vide, Opere di Tommaso Campanella, da Alessandro d'Ancona,
Torino, 1854. (Translator.)
Man has received the gift of language, so as to be able to
conceal his thoughts.
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 197
opposite of Compassion, and nothing else but powerless
cruelty, which, unable itself to bring about the misery
it so gladly beholds others enduring, is thankful to
Tvxn for having done so instead. According to the
code of knightly honour, the reproach of being a liar
is of extreme gravity, and only to be washed out with
the accuser's blood. Now this obtains, not because
the lie is wrong in itself, since, were such the reason,
to accuse a man of an injury done by violence would
certainly be regarded as equally outrageous, which
is not the case, as every one knows ; but it is due to
that principle of chivalry, which in reality bases right
on might ; so that whoever, when trying to work
mischief, has recourse to falsehood, proves that he
lacks either power, or the requisite courage. Every
untruth bears witness of his fear ; and this is why a
fatal verdict is passed on him.
CHAPTER VII.
THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS.
THUS justice is the primary and essentially cardinal
virtue. Ancient philosophers recognised it as such,
but made it co-ordinate with three others unsuitably
chosen. 1 Loving-kindness (caritas, cuydfrrf) was not
as yet ranked as a virtue. Plato himself, who rises
highest in moral science, reaches only so far as
voluntary, disinterested justice. It is true that
loving-kindness has existed at all times in practice
and in fact ; but it was reserved for Christianity,
whose greatest service is seen in this to theoretically
formulate, and expressly advance it not only as a
virtue, but as the queen of all ; and to extend it even to
enemies. We are thinking of course only of Europe.
For in Asia, a thousand years before, the bound-
less love of one's neighbour had been prescribed
and taught, as well as practised: the Vedas 2 are
1 Plato taught that Justice (&iKaio(rvvri) includes in itself
the three other virtues of Wisdom (o-o^i'a), Fortitude (di/Spet'a),
and Temperance (o-w^poo-uw?). With Aristotle, too, Justice is
the chief of virtues ; while the Stoic doctrine is that Virtue
is manifested in four leading co-ordinate forms : Wisdom,
Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance. (Translator.)
1 There are four Vedas : the Rig- Veda, Yajur- Veda, Sdma-
Veda, and Atharva- Veda. (Translator.)
198
THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS. 199
full of it ; while in the Dharma-Sastra, 1 Itihasa, 2
and Purana 3 it constantly recurs, to say nothing of
the preaching of Sakya-muni, the Buddha. And to
be quite accurate we must admit that there are
traces to be found among the Greeks and Romans
of a recommendation to follow loving-kindness ; for
instance, in Cicero, De Finibus, V., 23 ; 4 and also
in Pythagoras, according to lamblichus, De vita
Pythagorae, chap. 33. 5 My task is now to give a
philosophical derivation of this virtue from the
principle I have laid down.
It has been demonstrated in Chapter V. of this
Part, that the sense of Compassion, however much its
origin is shrouded in mystery, is the one and sole cause
whereby the suffering I see in another, of itself, and
as such, becomes directly my motive ; and we have
seen that the first stage of this process is negative.
1 Dharnia-Sdstra (" a law book ") : the body or code of
Hindu law. (Translator.}
Itihasa (iti-ha-asa, " so indeed it is ") : talk, legend, tradi-
tional accounts of former events, heroic history ; e.g., the
Maha-bharata. (Translator.)
3 Purana (ancient, legendary) : the name given to certain
well-known sacred works, eighteen in number, comprising
the whole body of modern Hindu mythology. V. Monier
Williams' Sanskrit Dictionary. (Translator.)
4 Ipsa CARITAS generis humani, quae nata a primo satu,
quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur, et tota domus conjugio
et stirpe conjungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus
primum, turn affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus
tuni civibus et MS, qui publice socii atque amid sunt, deinde
TOTIUS COMPLEXU GENTIS HUMANAE.
5 This chapter describes the Pythagorean <f>t\ia jravrav -n-pbs
&rravras, which comes very near to loving-kindness. It
contains also certain *aXa rfjs (pi\ias TfK^pia. (Translator.)
200 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
The second degree is sharply distinguished from the
first, through the positive character of the actions
resulting therefrom ; for at this point Compassion
does more than keep me back from injuring my
neighbour ; it impels me to help him. And according
as, on the one hand, my sense of direct participation
is keen and deep, and, on the other hand, the distress
is great and urgent, so shall I be constrained by
this motive, which (be it noted) is purely and wholly
moral, to make a greater or less sacrifice in order to
meet the need or the calamity which I observe ; and
this sacrifice may involve the expenditure of my
bodily or mental powers, the loss of my property,
freedom, or even life. So that in this direct
suffering with another, which rests on no arguments
and requires none, is found the one simple origin of
loving-kindness, caritas, ayaTrr}- in other words, that
virtue whose rule is : Omnes, quantum potes, juva
(help all people, as far as lies in your power) ;
and from which all those actions proceed which are
prescribed by Ethics under the name of duties of
virtue, otherwise called duties of love, or imperfect
duties. It is solely by direct and, as it were,
instinctive participation in the sufferings which we
see, in other words, by Compassion, that conduct
so defined is occasioned ; at least when it can be
said to have moral worth, that is, be declared free
from all egoistic motives, and when on that account
it awakens in us that inward contentment which is
called a good, satisfied, approving conscience, and
elicits from the spectator (not without making him
cast a humiliating glance at himself), that remark-
THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS. 201
able commendation, respect, and admiration which are
too well-known to be denied.
But if a beneficent action have any other motive
whatever, then it must be egoistic, if not actually
malicious. For as the fundamental springs of all
human conduct (v. Chapter Y. of this Part), are three,
namely, Egoism, Malice, Compassion ; so the various
motives which are capable of affecting men may be
grouped under three general heads : (1) one's own weal ;
(2) others' woe ; (3) others' weal. Now if the motive
of a kind act does not belong to the third class, it must
of course be found in the first or second. To the
second it is occasionally to be ascribed ; for instance,
if I do good to some one, in order to vex another,
to whom I am hostile ; or to make the latter's
sufferings more acute ; or, it may be, to put to
shame a third person, who refrained from helping ;
or lastly, to inflict a mortification on the man whom
I benefit. But it much more usually springs from
the first class. And this is the case whenever, in
doing some good, I have in view my own weal, no
matter how remote or indirect it may be ; that is,
whenever I am influenced by the thought of reward
whether in this, or in another, world, or by the hope
of winning high esteem, and of gaining a reputation
for nobleness of character ; or again, when I reflect
that the person, whom I now aid, may one day be
able to assist me in return, or otherwise be of some
service and benefit ; or when, lastly, I am guided
by the consideration that I must keep the rules of
magnanimity and beneficence, because I too may on
some occasion profit thereby. In a word, my motive
202 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
is egoistic as sooii as it is anything other than the
purely objective desire of simply knowing, without
any ulterior purpose, that my neighbour is helped,
delivered from his distress and need, or freed from
his suffering. If such an aim shorn, as it is, of
all subjectivity be really mine, then, and then only,
have I given proof of that loving-kindness, caritas,
dyaTrr}, which it is the great and distinguishing merit
of Christianity to have preached. It should be ob-
served, in this connection, that the injunctions which
the Gospel adds to its commandment of love, e.g.,
fjbr) ryvcbrw r) dpLcrrepd crov, rl irotel 77 Seid trov (let
not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth),
and the like, are, in point of fact, based on a
consciousness of the conclusion I have here reached,
namely, that another's distress, of itself alone, without
any further consideration, must be my motive, if
what I do is to be of moral value. And in the same
place (Matth. vi. 2) we find it stated with perfect
truth that ostentations almsgivers (nrk-^ovaiv rby
picrdov avr&v. (Get in full exhaust their reward.)
Although, in this respect too, the Vedas shed on
us the light of a higher teaching. They repeatedly
declare that he, who desires any sort of recompense
for his work, is still wandering in the path of dark-
ness, and not yet ripe for deliverance. If any one
should ask me what he gets from a charitable act,
my answer in all sincerity would be : " This, that
the lot of the poor man you relieve is just so much
the lighter ; otherwise absolutely nothing. If you
are not satisfied, and feel that such is not a suffi-
cient end, then your wish was not to give alms,
THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS. 203
but to make a purchase ; and you have effected a
bad bargain. But if the one thing you are concerned
with is that he should feel the pressure of poverty
less ; then you have gained your object ; you have
diminished his suffering, and you see exactly how
far your gift is requited."
Now, how is it possible that trouble which is not
mine, and by which I am untouched, should become
as direct a motive to me as if it were my own, and
incite me to action ? As already explained, only
through the fact that, although it comes before
me merely as something outside myself, by means
of the external medium of sight or hearing ; I am,
nevertheless, sensible of it with the sufferer ; I feel
it as my own, not indeed in myself, but in him
And so what Calderon said comes to pass :
que entre el ver
Padecer y el padecer
Ninguna distancia habia.
(No Siempre lo Peor es Cierto. Jorn. II., Esc. 9.) 1
This, however, presupposes that to a certain extent
I have become identified with the other, and con-
sequently that the barrier between the ego and the
non-ego is, for the moment, broken down. It is then,
and then only, that I make his interests, his need,
his distress, his suffering directly my own ; it is then
that the empirical picture I have of him vanishes,
1 For between the view
Of pain, and pain itself, I never knew
A distance He.
It is not Always the Worst that is Certain : Act II.,
Sc. 9. (Translator. )
204 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
and I no longer see the stranger, who is entirely
unlike myself, and to whom I am indifferent ; but
I share his pain in him, despite the certainty that
his skin does not enclose my nerves. Only in this
way is it possible for his woe, his distress to become a
motive for me ; otherwise I should be influenced solely
by my own. This process . is, I repeat, mysterious.
For it is one which Reason can give no direct account
of, and its causes lie outside the field of experience.
And yet it is of daily occurrence. Every one has
often felt its working within himself; even to the
most hard-hearted and selfish it is not unknown.
Each day that passes brings it before our eyes, in
single acts, on a small scale ; whenever a man, by
direct impulse, without much reflection, helps a
fellow-creature and comes to his aid, sometimes even
exposing himself to the most imminent peril for the
sake of one he has never seen before, and this, with-
out once thinking of anything but the fact that
he witnesses another's great distress and danger. It
was manifested on a large scale, when after long
consideration, and many a stormy debate, the noble-
hearted British nation gave twenty millions of pounds
to ransom the negroes in its colonies, with the
approbation and joy of a whole world. If any one
refuses to recognise in Compassion the cause of this
deed, magnificent as it is in its grand proportions,
and prefers to ascribe it to Christianity ; let him
remember that in the whole of the New Testament
not one word is said against slavery, though at that
time it was practically universal ; and further, that
as late as A.D. I860, in North America, when the
THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS. 205
question was being discussed, a man was found who
thought to strengthen his case by appealing to the
fact that Abraham and Jacob kept slaves !
What will be in each separate case the practical
effect of this mysterious inner process may be left
to Ethics to analyse, in chapters and paragraphs
entitled "Duties of Virtue," "Duties of Love,"
" Imperfect Duties," or whatever other name be used.
The root, the -basis of all these is the one here
indicated ; for out of it arises the primary precept :
Omnes, quantum potes, jmia ; from which in turn
everything else required can very easily be deduced ;
just as out of the Neminem laede the first half of
my principle all duties of justice are derivable.
Ethics is in truth the easiest of all sciences. And
this is only to be expected, since it is incumbent on
each person to construct it for himself, and himself
form the rule for every case, as it occurs, out of
the fundamental law which lies deep in his heart ;
for few have leisure and patience enough to learn
a ready-made system of Morals. From justice and
loving-kindness spring all the other virtues ; for which
reason these two may properly be called cardinal, and
the disclosure of their origin lays the corner-stone
of Moral Science. The entire ethical content of
the Old Testament is justice ; loving-kindness being
that of the New. The latter is the tccuvr) eVroX^ (the
new commandment [John xiii. 34] ), which accord-
ing to Paul (Romans xiii. 8-10) includes all Christian
virtues.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED
BY EXPERIENCE.
THE truth I have here laid down, that Compassion
is the sole non-egoistic stimulus, and therefore the
only really moral one, is a strange, indeed almost
incomprehensible paradox. I shall hope, therefore,
to render it less extraordinary to the reader, if I
show that it is confirmed by experience, and by the
universal testimony of human sentiment.
(1) For this purpose I shall, in the first place,
state an imaginary case, which in the present investi-
gation may serve as an experimentum crucis 1 (a crucial
test). But not to make the matter too easy, I shall
take no instance of loving-kindness, but rather a
breach of lawful right, and that of the worse kind.
1 This term appears to have been first used by Newton
and Boyle. The sense is undoubtedly derived from Bacon's
phrase "instantia crucis" which is one of his "Prerogative
Instances." Vide, Novum Organum : Lib. II., xxxvi., where it
is explained as follows : Inter Praerogativas Instantiarum
ponemus loco decimo quarto INSTANTIAS CRUCIS ; translate
vocabulo a Crucibus, quae erectae in Hiviis, indicant et signant
viarum separationes. Has etiam Instantias Decisorias et
Judiciales, et in Casibus nonnullis Instantias Oracvli et
Mandati, appellare consuevimus, etc. (Translator.)
206
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 207
Let us suppose two young people, Cains and Titus,
to be passionately in love, each with a different girl,
and that both are completely thwarted by two other
men who are preferred because of certain external
circumstances. They have both resolved to put their
rivals out of the way, and are perfectly secure from
every chance of detection, even from all suspicion.
But when they come to actually prepare for the
murder, each of them, after an inward struggle,
draws back. They are now to give us a truthful and
clear account of the reasons why they abandoned
their project. As for Caius, I leave it entirely to
the reader to choose what motive he likes. It may
be that religious grounds checked him ; for in-
stance, the thought of the Divine Will, of future
retribution, of the judgment to come, etc. Or perhaps
he may say : " I reflected that the principle I was
going to apply in this case would not be adapted to
provide a rule universally valid for all possible
rational beings ; because I should have treated my
rival only as a means, and not at the same time as
an end." Or, following Fichte, he may deliver
himself as follows : " Every human life is a means
towards realising the moral law ; consequently, I
cannot, without being indifferent to this realisation,
destroy a being ordained to do his part in effecting
it." (Sittenlehre, p. 373.) (This scruple, be it ob-
served in passing, he might well overcome by the
hope of soon producing a new instrument of the moral
law, when once in possession of his beloved.) Or,
again, he may speak after the fashion of Wollaston :
" I considered that such an action would be the
208 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
expression of a false tenet." Or like Hutcheson : " The
Moral Sense, whose perceptions, equally with those
of every other sense, admit of no final explanation,
forbade me to commit such a deed." Or like Adam
Smith : " I foresaw that my act would awaken no
sympathy with me in the minds of the spectators."
Or his language may be borrowed from Christian
Wolff : " I recognised that I should thereby advance
neither the work of making myself perfect, nor the
same process in any one else." Or from Spinoza :
" Homini nihil utilius homine : ergo hominem interimere
nolui." (To man nothing is more useful than man :
therefore I was unwilling to destroy a man.) In
short, he may say what one pleases. But Titus,
whose explanation is supplied by myself, will speak
as follows : " When I came to make arrangements
for the work, and so, for the moment, had to occupy
myself not with my own passion, but with my rival ;
then for the first time I saw clearly what was going
to happen to him. But simultaneously I was seized
with compassion and pity; sorrow for him laid hold
upon me, and overmastered me : I could not strike the
blow." Now I ask every honest and unprejudiced
reader : Which of these two is the better man ? To
which would he prefer to entrust his own destiny?
Which is restrained by the purer motive? Conse-
quently, where does the basis of morality lie ?
(2) There is nothing that revolts our moral sense
so much as cruelty. Every other offence we can
pardon, but not cruelty. The reason is found in the
fact that cruelty is the exact opposite of Compassion.
When we hear of intensely cruel conduct, as, for
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 209
instance, the act, which has just been recorded in
the papers, of a mother, who murdered her little
son of five years, by pouring boiling oil into his
throat, and her younger child, by burying it alive ;
or what was recently reported from Algiers : how a
casual dispute between a Spaniard and an Algerine
ended in a fight ; and how the latter, having van-
quished the other, tore out the whole of his lower
jaw bone, and carried it off as a trophy, leaving his
adversary still alive ; when we hear of cruelty like
this, we are seized with horror, and exclaim : " How
is it possible to do such a thing ? " Now, let me
ask what this question signifies. Does it mean :
" How is it possible to fear so little the punishments
of the future life ? " It is difficult to admit this
interpretation. Then perhaps it intends to say :
" How is it possible to act according to a principle
which is so absolutely unfitted to become a general
law for all rational beings ? " Certainly not. Or,
once more : " How is it possible to neglect so utterly
one's own perfection as well as that of another ? "
This is equally unimaginable. The sense of the
question is assuredly nothing but this : " How is
it possible to be so utterly bereft of compassion ? "
The conclusion is that when an action is characterised
by an extraordinary absence of compassion, it bears
the certain stamp of the deepest depravity and loath-
someness. Hence Compassion is the true moral
incentive.
(3) The ethical basis, or the original moral stimulus,
which I have disclosed, is the only one that can be
justly said to have a real and extended sphere of
14
210 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
effective influence. No one will surely venture to
maintain as much of all the other moral principles
that philosophers have set up ; for these are composed
of abstract, sometimes even of hair-splitting propo-
sitions, with no foundation other than an artificial
combination of ideas ; such that their application
to actual conduct would often incline to the comic.
A good action, inspired solely by Kant's Moral Prin-
ciple, would be at bottom the work of philosophic
pedantry ; or else would lead the doer into self-
deception, through his reason interpreting conduct,
which had other, perhaps nobler, incentives, as the
product of the Categorical Imperative, and of the
conception of Duty, which, as we have seen, rests
on nothing. But not only is it true that the philo-
sophic moral principles, purely theoretical as they
are, have seldom any operative power ; of those
established by religion, and expressly framed for
practical purposes, it is equally difficult to predicate
any marked efficiency. The chief evidence of this lies
in the fact that in spite of the great religious differ-
ences in the world, the amount of morality, or rather
of immorality, shows no corresponding variation, but
in essentials is pretty much the same everywhere.
Only it is important not to confound rudeness and
refinement with morality and immorality. The re-
ligion of Hellas had an exceedingly small moral
tendency, it hardly went further than respect for
oaths. No dogma was taught, and no system of
Ethics publicly preached ; nevertheless, all things
considered, it does not appear that the Greeks were
morally inferior to the men of the Christian era. The
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 211
morality of Christianity is of a ranch higher kind than
that of any other religion which previously appeared
in Europe. But if any one should believe for this
reason that European morals have improved pro-
portionally, and that now at any rate they surpass
what obtains elsewhere, it would not be difficult to
demonstrate that among the Mohammedans, Guebres,
Hindus, and Buddhists, there is at least as much
honesty, fidelity, toleration, gentleness, beneficence,
nobleness, and self-denial as among Christian peoples.
Indeed, the scale will be found rather to turn unfavour-
ably for Christendom, when we put into the balance
the long list of inhuman cruelties which have con-
stantly been perpetrated within its limits and often
in its name. We need only recall for a moment the
numerous religious wars ; the crusades that nothing
can justify ; the extirpation of a large part of the
American aborigines, and the peopling of that con-
tinent by negroes, brought over from Africa, without
the shadow of a right, torn from their families, their
country, their hemisphere, and, as slaves, condemned
for life to forced labour ; the tireless persecution of
heretics ; the unspeakable atrocities of the Inquisition,
that cried aloud to heaven ; the Massacre of St.
Bartholomew ; the execution of 18,000 persons in
the Netherlands by the Duke of Alva ; and these are
but a few facts among many. Speaking generally,
1 According to Buxton (The African Slave-trade, 1839),
their number is even now yearly increased by about 150,000
freshly imported ; and to these more than 200,000 must be
added, who perish miserably at the time of their capture, or
on the voyage.
212 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
however, if we compare with the performances of its
followers the excellent morality which Christianity,
and, more or less, every creed preaches, and then
try to imagine how far theory would become practice,
if crime were not impeded by the secular arm of the
state ; nay more, what would probably happen, if, for
only one day all laws should be suspended ; we shall
be obliged to confess that the effect of the various
religions on Morals is in fact very small. This is
of course due to weakness of faith. Theoretically,
and so long as it is only a question of piety in the
abstract, every one supposes his belief to be firm
enough. Only the searching touch-stone of all our
convictions is what we do. When the moment for
acting arrives, and our faith has to be tested by
great self-denial and heavy sacrifices, then its feeble-
ness becomes evident. If a man is seriously planning
some evil, he has already broken the bounds of true
and pure morality. Thenceforward the chief restraint
that checks him is invariably the dread of justice
and the police. Should he be so hopeful of escap-
ing detection as to cast such fears aside, the next
barrier that meets him is regard for his honour. If
this second rampart be crossed, there is very little
likelihood, after both these powerful hindrances are
withdrawn, that any religious dogma will appeal
to him strongly enough to keep him back from the
deed. For if he be not frightened by near and
immediate dangers, he will hardly be curbed by
terrors which are distant, and rest merely on belief.
Moreover, there is a positive objection that may be
brought against all good conduct proceeding solely from
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 213
religious conviction ; it is not purged of self-interest,
but done out of regard for reward and punishment, and
hence can have no purely moral value. This view we
find very clearly expressed in a letter of the celebrated
Grand-Duke of Weimar, Karl August. He writes :
" Baron Weyhers was himself of opinion that he, who
is good through religion, and not by natural inclina-
tion, must be a bad fellow at heart. In vino veritas" 1
(Letters to J. H. Merck ; No. 229.) But now let us
turn to the moral incentive which I have disclosed.
Who ventures for a moment to deny that it displays
a marked and truly wonderful influence at all times,
among all peoples, in all circumstances of life ; even
when constitutional law is suspended, and the horrors
of revolutions and wars fill the air ; in small things
and in great, every day and every hour ? Who will
refuse to admit that it is constantly preventing much
wrong, and calling into existence many a good action,
often quite unexpectedly, and where there is no hope
of reward ? Is there any one who will gainsay the
fact that, where it and it alone has been operative,
we all with deep respect and emotion unreservedly
recognise the presence of genuine moral worth ?
(4) Boundless compassion for all living beings
is the surest and most certain guarantee of pure moral
conduct, and needs no casuistry. Whoever is filled
with it will assuredly injure no one, do harm to no
one, encroach on no man's rights ; he will rather have
1 I.e., under the influence of wine one speaks the truth. Cf.
Pliny, Nat. Hist., xiv., chap. 22, 28, 141, edit. Teubner ;
vulgoque VEEITA.S jam attributa VINO est. Gk. olvos KOI
. V. Paroemiographi, edit. Gaisford. (Translator.)
214 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
regard for every one, forgive every one, help every
one as far as he can, and all his actions will bear the
stamp of justice and loving-kindness. On the other
hand, if we try to say : " This man is virtuous, but
he is a stranger to Compassion " ; or : " he is an
unjust and malicious man, yet. very compassionate;"
the contradiction at once leaps to light. In former
times the English plays used to finish with a petition
for the King. The old Indian dramas close with
these words : " May all living beings be delivered
from pain." Tastes differ ; but in my opinion there
is no more beautiful prayer than this.
(5) Also from separate matters of detail it may
be inferred that the original stimulus of true morality
is Compassion. For instance, to make a man lose
a hundred thalers, by legal tricks involving no
danger, is equally unjust, whether he be rich or poor ;
but in the latter case the rapping of conscience is
much louder, the censure of disinterested witnesses
more emphatic. Aristotle was well aware of this,
and said : Beivorepov Se eart rby drvxpvvTa, rj rov
evTvxpvvra, aSiiceiv. (It is worse to injure a man
in adversity than one who is prosperous.) (Probl.
xxix. 2.) If the man have wealth, self-reproach is
proportionally faint, and grows still fainter, if it be
the treasury that has been overreached ; for state
coffers can form no object of Compassion. It thus
appears that the grounds for self-accusation as well
as for the spectators' blame are not furnished directly
by the infringement of the law, but chiefly by the
suffering thereby brought upon others. The violation
of right, by itself and as such, which is involved in
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 215
cheating the exchequer, (to take the above instance,)
will be disapproved by the conscience alike of actor
and witness ; but only because, and in so far as, the
rule of respecting every right, which forms the sine
qua non of all honourable conduct, is in consequence
broken. The stricture passed will, in fact, be in-
direct and limited. If, however, it be a confidential
employe in the service that commits the fraud, the
case assumes quite another aspect ; it then has all
the specific attributes of, and belongs to, that class
of actions described above, whose characteristic is
a double injustice. The analysis here given explains
why the worst charge which can ever be brought
against rapacious extortioners and legal sharpers is,
that they appropriate for themselves the goods of
widows and orphans. The reason appears in the
fact that the latter, more than others, owing to their
helplessness, might be expected to excite Compassion
in the most callous heart. Hence we conclude that
the entire absence of this sense is sufficient to lower
a man to the last degree of villainy.
(6) Compassion is the root no less of justice than
of loving-kindness ; but it is more clearly evidenced
in the latter than in the former. We never receive
proofs of genuine loving-kindness on the part of others,
so long as we are in all respects prosperous. The
happy man may, no doubt, often hear the words of
good- will on his relations' and friends' lips ; but
the expression of that pure, disinterested, objective
participation in the condition and lot of others, which
loving-kindness begets, is reserved for him who is
stricken with some sorrow or suffering, whatever
216 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
it be. For the fortunate as such we do not feel
sympathy ; unless they have some other claim on
us, they remain alien to our hearts : habeant sibi sua.
(They may keep their own affairs, pleasures, etc., to
themselves.) Nay, if a man has many advantages
over others, he will easily become an object of envy,
which is ready, should he once fall from his height
of prosperity, to turn into malignant joy. Neverthe-
less this menace is, for the most part, not fulfilled ;
the Sophoclean 7eX<n 8' e'%0/30/ (his enemies laugh)
does not generally become an actual fact. As soon
as the day of ruin comes to one of fortune's spoiled
children, there usually takes place a great transforma-
tion in the minds of his acquaintances, which for us
in this connection is very instructive. In the first
place this change clearly reveals the real nature of
the interest that the friends of his happiness took
in him : di/ugiunt cadis cum faece siccatis amid.
(When the casks are drained to the dregs, one's
friends run away.) 1 On the other hand, the exultation
of those who envied his prosperity, the mocking laugh
of malicious satisfaction, which he feared more than
adversity itself, and the contemplation of which he
could not face, are things usually spared him. Jealousy
is appeased, and disappears with its cause ; while
Compassion which takes its place is the parent of
loving-kindness. Those who were envious of, and
hostile to, a man in the full tide of success, after his
downfall, have not seldom become his friends, ready
to protect, comfort, and help. Who has not, at least
in a small way, himself experienced something of the
1 Hor., Carm., I., 35, 26. (Translator.)
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 217
sort ? Where is the man, who, when overtaken by
some calamity, of whatever nature, has not noticed
with surprise how the persons that previously had
displayed the greatest coldness, nay, ill-will towards
him, then came forward with unfeigned sympathy ?
For misfortune is the condition of Compassion, and
Compassion the source of loving-kindness. When our
wrath is kindled against a person, nothing quenches
it so quickly, even when it is righteous, as the words :
" He is an unfortunate man." And the reason is
obvious : Compassion is to anger as water to fire.
Therefore, whoever would fain have nothing to repent
of, let him listen to my advice. When he is inflamed
with rage, and meditates doing some one a grievous
injury, he should bring the thing vividly before his
mind, as a fait accompli ; he should clearly picture
to himself this other fellow-being tormented with
mental or bodily pain, or struggling with need and
misery ; so that he is forced to exclaim : " This is
my work ! " Such thoughts as these, if anything,
will avail to moderate his wrath. For Compassion
is the true antidote of anger ; and by practising on
oneself this artifice of the imagination, one awakes
beforehand, while there is yet time,
la pitie, dont la voix,
Alors qu'on est vengj, fait entendre ses lais. 1
(Voltaire, Semiramis, V. 6.)
And in general, the hatred we may cherish for
others is overcome by nothing so easily as by our
taking a point of view whence they can appeal to our
1 Compassion, who with no uncertain tone,
The work of vengeance done, her laws makes known.
218 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
Compassion. The reason indeed why parents, as a
rale, specially love the sickly one of their children
is because the sight of it perpetually stirs their
Compassion.
(7) There is another proof that the moral incentive
disclosed by me is the true one. I mean the fact
that animals also are included under its protecting
aegis. In the other European systems of Ethics no
place is found for them, strange and inexcusable as
this may appear. It is asserted that beasts have
no rights ; the illusion is harboured that our conduct,
so far as they are concerned, has no moral significance,
or, as it is put in the language of these codes, that
" there are no duties to be fulfilled towards animals."
Such a view is one of revolting coarseness, a barbarism
of the West, whose source is Judaism. In philosophy,
however, it rests on the assumption, despite all
evidence to the contrary, of the radical difference
between man and beast, a doctrine which, as is well
known, was proclaimed with more trenchant emphasis
by Descartes than by any one else : it was indeed the
necessary consequence of his mistakes. When Leibnitz
and Wolff, following out the Cartesian view, built up
out of abstract ideas their Rational Psychology, and
constructed a deathless anima, rationalis (rational
soul) ; then the natural claims of the animal kingdom
visibly rose up against this exclusive privilege, this
human patent of immortality, and Nature, as always
in such circumstances, entered her silent protest.
Our philosophers, owing to the qualms of their
intellectual conscience, were soon forced to seek aid
for their Rational Psychology from the empirical
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 219
method ; they accordingly tried to reveal the exist-
ence of a vast chasm, an immeasurable gulf between
animals and men, in order to represent them, in the
teeth of opposing testimony, as existences essentially
different. These efforts did not escape the ridicule
of Boileau ; for we find him saying :
Les animaux ont-ils des univer&ith ?
Voit-on fleurir chez eux des quatre faeultis ? '
Such a supposition would end in animals being
pronounced incapable of distinguishing themselves
from the external world, and of having any self-
consciousness, any ego ! As answer to such absurd
tenets, it would only be necessary to point to the
boundless Egoism innate in every animal, even the
smallest and humblest ; this amply proves how
perfectly they are conscious of their self, as opposed
to the world, which lies outside it. If any one of the
Cartesian persuasion, with views like these in his
head, should find himself in the claws of a tiger,
he would be taught in the most forcible manner
what a sharp distinction such a beast draws between
his ego and the non-ego. Corresponding to these
philosophical fallacies we notice a peculiar sophism
in the speech of many peoples, especially the Germans.
For the commonest matters connected with the
processes of life, for food, drink, conception, the
bringing forth of young ; for death, and the dead
body ; such languages have special words applicable
only to animals, not to men. In this way the
1 Have beasts, forsooth, their universities,
Endowed, like ours, with all four faculties?
220 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
necessity of using the same terms for both is avoided,
and the perfect identity of the thing concealed under
verbal differences. Now, since the ancient tongues
show no trace of such a dual mode of expression,
but frankly denote the same things by the same
words ; it follows that this miserable artifice is
beyond all doubt the work of European priestcraft,
which, in its profanity, knows no limit to its dis-
avowal of, and blasphemy against, the Eternal Reality
that lives in every animal. Thus was laid the founda-
tion of that harshness and cruelty towards beasts
which is customary in Europe, and on which a native
of the Asiatic uplands could not look without righteous
horror. In English this infamous invention is not to
be found ; assuredly because the Saxons, when they
conquered England, were not yet Christians. Neverthe-
less the English language shows something analogous
in the strange fact that it makes all animals of the
neuter gender, the pronoun " it " being employed
for them, just as if they were lifeless things. This
idiom has a very objectionable sound, especially in
the case of dogs, monkeys, and other Primates, and
is unmistakably a priestly trick, designed to reduce
beasts to the level of inanimate objects. The ancient
Egyptians, who dedicated all their days to religion,
were accustomed to place in the same vault with
a human mummy that of an ibis, a crocodile, etc.;
in Europe it is a crime, an abomination to bury a
faithful dog beside the resting-place of his master,
though it is there perhaps that he, with a fidelity
and attachment unknown to the sons of men, awaited
his own end. To a recognition of the identity, in all
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 221
essentials, of the phaenomena which we call " man "
and " beast," nothing leads more surely than the study
of zoology and anatomy. What shall we say then,
when in these days (1839) a canting dissector has
been found, who presumes to insist on an absolute
and radical difference between human beings and
animals, and who goes so far as to attack and
calumniate honest zoologists that keep aloof from
all priestly guile, eye-service, and hypocrisy, and dare
to follow the leading of nature and of truth ?
Those persons must indeed be totally blind, or
else completely chloroformed by the foetor Judaicus
(Jewish stench), who do not discern that the truly
essential and fundamental part in man and beast is
identically the same thing. That which distinguishes
the one from the other does not lie in the primary
and original principle, in the inner nature, in the
kernel of the two phaenomena (this kernel being
in both alike the Will of the individual) ; it is found
in what is secondary, in the intellect, in the degree of
perceptive capacity. It is true that the latter is incom-
parably higher in man, by reason of his added faculty
of abstract knowledge, called Reason ; nevertheless
this superiority is traceable solely to a greater cerebral
development, in other words, to the corporeal difference,
which is quantitative, not qualitative, of a single
part, the brain. In all other respects the similarity
between men and animals, both psychical and bodily,
is sufficiently striking. So that we must remind
our judaised friends in the West, who despise animals,
and idolise Reason, that if they were suckled by their
mothers, so also was the dog by his. Even Kant fell
222 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
into this common mistake of his age, and of his
country, and I have already administered the censure l
which it is impossible to withhold. The fact that
Christian morality takes no thought for beasts is a
defect in the system which is better admitted than
perpetuated. One's astonishment is, however, all
the greater, because, with this exception, it shows
the closest agreement with the Ethics of Brahmanism
and Buddhism, being only less strongly expressed,
and not carried to the last consequences imposed by
logic. On the whole, there seems little room for
doubting that, in common with the idea of a god
become man, or Avatar, 2 it has an Asiatic origin, and
probably came to Judaea by way of Egypt ; so that
Christianity would be a secondary reflection of the
primordial light that shone in India, which, falling
first on Egypt, was unhappily refracted from its
ruins upon Jewish soil. An apt symbol of the insen-
sibility of Christian Ethics to animals, while in other
points its similarity to the Indian is so great, may
be found in the circumstance that John the Baptist
comes before us in all respects like a Hindu
Sannyasin, 8 except that he is clothed in skins : a
thing which would be, as is well known, an abomina-
tion in the eyes of every follower of Brahmanism
or Buddhism. The Royal Society of Calcutta only
1 V. Part II., Chapter VI.
J Avatara (ava-trl to descend), descent of a deity from
heaven ; e.g., the ten incarnations of Vishnu. V. Monier
Williams' Sanskrit Dictionary. (Translator.)
Sannyasin (one who lays down, or resigns), an ascetic ;
a religious mendicant, or Brahman of the fourth order. V.
Monier Williams' Sanskrit Dictionary. (Translator.)
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 223
received their copy of the Yedas on their distinctly
promising that they would not have it bound in
leather, after European fashion. In silken binding,
therefore, it is now to be seen on the shelves of their
library. Again : the Gospel story of Peter's draught
of fishes, which the Saviour blesses so signally that the
boats are overladen, and begin to sink (Luke v. 1-10),
forms a characteristic contrast to what is related of
Pythagoras. It is said that the latter, initiated as he
was in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, bought the
draught from the fishermen, while the net was still
under water, in order to at once set at liberty the captive
denizens of the sea. (Apuleius : De Magia, p. 36 :
edit. Bipont.) l Compassion for animals is intimately
connected with goodness of character, and it may
be confidently asserted that he, who is cruel to living
creatures, cannot be a good man. Moreover, this
compassion manifestly flows from the same source
whence arise the virtues of justice and loving-
kindness towards men. Thus, for instance, people
of delicate sensitiveness, on realising that in a fit
of ill-humour, or anger, or under the influence of
wine, they punished their dog, their horse, their ape
undeservedly, or unnecessarily, or excessively, are
seized with the same remorse, feel the same dissatis-
faction with themselves, as when they are conscious
1 V. Apuleius : Apologia sive De Magia Liber (Lipsiae,
Teubner, 1900 : page 41, chap, xxxi) : Pythagoram . . . memoriae
prodiderunt, cum animaduertisset proxime Metapontum in
litore Italiae suae, quam subsiciuam Graeciam fecerat, a
quibusdam piscatoribus euerriculum trahi, fortunam iactus
eiw emisse et pretio dato iussisse, ilico piscis eos qui capti
tenebantur solui retibus et reddi pro/undo. (Translator.)
224 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
of having done some wrong to one of their fellows.
The only difference a purely nominal one is that
in the latter case this remorse, this dissatisfaction
is called the voice of conscience rising in rebuke.
I remember having read of an Englishman, who,
when hunting in India, had killed a monkey, that
he could not forget the dying look which the creature
cast on him ; so that he never fired at these animals
again. Another sportsman, William Harris by name,
a true Nimrod, has much the same story to tell.
During the years 1836-7 he travelled far into the heart
of Africa, merely to indulge his passion for the chase.
A passage in his book, published at Bombay in 1838,
describes how he shot his first elephant, a female.
Next morning on going to look for his game, he found
that all the elephants had fled from the neighbour-
hood, except a young one which had spent the night
beside its dead mother. Seeing the huntsmen, it
forgot all fear, and came to meet them, with the
clearest and most lively signs of disconsolate grief,
and put its tiny trunk about them, as if to beg
for help. " Then," says Harris, " I was filled with
real remorse for what I had done, and felt as if I
had committed a murder."
The English nation, with its fine sensibility, is, in
fact, distinguished above all others for extraordinary
compassion towards animals, which appears at every
opportunity, and is so strong that, despite the " cold
superstition " which otherwise degrades them, these
Anglo-Saxons have been led through its operation to
fill up by legislation the lacuna that their religion
leaves in morality. For this gap is precisely the
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 225
reason why in Europe and America there is need
of societies for the protection of animals, which are
entirely dependent on the law for their efficiency. In
Asia the religions themselves suffice, consequently no
one there ever thinks of such associations. Meanwhile
Europeans are awakening more and more to a sense
that beasts have rights, in proportion as the strange
notion is being gradually overcome and outgrown,
that the animal kingdom came into existence solely
for the benefit and pleasure of man. This view, 1 with
the corollary that non- human living creatures are to be
regarded merely as things, is at the root of the rough
and altogether reckless treatment of them, which
obtains in the West. To the honour, then, of the
English be it said that they are the first people who
have, in downright earnest, extended the protecting
arm of the law to animals : in England the mis-
creant, that commits an outrage on beasts, has to
pay for it, equally whether they are his own or
not. Nor is this all. There exists in London the
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,
a corporate body voluntarily formed, which, without
state assistance, and at great cost, is of no small
service in lessening the tale of tortures inflicted on
animals. Its emissaries are ubiquitous, and keep
secret watch in order to inform against the tor-
mentors of dumb, sensitive creatures ; and such
persons have therefore good reason to stand in
fear of them. 2 At all the steep bridges in London
1 In Vol. II. of my Parerga, 177, I have shown that its
origin can be traced to the Old Testament.
2 How seriously the matter is being taken up may be
seen from the following case which is quite recent. I quote
15
226 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
this Society stations a pair of horses, which without
any charge is attached to heavy freight- waggons.
Is not this admirable ? Does it not elicit our ap-
proval, as unfailingly as any beneficent action
towards men ? Also the Philanthropic Society of
London has done its part. In 1837 it offered a prize
of 30 for the best exposition of the moral reasons
which exist to keep men from torturing animals.
The line of argument, however, had to be taken almost
exclusively from Christianity, whereby the difficulty
of the task was, of course, increased ; but two years
from the Birmingham Journal of December, 1839. "Arrest
of a company of eighty-four abettors of dog-fights. It had
come to the knowledge of the Society of Animals' Friends
that the Square in Fox Street, Birmingham, was yesterday
to be the scene of a dog-fight. Measures were accordingly
taken to secure the assistance of the police, and a strong
detachment of constables was sent to the spot. At the right
moment all the persons present were arrested. These precious
conspirators were then handcuffed together in pairs, and the
whole party was made fast by a long rope passing between
each couple. In this fashion they were marched off to the
Police Station, where mayor and magistrate were sitting in
readiness for them. The two ringleaders were condemned to
pay, each, a fine of l, and 8s. 6d. costs ; in default, to undergo
14 days' hard labour." The coxcombs whose habit is never
to miss noble sport of this sort, must have looked somewhat
crestfallen in the midst of the procession. But the Times
of April 6, 1855, p. 6, supplies a still more striking instance
from the present day; and here we find the paper itself
assuming judicial functions, and imposing the right punish-
ment. It recounts the case of a very wealthy Scotch baronet's
daughter. The matter had been brought before the law, and
the evidence showed that the girl had used a cudgel and knife
on her horse with the greatest cruelty; for which she was
ordered to pay a fine of 5. But for one in her position
such a sum means nothing, and she would practically have
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 227
later, in 1839, Mr. Macnamara was the successful
competitor. At Philadelphia there is an Animals'
Friends' Society, having the same aims ; and it is
to the President of the latter that a book called
Philozoia ; or, Moral Reflections on the Actual Con-
dition of Animals, and the Means of Improving the
Same (Brussels, 1839), has been dedicated by its
author, T. Forster. It is original and well written.
Mr. Forster earnestly commends to his readers the
humane treatment of animals. As an Englishman he
naturally tries to strengthen his position by the
support of the Bible ; but he is on slippery ground,
got off scot-free, had not the Times intervened to inflict
on her a proper correction, such as she would really feel.
It twice mentions the young lady's name in full, printing
it in large type, and concludes as follows : " We cannot help
saying that a few months' imprisonment with the addition of
an occasional whipping administered in private, but by the
most muscular woman in Hampshire, would have been a much
more suitable penalty for Miss M. N. A wretched being of
this sort has forfeited all the consideration and the privileges
that attach to her sex ; we cannot regard her any longer
as a woman." These newspaper paragraphs I would especially
recommend to the notice of the associations now formed in
Germany against cruelty to animals ; for they show what
lines should be adopted, in order to reach some solid result.
At the same time I desire to express my cordial appreciation
of the praiseworthy zeal shown by Herrn Hofrath Perner, of
Munich, who has entirely devoted himself to this branch of
well-doing, and succeeded in arousing interest in it all over
the country. [It should be observed that the first portion of
this note belongs to the earliest edition of the work, published
September, 1840 ; the latter part was written for the second
edition, which appeared in August, 1860. This explains why
Schopenhauer says that the first instance, dated 1839, is " quite
recent," and that the second, dated 1855, is taken " from the
present day." (Translator.)'}
228 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
and meets with such poor success that he ends by
catching at the following ingenious position : Jesus
Christ (he says) was born in a stable among oxen
and asses ; which was meant to indicate symbolically
that we ought to regard the beasts as our brothers,
and treat them accordingly. All that I have here
adduced sufficiently proves that the moral chord, of
which we are speaking, is now at length beginning
to vibrate also in the West. For the rest, we may
observe that compassion for sentient beings is not to
carry us to the length of abstaining from flesh, like
the Brahmans. This is because, by a natural law,
capacity for pain keeps pace with the intelligence ;
consequently men, by going without animal food,
especially in the North, would suffer more than
beasts do through a quick death, which is always
unforeseen ; although the latter ought to be made
still easier by means of chloroform. Indeed without
meat nourishment mankind would be quite unable
to withstand the rigours of the Northern climate.
The same reasoning explains, too, why we are right
in making animals work for us ; it is only when
they are subjected to an excessive amount of toil
that cruelty begins.
(8) It is perhaps not impossible to investigate and
explain metaphysically the ultimate cause of that
Compassion in which alone all non-egoistic conduct
can have its source ; but let us for the moment
put aside such inquiries, and consider the phaenome-
non in question, from the empirical point of view,
simply as a natural arrangement. Now if Nature's
intention was to soften as much as possible the
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 229
numberless sufferings of every sort, to which our
life is exposed, and which no one altogether escapes ;
if she wished to provide some counterbalance for the
burning Egoism, which fills all beings, and often
develops into malice ; it will at once strike every
one as obvious that she could not have chosen any
method more effectual than that of planting in the
human heart the wonderful disposition, which inclines
one man to share the pain of another, aud from
which proceeds the voice that bids us, in tones strong
and unmistakable, take thought for our neighbour ;
calling, at one time, " Protect ! " at another, " Help ! "
Assuredly, from the mutual succour thus arising,
there was more to be hoped for, towards the attain-
ment of universal well-being, than from a stern Com-
mand of duty, couched in general, abstract terms,
the product of certain reasoning processes, and of
artificial combinations of conceptions. From such an
Imperative, indeed, all the less result could be expected
because to the rough human unit general propositions
and abstract truths are unintelligible, the concrete
only having some meaning for him. And it should
be remembered that mankind in its entirety, a very
small part alone excepted, has always been rude,
and must remain so, since the large amount of bodily
toil, which for the race as a whole is inevitable, leaves
no time for mental culture. Whereas, in order to
awaken that sense, which has been proved to be the
sole source of disinterested action, and consequently
the true basis of Morals, there is no need of abstract
knowledge, but only of intuitive perception, of the
simple comprehension of a concrete case. To this
230 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
Compassion is at. once responsive, without the media-
tion of other thoughts.
(9) The following circumstance will be found in
complete accord with the last paragraph. The
foundation, which I have given to Ethics, leaves me
without a forerunner among the School Philosophers ;
indeed, my position is paradoxical, as far as their teach-
ing goes, and many of them, for instance, the Stoics
(Seneca, De dementia, II., 5), Spinoza (Ethica, IV.,
prop. 50), and Kant (Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft,
p. 213 ; R. p. 257) only notice the motive of Com-
passion to utterly reject and contemn it. On the
other hand, my basis is supported by the authority
of the greatest moralist of modern times ; for such,
undoubtedly, J. J. Rousseau is, that profound reader
of the human heart, who drew his wisdom not from
books, but from life, and intended his doctrine not
for the professorial chair, but for humanity ; he, the
foe of all prejudice, the foster-child of nature, whom
alone she endowed with the gift of being able to
moralise without tediousness, because he hit the truth
and stirred the heart. I shall therefore venture here
to cite some passages from his works in support of
my theory, observing that, so far, I have been as
sparing as possible with regard to quotations.
In the Discours sur VOrigine de Vlnegalite, p. 91
(edit. Bipont.), he says : 11 y a un autre principe,
que Hobbes n'a point aperqu, et qui ayant ete donne
a I'homme pour adoucir, en certaines circonstances, la
ferocite de son amour-propre, tempere Vardeur quil
a pour son bien-etre par une REPUGNANCE IN NEE A
VOIR SOUFFRIR SON SEMBLABLE. Je ne crois pas
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 231
avoir aucune contradiction a craindre en accordant a
I'homme la SEULE VERTU NATURELLE qu'ait ete force
de reconnaitre le detracteur le plus outre des vertus
humaines. Je parle DE LA PITIE, etc. 1
P. 92 : Mandeville a bien senti qu'avec toute leur
morale les hommes rieussent jamais ete que des mon-
stres, si la nature ne leur eut donne LA PITIE a I'appui
de la raison : mais il n'a pas vu, que DE CETTE SEULE
QUALITE DEGOULENT TOUTES LES VERTUS SOCIALES,
qu'il veut disputer aux hommes. En effet, qu'est-ce
que la generosite, la clemence, Vhumanite, sinon
LA PITIE, appliquee aux faibles, aux coupables, ou a
I'espece humaine en general 1 ? La bienveillance et
famitie meme sont, a le bien prendre, des productions
d'une pitie constante, fixee sur un objet particulier ;
car desirer que quelqu'un ne souffre point, qu'est-ce
autre chose, que desirer qu'il soit heureux ? . . . La
commiseration sera d'autant plus energique, que
V ANIMAL SPECTATEUR S'IDENTIFIERA plus intimement
L ANIMAL SOUFFRANT. 2
1 There is another principle which Hobbes did not perceive
at all. It was implanted in man in order to soften, in certain
circumstances, the fierceness of his self-love, and it moderates
the ardour, which he feels for his own well-being, by producing
a certain innate aversion to the sight of a fellow-creature's
suffering. In attributing to rnan the only natural virtue,
which even the most advanced scepticism has been forced to
recognise, I stand, assuredly, in no fear of any contradiction.
I allude to compassion, etc.
Mandeville was right in thinking that with all their
systems of morality, men would never have been anything but
monsters, if nature had not given them compassion to support
their reason ; but he failed to see that from this one quality
spring all the social virtues, which he was unwilling to credit
232 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
P. 94 : II est done bien certain, que la pitie est
un sentiment naturel, qui, moderant dans chaque
individu I 'amour de soi-meme, concourt a la conserva-
tion mutuelle de toute Vespece. C'est elle, qui dans
I'etat de nature, tient lieu de lois, de moeurs, et de
vertus, avec cet avantage, que nul ne sera tente de
desobeir a sa douce voix: c'est elle, qui detournera
tout sauvage robuste d'enlever a un faible enfant, ou
a un vieillard infirme, sa subsistence acquise avecpeine,
si lui meme espere pouvoir trouver la sienne ailleurs :
c'est elle qui, au lieu de cette maxime sublime de
justice raisonnee : " Fais a autrui comme tu veux qu'on
te fasse ; " inspire a tous les hommes cette autre
maxime de bonte naturelle, bien moins parfaite, mais
plus utile peut-etre que la precedente : " Fais ton
bien avec le moindre mal d'autrui qu'il est possible"
C'est, en un mot, DANS CE SENTIMENT NATUREL
PLUTdT, QUE DANS LES ARGUMENTS SUBTILS, qu'il
faut chercher la cause de la repugnance qu'eprouverait
tout homme a mal faire, meme independamment des
maximes de I'education. 1
mankind with. In reality, what is generosity, clemency,
humanity, if not compassion, applied to the weak, to the
guilty, or to the human race, as a whole ? Even benevolence
and friendship, if we look at the matter rightly," are seen to
result from a constant compassion, directed upon a particular
object ; for to desire that some one should not suffer is nothing
else than to desire that he should be happy. . . The more closely
the living spectator identifies himself with the living sufferer,
the more active does pity become.
1 It is, then, quite certain that compassion is a natural feeling,
which checking, as it does, the love of self in each individual,
helps by a reciprocal process to preserve the whole race. This
it is, which in the state of nature, takes the place of laws,
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 233
Let this be compared with what he says in Emile,
Bk. IV., pp. 115-120 (edit. Bipont.), where the follow-
ing passage, occurs among others :
En effet, comment nous laissons-nous emouvoir a la
pitie, si ce n'est en nous transportant hors de nous
et en nous IDENTIFIANT AVEC v ANIMAL SOUFFRANT-.
EN QU ITT ANT, pour ainsi dire, NOTRE ETRE, POUR
PRENDRE LE SIEN? Nous ne souffrons qu'autant que
nous jugeons qu'tt souffre : CE N'EST PAS DANS NOUS,
(TEST DANS LUI, que nous souffrons . . . offrir au
jeune homme des objets, sur lesquels puisse agir la
force expansive de son coeur, qui le dilatent, qui
I'etendent sur les autres etres, qui le /assent partout
SE RETROUVER HORS DE LUi; ecarter avec soin ceux,
qui le resserrent, le concentrent, et tendent le ressort
DU HOI HUMAIN, etc. 1
customs, and virtues, with the added advantage that no one
will be tempted to disobey its gentle voice ; this it is, which
will restrain every able-bodied savage, provided he hope to
find his own livelihood elsewhere, from robbing a weak child,
or depriving an infirm old man of the subsistence won by hard
toil ; this it is, which inspires all men, not indeed with that
sublime maxim of reasoned justice: "Do to others as you
would they should do unto you ; " but with another rule of
natural goodness, no doubt less perfect, but perhaps more
useful, namely : " Do what is good for yourself with the least
possible harm to others." In a word, it is in this natural
feeling rather than in subtle arguments that we must look
for the reason of the repugnance with which every one is
accustomed to view bad conduct, quite independently of the
principles laid down by education.
1 In fact, how is it that we let ourselves be moved to pity,
if not by getting out of our own consciousness, and becoming
identified with the living sufferer ; by leaving, so to say, our
own being, and entering into his ? We do not suffer, except
234 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
Inside the pale of the Schools, as above remarked,
there is not a single authority in favour of my posi-
tion ; but outside, I have other testimony to cite, in
addition to Rousseau's. The Chinese admit five
cardinal virtues (Tschang), of which the chief is
Compassion (Sin). The other four are : justice, courtesy,
wisdom, and sincerity. 1 Similarly, among the Hindus,
we find that on the tablets placed to the memory
of dead chieftains, compassion for men and animals
takes the first place in the record of their virtues.
At Athens there was an altar to Compassion in the
Agora, as we know from Pausanias, I. 17 : ' Adrjvatois
Be ev rf) dyopa ecm, 'E\eov /3//.6?, &>, /j,d\icrTa dewv
(3lov /cat //,era/3oXa<? Trpa^f^drcov OTI a>-
as we suppose he suffers ; it is not in us, it is in him, that we
suffer . . . offer a young man objects, on which the expansive
force of his heart can act ; objects such as may enlarge his
nature, and incline it to go out to other beings, in whom he
may everywhere find himself again. Keep carefully away
those things which narrow his view, and make him self-centred,
and which tighten the strings of the human ego. [Tendent le
ressort (stretch the spring) du moi humain : i.e., stimulate the
egoistic tendency. (Translator.)]
1 Journal Asiatique, Vol. ix., p. 62. Cf. Meng-Tseu (other-
wise called Mencius), edited by Stanislas Julien, 1824, Bk. 1,
45 ; also Meng-Tseu in the Livres Sacres de VOrient, by
Panthier p. 281.
V. Dictionnaire Francais Latin Chinois, par Paul Perny
(Didot Freres, Paris, 1869) ; where the five cardinal virtues
(-ft, 1^") are transliterated : ou clistng. V. also : A Syllabic
Dictionary of the Chinese Language ; by S. Wells Williams,
LL.B. (Shanghai: 1874); where Sin (Sin), i.e., humanity.
love of one's neighbour, is written Sin'. (Translator.}
2 The Athenians have an altar in their Agora to Compassion ;
THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 235
Lucianalso mentions (his altar in the Timon, 99. 1 A
phrase of Phocion, preserved by Stobaeus, describes
Compassion as the most sacred thing in human life :
ovre eg iepov {3a)/ji6v, ovre etc rf)<; avOpwirivrjs (^ucreo)?
a^aipereov rov eA,eov. 2 In the Sapientia Indorum,
the Greek translation of the Panca-tantra, we read
(Section 3, p. 220) : Aeyerat, yap, o>9 Trpcorrj rwv
aperwv 77 eXe^/uocruj/T;. 3 It is clear, then, that the
real source of morality has been distinctly recog-
nised at all times and in all countries ; Europe
alone excepted, owing to ihefoetor Judaicus (Jewish
stench), which here pervades everything, and is
the reason why the Western races require for the
object of their obedience a command of duty, a moral
law, an imperative, in short, an order and decree.
They remain wedded to this habit of thought, and
for this deity, they believe, is of all the gods the most helpful
in human life, and its vicissitudes. They are the only Greeks
who have instituted this cultus. (Translator.)
1 V. Lucian, Timon, chap. 42 (Ausgewahlte Schriften des
Liician, edit. Julius Sommerbrodt ; Weidmann, Berlin, 1872,
p. 75) : (f)i\os 8e ^ f-evos f) tralpos rj 'EXe'ou /3o>/u6s vGXos nd\vs.
V. also Apollodorus (edit. J. Bekker) ; 2, 8, 1. 3, 7, 1. Dem.
(edit. Keisk.), 57. Scholiast on Soph. Oed. Col., 258.
(Translator.)
3 A temple must not be despoiled of its altar, nor human
nature of compassion. V. Joannis Stobaei Anthologium,
edit. Curtius Wachsmuth et Otto Hense ; Weidmann, Berlin,
1894 ; Vol. III., p. 20, Nr. 52. (Translator.)
3 The chief of virtues is said to be Compassion. The Panca-
tantra is a well-known collection of moral stories and fables
in five (pan6ari) books or chapters (tantra), from which the
author of the Hitopade'sa drew a large portion of his materials.
V. Monier Williams' Sanskrit Dictionary. (Translator.)
236 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
refuse to open their eyes to the fact that such a view
is, after all, based upon nothing but Egosim. Of
course, now and then, isolated individuals of fine
perception have felt the truth, and given it utterance :
such a one was Rousseau ; and such, Lessing. In a
letter written by the latter in 1756 we read : " The
best man, and the one most likely to excel in all
social virtues, in all forms of magnanimity, is he
who is most compassionate."
CHAPTER IX.
ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER.
THERE still remains a question to be resolved, before
the basis which I have given to Ethics can be
presented in all its completeness. It is this. On
what does the great difference in the moral behaviour
of men rest ? If Compassion be the original incentive
of all true, that is, disinterested justice and loving-
kindness ; how comes it that some are, while others
are not, influenced thereby ? Are we to suppose
that Ethics, which discloses the moral stimulus, is
also capable of setting it in motion ? Can Ethics
fashion the hard-hearted man anew, so that he be-
comes compassionate, and, as a consequence, just
and humane ? Certainly not. The difference of
character is innate, and ineradicable. The wicked
man is born with his wickedness as much as the
serpent is with its poison-fangs and glands, nor can
the former change his nature a whit more than the
latter. 1 Velle non discitur (to use one's will is
not a thing that can be taught) is a saying of Nero's
tutor. In the Meno, Plato minutely investigates
1 Of- Jeremiah xiii. 23. (Translator.)
237
238 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
the nature of virtue, and inquires whether it can,
or cannot, be taught. He quotes a passage from
Theonis :
dXXa 8i
QviroTf TToi^trfis TOV KaKov <iv8p' ayndov,
(But thou wilt ne'er,
By teaching make the bad man virtuous.)
and finally reaches this conclusion : dperrj civ e'lrj ovre
<f>v(Ti, ovre SiBaKTOv. d\\a Oeia pot pa Trapayvyvoaewri,
avev vov, ol? av TrapayiyvrjTat. 1 Here the terms
(frvaei, and Oeia uotpa form a distinction, in my opinion,
much the same as that between " physical " and
" metaphysical." Socrates, the father of Ethics, if
we may trust Aristotle, declared that OVK e<f> r} ulv
yevecrdai TO crTrovSaiov? elvai, rj <f)av\ov$. 2 (Moralia
Ma.gna, i. 9.) Moreover, Aristotle himself expresses
the same view : irafft yap So/cei e/caara TWV ydwv
vTrdpxetv <f>varei TTW?' KOI jap 81/caioi, Kal (raxfrpoviKol,
/cal rd\\a e^o/juev evdvf etc ^ej/err}?. 3 (Eth. Nicom.
vi. 13.) We find also a similar conviction very decidedly
expressed in the fragments attributed to the Pytha-
1 Virtue would appear not to come naturally (i.e., through
the physical order of things), nor can it be taught; but in
whomsoever it dwells, there it is present, apart from the
intellect, under divine ordinance. [V. Platonis Opera, edit.
Didot, Paris, 1856 ; Vol. I. Meno, 96 and 99, ad fin
(Translator.}]
2 It is not in our power to be either good or bad.
3 For it appears that the different characters of all men
are in some way implanted in them by nature ; if we are just,
and temperate, and otherwise virtuous, we are so straightway
from our birth.
ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 239
gorean Archytas, and preserved by Stobaeus in the
Florilegium (Chap. i. 77). 1 If not authentic, they are
certainly very old. Orelli gives them in his Opuscula
Graecorum Sententiosa et Moralia. There (Vol. II.,
p. 240) we read in the Dorian dialect as follows :
Ta? yap \6yois teal aTroSei^eaiv TroTt^pto^eva? dpera?
Seov eTTtcrrttyLta? TTorayopevev, aperav Se, rav r/Oticav /cat
av Kal iroioL rti/65 rj^iev \y6/j,eOa Kara TO rjdos, olov
e\v6epioi, SUatoi Kal o-w^poye?. 2 On examining the
virtues and vices, as summarised by Aristotle in the De
Virtutibus et Vitiis, it will be found that all of them,
without exception, are not properly thinkable unless
assumed to be inborn qualities, and that only as such
can they be genuine. If, in consequence of reasoned
reflection, we take them as voluntary, they are then
seen to lose their reality, and pass into the region
of empty forms ; whence it immediately follows that
their permanence and resistance under the storm
and stress of circumstance could not be counted
on. And the same is true of the virtue of loving-
kindness, of which Aristotle, in common with all
the ancients, knows nothing. Montaigne keeps, of
course, his sceptical tone, but he practically agrees
1 V. Joannis Stobaei Florilegium, edit. Meineke, publ.
Lipsiae, Teubner, 1855 ; Vol. I., p. 33, 1. 14, sqq. (Translator.')
2 For the so-called virtues, that require reasoning and demon-
stration, ought to be called sciences. By the term " virtue "
we mean rather a certain moral and excellent disposition of
the soil's unreasoning part. This disposition determines the
character which we show, and in accordance with which we
are called generous, just, or temperate.
240 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
with the venerable authorities above quoted, when
he says : Serait-il vrai, que pour etre bon tout a
fait, il nous le faille fare par occulte, naturelle et
universelle propriete, sans lot, sans raison, sans
exemple? 1 (Liv. IL, chap. 11.) Lichtenberg hits
the mark exactly in his Vermischte Schriften, (v.
Moralische Bermerkungeri). He writes : " All virtue
arising from premeditation is not worth much.
What is wanted is feeling or habit." Lastly,
it should be noted that Christianity itself, in its
original teaching, recognises, and bears witness to
this inherent, immutable difference between character
and character. In the Sermon on the Mount we
find the allegory of the fruit which is determined
by the nature of the tree that bears it (Luke
vi. 43, 44 ; cf. Matthew vii. 16-18) ; and then in
the following verse (Luke vi. 45), we read : 6 dyadbs
avdpa)7ro<> K TOV ajaSov drjcravpov TT}? KapStoG avrov
irpofyepei TO a<ya06v KOL 6 Trovrjpbs avOpwjros e/c TOV
Trovrjpov Orjaavpov T7?9 Kapoias avTov Trpotfrepei TOTrovrfpov. 2
(Cf. Matthew xii. 35.)
But it was Kant who first completely cleared up
this important point through his profound doctrine
of the empirical and intelligible 3 character. He
1 Are we to believe it true that we can only be thoroughly
good by virtue of a certain occult, natural, and universal
faculty, without law, without reason, without precedent ?
2 The good man out of the good treasure of his heart
bringeth forth that which is good ; and the evil man out of
the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is
evil.
3 V. Note on "intelligible," Part. IL, Chapter I
(Translator.)
ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 241
showed that the empirical character, which manifests
itself in time and in multiplicity of action, is a
phaenomenon ; while the reality behind it is the
intelligible character, which, being the essential
constitution of the Thing in itself underlying the
phaenomenon, is independent of time, space, plurality,
and change. In this way alone can be explained what
is so astonishing, and yet so well known to all who
have learnt life's lessons, the fixed unchangeable-
ness of human character. There are certain ethical
writers, whose aim is the moral improvement of men,
and who talk of progress made in the path of virtue ;
but their assurances are always met and victoriously
confuted by the irrefragable facts of experience, which
prove that virtue is nature's work and cannot be
inculcated. The character is an original datum,
immutable, and incapable of any amelioration through
correction by the intellect. " Now, were this not so ;
and further : if (as the above-mentioned dull-headed
preachers maintain) an improvement of the character,
and hence " a constant advance towards the good "
were possible by means of moral instruction ; then,
unless we are prepared to suppose that all the various
religious institutions, and all the efforts of the
moralists fail in their purpose, we should certainly
expect to find that the older half of mankind, at least
on an average, is distinctly better than the younger.
This, however, is so far from being the case, that it
is not to the old, who have, as we see, grown worse
by experience, but to the young that we look for
something good. It may happen that in his old age
one man appears somewhat better, another worse,
16
242 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
than he was in his youth. But the reason is not
far to seek. It is simply because with length of days
the intelligence by constant correction becomes riper,
and hence the character stands out in purer and
clearer shape ; while early life is a prey to ignorance,
mistakes, and chimeras, which now present false
motives, and now veil the real. For a fuller explana-
tion I would refer the reader to the principles laid
down in Chapter III. of the preceding Essay, on " The
Freedom of the Will." * It is true that among convicts
the young have a large majority ; but this is because,
when a tendency to crime exists in the character, it
soon finds a way of expressing itself in acts, and of
reaching its goal the galleys, or the gibbet ; while
he, whom all the inducements to wrong doing, which
a long life offers, have failed to lead astray, is not
likely to fall at the eleventh hour. Hence the
respect paid to age is, in my opinion, due to the
fact that the old are considered to have passed
through a test of sixty or seventy years, and kept
their integrity unsullied ; for this of course is the
sine qua, non of the honour accorded them. These
things are too well known for any one, in real life,
to be misled by the promises of the moralists we
have spoken of. He who has once been proved guilty
of evil-doing, is never again trusted, just as the noble
nature, of which a man has once given evidence,
is always confidently believed in, whatever else may
1 Die Freiheit des Willens and the present treatise were
published by Schopenhauer together, under the title of Die
Beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik. V. Introduction, p. xv.,
note. (Translator.)
ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 243
have changed. Operari sequitur esse (what one
does follows from what one is) forms, as we have
seen in Part II., Chapter VIII., a pregnant tenet
of the Schoolmen. Everything in the world works
according to the unchangeable constitution of which
its being, its essentia is composed. And man is no
exception. As the individual is, so will he, so must
he, act : and the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae
(free and indifferent choice) is an invention of
philosophy in her childhood, long since exploded ;
although there are some old women, in doctor's
academicals, who still like to drag it about with them.
The three fundamental springs of human action
Egoism, Malice, Compassion are inherent in every
one in different and strangely unequal proportions.
Their combination in any given case determines the
weight of the motives that present themselves, and
shapes the resulting line of conduct. To an egoistic
character egoistic motives alone appeal, and those,
which suggest either compassion or malice, have no
appreciable effect. Thus, a man of this type will
sacrifice his interests as little to take vengeance on
his foes, as to help his friends. Another, whose
nature is highly susceptible to malicious motives,
will not shrink from doing great harm to himself, so
only he may injure his neighbour. For there are char-
acters which take such delight in working mischief
on others, that they forget their own loss, which is
perhaps, equal to what they inflict. One may say of
such : Dum alteri noceat sui negligens 1 (disregarding
himself so long as he injures the other). These are
1 Seneca, De /ra, I. 1.
244 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
the people that plunge with passionate joy into the
battle in which they expect to receive quite as many
wounds as they deal ; indeed, experience not seldom
testifies that they are ready deliberately, first to
kill the man who thwarts their purposes, and then
themselves, in order to escape the penalty of the law.
On the other hand, goodness of heart consists of a
deeply felt, all-embracing Compassion for everything
that has breath, and especially for man ; because, in
proportion as the intelligence develops, capacity for
pain increases ; and hence, the countless sufferings
of human beings, in mind and body, have a much
stronger claim to Compassion than those of animals,
which are only physical, and in any case less acute.
This goodness of heart, therefore, in the first place
restrains a man from doing any sort of harm to
others, and, next, it bids him give succour whenever
and wherever he sees distress. And the path of
Compassion may lead as far in one direction as Malice
does in the other. Certain rare characters of fine
sensibility take to heart the calamities of others more
than their own, so that they make sacrifices, which,
it may be, entail on themselves a greater amount of
suffering than that removed from those they benefit.
Nay, in cases where several, or, perhaps, a large
number of persons, at one time, can be helped in this
way, such men do not, if need be, flinch from absolute
self-effacement. Arnold von Winkelried was one
of these. So was Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, in the
fifth century, when the Vandals crossed over from
Africa and invaded Italy. Of him we read in Johann
von Miiller's Weltgeschichte (Bk. X., chap. 10)
ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 245
that " in order to ransom some of the prisoners,
lie had already disposed of all the church plate,
his own and his friends' private property. Then, on
seeing the anguish of a widow, whose only son
was being carried off, he offered himself for servitude
in the other's stead. For whoever was of suitable
age, and had not fallen by the sword, was taken
captive to Carthage."
There is, then, an enormous difference between
character and character. Being original and innate,
it measures the responsiveness of the individual to
this or that motive, and those alone, to which he
is specially sensitive, will appeal to him with any-
thing like compelling force. As in chemistry, with
unchangeable certainty, one substance reacts only
upon acids, another only upon alkalies, so, with equal
invariableness, different natures respond to different
stimuli. The motives suggesting loving-kindness,
which stir so deeply a good disposition, can, of them-
selves, effect nothing in a heart that listens only to
the promptings of Egoism. If it be wished to induce
the egoist to act with beneficence and humanity, this
can be done but in one way : he must be made
to believe that the assuaging of others' suffering
will, somehow or other, surely turn out to his own
advantage. What, indeed, are most moral systems
but attempts of different kinds in this direction ?
But such procedure only misleads, does not better,
the will. To make a real improvement, it would
be necessary to transform the entire nature of the
individual's susceptibility for motives. Thus, from
one we should have to remove his indifference to the
246 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
suffering of others as such ; from another, the delight
which he feels in causing pain ; from a third, the
natural tendency which makes him regard the smallest
increase of his own well-being as so far outweighing
all other motives, that the latter become as dust in
the balance. Only it is far easier to change lead into
gold than to accomplish such a task. For it means
the turning round, so to say, of a man's heart in his
body, the remoulding of his very being. In point
of fact, all that can be done is to clear the intellect,
correct the judgment, and so bring him to a better
comprehension of the objective realities and actual
relations of life. This effected, the only result gained
is that his will reveals itself more logically, distinctly,
and decidedly, with no false ring in its utterance.
It should be noted that just as many a good act rests
at bottom on false motives, on well-meant, yet illusory
representations of an advantage to be obtained thereby
in this, or another, world ; so not a few misdeeds are
due solely to an imperfect understanding of the con-
ditions of human life. It is on this latter truth that
the American penitentiary system is based. Here
the aim is not, to improve the heart, but simply,
to educate the head of the criminal, so that he may
intellectually come to perceive that prosperity is more
surely, indeed more easily, reached by work and
honesty than by idleness and knavery.
By the proper presentment of motives legality may
be secured, but not morality. It is possible to remodel
what one does, bat not what one wills to do ; and
it is to the will alone that real moral worth belongs.
It is not possible to change the goal which the will
ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 247
strives after, but only the path expected to lead
thither. Instruction may alter the selection of means,
but not the choice of the ultimate object which the
individual keeps before him in all he does ; this is
determined by his will in accordance with its original
nature. It is true that the egoist may be brought
to understand that, if he gives up certain small
advantages, he will gain greater ; and the malicious
man may be taught that by injuring others he will
injure himself still more. But Egoism itself, and
Malice itself, will never be argued out of a person ;
as little as a cat can be talked out of her inclination
for mice. Similarly with goodness of heart. If the
judgment be trained, if the relations and conditions
of life become understood, in a word, if the intellect
be enlightened ; the character dominated by loving-
kindness will be led to express itself more consistently
and completely than it otherwise could. This happens
when we perceive the remoter consequences which
our conduct has for others : the sufferings, perhaps,
that overtake them indirectly, and only after lapse
of time, through one act or another of ours, which
we had no idea was so harmful. It occurs, too, when
we come to discern the evil results of many a well-
meant action, as, for instance, the screening of a
criminal ; and it is especially true when we realise
that the Neminem laede (injure no one) has in all
cases precedence over the Omnes juva (help all men).
In this sense there is undoubtedly such a thing as
a moral education, an ethical training capable of
making men better. But it goes only as far as I
have indicated, and its limits are quickly discovered.
248 TEE BASIS OF MORALITY.
The head is filled with the light of knowledge ; the
heart remains unimproved. The fundamental and
determining element, in things moral, no less than
in things intellectual, and things physical, is that
which is inborn. Art is always subordinate, and can
only lend a helping hand. Each man is, what he
is, as it were, " by the grace of God," jure divino,
Oeia ftoipq (by divine dispensation).
Du bist am Ende WAS DU BIST.
Setz' dir Perrucken auf von Millionen LocJcen,
Setz' deinen Fuss auf ellenhohe Socken :
Du BLEIBST DOOH IMMER WAS DU SIST. 1
But the reader, I am sure, has long been wishing to
put the question : Where, then, does blame and merit
come in ? The answer is fully contained in Part II.,
Chapter VIII., to which I therefore beg to call
particular attention. It is there that the explanation,
which otherwise would now follow, found a natural
place ; because the matter is closely connected with
Kant's doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and
Necessity. Our investigation led to the conclusion
that, once the motives are brought into play, the
Operari (what is done) is a thing of absolute
necessity ; consequently, Freedom, the existence of
which is betokened solely by the sense of responsi-
bility, cannot but belong to the Esse (what one is).
No doubt the reproaches of conscience have to do,
1 In spite of all, thou art still what thou art.
Though wigs with countless curls thy head-gear be,
Though shoes an ell in height adorn thy feet :
Unchanged thou eer remainest what thou art.
V. Goethe's Faust, Part I., Studirzimmer. (Translator.)
ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 249
in the first place, and ostensibly, with our acts, but
through these they, in reality, reach down to what
we are ; for what we do is the only indisputable
index of what we are, and reflects our character just
as faithfully as symptoms betray the malady. Hence
it is to this Esse, to what we are, that blame and
merit must ultimately be attributed. Whatever we
esteem and love, or else despise and hate, in others,
is not a changeable, transient appearance, but some-
thing constant, stable, and persistent ; it is that
which they are. If we find reason to alter our first
opinion about any one, we do not suppose that he
is changed, but that we have been mistaken in him.
In like manner, when we are pleased or displeased
with our own conduct:, we say that we are satisfied
or dissatisfied with ourselves, meaning, in reality,
with that which we are, and are unalterably, irre-
versibly ; and the same is true with regard to our
intellectual qualities, nay, it even applies to the
physiognomy. How is it possible, then, for blame
and merit to lie otherwise than in what we are ? As
we saw in Part II., Chapter VII., Conscience is that
register of our acts, which is always growing longer,
and therefore that acquaintance with ourselves which
every day becomes more complete. Conscience con-
cerns itself directly with all that we do ; when, at
one time, actuated by Egoism, or perhaps Malice,
we turn a deaf ear to Compassion, which bids us at
least refrain from harming others, if we will not
afford them help and protection ; or when again, at
another time, we overcome the first two incentives,
and listen to the voice of the third. Both cases
250 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
measure the distinction we draw between ourselves
and others. And on this distinction depends in the
last resort the degree of our morality or immorality,
that is, of our justice and loving-kindness, or the
reverse. Little by little the number of those
actions, whose testimony is significant on this point,
accumulates in the storehouse of our memory ; and
thus the lineaments of our character are depicted
with ever greater clearness, and a true knowledge of
ourselves is nearer attainment. And out of such
knowledge there springs a sense of satisfaction, or
dissatisfaction with ourselves, with that which we
are, according as we have been ruled by Egoism,
by Malice, or else by Compassion ; in other words,
according as the difference we have made between
ourselves and others is greater or smaller. And
when we look outside ourselves, it is by the same
standard that we judge those about us ; and we be-
come acquainted with their character less perfectly
indeed yet by the same empirical method as we
employ with reference to our own. In this case our
feelings take the form of praise, approval, respect, or,
on the other hand, of reproach, displeasure, contempt,
and they are the objective translation, so to say,
of the subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction (the
latter deepening perhaps into remorse), which arises
in us when we sit in judgment on ourselves. Lastly,
there is the evidence of language. We find certain
constantly occurring forms of speech which bear
eloquent testimony to the fact that the blame we
cast upon others is in reality directed against their
unchangeable character, touching but superficially
ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 251
what they do ; that virtue and vice are practically,
if tacitly, regarded as inherent unalterable qualities.
The following are some of these expressions : Jetzt
sehe ich, wie du bist ! (Now I know your nature !)
In dir habe ich mich geirrt. (I was mistaken
in you.) " Now I see what you are ! " Voila.
done, comme tu es f (This, then, is what you are !)
So bin ich nicht ! (I am not a person of that
sort !) Ich bin nicht der Mann, der fdhig ware,
Sie zu hintergehen. (I am not the man to impose
upon you.) Also : les dmes bien ntes (persons well-
born, i.e., noble-minded), the Spanish bien nacido ;
efyevrjs (properly "well-born"), evjeveia (properly
" nobility of birth ") used for " virtuous " and
" virtue " ; generosioris animi amicus (a friend of
lofty mind. Generosus : lit. " of noble birth "), etc.
Reason is a necessary condition for conscience,
but only because without the former a clear and
connected recollection is impossible. From its very
nature conscience does not speak till after the act ;
hence we talk of being arraigned before its bar.
Strictly speaking, it is improper to say that con-
science speaks beforehand ; for it can only do so
indirectly ; that is, when the remembrance of par-
ticular cases in the past leads us, through reflection,
to disapprove of some analogous course of action,
while yet in embryo.
Such is the ethical fact as delivered by conscious-
ness. It forms of itself a metaphysical problem,
which does not directly belong to the present question,
but which will be touched on in the last part.
Conscience, then, is nothing else than the acquaint-
252 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
ance we make with our own changeless character
through the instrumentality of our acts. A little
consideration will show that this definition har-
monises perfectly with, and hence receives additional
confirmation from, what I have here specially em-
phasised : namely, the fact that susceptibility for the
motives of Egoism, of Malice, and of Compassion,
which is so widely dissimilar in different individuals,
and on which the whole moral value of a man
depends, cannot be interpreted by anything else,
nor be gained, or removed, by instruction, as if it
were something born in time, and therefore variable,
and subject to chance. On the contrary, we have
seen that it is innate and fixed, an ultimate datum,
admitting of no farther explanation. Thus an entire
life, with the whole of its manifold activity, may
be likened to a clock-dial, that marks every move-
ment of the internal works, as they were made once
for all ; or it resembles a mirror, wherein alone,
with the eye of his intellect, each person sees re-
flected the . essential nature of his own Will, that
is, the core of his being.
Whoever takes the trouble to thoroughly think
out what has been put forward here, and in Part. II.,
Chapter VIII., will discover in the foundation given by
me to Ethics a logical consecution, a rounded com-
pleteness, wanting to all other theories ; to say
nothing of the consonance of my view with the facts
of experience, a consonance which he will look for
in vain elsewhere. For only the truth can uniformly
and consistently agree with itself and with nature ;
while all false principles are internally at variance with
ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 253
themselves, and externally contradict the testimony
of experience, which at every step records its silent
protest.
I am perfectly aware that the truths advanced
in this Essay, and particularly here at the close,
strike directly at many deeply rooted prejudices and
mistakes, and especially at those attaching to a certain
rudimentary system of morals, now much in vogue,
and suitable for elementary schools. But I cannot
own to feeling any penitence or regret. For, in the
first place, I am addressing neither children, nor the
profanum vulgus, but an Academy of light and
learning. Their inquiry is a purely theoretical one,
concerned with the ultimate fundamental verities
of Ethics ; and to a most serious question a serious
answer is undoubtedly expected. And secondly, in
my opinion, there can be no such thing as harmless
mistakes, still less privileged or useful ones. On
the contrary, every error works infinitely more evil
than good. If, however, it is wished to make existing
prepossessions the standard of truth, or the boundary
beyond which its investigation is not to go, then
it would be more honest to abolish philosophical
Faculties and Academies altogether. For where no
reality exists, there also no semblance of it should be.
Footnotes
Uncharted Knowledge
Wisdom From Previous Realities
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