part IV.
ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL
PHAENOMENON.
CHAPTER I.
HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD.
IN the foregoing pages the moral incentive (Com-
passion) has been established as a fact, and I have
shown that from it alone can proceed unselfish justice
and genuine loving-kindness, and that on these two
cardinal virtues all the rest depend. Now, for the
purpose of supplying Ethics with a foundation, this
is sufficient, in a certain sense ; that is, in so far
as Moral Science necessarily requires to be supported
by some actual and demonstrable basis, whether
existing in the external world, or in the consciousness.
The only alternative is to tread in the footsteps that
so many of my predecessors have left, in other words,
to choose arbitrarily some proposition or other, some
bare and abstract formula and make it the source
of all that morality prescribes ; or, like Kant, to
sublimate a mere idea, that of law, into the key-stone
of the ethical arch. But, dismissing this method
for the reasons discussed above, in the Second Part,
the investigation proposed by the Royal Society
appears to me now completed. For their question,
as it stands, deals only with the foundation of Ethics ;
as to a possible metaphysical explanation of this
foundation nothing whatever is asked. Nevertheless,
257 17
258 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
at the point we have reached, I am very sensible
that the human spirit can find no abiding satisfaction,
no real repose. As in all branches of practical
research, so also in Ethical Science, when all is
said, man is inevitably confronted with an ultimate
phaenomenon, which while it renders an account of
everything that it includes, and everything deduc-
ible from it, remains itself an unexplained riddle.
So that here, as elsewhere, the want is felt of a
final interpretation (which, obviously, cannot but be
metaphysical) of the ultimate data, as such, and
through these, if they be taken in their entirety
of the world. And here, too, this want finds utterance
in the question : How is it that, what is present to
our senses, and grasped by our intellect, is as it is,
and not otherwise ? And how does the character
of the phaenomenon, as manifest to us, shape itself
out of the essential nature of things ? Indeed, in
Moral Science the need of a metaphysical basis is
more urgent than in any other, because all systems,
philosophical no less than religious, are at one in
persistently attaching to conduct not only an ethical,
but also a metaphysical significance, which, passing
beyond the mere appearance of things, transcends
every possibility of experience, and therefore stands
in the closest connection with human destiny and
with the whole cosmic process. For if life (it is
averred) have a meaning, then the supreme goal
to which it points is undoubtedly ethical. Nor is
this view a bare unsupported theory ; it is sufficiently
established by the undeniable fact that, as death
draws nigh, the thoughts of each individual assume
HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 259
a moral trend, equally whether he be credulous of
religious dogmas, or not ; he is manifestly anxious
to wind up the affairs of his life, now verging to
its end, entirely from the moral standpoint. In
this particular the testimony of the ancients is of
special value, standing, as they do, outside the pale
of Christian influence. I shall therefore here quote
a remarkable passage preserved by Stobaeus, in his
Florilegium (chap. 44, . 20). It has been attri-
buted to the earliest Hellenic lawgiver, Zaleucus,
though, according to Bentley and Heyne, its source
is Pythagorean. The language is graphic and un-
mistakable. Ael ri6eo-6ai Trpb o/uLfj,dra)v rov icaipbv
rourov, ev d> <ylyvrai rb reXo9 e/cacrrw T
rov r)z>. TlaaL yap e/j,7ri7rrei, fjt,era[jie\eia rots
re\evrdv, fiefj-vrjuevo^ &v r)$i,Kr)Kacri, teal opftr) rov
f3ov\eo-0ai rcavra TrtTrpayQai StKaltoS aurofc. 1
Furthermore, to come to an historical personage,
we find Pericles, on his death-bed, unwilling to
hear anything about his great achievements, and
only anxious to know that he had never brought
trouble on a citizen. (Plutarch, Life of Pericles.)
Turning to modern times, if a very different case
may be placed beside the preceding, I remember
having noticed in a report of depositions made
1 We ought to realise as if before our eyes that moment
of time when the end comes to each one for deliverance from
living. Because all who are about to die are seized with
repentance, remembering, as they do, their unjust deeds, and
being filled with the wish that they had always acted justly.
'ATraXAayrj = Erlosung. V. Joannes Stobeaus, Florilegium,
edit. Meineke ; publ. Lipsiae : Teubner, 1855. Vol. ii., p.
164, 1. 7 sqq. (Translator.)
260 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
before an English jury the following occurrence. A
rough negro lad, fifteen years old, had been mortally
injured in some brawl on board a ship. As he was
dying, he eagerly begged that all his companions
might be fetched in haste : he wanted to ask if he
had ever vexed or insulted any one of them, and
after hearing that he had not, his mind appeared
greatly relieved. It is indeed the uniform teaching
of experience that those near death wish to be
reconciled with every one before they pass away.
But there is evidence of another kind that Ethics
can only be finally explained by Metaphysics. It is
well known that, while the author of an intellectual
performance, even should it be a supreme master-
piece is quite willing to take whatever remuneration
he can get, those, on the other hand, who have done
something morally excellent, almost without exception,
refuse compensation for it. The latter fact is specially
observable where conduct rises to the heroic. For
instance, when a man at the risk of his life has
saved another, or perhaps many, from destruction, as
a rule, he simply declines all reward, poor though
he may be ; because he instinctively feels that the
metaphysical value of his act would be thereby
impaired. At the end of Burger's song, " The Brave
Man," we find a poetical presentment of this psycho-
logical process. Nor does the reality, for the most
part, differ at all from the ideal, as I have frequently
noticed in English papers. Conduct of this kind
occurs in evefy part of the world, and independently
of all religious differences. In human beings there is
an undeniable ethical tendency, rooted (however uncon-
HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 261
sciously) in Metaphysics, and without an explanation
of life on these lines, no religion could gain standing-
ground ; for it is by virtue of their ethical side that
they all alike keep their hold on the mind. Every
religion makes its body of dogmas the basis of the
moral incentive which each man feels, but which he
does not, on that account, understand ; and it unites
the two so closely, that they appear to be inseparable.
Indeed the priests take special pains to proclaim
unbelief and immorality as one and the same thing.
The reason is thus apparent, why believers regard
unbelievers as identical with the vicious, and why ex-
pressions such as "godless," "atheistic," "unchristian,"
" heretic," etc., are used as synonymes for moral
depravity. The religions have, in fact, a sufficiently
easy task. Faith is the principle they start from.
Hence they are in a position to simply insist on
its application to their dogmas, and this, even to
the point of employing threats. But philosophy
has no such convenient instrument ready to hand. If
the different systems be examined, it will be found
that the situation is beset with difficulties, both as
regards the foundation to be provided for Ethics, and
in relation to the point of connection discoverable in.
any such foundation with the given metaphysical theory.
And yet, as I have emphasised in the introduction,
with an appeal to the authority of Wolff and Kant
we are under the stringent necessity of obtaining
from Metaphysics a support for Moral Science.
Now, of all the problems that the human intellect
has to grapple with, that of Metaphysics is by far
the hardest ; so much so that it is regarded by many
262 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
thinkers as absolutely insoluble. Apart from this,
in the present case, I labour under the special dis-
advantage which the form of a detached monograph
involves. In other words, I am not at liberty to start
from some definite metaphysical system, of which I
may be an adherent ; because, if I did, either it would
have to be expounded in detail, which would take
too much space ; or else there would be the necessity
of supposing it granted and unquestioned, an exceed-
ingly precarious proceeding. The consequence is that
I am as little able to use the synthetic method here
as in the foregoing Part. Analysis alone is possible :
that is, I must work backwards from the effects
to their cause, and not vice versd. This stern obliga-
tion, however, of having at the outset no previous
hypothesis, no standpoint other than the commonly
accepted one, made the discovery of the ethical basis
so laborious that, as I look back upon the task, I
seem to have accomplished some wondrous feat of
dexterity, not unlike that of a man who executes with
subtlest skill in mid air what otherwise is only done
on a solid support. But now that we have come to
the question whether there can be given a metaphysical
explanation of the foundation obtained, the difficulty
of proceeding without any assumption becomes so
enormous, that but one course appears to me open,
namely, to attempt nothing beyond a general sketch
of the subject. I shall, therefore, indicate rather
than elaborate the line of thought : I shall point
out the way leading to the goal, but not follow it
thither ; in short, I shall present but a very small
part of what, under other circumstances, could be
HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 263
adduced. In adopting this attitude for the reasons
stated, I wish, before beginning, to emphatically
remark, that in any case the actual problem put for-
ward has now been solved ; consequently, that what
I here add is an opus supererogationis, an appendix
to be given and taken entirely at will.
CHAPTER II;
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWOEK.
So far all our steps have been supported by the firm
rock of experience. But at this point it fails us, and
the solid earth sinks from under our feet, as we
press forward in our search after a final theoretical
satisfaction, there, where no experience can ever by
any possibility penetrate ; and happy shall we be,
if perchance we gain one hint, one transient gleam,
that may bring us a certain measure of content.
What, however, shall not desert us is the honesty
that has hitherto attended our procedure. We shall
not make shift with dreams, and serve up fairy tales,
after the fashion of the so-called post-Kantian
philosophers ; nor shall we, like them, seek, by a
wordy exuberance, to impose upon the reader, arid
cast dust in his eyes. A little is all we promise ;
but that little will be presented in perfect sincerity.
The principle, which we discovered to be the final
explanation of Ethics, now in turn itself requires
explaining ; so that our present problem has to deal
with that natural Compassion, which in every man
is innate and indestructible, and which has been
shown to be the sole source of non-egoistic conduct,
this kind alone being of real moral worth. Now
264
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 265
many modern thinkers treat the conceptions of Good
and Bad as simple, that is, as neither needing, nor
admitting any elucidation, and then they go on, for
the most part, to talk very mysteriously and devoutly
of an " Idea of the Good," out of which they make
a pedestal for their moral system, or at least a cloak
for their poverty. 1 Hence I am obliged in this
connection to point out parenthetically, that these
conceptions are anything but simple, much less a
priori ; that they in fact express a relation, and are
derived from the commonest daily experience. What-
ever is in conformity with the desires of any individual
will, is, relatively to it, termed good ; for instance,
good food, good roads, a good omen ; the contrary is
called bad, and, in the case of living beings, malicious.
And so one, who by virtue of his character, has no
wish to oppose what others strive after, but rather,
as far as he reasonably may, shows himself favourable
and helpful to them ; one, who, instead of injuring,
assists his neighbours, and promotes their interests,
when he can ; is named by the latter, in respect to
themselves, a good man ; the term good being applied
to him in the sense of the above definition, and from
-their own point of view, which is thus relative,
1 The conception of the Good, in its purity, is an ultimate
one, " an absolute Idea, whose substance loses itself in
infinity." (Bouterweck : Praktische Apkorismen, p. 54.)
It is obvious that this writer would like to transform the
familiar, nay, trivial conception " Good " into a sort of AtiVtr*;?,
to be set up as an idol in his temple. [AuVrerjfs- lit., " fallen
from Zeus " ; and so " heaven-sent," " a thing of divine origin."
Of. Horn., II. XVI., 174 ; Od. IV. 477. Eur., Bacch., 1268.
(Translator.)]
266 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
empirical, and centred in the passive subject. Now,
if we examine the nature of such a man, not only
as it affects others, but as it is in itself, we are
enabled by the foregoing exposition to perceive that
the virtues of justice and loving-kindness, which he
practises, are due to a direct participation in weal
and woe external to himself ; and we have learnt
that the source of such participation is Compassion.
If, further, we pause to consider what is the essential
part in this type of character, we shall certainly find
it to lie in the fact that such a person draws less dis-
tinction between himself and others than is usually done.
In the eyes of the malicious individual this
difference is so great that he takes direct delight
in the spectacle of suffering, a delight, which he
accordingly seeks without thought of any other benefit
to himself, nay, sometimes, even to his own hurt.
From the egoist's point of view the same difference is
still large enough to make him bring much trouble on
his neighbours, in order to obtain a small personal
advantage. Hence for both of these, between the
ego, which is limited to their own persons, and the
non-ego, which includes all the rest of the world,
there is fixed a great gulf, a mighty abyss : Pereat
munduSj dum ego salvus sim (the world may perish,
provided I be safe), is their maxim. For the good
man, on the contrary, this distinction is by no means
so pronounced ; indeed, in the case of magnanimous
deeds, it appears to become a vanishing quantity, be-
cause then the weal of another is advanced at the cost
of the benefactor, the self of another placed on an
equality with his own. And when it is a question of
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 267
saving a number of fellow-beings, total self-obliteration
may be developed, the one giving his life for many.
The inquiry now presents itself, whether the latter
way of looking at the relation subsisting between
the ego and the non-ego, which forms the mainspring
of a good man's conduct, is mistaken and due to an
illusion ; or whether the error does not rather attach
to the opposite view, on which Egoism and Malice
are based.
No doubt the theory lying at the root of Egoism
is, from the empirical standpoint, perfectly justified.
From the testimony of experience, the distinction
between one's own person and that of another appears
to be absolute. I do not occupy the same space as
my neighbour, and this difference, which separates
me from him physically, separates me also from his
weal and woe. But in the first place, it should be
observed that the knowledge we have of our own
selves is by no means exhaustive and transparent to
its depths. By means of the intuition, which the
brain constructs out of the data supplied by the
senses, that is to say, in an indirect manner, we
recognise our body as an object in space ; through
an inward perception, we are aware of the continuous
series of our desires, of our volitions, which arise
through the agency of external motives ; and finally,
we come to discern the manifold movements, now
stronger, now weaker, of our will itself, to which
all feelings from within are ultimately traceable.
And that is all : for the perceiving faculty is not in
its turn perceived. On the contrary, the real sub-
stratum of our whole phaenomenal nature, our inmost
268 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
essence in itself, that which wills and perceives, is
not accessible to us. We see only the outward side
of the ego ; its inward part is veiled in darkness.
Consequently, the knowledge we possess of ourselves
is in no sort radical and complete, but rather very
superficial. The larger and more important part of
our being remains unknown, and forms a riddle to
speculate about ; or, as Kant puts it : " The ego
knows itself only as a phaenomenon ; of its real
essence, whatever that may be, it has no knowledge."
Now, as regards that side of the self which falls
within our ken, we are, undoubtedly, sharply dis-
tinguished, each from the other ; but it does not
follow therefrom that the same is true of the re-
mainder, which, shrouded in impenetrable obscurity,
is yet, in fact, the very substance of which we consist.
There remains at least the possibility that the latter
is in all men uniform and identical.
What is the explanation of all plurality, of all
numerical diversity of existence ? Time and Space.
Indeed it is only through the latter that the former
is possible : because the concept " many " inevitably
connotes the idea either of succession (time), or of
relative position (space). Now, since a homogeneous
plurality is composed of Individuals, I call Space and
Time, as being the conditions of multiplicity, the
principium individuationis (the principle of individua-
tion) ; and I do not here pause to consider whether this
expression was exactly so employed by the Schoolmen.
If in the disclosures which Kant's wonderful
acumen gave to the world there is anything true
beyond the shadow of a doubt, this is to be found
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 269
in the Transcendental Aesthetics, that is to say,
in his doctrine of the ideality of Space and Time.
On such solid foundations is the structure built that
no one has been able to raise even an apparent
objection. It is Kant's triumph, and belongs to
the very small number of metaphysical theories which
may be regarded as really proved, and as actual
conquests in that field of research. It teaches us
that Space and Time are the forms of our own
faculty of intuition, to which they consequently
belong, and not to the objects thereby perceived ;
and further, that they can in no way be a condition
of things in themselves, but rather attach only to
their mode of appearing, such as is alone possible
for us who have a consciousness of the external
world determined by strictly physiological limits.
Now, if to the Thing in itself, that is, to the Reality
underlying the kosmos, as we perceive it, Time and
Space are foreign ; so also must multiplicity be.
Consequently that which is objectivated in the count-
less phaenomena of this world of the senses cannot
but be a unity, a single indivisible entity, manifested
in each and all of them. And conversely, the web
of plurality, woven in the loom of Time and Space,
is not the Thing in itself, but only its appearance-
form. Externally to the thinking subject, this appear-
ance-form, as such, has no existence ; it is merely
an attribute of our consciousness, bounded, as the
latter is, by manifold conditions, indeed, depending
on an organic function.
The view of things as above stated, that all
plurality is only apparent, that in the endless series
270 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
of individuals, passing simultaneously and successively
into and out of life, generation after generation,
age after age, there is but one and the same entity
really existing, which is present and identical in all
alike ; this theory, I say, was of course known
long before Kant ; indeed, it may be carried back
to the remotest antiquity. It is the alpha and
omega of the oldest book in the world, the sacred
Vedas, whose dogmatic part, or rather esoteric
teaching, is found in the Upanishads. 1 There, in
almost every page this profound doctrine lies
1 The genineness of the Oupnek'hat has been disputed on
the ground of certain marginal glosses which were added by
Mohammedan copyists, and then interpolated in the text.
It has, however, been fully established by the Sanskrit scholar,
F. H. H. Windischmann (junior) in his Sancara, sive de
Theologumenis Vedanticorum, 1833, p. xix ; and also by
Itochinger in his book De la Vie Contemplative chez les
Indous, 1831, p. 12. The reader though ignorant of Sanskrit,
may yet convince himself that Anquetil Duperron's word
for word Latin translation of the Persian version of the
Upanishads made by the martyr of this creed, the Sultan
Dara-Shukoh, is based on a thorough and exact knowledge
of the language. He has only to compare it with recent
translations of some of the Upanishads by Rammohun Koy,
by Poley, and especially with that of Colebrooke, as also
with Roer's, (the latest). These writers are obviously
groping in obscurity, and driven to make shift with hazy
conjectures, so that without doubt their work is much less
accurate. More will be found on this subject in Vol. II. of
the Parerga, chap. 16, 184. [V. The Upanishads, translated
by Max Muller, in The Sacred Books of the East, Vols. I. and
XV. Of. also Max Muller, The Science of Language, Vol. I.,
p. 171. Now that an adequate translation of the original
exists, the Oupnek'hat has only an historical interest.
The value which Schopenhauer attached to the Upanishads
is very clearly expressed also in the Welt als Wille and
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 271
enshrined ; with tireless repetition, in countless
adaptations, by many varied parables and similes
it is expounded and inculcated. That such was, more-
over, the fount whence Pythagoras drew his wisdom,
cannot be doubted, despite the scanty knowledge we
possess of what he taught. That it formed practically
the central point in the whole philosophy of the
Eleatic School, is likewise a familiar fact. Later
on, the New Platonists were steeped in the same,
one of their chief tenets being : Sia ryv evortjTa
airdvrwv Tracra? -^vya? piav elvai. (All souls are
one, because all things form a unity.) In the ninth
century we find it unexpectedly appearing in Europe.
It kindles the spirit of no less a divine than Johannes
Scotus Erigena, who endeavours to clothe it with the
forms and terminology of the Christian religion.
Among the Mohammedans we detect it again in the
rapt mysticism of the Sufi. 1 In the West Giordano
Bruno cannot resist the impulse to utter it aloud ;
but his reward is a death of shame and torture.
And at the same time we find the Christian Mystics
losing themselves in it, against their own will and
Vorstellung, Preface to the first Edition ; and in the Parerga,
II., chap, xvi., 184. (Translator.)]
1 For the Sufi, more correctly S u f I y a sect which ap-
peared already in the first century of the Hijrah, the reader is
referred to : Tholuck's Bliithensammlung am der Morgen-
landischen Mystik (Berlin, 1825) ; Tholuck's S-dfismits, sive
Theosvphia Persarum Pantheistica (Berlin, 1821); Kremer's
Oeschichte der Herrschenden Ideen des Isldms (Leipzig, 1868) ;
Palmer's Oriental Mysticism (London, 1867) ; Gobineau's Les
Religions et les Philosophies dans VAsie Centrale (2nd edit.
Paris, 1866) ; A Dictionary of Islam, by T. P. Hughes (London,
1885), p. 608 sqq. (Translator.)
272 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
intention, whenever and wherever we read of them 1 l
Spinoza's name is identified with it. Lastly, in onr own
days, after Kant had annihilated the old dogmatism,
and the world stood aghast at its smoking ruins,
the same teaching was revived in Schelling's eclectic
philosophy. The latter took all the systems of
Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant, and Jacob Boehm, and
mixing them together with the results of modern
Natural Science, speedily served up a dish sufficient
to satisfy for the moment the pressing needs of his
contemporaries ; and then proceeded to perform a
series of variations on the original theme. The con-
sequence is that in the learned circles of Germany
this line of thought has come to be generally ac-
cepted ; indeed even among people of ordinary educa-
tion, it is almost universally diffused. 2 A solitary
exception is formed by the University philosophers
of the present day. They have the hard task of
fighting what is called Pantheism. Being brought
1 This is too well-known to need verification by references.
The Gantico del Sole by St. Francis of Assisi sounds almost like
a passage from the Upanishadsor the Bhagavadgit3.
(Translator.)
2 Onpeut assez long temps, chez notre espece,
Fermer la porte a la Raison.
Mais, des qu'elle entre avec adresse,
Elle reste dans la maison,
Et bientot die en est maltresse.
(Voltaire.)
(We men may, doubtless, all our lives
To Reason bar the door.
But if to enter she contrives,
The house she leaves no more,
And soon as mistress there presides.)
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 273
through the stress of battle into great embarrassment
and difficulty, they anxiously catch now at the most
pitiful sophisms, now at phrases of choicest bombast,
so only they may patch together some sort of re-
spectable disguise, wherein to dress up the favourite
petticoat Philosophy, that has duly received official
sanction. In a word, the *Ev teal -rrav l has been in
all ages the laughing-stock of fools, for the wise a
subject of perpetual meditation. Nevertheless, the
strict demonstration of this theory is only to be
obtained from the Kantian teaching, as I have just
shown. Kant himself did not carry it out ; after
the fashion of clever orators, he only gave the
premises, leaving to his hearers the pleasure of
drawing the conclusion.
Now if plurality and difference belong only to the
appearance-form; if there is but one and the same
Entity manifested in all living things : it follows that,
when we obliterate the distinction between the ego
and the non-ego, we are not the sport of an illusion.
Rather are we so, when we maintain the reality of
inclividuation, a thing the Hindus call Maya, 2 that
is, a deceptive vision, a phantasma. The former
theory we have found to be the actual source of the
phaenomenon of Compassion ; indeed Compassion is
nothing but its translation into definite expression.
This, therefore, is what I should regard as the
metaphysical foundation of Ethics, and should describe
1 To tV = the eternal Reality outside Time and Space
To ivav = the phaenomenal universe. (Translator.)
3 May is " the delusive reflection of the true eternal
Entity." (Translator.)
18
274 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
it as the sense which identifies the ego with the
non-ego, so that the individual directly recognises
in another his own self, his true and very being.
From this standpoint the profoundest teaching of
theory pushed to its furthest limits may be shown
in the end to harmonise perfectly with the rules
of justice and loving-kindness, as exercised ; and
conversely, it will be clear that practical philosophers,
that is, the upright, the beneficent, the magnanimous,
do but declare through their acts the same truth
as the man of speculation wins by laborious research,
by the loftiest flights of intellect. Meanwhile moral
excellence stands higher than all theoretical sapience.
The latter is at best nothing but a very unfinished
and partial structure, and only by the circuitous path
of reasoning attains the goal which the former reaches
in one step. He who is morally noble, however
deficient in mental penetration, reveals by his conduct
the deepest insight, the truest wisdom ; and puts to
shame the most accomplished and learned genius, if the
latter's acts betray that his heart is yet a stranger to
this great principle, the metaphysical unity of life.
" Individuation is real. The principium individua-
tioniSj with the consequent distinction of individuals,
is the order of things in themselves. Each living
unit is an entity radically different from all others.
In my own self alone I have my true being ; every-
thing outside it belongs to the non-ego, and is foreign
to me." This is the creed to the truth of which flesh
and bone bear witness : which is at the root of all
egoism, and which finds its objective expression in
every loveless, unjust, or malicious act.
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. "275
" Individuation is merely an appearance, born of
Space and Time ; the latter being nothing else than
the forms under which the external world necessarily
manifests itself to me, conditioned as they are by
my brain's faculty of perception. Hence also the
plurality and diiference of individuals is but a
phaenomenon, that is, exists only as my mental
picture. My true inmost being subsists in every
living thing, just as really, as directly as in my own
consciousness it is evidenced only to myself."
This is the higher knowledge : for which there is
in Sanskrit the standing formula, tat tvam asi, " that
art thou." 1 Out of the depths of human nature it
wells up in the shape of Compassion, and is therefore
the source of all genuine, that is, disinterested
virtue, being, so to say, incarnate in every good
deed. It is this which in the last resort is invoked,
whenever we appeal to gentleness, to loving-kindness ;
whenever we pray for mercy instead of justice. For
such appeal, such prayer is in reality the effort to re-
mind a fellow-being of the ultimate truth that we are
all one and the same entity. On the other hand,
Egoism and its derivatives, envy, hatred, the spirit of
persecution, hardness of heart, revenge, pleasure at the
sight of suffering, and cruelty, all claim support from
the other view of things, and seek their justification in
it. The emotion and joy we experience when we hear
of, still more, when we see, and most of all, when
1 This expression is used in the Brahmanical philosophy
to denote the relation between the world-fiction as a whole
and its individualised parts. V. A. E. Gough, Philosophy of
the Upanishads, 1882. (Translator.)
276 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
we ourselves do, a noble act, are at bottom traceable
to the feeling of certainty such a deed gives, that,
beyond all plurality and distinction of individuals,
which the principium individuationis, like a kaleido-
scope, shows us in ever-shifting evanescent forms,
there is an underlying unity, not only truly existing,
but actually accessible to us ; for lo ! in tangible,
objective form, it stands before our sight.
Of these two mental attitudes, according as the
one or the other is adopted, so the </u?ua (Love) or the
veiKos (Hatred) of Empedocles appears between man
and man. If any one, who is animated by z/et/co?, could
forcibly break in upon his most detested foe, and
compel him to lay bare the inmost recesses of his
heart ; to his surprise, he would find again in the
latter his very self. For just as in dreams, all the
persons that appear to us are but the masked images
of ourselves ; so in the dream of our waking life, it
is our own being which looks on us from out our
neighbours' eyes, though this is not equally easy
to discern. Nevertheless, tat tvam asi.
The preponderance of either mode of viewing life
not only determines single acts ; it shapes a man's
whole nature and temperament. Hence the radical
difference of mental habit between the good character
and the bad. The latter feels everywhere that a
thick wall of partition hedges him off from all others.
For him the world is an absolute non-ego, and his
relation to it an essentially hostile one ; consequently,
the key-note of his disposition is hatred, suspicion,
envy, and pleasure in seeing distress. The good
character, on the other hand, lives in an external
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 277
world homogeneous with his own being ; the rest of
mankind is not in his eyes a non-ego ; he thinks of it
rather as " myself once more." He therefore stands
on an essentially amicable footing with every one :
he is conscious of being, in his inmost nature, akin
to the whole human race, 1 takes direct interest in
their weal and woe, and confidently assumes in their
case the same interest in him. This is the source
of his deep inward peace, and of that happy, calm,
contented manner, which goes out on those around
him, and is as the "presence of a good diffused."
Whereas the bad character in time of trouble has
no trust in the help of his fellow-creatures. If he
invokes aid, he does so without confidence : obtained,
he feels no real gratitude for it ; because he can
hardly discern therein anything but the effect of
others' folly. For he is simply incapable of recognis-
ing his own self in some one else ; and this, even
after it has furnished the most incontestible signs
of existence in that other person : on which fact the
repulsive nature of all unthankfulness in reality de-
pends. The moral isolation, which thus naturally
and inevitably encompasses the bad man, is often the
cause of his becoming the victim of despair. The
good man, on the contrary, will appeal to his neigh-
bours for assistance, with an assurance equal to the
consciousness he has of being ready himself to help
them. As I have said : to the one type, humanity is
a non-ego ; to the other, " myself once more." The
magnanimous character, who forgives his enemy,
1 Homo sum : humani nil a me alienum puto. Terence,
Heaut., I. 1, 25. (Translator.')
278 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
and returns good for evil, rises to the sublime, and
receives the highest meed of praise ; because he
recognises his real self even there where it is most
conspicuously disowned.
Every purely beneficent act all help entirely and
genuinely unselfish, being, as such, exclusively inspired
by another's distress, is, in fact, if we probe the
matter to the bottom, a dark enigma, a piece of
mysticism put into practice ; inasmuch as it springs
out of, and finds its only true explanation in, the
same higher knowledge that constitutes the essence
of whatever is mystical.
For how, otherwise than metaphysically, are we
to account for even the smallest offering of alms made
with absolutely no other object than that of lessening
the want which afflicts a fellow-creatare ? Such an
act is only conceivable, only possible, in so far as
the giver knows that it is his very self which stands
before him, clad in the garments of suffering ; in
other words, so far as he recognises the essential part
of his own being, under a form not his own. 1 It now
becomes apparent, why in the foregoing part I have
called Compassion the great mystery of Ethics.
He, who goes to meet death for his fatherland, has
freed himself from the illusion which limits a man's
existence to his own person. Such a one has broken
the fetters of the principium individuationis. In his
1 It is probable that many, perhaps, most cases of truly
disinterested Compassion when they really occur are due
not to any conscious knowledge of this sort, but to an
unconscious impulse springing from the ultimate unity of all
living things, and acting, so to say, automatically. (Translator.)
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 279
widened, enlightened nature he embraces all his
countrymen, and in them lives on and on. Nay, he
reaches forward to, and merges himself in the genera-
tions yet unborn, for whom he works ; and he regards
death as a wink of the eyelids, so momentary that
it does not interrupt the sight.
We may here sum up the characteristics of the
two human types above indicated. To the Egoist all
other people are uniformly and intrinsically strangers.
In point of fact, he considers nothing to be truly real,
except his own person, and regards the rest of man-
kind practically as troops of phantoms, to whom he
assigns merely a relative existence, so far as they
may be instruments to serve, or barriers to obstruct,
his purposes ; the result being an immeasurable differ-
ence, a vast gulf between Ms ego on the one side, and
the non-ego on the other. In a word, he lives ex-
clusively centred in his own individuality, and on his
death-day he sees all reality, indeed the whole world,
coming to an end along with himself. 1 Whereas the
Altruist discerns in all other persons, nay, in every
living thing, his own entity, and feels therefore that
his being is commingled, is identical with the being
of whatever is alive. By death he loses only a small
part of himself. Putting off the narrow limitations
of the individual, he passes into the larger life of all
mankind, in whom he always recognised, and, recog-
nising, loved, his very self; and the illusion of Time
and Space, which separated his consciousness from
that of others, vanishes. These two opposite modes
1 Cf. Richard Wagner : Jesus von Nazareth ; pp. 79-90.
(Translator.)
280 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
of viewing the world are probably the chief, though
not indeed the sole cause of the difference we find
between very good and exceptionally bad men, as to
the manner in which they meet their last hour.
In all ages Truth, poor thing, has been put to
shame for being paradoxical ; and yet it is not her
fault. She cannot assume the form of Error seated
on his throne of world-wide sovereignty. So then,
with a sigh, she looks up to her tutelary god,
Time, who nods assurance to her of future victory and
glory, but whose wings beat the air so slowly with
their mighty strokes, that the individual perishes
or ever the day of triumph be come. Hence I,
too, am perfectly aware of the paradox which this
metaphysical explanation of the ultimate ethical
phaenomenon must present to Western minds, accus-
tomed, as they are, to very different methods of
providing Morals with a basis. Nevertheless, I cannot
offer violence to the truth. All that is possible
for me to do, out of consideration for European
blindness, is to assert once more, and demonstrate
by actual quotation, that the Metaphysics of Ethics,
which I have here suggested, was thousands of years
ago the fundamental principle of Indian wisdom.
And to this wisdom I point back, as Copernicus did
to the Pythagorean cosmic system, which was sup-
pressed by Aristotle and Ptolemaeus. In the
Bhagavadgita (Lectio XIII. ; 27, 28), according to
A. W. von Schlegel's translation, we find the following
passage : Eundem in omnibus animantibus consis-
tentem summum dominum, istis pereuntibus hand
pereuntem qui cernit, is vere cernit. Eundem vero
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 281
cernens ubique praesentem dominum, non violat semet
ipsum sua ipsius culpa : exinde pergit ad summum
iter. 1
With these hints towards the elaboration of a
metaphysical basis for Ethics I must close, although
an important step still remains to be taken. The
latter would presuppose a further advance in Moral
Science itself ; and this can hardly be made, because
in the West the highest aim of Ethics is reached
in the theory of justice and virtue. What lies
beyond is unknown, or at any rate ignored. The
omission, therefore, is unavoidable ; and the reader
1 That man is endowed with true insight who sees that the
same ruling power is inherent in all things, and that when
these perish, it perishes not. For if he discerns the same
ruling power everywhere present, he does not degrade himself
by his own fault : thence he passes to the highest path. For
the Ehagavadflitd the reader is referred to Vol. VIII. of The
Sacred Books of the East (Oxford : Clarendon Press), where
(p. 105) this passage is translated as follows : " He sees
(truly) who sees the supreme lord abiding alike in all entities,
and not destroyed though they are destroyed. For he who
sees the lord abiding everywhere alike, does not destroy him-
self * by himself, and then reaches the highest goal."
"Not to have true knowledge, is equivalent to self-
destruction."
Of. Fauche : Le Maha-Bharata : Paris, 1867 ; Vol. VII., p.
128:
" Celui-la possede une vue nette des choses, qui voit ce
principe souverain en tous les gtres d'une maniere 6gale, et
leur survivre, quand ils pe>issent. II ne se fait aucum tort
a soi-meme par cette vue d'un principe qui subsiste egalement
partout : puis, apres cette vie, il entre dans la voie superieure."
The obscurity of Schlegel's Latin in the second sentence
is sufficiently removed by these more recent translations.
(Translator.)
282 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
need feel no surprise, if the above slight outline of
the Metaphysics of Ethics does not bring into view
even remotely the corner-stone of the whole meta-
physical edifice, nor reveal the connection of all
the parts composing the Divina Commedia. Such
a presentment, moreover, is involved neither in the
question set, nor in my own plan. A man cannot
say everything in one day, and should not answer
more than he is asked.
He who tries to promote human knowledge and
insight is destined to always encounter the opposition
of his age, which is like the dead weight of some
mass that has to be dragged along : there on the
ground it lies, a huge inert deformity, defying all
efforts to quicken its shape with new life. But such
a one must take comfort from the certainty that,
although prejudices beset his path, yet the truth is
with him. And Truth does but wait for her ally,
Time, to join her ; once he is at her side, she is
perfectly sure of victory, which, if to-day delayed,
will be won to-morrow.
JUDICIUM
EEGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS.
QUAESTIONEM anno 1837 propositam, " utrum philo-
sophiae moralis fons et fundamentum in idea morali-
tatis, quae immediate conscientia contineatur, et ceteris
notionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex ilia prodeant,
eocplicandis quaerenda sint, an in alio cognoscendi
principio" unus tantum scriptor explicare conatus
est, cujus commentationem, germanico sermone com-
positam, et his verbis notatam : " MORAL PREDIGEN
IST LEICHT, MORAL BEGRUNDEN IST SCHWER," praemio
dignam judicare nequivimus. Omisso enim eo, quod
potissimumpostulabatur, hoc expeti putavit, ut princi-
pium aliquod ethicae conderetur, itaque earn partem
commentationis suae, in qua principii ethicae a se
propositi et metaphysicae suae nexum exponit, appen-
dicis loco habuit, in qua plus quam postulatum esset
praestaret, quum tamen ipsum tkema ejusmodi disputa-
tionemjlagitaret t in qua velpraecipuo loco metaphysicae
et ethicae nexus consider aretur. Quod autem scriptor
in sympathia fundamentum ethicae constituere conatus
est, neque ipsa disserendi forma nobis satisfecit, neque
reapse, hoc fundamentum sufficere, evicit ; quin ipse
contra esse confiteri coactus est. Neque reticendum
videtur, plures recentioris aetatis summos philosophos
283
284 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
tarn indecenter commemorari, ut justam et gravem
offensionem habeat.
JUDGMENT OF THE DANISH EOYAL SOCIETY OF
SCIENCES.
In 1837 the following question was set as subject for
a Prize Essay : " Is the fountain and basis of Morals
to be sought for in an idea of morality which lies
directly in the consciousness (or conscience), and in
the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions
which arise from it ? Or is it to be found in some
other source of knowledge ? " There was only one
competitor ; but his dissertation, written in German,
and bearing the motto : " To preach Morality is easy,
to found it is difficult" l we cannot adjudge worthy
of the Prize. He has omitted to deal with the
essential part of the question, apparently thinking
that he was asked to establish some fundamental
principle of Ethics. Consequently, that part of the
treatise, which explains how the moral basis he
proposes is related to his system of metaphysics,
we find relegated to an appendix, as an " opus
supererogationis" although it was precisely the con-
nection between Metaphysics and Ethics that our
question required to be put in the first and foremost
1 The Academy has been good enough to insert the second
" is " on its own account, by way of proving the truth of
Longinus' theory ( V. De Sublimitate : chap. 39, ad fin.\ that
the addition or subtraction of a single syllable is sufficient
to destroy the whole force of a sentence. [ V. Longinus : De
Sublimitate Libellus ; edit. Joannes Vahlen, Bonnae, 1887.
(Translator.*)]
REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS. 285
place. The writer attempts to show that compassion
is the ultimate source of morality ; but neither does
his mode of discussion appear satisfactory to us, nor
has he, in point of fact, succeeded in proving that
such a foundation is adequate. Indeed he himself
is obliged to admit that it is not. 1 Lastly, the Society
cannot pass over in silence the fact that he mentions
several recent philosophers of the highest standing
in an unseemly manner, such as to justly occasion
serious offence.
1 I suppose this is the meaning of contra esse confiteri.
(Translator.)
Uncharted Knowledge
Wisdom From Previous Realities
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