TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION
IN 1837 the Danish Royal Society of Sciences propounded, as subject for a prize competition, the
question with which this treatise opens ; and Schopenhauer, who was glad to seize the opportunity of
becoming better known, prepared, and sent to Copenhagen, the earliest form of " The Basis of Morality." In January, 1840, the work was pronounced unsuccessful, though there was no other candidate. In
September of the same year it was published by
the author, with only a few unimportant additions,
but preceded by a long introduction, which, cast
in the form of an exceedingly caustic philippic, is,
in its way, a masterpiece. In 1860, (only a month
before Schopenhauer's death,) the second edition was
printed with many enlargements and insertions, the
short preface, dated August being one of the last
things he wrote.
The reason why the prize was withheld is not far to seek, and need not detain us. At that time the philosophical atmosphere was saturated with Hegel, and, to a certain extent, with Fichte ; hence it is easy to imagine with what ruffled, not to say, scandalised feelings the Academy must have risen from its perusal of the work. Moreover, putting Hegel and Fichte out of the question, the position advanced was in 1840 so new, indeed so paradoxical (as Schopenhauer himself admits) ; there is at times such an aggressiveness in the style ; the whole essay is so much more calculated to startle than to conciliate; that we cannot feel much surprise at the official decision.
In the Judgment published by the Society three
reasons are given for its unfavourable attitude. The
second is declared to be not only dissatisfaction with
the mode of discussion (ipsa disserendi forma), but
also inability to see that Schopenhauer proves his
case. As the third is alleged the "unseemly"
language employed in connection with certain "summi philosophi" (Hegel and Fichte). These two objections are of course in themselves perfectly legitimate,
and how far the Academy was right or wrong may
be left for the reader to determine.
But the first reason stated is of a different kind,
and affords as neat an instance of self-stultification
proceeding ex cathedra as can well be found. It is
true that the question is worded vaguely enough, but
if it means anything, it asks where the "philosophiae
moralis Jons et fundamentum" the foundation of
moral science is to be sought for, i.e., where it is
to be found. Turning to the Judgment we read :
" He " (Schopenhauer) " has omitted to deal with
the essential part of the question, apparently thinking
that he was required to establish some fundamental principle of Ethics " : which he was required to do,
unless the Society's Latin is borrowed from Ne<a\o-
KOKtcisyia. And then it goes on to declare that he
treated as secondary, indeed as an opus supererogationis,
the very thing which the Academy intended should
occupy the first place, namely, the connection between
Metaphysics and Ethics. But the "metaphysicae et
ethicae nexus," so far from being formulated in the
question as the chief point to be considered, is not
even mentioned! The Society thus denies having
asked what it actually did ask, while the discussion,
which it asserts was specially indicated, is not
suggested by a single word. Its embarrassment is
sufficiently shown by this unworthy shifting, to
enlarge upon which would here be out of place.
It is not intended to offer any criticism either
on Schopenhauer's main position in this essay, or
on the various side-issues involved. The reader is
supposed to be accurately acquainted with the fundamentals of his philosophy, as contained in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellurig, and is invited to be
the critic himself. But perhaps a few remarks on
the structure and general trend of the work may
not be amiss.
After preliminary considerations, partly to show the difficulty of the subject, partly to clear the ground (Part I.), the treatise opens with a searching critique of Kant's Ethical Basis, of the Leading Principle of his system, and of its derived forms. (Part II., Chapters I. -VI.) Schopenhauer's conclusion is that the Categorical Imperative is a very cleverly woven web, yet in reality nothing but the old theological basis in disguise, the latter being the indispensable, if invisible, clothes' peg for the former ; and that Kant's tour de main of deducing his Moral Theology from Ethics is like inverting a pyramid. The theory of Conscience is next discussed (Chapter VII.). The half-supernatural element which Kant introduced under the highly dramatic form of a court of justice holding ing secret session in the breast, is examined, and eliminated ; and Conscience is defined as the knowledge that we have of ourselves through our acts.
But if, so far, the result obtained is distinctly
unfavourable to Kant, Schopenhauer is glad to agree
with him on one point, namely, the theory of Freedom,
to a brief notice of which he now passes (Chapter
VIII.). He points out that the solution of this question
is found in the doctrine of the coexistence of Liberty
and Necessity : according to which the basis of our
nature, the so-called Intelligible Character, that lies
outside the forms attaching to phaenomena, namely,
Time, Space, and Causality, is transcendentally free ;
while the Empirical Character, together with the whole person, being, as a phaenomenon, the transient objectivation of the Intelligible Character, under the laws of
the principium individuationis, is strictly determined.
Part II. closes with a sufficiently amusing examination of Fichte (Chapter IX.). His proper function is shown to be that of a magnifying glass for Kant.
By means of this powerful human lens we can see
the monstrous shapes into which the Kantian pet
creations are capable of developing. Thus we find the
Categorical Imperative become a Despotic Imperative,
the " Absolute Ought " grown into a fathomless inscrutable Eifj,ap/jLwr), etc.
With Part III. we reach the positive part of the
work. Schopenhauer begins (Chapter I.) by emphasising the necessity of finding a basis for Ethics
that appeals, not to the intellect, but to the intuitive
perception. Such (he says) can never be any
artificial formula, which surely crumbles to powder
beneath the rough touch of real life ; rather must
it be something springing out of the heart of things,
and therefore lying at the root of man's nature. But
is there, he asks (Chapter II.), after all, such a thing
as natural morality ? Is anything good ever done
absolutely without an egoistic motive? The conclusion arrived at is that, although much may be,
and has been, at all times, said in favour of the
Sceptical View, and although this view is in fact true as regards the greater number of apparently
unselfish acts, yet there can be no doubt that truly
moral conduct does occur, that deeds of justice and
loving-kindness are occasionally performed without
the smallest hope of reward, or fear of punishment
involved in their omission. The last paragraph of
this chapter is important because it puts in the
clearest light what, according to Schopenhauer, is
the end of Ethics. Its aim, he says, is not to treat
of that which people ought to do (for " ought " has no
place except in theological Morals, whether explicit,
or implicit) ; but l: to point out all the varied moral
lines of human conduct ; to explain them ; and to
trace them to their ultimate source." This definition,
which assigns no educative function to Ethics, strictly
agrees with the doctrine of the unchangeableness
of character. (F. Chapter IX. of this Part.)
Our philosopher then proceeds to show (Chapter III.)
that there are two fundamental " antimoral " incentives in man's nature : Egoism and Malice. Be
it, however, here remarked that a still simpler
classification would reduce these two to one. Malice
may well be regarded as nothing but Egoism carried
to its extreme, developed to gigantic proportions. It
is a distinct source of gratification to certain natures
to witness the suffering of another ; because a diminution of the latter' s capacity for action, whether effected
by itself, or not, is regarded by an ego of this kind
as an increase of its own power to do as it likes, as
an enhancement of its own glorification.
In Chapter IV. the ultimate test of truly moral conduct is explained to be the absence of all egoistic motivation ; and in Chapters V.-VIL, by a process
of careful reasoning, every human act is traced to
one of three original springs, namely, (1) Egoism,
(2) Malice, and (3) Compassion ; or to a combination
of (1) and (3), or (1) and (2). Of these the third
is shown to be the only counter-motive to the first
and second, and in fact the sole source of the two
cardinal virtues, justice and loving-kindness, which
are explained as the manifestation of Compassion
in a lower, and a higher, degree, respectively. In
the course of the demonstration the question as to
how far a lie is legitimate comes incidentally under
discussion ; as also the theory of Duty ; duties being
defined as "actions, the simple omission of which
constitutes a wrong." (Cf. Part II., Chapter III.)
The position now reached, namely, that Compassion
is the one and only fount of true morality, because
it is the sole non-egoistic source of action, is (says
Schopenhauer) a strange paradox ; hence the testimony
of experience and of universal human sentiment is
appealed to, in confirmation of it, under nine different
considerations (Chapter VIII.). They are as follows :
(1) An imaginary case.
(2) Cruelty, which means the maximum deficiency
in Compassion, is the mark of the deepest moral
depravity. Therefore the real moral incentive must
"be Compassion.
(3) Compassion is the only thoroughly effective
spring of moral conduct.
(4) Limitless Compassion for all living things is
the surest and most certain token of a really good
man.
(5) The evidence of separate matters of detail.
(6) Compassion is more easily discerned in its higher
power ; it is more obviously the root of loving-kindness-
than of justice.
(7) Compassion does not stop short with men ;
it 'includes all living beings.
(8) Considered simply from the empirical point of
view, Compassion is the best possible antidote to
Egoism, no less than the most soothing balsam for
the world's inevitable suffering.
(9) Rousseau's testimony is quoted, as well as.
passages from the Paiiea-tantra, Pausanias, Lucian,
Stobaeus, and Lessing ; and reference is made to
Chinese Ethics and Hindu customs.
Part III. closes (Chapter IX.) with an inquiry into
the Ethical Difference of Character. The theory that
this difference is innate and immutable is supported
by numerous extracts from various writers of all
periods, and illustrated in many ways. But all the
evidence accumulated hardly amounts to more than
so many hints and indications, and the matter (says
Schopenhauer) was only satisfactorily explained by
Kant's doctrine of the Intelligible and Empirical Character. (Cf. Part II., Chapter VIII.) According
to this, the ethical difference between man and man
is an original and ultimate datum, caused by the
transcendentally free act of the Intelligible Character,
that is, the Will, as Thing in itself, outside phaeno-
mena ; the Empirical Character being, so to say,
the reflection of the Intelligible, mirrored through
the functions of our perceptive faculty, namely, Time,.
Space, and Causality. Hence the former, while
manifested in plurality and difference of acts, yet
necessarily always wears the same unchangeable
features, inasmuch as it is but the appearance-form
of the unity behind. If the reader asks why " the
essential constitution of the Thing in itself under-
lying the phaenomenon " is so enorrnousty different
in different individuals, it can only be said that our
intellect, conditioned, as it is, by the laws of Causality,
Space, and Time, has no power to deal with noumena,
its range being limited to phaeaomena ; and that
therefore this question is one of those which have
no conceivable answer. (Cf. Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung, vol. ii., chap. 50., Epiphilosophie.)
The discussion now terminated points to the
conclusion that nine-tenths, or perhaps nineteen-
twentieths, of what we do is, more or less, due
to Egoism, conscious or unconscious ; while acts of
real morality, that is, of unselfish justice and pure
loving-kindness (admitting that they occur) are to
be attributed to Compassion, that is, the sense of
suffering with another. Nor is the principle of
Altruism new. It is as old as man himself. All
the rare and sensitive natures in the world have
given utterance to it, each in his own way. Like a
golden thread it runs from the earliest Indian literature
to George Eliot, to Tolstoi ; and every day, for un-
numbered ages, " from youth to eld, from sire to
son," in lowly dwellings and in princes' palaces, it
has been unawares translated into action.
And if we may forecast the future from the past,
it would appear that in all the stormy seas yet to
be traversed by the human race, before its little day
is spent, Compassion will ever be the surest guide
to better things ; and that the light of knowledge
illuminating the path, whereby the world may become
relatively happier, will always vary directly as man's
susceptibility to its promptings : for "Durch Mitleid
wissend" is not truer of Parsifal than of all other
saviours.
In the fourth Part of the treatise Schopenhauer
attempts the metaphysical explanation of Compassion,
which for those, who still think that Metaphysics is
something more than a pseudo-science of the past--like Alchemy or Astrology--will have special
interest.
It should be observed (as is pointed out in our author's
Preface to the first edition) that the line of thought
followed does not belong to any particular meta-
physical school, but to many ; being in fact a principle
at the root of the oldest systems in the world, and
traceable in one form or another down to Kant. As
in the dawn of history it was our own Aryan fore-
fathers, who divined with subtle intuition the ideality
of Time and Space ; so in the fulness of the ages
it was reserved for another Aryan of Scotch descent
to formulate the same in exact language. Now, by
the vast majority of men the ideality of the principium
individuationis is undoubtedly either not consciously
realised at all, or else but dimly perceived under
the form of allegories and mythologies. Yet, if this
theory be true, if individuation be only a phaenomenon
depending on the subjectivity of Time and Space,
then Compassion, and its external expression, the
ajaTTij that is greater than Faith and Hope, receive
their final explanation. And every evdavaata ; every
word that vibrates in harmony with the inspired
rhapsody of 1 Corinthians xiii. ; every act of genuine
justice, or of true loving-kindness, done by man to
man, as well as the uplifting emotion which stirs
our hearts at the sight of such conduct :--all these
things become fraught with a new and luminous
significance : the secret writing is interpreted, its
deepest meaning disclosed.
Moreover, the " thou shalt," and the " thou shalt
not," no less of the various theologies than of the
Categorical Imperative, may from this point of view
be accounted for, on the ground of the identity of man, so far as he is noumenal, with the transcendental Reality behind phaenomena. The crude threats of
punishment and promises of reward, the stern Moral
Law, poised in mid air, these hypotheses, and all
their varieties (whose function is in reality nothing
else but to check Egoism), are seen to be due to the
intellect's imperfect comprehension of, or rather,
its vague groping after, the transcendental unity of
life, however individualised and differentiated as a
phaenomenon in Time and Space. It thus becomes
apparent that the position developed by Schopenhauer
in the third and fourth parts of the Essay is not so
much destructive, as explanatory, of the usual theories,
which, if once the former be fully grasped, lose
themselves in it as stars and moon in the light of
day. They are at once interpreted, and shown to
be no longer of importance. Similarly, all the
religions of the world, " which are the Metaphysics
of the people," find their raison d'etre in the same
doctrine. The theory of an external bjfuovprfa takes
its place as the natural mode of denoting, in children's
language, the internal metaphysical Entity, whose
appearance-form, in terms of our consciousness, is
called the Universe. The circle is completed ; the
discords vanish, and an ultimate harmony is reached.
And so over the thrice-tangled skein of phaenominal
existence a simplifying and integrating light is shed,
showing that the irav is but the reflection of the
ev, under the forms of our faculty of perception,
namely, Time, Space, and Causality forms, which
necessarily imply plurality and change, on which,
again, in the last resort the Welt-Schmerz depends.
"The One remains, the many change and pass;
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity,
Until Death tramples it to fragments."
"What an unspeakable gain," says Richard
Wagner, "we should bring to those who are terrified
by the threats of the Church, and, on the other hand, to those who are reduced to despair by our physicists, if we could quicken the noble edifice of 'Love, Faith, and Hope,' with a clear consciousness of the ideality of the world, conditioned by the laws of Space and Time, which form the sole basis of our perceptive capacity! In that case all anxious inquiries as to a 'Where' and 'When' of the 'other world' would be understood to be only answerable by a blissful smile. For, if there is a solution to these questions, which seem of such boundless importance, our philosopher has given it with incomparable precision and beauty in the following sentence, which, to a certain extent, is only a corollary to the definition of the ideality of Time and Space: 'Peace, Rest, and Bliss dwell only there where there is no where, and no when." (V. Schopenhauer : Parerga, and Paralipomena, vol. ii., chap. 3, 30 bis.)
Footnotes
Uncharted Knowledge
Wisdom From Previous Realities
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